J.L.

SHAW

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A

AND THE ADVAITA VEDANTA

SENTENCE: THE NYAYA

INTRODUCTION

Usually the cognition of words, the memory cognition of objects, the

cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, syntactic
anks
. a),
semantic compatibility
expectancy between the words (ak
contiguity of words in space and time (asatti)

and the inten(yogyata),

tion of the speaker (tatparyaj

nana)
are considered as causal conditions
for understanding the meaning of a sentence. As there is a difference
of opinion among Indian philosophers with respect to the referent or
the meaning of a word, so there is a difference of opinion with respect
to the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The
aim of this paper is (i) to explain the Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta
conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, (ii) to claim
that the Vedanta view complements the Nyaya view and vice versa, and
(iii) to discuss the nature of understanding the meaning of a complex
sentence. Both the followers of the Nyaya and the Vedanta have used
anks
. a,
asatti

yogyata,
and tatparya,
but not in
the expression ak

the same sense. The Vedanta philosophers claim that akanks. a, yogyata,

are conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence,

and asatti
while the Nyaya philosophers claim that their cognitions are necessary
for understanding the meaning of a sentence.
As regards the interpretation of these terms, there is difference of
opinion between the followers of the Nyaya and the Vedanta. Moreover,
the New Nyaya differs from the Old Nyaya with respect to the interpretation of certain terms. As regards the (primary) meaning or the reference

and the meaning relation which relates an expresof a word (padartha)

sion (or word) to its referent, there is a striking difference between
these two systems of philosophy. According to the followers of the
Vedanta the meaning of a common noun or a general term such as
cow is the related cowness. In other words, the meaning of a term is
the universal being related to something else. According to the New
Nyaya the meaning of the word cow includes both the particular cows
Journal of Indian Philosophy 28: 273293, 2000.
c 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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J.L. SHAW

and the universal cowness, although the Old Nyaya has included the
configuration of the particular cows as well in the meaning complex. But
neither the Old nor the New Nyaya has accepted the related designation

ana)
theory of meaning.
(anvitabhidh
Similarly, the Vedanta differs from the Nyaya with respect to the
relation between an expression and what is referred to by it. According
to the Nyaya the meaning relation which is called sakti in the case
of primary meaning is due to the intention of the name giver. Hence
it is a conventional relation and it takes the form Let such and such
expression generate the cognition of such and such object or objects.
But the followers of the Vedanta consider the meaning relation (sakti)

The sakti of an expression has been explained

to be an entity (padartha).
in terms of certain effects. As fire has the capacity to burn something,
so a word (pada) has the capacity which is conducive to the generation
of understanding the meaning of a sentence.
According to our positive thesis a comprehensive discussion of the
conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence would include
the conditions of both the Nyaya and the Vedanta philosophers. Hence
these two systems in this case, far from being incompatible, would
complement each other. At the end of this paper I shall discuss the
atomistic and the holistic nature of understanding the meaning of
a complex sentence. Moreover, since Indian philosophers have put
forward a theory for understanding the meaning of complex sentences,
a consideration of their contributions might add a new dimension to
contemporary Western philosophy.

As regards the understanding of the meaning of a sentence, both the

schools claim that it lies in cognising a relation between the referents
of the words which have occurred in a sentence. According to both the
schools the same relation may be cognised in other types of cognition
such as perceptual or inferential. In other words, the same object may
be cognised in perceptual, inferential, or verbal cognition, but not in
the same way. The causal conditions of these cognitions would not
be the same. The set of causal conditions for each of them would be
different. Moreover, the mode under which an object is cognised in a
perceptual cognition cannot be the same as the mode under which it is
cognised in an inferential or verbal cognition.
Let us consider the cognition of a mountain having fire. In a perceptual
cognition the sense-organs are related to the mountain, fire and the

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

275

relation between them of conjunction. The mountain which is related

to our senses is presented under the universal mountainhood, and its
particularity (vises. atva) is also cognised. Similar is the case with fire or
the relation of conjunction. But in an inferential or a verbal cognition,
while the same mountain can be cognised under the mode of the universal
mountainhood, its particularity (vises. atva) will not be cognised. Similar
will be the case with fire and the relation of conjunction. In other words,
in a verbal cognition corresponding to the sentence A mountain has
fire, we cannot cognise the particularities of the mountain such as its
height. Similarly, we cannot cognise the particular properties of the fire
or the conjunction relation.
Now the question is whether the sentence A mountain has fire
would generate the cognition of the relation between any mountain and
any fire or between a particular mountain and the fire which is present
there. Suppose a, b, c are mountains, d is the kitchen, and F, G, H are
fires. Further suppose the following sentences are true.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

a has F
b has absence of fire
c has G
d has H

Now the question is whether the sentence A mountain has fire would
give rise to the cognition of a has G or a has H, in addition to the
cognition of a has F or c has G. Since a is not related to G or H, the
sentence would not generate the cognition of a has G or a has H. Hence
the sentence A mountain has fire would generate the cognition of a has
F or c has G only. Now suppose fire is not present in any mountain, but
present in the kitchen only. The sentence A mountain has fire would
generate an erroneous cognition of a mountain being characterised by
the fire which is present in the kitchen only. In other words, the fire
which is related to the kitchen by the relation of conjunction is cognised
in a mountain. Hence the sentence would generate at least one of the
following cognitions:
(i) a being characterised by H
(ii) b being characterised by H
(iii) c being characterised by H
This is how different erroneous cognitions can be generated in different
hearers by a sentence which is false.
As regards the nature of a sentence there is agreement among the
followers of both the Nyaya and the Vedanta. A sentence is an order
n-tuple such that n 2 morphemes or meaningful expressions. A

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J.L. SHAW

sequence of morphemes having mutual syntactic expectancy would

constitute a sentence. Hence expressions, such as cooks, is cooking,

(pacati), cooks rice (tan. d. ulam

. pacati), Rama cooks rice (Ramas
tan. d. ulam
. pacati), would be considered sentences. Let us explain the
meaning of a simple sentence such as John is tall. The utterance of
this sentence would generate a cognition of the relation between the
objects referred to by the words John and tall. Since each of the
terms is meaningful or non-empty, each of them would generate the
memory cognition of its referent if the hearer knows its referent. This
is due to the fact that if two entities are related by a relation and if
the hearer knows this relation and cognises one of the terms, then the
memory-cognition of the other will be generated. Now let us consider
the sentence cooks (pacati). Since it consists of the words cook
(pac) and s (ti), it is treated as a sentence.
It is to be noted that according to the Nyaya verbal and nominal
suffixes are words (padas). In this example the word cook (pac) is
characterised by the property of being the immediate predecessor of
the word s (ti) and the latter by the property of being the immediate
anks
. a
successor of the word cook. When it is said that there is ak
between them, what is meant is that the order between them is conducive
to understanding the relation between the referents of the words cook
(pac) and s (ti). Since the word cook refers to cooking activity
and the suffix s refers to mental effort or mental preparedness (kr. titva
or kartr. tva), the expression cooks would give rise to the cognition of

which will relate cooking activity to mental

conduciveness (anukulatva)
anks
. a
is defined in terms of the properties
effort. Hence the word ak
of a sequence (an ordered n-tuple, where n 2) and the ability of
this sequence to generate the cognition of a relation which will relate
the referents of the second term (pratiyogin) to the referent of the
not simply ak

anks
. a,
anks
. a,
first term (anuyogin). The cognition of ak
is considered as a causal condition for understanding the meaning of
a sentence as distinct from the meanings of the words which have
occurred in a sentence such as cooks. The cognition of the words and
the memory-cognition of their referents or meanings are also causal
conditions for understanding the relation between the referents.

According to the New Nyaya the cognition of a word (padajnana)

is a karan. a (special instrumental cause) and the memory cognition
ara
(operation) of understanding the
of the referent of a word is a vyap
meaning of a sentence. But according to the Old Nyaya the karan. a is the

anapada).
There is an
cognised word or the words cognition (jnayam

anapada)
important difference between the cognised word (jnayam

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

277

In the former case the

and the cognition of a word (padajnana).
word is the qualificand (vises. ya) and the cognition is its qualifier
(vises. an. a). If the word is not present, there cannot be word cognition

anapada).
Hence the presence of the word is necessary for its
(jnayam
cognition. This theory cannot explain the understanding of the meaning
of a sentence which is due to the memory-cognition of the words which
have been apprehended in the past. Sometimes memory-cognitions of
words are due to inscriptions, or gesture and posture. For this reason
the New Nyaya considers the cognition of a word as a karan. a (special
instrumental cause). In the technical language of the Nyaya karan. a and
ara
may be defined in the following way:
vyap

(A) x is a karan. a of the effect E Df x is a causal condition, x is related

to the locus of E through an operation, and it is considered as a
cause due to this relation only.
ara
of the effect E Df (Ey) (y is a cause or a set of
(B) x is a vyap
causes of E and x is a cause of E, but x is due to y).
From the above discussion it also follows that the memory-cognition
of the referent of a word depends upon the cognition of the relation
between a word and its referent, and upon the cognition of the word.
Now it may be asked whether the cognition of the word which is a
karan. a presupposes the cognition of the relation between them. In
reply, it may be said that usually the cognition of the relation between
a word and its referent precedes the cognition of the word which is a
causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. But one
may cognise the relation after cognising the word. What is required is
the cognition of both the conditions for the memory-cognition of the
referent. Hence the order between these two conditions is not necessary.
anks
. a in the expression
Now it may be asked whether there is ak
anks
. a in cook + s, there
s + cook i.e. scook. Since there is ak
anks
. a in its converse as well. Hence s + cook may be
should be ak
anks
. a
treated as a sentence. On this point the Nyaya claims that ak
cannot be identified with any sequence. It is a fact that both cook +
anks
. a is not defined in terms
s and s + cook are sequents. But ak
of sequence alone. The sequence which is conducive to understanding
anks
. a.
Since the sequence s + cook
the meaning of a sentence has ak
anks
. a.
On
is not conducive to understanding its meaning, it has no ak
this point one may raise the following objection. If b is related to a by
the relation R and we can cognise the relation of b to a, then a must
Since
be related to b by the converse of R and we can cognise bRa.
cook + s generates the cognition of relation of the referent of cook
to the referent of s, s + cook should also generate the cognition of

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J.L. SHAW

the converse of this relation. On this point the followers of the Nyaya
would claim that since there is no convention for the use of s + cook in
our ordinary language, it is not treated as a sentence. From this it does
not follow that the converse relation in question cannot be cognised. In
order to cognise this relation we have to use a sentence such as The

This
relation of mental effort (kr. ti) to the activity of cooking (paka).
relation is called prayojyatva (the converse of conduciveness).
From the above discussion it follows that the sequences which are
anks
. a.

considered as well-formed in our ordinary language have ak

Since there is no use of sequences such as s + cook, they do not have
anks
. a.
anks
. a coincides with the concept of
Hence the concept of ak
ak
well-formedness. In other words, the sequences which are in accordance
anks
. a.
Therefore,
with the rules of formation or transformation have ak
the ordered n-tuples which are in accordance with the rules of language
are considered sentences.
According to the Old Nyaya, the cognition of yogyata is another
causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. In this
means the relation of the qualifier (vises. an. a)
context the word yogyata
to the qualificand (vises. ya). Let us consider the sentence a has F. The
word a would generate the memory-cognition of a under a mode (say
m) and the word F would generate the memory-cognition of F under
a mode (say n). Suppose there are three types of relation, namely, R,
S, T, and the relation which relates F to a comes under the type T. If
we know that neither R nor S relates F to a, then the sentence a is F
would generate the cognition of am TFn . But the sentence would not
generate the cognition of the specific relation with its particularity. The
relation T which relates F to a will be cognised under a description.
Hence it may be expressed by the definite description The T which
relates F to a. In other words, the T will not be cognised as a mode

of F.
of presentation (prakara)

The Old Nyaya also claims that a doubt-free cognition (niscayatmaka

of T or a dubious cognition (sam

s
ay
atmaka
j
n
ana)
of
T
is a
jnana)
.
causal condition for cognising the meaning of the sentence a is F. If
it is a dubious cognition, then it is expressed by the sentence Is a F
or not F? If it is doubt-free, then it is expressed by a is F. Since a
which could
verbal cognition is always doubt-free, the yogyata jnana
be dubious cannot be equated with it. Now it may be asked whether the
verbal cognition can be identified with the cognition of yogyata if the
latter is non-dubious. On this point the Old Nyaya would claim that the
cognition of yogyata is never cognised as doubt-free even if it is nondubious. In other words, it is presented under the mode of cognitionhood

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

279

not under the mode of certainty (niscayatva). But the verbal

(jnanatva),
cognition is presented under the mode of certainty. In other words,
. atavacchedaka)

the limitor of the property of being the cause (karan

is

cognitionhood (jnanatva), but the limitor of the property of being the

avacchedaka)
is certainty (niscayatva), Hence there is no
effect (karyat

circularity in accepting the cognition of yogyata.

Moreover, we can have a true or a false verbal cognition from a
Similarly, we can have a true or
non-dubious cognition of yogyata.
If the
a false verbal cognition from a dubious cognition of yogyata.
verbal cognition is true, then its cause would be the true cognition
of yogyata (relation). The cause of the latter could be a previous true
perceptual or inferential cognition of it. If its cause is some previous
then the cause of the latter would be some
verbal cognition of yogyata,
previous perceptual or inferential cognition.
If the verbal cognition corresponding to our sentence a has F is false,
then its cause would be the false cognition of yogyata (relation). The
latter could be some previous false perceptual or inferential cognition.
If it is also verbal, then its cause would be some other false perceptual
or inferential cognition about the same object.
Now the question is whether the sentence He irrigates the field with
fire would generate any verbal cognition. The followers of the Old
Nyaya claim that since there is neither a dubious nor a non-dubious
cognition of the relation, this sentence cannot generate a verbal cognition.
On this point the followers of the New Nyaya claim that it is due to
the fact that there is a preventer cognition. In other words, we have
a cognition that fire has the absence of irrigation. That is to say, we
know that one cannot irrigate the field with fire. Since the presence
of a preventer cognition can explain the non-occurrence of a verbal
cognition from this sentence, there is no need to consider the absence
of a dubious or a non-dubious cognition of it (He irrigates the field with
fire) as a causal condition. Moreover, since the absence of a preventer
cognition is a common causal condition for the occurrence of any other
type of cognition, the acceptance of it would satisfy the principle of
parsimony. Hence the view of the Old Nyaya multiplies the number
of conditions. The followers of the New Nyaya interpret yogyata as

Badha
refers to a preventer cognition. If F
the absence of badha.
is related to a by the relation R, then the doubt-free cognition of F

In other words, it
not being related to a by the relation R is badha.
would be a contrary or a contradictory cognition. The absence of it is
Hence according to the new Nyaya, yogyata,
not the cognition
yogyata.
is a causal condition for verbal cognition.
of yogyata,

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J.L. SHAW

Furthermore, the followers of the New Nyaya do not rule out the
possibility of cognising a new relation in a verbal cognition, which has
not been cognised before. In such cases the relation is cognised in its
generic feature. If it is a relation of conjunction, then it is cognised under
the mode of conjunctionhood, not under the mode of its particularity
(vises. atva), although it has not been cognised before. According to the
New Nyaya, the causal condition for cognising it in a verbal cognition
anks
. a (syntactic expectancy between the
would be the cognition of ak
words). Hence the view of the Old Nyaya may be rejected on the ground
of inadequacy and the violation of the principle of simplicity.
Now let us discuss whether a contradictory sentence or its denial
can generate a cognition in a hearer or a speaker. According to the
Nyaya philosophers, both old and new, a contradictory or a contrary
sentence does not generate a cognition as it has no yogyata (semantic
anks
. a
compatibility). Since it is considered as a sentence, it has ak
(syntactic expectancy). Hence it is a well-formed formula. The relation
between the cognition generated by p and the cognition generated by
not p is called preventer-prevented. In other words, the occurrence
of the former prevents the occurrence of the latter and vice versa.
According to the Nyaya there is no contradiction in reality as well
as in thought, although contradictory expressions are sentences. Now
it may be asked, why should we consider contradictory or contrary
expressions as sentences? The Nyaya might claim that since the denial
of a contradiction is an analytic or an identity sentence which is true,
a contradiction may be considered as a sentence. Let us consider the
following sentences:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

This brown table is not brown.

This brown table is brown.
John is not John.
John is John.

According to the Nyaya (a) is a contradiction. Hence it cannot generate

a unified cognition. The expression this brown table would generate
a cognition and the expression not brown would generate a cognition, but the entire sentence would not generate a cognition. In other
words, there is no unified cognition such that this brown table is
the qualificand and the absence of brown colour is the qualifier. As
regards (b), it is claimed by the followers of the Nyaya that it cannot
generate a cognition as the limitor of the property of being the qualifier

is part of the limitor of the property of being

(vises. an. atavacchedaka)

According to the Nyaya if the

the qualificand (vises. yatavaccedaka).
former is not contained in the latter or is not identical with the latter,

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

281

then a cognition can be generated. Since in (d) they are identical, it

cannot also generate a cognition. Since (c) is a contradiction, it cannot
generate a cognition. Hence two types of argument may be put forward
against the generation of verbal cognition. One type of argument would
be applicable to contrary or contradictory sentences. Another type of
argument would be applicable to identity sentences.
Against the second type it may be said that the limitor of qualifier1
of an identity or analytic sentence is neither identical with the limitor
of the qualificand nor is it contained in it. Since the relation of the
qualifier to the qualificand is also a limitor of the qualifier, the set of
the limitors of the qualifier is neither identical with nor contained in the
set of the limitors of the qualificand. In reply the Nyaya philosophers
would argue that by the word limitor they mean property-limitors
only. Even if the objection can be avoided in this way, the fact remains
that there are two types of rules for two types of sentences. The type
of rule for contradictory sentences can be substantiated in terms of the
ontological claim that there is no contradiction in reality. Hence there
is no contradiction at the level of thought or in the content of thought.
In other words, we cannot think of a contradiction. On the contrary, in
favour of identity sentences it may be said that the ontological claim is
that everything has its own identity. Hence every sentence of the form
a is a is true.
On this point it may be proposed that since a contradiction cannot
generate a cognition, its negation which is an analytic sentence also
cannot generate a cognition. If we do not accept this, then we have
to put some restriction on the use of not and thereby the law of
parsimony would be violated. Hence the claim is that both the types
of expression are sentences and meaningful, but neither of them would
generate any cognition. Now it may be asked: If they cannot generate
cognitions, then how can we know their truth-values? On this point
the followers of the Nyaya have given an ingenious reply. In order to
know the truth of an identity sentence such as John is John it is not
a requirement that it must generate a cognition. In order to know the
truth of John is John what we need to know is the truth of a sentence
about John, such as John is tall or John exists. Since there is an
entailment relation, the latter would establish the former. As regards
a contradictory sentence such as John is not John, we know it to be
false when we come to know the truth of the sentence John is John.
From the above discussion of yogyata it follows that there is no
one-to-one relation between the members of the sets corresponding
anks
. a
The set which corresponds to yogyata

and yogyata.
to ak

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J.L. SHAW

anks
. a.
It also
is a proper subset of the set which corresponds to ak
follows that the Nyaya has avoided two extreme positions present in
contemporary philosophy. According to one of them a contradictory
expression is meaningless.2 Hence it cannot be treated as a sentence
or well-formed expression. Therefore, an analytic sentence which is
a negation of a contradiction has no meaning. According to the other
both the types of expression are meaningful sentences and we can
understand their meanings. Hence the Nyaya philosophers have avoided
the undesirable or counter-intuitive consequences of both the views.

the cognition of which

Now let us discuss the Nyaya concept of asatti,
is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. The

refers to spatio-temporal contiguity between the words of

word asatti
a sentence. Hence the words cook and s which have occurred in the
sentence cooks are contiguous in space and time. Similar is the case
with other sentences such as John is tall, or John cooks rice. Here
contiguity means absence of a gap or a long gap between the words
of a sentence or in an utterance. The gaps which are not conducive
to understanding the meaning of a sentence are not permissible. The

(contiguity) is a causal condition for understanding

cognition of asatti
the meaning of a sentence.

in addition
Now the question is whether there is any need for asatti
anks
. a and yogyata.
In reply, it is said that there are
to the cognition of ak

is necessary for removing the ambiguity

certain examples where asatti
of understanding the relation. Consider the sentence, Here comes the
nah. purus. o
son-kings-man should be removed (ayam eti putro-raj

am).
pasaryat
It is said that this sentence would give rise to the cognition of the
relation of the king to his son or the cognition of the relation of the
king to his officer (man). Hence it means either (a) Here comes the son
of the king; the officer (man) should be removed, or (b) Here comes
the son; the kings officer (man) should be removed.

In such contexts the ambiguity has been removed in terms of asatti.

In our above example, since the word man (purus. a) is contiguous
in Sanskrit), the relation of the king
with the word s (the suffix ns
to his officer should be cognised, not the relation of the king to his
son as the word son (putra) is not contiguous with the suffix s
in Sanskrit). Hence asatti

of the Nyaya philosophers

(the suffix ns
plays the role of scope notations or is a substitute for scope notations.

not simply asatti,

is a causal condition for
The cognition of asatti,
understanding the meaning of a sentence.

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283

Now let us discuss the need for the cognition of the intention of
the speaker for understanding the meaning of a sentence. If a word
is ambiguous or homonymous, then the sentence in which it is used
would give rise to different cognitions even if all other conditions
for understanding its meaning are fulfilled. Consider the sentence

(Bring saindhava). Since the saindhava in

saindhavamanaya
Sanskrit means both salt and horse, the sentence would generate the
cognition of Bring salt or Bring a horse. In order to remove this
type of ambiguity the cognition of the intention of the speaker is
necessary. From the context of utterance the intention of the speaker
may be cognised. Moreover, there are contexts where the intention of
the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning of a sentence,
although the sentence does not contain any homonymous expression.

dadhi
For example, Protect the yoghurt from the crows (kakebhyo

Here the speaker intends to use the word crow to refer to

raks. yatam).
any animal or bird which will spoil the yoghurt. Hence the cognition of
the intention of the speaker is necessary for understanding the meaning
of a sentence which contains a metaphorical or suggestive expression.

II

In this section I would like to discuss the Advaita Vedanta theory of

understanding the meaning of a sentence. According to Vedanta also
the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of terms
lies in cognising a specific relation between the referents of its two
terms. The meaning of a general term is a related universal, not a set of
particulars. Hence the word pot means related potness. In other words,
potness being related to something else is the meaning of the word

is
pot. If the sentence The floor has a pot (ghat. avad bhutalam)
uttered, then the word floor would give rise to the memory-cognition
of the related floorness and the word pot would give rise to the
memory-cognition of the related potness. Since potness is related to a
particular pot by the relation of specific inherence (or identity), floorness
is related to a floor by a specific inherence and the pot is related to
the floor by the relation of conjunction, the universal potness would
be related to floorness by an indirect relation. When we understand
the meaning of this sentence, we cognise the relation of potness to
floorness. As regards the cognition of a particular from the cognition
of a related universal which is the meaning of a word, there are at
least four views.3 These views may be formulated in the following
ways:

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J.L. SHAW

(1) If there is a cognition of a universal, then there is a cognition of

its instances which are particulars. This is due to the fact that
there cannot be a qualificative cognition of a universal without
cognising its instances. Hence the set of causal conditions for
the cognition of a universal would also be the causal conditions
for the cognition of its instances. Therefore, when we come to
know that the word pot has the power to generate the cognition
of the related potness, then we cognise both the related potness
and the particular pots.
(2) According to another view the word pot has the power (sakti)
to generate the cognition of both the related potness and the
particular pots. Hence there are two powers in a word. But the
cognition of both the powers in a word is not necessary for
cognising the meaning of a sentence in which it occurs. What
is needed is the cognition that it can generate the cognition of
a related universal. Hence the cognition that the word pot can
generate the cognition of a particular pot is not required for
understanding the meaning of a sentence in which the word pot
occurs.
(3) According to another alternative the primary meaning of a word
is the related universal, but the secondary meaning is a set of
particulars which are instances of the universal. Hence the relation
between the word pot and the related potness is called sakti
(the primary meaning-relation), and the relation between the
(the secondary
word pot and a particular pot is called laks. an. a
meaning-relation). Therefore, the cognition of the former relation
would generate the cognition of the related universal, but the
cognition of the latter relation would generate the cognition of
a particular.
(4) According to another alternative the meaning of a word is the
related universal, but the effect of its power is the cognition of the
things limited by this universal. Hence the meaning of the word
pot is the related potness, but its power (sakti) will generate
the cognition of particulars which are limited by potness. Hence
this view draws a distinction between the meaning of a word
and its power to generate a cognition of particulars.4
As regards causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a
sentence, the followers of the Advaita Vedanta claim that the sentence,
not the cognition of it, is the special instrumental cause (karan. a) of
understanding its meaning. But according to the Nyaya the special
instrumental cause (karan. a) is the cognition of words, not the cognition

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285

of sentence in which they have occurred. In this context it is to be

noted that according to the Vedanta a sentence is not just a collection
of words. It is also an ordered n-tuple, where n 2 words. Hence the
words have mutual syntactic expectancy.
ara)

of understanding the meaning is the memoryThe operation (vyap

cognition of the entities referred to by the words which have occurred
in a sentence. The memory-cognition is due to the cognition of the
relation between a word and its meaning, primary or secondary. Since

(related designation)
ana
the Vedantins are followers of anvitabhidh
theory of meaning, the meaning complex of a word includes a relation
in general, not any specific relation. If there are two words in a sentence,
there would be cognition of two relations in general. For example, the
floor has a pot. This sentence would generate the memory-cognition
of related floorness and related potness. The cognition of these two
relations would eventually yield the cognition of a specific relation
which relates potness to floorness. In the technical language of the
an
adhikaran

Advaita Vedanta it is called svasrayasam

. ya (the relation
of being the locus and having the same locus). In other words, we
cognise the relation of potness to a pot and the relation of the pot to
the floor which has floorness.
Now let us discuss other causal conditions for understanding the
anks
. a,
yogyata and
meaning of a sentence. According to the Vedanta ak

asatti,
not their cognitions, are considered causal conditions. But with

the cognition of it is considered a causal condition

respect to tatparya
for understanding the meaning of a sentence.
anks
. a
the Vedanta differs from the
As regards the definition of ak
anks
. a is a property of the object of a
Nyaya. According to the Vedanta ak
question which is due to the cognition of the meaning of a word. When
we hear the expression bring, we may ask, what should we bring? If
the answer is a chair, then it has the property of being the object of this
a-vis
. ayatva). Similarly, if we hear the words a chair,
question (jijnas
we may ask, what should we do with it? If the answer is bring, then it
(bringing activity) has the property of being the object of this question
a-vis
. ayatva). Hence the cognition of one leads to the cognition of
(jijnas
the other via a question. Therefore there is expectancy between them.
But if we utter the sentence Bring a chair and there is no further
question, then also the chair or the bringing activity does not cease to
be the object of a question. Each of them has the ability (yogyatva) to
a-vis
. ayatva).
have the property of being the object of a question (jijnas
In other words, the chair or the bringing activity could have been the
anks
. a between the
object of a question. Similarly, there would be ak

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J.L. SHAW

arthas)

contents or meanings (vaky

of two sentences if one of them
is the object of a question which is due to the understanding of the
meaning of the other.
anks
. a is related to
It is to be noted that the Vedanta use of the word ak
a question or the desire of the hearer. Hence it is closer to our ordinary
anks
. a as a sequence of words
usage. But the Nyaya conception of ak
is present in the Vedanta conception of a sentence which is a causal
condition for understanding its meaning.
is defined in terms of what is intended
In Vedanta the term yogyata
by the speaker when he/she utters a sentence and the absence of the
preventer cognition in the hearer. Suppose the speaker utters the sentence
a has F and intends the relation R which relates F to a. If the cognition
of R is not prevented by some other cognition, then there is yogyata for
understanding its meaning. Since it refers to the absence of a cognition
in the hearer, it becomes a property of the cogniser. In this respect the
Vedanta conception of yogyata is not different from the New Nyaya
conception of it.
According to the Vedanta also, the sentence He/she irrigates the field
with fire would not generate a cognition in the hearer, if he/she knows
that fire is not a cause of irrigation and the speaker intends this causal
relation. But if the hearer does not know that the causal relation between
fire and irrigation does not hold good, then this sentence would generate
a cognition which is erroneous. In this respect also the explanation of
the Vedanta coincides with that of the New Nyaya. But the difference
between the old Nyaya and the Vedanta remains.

It has been
Now let us discuss the Vedanta conception of asatti.
defined in terms of the contiguity or proximity (sannidhi) between
the cognitions of the meanings of the words which have occurred
in a sentence. The cognition of the relation between a word and its

meaning (padavr. ttijnana)

would give rise to the memory-cognition of
the meaning. If the memory-cognitions are contiguous, then there is

asatti
between them. Hence asatti
becomes a property of the memorycognitions, not a property of words. But according to the Nyaya it
is a property of the words. For this reason the Nyaya claims that the

is a causal condition, while the Vedanta claims that

cognition of asatti

asatti
itself is a causal condition for understanding the meaning of a
sentence.

nana,
the followers of the Vedanta consider it to
As regards tatparyaj
be a causal condition for understanding the meaning of any sentence,
ambiguous or non-ambiguous. Even in a sentence such as Bring a
pot, the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary. The

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

287

fact that the word pot has been used to refer to a pot and has not
been used in a metaphorical sense is the intention of the speaker.
Hence the cognition of the intention of the speaker is necessary for
understanding the meaning of any sentence. But according to the Nyaya
the cognition of the intention of the speaker is a casual condition only
in the case of homonymous words such as saindhava (salt, horse),
. anika) uses such as Protect the yoghurt from the
or metaphorical (laks

crows (kakebhyo dadhi raks. yatam).

the followers of the Vedanta claim

As regards the nature of tatparya,
that it is a property of a sentence, not a property of the speaker. A
sentence has the ability to generate a cognition, the object (content) of
artha).

The word tatparya

is used to refer
which is its meaning (vaky
to this ability of a sentence.

III

In this section I would like to substantiate the view that most of the
causal conditions mentioned in the Vedanta are present in the Nyaya or
would be acceptable to the followers of the Nyaya. Similarly, most of
the causal conditions mentioned in the Nyaya are implicitly or explicitly
present in the causal conditions of the Vedanta.
(a) According to both the Nyaya and the Vedanta the intention of

will supersede all other causal conditions.

the speaker (tatparya)
We have to understand the meaning in the light of the intention

Consider the
of the speaker even if there is no contiguity (asatti).
expression A pot is blue a piece of cloth is a substance (nlo

between a
ghat. o dravyam
. patah. ). In this case there is asatti
pot and blue, and between a piece of cloth and substance.
Hence this sentence would give rise to the cognition of the
relation between a blue colour and the pot, and the cognition of
the relationship between the piece of cloth and a substance. But
if the speaker intends the relationship between the piece of cloth
and a blue colour, and between the pot and a substance, then the
hearer has to cognise these relations when he/she understands
the meaning of this sentence. Hence those who do not know the
intention of the speaker would understand the former meaning, but
those who do know the intention of the speaker would understand
the latter meaning.
Now consider an expression such as The mountain is eating Devadatta
Devadattena).
is fire-possessor (girirbhuktam agniman

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J.L. SHAW

According to both Nyaya and Vedanta there is no asatti

in this
expression. But if the speaker intends the relation between the mountain
and the fire on the one hand, and the relation between Devadatta and
eating on the other, then the hearer has to cognise these relations. Hence
one has to understand the intention of the speaker even if there is no

between the words.

contiguity (asatti)

(b) As regards yogyata there is no difference between the New Nyaya

and the Vedanta. According to both of them the absence of the
preventer cognition is a causal condition for understanding the
meaning of a sentence. It is to be noted that it is not an uncommon
causal condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence.
It is a common condition for any cognition other than ordinary
perception (laukika pratyaks. a).

as a condition for under(c) The Vedanta conception of tatparya

standing the meaning of any sentence would be acceptable to
the Nyaya as well. The fact that the speaker uses the word pot
to refer to a pot when he/she utters the sentence Bring a pot
and that it has not been used in a metaphorical way would be
an assumption of the Nyaya philosophers. Similarly, the Vedanta
philosophers would not differ from the Nyaya when we come
across a homonymous expression in a sentence, or when a word,
not a sentence, is used metaphorically. But there would be a
significant difference between them with respect to the question
whether a sentence, not the words which have occurred in it,
can be used metaphorically. The Nyaya philosophers have tried
to explain all types of metaphorical meaning in terms of the
metaphorical use of words only. But the followers of the Vedanta
claim that certain metaphorical uses cannot be explained in terms
of the metaphorical use of words only. Consider the sentence
. va) uttered in the context of eating
Take poison (vis. am
. bhunks
at the house of an enemy. The intended meaning is that one
should not eat at the house of ones enemy. The Nyaya philosophers have tried to explain this intended meaning by assigning
a metaphorical meaning to the word poison in the following
way:
The metaphorical meaning of the word poison is something similar to
poison. Since the metaphorical referent is related to the primary referent by
the relation of similarity, the word poison may be used to refer to something
similar to poison. As one should not take poison, so one should not take
something similar to poison. Similarly, one should not eat at the house of
ones enemy. In other words, taking food at the house ones enemy would
lead to harmful consequences. Hence one should not eat at the house of
ones enemy.

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

289

But the followers of the Vedanta claim that we cannot convey the thought
that one should not eat at the house of ones enemy even if we interpret
the word poison as something similar to poison. The concept of
ought or duty cannot be conveyed by using the word poison in a
metaphorical way. Since the sentence Take poison as a whole conveys
this meaning, the metaphorical meaning is to be assigned to it. Hence
understanding the meaning of the sentence, not the words, would give
rise to the metaphorical meaning of it. Secondly, the followers of the
Vedanta claim that the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation which
is due to the related referents of the words which have occurred in the
sentence. In the above example, according to the Vedanta, the primary
meaning of the sentence is related to the metaphorical meaning. Hence
the Nyaya and the Vedanta would differ with respect to the primary
meaning of a word and the explanation of the metaphorical meaning
of a sentence.

(d) As regards asatti,

they would accept each others views. In
other words, the Nyaya would accept the contiguity among the
memory-cognitions which are due to the cognition of the words
which are contiguous. Since the followers of the later Vedanta
have accepted the cognition of the sentence, not the sentence, as
the special instrumental cause (karan. a), the contiguity among the
words would be cognised if the sentence is cognised. Hence the
cognition of the contiguity among the words would be acceptable
to the followers of the Vedanta.
the followers of Vedanta would accept the
anks
. a,
(e) As regards ak
relation of successor or predecessor between any two words of
anks
. a as an ordered
a sentence. Hence the Nyaya concept of ak

n-tuple is present in the Vedanta concept of a sentence. Now

the question is whether the Vedanta would accept the cognition
anks
. a in addition to ak
anks
. a.
Since some of the Vedanta
of ak
philosophers have accepted the cognition of a sentence as the
special instrumental cause (karan. a), this cognition would entail
the cognition of the sequence. Hence the Nyaya cognition of
anks
. a is present in the Vedanta cognition of a sentence.
ak
anks
. a,
the Nyaya would accept
As regards the Vedanta concept of ak
it so far as contingently true or false sentences are concerned. In other
words, the referents of the words which have occurred in contingently
true or false sentences could be objects of questions. For example,
the table is blue. The table would be the object of a question and the
blue colour would be the object of another question. But identity and
contradictory sentences would be excluded, as their referents are not

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J.L. SHAW

objects of questions. Consider the sentence The table is the table

or John is John. When we cognise the referent of the word the
table we do not ask the question whether it is a table. Similar is the
case with the word John. Again sentences such as The brown table
anks
. a of Vedanta. The person who has
is brown would lack the ak
cognised the meaning of the brown table would not ask the question
whether the table is brown. Hence the identity sentences lack the
anks
. a of Ved
ak
anta. Similarly, the contradictory sentences do not have
anks
. a of Ved
anta. Consider the sentence The table is brown
the ak
and not brown. The question, what is the colour of the table?, cannot
be answered in terms of brown and not brown. Hence it lacks the
anks
. a of Ved
ak
anta. From this observation it follows that the Vedanta
philosophers also would not accept understanding the meaning of
an identity or a contradictory sentence. Hence both the Nyaya and
the Vedanta philosophers would claim that identity and contradictory
sentences do not generate cognitions. As regards necessary truths of
mathematics, both of them would claim that sentences such as 2 2 =
4 would generate cognitions. From the above discussion it follows that
anks
. a is not co-extensive with the Nyaya
the Vedanta conception of ak
anks
. a,
although according to both the systems identity
concept of ak
or contradictory sentences do not generate any cognition in the hearer
anks
. a would be a proper
or the speaker. The Vedanta concept of ak
anks
. a as the latter defines well-formed
subset of the Nyaya concept ak
sentences.
(f) As regards the cognition of words, it is also present in the
views of the Vedanta philosophers. Since the sentence and the
cognition of the meaning relation between a word and its referent

are considered causal conditions for cognising

(padavr. ttijnana)
the referents, the cognition of the word is already present in the
latter causal condition. But if we follow the view of the later
Vedanta philosophers, then the cognition of the words would
be present in the cognition of the sentence which is a causal
condition.
From our discussion it follows that most of the concepts mentioned
above can be found both in Nyaya and Vedanta, although they have
not used the same expressions for these concepts. Hence, as regards
the conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence, there is
very little difference between these two systems.

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

291

IV

In this section I would like to discuss the nature of understanding

the meaning of a complex sentence. In other words, the question is
whether understanding the meaning of a molecular sentence is atomistic
or holistic. In the case of atomistic understanding, first we understand
the meaning of embedded sentences or complex expressions which have
occurred in a molecular sentence. Then we understand the meaning
of the entire sentence. But in the case of holistic understanding we
apprehend simultaneously the meanings of the embedded sentence(s)
and the molecular sentence.5
Let us consider the nature of the cognition generated by the sentence
The deer has a brown horn. The question is whether we first apprehend
the relation of a particular brown colour to a horn, and then apprehend
the relation of a brown horn to the deer. For the sake of simplicity
we consider the deer as one term. According to some followers of
the Nyaya the cognition of the relation of a brown horn to the deer
follows the cognition of the relation of a brown colour to a horn.
But according to some other Nyaya philosophers we cognise both the
relations simultaneously. The followers of the Vedanta would also accept
these two types of the nature of understanding.
Now let us explain the nature of understanding corresponding to
the sentence The deer has a brown horn. In this case the deer is
the qualificand, a horn is the qualifier, and a brown colour is the
qualifier of a horn. For the sake of simplicity we are not considering
the mode of presentation of these objects of cognition. Hence a horn
is the qualifier in relation to the deer, and it is also a qualificand
in relation to the brown colour. Since the deer is the qualificand in
this cognition, it has the relational property of being the qualificand
Similarly, the brown colour has the property of being the
(vises. yata).
But the horn which is the object of this cognition
qualifier (vises. an. ata).
has both the property of being the qualificand and the property of
being the qualifier. It is to be noted that these relational properties
specify the way objects are related to this cognition. Now the question
is how these relational properties are related to each other. In this
residing in
cognition the property of being the qualificand (vises. yata)

the property of being the qualifier

the deer is determined by (nirupita)
residing in the horn and vice versa. Similarly, the property of being the

the property
qualificand residing in the horn is determined by (nirupita)
of being the qualifier residing in the brown colour, and vice versa.
Now the question is whether the properties of being the qualificand
and the qualifier residing in the horn are related to each other or not.

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J.L. SHAW

If they are independent properties, then we cannot draw the distinction

between
(a) The deer has a brown horn, and
(b) The deer has a horn, and that horn is brown.
In order to draw the distinction between them it is said that in (a) the
property of being the qualifier and the property of being the qualificand
residing in the same horn are related to each other by the relation of
limitor-limited (avacchedya-avacchedaka). In other words, the former
is the mode of presentation of the latter and the latter is the mode of
presentation of the former. But this is not the case in (b). Hence in (b)
they are not related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In
a holistic understanding we cognise the relation of the brown colour
to the horn and the relation of the horn which is brown to the deer
simultaneously. In an atomic understanding first we cognise the former
relation, then we cognise the latter relation.
This technique is used to explain the nature of understanding corresponding to a more complex sentence. Suppose a sentence contains four
terms, say a, b, c, and d. As regards the relation between them, c is
qualified by d, b by c, and a by b. At the level of understanding, d has
only the property of being the qualifier, and a has only the property of
being the qualificand. But b and c would have both the properties of
being the qualificand and qualifier. The property of being the qualificand
residing in c will be determined by the property of being the qualifier
residing in d and vice versa. But the property of being the qualifier
residing in c will be determined by the property of being the qualificand
residing in b and vice versa. Moreover, these two properties residing
in c are related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited. In other
words, each of them is a mode of presentation of the other. Similarly,
the properties of being the qualificand and qualifier residing in b will
be related to each other by the relation of limitor-limited.
The techniques developed by the Nyaya philosopher and adopted
by others has far reaching consequences. This technique may be used
to explain the difference in meaning between the following pairs of
sentences:6
(a)
(a0 )
(b)
(b0 )
(c)
(c0 )

Brutus killed Caesar.

Caesar was killed by Brutus.
John gave a book to Tom.
Tom received a book from John.
John sprayed paint on the wall.
John sprayed the wall with paint.

CONDITIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE

293

(d) A pot is on the floor.

(d0 ) The floor has a pot on it.
Since the meaning of a sentence lies in the relation along with its
direction, the meaning of (a) would not be the same as that of (a0 ).
Similar will be the case with other pairs of sentences. Contemporary
philosophers of language such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and
Jackendoff are also concerned with the question whether the above
pairs have the same meaning. Since the Nyaya has developed a theory
for the explanation of the meaning of a sentence and its understanding,
it might throw some light on the contemporary discussion of meaning
and transformation.7
NOTES
1

For simplicity, expressions like the property of being the qualifier are avoided.
Moore, G.E., Is Existence a Predicate, Philosophical Papers, p. 118, George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1959.
3
In this context I have included some of the discussion from Dharmaraja Adhvarindras

. a and Gad

Vedanta-Paribh
as
adharas Saktiv
ada.
I have also included the view of Pandit
Visvabandhu Tarkatrtha.
4
For a more comprehensive discussion on this topic see authors The Advaita

Vedanta on Meaning, Vedanta:

Concepts and Application, edited by J L Shaw and
S Walters, The R K Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta (forthcoming).
5
In this context I am not talking about Bhartr. haris theory, which deals with the
holistic approach to meaning.
6
Fodor, J., Semantics: Theories of Meaning in Generative Grammar, pp. 8996,
Thomas Y Cromwell Company, New York, 1977.
7
I am greatly indebted to Pandit Visvabandhu Tarkatrtha with whom I have
discussed almost all the points mentioned in this paper. Since this research was
partly supported by a grant from Internal Research Committee, Victoria University
of Wellington, I would like to thank them.
2

Philosophy Department
Victoria University of Wellington
New Zealand