SECOND LIST

Testamentary Capacity
Estate of the Deceased Victorina Villaranda, Eusebia
Lim,vs. Juliana Chinco
G. R. No. L-33592, March 31, 1931
FACTS: This is a contest over the probate of a paper
writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y
Diaz, a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who died in
Manila, on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no
descendants or ascendants, and the document produced
as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of
properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to
three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of
the surname of Lim. The opposition was made by Juliana
Chinco, a full sister of the deceased.

testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect

that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during
the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent
to the attack, and that on the forenoon of June 5, 1929,
she did not have sufficient command of her faculties to
enable her to do any valid act. In contrast,the attorney
testified that he was able to communicate with the
deceased when the will was made, and that he read the
instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her
whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she made
signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred
in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the
statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to
utter intelligent speech. Hence, the paper offered for
probate was properly disallowed.
Agustin Barrera, et al. vs. Jose Tanjoco, et al.,
G.R. No. L-5263, February 17, 1954

The deceased was about 80 years of age at the

time of her death. On the morning of June 2, 1929, she
was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral
hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious condition.
Doctor Gaanan, a physician from Meycauayan, examined
the patient and he found her insensible and incapable of
talking or controlling her movements. On the morning of
June 5, 1929, she was taken to a hospital in Manila.
The purported will was prepared by Atty. Perfecto Gabriel,
whose wife appears to be related to the chief
beneficiaries named in the will. After informing himself of
the condition of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent
to that occupied by the patient and, taking a sheet from
an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. He
then took it into the sick room for execution. The intended
testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the
document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
Upon hearing the cause, the trial court sustained
the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that
the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the
time the instrument purports to have been executed by
her. From this judgment the proponent of the will
appealed.
ISSUE:
Did the testatrix have testamentary capacity at
the time the paper referred to was signed?
HELD:
No. The testator was in a comatose condition
and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act.
This conclusion was proven by the testimony of the
witnesses, specifically the testimony of the doctors, and
that of the caretaker and neighbor of the deceased. The

FACTS: Oliva Villapaa died in Tarlac on December 13,

1948. On December 31, 1948, a petition was filed by
Agustin Barrera for the probate of the will executed by the
testator on July 17, 1948, and for the appointment of the
petitioner as executor. According to the petition the
properties left by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and
the heirs instituted are nephews, nieces and
grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose Tampoco and
Victoriano Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the testatrix
and the other nephews and nieces, filed an opposition,
claiming the following
The will was not executed and attested in
accordance with law;
That the testratrix lacked testamentary capacity;
That there was undue influence and pressure in
its execution;
That the signature of Oliva Villapaa was
obtained by fraud and trickery; and,
That the testamentary provisions are illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was allowed.
HELD: TRIAL COURT -- No, the will was disallowed
because it was not the personal last will and testament of
the deceased and it was not based on the finding that
Oliva Villapaa did not furnish the names of the persons
instituted as heirs and that the will was not read to her
before she signed it. The second ground is based on the
conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was
not present when Oliva Villapaa and attesting witness
Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only partially
saw the signing by attesting witness Modesto Puno; and

that Oliva Villapaa saw Antonio sign only two or three

times.
SUPREME COURT -- The will was allowed. Two attesting
witnesses testified that the will was signed by the testatrix
and by the three attesting witnesses in the presence of
each other, while the other attesting witness testified to
the contrary. The court gave weight to the testimony of
the first two one of whom is an attorney and justice of the
peace who drafted the will, the court also considering the
fact that the witness who testified against the due
execution of the will, signed the attestation clause stating
that the will was signed by the testatrix and the witnesses
in the presence of each other. he fact that the witnesses
to the execution of the will are related to some of the
beneficiaries thereunder, is not sufficient to make them
biased witnesses. It is not necessary that the will be read
upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses.
The Heirs of the Late Matilde Montinola-Sanson v. CA
and Eduardo Hernandez
G.R. No. 76648
FACTS: This case arose from a petition filed by private
respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981
seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late
Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. The
testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on
March 29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will
several of her real properties to specified persons. On
April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named
executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment
of special administrator.
On June 29, 1981,
Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving
sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said
will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging the
following
That the subject will was not entirely written,
dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the
same was falsely dated or antedated;
That the testatrix was not in full possession of her
mental
faculties
to
make
testamentary
dispositions;
That undue influence was exerted upon the
person and mind of the testatrix by the
beneficiaries named in the will; and,
That the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator has testamentary
capacity when she executed her will.

HELD: TRIAL COURT -- Allowed the will for probate.

APPELATE COURT -- Affirmed in toto the decision of the
lower court.
SUPREME COURT -- Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides
"A will shall be valid even though it should not contain
an institution of an heir, or such institution should not
comprise the entire estate, and even though the person
so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should
be incapacitated to succeed. In such cases, the
testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law
shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate
shall pass to the legal heirs." Thus, the fact that in her
holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of
her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an
indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The
portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the
heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
Finally, the Supreme Court quotes with approval the
observation of the respondent court "There is likewise
no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To
Our minds, the most authentic proof that deceased had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the
Will, is the Will itself.
Holographic Will
Spouse Roberto and Thelma Ajero v CA and
Clemente Sand
G.R. No 106720, Sept. 15, 1994
FACTS: In the will, decedent named as devisees, the
following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private
respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah
Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand,
and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. On January 20,
1983, petitioners sought for the allowance of decedent's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not
acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in
every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds
that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained
alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The
petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He
contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed

that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in

its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the holographic will executed by
the testator has complied with the requirements provided
by law.
HELD: TRIAL COURT -- It has been satisfactorily shown
that the holographic will in question was indeed written
entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the
testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly
shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have
been presented and have explicitly and categorically
identified the handwriting with which the holographic will
in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and
signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid
evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic
will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
APPELLATE COURT -- The Court of Appeals found that,
"the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its
validity." It held that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which
read, as follows:
"Article 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in
a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the
last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the
time of prior dispositions."
"Article 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature."
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were
either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations
made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
SUPREME COURT -- Likewise, a holographic will can
still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case
of Kalaw, the SC held:
"Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will
have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of

authentication will only result in disallowance of such

changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of
authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)
separate from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and
688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present
provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They
read as follows:
"Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator
writes it himself in the form and with the requisites
required in Article 688.
"Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by
persons of full age.
"In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on
stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution,
written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him,
and must contain a statement of the year, month and day
of its execution.
"If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined
words, the testator must identify them over his signature.
"Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own
language."
This separation and distinction adds support to the
interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of
the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles 813
and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate
of a holographic will.
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Validity
Testate Estate of Edward Christensen Aznar v
Christensen Garcia
L- 6759, January 31, 1963
FACTS: A will was executed by Edward E. Christensen in
Manila on March 5, 1951. It is in accordance with the said
will that the executor in his final account and project
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was
filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is
contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen,
one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the

estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above

grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the
forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil
Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent
apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen
Christensen
having
been
declared
an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her
birth.

no legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law

(Articles 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines)
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs
of the parent recognizing them.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine laws will govern the

disposition of the estate.

The term renvoi also refers to the rules that, in a lawsuit

by a nonresident upon a cause arising locally, the
capacity to sue is determined by the law of the
nonresident's domicile, rather than by local law.

HELD: TRIAL COURT -- No, the Laws of California will

govern since Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of
his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California, in accordance with which a testator has the
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property
is sacred and inviolable.
SUPREME COURT -- Yes, Philippine law shall govern the
disposition of the estate. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any
general American law, because there is no such law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the union having its own
private law applicable to its citizen only and in force only
within the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the
private law of the state of which the decedent was a
citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California,
prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law
for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdiction. Hence,
reason demands that the California conflict of law rules
should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar. he
conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should
refer the case back to California, as such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination, because the
case will then be tossed back and forth between the two
states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine
court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the
domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law
rule of the state of the decedent, California, and
especially because the internal law of California provides

DOCTRINE: RENVOI DOCTRINE

The process by which a court adopts the rules of a
foreign jurisdiction with respect to any conflict of laws that
arises.
In some instances, the rules of the foreign state might
refer the court back to the law of the forum where the
case is being heard.

Bellis v.Bellis
L-23678, June 6, 1967
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of
the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five
legitimate children and by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children and finally, he had three illegitimate children. On
August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for,
his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis,
and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c)
after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos
G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is the Philippine law that will
govern the disposition of the estate.
Whether or not the children are entitled to their legitimes.
HELD: TRIAL COURT -- No, the Texas Law will govern
applying Article 16 of the Civil Code.

No, since it is the Texas Law that will apply, there can be
no legitimes for under such law there are no legitimes.
SUPREME COURT -- No, a provision in a foreigner's will
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national
law, is illegal and void for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now
Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
G.Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law
on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos
G. Bellis.
No, since it is the Texas Law that will apply, there can be
no legitimes for under such law there are no legitimes.
Lourdes Dorotheo v. CA, Nilda Quintana, et al.,
G.R. No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS: Private respondents were the legitimate children
of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died
in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died
thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death,
petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro
before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate
of the latters last will and testament. In 1981, the court
issued an order admitting Alejandros will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said
order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and
issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife
of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last
will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically
void, and declaring the oppositors as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is
entitled to some compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that
they were not married to each other, which was denied.
On appeal, the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellants brief within the extended period granted. This
dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989. An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order on the ground
that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final

in character. The court added that the dispositive portion

of the said Order even directs the distribution of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
private respondents filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review
arguing that the case filed by private respondents before
the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: May a last will and testament admitted to probate
but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become
final and executory still be given effect?
HELD: The trial court granted the Motion To Declare The
Will Intrinsically Void. That the provisions of the last will
and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void,
and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose
Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs
of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta
Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government.
In accordance with the TCTs, Judge Angas set aside the
earlier decision and cancelled the writ of execution,
favoring the Petitioner.
Petitioner appealed that she was entitled to some form of
compensation since she took care of Alejandro before he
died. Court of Appeals denied the said appeal because
failure to file appellants brief within the extended period
granted.
In the case of the TCTs, the order in the lower court was
nullified. A petition for review was filed claiming that the
claim of lack of jurisdiction of Judge Angas is wrong and
that will of Alejandro is valid and legal.
SUPREME COURT -- The petition is without merit. A
final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
be. In the order of Judge Angas that nullified an already
final order, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of
judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled
that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate
the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of
review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on

probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole

world.

Notarial Will
Felix Azuela v. CA, Geralda Aida Castillo, substituted
by Ernesto Castillo
G.R. No. 12280, April 12, 2006
FACTS: A petition for probate filed by petitioner Felix
Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of
Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on June 10,1981.
Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the
vernacular Filipino.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the
will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. And in
the place of the Notary Public a Jurat was written by the
Notary Public swearing that he notarized the document.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs,
legatees and devisees of the deedent, and the
executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo , who
represented herself the attorney of "the 12 legitimate
heirs" of the decedent. She claimed that the will is a
forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was
so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases
filed by oppositor against petitioner.
Centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of
the decedent. It also alleged that the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her
grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject will complied with the
requirements of the law and, hence, should be admitted
to probate.
HELD: The petition is DENIED. A will whose attestation
clause does not contain the number of pages on which
the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most
importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective.
Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been
validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses. While

the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on

the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental
witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite
that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page
they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand,
the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause
results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental
witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do
appear on the page were directed towards a wholly
different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote,
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10
(sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. By no manner of
contemplation can these words be construed as an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one
who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a
jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language
thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary
certifies that before him/her, the document was
subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is
not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The
importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from
the other requirements under Art. 805 and entrusted into
a separate provision, Art. 806. The express requirement
of Art. 806 is that the will be acknowledged,and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment
coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act
or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of
persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills,
or those executed without the free consent of the testator.
It also provides a further degree of assurance that the
testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary

dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in

the will.

Blind Testator
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, Cesar
Alvarado, petitioner, v. Hon. Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., et
al.,
G.R.No. 74695, September 14, 1993
FACTS: On November 5, 1977, the 79-year old Brigido
Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (herein
petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will. The notarial will was testified to by the
three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by
private respondent who were present at the execution.
The testator did not read the final draft of the will. Instead,
private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eightpaged document, read the same aloud in the presence of
the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public. The latter four followed the reading with
their own respective copies.
Meanwhile, the holographic will of Brigido was
admitted to probate. A codicil was then executed
changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate
cash for his eye operation as he was suffering from
glaucoma. However the disinheritance and revocatory
clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial
will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of
the codicil.
Herein private respondent filed a petition for the
probate of the notarial will and codicil. Petitioner, in turn,
filed an opposition on the ground that the deceased was
blind within the meaning of the law at the time the will and
codicil was executed and that the reading required by
Article 808 was not complied with hence the probate
should be denied.
ISSUE: Whether the foregoing circumstances would
qualify Brigido as a blind testator under Article 808 of
the Civil Code
HELD: Yes. Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of
reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the
separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor,"
"defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other
course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes

within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art.

808.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that
substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose
of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are
intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible
as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's
will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his
three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior
and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his
instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and
petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and
communicated to the testator.
Heirs
Salud Teodo Vda. De Perez v. Hon. Zotico A. Tolete, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge Br. 18, RTC, Bulacan
G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994.
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn
Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and
residents of New York, each executed a will, also in NY,
containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in
the event that it is not known which one of the spouses
died first, the husband shall be presumed to have
predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in
a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was
named trustee in Joses will, filed for
separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a
petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to NY laws. He
contended that since the wills were executed
in NY, NY laws should govern. He further argued that in
accordance with NY laws, he and his brothers and
sisters were Joses heirs and as such are entitled to
notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to
give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of
her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York laws. But before she could

present evidence to prove the law of New York, the

reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing
the wills.
ISSUE: Should the reprobate of the wills be allowed?
HELD: The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who
were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with Art. 816 of the Civil Code.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities
prescribed by NY laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate
or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the
will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in
such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is
a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on
procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and
last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence. The necessity of presenting evidence on the
foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country
is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of them.

Perez Cunanan, and because she does not consider

herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably
failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the
reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given
as in case of an original will presented for allowance"
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that
with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be
treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is
presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly,
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which
require publication and notice by mail or personally to the
"known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not
the petitioner, are required.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed
for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.

This petition cannot be completely resolved

without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn