THE CONCEPT OF A CONCEPT

Author(s): A. K. WARDER
Source: Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 1971), pp. 181-196
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23437948 .
Accessed: 15/02/2015 06:44
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Indian Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

In discussions

about words and meanings (or objects), and in logical

discussions involving terms and their extension, a distinction comes to be
made between objects in the world and the signs, symbols, etc. used to
denote them. In some philosophical
discussions it may not be clear
whether what is referred to is the words or their objects, but this question
tends to be cleared up fairly soon and also to lead into interesting discus
sions about what 'exists', whether we can go beyond words to 'reality'
and so forth. In the Buddhist schools, because of their initial epistemo
a categorical distinction was soon
logical and critical preoccupations,
between
words
and
perceived
objects. Thus it was found at the outset
that some words seemed to have no objects to 'mean', though apparently
perfectly at home in everyday language. Consequently it was concluded
that such meaningless

words should be excluded from philosophical

discussion, implying immediately that there were two types or levels of
discussion or language, everyday and philosophical, with problems of
translation from one to the other. For example, pronouns were found not
to refer to anything which could be pointed to as their proper objects.
The Buddha

himself appears to have been responsible for this initial

of Buddhist philosophical
discourse, moving on
depronominalisation
into a thoroughgoing depersonification of discourse. Thus instead of
posing meaningless problems such as "who desires?" or "who is con
scious?" or "is he who acts the same as he who experiences the result
of the action?", one must substitute the proper formulations "through
what condition is there desire?" or "through what condition is there
consciousness?" or "through what condition does such and such a result
occur?"

(see e.g. Samyutta Nikya II 13 / Taish 99 section 15 No. 10;

75f./section 12 No. 18 / Nidna Samyukta ed. by Tripth, pp. 165-7).
The doctrine of 'conditioned origination', without any 'agent' or 'subject'
or 'person', is fundamental to all schools of Buddhism. In these discussions
the Buddha rejects all such terms (which we would call 'concepts') as
'soul' ('self'), 'life-principle', 'person', 'being' and so on (in Sanskrit
Journal

1 (1971) 181-196.
All Rights Reserved
of Indian Philosophy
- Holland
1971 by D. Reidel Publishing
Company, Dordrecht

Copyright

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

182

tman,jlva, pudgala, sativa-, Pali attanjlva, puggala, satta) as not meaning

anything, defying his opponents to point out what they referred to.
The word which we are about to translate as 'concept', namely Sanskrit
prajapti or Pali paatti, because that appears to be the nearest English
equivalent to it as used in the Buddhist schools, rarely occurs in the
presumed discourse of the Buddha himself (primarily the Stra or Suttanta
Pitaka

as common

to the available

recensions

of its text). However, it

and thus lay at hand for

does occur there in some significant passages

later commentators and philosophers to develop as a more precise tool
in discussion. One might observe here that the convenient word iti or ti
in the Indian languages, marking the end of a quotation or quoted word,
tended to make the overt description and labelling of something as a
'concept' seem superfluous. The development of the concept of a 'concept'
by Buddhist philosophers

was thus not inevitable and might itself seem

meaningless.
In this paper we shall pursue this development through the work of
several philosophers. First we shall note the more significant occurrences
of 'concept' in the Stra Pitaka. After that we shall take up the Abhidhar
ma Pitaka, with which we clearly leave the discourse of the Buddha
himself and enter the discussions of the schools which claimed to be
systematising his doctrine. To keep our task simpler, we shall confine
ourselves to one of these schools, the Sthaviravda
(Pali Theravda),
where we are in the favourable position of having intact at least the litera
ture which they considered of permanent value for philosophical study.
It must be noted, however, that every known school of Buddhism operated
with the same term 'concept' (prajapti) in its discussions, using it appar
ently in the same way though in order to lead sometimes to differenet
conclusions.
Thus there was actually a 'Concept
so-called
School',
of the Mahsanxgha
branch, whose special doctrine
(Prajaptivda),
consisted in a particular set of distinctions between what was ultimately
real and what was merely conceptual (see Indian Buddhism p. 278). The
Sammitya held their peculiar doctrine of the 'person' as a "concept based
on the groups" (Indian Buddhism p. 276), which the Sthaviravda attacked
in their Kathvatthu (see below). Ngrjuna's 'emptiness' is itself a "con
XXIV. 18).
cept based on" (updya prajapti, Mlamadhyamakakrik
The Abhisamaylahkra
distinguishes the imagining of 'concepts' from
that of 'substances'
(so-called but false; 1.36, V.6, 13, 30). After the

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

183

(Pali Abhidhamma) we may look at certain

post-canonical works of the school, then the 'commentaries' (Atthakath)
as put into Pali by Buddhaghosa,
the work of his contemporary Budd
Sthaviravda

Abhidharma

hadatta, then the later writers nanda, Dhammapla

ruddhas and Kassapa. We may add what Aggavamsa
of view of linguistics.
1. Mahnidna
or summarised

(II), the two Anu

says from the point

(D II 62ff.). "By whatever features, characteristics, signs

descriptions there is a concept of the body of sentience

(i.e. in a 'living being', in everyday language); in the absence of these

features, etc., there would be no contact discerned between the designation
and the body of matter (of the 'same' 'living being'). By whatever features,
etc., there is a concept of the body of matter; in the absence of these
features, etc., there would be no contact discerned between the resistance
(i.e. the matter) and the body of sentience. In the absence of the features,
etc., by which there is a concept of both the body of sentience and the
body of matter, there would be discerned neither contact of the designa
tion nor contact of the resistance. In the absence of the features, etc., by
which there is a concept of sentience plus matter (i.e. a sentient body, a
sentient 'being', human or animal), there would, therefore, be no contact
discerned ('contact' here means a stimulus arising through the sense organs
and affecting consciousness via the complex of 'sentience' : the argument
is that without the compound sentience plus matter no contact or stimulus
could arise and affect consciousness).
...To

this extent there can be being born, growing old, dying, passing
or
away
being reborn; to this extent there is a way for designation, for
language, for a concept, there is scope for understanding; to this extent
the cycle (of the universe) revolves so that this world can be conceived
(or 'discerned') ; namely to the extent that there is sentience plus matter,
with consciousness."
There is a similar passage a few pages further on (p. 68), indicating
that designation, language, concept, understanding and their 'ways' are
coextensive with the cycle of the universe.
It would seem that in these passages, especially the first,the word 'con
cept' (Pali paatti) retains much of its apparent original meaning as a
'to understand', with causative
derivative from the verb (p)pa-(),
and action noun suffixes, i.e. 'making understood'. We shall find later

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

184

that a 'concept' is a technique or device for making something understood,

in other words for conceptualising something so that it can be discussed.
In the above passages we have translated the passive of this same verb as
'be discerned'.

From these contexts we can see how the new technical

term 'concept' may have been generated, requiring only to be institutiona

lised by later writers, as we shall see below.
Other occurrences of concept in the Stra Pitaka tend to suggest that
it is more or less synonymous with a series of terms meaning linguistic
of everyday language, which for the Buddha generally do
not refer to anything real but are 'pronominal' in the sense indicated at

conventions

the beginning of this paper. Thus the different types of living being are
"agreed usages in the world, expressions in the world, usages in the world,
concepts in the world" (D I 202, the four Pali terms here are sama,
In various texts concept appears approxi
nirutti, vohra and pamatti).
with
mately synonymous
'agreed usage' (sama, M III 68), 'expression'
and 'designation' (nirutti and adhivacana, S III 7Iff.), 'denomination'
('reckoned as') and 'agreed usage' (samkh and sama, same passage).
In an apocryphal Stra text of this school, the Niddesa, which is a lexico
graphical compilation arranged as commentary on certain old texts, these
in a list of synonyms: "'man' is a
agreed usage, concept, usage, name, making of a name,

and other terms have been collected

denomination,
putting a name to, expression (nirutti, language), expression (vyajana),
appellation (abhilpa)" (Nd I 124). The same list is afterwards applied to
certain proper names ('Tissa', 'Ajita', etc.) as synonyms for 'name' (nma,
Nd I 127, 140, Nd II 77). The same text applies the term concept to the
and 'Buddha', as known because of his
words 'Bhagavant'
('Master')
enlightenment (Nd I 143, 187, etc., Nd II 212-6). Returning to the
older Stra texts we may note that 'Mra' ('Death' personified), '(living)
being' (satta), 'unhappiness' and 'the world' (loka) are concepts (S IV 38f.).
Again, "The Master teaches the doctrine with reference to the concepts
of the 'spheres' (of the senses)" (D III 102).
2. The Abhidhamma registers the list of synonyms for concept which we
have noted in the Niddesa (Dhammasagani
p. 226 ; these are also syno
of 'language'
or
for
It
further
speaks
incidentally
nyms
'designation').
'expression' (nirutti) as providing a concept of the dhammas ('natures',
natural objects or events) referred to (Vibhaga p. 295).

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

185

It is with the Puggalapaatti that the idea of a 'concept' is really estab

lished in Theravda philosophy. Here 'concept' is institutionalised as a
technical term and here is the starting point for all later discussions. The
title of this book means "The Concept of a Person" (anticipating Professor
Ayer by more than two thousand years), 'person' (puggala) being one of
the most notorious pronominal concepts which the Buddha had rejected
from philosophical discourse. It is even a little odd, at first sight, to find
a treatise on an unphilosophical concept accorded a place in the philoso
phical Abhidhamma. The explanation for this appears to be firstlythat the
Buddha had in fact often used the concept, as a word necessary to every
day language, in his ordinary teaching, especially moral teaching, and
secondly that it was desirable somewhere in the Abhidhamma to define the
limits of philosophical discourse. In introducing its subject matter, the
"Concept of a Person" incidentally stretches 'concept' over both philosop
ical and unphilosophical discourse, thus posing the problem of 'concept'
afterwards worked out by the commentators on this text and other later
writers. This text itself does not elucidate the problem and in fact has to
be completed by the text which immediately follows it in the Abhidhamma,
the Kathvatthu, which we shall turn to in a moment.
This "Concept of a Person", then, simply lays down that there are six
concepts, those of 'group', 'sphere', 'element', 'truth', 'faculty' and 'per
son'. We are not now concerned with the first five, except to note that in
Theravda they are all philosophical in the sense of being the real stuff in
experience, as opposed to the last which is pronominal and not ultimately
real. The Vibhahga has a chapter on each of the five but eschews the
On the ground of collation with the texts of other schools of
Buddhists, it in fact appears that a chapter on 'persons' in some archetypal
Vibhahga has by the Theravdins been excluded as unphilosophical and
'person'.

set apart as a special treatise to prevent confusion with properly philo

sophical topics. This special treatise, having remarked that there are six
concepts, then takes up only the last and presents a review of the different
types of 'person' spoken of in the Stra Pifaka.
The Kathvatthu shows the technical term 'concept' fully fledged and
represents the furthest development of the idea in the Abhidhamma. Its
first discussion (kath) is precisely on the 'person' left unexplained by the
treatise preceding it. Criticising the views of those Buddhist schools
(including the Sammitiya, but in the firstplace the Vtsputrya) who held

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

186

that the 'person' spoken of by the Buddha was in some sense real, the
Kathvatthu affirms that it is not and argues that to affirm it would be in
with the generally accepted doctrine of the Stra Pitaka.
In doing this, the text brings in a number of subsidiary logical discussions
in order to clarify the meanings of the terms used, whether they are
distributed in certain propositions, and so on, and eliminate equivoca
of the Concept' (Paattd
tions. One section is entitled 'Examination
contradiction

nuyoga, pp. 25-28). Here it is asked whether the supposed 'person' is

'material', how it is supposed to 'transmigrate', whether it is the same
thing as the so-called 'life-principle' (Jlva), and so on. The opponent is
shown as unable to give any account of it consistent with the Buddha's
doctrine.
more important is the section entitled 'Examination
of the
Based On"' (UpdpaMattnuyoga,
"Concept
pp. 34-45). This begins
with the question: "Is there a concept of a person based on matter?"
Much

The opponent assents to this, but is shown that 'matter' gives rise only
to the various properties of matter as really connected with it, and these
are not the properties he wishes to attach to the 'person'. The case is the
same with the other 'groups' ('sensation',
'forces' and
'perception',
It is still the same with all five groups taken together
'consciousness').
all
the
of a 'living being', of 'sentience plus matter, with
constituents
(i.e.,
It is equally the same with the 'spheres', 'elements',
consciousness').
'faculties', 'thought', or any other identifiable constituent of a living being.
The conclusion is that there is nothing which is identifiable as a 'person'.
The concept is popularly based on any or all of these really occurring
natural phenomena or events, but is itself nothing, disappears under
examination.
One more Abhidhamma treatise, the Yamaka, has a series of sections,
within its main discussions, entitled 'Concept Section' (Vol. I, pp. 16-19,
53-58, etc., Pannattivra - pannatti is simply a variant orthography for
paatti). Here the concepts concerned refer to real objects such as the
and the purpose of the sections is their clarification, including
and so on.
delimiting the extension of terms, removal of equivocations

groups

(except in Burma, but in any case showing a further

and
development,
Pefakopadesa
leading towards the commentaries)
two
of
are
in
fact
versions
the
same
the
second
work,
Nettippakarana
3. The post-canonical

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

187

improved and accepted as standard in the school (as shown by anamoli

in his translation, The Guide). Here there are two important discussions
involving 'concept'. In the first (Peiakopadesa
p. 5, Netti p. 9) we have
enunciated a series of six levels of linguistic analysis of Tripitaka texts and
a parallel series of six levels of 'meaning' or semantic analysis. Briefly,
the six linguistic levels are 'syllable', 'word', 'sentence', 'section', 'analysis'
and'elaborate exposition'. The six meaning (attha) levels are 'appearance',
'showing', 'opening', 'distinguishing', 'clarification' and 'concept'. It is
suggested that these correspond, level for level, though pointed out that
they overlap. The important point for us is that a 'concept' is the highest
level of meaning, attained through an 'elaborate exposition' (niddesa)
setting out a complete idea or topic.
The other discussion introduces 'adducing the concept' as one of six
teen types of investigation of the wording of a statement (Peiakopadesa
96ff., Netti 56ff., where we incidentally see that the former is inadequate
and hardly explains the idea). This investigation is explained as that the
teaching with discussion of 'nature' (jpakati) has various concepts under
lying it, for example the 'truths', 'groups', 'spheres', 'elements' or 'facul
ties'. A text can therefore be clarified in the light of one of these, whichever
may

be

relevant.

More

than

one

may

be

relevant,

for example

more

than

one of the four 'truths', in which case further types of 'concept' are noted.
Thus the same text may give rise to a concept of 'full understanding' in
relation to 'unhappiness', to a concept of 'abandoning'
in relation to
'origination', and so on. In other words we have a second series of con
cepts subordinate to the first. A single doctrine, such as the 'groups' or the
'truths', is thus taught through various concepts.
4. We now come to the commentaries

on the Tripitaka of this school.

The versions we have, in Pali, were mostly prepared by Buddhaghosa,
supplemented by Dhammapla
(I) and others. They contain the explana
tions, accumulated by numerous teachers, of the texts we have so far
examined, the most fruitful among them for our present study being the
Abhidhamma. The Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa,
a systematic review
of the doctrine prefixed to the commentaries, is to be taken with these as
representing the final phase of their development. On the whole, these
and his followers, use the term 'concept'
commentators, Buddhaghosa
rather rarely in their exegesis, but assume its meaning known. No doubt

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

188

they follow the methods of the Nettippakarana, but they do so without

any pedantic outward show of applying its armoury of technical terms.
Where the word 'concept' occurs in the Sutra Pitaka it is generally ex
simply as 'making known' or 'making understood', possibly
through a variety of synonyms (e.g. DA pp. 504 and 885). It is only when
we come to the special discussions in, or implied by, the Abhidhamma
plained

texts that we find new theories propounded. The impression is that these
are not due to Buddhaghosa
(who wrote our present commentaries on
all the Abhidhamma texts as well as on the main Stra texts) but are
simply recorded by him from the old sources he used. He does not think
it worth reviewing them in his Visuddhimagga.
The commentary on "The Concept of a Person" offers the most com
plete account of 'concepts' so far (pp. 171-176). Twenty four types of
concept are defined, beginning with the six mentioned in the text commen
ted on. First, 'concept' itself is more fully defined. It is "showing a
This includes mak
determined doctrine" (paricchinnadhammanidassana).
something which is being taught and also proposing
something already well known. The expression "concept of a name" is
used for these topics proposed for showing the various doctrines. Thus
ing understood

"concept of a group" is a 'name' in this sense.

Outside the 'Pli' (i.e. the canonical texts), six types of concept accord
ing to a scheme of the 'commentaries' are defined ('commentaries' means
here certain sources used by Buddhaghosa,
or possibly a predecessor).
Of these six, the first two are basic: (1) a concept 'occurring' (vijjamna),
(2) a concept 'not occurring'. 'Occurring' here means that there is a reality
corresponding to the concept; 'not occurring' that there is no such reality,
that the concept is in fact a pronominal term. We are already familar
with both types of concept, only they had not been named and defined:
the concepts of 'group', 'sphere', 'element', 'truth' and 'faculty' are
'occurring'; the concept of a person is 'not occurring'. One might also
translate that 'group', etc., are 'instantiated' and 'person' 'not instantiated'.
This concept of 'occurring' and 'not occurring' concepts enabled Thera
vdin philosophers to cover the entire range of discourse conceptually
without any inconsistency, dividing all terms and statements into 'in
stantiated' and 'not instantiated', or in other words into the two levels
we noted at the beginning of this paper.
The other four types of concept in this set of six involve combinations

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

189

of the firsttwo, in other words compound ideas or terms which might not
be purely at either level. Thus : (3) a concept 'not occurring with occur
ring' is for example a "person having the three sciences", where 'person'
is unreal but the occurrence of the three sciences is a real event; (4) a
concept 'occurring with not occurring' is for example 'matter' (real)
qualified as 'woman' (unreal); (5) a concept 'occurring with occurring'
is for example "stimulus of the sense of sight", where both 'stimulus' and
'sight' are real; (6) a concept 'not occurring with not occurring' is for
example 'son of a warrior' (neither real).
The remaining twelve types of concept are introduced, in two sets of
six, as "outside the commentaries" (evidently as they once stood) but
"according to the scheme of the teachers". The first is in fact the "con
cept based on", which we have met in the Pli itself, in the Kathdvatthu.
Here the idea is developed with a series of examples of interest, presum
ably due to the 'teachers'. First there is the example we have met already,
of a 'being' (satta) based on matter, sensation, consciousness, etc. (the
'groups'). Then there is the 'school' example of the 'chariot' (as a whole)
based on its parts. A 'pot' or a piece of 'cloth', and so on, are concepts
based on objects seen, or registered by the other senses, i.e. concepts
imposed on sense data. The concepts of 'time' and 'direction' are based on
the revolutions of the Sun and Moon. Anything conceived as the counter
part, having the features, of something actually observed is a "concept
based on". Such a concept, it is added, is not one which makes something
understood but instead one which itself requires to be made understood.
Secondly we have 'relative' (upanidhi) concepts ; for example the series
of ordinal numerals, 'second' relative to 'first', 'third' relative to 'second'
and so on; also 'long' relative to 'short', 'far' relative to 'near' and the
like. A vast range of concepts is covered here, extending as far as charac
terising a village according to the social class of the majority of its in
habitants and other usages of language.
A 'collective' (samodhdna) concept is for example an 'eight steps' (i.e.
a chessboard) or a 'heap of grain'.
The series of cardinal numbers 'two', 'three', 'four', etc., exemplifies
the 'adjacent' (upanikkhitta) concept.
A 'produced by' (tajja) concept is a (real) property, referring to the
'own-nature' (sabhdva) of a natural element, for example 'hardness' as
property of the element 'earth'.

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

190

A concept of 'extension' (santati) refers to the absence of a break in

continuity, for example an 'eighty-year-old'.
Of the preceding six concepts, only the 'produced by' is 'occurring'.
The concept of 'function' (kicca) is for example of a person by his
function, such as "explainer
with occurring'.

of the meaning".

It may be 'not occurring

The concept of 'shape' or 'figure' (samthna), which is 'not occurring',

is for example 'thin', 'fat', 'circular', 'square' and the like.
The concept of 'gender' (liga) is for example 'woman' or 'man'. This
is 'not occurring', but we may note here that according to this school
'femininity' and 'masculinity' are 'occurring' material elements (dham
mas) ; it is thus the personification which is 'not occurring', not the sexual
nature itself.
A concept of 'region' (bhmi) is for example the name of a country,
which is 'not occurring' ; the planes (avacara) of experience and meditation,
however, are 'occurring'.
A 'proper name' (paccatta)

as concept, such as 'Tissa',

is of course 'not

occurring'.
or 'unactivated'
Lastly there is the concept of the 'unsynthesised'
(asakhata), a reality made understood by such words as 'extinction'
(nibbna, Sanskrit nirvana) and 'cessation' (nirodha): this is 'occurring'.
The commentary on the Kathvatthu adds little except an explanation
of'based on' (upddya) in the expression 'concept based on', namely that
it means 'conditioned
'not
'depending on' (gamma),
by' (paticca),
without that' (na virt ta) (p. 26). The Yamaha commentary has nothing
but the note (pp. 60-61) that outside the five 'groups' there is only
'extinction' and 'concept', an idea possibly borrowed from Buddhadatta,
Buddhaghosa's

elder contemporary, to whom we must now turn.

(5th century A.D.) wrote an "Introduction to the Abhid

(Abhidhammvatra), as an independent manual summarising the
doctrine of the Abhidhamma and introducing students to it. He undertakes
5. Buddhadatta

hamma"

his exposition by following the traditional order of analysis of the 'ele

ments' or 'natural phenomena' (dhammas) as inaugurated by the Dham
masangarti. Coming to the end of this, however, he asks : "Is this as much
as is to be known, or is there something else?" His answer is that there is
'concept' (p. 83). He begins his exposition of 'concept' by saying it is

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

191

'requiring to be made understood' as well as 'making understood', quoting

the list of approximate synonyms for it which we have found in the
Niddesa and the Dhammasagani. He defines all these, making clear that
they are all in effect aspects of 'concept'. He adds some further explana
tions of 'concept', making its range of meaning more general, or at least
more explicit. Thus the pronoun T (aham), in the first place and most
significantly in view of what we have said above, is explained as a "con
cept based on, conditioned by, caused by, matter and other elements".
This is the type of the concept, established by the convention of the world
only and defying the transient nature of the elements it is based on.
Buddhadatta continues with an account of some of the types of con
cept, which varies somewhat from that in the commentary on the "Con
cept of a Person", suggesting he had used some of the same sources as
but not exactly the same, or had interpreted them differ
Buddhaghosa
ently. Concepts are of three types: 'produced by', 'based on' and 'relative'.
'Produced by' in this case means any concept which arises according to
the scheme : 'sight', 'hearing', 'visible object', 'sound', 'earth', 'heat', 'air',
etc. This is not immediately clear, but it appears to mean the establishing
of concepts through the senses or empirically, resulting in the sets of
elements recognised in the Abhidhamma.
Concepts 'based

on' are firstly of two types, 'manifold' (samha) and

'simple' (asamha). A 'manifold concept' is based on a manifold of ele
ments, for example 'bear', 'hyena', 'elephant', 'horse', 'pot', 'cloth', etc.
A 'simple concept' is for example 'direction', 'space', 'time', 'sign', 'ab
sence' (abhva), 'cessation', etc. It is concepts based on which are now
divided into the six varieties, 'occurring', 'not occurring', and so on, which
we have met already. An 'occurring' concept indicates something ulti
mately real (paramattha), a 'not occurring' concept something which is
a mere

name

(nmamatta).

A 'relative' concept is in fact a variety of concept based on, one concept

depending on another, 'short' on 'long', 'long' on 'short', 'human misery'
on 'royal or divine happiness' and so on.
After this discussion, Buddhadatta
continues appropriately with a
on
the
so-called
chapter
'agent' (kraka), which is another pronominal
expression equivalent to 'soul' or 'self'. Both chapters conclude with an
affirmation of the two levels of statement or 'truth', 'ultimate' (real) and
'concealing' (worldly conventions), in other words concepts 'occurring'

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

192

A. K. WARDER

and concepts 'not occurring' : there is no third possibility. With this work
Buddhadatta added a new topic or category to the standard Abhidhamma
categories classifying the recognised 'elements'. The traditional categories
are four in number: 'thought' (citta), 'mental phenomena' (volition, etc.),
'matter' and 'extinction' (nibbna). These include everything ultimately
real. But it is necessary to discuss what is not ultimately real, 'concealing
of all discourse
truth', 'mere names'. Buddhadatta's
conceptualisation
makes this possible within the Theravda
system; later writes of the
school followed his method.
(10th century A.D.) in his Mlatlk or sub-commentary on
the Abhidhamma distinguishes (p. 129) two kinds of concept: "concepts
based on", which are wordly usages 'requiring to be made understood'
and 'name-concepts'
(papetabba),
(concepts of names), which are
6. nanda

'making
also

understood'

convey

the

ideas

(papana).
of the

real

The latter convey the former, and

elements

such

as

'matter',

through

the

hearing into consciousness.

Dhammapla
(II, pupil of nanda, 10th century A.D.) in his short
manual Saccasakhepa,
"Summary of the (Two) Truths", sets out the
doctrine of the Abhidhamma under the two general headings 'ultimate
'concealing truth', where the second is synonymous with
He
thus follows Buddhadatta's
arrangement, abridging the
'concepts'.
in
the
final
section
is an abridgement of the
older work, and
particular
truth' and

introduces the topic by saying that

chapter on 'concept'. Dhammapla
the concealing truth speaks of things which are not real (avatthu), such
as 'beings', etc. (p. 24). 'Concepts' are in the first place of two kinds,
'occurring' and 'not occurring'. After brief notes on language and indi
cating that concepts (and 'concealing truth') can be used towards ex
mentions concepts based on matter,
pounding the doctrine, Dhammapla
be
understood.
He concludes with the six
as
to
made
etc.,
requiring
types 'occurring', etc.
Anuruddha (I, of Ceylon, 12th century) in his somewhat similar, but
fuller, manual Abhidhammatthasagaha
presents 'concept' in a different
a
review
of
A condition (paccaya)
The
context
is
'conditions'.
way (p. 39).
is a kind of element (dhamma), hence Anuruddha goes on to say that
there are three types of element, namely 'concept', 'sentience' (or here
'immaterial' in general, nm) and 'matter'. 'Concept' is of two kinds,

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

193

'requiring to be made understood' and 'making understood'. Concepts

of the first kind are conceived on the basis of the changing features of
what is real (bhta). They are imagined (parikappiyamna)
on the basis
of, or relative to, this as objects in thought shadowing real objects. The
second kind are 'names'. Anuruddha concludes with the six types 'oc
curring', etc. His apparently original idea that a concept is a kind of
element is surprising, going beyond Buddhadatta's
position and adding
an element to the received list in the Abhidhamma and its commentaries.
It is perhaps a logical addition, since originally the elements were con
ceived as including everything real, but hitherto a concept could be real,
or 'occurring', only in the sense that the object corresponding to it might
be 'occurring'. With Anuruddha, 'concept' seems to have emerged as an
element in its own right, not reducible to others.
The Nmarpapariccheda,
a much more detailed and comprehensive
manual of Abhidhamma, seems to be the work of the same Anuruddha,
since there are significant agreements of doctrine between the two books.
Here he says (p. 53) that there are three kinds of condition, namely 'con
cept', 'immaterial' and 'material', and continues much as in the other
work.
The Paramatthavinicchaya
of Anuruddha
II (of Kfic, also 12th
is
much
more
elaborate
on
century)
'concept' and on the other hand
idea of the topics
appears as a complete working out of Buddhadatta's
of Abhidhamma. The book is in five parts: 'thought', 'mental elements',
and 'concept', each divided into several chapters.
'Concept' occupies Chapters 27-29. This Anuruddha says by way of in
'matter', 'extinction'

troduction to his book that ultimate reality (paramattha) is of four kinds

(the first four parts of his work) and 'concept' of two kinds, "concept of
a name"

(nmapaatti, cf. the commentary on "The Concept of a

above) and "concept of an object" (or of a 'meaning', atiha
paatti) (verses 6 and 7). Chapter 27 is on 'concept' in general, Chapter
28 on "concept of an object" and Chapter 29 on "concept of a name".
Person"

A "concept of an object" is a conceptual object such as a 'being' or a

'collection' (sambhra, of parts into a supposed 'whole') or a 'shape', and
so on, superimposed by usage on features having imagining as their basis
(1066). A "concept of a name" is a name making some object (or mean
ing) understood. There are two kinds of 'object', ultimate reality (para
mattha) and conceptual object {paattattha) ; in other words conceptual

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A. K. WARDER

194

objects (and concepts generally) do not overlap with the ultimately real
elements discussed in the previous parts of the book but form a distinct
category. A conceptual object or concept of an object is therefore a
"concept based on" (1070). 'Concealing truth', being concepts, is hence
of two kinds, conceptual objects and names. These with 'ultimate truth'
make up three kinds of meaning to be known. Ultimate truth is 'not
by the nature of reality; concealing truth is
(avisamvdaka)
the
'not contradicted' by
agreed usage of the world (1083-1084). In other

contradicted'

words one discourses in conformity to the linguistic usages of the world

when using everyday language, even when teaching doctrines which are
true (thus teaching them indirectly). On the other hand in philosophical
one speaks simply in conformity to reality.
The conceptual objects or concepts of objects are for example 'beings'
such as 'human beings' and the like, also the 'agent' or the 'experiencer'
supposed to transmigrate from existence to existence. This 'being' is
discourse

imagined as the 'person', 'I', 'self', 'other', 'woman', or 'man'. It is not

spoken of apart from the 'groups' (which really occur) and is thus a way
of speaking of the groups themselves. When we speak of a person 'dying'
or 'being born', and so on, we are speaking metaphorically (upacratas)
of the splitting up, etc., of the groups. A 'person' cannot be spoken of as
'one' or 'manifold' or 'annihilated' or 'eternal'.
an

Besides this 'being' concept, there are nine other types of "concept of
(e.g. 'chariot',
object", namely 'collection', 'shape', 'combination'

e.g. 'yogurt'),
'imaginary'
'house'),
'development'
(transformation,
(vikappa, purely conceptual entities such as 'time', 'space' and 'direction'),
'copy' ('counterpart' of something perceived), 'feature' (e.g. 'lightness'),
'usage' (e.g. a 'serious transgression') and 'superimposing' (e.g. 'that is
the universe', 'that is my soul', 'permanent', 'eternal', etc., and all the
false concepts of other schools of philosophy).
The chapter on the "concept of a name" is primarily concerned with
and linguistic categories, such as types of noun and how they
originate. The six types of concept, 'occurring', 'not occurring' and so on
are given here, however, as types of concept of a name, and the work

language

concludes

with these.

The Paramatthavinicchaya
appears to represent the culminating point
of Theravda discussion about concepts. Short of putting 'concept' first
and subsuming the discussion of the ultimately real elements under this it

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

THE

CONCEPT

OF

A CONCEPT

195

would hardly be possible to develop the concept of a concept further.

The excellent and comprehensive manual of Kassapa,
Mohavicchedanl
all
the
aware
of
12th
(late
century), though apparently
preceding discus
sions, does not seem anywhere to go beyond them, and its plan as an
exposition of the Abhidhamma itself, with its commentaries, hardly allows
for innovations. Nevertheless Kassapa brings in "concept of a name" and
"concept of an object" under the main discussion on concept of a person
(p. 246): the former can be 'occurring', the latter are not 'occurring'. This
was perhaps the best attempt which could be made towards reconciling
the two Anuruddhas, also towards bringing the commentary tradition
Where Kassapa
into line with the innovations begun by Buddhadatta.
discusses the six types, 'occurring', etc., in detail (pp. 110-111),
he seems to agree with Anuruddha of Kci.

however,

It may be useful to summarise the main trend of these discussions in the

form of a diagram, following primarily Anuruddha of Kci:
KNOWABLE

CONCEPTS

REALITY

NAMES

matter
f sensations
rol

(making

gji perceptions
forces

(volition,

consciousness
(thought)

understood)

CONCEPTUAL
(requiring

OBJECTS

to be made

'being'

etc.)

language
of the world)
(usage
'
|
"4 occurring

understood)

'person'
not occurring

'I"

'agent'

extinction
{.nirvana)

'man'
(including
for
synonyms
the same

'horse'
'pot'

reality)

'time'
'square'
( collections,
('concepts

shapes,
based

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

etc.)
on')

A. K. WARDER

196

There remains one other writer on 'concept' whose contribution must

be noted, though it takes us into linguistics rather than philosophy.
Taking the Netti analysis as his starting point, Aggavamsa (middle of the
12th century) in his Saddaniti explains 'concept' as that which causes a
meaning to be discerned (or causes one to be conscious of it) by sharpening
the intellect and producing satisfaction in various ways (pp. 908-909). He
then illustrates 'concept' by quoting such manifold explanations, of ele
ments such as 'matter', in other words discourses which are 'elaborate
expositions' and of which 'concept' is the meaning (cf. the Netti, above).
This is 'making understood' by means of an 'elaborate exposition'. After
wards (pp. 911-912) he refers to nanda's distinction of 'name concept'
(concept of a name) and 'concept based on', but appears dissatisfied with
it since all concepts are by nature names or speech. The 'meaning' con
veyed by a linguistic expression
'speech'

cannot

ultimately be separated

from

(sadda).

University of Toronto
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For

the Pali

Suttanta

and

Pali Text Society, London,

S = Sarpy ut ta Nikya).

Abhidhamma
texts and commentaries
the editions
of the
are referred to (D = Digha Nikya, M = Majjhima
Nikya,

ed. by A. Barua, P[ali] T[ext] S[ociety],

1949.
ed. by E. Hardy, PTS, 1902.
ed. by H. C. Warren and Dharmananda
Kosambi,
Visuddhimagga
Mass., 1950.
Series, Cambridge,

Pefakopadesa

Nettipakarana

Kathvatthu
on the Puggalapaatti,
and
commentaries
and 1912 respectively.
the Journal of the PTS, 1914,1889
Abhidhammvatra
Buddhadatta:
(ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta),
Part I Atthaslini
nanda:
Mulafika,
Linatthapadavannan
1938.
Vidyodaya
JikiL Series, Colombo
Vimaladhamma),
The

Dhammapla:
Anuruddha

Saccasankhepa
(I):

TS, 1884.
Anuruddha
(I):

Harvard

Yamaka
PTS,
(ed.

Oriental

will be found

in

1915.
by Paasra

and

Journal of the PTS, 1919.

(ed. by P. Dhammrma),
Journal of the
(ed. by T. W. Rhys Davids),

Abhidhammatthasagaha
Nmarpapariccheda

(ed.

by A. P. Buddhadatta),

Journal

of the PTS,

1914.
the writer has been fortunate in being able to
(13): Paramatthavinicchaya,
after collating
several manuscripts,
a transcript made by A. P. Buddhadatta
which it is hoped will soon appear in print (PTS).
and A. K. Warder),
Mohavicchedani
PTS, 1961.
Kassapa:
(ed. by A. P. Buddhadatta
Av Kungl.
Lund
Saddaniti
Smith),
(Skrifter Utgivna
(ed. by Helmer
Aggavarpsa:
Anuruddha
use

I Lund), 1928-66 (6 parts).

Vetenskapssamfundet
A. K. : Indian Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass,
Delhi, 1970.

Humanistiska
Warder,

This content downloaded from 194.95.59.195 on Sun, 15 Feb 2015 06:44:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions