International Dimension of Ethnic Conflicts

The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory
Authors(s): David Carment

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 137-150
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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 2, 1993, pp. 137-150
The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict:
Concepts, Indicators, and Theory*
DAVID CARMENT
Department of Political Science, McGill University
One of the growing debates among students of international politics concerns the precise linkage
between ethnic conflict and international conflict. The present investigation attempts to contribute to
this dialogue in three ways. First, prior studies of ethnic conflict and international relations are
reappraised in terms of the central concepts and presumed causal linkage, leading to several changes in
approach. Specifically, a typology of ethnic conflicts is devised deductively, including a rank ordering of
types of ethnic conflicts in terms of the impact they have on levels of international violence. Second,
testing focuses on the presumed ordering of ethnic conflicts from anti-colonial, secessionist and
irredentist utilizing data from the International Crisis Behaviour Project on cases in the period 1945-81.
A set of bivariate and multivariate indicators and an index of violence are used in the assessment of the
proposed impact ethnic conflicts have on interstate violence. Four of the five propositions are
confirmed. Third, the paper offers some preliminary conclusions about the policy and theoretical
implications of the international dimensions of ethnic conflict, including directions for future research.
The conflicts which are of global concern involve

of successive "'conflicts on the ground"' (p.
deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recog-
86). In view of the fact that there are over
nition and of participation that are usually denied to
5,000 different ethnic groups in the world it

ethnic minorities in addition to issues of security
and other values that are not negotiable (Burton,
1987, p. 5).
is perhaps not surprising that of the 180
existing states in the international system
only a handful embody the principles of
nation-states (United Nations Report on
1. Introduction
Ethnicity and Development, 1987). Indeed,
as Ryan has argued, 'multi-ethnic states are

1.1 Statement of Research
likely to continue to be a feature of politics

The persistence and resurgence of ethnic
both within and between sovereign states'

conflict in the latter half of this century
(1990, p. 174). The lacunae of research on

presents a paradox to theorists and policy-
the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict is

makers alike. As Anthony Smith percep-
clearly a case in which theory has lagged

tively notes, 'there is widespread feeling,
behind emerging realities.

popular and academic, that state interests
From a policy perspective, it is no longer

and the imperatives of the system of states,
possible to ignore the widespread tenacity of

economic as well as political, furnish both
ethnic conflict and the way in which it is

the causes and the issues for most wars'
deeply influencing current interstate behav(1986, p. 65). Such a perspective, Smith
iour. For some states, ethnic conflict

argues, 'grossly underestimates the potency
presents a wide range of challenges for

of certain kinds of identity and community
foreign policy and interstate cooperation.

and systematically fails to address the roots
Human rights issues and refugee situations
represent one level in which nations are

* I am grateful to Patrick James, Michael Brecher, Jer-
ome Black, Hudson Meadwell, Brian Job, Blema
Steinberg and Hamish Telford and the reviewers and
closely interlinked by ethnic conflict. Con-
flict management, conflict resolution and
editor of JPR for helpful comments on the earlier drafts

intervention in civil wars another (Azar,
of this paper. I would also like to thank the Department
1990; Heraclides, 1991).
of National Defence (Canada) and the Social Sciences
Such theoretical and policy concerns are

and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their
support in this research.
pressing given that ethnic conflicts often
138 David Garment
assume a 'chronic and bitter character', in
ing variable. The second stage is a consider-
which human beings are prepared to 'sacri-
ation of a crisis-based model which specifies
fice their lives and inflict violence on each
the relationship between types of ethnic
other that seem far from insignificant - or
conflict and levels of interstate conflict in
amenable to rational, peaceful solution'
terms of the frequency of violent outcomes.
(Smith, 1986, p. 65). Interestingly, though
Third, the methodology and operationaliz-
many scholars recognize the protractedness
ation of the variables are presented. Fourth,
of ethnic conflicts and their oft violent
the empirical evidence is examined and
nature, few have argued that this intensity
assessed. Fifth, and finally, implications of
of violence poses a major threat to the vi-
the results and directions for further
ability of the contemporary state and inter-
research are explored.2
national system (Birch, 1989, p. 229). For
example, in their 1977 assessment of eight
case studies, Suhrke & Noble concluded
2. Theoretical Considerations
that internal ethnic conflict did not comprise
a significant source of international conflict
2.1 The State and Ethnic Conflict
Two theoretical orientations have been used
(1977, p. 231).1
In sum, the impetus for this inquiry is de-
to explain the involvement of states in
rived from two basic assumptions. First, the
ethnic conflicts. More specifically, elite
neglect of the study of ethnic conflict within
decision-making is shaped by both instru-
international relations theory needs to be
mental and affective motives (Heraclides,
rectified. Second, this study has implications
1990; Suhrke & Noble, 1977). From the
for understanding why ethnic conflicts tend
point of view of states at the decision-
towards violence even though, as earlier
making level, instrumental motivations for
argued, such conflicts do not constitute a
involvement in ethnic conflicts include, (1)
major source of international conflict
international political considerations; (2)
(Suhrke & Noble, 1977). Two questions
economic gains; (3) domestic or internal
are pertinent to this inquiry. 1. What types
politics; and (4) military considerations
of ethnic conflict have an international
dimension? 2. Can ethnic conflict account
for differences in levels of interstate viol-
(Heraclides, 1990).
Instrumental variables are also useful in
explaining the behaviour of groups within
ethnic conflict settings (Meadwell, 1991).
ence?
Presumably, a study of the international
Approaches that stress the instrumental
dimensions of ethnic conflict can have
aspects of ethnic group behaviour
broader applicability towards a theory of the
encompass two basic assumptions. First,
management and resolution of ethnic con-
ethnic identification is created or main-
flicts by delineating the conditions under
tained as a basis for collective action when
which conflicts take on a range of possi-
there are clear competitive advantages
bilities from non-violent outcomes to full-
attached to an ethnic identity. Secondly,
ethnicity is defined situationally as a set of
scale war.
In order to respond to these questions this
inquiry will: (1) empirically assess the
impact that ethnic conflict has upon levels of
socially attributed characteristics having
both behavioural and identitive dimensions.
The fluidity of ethnic identity is dependent
interstate violence; (2) determine the con-
on the situational constraints and the stra-
ditions under which interstate ethnic conflict
tegic utility attached to the identity. The
is most likely to result in violent outcomes;
idea of situational ethnic identification
and (3) make a theoretical contribution to
means that various ethnic boundaries are
the understanding of the linkages between
activated in different situations in order to
ethnicity and interstate conflict. For the
achieve specific goals. Instrumental argu-
present investigation the point of departure
ments suggest that ethnic conflict carries
is an overview of a reformulated approach,
with it a distinctly political nature and has
with an emphasis on ethnicity as the defin-
shifted away from purely cultural and
International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict 139
linguistic spheres to political and often terri-
desh-Pakistan conflict constitutes an
torial appeals for self-determination (Mead-
example of this second type. Or, consider in
well, 1991).
this context the motivations of Indian elites
Instrumental perspectives often fall short
in explaining the behaviour of all the actors
within an ethnic conflict (Heraclides, 1990).
In some instances, elite decision-making
to send troops to Sri Lanka in 1987. Both
affective and instrumental considerations
played an important role in this decision
(Carment, 1992).
and ethnic group behaviour are also imbued
with a powerful affective component includ-
ing, (1) historic injustice; (2) common iden-
Still other ethnic conflicts involve the pro-
cesses of de-colonization between colonial
powers and nationalist groups - struggles
tity; (3) religion; (4) a shared sense of injus-
which often lead to interstate conflict. The
tice or principle; (5) a degree of inchoate
encounter between Indonesian nationalists
racial-cultural affinity; and (6) humanitar-
and the Dutch in 1957 over West Irian is an
ian considerations (Carment et al., 1992;
example of this third kind of ethnic conflict
Heraclides, 1990, p. 371).3 In sum, states
(Appendix). Anti-colonial ethnic conflicts
and ethnic groups are likely to exhibit both
differ from irredentist and secessionist
affective and instrumental behaviour within
conflicts since the conflict is between a
ethnic conflict settings. On occasion, the
highly motivated (and affectively moti-
two types of motivation are mutually rein-
forcing, while in other instances they are
contradictory.
vated) ethnic group and a colonial power.
Such conflicts often draw in third parties
whose motivations may be both affective
and instrumental in character (Heraclides,
2.2 A Typology of Ethnic Conflicts
There are three types of ethnic conflicts
having an international dimension. The
1990).
The preceding analysis attempts to
demonstrate that there is the potential for
most common type is irredentist, including,
variation among types of ethnic conflicts.
the Arab-Israeli dispute that has lasted
Variation in levels of violence requires con-
through six wars, the conflict over Cyprus
sideration of several factors. First, varia-
and the rival claims to Kashmir by India and
bility is primarily accounted for by the
Pakistan (Appendix).4 The primary actors
degree of affect and instrumental-laden
in irredentist conflicts are states. The behav-
iour of states external to the conflict (for
group behaviour and the levels of sub-
sequent mobilization of ethnic groups by
example US or Soviet Union involvement in
elites towards the pursuit of collective goals,
the Arab-Israeli conflict) may be best
ranging from greater access to resources to
explained in instrumental terms. In con-
trast, the factors that motivate states in
self-preservation, to the creation of a new
state (Gastil, 1979). When affect is a salient
irredentist conflicts where ethnicity is an
aspect of the conflict there is the potential
intrinsic aspect (for example Turkey and
for increased violence (Carment et al.,
Greece involvement in Cyprus) may be best
1992). Second, the presence of 'policies of
understood in both affective and instru-
denial' on the part of at least one group
mental terms (Chazan, 1991; Heraclides,
towards the mobilization of another will
1991).
determine whether an ethnic conflict has the
Less understood from the dual perspec-
tives of theory and policy are those ethnic
conflicts which have their origins within
potential for violence.6 Policies of denial are
often conditioned by the use of force and
are particularly significant in confrontations
state settings but spill over into the inter-
between a state and ethnic minorities such
national arena (Carment, 1992). These are
as secessionist conflicts. Policies of accept-
secessionist conflicts that lead to interstate
ance or denial also arise in conflictual re-
conflict by drawing in third party states,
lations between entire states, particularly in
'self-appointed' regional peacekeepers and
irredentist conflicts.7 When confronted by a
occasionally the major powers (Appendix).5
threat to several core values ethnic min-
India's 1971 intervention in the Bangla-
orities usually have less to lose because the
140 David Garment
'threshold of acceptable costs' is much
of 1928-85. Descriptions of each crisis were
higher than in any one value (Heraclides,
obtained from Crises in the Twentieth Cen-
1989, p. 197). Furthermore, armed struggle
could be an acceptable choice to elites if the
alternative is loss of power, assimilation of
the group, or at worst genocide.8 Third,
tury: Volumes I and 2 (Brecher & Wilken-
feld, 1988).
There are several distinct advantages to
using crisis-based data. First, though all
ethnic conflicts involve overlapping issues
crises are by definition conflicts, not all
which tend to be reinforcing. Once elite
crises necessarily lead to war. Indeed, many
political assertiveness in one issue area is
crises are successfully managed without
imbued with ingroup legitimation and mo-
recourse to war. Hence, the data selected
bilization, the move towards conflict in
capture a broad range of interstate behav-
other issue areas is often irreversible
iour including that behaviour that falls short
(Eldridge, 1979). Elites are often carried
of war but nevertheless exhibits significant
along by the fervor of the groups whose sup-
levels of conflict. Second, the dataset
port they seek. Hence ethnic conflicts tend
provides, among other important indicators,
to be more protracted, formidable and
the number of actor-states in each crisis, the
potentially more violent than non-ethnic
nature of the threat involved (the triggering
conflicts. Alternatively, anti-colonial and
mechanism of the crisis) and the issues over
secessionist ethnic conflicts are militarily
which the crisis occurred. Such information
weaker and garner far less third party aid
is vital for determining under which cate-
than in comparison to irredentist conflicts
gory the conflict falls - non-ethnic, anti-
involving entire states. Irredentist conflicts
colonial, secessionist or irredentist. Finally,
would be expected to be the most violent
the crisis data focus specifically on those
kind of ethnic conflict. Such conflicts have
conflicts that occur at the interstate level.
the potential to escalate to interstate con-
Conflicts which are of either the ethnic or
frontations involving high levels of violence
non-ethnic variety that have not yet pro-
especially when two or more states possess-
duced crises at the international level are
ing sophisticated military hardware are
involved (Rosh, 1987). In sum, there is the
potential for variation among ethnic con-
excluded. For example, the Quebec separ-
atist movement in Canada does not figure in
this analysis as it has yet to produce a
flicts in terms of violent outcomes. It is
foreign policy crisis for any one state. In
hypothesized that violence is a probable
contrast, Lebanon's ethnic conflict of 1958 is
outcome in many but not all interstate con-
included, as it constituted foreign policy
flicts where ethnic conflict is present. Here-
crises for the following actors: Jordan, the
with two propositions:
UK, Lebanon and the US.11
Proposition 1: Ethnic conflicts result in
For the purposes of this research, data for
higher levels of violence than non-ethnic
the period 1945-81 were selected. One of
conflicts.9
the major reasons for narrowing the time
Proposition 2: There is a rank order of
frame to the postwar era is to accord with
ethnic conflicts such that anti-colonial ethnic
the current thought that there has been a
conflicts are the least violent, secessionist
substantial transformation in the character
ethnic conflicts the second most violent and
of ethnic conflicts since the end of World
irredentist conflicts the most violent.
War II. For example, Connor and Smith,
among others, have commented on both the
qualitative and quantitative shift in ethnic
3. Gathering the Evidence
conflicts since 1945 (Gurr, 1990).12 Further-
The data utilized for this research are the
more, the study is concerned with those
actor level set of the International Crisis Be-
cases that are characteristic of the changing
haviour Project (ICB) developed by
international system, a system that began as
members of the Department of Political
Science at McGill University.10 The original
dataset consists of 698 cases for the period
a tight bipolar structure and evolved into a
polycentric system through this period
(Brecher et al., 1990).
Table I. Violence in Ethnic and Non-ethnic Conflicts

3.1 Recoding the Data and
Operationalization
Type of Conflict
A two-stage content analysis for each crisis
Count Nonwas carried out utilizing the working defi-
Column (%) ethnic Ethnic
nition of ethnicity and the typology of ethnic
conflict provided in this investigation.
Levels of 71 75 146
Violence None 35% 29%

Initially, each crisis was coded on the basis
of whether it was deemed to fulfil the full
71 80 151
Low/Moderate 35% 31%

criteria of the working definition.'3 Those
crises that were not considered ethnic con-
60 103 163
High 30% 40%
flicts were coded O and ethnic conflicts were
coded 1. A second coding was carried out

Total 202 258 460
100% 100% 100%
utilizing the typology of ethnic conflicts.
Anti-colonial conflicts were coded 1, se-
Chi-square - 5.24 (p < 0.07); Tau-c - 0.10 (p < 0.01);
cessionist conflicts were coded 2 and irreGamma - 0.16 (p < 0.01).
dentist conflicts were coded 3.14 In the event
that there was some doubt or ambiguity
about the face validity of the conflict it was
coded a non-ethnic conflict. 15
ages in Table I, it can be inferred that ethnic
conflicts more frequently involve modestly
higher levels of violence. Furthermore,
3.2 An Index of Violence - the Dependent
Variable
recalling proposition 1, a greater proportion
of ethnic conflicts result in higher levels of
International violence is a dynamic and mul-
violence than do non-ethnic conflicts and
tifaceted concept. In order to give proper
are less frequently involved in moderate
scope to the multifaceted nature of violence
levels of conflicts and non-violent conflicts.
and the tentative state of knowledge regard-
A proportion of more than 10% (column
ing the causal mechanism linking ethnic con-
percentages) of the crises involve ethnic
flicts and violence, an ordinal index of
conflicts and high levels of violence. Is the
violence utilizing several indicators within
difference significant? The null hypothesis
the dataset was developed. Each indicator
would suggest that types of conflict and
was selected on the basis of its relatedness to
levels of violence are independent of each
the resolution of interstate conflicts. A dis-
other. In Table I chi-square is 5.24, which is
tinction has been made between indicators
significant at the 0.07 level suggesting that
of domestic violence and indicators of inter-
there is a tendency for higher levels of
state violence. As this paper is concerned
violence to occur among ethnic conflicts.
with conflicts having an international scope,
However, the effect fails to show a high co-
the domestic component of violence does
efficient Tau-c 0.10, Gamma 0.16 (p <
not figure in this index.'16 Internal and exter-
0.01).
nal validation procedures were conducted
for the index.'17
Moving from a testing of proposition 1 to
a testing of proposition 2, which utilizes the
typology of ordered ethnic conflicts, the
following relationship is revealed through
4. Testing the Propositions
percentages. Recalling proposition 2, it was
4.1 Bivariate Analysis
flicts corresponding to increases in the fre-
argued that there is a range of ranked con-
Initial analysis of the bivariate relationship
quencies of levels of violence such that non-
reveals the results given in Table I. Recall-
ethnic conflicts will rank lowest, anti-col-
ing proposition 1 of the hypothesis it was
onial ethnic conflicts second, secessionist
argued that a greater percentage of ethnic
ethnic conflicts third and irredentist highest.
conflicts should involve higher levels of
An assessment of this proposition can be
violence than non-ethnic conflicts. Thus,
inferred from reading across the column
from an inspection of the column percent-
percentages in Table II.
142 David Garment
Table II. Violence in Different Types of Conflict
Type of conflict
Count Column (%) Non-ethnic Anti-colonial Secessionist Irredentist
Levels of 71 26 41 8 146
Violence None 35% 40% 32% 12%
71 19 40 21 151
Low/Moderate 35% 30% 32% 31%
60 19 46 38 163
High 30% 30% 36% 57%
Total 202 64 127 67 460
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Chi-square - 23.3 (p < 0.001); Tau-c- 0.15 (p < 0.001); Gamma - 0.21 (p < 0.0001).
Clearly, these are mixed results. For focusing exclusively on the foreign policy
example, while both secessionist and irre- crises of superpowers, all states that
dentist conflicts show higher frequencies of achieved independence up to and including
high violence (56% and 36%) than both 1945 are examined. For example, focusing
anti-colonial and non-ethnic conflicts, as on older states allows consideration of
predicted, it appears that anti-colonial Dutch involvement in Indonesian inde-
ethnic conflicts are more likely to be non- pendence and British involvement in the
violent (40%) and have frequencies of high Palestinian partition of 1947.18 In both
violence equal to that of non-ethnic conflicts instances these old states were crisis actors.
(29%). Herewith a proposition:
Proposition 3. Old state involvement in
4.2 Multivariate Analysis ethnic conflicts will increase their levels of
The purpose of this section is to test for violence.
possible threats to validity through the All states within the ICB dataset were
introduction of control variables. The first recorded as either new or old states depend-
of these multivariate analyses is designed to ing on their date of independence. The
test the conventional wisdom that involve- results for old states are shown in Table III.
ment of the superpowers, the major powers From Table III it is clear that the relation-
and other industrialized states tends to ship becomes stronger as hypothesized. For
exacerbate ethnic conflicts. Rather than example, while the frequency of involve-
Table III. Controlling for Old States
Type of conflict
Levels of 55 12 17 1 85
59 9 20 13 101
Low/Moderate 41% 30% 35% 39%
30 9 20 19 78
High 21% 30% 35% 58%
Total 144 30 57 33 264
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Chi-square - 25.037 (p < 0.0003); Tau-c - 0.22 (p < 0.000); Gamma - 0.34 (p < 0.000).
Table IV. Controlling for New States
Type of conflict
Levels of 16 14 24 7 61
12 10 20 8 50
Low/Moderate 21% 30% 29% 23%
30 10 26 19 85
High 51% 29% 37% 56%
Total 58 34 70 34 196
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
ment in irredentist and secessionist conflicts
in the high violence category remains
unchanged from the original relationship
shown in column percentages in Table II
(58% and 35% compared to 57% and 36%
powers, France and the United Kingdom.
As this analysis is concerned with the period
1945-81, an era of intense Cold War con-
flict, tight bipolar alliances and the
regionalization of conflict, it is perhaps not
in Table II) there are fewer incidents of
surprising that old states have become
involvement in peaceful secessionist and
involved in frequent and violent ethnic con-
irredentist conflicts than there were in the
flicts. In an historical period in which
original table. There are, however, fewer
nuclear weapons prevented the main non-
high-violent conflicts in general than in the
ethnic conflict (the Cold War) from being
original relationship (78 compared to 163)
violent it appears that the major powers
though the proportion of moderate levels of
found themselves involved in proxy wars,
violence increases across the table but par-
many of which may have been the ethnic
ticularly among secessionist and irredentist
conflicts of allies and clients (Heraclides,
conflicts (increases of at least 5%). These
1990). Furthermore, these old states have
results also suggest that old states are likely
the resources to allocate greater percentages
to be involved almost equally in conflicts of
of their GNP to military expenditures and
both the ethnic and the non-ethnic variety
therefore high levels of conflict may be es-
(55% vs 45%). These results indicate two
pecially salient when old states come in con-
things. First the original relationship is not
tact, through their allies, with secessionist
spurious, as the introduction of the control
and irredentist movements such as those in
variable does not lead to entirely different
the Middle East, South Asia, South-East
results but rather moderately strengthens
Asia and Africa. Does a similar relationship
them, a conclusion that supports prop-
hold for the new states as concluded by
osition 3.
Suhrke & Noble (1977, p. 213)?
Proposition 4: New state involvement in
Second, in accounting for the strengthen-
ing of the relationship it is necessary to
consider the age of the state as a variable
that is theoretically related to the indepen-
dent variable. One possibility suggested by
ethnic conflicts will increase their level of
violence.
A partial table controlling for the foreign
policy crises of new states (those that
Rosh is that, on average, ethnic conflicts
achieved independence after 1945) indicates
elicit a military response because they serve
that the original relationship is strengthened,
to destabilize specific regions that have im-
thereby supporting proposition 4.
portant geo-strategic value to old states such
Judging from the results of Table IV it
as the two superpowers the US and the
appears that controlling for new states has a
former Soviet Union, and the major
modest impact upon levels of violence
144 David Carment
among non-ethnic conflicts. On the one
1987). This index is believed to measure the
hand, the frequency of non-ethnic high viol-
relationship of dependence between states
ent crises is 52% compared to 30% for the
and hence the unevenness of economic re-
original relationship. On the other hand, the
lations between states. The index is based
proportion of non-ethnic crises for new
on the assumption that most states partici-
states has dropped dramatically from 202 of
pate in the international economy. It is
460 cases (or 43% of the total) to 58 of 196
argued that the degree of dependence
crises (or 30% of the total). There are also
increases geometrically as the concentration
modest changes for ethnic conflicts across
in one's commodities and in one's trading
the ranges of moderate and high violence.
partners increases. A simple random sample
From this table it can be inferred that while
of the country index was taken (n = 40) and
new states are likely to be involved in viol-
then aggregated by region such that an ordi-
ent conflicts of all types, these are more
nal ranking of dependent economic re-
likely to be secessionist conflicts (70 cases or
lations could be established for five different
regions. The ranking of the control variable
35% of the total vs 34 each for anti-colonial
and irredentist or 17% of the total). This
was as follows: North America = 1, Europe
result is not surprising given that since 1945
= 2, South America = 3, Oceania = 4, Asia
there has been a dramatic increase in the
= 5, Africa-Middle East = 6.
rise of militant separatist and secessionist
For purposes of brevity, only the partial
movements among the newly independent
table showing the control Africa-Middle
states. If developing states are indeed prone
East is given as it is the only one that pro-
to violent conflicts, can developing regions
duced significant results.
The results clearly indicate that in the
also be said to be susceptible to ethnic con-
flicts?
case of the most economically dependent
region, Africa and the Middle East, the
Proposition 5: Economically weak and
dependent regions are prone to violent
original relationship is strengthened, thus
ethnic conflicts.
confirming proposition 5. For example, in
comparison with the original relationship in
To test this proposition, a transformed
index of economic dependence as a control
Table II there are fewer frequencies of non-
variable is utilized. The index attempts to
ethnic conflicts (23 crises of 181 or 12% of
tap many of the aspects of economic depen-
the total vs 202 of 460 crises or 45% of the
dence by multiplying the percentage of a
total) and over 45% (83 crises of 181) of
country's exports that is concentrated in its
conflicts resulting in high levels of violence
(with 69% of irredentist conflicts resulting in
primary commodity by the percentage of its
exports that is accounted for trade with its
high violence). Furthermore, the high viol-
most important trading partner (Rosh,
ent cases follow the hypothesized pattern
Table V. Controlling for Africa and the Middle East
Type of conflict
Levels of 8 16 19 3 46
9 9 24 10 52
Low/Moderate 39% 25% 30% 24%
6 11 37 29 83
High 26% 31% 46% 69%
Total 23 36 80 42 181
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
suggested in proposition 2. Are these results
spective this inquiry has suggested that
significant enough to accept proposition 5?
understanding differences between ethnic
On the one hand, the results are unsatisfac-
conflicts requires a multidimensional
tory because of the failure to produce stat-
approach utilizing both instrumental and
istically significant results for the other
affective assumptions about group behav-
regions, hence consideration must be given
iour. It has been suggested that variations
to the conceptual rather than statistical
in outcomes of ethnic conflicts can be
inferences suggested by these mixed results.
On the basis of preliminary results it is
accounted for by treating ethnic conflict as a
political phenomenon incorporating both a
difficult to accept the proposition that econ-
behavioural and an indentitive component.
omic dependence has a direct effect upon
Second, violence constitutes only one aspect
the frequency of violent ethnic conflicts.
of the multidimensional impact that ethnic
The degree to which a country's geographic
conflict has upon interstate behaviour. What
neighbourhood is characterized by insta-
is needed is the patient and sensitive exam-
bility and the strategic importance of the
ination of ethnic conflicts across a variety of
region to the major powers may also play
dimensions including the claims of rival
important roles in influencing violent out-
ethnic groups as well as the interest of the
comes (Rosh, 1987). However, determining
states involved (Gurr, 1991). The foregoing
the dynamic between economic depen-
analysis decisively shows that any attempt to
dence, regional instability and external
understand the international dimensions of
power interests requires further research. A
ethnic conflict without regard for the role of
second set of factors may be related to the
the state in violent as well as non-violent
propensity towards irredentist movements
outcomes may be theoretically limiting. At
in these regions. More specifically, Africa
the same time, however, it is no good rely-
and the Middle East has been witness to
ing exclusively on statist theoretical perspec-
numerous irredentist conflicts because of
tives to explain those conflicts which involve
postcolonial border demarcation problems
not only states but ethnically divided com-
(Azar, 1990; Heraclides, 1990; Rothman,
munities and regions as well. Third, with
1992).
regard to the theoretical consideration of
the rankings of ethnic conflicts and the evi-
dence suggesting that anti-colonial conflicts
5. Conclusions
are on average less violent than non-ethnic
As stated in the introduction, research on
conflicts, further comparative research util-
the international dimensions of ethnic con-
izing both quantitative and contextual ap-
flict is still in the preliminary stages. The
proaches may be necessary. One possible
contribution of this paper has been the cre-
reason that these rankings were reversed
ation and testing of an index of ethnic con-
from those hypothesized is the overwhelm-
flict and index of interstate violence. Cross-
ing influence of peaceful negotiations within
tabulations were employed to discover how
the process of de-colonization since 1945
the dynamics of ethnic conflicts influence
(Haas, 1983).19 Longitudinal studies incor-
levels of violence in interstate conflicts.
porating longer and shorter time periods
Initial results appear to challenge the pre-
would perhaps reveal more favourable
vailing assumption that ethnic conflicts have
a limited impact on interstate conflict. The
results.
From a policy perspective, the con-
findings suggest that ethnic conflict is an im-
clusions relate to understanding why ethnic
portant explanatory variable in analysing
conflicts are generally more violent than
levels of interstate violence.
Some tentative conclusions can now be
their non-ethnic counterparts. One obvious
problem is the absence of effective conflict
offered, although caution should be exer-
management techniques in areas where the
cised in interpreting the results as alterna-
problem of collective identity is concerned
tive approaches may provide different
(Azar & Burton, 1986). This is particularly
conclusions. First, from a theoretical per-
true wherein the groups involved are not
146 David Garment
states but communities which often lack the
ominous, perhaps, is the possibility that
commitment to and experience of conflict
levels of interstate ethnic violence will
management practices.2 Equally problem-
increase over time.
atic has been the relative neglect of such
conflicts by the international community.
NOTES
A second policy aspect touches upon the
need to redefine the meaning of inter-
1. The example of Bangladesh in 1971 is, of course,
the most well known. An examination of a current

national security, in particular for those
geopolitical map points to potential cases including
states of the developing world wherein the
the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and South
major objections by state leaders against

Asia.
refocusing our attention on ethnic conflicts
is that they constitute a potential threat to
2. Ethnic identification can attach itself to any one of
six different criteria including: (i) race - shared
phenotypical features such as pigmentation stature

the leadership and integrity of many states
and facial or hair type, (ii) kinship - assumed blood
(Azar & Moon, 1986). Thus recent efforts in
ties and alleged common ancestry such as is gener-
transcending the intrastate and interstate

ally claimed by clans, tribes and occasionally by
distinctions of ethnic conflict have met with
whole nations, (iii) religion as a leaven of social
allegiances, not as a formal belief system about

success in invoking the primacy of the inter-
ultimate essences, (iv) language - as a vehicle of
national community in ethnic conflict resol-
communication and as a symbol of ethnic and cul-
ution, but it remains to be seen if and how

tural identity, (v) customary mode of livelihood -
such approaches can be applied and whether
examples include the Javanese and Bengali who
preen themselves as the bearers of customs and

they will be accepted by leaders sensitive to
cultures superior to those of their neighbours, (vi)

internal security problems (Gurr, 1990;
regionalism - in which groups of people are united
Ryan, 1990). A third implication of this

because of a distinct geographic region (see Roths-
study relates to the fact that the period

child, 1981, pp. 86-87). For Fredrik Barth, the
selected (1945-81) constitutes the time in
critical features of an ethnic group are that it is
ascriptive and exclusive: its continuity depends on

which the Cold War was at its peak. One
the maintenance of a boundary (Barth, 1969, p.
tentative but partial conclusion is that ethnic
14).
conflicts generally tend towards violence

3. Testing of affective variables in irredentist crisis
because the structure of the international
settings has been carried out by Carment et al.
(1992).
system - a bipolar system - prohibited con-
4. For a comprehensive examination of the relationflict between the major powers but not
ship between irredentism and international poli-
among its clients (Tillema, 1989). While it is

tics, see Chazan (1991). On the complex inter-
certainly important to situate local and

relationship between irredentism and secessionist
regional ethnic conflicts in terms of the
movements see Horowitz (1991, pp. 9-22). 'Irre-
dentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomenon,

wider structure of bipolar superpower blocs
Neglected Connections' in Chazan (1991). For
and their client systems it would not serve
Donald Horowitz irredentism contains two distinct
our purposes to identify systemic factors as

subtypes: 'the attempt to detach land and people
the primary source of explanation. More
from one state in order to incorporate them in
another, as in the case of Somalia's recurrent irrelikely the answers to managing, resolving
denta against Ethiopia, and the attempt to detach

and anticipating future ethnic conflicts are
land and people divided among more than one
to be found in both case study and macrostate in order to incorporate them in a single new
level perspectives. Perspectives that on the

state - a "Kurdistan", for example, composed of
one hand provide insight into the question
Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey'
(Horowitz, 1991, p. 10). On the relationship beof how ethnic conflicts shape interstate be-
tween secessionism and separatism, see Meadwell
haviour and on the other hand provide
(1991).
answers to the question as to why ethnicity

5. According to Alexis Heraclides (1991) the inter-
is such a vital and persistent form of political
organization. If the findings of this paper are
national system can respond in one of three ways:
(i) by diffusion and encouragement, (ii) by reconci-
liation, or (iii) by isolation and suppression.

indeed valid then it stands to reason that the
6. For a fuller description of the term 'policies of
end of the Cold War will have only a partial

denial', see Heraclides (1989) and Azar & Burton
effect on reducing the significance of ethnic

(1986).
conflict in international relations. More
7. Values seem to be most susceptible to large-scale
agreement and conflict. There are three important
political world created by the modern states and by
aspects here: First, values have a large affective
nationalism . . . [w]hich amount to the systematic
component. Second, values, because of their level
denial of the aspirations of particular ethnic and
of abstraction, serve as organizing principles for
would be nations for social and political recog-
most other concepts. As Boucher, Landis & Clark
nition, and an inability to make provisions for the
argue: 'There is little that cannot be seen as an
respective security fears and identity needs of vari-
exemplar of a particular value. One could then pos-
ous communities (Smith, 1986, p. 74). A second
tulate that when differences in values are made
important reason is that the results of this study can
salient, the stage is set for inter-ethnic conflict'
more readily be compared to other correlational
(1987, p. 21). Third, some values, such as identity
studies and case studies which use a similar time
and territory, are 'non-negotiable' in confron-
frame though their assumptions and conclusions
tations between ethnic groups (Rothman, 1992).
about the nature of ethnic conflict are somewhat
8. According to Heraclides, armed struggle is the
different. For example, Heraclides (1990) and
result of an ethnic group's quest for identity, posi-
Suhrke & Noble (1977) rely exclusively on cases
tive group distinctiveness and ingroup cohesion
from the postwar era, but test assumptions derived
(1989).
9. The concern here is not absolute differences in
terms of the total number of conflicts but relative
largely from conventional wisdom.
13. These measurements are, admittedly, imprecise.
There are a number of criteria by which to measure
differences - the proportion of each type of conflict
the phenomenon of ethnic conflicts. Having said
resulting in different levels of violence. This focus
this, there appears to be face validity. However,
allows inferences to be made about the impact that
scoring can change according to the measurement
kinds of conflict have upon levels of violence - the
impetus for this investigation.
10. International ethnic conflicts like all international
conflicts are first and foremost foreign policy crises.
used.
14. In order to develop intersubjective agreement on
the nominal definition of ethnic conflict, a second
coding was carried out utilizing a random sample of
In Crises in the Twentieth Century (1988) Michael
75 crisis cases by a colleague familiar with research
Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld define a foreign
on ethnicity. The second coding scored 80% agree-
policy crisis, that is, a crisis viewed from the per-
ment, prior to consultation, for ethnic and non-
spective of an individual state, as: a situation with
three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving
from changes in a state's external or internal en-
vironment. All three perceptions are held by the
ethnic conflicts.
15. Value Type Frequency Percent
0 Non-ethnic 234 47
1 Anti-colonial 64 12
highest level decision-makers of the actor con-
2 Secessionist 127 26
cerned: a threat to basic values, along with the
3 Irredentist 67 14
awareness of finite time for response to the value
threat and a high probability of involvement in
Total 492 100
The discrepancy in total frequencies for non-ethnic
military hostilities. The crisis definition utilizes an
conflicts between these frequencies and the con-
important concept that is useful for this research:
tingency tables (234 vs 202) is accounted for by 32
threat to values. In the case of ethnic conflict,
cases missing data relating to the index of violence.
threat to values is based on an ethnic boundary
The overall number of cases examined in Tables I
between ingroup and outgroup which has the
potential to give rise to group mobilization and
politicization qua separate community, society or
state. Threat to values encompasses: cultural,
political, social, religious and economic values.
11. In contrast to cases selected for this paper the
Suhrke & Noble studies are limited to eight cases.
All but one case includes Islam as a major com-
ponent of ethnicity. The authors also recognize
that their study may have been biased towards
'penetrable' developing states in which radical
challengers of the ethnic status quo were present
and II is therefore 460.
16. V = Index of Violence, where V = V1 + v2 + V3;
vI = severity of violence (the magnitude of
violence from none to full-scale war); v2 = cen-
trality of violence (the importance of violence with
respect to the resolution of the conflict); V3 =
timing of violence (the presence of violence before,
during or after the conflict).
17. Internal validation procedures for v1 and v2; v2 and
V3; and v1 and V3 produced correlations of 0.66,
0.45 and 0.27, respectively. With respect to exter-
nal validation, one indicator that is related to the
(1977, p. 321). Similarly, Heraclides' (1990) assess-
index, but not part of it, was selected. Theoreti-
ment of seven cases concentrates heavily on three
cally speaking, the external validator is linked to
developing regions, the Middle East, Africa and
the index as a whole but not as closely as the actual
Asia and exclusively on secessionist movements
component. The external validator chosen is intra-
(Heraclides, 1990, p. 344).
12. Quantitative aspects include the significant
war crisis (IWC), which refers to crises that occur
during periods of war. Intra-war crises are quite
increase in conflicts (both domestic and inter-
common among ethnic conflicts since many ethnic
national) that have arisen out of processes associ-
conflicts result in violence. If introduced into the
ated with state and nation building, de-colonization
index, the variable IWC might exaggerate the level
and development. Qualitative shifts include 'the
of violence for ethnic conflicts. Pearson corre-
sense of exclusion and failure in the social and
lations between the Index of Violence and the
148 David Carment
external validator are strong at 0.51 (p < 0.01).
Taken together, the results of the external and
internal validation procedures provide ample sup-
port for the construction of an index along the lines
noted above.
18. The distinction is not arbitrary. Most states that
have achieved independence since 1945 are former
colonial possessions, developing states beset with
Brecher, Michael; Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Sheila
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Burton, John, 1987. 'The International Conflict Resol-
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19. If the study were to be extended to include the
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Garment, David, 1992. 'Les dimensions internes des
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Ethnic groups have neither diplomats nor armies
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focus of this investigation has been a comparison
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Non-ethnic conflicts. Expected average levels of violence
- low. In non-ethnic conflicts ethnicity is not a factor in
the triggering of the conflict or in any of its phases from
escalation to resolution. Example - 'The Cod Wars'.
Disputes over fishing rights in waters contiguous to Ice-
land precipitated a crisis for the UK and Iceland from
23 November 1975 to 1 June 1976. On 23 November
British trawler skippers warned the UK that they would
withdraw from Iceland's 200-mile zone unless they
were assured of Royal Navy protection. On the 25th
the British Government, convinced of the danger to the
welfare and safety of the fishermen, dispatched frigates
to Icelandic waters, triggering a crisis for Iceland.
Britain maintained the presence of the Royal Navy in
order to protect the trawlers. On 1 June 1976 an interim
agreement between the two countries was signed in
Oslo allowing British trawlers rights within the 200-mile
150 David Carment
zone. Talks were held under UN auspices and the Nor-
dic Council discussed the economic and military impli-
cations of the crisis and met with the British and Icelan-
dic leaders.
dence in 1949 and reached crisis proportions in 1957.
Following an Indonesian decision to liberate West
Irian, Sukarno appealed to the USSR for political and
military support, which was granted. A new Dutch plan
was designed stressing the idea of self-determination
Irredentist conflicts. Expected average levels of violence
- high. These are protracted ethnic conflicts involving
whole communities and states occasionally escalating to
full-scale wars with high levels of violence and low
levels of negotiation. Core values such as territory and
for the Papuans. In order to focus world attention, the
Indonesian government implemented a small-scale
infiltration into West Irian. This triggered a crisis for
The Netherlands. Active participation by the UN Sec-
retary-General and an announcement by President
population are usually threatened. Both instrumental
Kennedy of the USA to seek a solution actively per-
and affective motivations are highly salient. Irredentist
suaded The Netherlands to drop its demand for Papuan
movements usually lay claim to the territory of an
self-determination on 3 January. According to an
entity - usually an independent state - wherein their
agreement signed by the Dutch and the Indonesians on
ingroup is in a clear numerical minority. Example -
15 August 1962, the UN would supervise the evacu-
Ogaden. War between Ethiopia and Somalia over the
ation of Dutch military forces and take over adminis-
disputed territory of Ogaden lasted from 22 July 1977
tration of the area until it could be handed over to
to 14 March 1978. Since Somalia's independence in
Indonesia not later than 1 May 1963,
1960, Somalia had sought the creation of a 'Greater
Somalia' which would include Djibouti, the Northern
Separatist and secessionist ethnic conflicts. Expected
Frontier District of Kenya and above all the Ogaden on
average levels of violence - moderate. These are ethnic
Ethiopia's border with Somalia. In Ethiopia, the anti-
conflicts that have their origins within state settings and
monarchical revolution of 1974 had brought about the
occasionally involve third party intervention, hence
upsurge of competing regional nationalism - 14 states
they have the capacity to become interstate conflicts.
in Ethiopia were in a state of armed insurrection afford-
Levels of violence are expected to be greater because
ing Somalia an opportunity to realize the long-held aim
they almost always involve policies of denial, the use of
of liberation. On 22 July 1977 Somali troops attacked
force and politically mobilized, well-organized ethnic
the Ogaden and by October most of the disputed terri-
insurgency movements. These conflicts are likely to
tory was completely overrun. At that time the Soviet
become protracted and are also likely to involve spor-
Union came to the aid of Ethiopia in the form of an
adic and violent conflict. Motivations of the actors are
airlift of weapons and after that air and military person-
imbued with high instrumental and affective content.
nel. A counter-offensive involving Cuban and Ethio-
Example - Bangladesh. The crisis over Bangladesh
pian troops managed to retake most of the territory by
took place from 25 March to 17 December 1971. In
March 1978. By 14 March 1978 the Somalis formally
mid-February 1971 a decision was taken by the military
withdrew, conceding victory to Ethiopia. Source:
rulers in West Pakistan to suppress the growing fervor
Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1988.
of East Bengal nationalism. Military personnel were
posted to the East. On 1 March President Yahya Khan
Anti-colonial ethnic conflicts. Expected average levels of
postponed the opening of the assembly. This was pro-
violence - low-moderate. These conflicts, where ethni-
tested by the Awami League, which launched a non-
city is deemed to be a factor in the triggering of the
cooperative movement on the 6th. The UN approached
conflict and in all of its phases, are developed from the
by Bangladesh in March 1971 declared the matter an
UN declaration of the right to self-determination and
internal matter for Pakistan. While fighting raged over
policies of de-colonization. These conflicts generally
the spring and summer an estimated nine million refu-
constitute a low to moderate threat to the core values of
gees fled from Bangladesh to India. On 21 November
the protagonists. They involve policies of negotiation as
the Indian Army crossed into West Pakistan already at
well as policies of denial and the occasional use of
war with Bangladesh. Indian forces overwhelmed the
force. Example - West Irian. There were two actors in
Pakistani troops in seceding territory. The war ended
this crisis, Indonesia and The Netherlands. It began in
on 17 December 1971 with Pakistan's surrender and the
September 1961 and ended on 15 August 1962. The
emergence of a new sovereign state on the Indian sub-
dispute over the territory of West Irian (West New
continent.
Guinea) began when Indonesia attained its indepen-
DAVID GARMENT, b. 1959, PhD Candidate in Political Science, McGill University; MA, Norman
Paterson School of International Affairs (1985); Current main research interests: international re-
lations, ethnic conflict and resolution, global change, and conflict processes.

International Dimension of Ethnic Conflicts

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International Dimension of Ethnic Conflicts

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The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators, and Theory

Authors(s): David Carment

? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 2, 1993, pp. 137-150

The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict:

Concepts, Indicators, and Theory*

Department of Political Science, McGill University

The conflicts which are of global concern involve

deep issues of ethnic and cultural identity, of recog-

86). In view of the fact that there are over

nition and of participation that are usually denied to

5,000 different ethnic groups in the world it

and other values that are not negotiable (Burton,

is perhaps not surprising that of the 180

existing states in the international system

only a handful embody the principles of

nation-states (United Nations Report on

Ethnicity and Development, 1987). Indeed,

as Ryan has argued, 'multi-ethnic states are

likely to continue to be a feature of politics

both within and between sovereign states'

(1990, p. 174). The lacunae of research on

the interstate dimensions of ethnic conflict is

clearly a case in which theory has lagged

behind emerging realities.

From a policy perspective, it is no longer

possible to ignore the widespread tenacity of

ethnic conflict and the way in which it is

deeply influencing current interstate behav(1986, p. 65). Such a perspective, Smith

iour. For some states, ethnic conflict

presents a wide range of challenges for

foreign policy and interstate cooperation.

Human rights issues and refugee situations

represent one level in which nations are

ome Black, Hudson Meadwell, Brian Job, Blema

Steinberg and Hamish Telford and the reviewers and

closely interlinked by ethnic conflict. Con-

flict management, conflict resolution and

editor of JPR for helpful comments on the earlier drafts

of this paper. I would also like to thank the Department

1990; Heraclides, 1991).

of National Defence (Canada) and the Social Sciences

Such theoretical and policy concerns are

support in this research.

pressing given that ethnic conflicts often

138 David Garment

assume a 'chronic and bitter character', in

ing variable. The second stage is a consider-

which human beings are prepared to 'sacri-

ation of a crisis-based model which specifies

fice their lives and inflict violence on each

the relationship between types of ethnic

other that seem far from insignificant - or

conflict and levels of interstate conflict in

amenable to rational, peaceful solution'

terms of the frequency of violent outcomes.

(Smith, 1986, p. 65). Interestingly, though

Third, the methodology and operationaliz-

many scholars recognize the protractedness

ation of the variables are presented. Fourth,

of ethnic conflicts and their oft violent

the empirical evidence is examined and

nature, few have argued that this intensity

assessed. Fifth, and finally, implications of