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US vs DORR2 Phil 332
Administration as an Organization Distinguished from Government
FACTS:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
oense of writing,publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the InsularGovernment of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of c t !o. "#" of the$ommission,
which is as follows%&'ver( person who shall utter seditious words or speeches,
write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libelsagainst the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or whichtend to disturb
or obstruct an( lawful o)cer in e*ecuting his o)ce, or which tend to instigate others
tocabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, orwhich tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities, or to disturb the peace of the communit(,the safet( and order of the
Government, or who shall +nowingl( conceal such evil practices, shall bepunished
b( a ne not e*ceeding two thousand dollars or b( imprisonment not e*ceeding two
(ears, orboth, in the discretion of the court.& The alleged libel was published as an
editorial in the issue of the &-anila reedom& of p ril /, 0#1", underthe caption
of& few hard facts.&
ISSUE:
2hether or not the article be regarded as embraced within the description of
&scurrilous libelsagainst the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands&
RULI!:
!o.
whose hands the reins of government arefor the time being 7the chief ministers or
heads of departments.& 76ouvier, 9aw 4ictionar(, 8#l. 6ut thewriter adds that
the terms &government and ::administration& are not alwa(s used in their
strictness, andthat &government& is often used for ::administration.:: The article in
3uestion contains no attac+ upon the governmental s(stem of the United States,
and it is3uite apparent that, though grossl( abusive as respects both the
$ommission as a bod( and some of itsindividual members, it contains no attac+
upon the governmental s(stem b( which the authorit( of theUnited States is
enforced in these Islands. The form of government b( a $ivil $ommission and a
$ivilGovernor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are intrusted with
the administration of thegovernment that the writer is see+ing to bring into
disrepute b( impugning the purit( of their motives,their public integrit(, and their
private morals, and the wisdom of their polic(. The publication of the
article,therefore, no seditious tendenc( being apparent, constitutes no oense
under c t !o. "#", section 8.
RATIO:
MECANO vs.COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some
act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding
petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination
of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners
claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to
Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA to
the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73,
S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for
favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section
was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He
commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees
Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred
after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro
to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme
Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the RAC
HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to
give due course to petitioners claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent
law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by
incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A
declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific
law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of
whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the
new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative
Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing
clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an
example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the
intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied
repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of
the earlier one.
2.
If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on
the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be
no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by
implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:
Contract A a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and. Leveriza
over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.
Contract B a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between
Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to
3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff
Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25
years.
There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts
of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same
parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is
4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to
3,000 square meters.
It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it
appears that defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for
durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil,
and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit:
(1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of time that also overlapped.
Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased.
This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of
brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already
been cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that Contract C with the
defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land,
subject to the present litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has
never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C
between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by
Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the
violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of
Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not
having been approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not
valid.
After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has
therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28,
1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;
3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is
still valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was
properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the
President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute
the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the
Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered
into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil
was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. Said motion was however denied.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this
petition for Review on certiorari.
ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract A at the time of its execution was a valid
contract. The issue therefore is whether or not said contract is still subsisting after
its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with
Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another
contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of
Contract A
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
YES
Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee
specifically for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the
latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased
premises, the provision of paragraph 7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in
such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In
any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of
this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of the above-mentioned terms
and conditions of the contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract
by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.
It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease
(Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of
the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA
addressed to Rosario Leveriza.
Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation,
claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the
cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director
of CCA who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or
setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of
the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation
or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in
Contract A which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is
evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said
Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant
The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case. The
dismissal was anchored on the provision of the Rules of Court stating that only
natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
case.
Petitioner ISA moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
ISA went on appeal to the CA, which affirmed the order of dismissal of the trial
court. At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals held that it was premature
for the trial court to have ruled that the expropriation suit was not for a public
purpose, considering that the parties had not yet rested their respective cases.
Hence this Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WON the RP is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of
ISAs term.
HELD: The Decision of the CA to the extent that it affirmed the trial courts order
dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the
RPfor petitioner ISA
YES
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be parties to a civil action:
Sec. 1. Who May Be Parties. Only natural or juridical persons or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Examination of the statute which created petitioner ISA shows that ISA falls under
category (b) above. P.D. No. 272, as already noted, contains express authorization
to ISA to commence expropriation proceedings like those here involved. It should
also be noted that the enabling statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into
certain kinds of contracts for and in behalf of the Government in the following
terms: xx
(i) to negotiate, and when necessary, to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the
government, for the bulk purchase of materials, supplies or services for any sectors
in the industry, and to maintain inventories of such materials in order to insure a
continuous and adequate supply thereof and thereby reduce operating costs of such
sector; xxx
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated
with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in P.D. No. 272 recognizing
ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate
and distinct from that of the Government.
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply
of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality.
The relevant definitions are found in the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined. Unless the specific words of the text, or the
context as a whole, or a particular statute, require a different meaning:
(1) Government of the RPrefers to the corporate governmental entity through which
the functions of government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including,
save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
xxx xxx xxx
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revertback to, and
are re-assumed by, the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying
some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the RP.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry
must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality
of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into GRP and hence assumed once again by the Republic,
no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession
thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the RP and not the NSC, even
though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the
condemnation suit be eventually successful.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the RP is entitled to be substituted in
the expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of
ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did
not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
In E.B. Marcha, the Court also stressed that to require the Republic to commence all
over again another proceeding, as the trial court and CA had required, was to
generate unwarranted delay and create needless repetition of proceedings:
(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from time to
time.
The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the CHP, against calamities such as
landslides due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the
petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management specialist. In fact,
the law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to perform such narrowly
defined monitoring function.
03 September 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications,
Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2,
1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3
o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction
and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not
allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against
the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting
of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They
also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be
directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such
order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government
infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the
bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of
the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the
ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or
transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus,
equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M
had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would
henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta.
Maria Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by
the Philippine and Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly
requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of
the expected profit of the contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official duties.
Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he
was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual
hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified
period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to include elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government
Held: Yes. The word includes used in defining a public officer indicates that the
definition is not restrictive. The terms classified, unclassified or exemption service
were the old categories of position in the civil service which have been reclassified
into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization
of the Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of
1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than
those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and 2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with
that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include
Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or
technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
OPLE VS torres
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the
CSC does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law
(P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to
the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the
CSC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career
Executive Service Board.
HELD: No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature.
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except
for Constitutional offices. The power to restructure granted to the CSC is limited to
offices under it. The law that created the CESB intended said office to be an
autonomous entity although it is administratively attached to the CSC.