Synthese (2012) 187:899912

DOI 10.1007/s11229-011-9908-6

The medieval theory of consequence

Stephen Read

Received: 26 August 2009 / Accepted: 15 April 2010 / Published online: 22 March 2011
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract The recovery of Aristotles logic during the twelfth century was a great
stimulus to medieval thinkers. Among their own theories developed to explain Aristotles theories of valid and invalid reasoning was a theory of consequence, of what
arguments were valid, and why. By the fourteenth century, two main lines of thought
had developed, one at Oxford, the other at Paris. Both schools distinguished formal
from material consequence, but in very different ways. In Buridan and his followers in
Paris, formal consequence was that preserved under uniform substitution. In Oxford,
in contrast, formal consequence included analytic consequences such as If its a man,
then its an animal. Aristotles notion of syllogistic consequence was subsumed under
the treatment of formal consequence. Buridan developed a general theory embracing
the assertoric syllogism, the modal syllogism and syllogisms with oblique terms. The
result was a thoroughly systematic and extensive treatment of logical theory and logical
consequence which repays investigation.
Keywords Aristotle Ockham Buridan Signification Syllogism Modality
Formal Material
1 Medieval logic
The medievals own original contribution to logic was stimulated by the recovery
of Aristotles logic in the Latin West during the twelfth century. Logic at the start
of that century consisted of what is generally known as the logica vetus: Aristotles
Categories and De Interpretatione and the works of Boethius. The logica nova, as it
Paper presented at the Workshop on The Philosophy of Logical Consequence at Uppsala, 31 October2
November 2008.
S. Read (B)
Department of Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews KY16 9AL, Scotland, UK
e-mail: slr@st-andrews.ac.uk

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became known, consisted of the rest of the Organon, all of which was available in Latin
translation by around 1200. The Latin medievals own contribution, usually termed
the logica modernorum, consisted of: the theory of properties of terms (signification,
supposition, ampliation etc.); the theory of consequences; the theory of insolubles;
and the theory of obligations. It is usually taken, following De Rijk (1967), to have
been stimulated by the theory of fallacy, following recovery of Aristotles De Sophisticis Elenchis around 1140. It reached fulfilment in the fourteenth century, the most
productive century for logic before the nineteenth. In what follows, I will concentrate
on the fourteenth century, on the theory of consequence, and in particular on the works
of three significant logicians.
The first is Walter Burley, or Burleigh, born in Yorkshire, England, around 1275.
He was a Master of Arts at Merton College in Oxford University by 1301, and two
early logical works of his are Suppositions and Obligations, both dating from 1302.
He moved to Paris before 1310, and studied theology there until around 1326 or
1327. As was common, however, he continued to teach and write on Arts subjects
throughout this time, and his most famous logical treatise, De Puritate Artis Logicae
(On the essence of the art of logic) was composed in Paris in 1324, though in it
he is clearly aware of developments in England, in particular the ideas of William
Ockhams. Subsequently, he became a member of Richard de Burys circle. De Bury
was the Bishop of Durham, famous for having the largest library in England, who
gathered an intellectual circle round him of the best thinkers in England. Following
Edward IIIs accession to the throne of England in 1327, Burley became envoy to the
papal court. He wrote very many other works, including commentaries on Aristotle,
and died around 1344 or 1345.
William Ockham was born at Ockham (or Oakham) in Surrey in 1287 or 1288
and joined the Franciscans at their London house before 1300. He studied at London
and Oxford, lecturing in Oxford on the Sentences of Peter Lombard in 13171319. He
wrote his Summa Logicae in London around 1323 and shortly afterwards was called
to answer charges of heresy before the Pope in Avignon in May 1324. He escaped
from Avignon to the protection of the Holy Roman Emperor in Munich in May 1328.
He wrote many other works, including commentaries on Aristotle and on political
philosophy, and died in Munich in April 1347.
While the lead in logical, as in all other studies, was forged in Paris in the thirteenth
century, with Oxford following along, in the fourteenth century there was a distinct
split between Oxford and Paris. This started long before the 100 Years War between
England and France, which began in 1337, but it was certainly compounded by it. The
leading logician of the early fourteenth century in Paris was John Buridan, born in the
late 1290s near Bthune in Picardy in northern France. Buridan studied in Paris and
taught there as Master of Arts from the mid-1320s. Unusually, he remained in the Arts
Faculty throughout his career. He wrote his Treatise on Consequences in 1335 or soon
afterwards, and composed his Summulae de Dialectica (Compendium of Dialectic)
from the late 1330s onwards, in eight (or nine) treatises with successive revisions into
the 1350s. His Sophismata, often included as the ninth treatise of the Summulae, has
been much studied in the last 50 years. He wrote many other works, again, mostly
commentaries on Aristotle, and died around 1360.

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2 Properties of terms
Before we turn to the theory of consequence, in the theories of the assertoric and modal
syllogism, we need to look at the medieval theories of properties of terms, in particular, signification, supposition and ampliation. In De Interpretatione 1 (as translated by
Boethius), Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of terms: spoken [words] are signs
(notae) of impressions (passionum) in the soul, and written of spoken. (16a34) Boethius, commenting on Aristotle in the sixth century, interpreted this as saying that
thing, concept, sound and letter are four: the concept conceives the thing, spoken
sounds are signs of the concept, and letters signify the sounds. In contrast, Augustine, a 100 years earlier, but far less influenced by Aristotle, decreed that words signify
things by means of concepts. This raises the question: do words signify concepts or
things? On the one hand, it was said that if words signified things, empty names would
be impossible; on the other, that when I say Socrates runs, I mean that Socrates, not
some concept of Socrates runs.
The thirteenth century insight was to recognise the concept itself as a sign. Ockhams
theory of mental language can be pictured like this:

Ockhams guiding principle was that everything is individualthere are no common natures; so nothing is universal except by signification (nominalism) and mental
acts (concepts) form a language which signifies naturally.
At Paris, Buridan had a rather different, more Aristotelian, theory of signification:

Buridan wrote:
Categorematic words signify things by the mediation of their concepts,
according to which concepts, or similar ones, they were imposed to signify.

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So we call the things conceived by those concepts ultimate significata but

the concepts we call immediate significata. (Buridan 2001, pp. 253254)
Besides the signification of terms, there is also the signification of propositions.
Abelard spoke of the dictum of a proposition, what it signified. The Ars Burana,
written in the twelfth century, says:
We speak about the dictum of a proposition or of the significate of the proposition
or of an enuntiabile For example: A man is an animal is true because what
it signifies is true, and that true thing is the enuntiabile Some enuntiabilia
are of the present, some are of the past and some are of the future. (Anon 1967,
pp. 208209)
Burley spoke similarly of the propositio in re, a mental compounding of the things
themselves outside the mind.1 Ockham tried to explain everything without recourse
to such entities.
The issue at hand was, what is the object of scientific knowledge? The London
debate in the 1320s involved the three Franciscans, William Ockham, Walter Chatton
and Adam Wodeham. Ockham put forward his Razor, though in a more qualified
manner than one might expect:
No plurality should be assumed unless it can be proved by reason, or experience,
or by some infallible authority.2
So Ockham says that the object of knowledge is the mental proposition (complexum),
that is, the actus sciendi (act of knowing) is sufficient on its own, just as for him, the
actus intellectus (the act of conceiving) is the only universal he recognises. Chatton
replied with his Anti-Razor: if n things are not enough to explain something, posit
n + 1.3 Consequently, Chatton claimed that the object of knowledge was the thing or
things signified by the terms in the proposition. Adam Wodeham, a younger contemporary of Ockhams at the Franciscan house in London, countered with the notion of
the complexe significabile, things being a certain way. According to Wodehams via
media, the object of knowledge is the state of affairs (modus rei) signified by the proposition, the complexly signifiable (complexe significabile) that can only be signified
in a complex way, that is, by a proposition.
The doctrine of the complexe significabilia reached Paris by way of Gregory of
Rimini in 1344. As adapted by Gregory, it said that we must recognise enuntiabilia or
complexe significabilia as things:
Every complex or incomplex signifiable, whether true or false, is said to be a
thing (res) and to be something (aliquid).4
But Buridan vehemently rejected all talk of complexe significabilia:

1 See, e.g., Cesalli (2001).

2 See Adams (1987, p. 1008).
3 See, e.g., Keele (2006, p. 25).
4 Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, cited in Zupko (19941997, p. 221).

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If we can explain everything by fewer, we should not posit many, because it

is pointless to do with many what can be done with fewer. Now everything can
be easily explained without positing such complexe significabilia, which are not
substances, nor accidents, nor subsistent per se, nor inherent in anything else.
Therefore, they should not be posited.5
For Buridan, what was signified by a proposition was just what was signified by the
terms in it. Hence, in particular, a proposition and its negation have the same signification.6 We will see that this influenced his theory of truth significantly.
The medieval theory of properties of terms comprised a number of notions besides
signification. Putting it in Ockhamist language, where a terms signification comprises
those things of which it can be truly predicated, supposition comprises those among a
terms significata that it stands for in a particular proposition. Appellation originally
comprised everything of which a term can be truly predicated in the present tense;
later, after falling into disuse, it was remodelled by Buridan to account for intensional
verbs. For some authors, nouns and subjects have supposition; predicates and verbs
have what they called copulation. Ampliation was the property of certain expressions to enlarge and extend the supposition of other terms. Restriction was, similarly,
the property of certain expressions to restrict the supposition of other terms.
For example, some words have the effect of widening or narrowing the supposition
of other terms in a proposition. The past tense ampliates the subject to include past
as well as present supposita. E.g., A white thing was black means that something
which is now white or was white in the past was black. The future tense ampliates
the subject to include future as well as present supposita. Modal verbs ampliate the
subject to possible supposita, as do verbs such as understand, believe, and verbal
nouns ending in -ble: possible, audible, credible, capable of laughter. Other
expressions restrict the supposition of terms, e.g., qualifying man with the adjective
white restricts the supposition of man in A white man is running to white men.
A common doctrine was to say that a proposition is true if things are as it signifies
they are (qualitercumque ipsa significat ita est). Buridan objected:7 if Aristotles horse
cantered well, Aristotles horse cantered well is true, but his horse is now dead, so
nothing at all is signified. Perhaps, he said, a proposition is true if things are, were
or will be as it signifies they are, were or will be. His second objection depended on
his rejection of the complexe significabilia: A man is a donkey signifies that a man
exists, but is not true. His moral was that to assign truth and falsity, we have to go
beyond signification and consider supposition. His full statement, in the Sophismata
(Buridan, 2001, pp. 858859), required a plethora of clauses. A particular affirmative
proposition is true when subject and predicate supposit for the same; a particular negative is true when the predicate does not supposit for everything for which the subject

5 In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Quaestiones, cited in Zupko (19941997, p. 224).

6 This may remind one of Wittgensteins remark in his Notes on Logic: The chief characteristic of my

theory is that, in it, p has the same meaning as not- p (Potter 2009, p. 281). However, he goes on:
p has the same meaning as not- p but opposite sense. The meaning is the fact. [p. 288] This is again the
acceptance of significates of propositions that Buridan rejected.
7 Sophismata, in Buridan (2001, Chap. 2); cf. Hubien (1976, I.1).

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supposits; a universal affirmative is true when whatever the subject supposits for the
predicate also supposits for; and so on.
3 Consequence
Buridan wrote:
Now a consequence is a molecular proposition, for it is composed from several
propositions conjoined by the expression if or by the expression therefore or
something similar. (Hubien 1976, I.3)
Thus a consequence consists of several premises (antecedentia) and a conclusion (consequens). But it can also be taken as a single conditional proposition, with antecedent
and consequent. A consequence is by definition a valid consequence. E.g., if one proposition is antecedent to another, that means that the other does indeed follow from
it, and is succedent to it.
There are two main divisions of consequences. They first divided consequence into
formal and material consequence. These were treated differently in Oxford and in
Paris. For example, according to Buridan:
A formal consequence is one that holds for all terms retaining the same form,
or if you wish to speak carefully for which any equiform proposition which
might be formed would be an acceptable consequence. For example, That which
is A is B, so that which is B is A A material consequence is where not every
proposition of the same form is valid , e.g., A man runs, so an animal runs,
because it is not valid with these terms: A horse walks, so wood walks No
material consequence is evident except by reduction to a formal consequence by
the addition of some necessary proposition. (Hubien 1976, I.4)
There is a significantly different account of formal and material consequence in
England. A typical English view is expressed by Robert Fland, writing in Oxford
around 1350:
General rules are given in order to appreciate when an inference is formally valid.
The first is this: where the conclusion is formally understood in the premises.
For example, this inference is formally valid: There is a man, so there is an
animal because the conclusion animal is formally understood in the premise,
namely, man. (Spade 1976, p. 57)
Thus in the English tradition, formal consequence includes what Spade (1974, p. 78)
calls analytical validity. The examples of material consequence that are given in
English writers are limited to the strict implicational paradoxes:
from the impossible anything follows (ad impossibile sequitur quodlibet): e.g., If
a man is an ass, there is a stick in the corner.
the necessary follows from anything (necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet):8 e.g.,
If a man runs, there is a God.
8 Note the increasingly prevalent use of ad with the accusative in medieval Latin to replace the dative or
ablative.

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The other main division was between simple and ut nunc consequence. In a simple
consequence, the premises can never be true without the truth of the conclusion. In
contrast, a matter-of-fact or ut nunc consequence (sometimes also translated as-ofnow) can have true premises and a false conclusion at some time, but not at present.
For example:
Every man is running
So Socrates is running
is valid ut nunc only while Socrates (exists and) is a man. Both simple and ut nunc
consequence allow suppressed premises, but only necessary truths may be suppressed
in simple consequence.
Buridan gives an intriguing example of ut nunc consequence:9
A white cardinal has been elected Pope
I see this man
So I see a deceitful man (homo falsus)
In 1335, the newly elected Pope, Jacques Fournier, was a member of the Cistercian
order of white monks. He was a fierce opponent of fourteenth-century innovations
in logic even before his election as Pope Benedict XII. Material consequence ut nunc
can be reduced to formal consequence in Buridans sense, to hold solely in virtue of its
form, by the addition of a contingently true premise (in this case, The white cardinal
is a deceitful man). Simple material consequences reduce to formal consequences by
adding a necessarily true premise.
An unknown author, writing in Paris probably in the 1340s (now known as PseudoScotus because his works were published with Scotus in a seventeenth-century
edition), challenged the modal criterion that a consequence is valid just when it is
impossible for the premise to be true and the conclusion false.10 Consider the argument: God exists
So this consequence is invalid.
According to the modal criterion, any consequence with a necessarily true conclusion
is valid. But the above consequence does have a necessarily true conclusion. For suppose it were valid. Then the premise would be true and the conclusion false, so it would
be invalid. It follows, by reductio ad absurdum, that its invalid. This proof of invalidity depends only on the assumption God exists, which (Pseudo-Scotus certainly
believed) is necessarily true. So that the consequence is invalid is also necessarily true.
Thus we have an invalid argument with a necessarily true conclusion. So the modal
criterion must be wrong.
Pseudo-Scotus proposed solution was to add an extra clause, provided how the
conclusion signifies is not incompatible with how the premise signifies. But PseudoScotus argument is a semantic paradox (what the medievals called an insoluble),
as recognised by many, e.g., Albert of Saxony, writing in Paris in the 1350s. For we
9 Hubien (1976, I.4); cf. Hubiens Introduction, p. 9.
10 English translation in Yrjnsuuri (2001, p. 227).

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deduced its conclusion (Its invalid) from its premise (God exists), so it really is
valid (as well as invalid).11 According to Albert, every proposition signifies its own
truth. Having shown it invalid, we infer that things are as the conclusion signifies, and
so its true. But that does not follow: to show its true we have to show that things
are however it signifies. Whether Alberts solution is satisfactory is arguable. But any
decent solution to such paradoxes will rebut Pseudo-Scotus objection.
The doctrine that a consequence is valid if the premise cannot be true without the
conclusions being true was also challenged by Buridan (Hubien 1976, I.3): Every
man runs, so some man runs is valid, but it is possible for the premise to be true without the conclusion even existing, and so without it being true. One might, therefore,
suggest that consequence is valid if the premise cannot be true without the conclusions being true, when both are formed together. That will not work, says Buridan:
No proposition is negative, so no ass is running is not valid (for its contrapositive is
not valid), but the premise cannot be true, and so cannot be true without the conclusions being true. Buridan proposes that a consequence is valid if it is impossible that
however the premise signifies to be it is not however the conclusion signifies, when
they are formed together, provided that however it signifies is not taken literally, but
in the sense given at the end of Sect. 2 above.
4 The syllogism
We need first to rehearse Aristotles theory of the assertoric syllogism, composed of
non-modal propositions. A syllogism is a consequence with two premises, a major
premise and a minor premise, and three terms. The major premise, containing the
major term, is the first premise (the stock definition of the major term as the predicate
of the conclusion did not come until the sixteenth century). The middle term appears
in each premise but not the conclusion. Each proposition is of one of four forms, A-,
E-, I- and O-propositions, forming the Square of Opposition. A-propositions have the
form All A is B (Aa B), E-propositions the form No A is B (AeB), I-propositions
the form Some A is B (Ai B), and O-propositions the form Not all A is B, or
equivalently, Some A is not B (AoB). The medievals for the most part interpreted
A- and I-propositions as false if the subject, A, was empty, and E- and O-propositions
true in such a case:

11 Albert of Saxony (1988, p. 360). Cf. Currys paradox (Lb 1955, p. 118) in this form: If this proposition

is true, God does not exist.

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Contraries cannot both be true; subcontraries cannot both be false; contradictories

cannot both be true and cannot both be false. Subalterns are consequences of the
propositions to which they are subalternate.
Aristotle, and the medieval tradition, took there to be three figures:
Figure I

where the middle term is subject of one premise and predicate of the
other;
Figure II
where the middle term is predicate of both premises; and
Figure III where the middle term is subject in both premises
What later became known as the fourth figure is here construed as an indirect form of
the first figure. We can display the three figures as follows:
Figure I (direct)
MP
SM
SP

Figure I (indirect)
MP
SM
PS

Figure II
PM
SM
SP

Figure III
MP
MS
SP

The famous medieval mnemonic then tells us which forms are valid (separating the
three figures by semi-colons):
Barbara Celarent Darii Ferio Baralipton
Celantes Dabitis Fapesmo Frisesomorum;
Cesare Camestres Festino Baroco; Darapti
Felapton Disamis Datisi Bocardo Ferison.
The vowels give the form of the premises and conclusion. Aristotles theory of the
assertoric syllogism was based on the dictum de omni et nullo: whatever is asserted
of a (quantitative) whole is asserted of its part, and whatever is denied of the whole is
denied of the part.12 These principles establish the validity of the direct moods in the
first figure: Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio. All other moods can be reduced to one
of those four, the one beginning with the same consonant by the system of reductions
which are encoded in the consonant following each vowel in the mnemonic. For example, s instructs one to perform simple conversion on that proposition (see below),
m to interchange the premises, p to perform conversion per accidens and c to
perform reduction per impossibile. The rules of conversion are:
Simple conversion: Ai B implies Bi A and AeB implies Be A
Conversion per accidens: Aa B implies Bi A
Reduction per impossibile requires interchanging the negation of one premise with
the negation of the conclusion.
Here is an example of reduction, reducing Camestres (aee in Figure II) to Celarent:

12 Although not found explicitly in Aristotle, the dictum de omni et nullo is commonly traced to Prior
Analytics I 1 (24b2830): We say that one term is predicated of all of another whenever no instance of
the subject can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted; to be predicated of none must be
understood in the same way.

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Pa M
SeM
Se P

SeM
MeS

Pa M

Pa M
m tells us to interSe P
the first s tells us to
Se P
change the premises
convert SeM simply
MeS
Me P

Pa M

Sa M
the second s tells us to PeS we now reletter to Se P which is Celarent, eae
convert Se P simply
make S and P
in Figure I.
subject and predicate
of the conclusion
The validity of Celarent therefore entails () the validity of Camestres.
In the fourteenth century, the syllogism was brought under a general theory of
consequence. Buridan, in particular, treats the syllogism as a special case of formal
consequence. Indeed, he introduces a novel approach to demonstrating the validity
of assertoric syllogisms. For example, he establishes the following theorems (Hubien
1976, III 4):
2. No valid syllogism has two negative premises
6. In every valid syllogism, the middle term is distributed at least once
8. Any term distributed in the conclusion must have been distributed in the premises.
Then he can go systematically through all combinations of premises and conclusion
and identify the valid syllogisms.
Another of Buridans novelties was to consider syllogisms in non-standard form,
e.g., with oblique terms:
No mans donkey (i.e., no donkey of a man) is running
A man is an animal
So some animals donkey is not running
In his translation of Buridans Summulae, Gyula Klima shows how the logical relations
hold analogously between propositions with oblique terms and modal propositions.13
E.g.,
Every man necessarily runs
is contrary to
Some man necessarily does
not run
just as
Of every man every donkey runs

is contrary to

Of every man some donkey

does not run

It is well known that Augustus De Morgan criticised traditional logic as incapable

of explaining the validity of the following inference:14
Every horse is an animal
So every horses head is an animals head.
13 See Buridan (2001, p. 45). However, note that in the middle column, the entries on rows 2 and 5, and 4
and 7, should be interchanged to obtain the right analogy. Cf. Hubien (1976, III II).
14 Wengert (1974, p. 165) notes that the example as traditionally given cannot be found in De Morgan, but
only a version with man in place of horse. See, e.g., De Morgan (1966, p. 29 and 216).

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Buridans theory can explain why this is valid. Its an enthymeme, not formally valid,
but valid simpliciter, that is, simply valid. The suppressed premise is the necessary
truth: Every horses head is a horses head. Then the argument has this form:
Every M is a P
Every horses head is an Ms head
So every horses head is a Ps head

Every horse is an animal

Every horses head is a horses head
So every horses head is an animals head.

5 The modal syllogism

Aristotle extended his theory of the syllogism to include the modal operators necessarily, contingently and possibly. He endorsed the K-principles:
If, for example, one should indicate the premises by A and the conclusion by
B, it not only follows that if A is necessary, B is necessary, but also that if A is
possible, B is possible,15
that is:
from (A B) infer A B, and
from (A B) infer A B
He also endorsed the characteristic thesis of necessity: A A (that which is of
necessity is actual)16 and the thesis relating necessity and possibility: A A
(when it is impossible that a thing should be, it is necessary that it should not be
and vice versa).17
However, Aristotle bequeathed a difficult problem to his successors, which often
goes by the title The Problem of the Two Barbaras. Aristotles theory allowed the
premises and conclusion of a modal syllogism to have any of the modes, necessary,
possible, contingent or just assertoric. In particular, it included mixed syllogisms,
with premises with different modality. There are two Barbaras with one modal premise
of necessity, the other assertoric:
Necessarily all M are P
All M are P
All S are M
Necessarily all S are M
So necessarily all S are P
So necessarily all S are P
In Prior Analytics I 9, Aristotle says the first, Barbara LXL, is valid, but the second,
Barbara XLL, is not. The natural interpretation (adopted by the medievals) is that he
reads Necessarily all M are P de re, that is, as All M are necessarily P. But that
conflicts with I 3, where he says that Necessarily all M are P converts simply to
Necessarily some P are M, which seems only to be valid de dicto.
Almost every medieval logician attempted to deal with the problem of the two Barbaras, and almost every one did so differently.18 I will here concentrate on Buridans
15 Prior Analytics 34b2224.
16 De Interpretatione 23a21.
17 De Interpretatione 22b5-6.
18 See, e.g., Thom (2003).

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and Ockhams solutions. First, Buridans. All modal propositions are either taken in
the composite sense (that is, de dicto), or in the divided sense (that is, de re). Nothing
follows from composite modal premises where the mode is possible or contingent.
From composite modal premises of necessity, the conclusion follows in the same
mode. The interesting modal syllogisms are those with divided modal premises, and
with combinations of assertoric and divided modals. Buridan claims that all divided
modal propositions ampliate their subject. Thus, e.g., Every A is necessarily B is
true iff everything which is or might be A must be B. Similarly, Some A is possibly
B is true iff something which is or might be A might be B. We can override this
ampliation by replacing the subject by a what is-phrase, e.g., Everything which is
A is necessarily B.
Paul Thom (2003, p. xiv, 17) sets out a useful notation to represent modal and
non-modal propositions. For terms a and b, let represent inclusion, | exclusion, 
coincidence, a what is (a or) possibly a, and b what is necessarily b. Thus Every
A is necessarily B, for example, is represented as a b , on Buridans view that
the subject is ampliated to what is possible. Buridan set out a Modal Octagon, similar to the Square of Opposition, in which the relations between modal A-, E-, I- and
O-propositions fall in the divided sense.19 Using Thoms notation, we can represent
Buridans modal octagon as follows:

In a series of twenty-eight theorems, Buridan takes us through all the various combinations. E.g., Theorem 15:
In the first figure from an assertoric major [premise] and a minor [premise]
of necessity a conclusion of necessity does not follow, nor does an assertoric
conclusion follow except in Celarent. (Hubien 1976, IV 2)
In particular, Barbara XLL is invalid. Suppose God is, as it happens, creating:

19 Buridan (2001, I 5, pp. 4445). Cf. Hughes (1989, p. 109).

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911

Every God is creating

Every first cause is of necessity God
But not every first cause is of necessity creating.
Nonetheless, Celarent XLX is valid: m| p, s m , so s| p. For s s m
m| p, so s| p.
However, Buridan also rejects Barbara LXL as invalid, by Theorem 16:
From a major [premise] of necessity and an assertoric minor there is always a
valid syllogism in the first figure to a particular conclusion of necessity, but not
to a universal. (Hubien 1976, IV 2)
The reason is Buridans interpretation of necessity propositions as ampliating their
subject. From m p and s m, s p does not follow. For something could
be s which could not be m. For example, suppose only donkeys are white. All donkeys
necessarily bray (if it could be a donkey, it is a donkey). But although on this assumption, all actual white things are donkeys, not everything which could be white (say,
a horse) could be a donkey, so the conclusion (All white things necessarily bray) is
false.
Ockhams analysis of modal propositions is very different. He does not invoke the
notion of ampliation in his account of modal and tensed propositions. Whereas the
ampliative account of tensed propositions takes the proposition, e.g., Some A was
B to mean Something which is or was A was B (Ockham 1974, II 7), claims it is
ambiguous between Something which is A was B and Something which was A was
B. Similarly Ockham (1974, II 9) claims that Some A can be B can mean either
Something which is A can be B or Something which can be A can be B . But
he denies that the corresponding proposition of necessity is ambiguous: Some A of
necessity is B means only that something which is A must be B, and Every A of
necessity is B means only that everything which is A must be B.20
On Ockhams analysis, Barbara LXL is valid (Ockham 1974, III-1 31). It reads:
m p , s m, so s p . In fact, Ockham vindicates Aristotles claim that all
LXL moods in Figure I are valid (Thom 2003, Theorem 8.3):
Celarent: s m| p entails s| p
Darii: s m p entails s  p (for s m is equivalent to s d m for some
d, so for some d, s d p )
Ferio: s m| p entails s  p (for if there is an s, s  p is equivalent to
s d| p for some d, and s m| p entails that for some d, s d m| p )

Buridans account only validates Darii and Ferio LXL, where the major premise is
ampliated:
1. Darii: s m m p entails s  p
2. Ferio: s m m | p entails s  p
20 See, e.g., Priest and Read (1981).

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Synthese (2012) 187:899912

6 Conclusion
Medieval logicians extended Aristotles theory of the syllogism to a general theory
of consequence. Within consequence, they distinguished formal from material consequence, and simple from ut nunc consequence. They developed a theory of properties
of terms, in particular, of signification, supposition and ampliation, which played a
central role in their theory of consequence. Much of their work on the modal syllogism was an attempt to correct and clarify Aristotles theory. John Buridans theory
of consequence and of the syllogism was the most sophisticated and extensive in its
theoretical organisation.
Acknowledgments This work is supported by Research Grant AH/F018398/1 (Foundations of Logical
Consequence) from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, UK.

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