G.R. No. 165896 September 19, 2008 RUSTICO ABAY, JR.

and REYNALDO DARILAG,

Petitioners, V. DE MESA. NARAG. PENA. TUGELIDA. VIBAR 8 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent (DE MESA) FACTS: On January 13, 1995, Information was
filed charging Rustico Abay, Jr., Reynaldo Darilag, Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde,
Ramon Punzalan, Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello
and Danilo Pascual with the crime of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. That on or about
7:30 oclock in the evening of February 17, 1994, at the South Luzon Expressway,
Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna, accused Ramoncito Aban y Casiano,
Ernesto Ricalde y Jovillano, Rustico Abay, Jr. y Serafico, Ramon Punzalan y Carpena,
Reynaldo Darilag y Apolinario, Leonardo Perello y Esguerra and Danilo Pascual y
Lagata, who are principals by direct participation, conspiring and confederating
together with Ariston Reyes y Plaza, Isagani Espeleta y Arguelles and Cesar
Camacho y Deolazo, who are principals by indispensable cooperation and mutually
helping each other, form themselves as band of robbers and conveniently armed
with handguns and deadly bladed weapons, and while on board a Kapalaran Bus
Line and a semi stainless owner type jeep as backup vehicle, accused with the use
of the aforesaid handguns and bladed weapons with intent to gain and taking the
passengers of the bus by surprise, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously divest and take away personalties of the passengers. When arraigned,
all the accused pleaded not guilty. However, upon motion filed by accused
Ramoncito Aban, with the conformity of the public prosecutor and private
complainants Thelma Andrade and Gloria Tolentino, he was allowed to withdraw his
earlier plea of not guilty. Thus, pleaded guilty to the crime of simple robbery
and on even date, the trial court sentenced him. Meanwhile, trial proceeded with
respect to the other accused. Thelma Andrade, a conductress of the Kapalaran Bus
Line, testified that she was on was held-up. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. and
Ernesto Ricalde as two of the other companions of Aban. Gloria Tolentino, a
passenger of the bus, testified that someone shouted hold-up and ordered them
to bow their heads. She obeyed the order but once in a while she would raise her
head. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. as one of the companions of the robbers.
Ramoncito Aban, testified that Camacho and Espeleta, who were both prison guards
of the New Bilibid Prison, took him and his companions, Ricalde, Abay, Jr., Punzalan,
Darilag, Reyes, Perello and Pascual, on board the owner-type jeepney of Camacho to
stage a hold-up. He said they held-up a Kapalaran bus and it was Punzalan and
Darilag who took the money and other belongings of the passengers in the bus. He
further testified that the February 22, 1994 hold-up was the fourth staged by their
group. According to Aban, the other hold-ups were carried out on February 11, 13
and 17, and all four hold-ups were staged by the same persons. All the accused
denied participation in the robbery that happened on February 17, 1994. Abay, Jr.,
Darilag, Reyes and Ricalde, who were detention prisoners, testified that they were
confined in the NBP at the time the incident happened. Pascual and Perello, both
civilians, testified that they were at home then. Genaro Alberto, a prison guard at
the Bureau of Corrections, testified that during the headcount of the inmates
conducted at 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on February 17, 1994, no inmate was found

to be missing. RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31 found petitioners Abay, Jr. and
Darilag, as well as the other accused guilty of the crime charged.The Court of
Appeals on appeal acquitted Espeleta, Camacho and Punzalan of the crime charged
but affirmed the conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, Ricalde and Reyes.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MAY BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONIES OF RAMONCITO ABAN, THELMA ANDRADE AND GLORIA TOLENTINO.
RULING: We note that it was not Abans extrajudicial confession but his court
testimony reiterating his declarations in his extrajudicial admission, pointing to
petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in convicting petitioners
of the crime charged. Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a
conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a
judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence
against those it implicates. Here, the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed
by him in open court during the trial. Thus, such confession already partook of
judicial testimony which is admissible in evidence against the petitioners. DE MESA.
NARAG. PENA. TUGELIDA. VIBAR 9 We likewise agree in finding without merit the
petitioners argument that, since Abans testimony is not credible as to Espeleta,
Camacho and Punzalan who were acquitted, then it should also be held not credible
as to them. But in our considered view, the petitioners are not similarly situated as
their aforementioned co-accused. Other than the testimony of Aban, there were no
other witnesses who testified on the participation of Espeleta, Camacho and
Punzalan. In contrast, anent the herein petitioners participation in the crime, not
only is their conviction based on the testimony of Aban, but it was also established
by the eyewitness testimony of Andrade and Tolentino who identified positively the
petitioners in open court. It is also worth stressing as part of the prosecution
evidence that Aban testified that malefactors used the same route and strategy in
the perpetration of the robberies which happened on four occasions -- February 11,
13, 17 and 22, 1994. What happened on February 22 was but a replication, so to
speak, of the robbery scenarios earlier perpetrated by the same gang on three
previous dates. It is very clear, however, that Aban, on the witness stand was
testifying specifically also about the offense that took place on February 17 in the
Expressway, Bian, Laguna. Petitioners claim that no physical evidence was
presented by the prosecution linking the petitioners to the crime charged. But in
this case, the alleged failure of the prosecution to present physical evidence does
not adversely affect the over-all weight of the evidence actually presented. Physical
evidence would be merely corroborative because there are credible witnesses who
testified on the complicity of petitioners in the crime charged.

.R. No. 181829 September 1, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.
SATURNINO VILLANUEVA, Appellant. (PENA) FACTS: Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals convicted Saturnino Villanueva with three counts of qualified rape

and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay damages.
The victim, AAA (not the real name) is Villanueva's daughter and is believed to be a
minor. The crime was committed in 3 separate instances. During the trial, the
prosecution presented AAA as witness to identify her rapist. However, during the
pre-trial, the birth certificate and medical certificate were marked as exhibit but
were not formally offered as evidence during the trial. The appellant contested that
the documentary evidence used against him should not be appreciated by the court
because those were not formally offered as evidence. ISSUE: Whether the
documentary evidence be admitted given the failure of the prosecution to formally
offer it in court? RULING: No. The Supreme Court agrees with Villanueva's
contention that both the medical and birth certificates of AAA though marked as
exhibits during the pre-trial should t not be admitted by the trial court and the CA
because they were not formally offered in evidence. Section 34 of Rule 132
explicitly provides that "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of evidence. It must be
emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration
of court must formally be offered by the party, otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO

398 SCRA 567, 5 March 2003, EN BANC
Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with
AAA, three (3) years of age, a minor and against her will and without her consent.
AAA described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact
manner in hertestimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three
years old at the time of the rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the
victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence.

Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed
for automatic review of the Supreme Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon
Rullepa
HELD:
A persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance,
especially in rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is
sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In
such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the
court can easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of
the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relativestestimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as
object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes
greater and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of
the
accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age
sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty
ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore,
exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here,
reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much weight and thetestimony of the mother is, by itself,
insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that AAA was below seven years
old at the time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to
suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon
him.