Griswold v.

Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with violating a
statute preventing the distribution of advice to married couples
regarding the prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the
statute violated the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

on

protected

Constitutional

freedoms.

Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly,
it is not unconstitutional. The citizens of Connecticut should use their
rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected
representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married couple to privacy is

protected by the Constitution.

community

standards.

Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice, and Justice

Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed
physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its
Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on
means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as
accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory
that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on
their professional relationship with the married people they advised.

Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage is so basic and

Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married
couples?

Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically

protected in either the Bill of Rights or the Constitution. Nonetheless,
it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated
by various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and
14th Amendments.

Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is

protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly
included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express
guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right
older than the Bill of Rights, and the States effort to control marital
activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges

fundamental that to allow it to be infringed because it is not

specifically addressed in the first eight amendments is to give the 9th
Amendment

no

effect.

Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment because if violates the basic values implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.

Discussion. An association may assert the rights of its membership

when the rights of the individual members are tightly interrelated to
People v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson
Brief Fact Summary. The National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP/Petitioner) was ordered to produce a
membership
list
by
the
state
court.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Freedom of association to promote
beliefs is insured by the Fourteenth Amendment and is protected by
adherence to strict scrutiny of any regulatory interference.

Facts. Petitioner was ordered by a court to provide a full

membership list, including names and addresses. Although Petitioner
agreed to provide a list of its officers and paid staff members, it
asserts that this list is protected and that it may assert the personal
privacy interests of each of its members. Additionally, Petitioner
claims that disclosure will serve as a restriction on lawful association
of members that can only be justified by a compelling state interest.
Issue. Can the state compel disclosure of the membership list of the
NAACP?
Held. No. Disclosure of the list will subject members to adverse
consequences including economic, physical and other forms of
public hostility. In essence, this will limit Petitioners members ability
to advocate their beliefs, and it will dissuade others from joining the
organization for fear of retribution.

the interest of the association.

made the transfer for the sole purpose of becoming IBP national
president. Complainant stressed that respondent neither resided in
Agusan del Sur nor held office there.
A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letterChapter 29 Velez v. De Vera: Velez v. De Vera:* Succession to the

request of respondent, asking the Supreme Court to schedule his

IBP Presidency The Facts In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo

oath-taking as IBP national president. On the other hand, AM No. 05-

Antonio Velez sought the suspension or disbarment of Respondent

5-15-SC referred to the letter-report of IBP National President Jose

Atty. Leonard de Vera

Anselmo I. Cadiz, furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP

(1) for misrepresentation through his concealment of the suspension

Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from the latters positions as IBP

order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and

board member and executive vice-president, for committing acts

(2) for violation of the rotation rule enunciated in Administrative

Matter No. 491.

inimical to the board and the IBP in general.

The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the

The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against

IBP board[1] approved the withdrawal of a Petition[2] docketed at the

Atty. de Vera before the State Bar of California. The action arose

Supreme Court as Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al v. Senate

from an insurance case he had handled involving Julius Wills III, who

of the Philippines et al. - SC-R165108. Subsequently, during the

had figured in an automobile accident in 1986. To settle the case

plenary session held at the 10th National IBP Convention,[3]

amicably, Atty. de Vera received -- on his clients behalf -- a $12,000

respondent allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos,

check, which he then deposited in his personal account. Because of

and blatant lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to

his irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was suspended

withdraw the Petition

from the practice of law for three years, upon the recommendation of

On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP

the hearing referee. The case was not decided on the merits,

National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board

because Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar. Later, his

membership of Atty. de Vera, who had allegedly committed acts

resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.

inimical to the board and the IBP in general. The following day,[4]

On the second ground, complainant averred that respondents

during its 20th regular meeting, the IBP board resolved by a

transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and

twothirds vote to remove respondent from his positions as a member

Muntinlupa (PPLM) IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter

of the board of governors and as the executive vice-president (EVP)

was a circumvention of the rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera

of the IBP. On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy

in the EVP position, brought about by the removal of Atty. de Vera. In

First Issue: Res Judicata Res Judicata The Court unanimously held

his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally

in a per curiam Decision that AC No. 6052 did not constitute a bar to

elected and declared as EVP. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago

the filing of AC No. 6697. The two administrative cases involved

voluntarily relinquished that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005, during

different subject matters and causes of action. In AC No. 6052, the

its last regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new EVP in the

subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run for the

person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar. On June 28, 2005,

position of IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present

IBP National President Cadiz requested the Supreme Court's

Administrative Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to

approval of Atty. Salazar's election and assumption of office as

practice law. The two aforementioned cases did not seek the same

national president, in the event that Atty. de Vera would be disbarred

relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent

or suspended from the practice of law; or should his removal from his

respondent from assuming his post as IBP governor for Eastern

positions as member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as

Mindanao; the cause of action referred to his alleged violation of IBP

EVP of the IBP be approved by the Court. Protesting the election of

bylaws. In the second case, what was principally sought was his

both Atty. Santiago and Atty. Salazar, respondent also denied having

suspension or disbarment; the primary cause of action was his

committed acts inimical to the IBP and its board. He maintained that

alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional

his removal from his two positions had been done without due notice

Responsibility.

and due process.

Second Issue: Moral Turpitude Moral Turpitude In resolving the

The Issues The issues were as follows: 1. Whether the judgment in

second issue, the Court cited Maquera, [5] according to which a

AC No. 6052 constituted a bar to the filing of AC 6697 2. Whether, in

judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign

the course of his practice of law, Respondent Atty. de Vera

jurisdiction may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in

committed malpractice amounting to moral turpitude in the State Bar

the Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign courts action included

of California and in the Philippines 3. Whether on May 13, 2005, the

any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction.

board of governors validly removed respondent from his positions as

The Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his

governor and EVP of the IBP 4. Whether Governor Salazar was

clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was

validly elected as EVP on June 25, 2005, and whether he could

impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his own personal

consequently assume the presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-

use. Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use of his clients funds was

2007

highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

The Court's Ruling

is emphatic about this matter. The conduct of Atty. de Vera -- holding

on to the money of his client without the latters acquiescence -- was

under the factual milieu of this case. Atty. de Veras actuations during

indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It was clear that by

the IBP National Convention in question had been witnessed by all

depositing the $12,000 check in his own bank account and using it

the members of the board, upon whose shoulders the determination

for his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice, gross

of the cause for removal of an IBP governor was placed, subject to

misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct

the approval of the Supreme Court. Atty. de Vera received a copy of

himself with all good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court

the Complaint against him; indeed, he was present in the meeting

decreed that, where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end

when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of stenographic

desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the amount

notes of the meeting on May 13, 2005, in which he was removed, it

involved in this case, the Court considered the penalty of suspension

was patent that he had been given a fair opportunity to defend

for two years appropriate. The Court found that the transfer by Atty.

himself against the accusations of Atty. Rivera. Under the IBP rules,

de Vera of his membership to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was

the expulsion of an IBP governor was done via a Resolution adopted

within his rights. He could not be deemed to be guilty of unethical

by two thirds of the remaining members. The phrase remaining

conduct or behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility

members excluded the complainant and the respondent. Of the 7

nor the Lawyers Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be the IBP

remaining members qualified to vote, 5 voted for expulsion, while 2

national president or prohibited them from doing perfectly legal acts

voted against it. The five votes still added up to the two thirds vote

in accomplishing that goal.

required for expulsion. Removal for Cause Removal for Cause

Third Issue: Validity of the Removal Validity of the Removal The

Conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity are

Court ruled that the constitutional provision on due process

inherent in the internal life of an organization. Like that of any other

safeguarded life, liberty and property. The position of EVP of the IBP,

organization, however, the effectiveness of the IBP would be diluted

however, was not a property within the constitutional sense. Further,

if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body. The

there was no right to security of tenure over that position, as all that

impression would be that the IBP, which speaks through its board of

was required to remove any member of the board of governors for

governors, does not and cannot authoritatively speak for its

cause was a resolution adopted by two thirds of the remaining board

members. Its prestige and reputation with lawyers, as well as with

members. Furthermore, in administrative proceedings, the essence

the general public, would diminish accordingly. Because of the

of due process was simply the opportunity to explain ones side. The

importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, no fault was

cross-examination of witnesses was not indispensable to due

attributed to the expulsion from the board of Atty. de Vera, who had

process. Neither was an actual hearing always essential, especially

insisted on bringing to the public his disagreement with a

policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion. The

bylaws was the principle that one who was to assume the highest

cause for expulsion was legal, because the effectiveness of the

position in its hierarchy must have been exposed to the demands

board as a governing body was being lessened.

and

responsibilities

of

national

leadership.

By

electing

the

Fourth Issue: Validity of Governor Salazar's Validity of Governor

replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 board

Salazar's Election as EVP Election as EVP The removal of Atty. de

of governors, the IBP stood to benefit from the experience of the

Vera from his membership in the board of governors ipso facto

2003-2005 EVP, who would have served in a national capacity prior

meant also his removal as EVP. The IBP board had shown no grave

to the latters assumption of the highest position. Therefore, in

abuse of discretion; thus, the Court found no reason to interfere in

electing Atty. Salazar as EVP and thus ensuring a succession in the

the resolution to remove him. The board had specific and sufficient

leadership of the IBP, its board of governors acted in accordance

guidelines in its rules and bylaws on how to fill the vacancies left by

with its bylaws.

the removal of Atty. de Vera. The 2003-2005 IBP board of governors

election of a new EVP, who would assume the presidency for the
term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative
granted to the board by the IBP bylaws. According to Article VII,
specifically Section 47, [t]he EVP shall automatically become
president for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next
succeeding term necessarily implied that the EVP who should
succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP president for the next succeeding term
(2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP
board of governors. Accordingly, the election of Governor Santiago,
and later of Governor Salazar upon the formers relinquishment of
her EVP position, was valid. In Bar Matter 491, the Court said that it
was the position of EVP that was actually rotated among the nine
regional governors. The rotation with respect to the presidency was
merely the result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP. Thus,
the rotation rule pertained in particular to the position of EVP; the
automatic succession rule, to the presidency. Intrinsic to the IBP

orientation in places of public accommodation. In finding

such a violation and ordering the Council to include GLIB
in the parade, the trial court, among other things,
concluded that the parade had no common theme other
than the involvement of the participants, and that, given
the Council's lack of selectivity in choosing parade
participants and its failure to circumscribe the marchers'
messages, the parade lacked any expressive purpose,
HURLEY et al. v. IRISH AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL
GROUP OF BOSTON et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS

No. 94-749. Argued April 25, 1995 -- Decided June 19, 1995
Petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from
various veterans groups, was authorized by the city of
Boston to organize and conduct the St. Patrick's Day
Evacuation Day Parade. The Council refused a place in
the 1993 event to respondent GLIB, an organization
formed for the purpose of marching in the parade in order
to express its members' pride in their Irish heritage as
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to show that
there are such individuals in the community, and to
support the like men and women who sought to march in
the New York St. Patrick's Day parade. GLIB and some of
its members filed this suit in state court, alleging that the
denial of their application to march violated, inter alia, a
state law prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual

such that GLIB's inclusion therein would not violate the

Council's First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
Held: The state courts' application of the Massachusetts
public accommodations law to require private citizens
who organize a parade to include among the marchers a
group imparting a message that the organizers do not
wish to convey violates the First Amendment. Pp. 8-24.
(a) Confronted with the state courts' conclusion that the
factual characteristics of petitioners' activity place it within
the realm of non expressive conduct, this Court has a
constitutional

duty

to

conduct

an

independent

examination of the record as a whole, without deference

to those courts, to assure that their judgment does not
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.

See, e.g.,

New

York

Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285. Pp. 8-10.

(b) The selection of contingents to make a parade is
entitled to First Amendment protection. Parades such as

petitioners' are a form of protected expression because

(d) The state court's application, however, had the effect

they include marchers who are making some sort of

of declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public

collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders

accommodation. Since every participating parade unit

along the way. Cf.,e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111,

affects the message conveyed by the private organizers,

112. Moreover, such protection is not limited to a parade's

the state courts' peculiar application of the Massachusetts

banners and songs, but extends to symbolic acts.

law essentially forced the Council to alter the parade's

See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

expressive

624, 632, 642. Although the Council has been rather

fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the

lenient in admitting participants to its parade, a private

autonomy to choose the content of his own message and,

speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by

conversely, to decide what not to say. Petitioners' claim to

combining multifarious voices, by failing to edit their

the benefit of this principle is sound, since the Council

themes to isolate a specific message as the exclusive

selects the expressive units of the parade from potential

subject matter of the speech, or by failing to generate, as

participants and clearly decided to exclude a message it

an

the

did not like from the communication it chose to make, and

communication. Thus, petitioners are entitled to protection

that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to

under the First Amendment. GLIB's participation as a unit

shape its expression by speaking on one subject while

in the parade was equally expressive, since the

remaining silent on another, free from state interference.

organization was formed to celebrate its members' sexual

The constitutional violation is not saved by Turner

identities and for related purposes. Pp. 10-13.

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. ___. The

original

matter,

each

item

featured

in

content

and

thereby

violated

the

Council is a speaker in its own right; a parade does not

(c) The Massachusetts law does not, as a general matter,

consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to

violate the First orFourteenth Amendments. Its provisions

be transmitted together for individual selection by

are well within a legislature's power to enact when it has

members of the audience; and there is no assertion here

reason

being

that some speakers will be destroyed in the absence of

discriminated against. And the statute does not, on its

the Massachusetts law. Nor has any other legitimate

face, target speech or discriminate on the basis of its

interest been identified in support of applying that law in

content. Pp. 13-14.

the way done by the state courts to expressive activity like

to

believe

that

given

group

is

the parade

Issue. This case questions whether an organization can be

compelled to accept a member whose activities and beliefs may be
against the very nature of the organization.
Held. Reversed.
The court found that, while the Petitioners laws and oaths do not
mention sexuality, the purpose of the organization to foster morally
straight and clean membership would be disregarded if the
Petitioner was forced to accept the Respondent. Further, the First
Amendment Rights of the association would be violated if it were
forced, under the guise of law, to send a message that it accepted
homosexual conduct when, on its own assertions, it did not. The
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Dale (Respondent), was an
eagle scout whose membership in the boy scouts was revoked when
the Petitioners, the Boy Scouts of America (Petitioner), learned that
he
was
a
homosexual.

Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that to

require the Petitioner to accept Respondent was an abridgment of
the

Petitioners

freedom

of

expression.

Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissented, noting

that by allowing the Petitioner to revoke the Respondents

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While individuals are given a right to

freely associate, associations are not forced to include members
whose beliefs may affect its own ability to express the message it
wishes to convey.

Facts. The Respondent, a life-long boy scout, was an assistant

scout master in New Jersey, when the Petitioner learned of his
homosexuality and revoked his membership. The Respondent
brought suit to enjoin the action and the New Jersey court, under its
public accommodations law, required the Petitioner to admit the
Respondent.

membership, the Supreme Court was allowing the organization to

prevail over the anti-discrimination laws of the state.

Discussion. An organization cannot be compelled to accept a

member whose beliefs do not align with the tenants upon, which the
organization stands. To do so would violate the First Amendment
constitutional rights of the entire organization and its members, who

also align themselves with the principals on which the organization

stands.

For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied
on by CLT, claiming that Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs
title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent
titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted
their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from
several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority.
The Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994.
The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title issued in the name of CLT valid.

MANOTOK
REALTY,
INC.
and
MANOTOK
CORPORATION
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007

ESTATE

FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of
the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3)
cities within Metropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.
CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks)
the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs claim was
anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from Estelita
Hipolito. Hipolitos title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title
appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994.

HELD:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat
the properties they purport to cover were " originally registered on 19
April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be
proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually
existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it
did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof
reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the
dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917
based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April
1917.

Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of
transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. Thus,
such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the
decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and
the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by
the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate
of title is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is
issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It was stressed that
what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the
decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the
register of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917
casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the
CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by
them on the dates appearing on their respective titles.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear the case on remand.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail,
the Special Division is directed to make further determinations based
on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may
be presented at the proceedings before it.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the
Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

[GR 137285, 16 January 2001] Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4
concur Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone
(PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority
(EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite
expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in
Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San
Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008
square meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later,
the said trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of
PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B).
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by the Estate of Salud
Jimenez contending that said lot would only be transferred to a
private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the
trial court reconsidered the Order dated 11 July 1991 and released

Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B

was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate
and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January
1993. The compromise agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees
to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court dated
October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation
proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez
agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss
of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot
by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the parties agree
that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with
an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot
registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and
exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of
Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of
Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact
that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the
government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11,
1991. However, instead of being paid Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the just compensation for said lot, the
estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT
No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by the
terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to
be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately
final and executory." The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement
entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of
the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the Order dated 23 August
1993, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. However,
PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate inasmuch as
it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate
filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In

the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court annulled the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties and
directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the Estate.
Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA
moved for its reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3
November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the
instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997
and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot
1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27
November 1997, PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders
dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial court. Acting
on the petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March
1998, partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the
trial court regarding "the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and instead ordered the trial judge to
"proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding
the determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate
sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998.
However, the appellate court in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999
denied the Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of
public use.
Held: This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders:
an expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once
the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be
questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of
the expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject
said order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by the
Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land
and the public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident
from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states
that the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B

covered by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez

is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the
Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal clear
from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to the
Estate. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the
issue of payment such that failure to pay by PEZA will also nullify the
right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this effect was
mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Since the
compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by
swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate
the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has
the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the
same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject
parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980
issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power
of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter,
Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was
expropriated "for the construction of terminal facilities, structures and
approaches thereto." The authority is broad enough to give PEZA
substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated
property would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA
leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was
made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending PEZA's original
charter. As reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement
for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term "public
use" has acquired a more Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 )
Narratives (Berne Guerrero) comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public
has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or
advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public use
which is just as broad as "public welfare."

Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered

owners of a parcel of land situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City.
ne-half of the above described land is occupied by squatters.
On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed an
ejectment case against the squatters before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered
decision in favor of [the spouses Ortega]. The case
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
decision of the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became
final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued on
February 1, 1994.

On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu

City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to
the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856
square meters) of [the spouses Ortegas] land (which is
occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that
purpose. The amount will be charged against Continuing
Appropriation, repurchase of lots for various projects. The
value of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal
Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April
15, 1994. Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the spouses
Ortega].

On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that

[Cebu City] has the lawful right to take the property subject
of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in
the complaint upon payment of just compensation.

Based on the recommendation of the appointed

Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of
[Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21,
1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at

ORTEGA vs. CEBU City

G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009

CASE:
These are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega (Spouses
Ortega) and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated
petition

FACTS:

ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) per square

meter and ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the
sum of THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED
SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just
compensation for the expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B.

The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory

because of [Cebu Citys] failure to perfect an appeal on time,
and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999
to enforce the courts judgment. Upon motion of [the
Spouses Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order dated March
11, 2002 for execution or garnishment.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution,
Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case,
contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just
compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way
beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its
socialized housing program. The motion was denied by the
[RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied.

By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003

Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a Notice of
Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and
Junquera Branch Cebu City, garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank
deposit therein.

Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the
CA]. Cebu City] filed before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve,
Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that
Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No.
1519 is not actually an existing bank account and that the
garnishment of [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine
Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and

properties may not be seized under writ of execution or

garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of
public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order dated March 8,
2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys] Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. The Spouses Ortega] filed
an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New Manager of Philippine
Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount,
which was granted by the [RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the determination of just compensation
is a judicial prerogative.

RULING:
It is well settle in jurisprudence that
determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.

the

The determination of just compensation in eminent

domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private
property may not be taken for public use without just compensation,
no statue, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can
the courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the
decreed compensation.