INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INDO-US RELATIONSHIP A FOCUS ON STRATIGIC AND POLITICAL

CONSULTATIONS
SUBMITTED BY: SUDHANSHU JATAV [13B142]
SUBMITTED TO: Mr. ARUNA KUMAR MALIK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AN OVERVIEW..(I)
THE COLD WAR AND INDIA(II)
THE PAKISTAN FACTOR.(III)
THE CHINESE INFUENCE(IV)
HOW KASHMIR WAS AN INFLUENCE.(VI)
AN INSIGHT ON HOW GANDHISM IS RELATED TO INDO-US...(VIII)
CONCLUSION...(X)
BIBLIOGRAPHY(XII)

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AN OVERVIEW
September 1945, two superpowers emerged from the dust of Germanys defeat and from the end
of Second World War, United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) .India was
on the verge of getting itself the status of an Independent state. In the past, Indo-US relationship
was mainly influenced by the Cold War politics reason for the same were the friendship existed
between India and Soviet Union and the alliance of United Nations and Pakistan. Even though
the then president of U.S John F. Kennedy was of the view to maintain a friendly relationship
with India but mostly both of them saw each other on different ends. U.S support to India in the
Sino-India dispute improved the mutual cooperation between both the countries but the 1965 war
between India and Pakistan bought the relationship with U.S back to square one. Later in 1980s
U.S strategically wanted to drift India apart from Soviet Union but since in 1990s dramatic turn
of events led to the disintegration of USSR and leaving India open to threat.
As said by Henry Kissinger The never-never land of India-US relations. In spite of the
accumulated and persistent discomfort between India and the U.S, relations had never broken
down completely, and the apostles of harmony have repeatedly had to discover grounds for hope.
Taking into consideration the wounded history that existed but still India with the recent
development and various official visits we (India) never looked at them (U.S) as
interventionists. Following the history of India. U.S have helped India in converting its image
from the land of poor to the country of brains. In my view there are no chancing of reverting
back to the relationship where a clear alliance of U.S and Pak existed since high level of military
to military contacts exists between the two countries also because India is one of the major
market in Asia.
The future is full of Optimism.

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THE COLD WAR AND INDIA

In 1961, USSR sent their troops towards Cuba to make it their base of Nuclear weapons. As
Cuba is on the coastline of U.S it puts U.S double in range to the threat from USSR. John F.
Kennedy made claims that if Russian ships will move any further towards Cuba they will
consider it as a grave threat, just to show their seriousness. For fifteen days world was on the
edge for the countdown of world war three but Russian troops did not move any further and the
world dodged another nuclear war. This nail biting period of fifteen days was what later
famously seen as The Cuban Missile Crisis.
This lead to the emergence of the point where the world was divided into two groups and
countries started choosing sides between U.S and USSR. India took a non-aligned standalone
from both the countries but was inclined towards Soviet Union and U.S was trying to pull India
to its side. So basically with India being a rope there existed a situation of thug of war in the
period of Cold War. Up to a point policy makers of US were have having a sympathetically
affected mindset over the non-alignment policy of India since openly taking sides will be
becoming a target of the other superpower the problem according to this policy of US was that
NAM in practice was not as neutral as India was trying to show it and was tilted towards USSR
which was making US concerned. Indias non-aligned foreign policy thus become a source of
considerable irritation to US. Main reason behind that was India did not actively cooperated in
containing Soviet Union but also cooperating with Soviet Union in many significant ways.
Other than the blurred lines of Indias non-align moment, we (India) were not also that
economically attractive during the Cold War and the result of that was that US did not see India
as a potential trading partner, target for investment or source for skilled labor.
This not a proper trading nature and the body of an economically weak state put India into a
position where it no more had the ability to pose any direct threat to Americas interest in South
Asia which reduced its relevance and lead to ignorance. And any strategic interest that US
perceived in South Asia lay primarily with Indias arch rival Pakistan.

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THE PAKISTAN FACTOR

Relationship between India and US has always been highly influenced by this result of Indias
partition. This result is the arc enemy of India and the moderate democratic Islamic state,
Pakistan. In the year 1954 Pakistan and U.S signed an informal diplomatic document by which
US started a military aid program with Pakistan. Main objective of US behind this treaty was to
use Pakistan as a defensive wall against the expansion of Soviet Union. It is debatable that this
was the result of Indias non-aligned stand since NAM was working as an obstacle US attempts
to contain communism by mobilizing the politics of Afro-Asian nations.
Moreover, by supporting Pakistan, New Delhi argued that America had forced India into an
unnecessary and costly arms race. The American arms program, agreed to in 1954, turned
Pakistan into a lesser, but still significant military power. It enabled Pakistan to field an armored
division equipped with first-line Patton M-48 tanks, to acquire a number of modern F-85 jet
aircraft, and a small navy. The Pakistan military also received extensive training and technical
support, including NATO briefings on nuclear war. These acquisitions, essentially completed by
the end of 1959, made it unlikely that India could militarily dominate Pakistan. Until 1965, aid
continued at a more modest pace and new weapons systems were not introduced. In 1981 a
major aid package to Pakistan provided forty F-16 aircraft, old but upgraded M-48 tanks, modern
artillery, and the loan of a several warships. While this did not tilt the military balance in
Pakistans favor, it neutralized Indias ongoing arms build-up.
Further, India attributed the distortion of Pakistans politics to the American connection after the
army took power in Ayub Khans 1958 coup. Delhi was concerned that the American-encouraged
militarization of Pakistan might spread to India itself. This was an additional reason to restrict
the ties between Indian officers and their Pakistani counterparts, and between the Indian and the
United States military establishments.
Lastly, the Pakistan-U.S. relationship came to be seen in Delhi as not directed against
communism, but against India. Formally, the only American commitment to Pakistan was to
consult, should the latter be faced with communist aggression.

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THE CHINEASE INFLUENCE

While Pakistan was the longest-lasting irritant in U.S.-Indian relations during the Cold War, the
wild oscillations in American ties to China were also distressing. After the communists seized
power in 1949, Washington warned New Delhi of the danger from the Chicoms. This did not
deflect Nehru from a policy of trying to be neutral in Korea, and accommodating China in Tibet
and along the disputed India-China border. But when the two Asian powers went to war in 1962,
it appeared that the American view of China was correct, and for several years New Delhi and
Washington entered into a close intelligence and strategic relationship. In the early 1960s, in
anticipation of an expected Chinese nuclear test, there was a discussion of providing India with a
nuclear capacity of its own, but the idea never went very far.1 Further the growing American
involvement in Vietnam led to a shift in the area in which China (and the Soviet Union) was to
be contained: the threat was now in Southeast Asia, not South Asia.
In the aftermath of the India-China border conflict of 1962, India requested, and received,
military assistance not only from the Soviet Union but also from the US and Britain. Although
much has been made of this gesture by the latter two countries, circumstances soon allowed the
reduction of this commitment. There are two points to be made in this context. Firstly, only a
small amount of 'emergency' assistance was actually committed. There was no offer of long term
military aid. Secondly, the US-UK offer was conditional on the successful resolution of the
Kashmir dispute in which India was expected to make substantial concessions. US-UK brokered
negotiations did take place in 196263 but were unsuccessful. Also, US military aid was provided
on the condition that it 'would in no circumstances be used against any adversaries but China'.
This was in total contrast to the unconditional military assistance by the US to Pakistan.
According to the then US Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, it also led 'the Indians to
conclude that we attribute to the Peoples Republic of China lion-like qualities in Southeast Asia
and sheep-like qualities along India's 2200 mile border'.
In the past India viewed the normalisation of US-China relations in 1971 with grave misgivings.
This was the result of a secret trip by Henry Kissinger to China which had been facilitated by
1 George Perkovich, Indias Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1999, pp. 93-9
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Pakistan. On 15 July 1971, President Nixon announced details of the trip and his own planned
visit there. This was, from an Indian point of view, a clear convergence of US, China and
Pakistan interests. Perhaps foreseeing the eventuality of the convergence of US-China interests
vis-a vis the Soviet Union and the inevitability of the war in East Pakistan, India signed the IndoSoviet Friendship Treaty on 9 August 1971.

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HOW KASHMIR WAS AN INFLUENCE

Kashmir has bedevilled India-US relations in recent times. It has been on the high priority list of
successive US Administrations, and particularly the Clinton dispensation. US Congressman Lee
Hamilton, for example, once described the Kashmir issue as the "single most contentious issue
disrupting India-US relations" (Indian Express, April 30, 1994). A lot of heat was generated in
India when in October 1993 the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphel,
stated that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is disputed. In the words of Ms Raphel: "We
do not recognise the Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir is an integral part of
India...the people of Kashmir have got to be consulted in any kind of final settlement of the
Kashmir dispute" (Times of India, October 30, 1993). The general picture that emerged was that
the US questioned the very accession of Kashmir to India and the situation in Kashmir was even
compared to the civil war in Afghanistan. Needless to say, a damage limitation exercise was
undertaken by Ms Raphel during her visit to India in March 1994 with the primary objective of
removing whatever misunderstandings had been created over her statement. Besides, the
differences over the human rights situation in Kashmir continue to be an irritant between the two
countries.
There were some who believed that Ms Raphel's statement reflected the antipathy of the middlelevel bureaucracy in the State Department towards India. These statements clearly further
strained India-US relations, which India perceived as interference in its internal affairs. Former
Indian Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit opined that never since the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" of the early
Seventies, had India-US relations deteriorated to the extent they did following Ms Raphel's
statement. India has so far not accepted any third party mediation to resolve the issue. New Delhi
basically considers Kashmir to be a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan that should be
resolved within the framework of the Simla Agreement. A good starting point would be for
Washington to clearly spell out its stand on the territorial integrity of India. Any attempt to push
India into making concessions on Kashmir could only be counter-productive. It will be in the
interest of both India and Pakistan and external powers like the US to follow a policy of least
provocation and try and build mutual trust. This trend has to be consolidated in the years to come
in the interest of regional and global peace. The US needs to encourage a solution to the Kashmir
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dispute based on the existing territorial and ground realities. There is need for greater
pragmatism on all sides, and a sense of realism has to go into the entire exercise. The need of the
hour is for India and the US to reflect a certain confidence in their bilateral diplomacy.

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AN INSIGHT ON HOW GANDHISM IS RELATED TO INDO-US

This idea comes to the point that till what extent the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and
truth have affected the relationship between India and US and in what all ways Indian Foreign
Policies are affected by the same.
Indian philosophy and the way of life according to Gandhi postulated the goals of liberty,
equality, justice and dignity of human being which is to a great extent similar to America who
were also committed to similar goals. Gandhis theories and philosophy was always looking
forward to get these two nations together so as to develop the hold of democracy all over the
world.
There was great involvement by Gandhi in the freedom struggle of India which is not something
new but due to this he was preoccupies and had practically no time to think about matters
relating to international relation but as mentioned above he always had this vision of getting
these two nations together so to strength the democracy of the world thus he formulated theories
and guidelines as to how there two countries can get maintain their relationship in good terms.
So basically what has been done here is a given problem is tested in the light of Gandhian norms,
the way Gandhi wouldve in all probability looked at the problem and going by this methodology
the relationship between US and India can also be analysed.
It is debatable that since Gandhi died early in the context of independence and did not witness
the development of any relationship between these two nations but it is a fact that he influenced
American leaders to support Indias fight against the British rule as well as the first prime
minister of India, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who more or less implemented his policies in the post
Gandhi period.
Echoing the American Charter, Gandhis principles were embedded in the Indian Constitution in
the form of the preamble comprising the objectives of liberty, equality, justice and fraternity. The
objective of fraternity helped Nehru to design external relations on a new basis of non-

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alignment, as it filtered from the Gandhian precept of shared ideals of universal peace and
harmony.
Gandhi has transcended narrow nationalism or chauvinism in his philosophy of non-alignment
which was meant to attract worlds attention and to provide a different direction with no other
nationalism possessed. With Gandhi, Indian nationalism as reflected in his human ethical
propositions, had assumed global dimensions but with this successor this quality began to
decline. Hence non-alignment ought not to have been viewed by American statesmen as
incompatible with their geo-political interest. Indeed, it would have served US interest more, had
Indian nationalisms outgrowing obsession of sovereignty been welcome.
For Indian and US it would be more suitable to carry out moral revolution, first as an experiment
with the truth of their relationships, before widening out the rest of the world and they are more
suited because of their religious traditions and democratic convention.

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CONCLUSION
While India-US relationship struggled for nearly half a century, the change coming up with
recent relationship ties and pace have taken many by surprise. 'India watchers these days are
suffering from a bad case of whiplash'. This comment by a respected 'India watcher' aptly sums
up the speed at which the India-US strategic relationship has developed over the last few years.
Instead of the gradual evolution that had characterised the bilateral relationship over a period of
more than two decades, President Clinton's visit galvanised the pace at which it was proceeding.
Whether it was a consequence of a tacit acknowledgement by the US of India's 'unofficial'
nuclear status, its economic reforms, its acceptance as a pre-eminent regional power and a source
of stability in the Indian Ocean region, or a reflection of a changed mind set of decision-makers
on both sides in a post-cold war environment, the fact remains that these developments could not
have been foreseen by any observer in 1998, the year India tested its nuclear devices.
The US no longer appears to view its relationship with India primarily through the prism of its
relations with other countries in the region, or indeed with Cold War blinkers. This process
started, albeit haltingly, with the end of the Cold War. Given the improvement in US-Russia
relations, the US now appears to have no objections to Russia being India's largest supplier of
military hardware. On the contrary, the US itself is in the process of becoming one of the major
suppliers (along with Israel and South Africa). Moreover, despite its own, sometimes volatile,
political relationship with China, there is no indication that it views the improvement in IndiaChina relations with any degree of concern. In other words, the US, finally, is acknowledging the
legitimacy of India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy; while there will be close politicostrategic-military ties between India and the US, there will be no 'alliance' relationship. It can be
argued that India is well aware of the fact that (as has been observed in the context of Australia
relations) 'you only have to think like a deputy to look like a deputy, and look like a deputy long
enough and one day they'll pin a badge on you and tell you to shut up and do as you're told.
Perhaps the most significant development in the strategic relationship is that it has finally been
decoupled from US relations with Pakistan. In the past this had been a major hurdle preventing
any significant improvement in India-US relations. This was most vividly demonstrated after the
events of September 2001 when the US launched military operations in Afghanistan. While
Pakistan provided bases and other support to the US and its forces, the US still unequivocally
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reminded Pakistan that it had to stop terrorist organisations operating from within its borders.
This was clearly aimed at addressing Indian concerns at Pakistan's support of terrorists operating
in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. While General Musharraf attempted to take
advantage of US appreciation of Pakistan's help in its operations in Afghanistan by asking the US
to take an active part in resolving the Kashmir dispute, the latter's response was clear. Apart from
encouraging the two sides to continue bilateral dialogue, the US had no role to play. India's
mobilisation of its troops after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament and its refusal to
resume talks with Pakistan until there was evidence that cross-border terrorism had stopped,
drew no criticism from the US apart from the standard comment that the dispute should be
resolved through dialogue.
Meanwhile, as demonstrated by recent events, as far as the India-US politico-strategic-military
relationship is concerned, it has been business as usual. High level contacts, arms sales and
military exercises have continued as planned months ago. Firm plans have been developed for
closer engagement in the future. This is the surest indication yet that India-US relations are
developing with a long-term perspective in mind and that the recent US-Pakistan re-engagement
has had no discernible impact.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles referred

India and America: An Emerging Relationship , Dr. Stephen P.Cohen

The Start of a Beautiful Friendship? The United States and India, Sumit Ganguly
The Transformation of U.S India Relations (An Explanation for the Rapprochment and

Prospects for the Future), S.Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganaguly

Relevance of Gandhism to Indo-American Relations, M.M Sankdher
Shedding Illusions about Indo-US Defence Co-operation, Rita Manchanda
Story of U.S food Assistance, M.N. Buch

Websites referred

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2001/12/08india-cohen/kyoto.pdf
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pu

bs/rp/rp0102/02RP20
http://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2015/07/indias-second-world-war-history-you-dont-hear-

about
http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/Malone_Mukherjee_IJ_0.pdf
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/impact-growing-pakistan-china-relations-united-states-india/p31626

Books referred

Indo-American Relations, Anand Mathur, Scientific Publishers India, Jodhpur, 2003

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