Last week we examined Heideggers reading of Aristotles reference to

in order to strengthen and extend his refutation of the Megarian thesis (20). We looked
at Aristotles reference to strengthens his refutation of the Megarians by
pointing to a capability in which there is no external work (). points even
more strongly than the capabilities that do produce external works to the sense of
having () that Aristotle shows to be elided by the Megarians. We also looked at
how Aristotle considers in terms of a specific relation between a besouled being
() and soulless being () that occurs in a way through the besouled being
itself and connected this in our own discussions to the phenomenon of time in Sein und
Zeit. We saw that (for Heidegger) Aristotle is both the first thinker to open the question
of the relation between and , and yet is still unable to truly think this
relation.
21-22 are the last two sections of Heideggers lecture course and of the text.
21 concludes the examination of Aristotles refutation of the Megarian thesis by
focusing on its third and last aspect. We have seen the other two in the previous
sections: the capability to produce an external work that is held in readiness (or is
practiced, and thus its readiness developed) and a capability () that does not
create an external work. The third and final aspect emphasizes how the Megarians
remain unable to think how and , being and not-being, together in a single
being. For the Megarians, according to Aristotle, a capability that has been withdrawn
cannot ever have been possible, since it was incapable of coming to enactment.
Enactment indicates the capability to do something (178). Heidegger demonstrates how
the Megarian thesis reduces the question of a capability to what is possible or impossible

( and , respectively); a capability that does not create a work could

never have been; only a work that is or was necessary comes to exist. Heidegger traces
this third part of the Megarian thesis, the determination of the possibility of a capability
through the necessity of the work, through Diodoros and Epictetus (179).
According to the Megarian thesis, a capability that does not yield a work was
impossible. The Megarians are not only unable to think how a capability can be held in
readiness and thus holds its possibility of enactment before the creation of the work; they
are unable to think how a being could be incapable, how a capability can be withdrawn
from a being that should have it according to its essence (we saw this in the example of
the blind person on p. 176), in that they see in the phenomenon of incapability only the
mere negation of being present (Vohandenseins), the negation of enactment as presence
(180). A person who is incapable of a particular capability also shows how a capability is
held prior to its enactment. Incapability shows how a capability can be there even
though it has withdrawn from the human being. Incapability shows even more clearly the
transition (180) that exists prior to pure possibility and actuality. Thus, for Aristotle,
the Megarians ignore the question of movement () (180, 1047a14). Heidegger
refers to Aristotles example of standing and sitting in 1047a15-17 in order to show how
Aristotle places an importance on transition and therefore movement as a constitutive
aspect of the way a capability can be said to be in enactment, enacted or withdrawn.
22 draws the entire book to a close and turns the discussion to
. The principle task of this section is to show how and
are two moments of a single phenomenon and not two separate
moments or modes of being of a human being. Here it is a question of how a being can

transition to in such a way that does not withdraw (fall into non-being)
altogether, that is, how to comprehend this co-determinateness, that the enactment of
capability in its own manner of actuality becomes visible in the actuality of something
capable as such? (186). Aristotles fundamental task is to split the senses of actuality
into two: the actuality of a capability as holding in readiness and the actuality of a
capability that is no longer withdrawn or held back. Heidegger emphasizes that, for
Aristotle, and can be distinguished only with the prior and consistent
maintenance of (186). Movement unites the two senses prior to their division
such that they can pass from one to the other reciprocally. Heidegger gives the example
of the sprinter holding in readiness at the starting line, the entire race before it and fixed
upon the end. Holding in readiness is the fulfillment of the actuality of a capability that is
withdrawn from enactment (the presence, Anwesenheit, of a capability before it is at
hand, Vorhanden) and not the mere negation of the capability, as in the Megarian thesis.
We witness in enactment the realization or actualization of a capability that has
already been fulfilled (or has not been fulfilled) in its prior withholding. Heidegger:
In a position to, this means first: he is fit for it. Yet not simply this, but
at the same time it also means: he ventures himself, has already become
resolved. To actually be capable is the full prepared-ness of being in a
position to, which lacks only the releasement (Enthemmung) into
enactment, such that when this is at hand, when it has imposed itself, this
means: when the one who is capable sets himself to work, then the
enactment is truly practice and just this. It is nothing other than setting
oneself to work - (: the work or the product). (188)
The last point of note is the reference to (to accept, admit, take upon
oneself) on p. 191 (the reference is to 1047a26-29 in Aristotles text). Heidegger notes
that and are here being used interchangably in connection with
(191). I am confused here. Is Heidegger saying that a capability is the

 , the origin of movement as such, that is both the origin of the enactment
of a capability, the origin of receiving a capability, the origin of moving between
capability and enactment such that each is the fulfillment of the other? All of them? If
this is so, I think there is double sense to as : the origin of the
change in another that gives the particular end in a capability to another being seen ahead
and held apart, which is at the same time the origin of the change (the origin of the
allowing) from the withholding of that capability to its enactment and back again.
Movement is the ekstasis of a being that precedes each of its modes. Thus,
movement must precede rest.

Questions
1. In addition to these questions, I would enjoy looking closely at the example of the
runner at the starting line. It might be fun to read it closely as a way of
recapitulating the entire interpretation.