On That Which Is Not

Author(s): Samuel C. Wheeler

Source: Synthese, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun., 1979), pp. 155-173
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115447
Accessed: 25/04/2009 14:16
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.

http://www.jstor.org

SAMUEL

C. WHEELER

ON THAT WHICH

IS NOT

none of the
that, very probably,
the
world
exist.
In parti
objects
'given'
are
no
as
there
nor, perforce,
cular,
persons,
conceived,
ordinarily
states of them. Since this may conflict with what
any psychological
seems to be thought, the way will be prepared by a sketch of the main

This

paper presents
'middle-sized'
ordinary

theory of reference
that all such counter-common

general argument
false. The point
rational grounds
of ways

I. THE

which
sense

lies behind

the

claims must

be

to destroy
is to begin
the
long digression
est
to the sorites1 arguments which
for resistance
a brief
the sorites arguments,
point. After presenting
of

the main

criticism

of

the

of

presuppositions

ablish

arguments

the

of avoiding

the conclusion

THAT

ARGUMENT

BELIEVE

MOST

OF

is presented.

WHAT

MOST

PEOPLE

IS TRUE

a
two theories
the second
I sketch
of reference,
of the first. I then show how the second theory of reference
the conclusion
that most
beliefs are
'ordinary' common-sense

In this

section

modification
entails

sense is for the most part correct and that

true; that is, that common
what appears to conflict with it either doesn't actually or is false.
A.
What,
their

after
sense.

Theory

object

Reference

determine
we

This

are
i.e. will

concept,

Resemblance

to apply? Our terms have as their extension

of sense.
is a function
that we are
So, given

are using a given

term, what we
by that
by the sense expressed
If the term applies,
its reference.

are

talking
term. The

Exactly

form

of what

how

'features'

I call
or

about

of

the

it is to apply,
are built
into

the

'the resemblance
'senses'

of

fits

whatever

about
talking
when
that
using

internal

by what
that
features

then,

the important
talking about will have
fit the sense of the term. (Imaginary
quotation)

is the basic

reference'.

I: Frege-Russell

is it for a term

all,

when we
anything
term is determined
concept

of Reference

concepts

features

of

theory
are

the

con

Synthese 41 (1979) 155-173. 0039-7857/79/0412-0155 $01.90.

Copyright

1979 by D. Reidel

Publishing

Co., Dordrecht,

Holland,

and Boston,

U.S.A.

156

SAMUEL

ceived

and which

features

to belong to the objects

version of this theory.
I has the weakness
Theory

have

way

of

what

determining

C. WHEELER

are part of the sense and

of concepts
the terms apply to vary from version
that
the

to

an empirical
not provide
a term is. What
sense a

it does

sense

so

of

even
has, that is, might well be a private matter,
term-for-a-person
The
when
the sense itself is an objective
relation
entity.
'expression'
a word or thought-component
sense is left to
between
and a particular
some kind of intuitive insight - we know what we mean, when
it is our
own word. More
our
for
the
form
basic
of the
purposes,
importantly,
does not give any guarantee
that we
theory of reference
are talking about anything
at all. What
is to prevent
the natures out
there from diverging
to
in essence
from the senses our terms express
resemblance

such an extent

reference.

that nothing fits our terms? Since the sense expressed

as
to what is outside when
itwere, not clearly connected
is,
in principle
is used, nothing
massive
failure of
prevents
In short, the basic
form of the resemblance
theory of

reference

does

by a word
the term

not provide

a rejoinder

to skepticism

or to metaphy

sical revisionism.

B.
This

Theory

la: Quine-Davidson

theory

overcomes

difficulties
something
by getting
into empirically
available phenomena.
the Quine-Davidson
version of this theory, and
and 'ordinary language' philosophers
that Wittgensteinian
principles

how

about

language

con

a: Quine-Davidson2

Version
If we

Theories

the above

the same
presuppose
virtually
to the world.
nects referentially

which

Resemblance

to sense

analogous
functionally
I will briefly describe
then argue

and British

are

talking
situations.

at all, what
Roughly,

we
our

are talking about

occasion-sentences

is determined
have

by what

stimulus-meaning

we

say in
or an

or radically
'outside correlate'
A language
has been translated
as
meaning.
interpreted
far as empirical
data goes when
the appropriate
between
correlations
what
is out there
have been established.
The reference
of a term in
(for us) and the person's
responses
an occasion
sentence
is constrained
correlates.
The constraint
may not
by these outside
be sufficient

to determine

reference,

but at least what

there

is to go on

in hypothesizing

THAT

ON

reference
All

there

WHICH

157

IS NOT

the empirical
is given by the outside
substitute
correlates,
in these outside
is to the 'sense' of a term is manifested

or a culture's
dispositions
person's
or a culture's
of a person's
speech

to use
behavior.

that

term.

i.e. in a
correlates,
senses
in the pattern

look for

So,

(Imaginary

senses.

for Fregean

quotation)

it is
this theory, given that a sentence
is true if and only if what
or interpreted
as obtains, most of what most people
translated
are inclined to say is true. (This holds in general,
for Davidson;
for

On

best

for Quine.)
That
and inter
sentences,
is, translation
nature
the
of
be
Given
that
'charitable'.
must,
reference,
by
pretation
as
same
must
met
the
is
insofar
be
thought
requirements
language-like
to refer, most of what most people
for thought-tokens
in a culture
observation

be true as well.3

think will

Version

b: British

It is somewhat

difficult

to pin down

a 'British'

theory

of reference

in a

to its practitioners,
since so many of the philoso
acceptable
as
and
I
the
later
have
in
such
mind,
Austin,5
phers
Wittgenstein,4
to
the
of
detailed
of
in
favor
tend
eschew
theories
descriptions
Ryle6
form

'ordinary' use of our terms. Since

use of 'refers' or
any technical
reference'
Their

can be called
views

such only
of

they eschew
so
'applies',
via locutions
and

its

theory, they eschew

that their 'theory of
of indirect

relation

discourse.

to

the world,
defense
of com

language
implicit
lead them to the most
however,
uncompromising
sense. According
mon
to their conclusions,
virtually
belief
'built into' language by way of the judgements

every
we

central
learn

in

to bring
learning a language is true. So it is important for my purposes
some
kind of relation with theory la in
into
their theory of reference
its Quine-Davidson
form.
the
from
would
further premise
yield a valid argument
a
the
rules
for
the
violates
that
certain
theory
premise
philosophical
use of a given term or concept or family of concepts
to the conclusion
I think that only a version
that the philosophical
theory is mistaken?
What

of theory la will make

almost all dissolvings
in this tradition.
To argue

that theory

this argument valid and that theory la is behind

and 'analyses of the grammar of
of problems
la is behind

every

such analysis

would

require

158

SAMUEL

C. WHEELER

and argument
for the case of each of the philoso
analysis
in
I
think
it
is
clear,
question.
phers
though, that a theory of essen
to
in
similar
Davidson's
'On
the
Idea of a Conceptual
tially
Very
is implicit
in most
such philosophers'
work. The British
Scheme',7
detailed

some modifications,
and
theory, though, contains
different
of
how
conception
strongly
empirical

is complicated
by a
sense determines

reference.

On

the generalized
'British' theory, ignoring individual differences,
have a sense which
is identified with their use, a complicated
and contextualized
version of 'outside correlate meaning'.

concepts
socialized

use of a term

in which
is, roughly, given by the sort of situation
to the rules of the language.
is to be applied,
according
seems to be the general surrogate
of application',
which
'Correctness
for truth, is determined
the
rules
of the language, which
them
by

The
the

term

seem

to be a function

of what most people

in the language
An application
situations.
of a term is
say in paradigm
community
a
sentence
correct
is
if
if
in fact the
and
what
is
true)
(i.e.
only
is in the set of situations where
situation
the term 'is to be used'.
selves

reasons

I do not fully understand,

these philosophers
to believe
from Quine and Davidson
in not finding reasons
that
use and reference.
some
is 'slack' between
'Rules', possibly
by
normative
results
force, are sufficient alone to give determinate
For

differ
there
subtle
as to

what
is being referred to. This might be regarded as a consequence
of
their strategy for avoiding
the paradoxical
results of an unrestricted
the resemblance
of
of
reference.
theory
application
Suppose
sense
reference
is strictly determined
and
is determined
by sense,
by
sense to
what people
if it makes
say in what circumstances.
Then,
apply

this

to an

isolated

culture

says will

one-person
some extension,

individual,
all, not most,
be true. This is because

of what

this

there

is always
in which
the

the set of situations

given by exactly
person applies the term, which will, by the theory, be what the person
means by the term. Since it is senseless
that a person can be speaking
utterance
he could make would also be a
truths when any alternative
that there can be one-person
linguistic
are
to
declared
be
languages'
'private
impossible.
to get the result
That is, to apply the resemblance
theory of reference
that most of what most people
say is true rather than that anything
truth, it has
communities.

to be

Thus

denied

ON

THAT

WHICH

159

IS NOT

or inter
rule-discovery
a whole
as
A
culture
pretation
so
error
some
that
of
rules
kind
generates
by
practice,
by
majority
individuals
is possible.
Since there can be no private language, and so
that anyone

say is true, the unit of

as a whole.
the culture

could

is made

no

is not

which

reference

makes

ontological

everyone's
no sense.

about
reference,
speculation
in the back
So 'aquiescence
sense.
that makes

relativity
ground language' is the only alternative
On the 'British' theory, reading 'use' for 'sense', truth is a function
the
is a function
of use. Once
of use, and so, reference
again,
so that
correlate of the sense of a term is brought out into the world,
use

meaning

or

plication,

over

determines

a culture

as

correct
a whole,

application.

Thus

correct

ap

is guaranteed.

of theory la, then, reference

is still a function of
if not determined,
is constrained,
by what is there in
a situation
use
a
to
in which
the speaker is disposed
given term. Sense
if not its being, in the outside world. Thus sense and
has its criterion,
On both

sense.

reference
puts

versions
sense

But

limits

on theory la, at least in that each

the other. What
this
distinguishes
a
or
means
I is that what
culture
is
person

are virtually
correlative
on the variation
of

theory from theory

determined
by seeing

what

an expression
is used and
is the case. Then since reference

is true when
to what

making meaning
correspond
is a function of sense, most of what a culture agrees on will
to be true by the very nature of what
it is for a term with
meaning

turn out
a given

to be true of an object.
the above
picture
given

of language and thought and its

the world,
there is a standard
reply to philosophical
doctrines
which
held beliefs
in great numbers:
challenge
widely
'You're misusing
'You're misinterpreting
the
language'. Alternatively,
Now,
relation

to

of this predicate/construction
for English
speakers.'
la is true, the revisionary
and the skeptical
metaphysician
or mis-paraphrasing
must
be misusing
epistemologist
language
because,
by the nature of the case, most of our beliefs must be true.
truth-conditions
If theory

that we are mostly wrong

in a whole
arguments which conclude
area of belief are, provably,
or
invalid
unsound. How
they go wrong
to this theory of reference
take subtle and skillful
may
according

Thus

analysis;
refutations

the

conclusion

include

paradigm

that
case

they

are wrong

arguments,

is foregone.
about
arguments

Such
how

160

SAMUEL

C. WHEELER

about when we say a person

has a
arguments
a
terms
of
in
of
arguments
concept,
suspect
analyses
'extending
a
of
idea
the
of
its
use', arguments
range
very
concept beyond
against
scheme, and many others.
conceptual
sense based on supposed
on common
inconsistencies
be
Attacks
is learned,

concept

tween

and common

science

theory
have alternative
associated
equally

are similarly treated by adherents

of
can't be radically wrong, we just
different families of predicates with their

sense

our ordinary

la. Since

descriptions,

beliefs

or different

application-constraints,
correct predicate-systems.

II. THE

DEATH

OF

THE

RESEMBLANCE

MIND-WORLD

and

Kripke8
language
use

of

Putnam9

links up

terms

such

have

as

'refer',

and

that the use

reference

THEORY

OF

RELATIONS

that

shown

to the world

la, then, is self-contradictory.

'use' of a term determines

for different

purposes

the above

not

does

coincide

theory of how
our ordinary

'discussed',

'names',

'about',

with

etc.

Theory

is, the theory that says that our

its meaning
is not the theory of meaning
A
of our idioms of reference
embodies.
That

of our
analysis
So
reference
meaning.

that use
referential
is not
shows
concepts
is not a function of sense, in general, accord
that it is.

'use'

ing to the theory

I should explain how Kripke's
and Putnam's
demonstrations
work.
the intuition we have about what we would
Consider
say in situations

it turned out that, for instance, we had accepted

the sentence
a
was
'Aristotle
who proposed
the paradox of
Megarian
philosopher
the heap and invented
In the appropriate
other fallacies'.
circum
This is a
stances, we would
say we had a false belief about Aristotle.
in which

manifestation
Intuitions

of
about

our
what

use

of

we

think

'about'
is the

or

of

case

the

sense

in such

of

'about'.

situations

are

'would say' in such situations.

about what we
By most
of reference,
such intuitions are the basic data for a theory of
remarks apply to the other
the sense of the term 'about'. Analogous
terms Kripke
referential
and Putnam
discuss.
By the resemblance
intuitions

theories

the relation of aboutness

theory of reference,
sets of ordered
tial relations must be whatever

and

the other

referen

pairs accord with

these

ON

THAT

WHICH

161

IS NOT

terms. But any such relations contain

to apply referential
dispositions
ordered pairs of terms and entities
such that the sense of the term
fit the entity as well
resemblance
theory of

doesn't

as it fits some other

entity. The
to referential

relations

notions
reference
assigns
the resemblance
and entities
theory would
pairs of concepts
not predict. Thus a 'use' analysis of reference
shows that use does not
the

contain

determine

reference.

are in order about

of these results. Kripke,

has shown
that the
example,
names.
his
false
for
'Twin
is
Putnam,
proper
theory
by
are
I
shown
that
and
la
and
has
Earth' examples10
others,
Theory
false of natural kind terms, such as 'water', 'cat', etc. His arguments
Some

remarks

by examples
resemblance

such

as

the scope

the Aristotle

seem to apply to any property-words

which pick out what we regard
we have a case of a term such that we
as real properties. Whenever
but
of our decision
hold that its correct application
is not a matter
things are, we have a case in which our intuitions are in
with
the resemblance
theory of reference.
disagreement
Putnam's
results
and
may not directly apply to terms for
Kripke's
our society chooses
our
are
to say is
that whatever
which
intuitions
rather of how

'was duly elected'

'is a bachelor',
Terms such as 'is married',
to designate
for
the
is
which
resemblance
theory
properties
at
if
all.
In
such
there
cases,
correct,
is,
they designate
properties
correct.
seem

no possibly
fact to pose a danger of
recalcitrant
objective
intuitively,
of a term mistaken.
This is because,
making most of our applications
our
on
to
it
what
that
'defines' these
is
say
facie,
agreement
prima
terms. Kripke's
and Putnam's
cases
in
which
of properties
being is social.
Even for properties
which
not
blance
be
theory may

fail to apply,
social artifacts,

results
are
seem

to be

correct.
seem

social

Putnam
to name

if at all, then, only

whose
properties

artifacts,
uses
the

the resem
example

of

a natural

does not
kind, but
'pediatrician',11 which
rather a kind of socially defined occupation.
'Pediatrician',
though,
a group of people. Thus
does seem to have come to rigidly designate
are not doctors,
if pediatricians
all
it could turn out that pediatricians
turn out

spies and to have

in fact shipping
while
aid,

to be Martian
medical

rendering
forced labor camps.

a pretense
of
just made
little children to Martian

162

SAMUEL

C. WHEELER

From a realistic point of view, the resemblance

theory claims that
all property-terms
have reference
in the way that 'bachelor' and 'duly
an exten
elected'
i.e. by socially deciding
appear to have reference,
sion. Only on an idealistic conception
of the world,
though, could it
that all of our

be claimed
artifacts.

On

a realistic

terms

from our conceptions

determine
its object.

deviate
doesn't
Even

if the resemblance
we

artifact

for kinds

there

view,

are social
and properties
can
out there which

is a world

of it, so that the content

of a conception

theory is right for sentences

using social
don't get the result that truths about the

terms, though,
are guaranteed.
Every
some
definition
reference

world

seems

to require
in its
as
real
such
kinds,
intuitively
'bachelor =df unmarried male person'. Thus there is no guarantee
that
most
of the term are
particular
agreed on applications
universally
a
so
true. 'Person'
is
natural kind term,
that the theory embodied
in
that concept

may

widely
agreed-on
he is a bachelor'
term known

not

not

artifact-term

to

true.

So it may be guaranteed
that most
of the form, 'If A is a male person,
then
are true, given that 'married' is a socially defined
to apply to A. But it will not be guaranteed
in any
be

sentences

that most
sentences
'A is a
of the form,
way
agreed-on
are true. If we are wrong about what it takes to be a person,
bachelor'
turn out that most
it could
of the things we all agree
in calling
are not. If, for instance, a thing has to have a soul to be a
bachelors
social

even

person,
paradigm

involves no such thing, none of our

though our concept
bachelors will be bachelors
if none of them have souls. The

social artifact terms may be guaranteed

involving
true by a 'use' analysis,
but claims about how the world
to such properties
really is with respect
get no such guarantee.
Only
on the view that all terms are social artifacts will any facts about the
hypothetical
to be mostly

world

follow

beliefs

from universal

beliefs.

and Putnam's
results, then, show that in no case can there
Kripke's
be an argument
that reference
is a function of sense. No replacement
theory is established
the negative
result
that the content
of causal
and

and Putnam's
results, however;
by Kripke's
only
that the resemblance
is wrong.
It is true
theory
seems to embody
a kind
of our referential
concepts

theory of reference where

intentional
items. Furthermore,

the caused
various

items are mentalistic

social

phenomena

seem,

ON

THAT

163

IS NOT

WHICH

as conditions
to be built into real reference
in this causal
intuitively,
relation. But apart from a resemblance
theory of reference, we have
no compelling
reason to conclude
that therefore
reference
is some
kind

of

causal

relation.

We

the complexities
theory of reference
intuitions about what refers to what,
An
results

unnoticed

apparently
is that

the

have

certainly

that accommodating
would entail.12
of Kripke's
the purported

If a concept's
is destroyed.
its content both determine
is out

to give our
our varied

when,

consequence
of
invulnerability

ordinary views of men

determined
by making
determined
by whatever

little reason

there when

we

and Putnam's
truth
reference

reference

of

the

is not
and be

use

it, then a concept

mistaken.
'Criterial'

to a theory which may be radically

features of a concept may be mostly
false of what the concept
is true
no
of. Conceptual
will
be
with
that,
very clear
merely
analysis
case.
If
for
what
is
the
the
consequences
replacement
theory for the
resemblance
by now familiar stories
theory is some causal account,
amounts

are available

in which

intuitions,
what

concepts,

Furthermore,
of our concepts.

there

is radical misinformation

of a society.
can be true of one concept

'built into' the

and beliefs

can be true of most

the referent of
On the causal alternative
again, where
a general term is the kind of which
the causal sources of our concept
we could have a situation where
are members,
all special analytic
were
from a resem
false.
contents
of concepts
Apart
empirically
we can be talking about
the real world
blance
theory of reference,
there is
If the resemblance
it all wrong.
theory is wrong,
error.
massive
about
truly
nothing
impossible
is that our terms may not refer to
A more poignant
possibility
if there is in fact no kind out there to
anything. On a causal theory,
and getting

which
nothing
entities.

cases belong,
then we are talking about
baptism
that concept.
with
Similarly
singular terms for fictional
refers to turns out not to be very often
If what
'reference'

all or most
with

instantiated, most of our terms will fail of reference.

or not a causal theory correctly
of
the essence
describes
Whether
a
the
that
the
resemblance
fact
if there is such
reference,
thing,
theory

is wrong

eliminates

impossible.

Massive

arguments

from a better-off

error,

error is
that massive
the major arguments
of course, will need to be supported
by
sense. The fact
than common
standpoint

164

SAMUEL

that we

seem
that

from

possibility,
the case.
arise

to make

standpoint.
that most
I believe

from

C. WHEELER

errors will

massive

to be given an account
that this last
section

have

I argue in the following

of our terms for objects

don't refer, is in fact

the apparent paradoxes
that
can be explained
in terms of a

that our errors

and

of objects'
at
most
the micro-particles
of physics
and
theory
recognizes
as
certain complexes
of them
genuine objects. This is not a skeptical
claim. I am not saying that we are as likely as not to be wrong about
this

'vanishing

that

the existence
very

of and features
in fact mistaken

probably

III.

of ordinary objects.
I argue that we
and that there are no such things.

SORITES

are

ARGUMENTS

are generally
or puzzles.
I
regarded as sophisms
think
is that by the resem
they have been so regarded
are demonstrably
blance theory of reference,
their conclusions
false.
The resemblance
not
the
is
motivation
for
theory
primary
rejecting
Sorites

arguments
the reason

but it is the main

arguments,
is irrational nostalgia. With

sorites
believe,

reason.

The main

the death

of

the

motivation,
resemblance

I think it is clear that sorites arguments

are
of reference,
most
for
the
sound,
part.
I use sorites arguments
to make intuitive what I think is plausible on
other grounds.
I think that to be objectively
real requires having an
theory

For an object to have an essence

is for there to be objective
true of it, that is, natural
laws. There appear to be very
while
the laws about medium-sized
good laws about micro-particles
clauses as to be mere
objects are very poor, so full of ceteris paribus
rules of thumb. Since there seems to be little hope of a reduction of
essence.

necessities

medium-sized
there
objects

to complexes
kinds
object
be two unrelated
systems
the worse
laws must go. For

can either
with

elsewhere,131
I begin with

think the medium-sized

of micro-particle
of objective
kinds
reasons

objects

must

I have

kinds,
or the

explained

go.

a pair of premises:
is a real property,
then it is a matter
(a) If a putative property
an object has that property or lacks it.
fact whether
a purported
object exists
object either exists or doesn't

(b) Whether
purported

or not
exist.

is a matter

of

of fact. A

ON

I take

these

to be basic

sorites

relevant

arguments
in turn.
present

A.

state
of ontology,
which
principles
a property. There are two general kinds of
to my purposes
in this section which
I will

'realistic'

it is to be and to have

what

165

IS NOT

WHICH

THAT

Sorites

Property-type

Arguments

tall by growing one micron. By

in the growth of a person
(a) though, at every micron-point
premise
a
he either has the property of being a tall person or lacks it. Unless

No

person who

is not tall can become

can make
the difference
between
having this property
single micron
no
can
a
tall person by continuous
become
and lacking it,
person
between
growth. Since we are very sure that any precise borderline
it
arbitrary,
having this purported property and lacking it is absolutely
seems clear that there is no property of being a tall person. Since it is
up to us, it is not a matter of any fact about the world. Since there is
no property,
nothing
in the range
course,
infinity of properties
real number.

positive

constitutes

properties
no

tall

has

it. There

of cases

of the form
What

are no tall persons. There are, of

seems to arise, an
the question
n is a
'is n meters
in height' where

where

has been

the property

is that no

shown

a tall person.

of being

set of

such

So there are

persons.

or to decide that
help to have three or more truth-values
nor
same
not tall' is a middle
that
'neither tall
fuzziness
category. The
'true' and 'false' and between
'tall' and 'not tall' will
obtains between
It doesn't

occur

between

any

two adjacent
truth-values
and between
any two
the
dimension.
And
this
fuzziness
shows
along

categories
adjacent
that there
is no property
there,
borderline
is correct.
(Sophisticated
dealt with

in the next

considerations

about

if we

are

versions

right that no precise

of alternative
logics are

section.)
is possibly
real in such cases would
be a relation on a
dimension.
In the case of a predicate
such as 'bald', such a relation is
even
not
there.
That
there
is
such a relation would depend
probably
on some kind of ratio of hairs to surface normally
hairy combined

briefly
All that

with

preserve
different

transitivity,
orderings

distribution.

conform

to our

of pairs of men.

No

Several

such

relations might
and give
roughly,
relation would be selected by
intuitions

166

SAMUEL

our

as clearly
that 'balder than' denotes.
So
the relation
'taller than', may not even denote a relation.
can be extended
to substance
sorites
arguments

intuitions

'balder

C. WHEELER

than' unlike

Property-type
terms and count-nouns,
are fuzzy
ties' which
trary. To

as long as there seem to be 'defining proper

are intuitively
arbi
borderlines
and for which
an
that there are no rational agents,
entity
imagine

show

fewer and fewer truths,

less rational, believing
gradually
are harder and harder
to translate without
sounds which
making
in
that become more
and
error,
ways
behaving
attributing
inexplicable
becoming

and more

difficult

in terms of
of agenthood
Analyses
as Den
or
such
interpretation,
explanation
to a sorites-type
of 'agent' as a
evaporation

to rationalize.

success

with

nett's14

lend themselves

intentional

substance-determiner.

I
such as 'tall person',
of paradigm
property-continua
a
we
are
no
sure
line
that
that
have argued elsewhere15
place in which
this as confidence
is objectively
is drawn
right, and have explained
In the case

that no

do not
point which
that there is no real cutoff

laws of nature
This

apply above any

to confidence
amounts

cutoff

apply below.
that it does
point in the nature of things. With persons, our confidence
not matter objectively
what one says is less clear, since a lot hangs on
an entity is called a person.
whether
On
vince

reflection
one

that

though,
the only

the property-sorites
that exist
objects

should con
argument
are ones with a precise

can constitute
essence
the being of a genuine
precise
or
of
real
of
logical subjects. And objects
properties
logical subject
seem to exclude
with precise essences
tables, chairs, etc. It
persons,
of
seems very implausible
that, at a certain point in the elimination
essence.

Only

some drastic change

should
'property' of such objects
an objectively
distinct
take place which made one of those objects
entity, where what kind of thing it was changed.
is that
The problem with generalizing
arguments
property-sorites
the essential

we

for putative
essential
'properties'
we have the right
that
for
thinking
grounds
is
the resemblance
essential
Since
theory of reference
properties.
that we take to be essential may well
the features
however,
wrong,
to
not be. It could turn out, that is, that something
very unimportant
have

to construct

and have

our concept

to have

dimensions

some

of person

is in fact essential

to the nature

of persons.

ON

B.
A more

easily

THAT

WHICH

Sorites

Ungefs

generalizable

sorites

167

IS NOT

Arguments

argument, due to Peter Unger,16

This
sorites.
of taking
consists

is

a
composition/decomposition
in the most favorable
such as a table and extracting
putative object
a
one
atom
at
time.
this kind of sorites,
way
(In
'table-preserving'
one
to be physically
is assumed
such extraction
Surely
possible.)
a
atom cannot make
the difference
between
table being there and
the

there not being a table there. But equally clearly,

tables. So there are no tables. The only principle
is premise
(b) that every
'object' either exists
diminution.
losing
0-atom

tables.

seems
atoms.

But

preserve

tablehood.

the form:

are

tables, then if
then there are
tablehood,
preserves
a single
there are no 0-atom tables and removing

has
argument
an atom most
favorably

atom would
beings.
Such

The

there are no 0-atom

this argument needs
or not, after each

If there

So there are no tables. Tables

are not

can be interpreted
as showing
that where
there
arguments
a complex
to be a table, there is at most
to be thought
of
A sequence
of complexes
of smaller and smaller
size
is

analogous
case also,

to the dimension
is no subset

on which

'taller than'

is defined.

In this

that sequence which

is the object of
a
common
be
there
definable
artificial
sense,
may
though
complex
That there is
object at each point up to the last in the diminution.
even a single relation
'is more
tabloid than' along this sequence
is
be
since
relations
could
defined.
many
questionable,
'acceptable'
there

In the case
almost

of

starts with
of persons, Unger's
argument
a
say that after
everyone would
brain-transplant,

brains, since
he has a new

the brain in the right sort of

body, not a new brain. So, keeping
the
nutrient bath, the extraction without
Now,
replacement
proceeds.
to be part of the person
nutrient bath itself would not be considered
and neither would
further life-support
that might have to be
systems
to the person as the decomposition
progressed. When we are
one
most
to
down
would
atom,
agree that there is
people
eventually
no person
most
there. And
agree that a single atom's
prople would
cannot
turn a non-person
into a person. A composition
addition
attached

version

of the same argument comes up in disputes about abortion.

If
a
a
not
old
but
is
then
is,
egg
person
thirty year
during

a fertilized

168

C. WHEELER

SAMUEL

a person must have come into being. Since

there are probably no persons.
unlikely,
physically
What
it would be for an ordinary object, a person, or any object to
a natural,
to make
reduction
be for some one-atom
exist, would
That is, for an object to exist is for there to be a
difference.
objective
some

interval

one-second

this seems

genuine

law of nature which

at one point

applied

apply at the next point.

this sorites establishes
What
we

conceive

precise
what we

is that ordinary
them do not exist. It is logically
some

but which

objects
possible
sort out

to

failed

and persons as
that there is a

there which
is
complex
entity
are referring to when we seen to refer to something with the
of, for instance, a person. But there seems to be no reason to
of

molecular

qualities
to think not. In any case,
think so and fairly good scientific grounds
not support the pos
does
scheme
the ordinary
certainly
conceptual
an
an
about when
intuitions
since ordinary
tulation of such
entity,
a diminution,
survives
that it always
survives
tiny
namely
object
are what

diminutions,

the sorites

argument

uses

to evaporate

putative

objects.
I believe

is valid, both of the property

that every such argument
that for
type. I believe
type and of the composition/decomposition
most
the
for
and
every
ordinary
properties,
object,
ordinary
nearly
a
a
not
between
the
atom
difference
will
make
that
single
premise
property

being

ordinary

objects

there

or not

is true. Thus

ponse by people
alternative
logics
a set as probabilistic,

on

partial,17 or on multiplying
Probabilistic
membership
seems to require violation
all the same

person
theory,

few

OUT

res
frequent
logics seem to have been the most
at all seriously.
The
take sorites arguments
who
in
I have seen depend either on treating membership

(1) Alternative

while

that very

are real.

IV. WAYS

with

I believe

treating membership
truth-values.

literally,

truth as

literally interpreted by a realist,

such as that no two persons
of principles
can be such that one is a tall
dimensions
in a set,

physical
is not. On
the other

if taken

in a set and

the probabilistic
have exactly

if two persons

set-membership
the same height

THAT

ON

WHICH

169

IS NOT

and are both in the set of tall persons with a probability

of 0.5, then
one may be tall while
the other is not. If physically
indiscriminable
to the same kind, objectively,
individuals must
then prob
belong
no
sense.
makes
literal
of
Some
abilistic set-membership
proponents18
this theory do not take it literally, but rather as a remark about how
an object is above or below. But
many acceptable
arbitrary borderlines
there.
this is to recognize
that there is no property
is a nearly equivalent
to the above objection.
seems to apply more

Partial

set-membership
is immune
theory which
of partial set-membership
orders

than

to real objects

in the world.

An

version
However,

of the above
the notion
to Masonic

properly
object must have an
amount to its extinc

that is, objective

features
losing which
a thing either has it or lacks it. The
for a real property,
tion. Similarly,
notion of being partly in a kind or partly having a certain property
amounts
to the admission
that what we have is a dimension
rather
essence,

can determine
the being of an object. For a
which
or a real property,
either a thing has it or lacks it. Real
are either true or false. More
do
truth-values
likewise,

than an essence
real essence

propositions,
not make sense
The

above

thought

out

reasons.
for the obvious
ontologically
remarks obviously
beg the question
against
I deal with
and elaborate
theories.
these
because

I think

of

reference

briefly,
though,
resemblance
theory

these well
theories

so

a
it is clear that they presuppose
and assume
that realism
is false.

for accepting
these complex
alternatives
is the assurance
the resem
ontological
principles
blance theory gives that our patterns of verbal behavior must be made
true. If reference were a function of societal dispositions
to
mostly
a
we
would
that reference would be probabilistic,
term,
expect
apply
are. Properties
would
be statistical
since response-patterns
social
Furthermore,
to our very

artifacts.
nothing
behavior.

But

the motivation

simple

on a realistic

to do with

what

view,
is out

such probability-distributions
have
our
with
there, only
description

behavior
(This is not to say that a theory of our description
is trivial or useless.
I think Zadeh, Fine and others are dealing with
but not with
of this paper.) Our
the problem
interesting
problems,
apart from the resemblance
theory, can deviate
description-behavior,

from what
massively
be
may
probabilistic,

is the case. Our

but what

to stimuli
in response
a thing has and whether
a

behavior

properties

170

SAMUEL

C. WHEELER

thing of a given kind exists or not is not. When

grounds for thinking ordinary
logic is mistaken,
be accepted. With
the death of the resemblance

there are no rational

its conclusions

should

theory of reference,
ones.
there are no rational grounds
for changing
logic; only nostalgic
we have reached via the
(2) People might respond to the conclusion
are ontologic
sorites arguments with the claim that ordinary objects

the objects
ally primary while
Thus the fact that the essence
terms is taken
micro-particle
not
and
vice-versa.
particles,
where

real

the

are instrumental
of physics
parasites.
of ordinary objects make no sense in
as a mark against
the reality of micro
This

amount

would

essences

were

rather

than atoms.

those

to a super-Aristo
of medium-sized

telianism,
nature of the
with atoms being fictions.
The fundamental
objects,
it. However
world
is just as we perceive
such a theory might go in
the same sorites arguments
detail, essentially
go through with small
chips of tables, for instance,
to the claim
be committed

a theorist would

Such

that, after some minute

chip has been
to exist, even though we
from a table, the table has ceased
are not aware of this and it is not clear from our concept
admittedly
that this is so.
removed

a reactionary
realism must concede,
though,
to exist will be a theoretically
isolated phenomenon,
Such

that this ceasing

in terms of

even

a 'medium-sized

terms. Not only will

object' system of basic scientific
or non-existence
of the table not be connected
with any
even
it will not
be connected
with any laws
laws of particle physics,

the existence
about
which

This

objects.

ordinary
connect

is because
terms

are

there

that we

have

no precise
any evidence

ordinary object
breakoff points
So that there are precise but unknown
seems
to be absolutely
trees
either
unfounded
The

thesis

is not

by
supported
is arbitrary.
every
point
of the very unlawlikeness
because
scientifically
about medium-sized
that look to be forthcoming
scientifically.
hold
intuitions

that

there

is a distinct

terms

of

chairs

vanishing
no
removal,

chip
seems to break

down.

before, you still can.

of objective
The discovery

point

of

the

intuitions
It

breaking

for.

for tables

and

intuitively
because

our

or

is not

supported
of the generalizations
That is, if
objects.

tablehood

connection

necessary
If you could

laws

of an object
or
to dinners

in
to

pull a chair up to the thing

points

seems

to be

impossible

THAT

ON

WHICH

171

IS NOT

in the case of medium-sized

for exactly
this reason. Since the
objects
or
of exactly
the
nonexistent,
discovery
imprecise
when an object has vanished
cannot be made by checking
anything
else. Only the activity of nous, an intuitive apprehension
of essence,
can do this, but nous seems to tell us in this type of case that there is
are either

laws

no

essence.

precise

more ways
the
try to avoid
people might
probably
a
I have been urging is that, apart from
resemblance
conclusion. What
is
there is no reason to think that the conclusion
theory of reference,
are

There

false and therefore to be avoided. Apart from a superficial appearance

to the disappearance
of paradox19 and a negative
emotional
response
of loved ones, nothing blocks acceptance
of the result.
sense to write
in any important
this. I
self-contradictory
success
it rather as a tractarian
ladder. The predictive
of
us
reason
to believe
that the fundamental
every
objects
gives

It is not
regard

physics
are micro-particles.
of

massive

leads

reference
errors

little reflection

us

to entertain

on developments
the possibility

in the theory
make

that we

in our

about what
exists. Our
ordinary
judgements
to think that intuitive persons
intuitions
and other
give us reason
middle-sized
objects are not the sort of thing that can be vanished
by
or
an
one
error.
atom
the
of
Thus, by
extracting
inducing
compulsion
are
the sorites arguments, we conclude
not
that persons
and their ilk
and
any real sort of thing at all. Where we seem to see the properties
natural kinds of the ordinary world
there are only fluxing clumps of
and continuous
dimensions.
The conclusion
entails
micro-particles
no persons
and so no 'theory of reference'
whose
results were
used
in the argument.
But this is harmless,
since the
is a reductio ad absurdum of the 'given' world.
argument
In the past, bad science could allow souls, spiritual substances,
etc.,
that

there

are

to be as reasonable
such bizarre

as anything
theories and other

longer any reason

conclusion
reached

to

think

else. The main

point to make about

out is that there is no

tempting ways
one of them is more

in this paper.

there

likely than the

to
is no reason

Logically,
'bold stroke' of accepting
the
adopt a faith or to change
logic. The
conclusion
of sorites arguments
is only emotionally
bold. Philoso
course. Rescues
it is the most plausible
from
phically and rationally,
these

conclusions,

prima

facie,

are

irrational,

amounting

to either

172

C. WHEELER

SAMUEL

blind faith in gods or unitary

accounts
water-molecule-like
the unpleasantness,
University

spirits or blind faith that science will

of personhood.
They are motivated
not the implausibility,
of the conclusion.20

find
by

of Connecticut

NOTES
1

I use

the

term

results,
2
Quine,

not

just

Davidson,

to refer to chain-arguments
in this paper
with
'sorites'
to any chain-argument.
Word
Ch. 2, (M.I.T. Press:
and Object,
W.V.,
Mass.,
Cambridge,
'On the Very
Idea of a Conceptual
Presidential
Donald,
Scheme',

Association,
Philosophical
Proceedings
of the American
'Truth and Meaning',
17, No.
3, 1967.
Synthese
3
This
in Richard
is made most
argument
explicitly
Journal
69, No.
19, 1972, pp. 649-665.
of Philosophy
4
Ludwig,
Philosophical
Investigations,
Wittgenstein,
York,
1953).
5
Austin,
John,

for

instance

'A Plea

for Excuses',

Inc.: Englewood
Hall,
Language
(Prentice
6
for instance
'The Theory
Ryle, Gilbert,
The Chappell
book, Richard
Language.

Cliffs, New
of Meaning'

The
Rorty's
Caton's
Charles

Vol.

47,

Rorty's

1973-74,

'The World

(The Macmillan
in V.C.
Jersey,
in V.C.

paradoxical
1960); and
address
in
pp. 5-20,

and

Well

Lost',

Company:

New

ed., Ordinary
1964), pp. 41-64.

Chappell,

ed., Ordinary
of
Turn,
(University
and Ordinary
Lan
Philosophy
of the
give an adequate
picture
Chappell,

Linguistic

Press:
1967), and
Chicago,
of Illinois Press:
guage,
Urbana,
1963)
(University
British
theory of reference.
7
loc. cit.
Idea of a Conceptual
'On the Very
Scheme',
Davidson,
Donald,
8
and G. Harman,
in D. Davidson
and Necessity',
eds.,
Saul,
Kripke,
'Naming
Semantics
Dordrecht,
Holland,
(D. Reidel:
1972), pp. 253-355.
Languages,
of Natural
9
of Meaning',
inMinnesota
Studies
'The Meaning
in the Philosophy
Putnam,
of
Hilary,
of Minnesota
Vol. 7, (University
Science,
Press,
1975), pp. 131-193.
10
Putnam,
op. cit., p. 139 if.
Hilary,
11
Putnam,
op. cit., p. 163.
Hilary,
12
account
of what Kripke
and Putnam
have
is given
in Sam Wheeler's
This
shown

Chicago

and Vagueness',
'Reference
30 (1975), 367-379.
Synthese
13
loc. cit., p. 375.
'Reference
and Vagueness',
Sam,
Wheeler,
14
and Consciousness
Press: New York,
Content
Daniel,
Dennett,
(Humanities
1969).
15
and Vagueness',
loc. cit.
'Reference
Sam,
Wheeler,
16
'IDo Not Exist', manuscript.
See also 'There Are No Ordinary
Peter,
Unger,
Things'
are
I use
this issue. The arguments
in applying
this sorites
Synthese,
argument-type
condensations
of his arguments.
17
An
is L.A.
Zadeh's
and Approximate
of this alternative
example
'Fuzzy
Logic
No.
Nov.
Memorandum
Research
ERL-M479,
12, 1974.
(Electronics
Reasoning',
of Engineering,
of California,
University
Berkeley).
Laboratory,
College
18
in 'Vagueness,
For example,
Kit Fine
Truth and Logic',
30 (1975), 265-300.
Synthese
19
to reach the conclusion
seem paradoxical
It might
that there are no persons,
since

ON THAT WHICH
there

has

there must

IS NOT

173

seem that
the illusion
that there are persons,
and it would
arisen
apparently
to have that illusion.
I think the best that might be made
of
be real persons
of instants of regions of the Platonic
is that there may be a dimension
flux on

persons
the relation
which

than' can be
than' or 'is more
active
intentionally
personal
status ordinary
and persons
of exactly
what
objects
might
if we can
have when
is a large topic for another
paper. Roughly,
they are not entities
are logical
we
can equally
and computers
that tables
subjects,
imagine mistakenly
The theory of persons
that we are logical subjects.
this paper accommodates
imagine
defined.

full

The

resembles

'is more

account

The
bundle-theory.
of micro-particles,

Hume's

constituents

of

the bundles

are

instantaneous

no
rather than sense
Also,
though,
impressions.
out of it. Thus
from what's
in the bundle
line divides what's
clear ontological
illusory
are
can arise
without
there being
illusions
in 'personal'
which
any entities
regions
states

of complexes

persons.
20
I would
and

like

especially
not exist even
use of

some

at the University
of Connecticut,
the philosophy
department
The paper would
and Jerry Fodor,
for helpful
discussion.
and the
of Peter Unger
view without
the encouragement
the ordinary

to thank
John
on

Troyer

of his arguments

in the composition/decomposition

sorites.