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Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
8TH Judicial Region
Branch 8
Tacloban City
Western Eagle Ltd.,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE NO. 2015-1
FOR ENFORCEMENT

-versusOF

FOREIGN

JUDGMENT
Juan P. Masipag,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------

DECISION
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of
a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum. Rule 131 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court recognizes that a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the
Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction unless such is contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.1

THE CASE
The plaintiff Western Eagle Limited filed a complaint on January
12, 2016 against the defendant Juan P. Masipag praying that said
defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by
the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in its judgment in Civil Action No.
970 of 2012 dated December 28, 2012 and amended on April 13,
2013, to wit:
(1) USD 1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong Kong
currency at the time of payment with legal interest from
December 28, 2012 until fully paid;
(2) Interest on the sum of USD 1,500.00 at 9.87% per
annum from October 31, 2012 to December 28, 2012;
and
(3) HKD 905.00 at fixed cost in the action; and
1

Sec 3 (n) Rule 131 1997 Rules of Court

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(4) at least USD 80,000.00 representing attorney's fees,

litigation expenses and cost, with interest thereon from
the date of the judgment until fully paid.
Western Eagle Limited is a corporation duly organized under
the laws of Hong Kong, with principal office address at Room 1, 17th
Floor, Tower 1, World Financial Tower, Causeway Road, Hong Kong.
Mr. John P. James, a national of Hong Kong and President of said
corporation was authorized by the Board of Directors through
Resolution Number 1-8-20162 to bring this action to represent
Western Eagle Limited, its interests and liabilities.
On 20 January 2016 defendant Juan D. Masipag filed his
Answer where he admits the existence of the judgment but assails
the validity of the same on the ground that the Hong Kong court
never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
At the pretrial conference, the parties could not arrive at any
settlement. However, the following stipulations and admissions are
of note:
1. The defendant admitted the existence of the judgment
dated December 28, 2012 as well as its amendment
dated April 13, 2013, but not necessarily the authenticity
or validity thereof;
2. The defendant admitted that the person charged in Civil
Action 970 before the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong
and herein defendant are one and the same person;
3. The defendant admitted the receipt of the summons
issued by the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong on 15
April 2013 (Exhibit 3).
During trial, plaintiff presented witness Mr. John P. James,
president of Western Eagle Limited, who testified as to the filing of
Civil Action 970 in the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong and that
judgment in favor of Western Eagle Limited was rendered by said
court. He stated that a notice of default was sent the defendant but on
cross-examination it was established that such notice bore no
signature by the defendant to prove that the latter had indeed
received it.
The second witness, Mr. Pepito Garcia, Consul-General of the
Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong, testified that Mr. John P. James
had brought a copy of a judgment by the Hong Kong Court of First
Instance in Civil Action 970 to his office for authentication and that,
upon verifying that the requirements had been met, he, Mr. Garcia,
2

Exh I

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proceeded to authenticate said document. The court, on clarificatory

questioning, was able to determine that the original judgment was
rendered in Chinese and that applicants for authentication usually
have their documents translated in local language translation
services. The Consulate, however, has in-house translators which
verify the translated version of documents brought for authentication.
The defense assailed the validity of the judgment in Civil Action
970 claiming it had not received any notice before trial. Ms. Maria
Okinawa, the secretary/personal assistant of the defendant, testified
that she received only two documents a copy of the summons
dated April 15, 2013 and the judgment in Civil Action 970 rendered by
Hon. Judge Kent Yee of the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong
dated December 28, 2012 and amended on April 13, 2013 that were
received on April 20, 2013. Another defense witness, Mr. Sean
Schubert, Record Officer of Marine Agency Limited, testified that no
notice or summons was ever received by his agency through him at
the agencys offices in London, United Kingdom. Marine Agency
Limited was the agent appointed by the defendant to accept service
of proceedings in the performance guaranty he executed with the
herein plaintiff. While said witness came replete with records
pertaining to documents received during the years 2009 to 2013 with
particular attention paid to those for the month of August 2012, it was
also shown that certain entries in the records were incomplete, that
is, the signature of the receiving officer was missing. The witness
could not also answer satisfactorily when asked about the procedure
for the actual receipt of documents as well as the standard procedure
followed in his absence.
Ms. Rebecca Poon was presented as an expert on the laws of
Hong Kong, and as a representative of the law office of the
defendant's counsel who made a verification of the record of the case
filed by the plaintiff in Hong Kong against the defendant, as well as
the procedure in serving court processes in Hong Kong. In her
affidavit (Exh. 8) which constitutes her direct testimony, the said
witness stated that:
Under Order 10, Rule 1, a writ must be served personally
on each defendant by the plaintiff or his agent. In other words,
the writ of summons or claim can be served to the defendant by
the plaintiff himself or his agent who could be his counsel as
there are no Court personnel who serve writs of summons
and/or most other processes in Hong Kong.
Under the same provision, it provides for 3 alternative
ways to serve a writ of summon on a defendant.

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The first type of service is the personal service which is

the most manner of service (sic).
The second manner of service of summons is by sending
a copy of the writ through registered post to the defendant at
his usual or last known address.
The third manner of service of summons is by inserting in
the defendants letter box a sealed copy of the writ enclosed in
a sealed envelope addressed to the defendant.
The plaintiff has to prove by affidavit or affirmation that the
writ of summons has been served on the defendant. In the said
affidavit or affirmation, the plaintiff has to state that he has
personally served the sealed copy of the writ of summons on
defendant on a specific date.
When asked what the effect of failure to present an affidavit or
affirmation in instances when the summons is served personally, she
answered:
It means that the personal service has not been properly
made which is tantamount to no service of summons at all.
Hence, the Court will not obtain jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, consequently, any proceedings and judgement
which arise out of it is a nullity.
When asked what the requirements were for the service of summons
through registered mail or letter box, she stated that the plaintiff has
to execute an affidavit stating that the summons had not been
returned through the post and that it will have come to the
defendants knowledge within seven (7) days thereafter. She further
stated that failure to present such affidavit means that the service had
not been properly made.

FINDINGS OF THE COURT

Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country; however, under the rules of comity, utility
and convenience, nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence
and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of
foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. 3
3

Mijares v. Ranada, G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397

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The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and

enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, which was in turn taken from the US
procedural laws. [20] The fact that the rule has remained unchanged
for nearly a century is an abiding guide in itself that international
comity is a well-entrenched principle in our laws and should be
accorded great respect and applied with conviction. 4 In our
jurisdiction, a foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in
the country from which it comes. The court that has rendered the
judgment is presumed to have acted in the lawful exercise of its
jurisdiction.5 Sec 48 of Rule 39 states to wit:
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order
is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order, is conclusive upon the title to
the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (50a)
In the case before this court, the defendant admits the
existence of the judgment but questions the validity of said judgment
on the ground of want of notice to the party. He claims never to have
received proper summons prior to the proceedings whereon the
judgment is based. Thus, he was not given his day in court or a
chance to refute the claims of the plaintiff properly. However, it should
be noted that it is also settled that the party attacking a foreign
judgment bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity.6
While this court does not presume to know the law or laws upon
which the judgment is based it being Hong Kong law, it does note that
there is no reference to the judgment as one made in default or one
made without the participation of the defendant Juan Masipag. In the
same document, Mr. Masipag is identified as the beneficial owner of
Hong Kong-Philippine International Navigation Services Ltd., the
defendant corporation.
4

Id. JJ. Malcolm and Avancea, dissenting.

Sec 3 (n) Rule 131 1997 Rules of Court
6
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112573, February 9, 1995, 241 SCRA 192
5

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The defendant avers that he did not receive any notice or writ of
summons prior to the rendition of judgment. Service of summons or
other court processes being matters of remedy and procedure are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. Under the
law on procedure in Hong Kong, the burden of proving that indeed
there was proper service of summons lies with the plaintiff. In the
absence of any affidavit by the plaintiff that summons was properly
served in Hong Kong Civil Case 970 in August 2012, around the time
the suit was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong,
this court is inclined to believe that summons was not properly
served.
The defendant, however, admits receipt of a second writ of
summons together with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Hong Kong in Civil Action 970 sometime in April 2013 which ordered
him to pay the plaintiff:
(1) USD 1,810,265.40 or its equivalent in Hong Kong
currency at the time of payment with legal interest from
December 28, 2012 until fully paid;
(2) Interest on the sum of USD 1,500.00 at 9.87% per
annum from October 31, 2012 to December 28, 2012;
and
(3) HKD 905.00 at fixed cost in the action; and
(4) at least USD 80,000.00 representing attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and cost, with interest thereon from
the date of the judgment until fully paid.
At the time of the receipt of said judgment as it is now, as
claimed by the defendant, the nullity of the decision on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over his person should have been obvious and
glaring and thus, an appeal of the decision or an action for annulment
of the judgment would have been proper had it been timely made.
Meanwhile, the plaintiff, after eight months from the time the
judgment was rendered and after relying on its having attained
finality, filed an action for its enforcement in this court as the
defendant is now within the jurisdiction of this court. Having been
properly served a copy of the decision, the defendant had the
opportunity, the right and the means to assail said decision and his
not having done so is considered a waiver of such. He should not be
given the same opportunity now as it would be unjust and unfair to
the plaintiff who has been adjudged entitled to the remedies it sought.
In our jurisdiction, judgments attain finality if after the lapse of
15 days from notice of judgment, the losing party had not perfected

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an appeal.7 The prevailing party is generally entitled to execution as a

matter of right or on motion. 8 If the principle of processual
presumption were applied, the judgment in Civil Action 970 would
have long before the action before this court was taken attained
finality and its execution would have become a right of the herein
plaintiff.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, premises considered and relying on the
presumption of validity of the judgment of the Court of First Instance
Hong Kong in Civil Action 970 this court finds for the PLAINTIFF and
orders the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amounts adjudged in the
aforementioned judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Done this 27th day of February 2016 in Tacloban City,

Philippines.

PROSPERO D. MAGIBA
Acting Presiding Judge

7
8

Sec 3 Rule 41
Sec 1 Rule 39