MMDA vs Jancom

Posted on October 14, 2008 by danabatnag

MMDA v. Jancom
Date: Jan 30, 2002
Petitioner: MMDA
Respondent: Jancom
Ponente: Melo, J.
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Facts of the case: After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA, Jancom won a
contract for the MMDAs San Mateo waste management project. A BOT contract for the waste to
energy project was signed on Dec 19, 1997, between Jancom and the Philippine Government,
represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through DENR Secretary
Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.
The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was too close to the end of his
term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but Estrada refused to sign it, for two reasons: the
passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the
closure of the dumpsite.
When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste management projects for
Metro Manila, Jancom filed a petition with the Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the
resolution of the Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding
the BOT contract with Jancom, and the call for bids for a new waste management contract.
On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of Jancom. Instead of appealing, the MMDA
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the
petition, the MMDA went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with Jancom was not
binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions precedent to the contract were
not complied with, and there was no valid notice of award.
The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for appeal instead of for certiorari,
because a certiorari would only apply in cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction,
something which the petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from the
final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has become final and gone
beyond the reach of any court to modify in any substantive aspect.
Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues, the court took it up just the
same, if only to put the petitioners mind to rest.
The contract with Jancom is valid: citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319 of the Civil Code.
In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can only allege that there was no
valid notice of award; the contract does not bear the signature of the President; the conditions
precedent specified in the contract were not complied with.
But the Court said that the lack of notice was the governments fault; though the President did not
sign, his alter-ego did; and anyway his signature was only necessary for the effectivity of the
contract, not its perfection; and that the two-month period within which Jancom should comply with
the conditions had not yet started to run because the contract had not yet taken effect, precisely
because of the absence of the Presidents signature.
HELD: The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected
contract between the Republic of the Philippines and Jancom. The MMDA cannot revoke or
renounce the same without the consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is
still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the President.
Voting: vitug, panganiban, Sandoval Gutierrez concur.
Carpio j: No part, I was former counsel to a foreign partner of Jancom Environmental Corporation.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution says: The Supreme Court en banc shall have the
power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Does this mean that all administrative decisions and penalties may be rendered only by the
Supreme Court en banc?
On February 7, 1989, the Court promulgated Circular No. 2-89 which says: A decision or resolution
of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the

concurrence of at least three such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Sec
4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of
citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable
development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of
environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans
and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public
health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity,
undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution
and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights
effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of
environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and
to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the
adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court.
Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
may, in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available

only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.
Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.
It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to
the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken.