1)

Eminent domain (taking of private property, for public purpose, by paying

just compensation)

Public Purpose
Housing for the poor: Ortega v. City of Cebu, 602 SCRA 601 (2009).
Taking for a cultural/historical purpose: Manosca v C.A., G.R. No. 106440,
January 29, 1996
When taking is not justified: Masikip v. Pasig City, 497 SCRA 391(2006). No
genuine necessity.

Moday v. C. A. 268 SCRA 586: The Court reiterated the limitations on the
power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation
must be made and due process of law must be observed. The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation,
necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose of the
taking, has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be
genuine and of a public character. Government may not capriciously choose
what private property should be taken.

Just Compensation
Principal criterion to determine just compensation: Tinio et al. v. NAPOCOR,
G.R. 160923, January 24, 2011. It is settled that the nature and character of
the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining
how much just compensation should be given to the landowner. Not the
states gain but the owners loss.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No.

172551, January 15, 2014.The determination of just compensation is
fundamentally a judicial function. In the exercise of the Courts essentially
judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not
granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated
factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98) that reflect these
factors. Courts may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formulas
application to fit the factual situations before them. They must, however,
clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors and formula
that the law and the rules have provided.
The time of taking refers to that time when the State deprived the
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State
acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section
4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
NOTE that: Expropriation is one of the harshest proceedings which the state
has against a private party because it deprives the party of perpetual use
of his property; requisites, how just compensation is determined; relate to
the Bill of Rights.
Action on Commissioners Report: Republic v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No.
191448, November 16, 2011. The duty of the court in considering the
commissioners report is to satisfy itself that just compensation will be made
to the defendant by its final judgment in the matter, and to fulfill its duty in
this respect, the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in dealing
with the report as the particular circumstances of the case may require.
Rule 67, Section 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that
the trial court has the discretion to act upon the commissioners report in
any of the following ways: (1) it may accept the same and render judgment
therewith; or (2) for cause shown, it may [a] recommit the report to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or [b] set aside the report and
appoint new commissioners; or [c] accept the report in part and reject it in
part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure
to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so
taken.
Compromise Agreement in Eminent Domain: City of Manila v. Alegar
Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012. Indeed, the Court has
held that when the property owner rejects the offer but hints for a better
price, the government should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a
conference. The government must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain
by agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will warrant the
dismissal of the complaint.

Compensation based on R.A. 6657: LBP v. Ferrer et al., G.R. No. 172230,
February 2, 2011
Recognition of Fair Market Value: EPZA v. Estate of Salud Jimenez, et al.,
G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011. Market value at the time of taking.
Interest rate on just compensation: Apo Fruits Corp. et al. v LBP, G.R. No.
164, October 12, 2010. the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time
of taking until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position
as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
2)

Extradition in terms of due process and independent states

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of
a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal
proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different
nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
Government of Hongkong SAR v. Olalia
A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing
a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. However, it does not
necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines

should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due

process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines
is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily
met.
Government of US v. Purungan and Jimenez
We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it,
a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Extradition proceedings are not in the nature of criminal proceedings.
Where there is a conflict between international law provisions with that of a
domestic law, the latter would prevail.
3)

Impeachment power of congress over impeachable officer

Gutierrez v. HOR, Feb. 15, 2011: consideration of two complaints as basis
Two complaint were filed: fertilizer scam and killing of naval. Gutierrez said
just take cognizance of naval killing. The 2 complaints can be considered
simultaneously because the internal rules provide. Congress may look into
separate complaints against an impeachable officer and consider the
inclusion of matters raised therein in the adoption of the Articles of
Impeachment. Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3,
paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year. Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from
the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or
four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She
posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to
petitioners claim, the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House
of Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the
term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. It
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress
taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House
on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than
one lighted matchstick light the candle at the same time. According to the
SC, what is important is that there should only be one candle that is kindled
in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks
can no longer rekindle the candle.
Francisco v. HOR, 415 SCRA 44: initiation of a complaint for impeachment
Chief Justice Corona v. Senate of the Philippines et al., G.R. No.200242, July
17, 2012: The power of judicial review includes the power of review
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Impeachment, described as
"the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," 14 was foreseen
as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing
factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more

by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of

innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly political character, the precise
role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance
to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while
preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government.
Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political
departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave
abuse or arbitrariness.
Note: Under the Constitution, the sole disciplining authority of all
impeachable officers, including Justices of this Court, is Congress. Section
3(1), Article XI of the Constitution provides that, The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. Likewise, Section 3(6) of the same Article provides that, The
Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide cases of impeachment.
These provisions constitute Congress as the exclusive authority to discipline
all impeachable officers for any impeachable offense, including betrayal of
public trust, a catchall phrase2 to cover any misconduct involving breach of
public trust by an impeachable officer.
While impeachment is often described as a political process, it also
functions as the equivalent of administrative disciplinary proceedings
against impeachable officers. Impeachable officers are not subject to
administrative disciplinary proceedings either by the Executive or Judicial
branch, in the same manner that non-impeachable officers are subject.
Thus, impeachment by Congress takes the place of administrative
disciplinary proceedings against impeachable officers as there is no other
authority that can administratively discipline impeachable
officers.3 Removal from office and disqualification to hold public
office,4 which is the penalty for an impeachable offense,5 is also the most
severe penalty that can be imposed in administrative disciplinary
proceedings.
Impeachment is not a criminal proceeding because conviction in an
impeachment complaint is not a bar to criminal prosecution for the same
act.6 An impeachable offense, like betrayal of public trust, may not even
constitute a criminal act. Like in an administrative proceeding, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required for conviction in impeachment. If
an impeachable officer is charged of a crime, as distinguished from an
administrative charge, the proper court has jurisdiction to try such
impeachable officer because the proceeding is criminal, not administrative.
However, neither the conviction nor acquittal of such impeachable officer in
the criminal case constitutes a bar to his subsequent impeachment by
Congress. There is no double jeopardy because impeachment is not a
criminal proceeding.7
Only Congress, as the exclusive disciplining authority of all impeachable
officers, can decide in a non-criminal, non-civil proceeding 8 whether a
sitting Justice of this Court has committed plagiarism. Plagiarism is a
betrayal of public trust because, as the majority puts it, to plagiarize is to
steal and pass off as ones own the ideas of another. 9 However, in writing
judicial decisions a judge is liable for plagiarism only if the copying violates
the moral rights of the author under the Law on Copyright.

This Court may conduct an investigation of an administrative complaint

against a sitting Justice to determine if there is basis in recommending to
the House of Representatives the initiation of an impeachment complaint
against the sitting Justice. This Court may also conduct an investigation of
an administrative complaint against a sitting Justice to determine if the
complaint constitutes contempt of this Court. However, this Court has no
power to decide on the guilt or innocence of a sitting Justice in the
administrative complaint because such act is a usurpation of the exclusive
disciplinary power of Congress over impeachable officers under the
Constitution. Any decision by this Court in an administrative case clearing a
sitting Justice of an impeachable offense is void for want of jurisdiction and
for violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or
disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not
needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of
the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can
convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III 83 of CA No. 141 and
other applicable laws.84
5) Treaty making powers vinuya, jepepa case
Treaty making power (Art. VII, Sec. 21) Section 21. No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Ratification by senate;
congress cannot object to signing of treaty.

Such a decision will put this Court on a collision course with Congress if
subsequently an impeachment complaint for plagiarism is filed with
Congress against the sitting Justice. Incidentally, an impeachment
complaint has already been filed in the House of Representatives involving
the same complaint subject of this administrative case. If the House of
Representatives decides to take cognizance of the complaint and initiates
an impeachment based on the same administrative complaint that this
Court had already dismissed as baseless, then this Court would have
created a constitutional crisis that could only weaken the publics faith in the
primacy of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court cannot assume jurisdiction over an administrative
complaint against a sitting Justice of this Court by invoking Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Clearly, the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over judges is found in Section 11 of Article VIII. However,
this disciplinary authority is expressly limited to lower court judges, and
does not incude Supreme Court Justices, precisely because the Constitution
expressly vests exclusively on Congress the power to discipline Supreme
Court Justices. By excluding Supreme Court Justices, Section
11 withholds from the Supreme Court en banc the power to discipline its
own members.
4)

Reclamation chavez v pea; READ UNCLOS

Regalian doctrine: all lands belong to the state. The 1987 Constitution declares
that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot be
alienated. Corporation are banned from owning alienable lands of public
domain, they can only lease it.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain,
waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the
State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless
they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural
resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. 71

Treaty distinguished from executive agreements

Arthur Lim et al v. Executive Secretary GR No. 131445, April 11, 2002: A
party who does not any legal standing cannot question the constitutionality
of the Visiting Forces Agreement. Funded by US govt funds.
Please note that the Court has, in a prior case, made a distinction between
an Executive Agreement and a Treaty. A treaty requires the ratification of
the Senate while an Executive Agreement does not. The VFA is considered
supplemental to the Mutual Defense Treaty executed by the Philippine
government and the U.S. government and ratified by both the U.S. Senate
and the Philippine Senate prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
6)

Elements for valid search and seizure; won exclusion rule will apply
ARTIII, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
To summarize:

Searches and Seizures: freedom from unwarranted and

unreasonable intrusions; right upholds privacy; as general rule
search and arrest must covered by warrant

Warrant must be issued by a judge; existence of probable cause;

personal examination of complainant, witnesses and documents;
addressed to law enforcers for service

Exceptions: search incident to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto,

hot pursuit and escaped prisoners), search of moving vehicles,
plain view doctrine and airport searches ; and all circumstances
set forth in the Rules in Criminal Procedure.

Exclusionary rule: Things and objects seized in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures are fruits of the poisonous tree and are
inadmissible as evidence
Lawful warrantless search:

1. In times of war within the area of military operation.

(People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716, Guanzon v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623)
2. As an incident of a lawful arrest.
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Requisites: a) arrest must be lawful; b) search and seizure must be
contemporaneous with arrest; c) search must be within permissible area (People v.
Estella, G.R. Nos. 138539 40, January 21, 2003)

c) that the police officer approached and restrained the person in order to check the
latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapon; and d) that the apprehending
officer must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that the person to be held
has weapon or contraband concealed about him People v. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos.
136066 67, February 4, 2003)
NOTE: SEARCH AND SEIZURE SHOULD PRECEDE THE ARREST. SEARCH THEN
ARREST.
7)

3. When there are prohibited articles open to the eye and hand of an officer (Plain
View Doctrine).
The plain view doctrine is usually applied where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an
incriminationatory object (People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597).

Requirements for double jeopardy:

1. A first jeopardy must have validly attached prior to the second
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information or is an attempt to commit the offense or a
frustration thereof

Requisites: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2) the evidence
was accidentally discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
c) the evidence must be immediately visible; and d) plain view justified the seizure
of the evidence without any further search (People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165, March
26, 2003). VIA valid intrusion, inadvertently discovered, apparent immediately.

Requisites for first jeopardy:

1. There is a valid complaint or information
2. Court of competent jurisdiction
3. Arraignment
4. Plea
5. The defendant is acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or
terminated without his express consent

4. When there is consent which is voluntary (consented search)

Requisites: a) there is a right; b) there must be knowledge of the existence of such
right; and c) there must be intention to waive (De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689).
5. When it is incident to a lawful inspection.
Example of this kind of search is the searches of passengers at airports, ports or bus
terminals. Republic Act 6235 provides that luggage and baggage of airline
passengers shall be subject to search
6. Under the Tariff and Customs Code for purposes of enforcing the customs and
tariff laws;
The purpose is to prevent violations of smuggling or immigration laws.
7. Searches and seizures of vessels and aircraft; this extends to the warrantless
search of motor vehicle for contraband.
Examples of this is the seizure without warrant of a fishing vessel found to be
violating fishery laws and the stop and search without a warrant at military or
police checkpoints which are legal. Warrantless search and seizure in these
instances are justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicles, vessels, or aircrafts can be moved quickly out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.

8. When there is a valid reason to stop and frisk.

Stop and frisk is defined as the particular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons
whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot (Terry v. Ohio).
Requisites: a) that there is a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct;
b) that the police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries;

Double jeopardy; demurrer

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.

PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Acquittal/Recantation The extinction of penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
Recantation or desistance does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the
case if there is independent proof to still establish the guilt of the accused.
Demurrer to evidence Motion must be filed within the non-extendible
period of 5 days after the prosecution rests its case stating specifically upon
what ground(s) the motion is filed. This period runs only after the trial court
has ruled on the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution. The grant of
the motion is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed
because double jeopardy will set in.
Nature of right: People v. Dante Tan G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010: In
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court explained the general rule
that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is,
thus, final and unappealable. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases is
"filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is
granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused."
Exception: The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

When right will not apply: Braza v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 195032,

February 20, 2013: Having given his conformity and accepted the
conditional arraignment and its legal consequences, Braza is estopped
from assailing its conditional nature just to conveniently avoid being
arraigned and prosecuted of the new charge under the second information.
Exception, when invoked: Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864,
January 18, 2011: To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused
twice in jeopardy of being punished for the crime of which he has already
been absolved. There is reason for this provision of the Constitution
In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused.
If there is no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same
offense after he has been acquitted, the infinite power and capacity of the
State for a sustained and repeated litigation would eventually overwhelm
the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.
Mistrial as ground for exception: People v. C.A.., G.R. No. 198589, July 25,
2012: The Court reiterated that mistrial is the only exception to the wellsettled, even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is immediately final and
cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court was
categorical in stating that a re-examination of the evidence without a
finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which is
what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy.
Effect of Acquittal based on Demurrer to Evidence
Bangayan, Jr., v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 172777, October 19, 2011: It is wellsettled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General.

affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality,

which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a
district does not have its own chief executive. The role of thecongressman
that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard
in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a
corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be
created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for
any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a
legislative district.

8)

Right to bail and HDO

9)

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan
Suspension by congress: Punitive measure to discipline misbehavior of
members; a penalty.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative

apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local government
unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment
does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government
unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement
that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be
a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.

Suspension by Sandiganbayan: Not a penalty, but a preliminary, preventive

measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on
petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. Preventive to
prevent tampering of evidence and influencing witnesses.
10) Bagabuyo and Sema ruling; plebiscite not required for legislative
apportionment.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a
sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a
member of the House of Representatives and members of the local
legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the
whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate
unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of
the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied
by the people who will choose a representative in their national

The local government units, on the other hand, are political

and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.[35] They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities
that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both
the Constitution and the Legislature.[36] A local government units corporate
existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive
and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.[37]
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an instrumentality of
the state in carrying out the functions of government.[38] As a corporate
entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it
exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as
an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs [39] and the
mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local
concerns.[40] In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly
secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a
plebiscite.

11) Diplomatic immunity

Article 22 - embassy cannot be entered without consent - premises of
embassy inviolable
Article 24 - archives and documents inviolable
Article 27 - "diplomatic bag" (i.e. pouch) inviolable
Article 29 - diplomats are inviolable exempt from arrest and detention
exempt from enforcement jurisdiction
Article 30 - private residence of diplomat inviolable
Article 31 - diplomats are exempt from civil jurisdiction except: real estate,
wills, professional and commercial activity outside official duties
Article 32 - immunity can be waived by the sending state
Article 37 - immunity applies to family of diplomat ["household"] certain
rights apply to technical staff other employees
Article 41 - mission cannot be used in a manner inconsistent with
international law

Article 9 - receiving state can declare diplomat persona non grata at any
time for any reason