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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136845. October 8, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG, appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias Imong was found guilty of parricide with the aggravating circumstance
of cruelty and sentenced to death. He was ordered to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Erlinda Ragudo Florendo,
the amount of P500,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs of suit. His conviction is the
subject of this automatic review.[1]
The records show that on 28 August 1996 at around 2:30 in the afternoon appellant and his
wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in an animated conversation. Living with them in the same house
inBarangay Bulbulala, La Paz, Abra, was appellants father AgustinFlorendo. After Erlinda was heard to have
told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without any provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in
the head and other parts of her body. The victim could only exclaim, Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is
going to kill me)![2]
Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant, Agustin left the
house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from his immediate neighbor,
Ernesto Anical,
and
told
him, Kasano Erning, patayen yen
met ni Imong nibaketnan (How
is
[3]
this Erning, Imong is killing his wife)! Ernesto too became frightened and did not go out of his house; instead,
he told Agustin to go to the barangay captain for assistance.
Agustin went to the house of Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya to report the incident but the latter was
not there. Thus, the wife of the barangay captain, upon being apprised of what happened, hurriedly went out to
look for any available barangay tanod for assistance and was able to contact Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora.
Agustin, on the other hand, restrained by fear and shock, stayed at the barangay captains house and when he
finally returned at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon Erlinda was already dead.
In the meantime, appellant ran to the house of the barangay captain after hacking his wife.
When Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora arrived at the house of the barangay captain, he found appellant there
holding a bloodied bolo, his hands and feet dripping with blood. Felipe advised appellant to yield his bolo but
the latter did not respond. This prompted Felipe to grab his hand and take away his bolo.
When Barangay CaptainGodofredo Apuya arrived, he asked appellant why his hand and feet were covered with
blood but the latter did not answer. Appellant was later taken to the La Paz District Hospital for treatment of his
wound and the police authorities of La Paz thereafter took him into custody pending investigation of the
incident.

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Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso, Municipal Health Officer of La Paz, autopsied the cadaver of the victim and
found that she sustained sixteen (16) wounds on various parts of her body, four (4) of which were considered
fatal and resulted in her instantaneous death due tohypovalemic shock caused by massive hemorrhage.[4]
On 2 September 1996 appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail. During his confinement, he was
observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not eat during meal times. Most of the time he would
stand in his cell without talking to anyone. Thus on 9 September 1996 he was treated as an outpatient at
the Abra Provincial Hospital (APH). The Provincial Warden then requested a psychiatric examination of
appellant to determine whether he was fit to be arraigned.[5]
On 17 October 1996 appellant was supposed to be arraigned but he appeared without counsel and remained
unresponsive to the questions propounded to him. On the same date, the trial court referred appellant to
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center (BGHMC) for psychiatric evaluation since there was no
psychiatrist at the APH. On 20 November 1996 he went to the BGHMC for consultation and was admitted and
managed as a case of schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type (schizophreniform disorder).[6] He was detained at
the hospital and given medication for his illness. On 7 June 1997, after confinement for six (6) months and
eighteen (18) days, he was discharged and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was found fit to face the
charges against him.[7]When finally arraigned on 12 August 1997 appellant pleaded not guilty.
At the pre-trial conference, appellant admitted killing his wife but put up the defense of insanity to claim
exemption
from
criminal
liability. At
the
initial
hearing,
the
prosecution
presented
Agustin Florendo, GodofredoApuya, Ernesto Anical, Felipe Adora and Dr. Corazon Lalin Brioso as witnesses.
Agustin Florendo attested that his son was not in his proper senses on the day of the incident and repeated
on cross-examination that appellant was crazy and had been behaving strangely for one (1) year before the
incident.[8]
Barangay Captain Godofredo Apuya, on the other hand, stated that he already knew that appellant was
mentally ill because in two (2) instances, three. (3) months prior to the incident, he saw him singing, dancing
and clapping his hands in their yard.[9] Witness Ernesto Anicalstated further that on the day of the incident
appellant was not in his right senses as he saw him sharpening his bolo with his eyes red and looking very
sharp. Yet, he likewise testified that appellant would join the people in their barangay in their drinking sprees
and when already drunk he would beat his wife.[10]
Barangay Tanod Felipe Adora also testified that appellant had been behaving oddly and was somewhat
crazy as he saw him ten (10) days before the incident singing and talking to himself.
[11]
Both GodofredoApuya and Felipe Adora stated that appellant suspected that his wife was having an affair
with Godofredo for he once went to the house ofGodofredo looking for her. But before the trial could prosper,
the presiding judge received a letter from the provincial warden asking for the recommitment of appellant to the
BGHMC because of his unstable mental condition. On 8 June 1998 the trial court directed the examination and
treatment of appellant but not his admission in the hospital. Nonetheless, appellant was readmitted at the
BGHMC on 11 June 1998 and discharged on 7 August 1998.
On 10 August 1998, upon the assurance of Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy that appellant was fit to stand trial,
appellant was called to testify. He stated that he did not remember anything that happened on 28 August 1996
but recalled seeing his children days before the incident; that he was brought to the provincial jail by the police

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authorities; that he thumbmarked a form given him in jail; that he came to know about the death of his wife only
when his father told him about it while he was in jail; and, that he did not know Barangay Captain Apuya when
asked about his alleged affair with his wife.[12]
In the assailed Decision dated 19 August 1998 the trial court held that the crime committed was parricide.
While no marriage certificate was presented to prove the relationship between appellant and the victim, such
fact was evident from the testimonies of the witnesses and appellant himself who averred that the victim was his
legitimate wife; that the aggravating circumstance of cruelty was present because the victim suffered sixteen
(16) wounds; that while it was true that there was evidence that appellant was observed to be doing things out of
the ordinary, like singing in English, dancing, laughing or talking alone, there was also evidence that he was
socializing freely with the other young men in the barangay; that all these were indicative only of mental
abnormality that did not excuse him from imputability for the offense; that no expert witness was presented to
testify on the insanity of appellant; and, the motive of appellant in killing his wife was jealousy.
Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground of insanity;
for appreciating cruelty instead as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, and for
upholding the legitimacy of his common-law relationship with the victim in order to bring the killing within the
ambit of Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code.
The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, ofThe Revised Penal Code exists when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts
without the least discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. Theonus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.[13]
The alleged insanity of Florendo was not substantiated by sufficient evidence. He was not completely bereft
of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally hacked his wife. The following
circumstances[14] clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence on his part when he
committed the felony: (a) He was apparently well until about three (3) to four (4) months prior to his admission
in the hospital when he was noted to have blank stares, claiming that he was in deep thought because he
suspected his wife of having an extramarital affair, and at times would confront his wife about the matter but the
latter would deny it; (b) That he became irritable at home and was easily angered by his childrens slightest
mistakes; (c) That due to his jealousy he claimed that he only wanted to frighten his wife with his bolo in order
to confront her but hacked her instead many times to death; (d) He denied having hallucinations at that time or
being possessed by an evil spirit; (e) Immediately after the incident he went to the barangay captain, never
thought of running away, and apparently felt guilty about what happened; (f) In jail, he said he started having
auditory hallucinations where he would hear voices commanding him to do something but refused to elaborate
on this; and, (g) He claimed that he frequently thought of his three (3) children whom he missed so much. These
were hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.
A perusal of appellants testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and
temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what happened on 28 August
1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the incident; that he was brought to the provincial
jail by the police authorities; and, that hethumbmarked a form given him in jail. Since he remembered the vital

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circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have been in full control of his mental faculties. His
recall of the events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and
contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his act.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a persons
mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with appellant, or who has rational
basis to conclude that appellant was insane based on the witness own perception of appellant, or who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[15]
The first four (4) witnesses of the prosecution were one in alleging that appellant was crazy and had lost his
mind as they noticed him to be behaving oddly, i.e., singing, dancing and talking to himself. The prosecution
witnesses may have testified that appellant appeared to them to be insane prior to, during and subsequent to the
commission of the crime, but there is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked
himself into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in his action. The fact that a
person behaves crazily is not conclusive that he is insane. The prevalent meaning of the word crazy is not
synonymous with the legal terms insane, non compos mentis, unsound mind, idiot, or lunatic. The popular
conception of the word crazy is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man
may behave in a crazy manner but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.[16]
The evidence adduced consisting of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellant was insane
immediately before or on the day the crime was committed consisted merely of assumptions, and is too
speculative, presumptive and conjectural to be convincing. Their observation that appellant manifested unusual
behavior does not constitute sufficient proof of his insanity because not every aberration of the mind or mental
deficiency constitutes insanity hence exempting.
In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering fromschizophrenia when he was committed to
the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental
disorder characterized by a persons inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and is often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable
through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature
and exaggerated emotionality.During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal
behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and
dreamy and may appear far away.[17]
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. [18] The medical findings of the BGHMC,
which diagnosed appellants mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellants
treatment after the incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived of
intelligence or discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether
he was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.

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In compliance with this Courts Resolution of 15 August 2000, an evaluation of the psychological and
psychiatric condition of appellant was conducted by the Supreme Court Clinic Services at the National
Penitentiary on 22 August 2000. The neuro-psychiatric evaluation report disclosed that appellant was suffering
from psychosis or insanity, classified as chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. It divulged further that prior to
the onset of the overt psychotic symptoms, appellant manifested unusual behavior prior to the commission of
the crime of parricide described as fearfulness, irritability, suspiciousness and jealousy or preoccupation with
the fidelity of his wife. In retrospect, this group of symptoms could have possibly been the prodromal phase
heralding the onset of the psychotic illness. [19] The report revealed that symptoms of appellants mental illness
were conceivably manifested prior to the date of the crime and that substantial evidence was lacking to
conclude that his abnormal behavior was due to the use of drugs or any prohibited substance.[20]
As can be gleaned from the reports, appellant could only be undergoing the percursory stages of a disease
prior to and at the time of the killing. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming that he had some form of
mental illness by virtue of the premonitory symptoms ofschizophrenia, it did not totally deprive him of
intelligence. The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife, sufficiently
discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While appellant on many
occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that he was not of sound mind,
such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state and not necessarily of unsound mind that
would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
[21]
The odd or bizarre behavior of appellant prior to the commission of the crime as described by the
prosecution witnesses, if anything else, did not completely deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. If
the defense of insanity is sustained, the floodgates to abuse will be opened by the cunning and ingenious
public. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the commission of the crime
does not prove insanity.The grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and
circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment through a
general plea of insanity.
We cannot sustain the ruling of the trial court that cruelty aggravated the killing simply because according
to the autopsy report the victims body bore sixteen (16) wounds all in all, four (4) of which were severe, deep
and fatal. The number of wounds is not a test for determining cruelty; it is whether appellant deliberately and
sadistically augmented the victims suffering. Thus, there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize
before appellant rendered the blow which snuffed out her life.[22]Although Erlinda received sixteen (16) wounds
in all there is no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased her suffering. At any rate, even if
cruelty is proved, it cannot be appreciated against appellant to raise the penalty to death as this was not alleged
in the Information. Under Sec. 9, Rule 110, of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,which took effect on 1
December 2000, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the information or complaint, otherwise, they
cannot be properly appreciated. Being favorable to appellant, this procedural rule must be given retroactive
application.
As to the marriage of the victim and appellant, the trial court properly upheld its legitimacy. In parricide,
the best proof of relationship between appellant and the deceased is the marriage certificate, and in the absence

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thereof, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered. The testimony of appellant that he was married
to the deceased is an admission against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of
the sem perpraesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [23] Even if the marriage certificate was not
presented, that the victim was the legitimate wife of appellant is evident from the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. In open court, appellant himself volunteered the information in his offer of evidence through counsel
and on direct examination that the victim was his legitimate wife.
Appellant was properly convicted of the crime of parricide. [24]Parricide not being a capital crime per se, as
it is not punishable by the mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetuato death
which are two (2) indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the
presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
appreciated for appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed.[25] Nonetheless, clinical findings
at the time of evaluation of the psychological and psychiatric condition of appellant show that despite
maintenance of anti-psychotic medication he remains to be symptomatic. It is imperative that there should be
continuous maintenance of his anti-psychotic medications and regular psychiatric follow-up to achieve and
sustain remission of psychotic symptoms.
As the trial court failed to award indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim, the amount of P50,000.00
should be adjudged as civil indemnity ex delicto, which award is mandatory and requires no proof other than
the victims death.[26]
WHEREFORE, the conviction of accused-appellant GUILLERMO FLORENDO alias IMONG of
parricide under Art. 246 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 5, of RA 7659, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,instead of death. He is further ordered
to pay the heirs of his wife, the deceased Erlinda Ragudo Florendo, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
for her death, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. [1] We nullify the proceedings in the courta quo and
remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with
the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:

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That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a
butchers knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place
of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his
death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per
Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this
City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of
not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.[2]
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent
Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was
alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a
mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio
General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order
confining him at the said hospital.[3]
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on
accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him intelligently, the court
denied the motion that same day.[4]
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellants behalf.[5]
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of
Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan,
an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accusedappellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation
was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The
cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop
went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his
blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the
Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops chair.The man was
accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accusedappellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops chair.Gripping the
chairs armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: No matter what will happen, I will not move out!
Hearing this, Santillan moved away.[6]
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near
accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the
guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did
not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when
suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below
his left throat.Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac
parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and
shouted: Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it
again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar.[7]

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Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion
inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on
his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and
advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands.Thereupon,
Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites
at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief
Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accusedappellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
waist.[8] He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon
arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.[9] He was found to
have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy
reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 x 1 penetrating. The
edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one side of the wound is
sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left
pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.[10]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accusedappellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his
defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.[11]
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused pretended to be
weak, tame and of unsound mind; that after he made the first stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing
the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was
being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of
January 6, 1995.[12]
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the
trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to
be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to
some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been
exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family.[13]
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail wardens letter. He reiterated that
the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent
government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper
person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill or not.[14]
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence. [15] Accused-appellant moved
for reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a
Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the

C R I M 1 A R T. 1 2 . . . P a g e | 9

court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the
top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and
sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by
him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed
that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital.
[16]
Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito
Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of appellants irrational
behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of
accused-appellant.[17] The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the
Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the
president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellants unusual behavior and
requested that immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail.[18]
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence.
The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996.[19]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria
Soledad Gawidan,[20] a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and
accused-appellants medical and clinical records at the said hospital. [21] Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had
been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from
Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type; [22] and after four (4)
days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. [23] The medical and clinical
records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan
to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after a relapse of
his violent behavior;[24] (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; [25] (3) the consent slip of appellants
wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH;[26] (4) the Patients Record;[27] (5) the Consent for Discharge
signed by appellants wife;[28] (6) the Summary and Discharges of appellant; [29] (7) appellants clinical case
history;[30] (8) the admitting notes;[31] (9) Physicians Order Form;[32] (10) the Treatment Form/ medication sheet;
[33]
and (11) Nurses Notes.[34]
The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accusedappellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.[35]
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS
PLEA OF INSANITY.
II

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 10

THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF
ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.[36]
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
[37]
Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human
free will.[38] Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.
[39]
When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done
voluntarily,[40] i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.[41] Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[42]
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind [43] and that all
acts are voluntary.[44] The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute
the normal condition of a person.[45] This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of
these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability.[46]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the
court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,
which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court
therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court
shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An
acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution.[47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act.
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.[48] The accused must be so insane as to
be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. [49] He must be deprived of reason and act without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the
will.[50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must
prove it by clear and positive evidence. [51] And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the
act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.[52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the
condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. [53] Direct testimony is not
required.[54] Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
[55]
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by
overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.[56]
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed
Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was
not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan [57] attached to the Information, there are
certain circumstances that should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full
possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 11

the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation
to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without
sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front
of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful
which no rational person would have made. He then returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing
happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on the day of the
arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his
client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is
authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order
his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and
to plead intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the
mental examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement
and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the
arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself afelo de se, for he can
neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.[58]
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. [59]And the test to
determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even
with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the
ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that
under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so
particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. [60] In the American
jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate
and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a
criminal trial concerns the defendants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission. Present insanity is
commonly referred to as competency to stand trial [61] and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the
criminal proceeding in light of the defendants present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. [62]In
competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense which
relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply
postponed until such time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely
postpones the trial.[63]
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his
position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational
manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 12

be interposed.[64] This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule
at common law.[65] Thus:
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has] some
recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.[66]
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent
to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is
able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. [67] The first requisite is the relation between
the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The
second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well
as a factual understanding of the proceedings.[68]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the
public.[69] It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense
for his life or liberty.[70] To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation
of the constitutional rights to a fair trial [71] and due process of law;[72] and this has several reasons underlying it.
[73]
For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot
comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence.
Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the
right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing
witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the
proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which
a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings
may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which
may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension
fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial
proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as
a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible
object. Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is
greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the
moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when
the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its significance.[74]
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the
discretion of the trial court.[75] Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or
circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt[76] or a bona fide doubt[77] as to defendants competence to stand trial.
Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the defendants irrational behavior, history of mental
illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant,
and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case.[78]
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of
accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on
appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared::
xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused, and he
(accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 13

The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[79]
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive
evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of
an unsound mental condition that effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to
fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea
of not guilty was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal to plead.[80]
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a
psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the
state of a persons mental health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the
instant case, should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the
latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants
competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its
case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual
behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be
placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellants counsel
filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to this motion
was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members
of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, [81] the judge ignored
the Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. The records are barren of any
order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence.[82]
Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a lifetime illness
and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. [83] After accused-appellant was discharged on
February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up.[84]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was waiving
the right to testify in his own behalf because he was suffering from mental illness. [85] This manifestation was
made in open court more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by
the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the judge
persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental examination. [86] The human
mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon
emotional and psychological appreciation.[87] Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds capacity for
rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than
laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made,
then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the accuseds abilities
may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.[88]
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a
dual purpose[89] by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In
some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 14

the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the accused. [90] The crime in the instant case was
committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may
make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission for him
to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.[91] Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accusedappellants competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial
meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The
trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the
proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica,[92] we ordered that the joint decision
of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who
was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of guilty to all
three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds plea was not an unconditional admission
of guilt because he was not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and thereby
ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the
time of commission of the crime.[93]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal
Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and
the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a
determination of his competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129899. April 27, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO VILLA, JR. y DELGADO, accusedappellant. ALEX
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
RODOLFO VILLA, JR. Y DELGADO appeals from the Decision of the trial court convicting him of four (4)
separate crimes of Murder qualified by treachery and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each murder. He
was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of his four (4) victims in the amount of P50,000.00 for each group of
heirs or a total of P200,000.00.[1]Ncmmis
The antecedents: In the early morning of 22 June 1991 Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard in New
Cabalan, Olongapo City. Accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito,
suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle[2] and shot Dionito from behind killing him instantly.
Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their fathers rescue after hearing the

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 15

gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was embracing his father, and mortally
wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach. Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the Fernandezes, attempted to
wrestle the rifle from the accused but Samuel too was gunned down. Scncm
After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr. surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino of S2 OMDC (Olongapo
Metropolitan District Command).[3]Rodolfo was accordingly charged with multiple murder. When arraigned on
3 October 1991 he entered a plea of not guilty. Later however his counsel, Atty. Cipriano Dumpit, manifested in
open court that the accused was desirous of changing his plea to guilty. Thereafter, the accused invoked selfdefense insofar as Dionito Fernandez was concerned, as the latter tried to stab him with a bolo. Thus, according
to the accused, he was forced to shoot Dionito with his rifle.[4] The trial court then proceeded to propound
searching questions on the accused to determine whether he understood the nature and consequences of his
change of plea, and upon being satisfied with the answers given by the accused who was assisted by counsel,
the court allowed the change of plea.[5]
Meanwhile, on 16 July 1992, the trial court issued an order appointing Atty. Romeo Alinea as counsel de
oficio for the accused, as his counselde parte Atty. Cipriano Dumpit was unavailable due to his ongoing medical
treatment.[6] Before the defense could present its evidence, however, counsel de oficio Alinea manifested his
inability to confer with the accused but moved that a psychiatric examination of the accused be made at the
National Center for Mental Health to determine his mental condition. The motion was granted and the accused
was examined at the Olongapo City General Hospital to ascertain whether he was suffering from mental illness
before, during and after the commission of the crimes.[7] Sdaamiso
Dr. Romeo Enriquez, the examining psychiatrist at the Olongapo City General Hospital, recommended that the
accused be confined at the National Center for Mental Health, Forensic Pavillion, where an evaluation process
for the possibility of insanity could be made.[8] Thus, on 4 November 1994, the accused was confined and
treated at the National Center for Mental Health, under the direct supervision of Dr. Celeste A. C. Pea, Medical
Officer III, and Dr. Isagani S. Gonzales, Medical Specialist II, Physician-in-charge Male Court Case Pavillion.
On 21 December 1994, after more than a month of psychiatric evaluation, the attending physicians submitted to
the trial court a psychiatric evaluation report,[9] which stated in part PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION RESULTS: Sdaad
Evaluation shows that the patient is suffering from Insanity or Psychosis classified as
Schizophrenia. This is a mental illness characterized by deterioration in social and occupational
functioning, auditory hallucination, delusion, thought disturbances and poor judgment. He is at
present incompetent to stand trial.
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
He is recommended for further confinement and treatment.
Six (6) months later, or on 5 June 1995, a follow-up report on the patients psychiatric status was made, this time
by Dr. Cheryl Zalsos, with remarks that the patients status had improved enough for him to withstand the rigors
of the trial. Thus, Adoracion Manuit, Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Section, National Center for Mental Health,
filed a Petition for Releasepraying that the accused be discharged and returned to jail for the speedy disposition
of his case, and further recommending that he be allowed to undergo periodic check-up to sustain his improved

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 16

mental state as well as to prevent a relapse of his illness.[10] In its Order of 21 June 1995 the trial court granted
the petition and the trial resumed with the accused now raising insanity as a defense. Jjlex
On 3 April 1997 the trial court disregarded the defense of insanity and forthwith convicted the accused of the
crimes charged. Thus The court is not convinced that the accused was suffering from insanity of schizophrenic type
before or during the killing. The evaluation reports do not say so in unequivocal terms. Dr.
Zalsos, during her direct testimony, did not testify to that effect. In her cross examination, she,
however, mentioned in passing that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia during the
commission of the offense. The court noted that she was unsure of her allegation. The said
reports and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos simply revealed that the accused suffered from insanity or
psychosis classified as schizophrenia. In order that insanity can be considered as an exempting
circumstance, it must be shown to exist just before or during the commission of the offense
(People v. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851). Also, in order to exempt the accused from criminal liability it
must be shown beyond cavil of doubt that there was complete deprivation of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of the commission of the crime (People v.
Renegado, 57 SCRA 275). These the accused failed to prove.
In resolving this appeal we need not inquire into the killing of the victims as this was already admitted by
accused-appellant, nor into his theory of self-defense which he did not pursue, much more prove, during the
trial. The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the
crimes as would exempt him from criminal liability. Misjuris
We affirm the judgment of conviction. Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while
committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is
complete absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.[11]
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of
his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject,
such as evidence of the alleged deranged persons general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident
bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read thoughts,
motives and emotions of a person, and through which we determine whether the acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind.[12] Jurissc
Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time he perpetrated
the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete absence of intelligence on
his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of surrendering to the PC Detachment in
Olongapo City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement at the Mental Hospital;[13] and, (c) He was able
to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutors Office in Olongapo City immediately after the commission of
the crimes narrating his version of the incident.[14] These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind.
In People v. Ambal[15] we held: "The fact that immediately after the incident (accused) thought of surrendering

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 17

to the law-enforcement authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and
that he was going to be punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a
clear indication that he was conscious of his acts, he acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them. Scjuris
What militates heavily against his plea of insanity is his signed statement before the Prosecutors Office dated 11
October 1991 which manifests on its face that he was mentally sound at the time of the killings. The Sworn
Statement is quoted hereunder for better appreciation and ready reference Na humigit kumulang ng ika-pito ng umaga, nagbibihis pa ako ng uniform para mag-duty ng
marinig ko si Mr. Dionito Fernandez na nagsabi ng ninakaw ng gagong CAFGU ang mga
manok ko kagabi. Pagkarinig ko noon, ako ay lumabas para tanungin kung sinong CAFGU ang
nagnakaw ng kanyang manok, at sumagot siya ng anong pakialam mo, tinanong ko siyang muli
na bakit nakarinig ako ng CAFGU, sinong CAFGU iyon, ako lang naman ang CAFGU rito sa
atin ah. Sumagot siya ng Hoy putang ina mo, hindi ako natatakot sa baril mo, walang baril-baril
sa akin gago," sabay dampot niya sa itak at paharap sa akin, nabigla ako at nag-alangan na
baka ibato o itaga niya sa akin ang hawak niyang itak at nakalabit ko ang gatilyo ng aking baril
at siya ay tinamaan; Juris
Pagkatapos ay bigla akong nilusob ng kanyang anak na si Ronald at dinampot ang itak na nasa
kamay ng kanyang ama at tatagain ako, at sinabi pang, mamamatay ka rin. Nagdilim na ang
aking paningin at siya ay aking nabaril at hindi ko napansin ang patakbong papalapit na si
Sheila sa kanila at hindi ko sinasadyang natamaan;
Nataranta na ako at naisip kong magpunta sa PC Detachment para sumuko, ngunit hinarang
ako ni Mr. Samuel Eclevia, na kanyang kumpadre na may dalang kutsara ng semento at kanyang
akmang aagawin ang baril ko at nakaumang rin sa akin ang kanyang hawak, sa nagdidilim ko
pang isipan ay nabaril ko rin siya;
Pagkatapos ay dumating ang aking ama na si Rodolfo Villa, Sr. at ako ay inaawat at parang
natauhan ako ng maulinigan ko ang kanyang boses, sinabi niya na anak, tumigil ka na, akina
ang baril mo at sasamahan kita sa Detachment para sumuko. Natatandaan ko pa na nasabi ko
na wala na akong kinabukasan itay, mabuti pang mamatay na rin ako at itinutok ko pa ang baril
sa leeg ko; Suprema
Narinig ko pa na sinabi niya na huwag anak, kapag ginawa mo iyan ay bibigyan mo kami ng
pagdurusa ng inay mo. Bayaan mo, gagawin ko ang lahat para sa iyo, ibaba mo iyan at i-safety
mo na;
Pagkatapos ay ibinaba ko ang baril ko at sasama na sana ako sa kanya papuntang Detachment,
ngunit napakaraming tao ang nakaharang sa daan at may nakita pa akong may mga hawak na
itak, kayat ako ay nag-warning shot para sila ay lumayo; Scsdaad
Maya-maya ay dumating na ang kasama kong CAFGU na si Agripino Saromo, at sa kanya ako
sumuko at sumama papunta sa P.C. Detachment at doon ko na lang nalaman na nadaplisan pala
ng bala si Mr. Bernardo Briones sa kanyang braso, ng ako ay mag-warning shot sa mga tao na
nakaharang sa daanan ko bago dumating si CAFGU Saromo;

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 18

Wala pong katotohanan ang kanilang hinala na si tatay ko, Rodofo Villa, Sr. ay nakialam sa
aking mga ginawa. Sarili ko po lamang ang pagkabaril sa mga nasabing tao.
We find it incredible for a supposedly deranged person to remember vividly and give such a lucid and detailed
account of the carnage, from the moment he shot his first victim up to the time he surrendered to the authorities.
Quite noticeable also, attempts to justify his criminal acts pervade the Sworn Statement which only a perfectly
sane and intelligent person, not a demented one, would be capable of making.
Moreover, if we were to follow accused-appellants narration of the incident in his Sworn Statement, it will
appear that he slaughtered his victims in a fit of rage after Dionito Fernandez, his first victim, allegedly accused
him of stealing chickens and cursed him saying, "p - t - g ina mo," and, "gago." These negate insanity. There is a
vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of
anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. A man sometimes does crazy things when
enraged but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is insane. miso
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary,
and that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.[16] Insanity is a defense by way of
confession and avoidance, and as such the quantum of evidence required to prove that is clear and convincing
evidence.
The defense banks heavily on the findings of the psychiatrists at the National Center for Mental Health,
specifically the pyschiatric evaluation report of Dr. Pea and Dr. Gonzales,[17] and the testimony of Dr. Zalsos,
that he was suffering from insanity or psychosis classified as schizophrenia. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion after a series of medical and psychological examinations on accused-appellant during his
confinement at the center.
However, we are still in a quandary as to whether accused-appellant was really insane when he committed the
crimes. Firstly, we fail to discern anything from the psychiatric evaluation report that accused-appellants
judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant the conclusion that his mental condition in
1991 when he killed his victims, and in 1994 when he was admitted for psychiatric treatment at the center, was
the same so that his guilt or mental competence at the time he committed the crimes may be reasonably
doubted. Secondly, without the least intention of casting doubt on the knowledge and integrity of expert
witnesses, we agree with the trial court that the results of the examinations conducted by the psychiatrists on
accused-appellant appear to be based on incomplete or insufficient facts. Records show that the psychiatrists
relied mainly on the data supplied by accused-appellant and his police escort, without conducting an
independent interview of any of accused-appellants family members, relatives or persons who could provide
information on his state of mind before or during the commission of the offenses. If he really was insane at the
time of the murders, certainly such a condition could not have escaped the notice of other persons, friends and
strangers alike, including the immediate members of his family. apdc
It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability,
such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without contact with
friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the
offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 19

to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accusedappellant should relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the
subject of the inquiry,[18] and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential
for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the
mental condition of the person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the
exempting circumstance of insanity may be appreciated in his favor. Accused-appellant miserably failed to
discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption that he committed the crimes freely, knowingly and
intelligently. spped
It has been repeatedly held that this Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court
because it is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
testifying on the stand. Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances which
might alter the result of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded
finality by this Court. We find no compelling reason to depart from the rule.
Finally, on the penalties imposed by the trial court, we do not agree that the aggravating circumstance of "taking
advantage of his public position" as a CAFGU member should be considered against accused-appellant. The
mere fact that he was a member of the CAFGU and was issued an M-1 Garand rifle is not sufficient to establish
that he misused his public position in the commission of the crimes.[19] miso
On the other hand, the trial court properly credited in favor of accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of
"plea of guilty." Thus, following Art. 64, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code, there being one mitigating
circumstance, the imposable penalty on accused-appellant should bereclusion temporal in its maximum period
for each crime of murder, it being the minimum imposable penalty after appreciating one mitigating
circumstance in his favor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be meted an
indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor maximum as minimum to reclusion
temporalmaximum as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellant RODOLFO VILLA, JR.
Y DELGADO of four (4) separate counts of Murder is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION of the
penalties imposed; consequently, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporalmaximum as maximum, for each crime of murder. He is
further ordered to INDEMNIFY the heirs of his victims in the amount of P50,000.00 in each case or for a total
of P200,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accusedappellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.: HTML

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 20

What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind. Law is
designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from reason. Thus,
when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong,
he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not the accused,
invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA
MADARANG in an Information[1] which reads:
"That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his
legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es)long and 3/16 of an
inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and
plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in
length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing
upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her instantaneous death,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang."
"Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code."
At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a "not
guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his
client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the
accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on the same
date, the Court issued an Order[2] directing the transfer of the accused to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of psychosis
known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered medication for his
illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the
NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him.[3]
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce evidence on
his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally
married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16)
years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and
stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and
started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to
cockfighting.[4]

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 21

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of
Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with
their eight child and was about to give birth.[5]
On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of
another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children,
the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise.[6]
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and crying
inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her nephew barged
into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by
Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house holding
a bolo. She scampered for safety.[7] yacats
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not notice
anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental illness.
Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any
argument while they were living with her.[8]
The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not remember
where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the
hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death.
He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment.[9]
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared
that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted
three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first
medical report, dated August 2, 1994,[10] the accused was found to be suffering from insanity or psychosis,
classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by
impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care,
insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity
to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent.[11] A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals
during which he may be able to distinguish right from wrong.[12] Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's
mental illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was
already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime.[13]
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from schizophrenia.
After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27,
1996,[14] showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused
was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.[15] olanski
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the time he
committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 22

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of
the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the
offense and that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to
exempt him from criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the
time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the accused FERNANDO
MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
"SO ORDERED."[16]
Hence this appeal.
The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence, making his
criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that fateful
day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He cited
the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes -- he may be violent and destructive, or
very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife
and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him holding a bolo. He did not
seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is
peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would
have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was ahigh possibility that he was already
suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993.[17] The defense posits
that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he started
through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually dependent on his mother-in-law
for his family's support and all these may have been beyond his capacity to handle. haideem
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that fateful day
should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife
on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the
crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their eighth
child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control, nobody in his
right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient
reason to kill a pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense. The
insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed with the
faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or
culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An insane
accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No purpose of criminal law is served

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 23

by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state, he would have no control over his
behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.[18]
A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the traditional
test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of
insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the nature and quality of the act, and that the act was
wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to
moral or legal wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen[19] as follows: A kills B
knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him
to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is
not a crime if the word "wrong" means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely
to intellectual reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may
know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions.
[20]
MNaghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as
insanity does not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient,
including his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does
not solely determine man's conduct.[21] kirsten
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" testwhich means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of
disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to
prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that what
he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental illness kept him from
controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there
are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is
right and wrong.[22] This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is
too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires
absolute impairment of the freedom of the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of
criminal law to deter criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is
difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.[23]
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally responsible
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect."[24] Critics of this test argued that it gave too
much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity
beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result of a mental
disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case thus becomes completely dependent
on the testimonies of experts.[25]
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its Model
Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 24

person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.[26] Still,
this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there
would be differences in expert testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient.
[27]
Objections were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested
only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving
of punishment.[28] barth
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of theM'Naghten style statutory formulation. It
enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law applicable in all
federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to
prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof to the defense, limited
the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of diminished capacity and provided for commitment of
accused found to be insane.[29]
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused
is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the
power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties
will not exclude imputability.[30]
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness
who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the
accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[31] The testimony or proof of the
accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense
with which he is charged.[32] Jksm
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering fromschizophrenia when he was committed to
the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common form of psychosis.
[33]
Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent
in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often
ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusions and
hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place
and is associated with serious thought disorder and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social
customs are disregarded.[34]During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal
behind barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and
dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little
concern about the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 25

intolerable lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself
from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a loss of
spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness.[35] A variety of subjective
experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral
changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in
conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly, this will
be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or respond appropriately to
his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in
his attempt to hold his attention.[36]
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms
associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure,
the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the appellant was already
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared that schizophrenics have lucid
intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from wrong.[37]Hence the importance of
adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the offense.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on
the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.[38] Chiefx
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of insanity at
the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant was completely of
unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the
appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no
recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. The fact
that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife
does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion.
Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of
his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that
the appellant and his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the
appellant's unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally dependent on
his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported by record.To be
sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his fortune
and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental illness. In fact,
the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant and while he lived in

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 26

her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have
suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried
on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial
on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime.[39] As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained
to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130210. December 8, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RALPHVELEZ DIAZ alias JIMBOY, accusedappellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FRANCIS BART FULACHE, eleven (11) years old, was found dead at Bulacao Bridge, Cebu City, on 4
December 1996. Subsequently, for his death, Ralph Velez Diaz alias "Jimboy" was charged before the Regional
Trial Court[1]of Cebu City with murder in relation to RA 7610.
On 3 December 1996 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening Francis Bart Fulache and his 10-year old brother
Felbart went to Pier 3 to defecate. They were with 30-year old Ralph Velez Diaz, a friend Francis Bart knew
from thehantakan, a gaming place near their store. Francis Bart then invited his brother Felbart to go with them
to Pier 4 but the latter was not inclined so he went home.
Francis Bart did not return home that evening. But Felbart was not alarmed as his brother was used to going
around and doing anything he wanted to without telling him nor asking permission from their parents. However
when Francis Bart still failed to show up in the afternoon of the next day their parents got worried and started
searching for him.[2]
Meanwhile, at noontime of the same day, SPO2 Ramon Villar received a report that a body of a boy
between ten (10) to twelve (12) years of age was found dead at the Bulacao Bridge. The body was in a
sickening state of nudity and physical abuse. The face was covered with a big stone in an apparent attempt to
hide the body. After the routine taking of photographs the body was brought to the Cosmopolitan Funeral
Homes for a post-mortem examination.[3]
The autopsy conducted by the PNP Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, revealed that the cause of
death was intracranial hemorrhage, extensive, with skull fracture, traumatic. [4] The examination also disclosed

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 27

contusions, abrasions and lacerations all over the boys body the most prominent of which was the comminuted
and depressed fracture on his head. There were, quite notably, multiple lacerations in his rectum.[5]
With respect to the injuries in the boys rectal area, Dr. Cerna opined that a blunt
instrument like a male organ in full erection could have caused them. He claimed that in an attempt to avoid any
violation of his rectum the boy could have suffered more pain considering his soft and tender skin and the
violation would necessarily result in hemorrhage which could cause instantaneous death.[6]
On 4 December 1996 while the Fulache family continued their search for Francis Bart a couple by the
name of Degamo claimed the body of the young victim in the belief that it was their missing son Joseph
Johnson Degamo. After two (2) days however, their missing son came home so the Degamos returned the body
to the funeral parlor. What was good news for the Degamos was bad news for the Fulaches. The body now back
in the funeral home turned out to be their Francis Bart. Bartolome Fulache, father of the Fulache boys,
identified the corpse after hearing over the radio that the cadaver of a boy remained unclaimed at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes.[7]
On 9 December 1996 at around 1:00 oclock in the morning a person acting suspiciously but unknown to the
Fulache spouses went to the wake. There he created a spectacle of himself by reciting poems for Francis Bart
and singing the theme song from the movie The Lion King, and giving emphasis to the word
surrender. Bartolome Fulache reported to the authorities the unusual behavior of their "uninvited guest." The
police immediately went to the Fulache residence to observe the person. They invited him to their headquarters
for further observation and questioning. He went with them voluntarily. He was identified later as herein
accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz.
Before conducting their investigation the police authorities as well as a certain Atty. Abellanosa [8] apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights in Cebuano, a language known to accused-appellant, in the
presence of men from the media[9] who themselves affixed their signatures in the sworn statement of accusedappellant to attest to the fact that he was duly informed of his rights under the Constitution. The investigation
proceeded where accused-appellant revealed his sexual perversity by narrating in detail how he perpetrated the
ghastly crime against Francis Bart.
But this extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant was however declaredinadmissible by the trial court
on the ground that Atty. Abellanosa who assisted accused-appellant during the custodial investigation was not
an independent counsel of the accused as required under the Constitution.[10]
The following day, between 11:00 oclock in the morning and 12:00 noon, a reenactment was made at the
scene of the crime. Those present were accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz, Felbart Fulache, police officers
Monilar,
Montebon
and
Tumakay,
and
people
from
the
ABS-CBN, Sun
Star
Daily, Freeman andSuperbalita. There accused-appellant demonstrated, with Felbart as victim, sexually abused
Francis Bart and later killed him. The reenactment was published in the 11 December 1996 issue of the Sun Star
Daily, but because only an unauthenticated photocopy of the newspaper was presented in court, it was likewise
declared inadmissible in evidence. But the trial court nevertheless took judicial notice thereof.
On his part, accused-appellant sought to establish the defense of insanity by presenting Dr. Wilson Tibayan,
a government physician connected with the National Center for Mental Health. The doctors testimony however
did not help accused-appellants case because although he admitted having initially categorized accused-

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 28

appellant as insane, the doctor eventually diagnosed accused-appellant to be afflicted with pedophilia, a mental
disorder not synonymous with insanity. He explained that pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein the subject
has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill,
especially when there are no people around. He claimed, however, that despite his affliction the subject could
distinguish right from wrong. In fact, he maintained that pedophilia could be committed without necessarily
killing the victim although injuries might be inflicted on the victim in an effort to repel any resistance.
Also worthy of note was Dr. Tibayans testimony that accused-appellant had disclosed to him that
his pedophilic acts were done in revenge as he himself as a child was also a victim of sexual abuse. Finally, Dr.
Tibayan declared that accused-appellants affliction had a very low prognosis thus making him very dangerous
to society.
On 11 April 1997 the court a quo found accused-appellant Ralph Velez Diaz guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder in relation to sexual abuse (sodomy) of a child, attended by treachery. He was sentenced to
death and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P250,000.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses.[11]
The trial court was convinced that notwithstanding the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession of accusedappellant and the absence of any eyewitness to the crime, there were enough pieces of circumstantial evidence
to support his conviction, to wit: (a) the testimony of 10-year old Felbart that he saw his brother last alive in the
company of accused-appellant; (b) the physical evidence of sexual abuse through sodomy committed against the
victim; (c) the exculpatory plea of insanity which only tended to negate liability but was an admission of guilt;
(d) the reenactment of the crime by accused-appellant the details of which could not have been known to
anybody but himself; and, (e) the fact that accused-appellant voluntarily confessed to the crime without any
evidence of coercion, duress or intimidation exerted upon him.
The case is now before this Court for automatic review pursuant to Art. 47, par. 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended by RA 7659. Accused-appellant submits that the trial court erred in (a) finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and (b) imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. It is the
contention of accused-appellant that if he is guilty his guilt would only be for homicide and not murder as the
qualifying circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation are absent.
The contention is untenable. We agree with the trial court that the crime committed by accused-appellant
was murder even in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation because treachery and
abuse of superior strength were present - either of which qualified the crime to murder.
"There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [12] In the instant case,
treachery characterized the killing of eleven (11)-year old Francis Bart.Well-settled is the doctrine that the
killing of children who by reason of their tender years cannot be expected to put up a defense is considered
attended with treachery even if the manner of attack is not precisely shown. [13] Thus, the killing of Francis Bart
must be deemed ipso facto qualified by treachery by reason of his inherent defenselessness.[14]

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 29

Likewise, there is a clear case of abuse of superior strength given the blatant inequality of strength between
the victim and accused-appellant.[15] However, this cannot be appreciated even as a generic aggravating
circumstance being necessarily absorbed in treachery.[16]
Anent the second assigned error, we agree with accused-appellant that he should not be meted the supreme
penalty of death. A careful scrutiny of the records shows that the Information charged him only with murder
qualified by treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation. It failed to mention the
commission of sexual abuse or sodomy on the victim. The Information designated the crime as murder in
relation to RA 7610, but as a rule, what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the
complaint or information.[17] The real nature of the criminal charge cannot be determined from the caption or
preamble of the information or from the mere reference to a particular provision of law alleged to have been
violated because they are conclusions of law. On the contrary, it is determined by the actual recital of facts in
the complaint or information. The technical name given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information
does not determine the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the information. [18] Thus, even
if there is positive proof of sexual abuse accused-appellant cannot be convicted therefor as it was not so alleged
in the information.
We cannot share the view of the Solicitor General that the trial court did not apply the provisions of RA
7610 in imposing the death penalty but merely made reference to them as sexual abuse, which was established
to have been committed by accused-appellant. He contends that the sodomy could be considered as an
aggravating circumstance for adding ignominy to the crime as the sexual abuse certainly augmented the wrong
done to the victim thus unduly increasing his pain.
We do not agree. The trial court was clear in declaring that [c]onsidering the aggravating circumstance
of alevosia and the seriousness of the sexual assault on the victim (in itself a heinous crime), this court after a
soul-searching and prayerful consideration has arrived at a firm resolution to impose the maximum penalty of
death."[19] Moreover, "ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime." [20] Thus, for ignominy to be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the instant case, it must be shown that the sexual assault on Francis Bart was done by accusedappellant to put the former to shame before killing him. This is clearly not the case here for accused-appellants
intention was shown to be the commission of sexual abuse on the victim as an act of revenge for his similar
experience as a child. Surely, the killing was done to eliminate the only witness to his crime.
We should not be misunderstood for our failure to hold accused-appellant responsible for committing
sexual abuse on his victim despite strong evidence in support thereof. We have no choice as our hands are tied
by the failure of the public prosecutor to file the appropriate information for accused-appellants sexual assault
on the victim.
The defense, invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, also appeals to this Court for the psychiatric
examination and evaluation of accused-appellant if indeed he is found to have committed the crime
charged. The defense emphasizes the fact that accused-appellant was institutionalized twice within a
considerable period in the National Center for Mental Health; consequently, there is no certainty that he was
sane when he committed the crime imputed to him.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 30

We cannot grant the request. When accused-appellant was committed to the National Center for Mental
Health, he was not diagnosed as insane but was suffering from pedophilia. Thus, there is no doubt in our mind
that he was sane during his two-year confinement in the center, pedophilia being dissimilar to insanity.
A defendant in a criminal case who interposes the defense of mental incapacity has the burden of
establishing that fact, i.e., he was insane at the very moment when the crime was committed. [21] He must prove it
by clear and positive evidence.[22] In the instant case, the defense of insanity as an exempting circumstance was
not established and did not overcome the legal presumption that a person's acts are of his own free will and
intelligence. The settled rule is that the onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as a defense, and the
defense failed to discharge this burden. Thus, the conviction of accused-appellant no doubt is in order.
The civil indemnity for the death of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 is upheld in accordance with
recent jurisprudence,[23] as well as the award of actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 representing
funeral expenses. The award of P250,000.00 as moral damages is excessive warranting its reduction
toP100,000.00 considering that the purpose of the award is to compensate the heirs for injuries to their feelings
and not to enrich them. Similarly, the amount ofP100,000.00 as exemplary damages is reduced to P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the 11 April 1997 Decision of the RTC-Br. 15, Cebu City, is MODIFIED. Accusedappellant Ralph Velez Diaz is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua instead of death.He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of Francis Bart Fulache the amount
ofP50,000.00 as death indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P40,000.00 as reimbursement for funeral expenses.Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125334. January 28, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.CRESENCIO TABUGOCA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the joint decision[1] rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of
Ilagan, Isabela in Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 finding accused appellant Cresensio Tabugoca guilty of
two counts of rape committed against his very own daughters and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in the first case and death penalty in the second.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 31

In two informations simultaneously filed on January 20, 1995 in the aforesaid trial court, accused-appellant
was accused of raping his daughters in two separate incidents. The information in Criminal Case No. 2386
charges him as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of March, 1992 in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused , did then and there willfully , unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with his own
daughter JACQUELINE A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 14 years old (sic), against latters will and consent.[2]
The information in the Criminal Case No. 2387 alleges:
That on or about the 9th day of December, 1994, in the municipality of Naguilian, province of Isabela,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter JINKY A. TABUGOCA, a girl of 12 years old (sic), against the latters will and consent.[3]
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when duly arraigned separately on the two indictments with the
assistance of counsel de oficio.[4] After a consolidated trial on the merits, on March 15, 1996 the court a
quorendered the decision now under mandatory review.[5] The commission of the two felonies was found by the
lower court to have been attended by the aggravating circumstances of relationship and intoxication purposely
sought by accused-appellant to embolden him to commit the same.
In Criminal Case No. 2386, accusedappellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
directed to indemnify Jacquiline Tabugoca in the sum of P50,000.00. In Criminal case No. 2387, wherein the
crime charged was committed after the effectivity Republic Act No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, [6] he was
condemned to suffer the capital punishment of death and ordered to indemnify Jinky Tabugoca in sum
ofP50,000.00.
The trial court arrived at the conclusion that, beyond reasonable doubt, accusedappellant had committed the
crimes charged on the bases of the testimonies of the victims, as corroborated by the medical reports, and the
testimony of the physician who examined them.
The respective complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 2386 and 2387, namely, Jacqueline Tabugoca and Jinky
Tabucoga, are the daughters of the accused-appellant. [7] This was not denied by him. He even expressly declared
during his testimony that Jacqueline[8] and Jinky[9] are his daughters.
Complainant Jacqueline testified that she and her three younger sisters, Janet, Jinky and Jewel, lived under
the sole care of their father after their mother died on August 28, 1991. While she and her sisters were sleeping
in their house at Barangay Roxas, Naguilian, Isabela at around 10 oclock in the evening of March 28, 1992, she
was roused by her father who asked her to scratch his back. It turned out, however, that accused-appellant had
other intentions that night aside from relief from his itchy discomfort.
While Jacqueline was thus scratching her fathers back, he told her to stay and wait for a while. Without any
intimation, accused-appellant then removed her shorts and underwear and made her lie down beside

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 32

him.Jacqueline could only cry at this point. As soon as she was completely disrobed, accused-appellant inserted
his penis into her vagina. With his manhood inside his daughter, accused-appellant warned her not to tell anyone
of his dastardly act if she would not want to be harmed (makaala ha kaniak). Complainant was so petrified with
fear that she did not even dare ask her father why he was sexually molesting her.[10]
Jacqueline was twelve years old and three months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on
December 27, 1979.[11]
Because of the incident, Jacqueline harbored ill-feelings against her father, and she reportedly became the
object of gossip by her classmates in school.[12] However, she did not tell anyone about her ordeal at the hands
of her own father until she learned that the same misfortune had befallen her sister, Jinky.
In criminal Case No. 2387, complainant Jinky declared in the court below that her father tried to rape her in
the early morning of December 9, 1994. While she was cleaning some articles in their house, accused-appellant
approached her and then took of his clothes. He then ordered Jinky to lie down and he removed her shorts and
panty. Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina. Jinky cried and complained to her father that she was in
pain. Accused-appellant explained that it is ordinary to feel pain because it was her first time to experience
coitus.
After a while, he did not persist anymore in his sexual pursuit.Appellant lay down beside Jinky and told her
that they will continue the following day. At dawn of December 10, 1994, accused-appellant made another
attempt to carnally molest Jinky. This time, however, Jinky resisted, thereby causing appellant to just lie down
and leave her alone.[13]
Jinky was only 12 years and nine months old at the time of the incident, she having been born on March 5,
1982. [14]
Later, on the same day, while Jacqueline and Jinky were watching television at their grandmothers house
nearby, Jinky confided to her grandmother about the sexual abuses of her father against her. Upon hearing the
revelation of her sister, Jacqueline also disclosed to her grandmother her own experience with her father two
years before.[15]
The victims grandmother, Perlita Alejandro, forthwith brought her granddaughters to the police authorities
and then to the Municipal Health Officer of Naguilian for physical examination. The two were examined on
December 12, 1994 by Dr. Maryann M. Fontanares.[16]
For Criminal Case No. 2386, with respect to Jacqueline, the doctor reduced her findings into a medico-legal
certificate[17] attesting as follows:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. PE findings: essentially normal except for the anxiety that the victim exhibited
2. Internal Examination: multiple healed lacerations/scars at 3, 5, 6 and 9 oclock position of the hymen.
: introitus admits two fingers with ease * * * no other findings noted * * *
RECOMMENDATIONS:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 33

Impression: The above findings suggest that the victim was forcibly abused and the incident, the first one
happened long ago based on the healed scars of the hymen.
For Criminal Case No. 2387, regarding Jinky, the medico-legal certificate[18] of the doctor states:
LEGAL FINDINGS:
1. The vulva is edematous although the hymen is intact.
* * * no other findings noted * * *
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The above findings suggest that full penetration was not successful although attempts were done based on the
swelling vulva of the victim.
During her testimony in court, Dr. Fontanares explained that the lacerations found on Jacquelines hymen
were the result of sexual intercourse which happened approximately on the date alleged. She added that, aside
from the swelling of Jinkys labia, she found out that they were tender and reddish.[19]
After the examination, Jacqueline executed a criminal complaint [20] for rape against accused-appellant,
while Jinky charged accused-appellant with frustrated rape in her own criminal complaint.[21]
At the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of his having been completely unaware of what transpired
on March 28, 1992 and on December 9, 1994 as he was very drunk on those occasions.
According to him, he does not know if he had sexually assaulted his daughter, Jacqueline. He only came to
know of the complaint of Jacqueline against him after the policemen who arrested him on December 10, 1994
told him thereof. On the same day, Jacqueline allegedly informed him that he was drunk on March 28, 1992, but
he claimed that he could not recall if indeed he drank liquor that day. He then surmised that perhaps he did drink
liquor based only on the supposed statement of Jacqueline.[22]
With regard to the complaint of Jinky, accused-appellant similarly declared in the lower court that he drank
liquor in their house on December 9, 1994. Again, he claimed that he could not recollect the ensuing events
after he had finished drinking. He was allegedly merely informed by the arresting policemen on December 10,
1994 that Jinky was accusing him of attempted rape.
Jacqueline, on cross-examination, stated that her father smelled of liquor and may have taken some drinks
at the time of the incident. [23] On the part of Jinky, she testified in turn that her father was drunk on the night of
December 9, 1994.[24]
Accused-appellant claimed that he learned to drink liquor after his wife died on August 28, 1991. Prior to
his wifes death, he was not used to drinking alcoholic beverages. He later resorted to alcohol whenever he
would remember his deceased wife, but the allegedly drank only once in a while.
Accusedappellant also opined that Jacqueline and Jinky must have filed their respective complaints in order
to get back at him for castigating or whipping them whenever they committed mistakes.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 34

In view of the gravity of the crimes charged and of the penalty imposable therefor, we patiently considered
and thoroughly deliberated on all the arguments and defenses presented by defendant-appellant not only in his
brief but even in his memorandum before the trial court, with all the possible implications and possibilities
thereof, no matter how specious and ridiculous some of them may appear to be. We have likewise taken into
account the socio-economic status and the apparent intellectual level of accused-appellant as may be gleaned
from the record.
After much thought and reflection, we find no reason to depart from the judgment of the court a quo.
On its own, the defense presented by accused-appellant before the lower court is pitifully and completely
unavailing. In law and in truth, he neither denied the charges against him nor raised any absolutory cause in his
defense. His feeble excuse of having been under the influence of liquor in order to disclaim knowledge of his
felonious acts does not inspire belief at all. The defense did not even comply with the evidentiary elements
whereby he could claim intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. The categorical and untraversed testimonies
of his daughters as to how committed the bestial outrage, and their identification of accused-appellant as their
defiler, remain uncontroverted and fully establish the charges.
Accused-appellants pretext that he could not remember the events of March 28, 1992 and December 9,
1994 is rendered more effete in light of the arguments in his memorandum [25] submitted before the lower
court,There, he claimed exemption from criminal liability on the ground of insanity brought about by
intoxication, invoking therefor some dicta in American jurisprudence.
We have held that the law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the
exempting circumstances of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. [26] Further, in order
that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete depreciation of intelligence in
the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not preclude imputability.[27]
Accused-appellant has utterly failed to overthrow the presumption of sanity. The defense did not present
any expert witness, any psychiatric evaluation report, or any psychological findings or evidence regarding his
mental condition at the time of the commission of the offenses. Accused-appellants charade of amnesia is
evidently a desperate gambit for exculpation. Yet, amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge
unless it is shown by competent proof that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action and that
it was wrong. Failure to remember is in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the crime
was performed.[28]
Also in the same memorandum, accused-appellant posits that he cannot be prosecuted for rape in Criminal
Case No. 2386 because the criminal complaint of Jinky only accuses him of frustrated rape. With such a charge,
he argues that the trial courts jurisdiction to punish him is limited only to said offense and cannot cover
consummated rape.
This is a meritless argument. When it is said that the filing of the complaint by the offended party in case of
rape is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceedings, but it is not
the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law.[29] Since the penalty for the rape in Criminal Case No. 21387 is properly within the jurisdiction

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 35

of the regional trial court,[30] then Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela may hear and try the
offense charged in the information and impose the punishment for it.
In People vs. Bangalao, et al.,[31] we convicted an accused of rape committed against a minor as charged in
the information, despite the allegation in the complaint that the rape was committed through force and
intimidation, on this ratiocination:
It must be borne in mind that complaints are prepared in municipalities, in most cases without the advice or help
of competent counsel. When the case reaches the Court the First Instance, the Fiscal usually conducts another
investigation, and thereafter files the information which the results thereof justify. The right and power of the
court to try the accused for the crime of rape attaches upon the filing of the complaint, and a change in the
allegations thereof as (to) the manner of committing the crime should not operate to divest the court of
jurisdiction already acquired.
In his brief,[32] accused-appellant contends that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution. In support of this lone assignment of error, he seeks to capitalize, among others, on the failure
of Jacqueline to immediately report the crime. Such failure, appellant contends, renders doubtful the truth of her
accusation.
The failure of complainant Jacqueline to immediately report the incident to the authorities does not
necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the charge in Criminal Case No. 2386. It is a settled decisional rule
that delay in reporting a rape case committed by a father against his daughter due to threats is justified. [33] In the
numerous cases of rape that have reached this Court, we find that it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal,
for some time, the assaults on their honor because of the rapists threat on their lives.[34]
In many instances, rape victims simply suffer in silence. With more reason would a girl ravished by her
own father keep quiet about what befell her. Furthermore, it is unfair to judge the action of children who have
undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected of mature individuals under the same
circumstances.[35]
In People vs. Melivo,[36] we declared that:
x x x. Delay in reporting rape incidents, in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the
victim. A rape victims actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear,
springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror,
because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore,
in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of
helplessness and the degree of fear.
This Court further trechantly observed in the same decision that:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 36

In all of these and other cases of incestuous rape, the perpetrator takes full advantage of his blood relationship,
ascendancy and influence over the victim, both to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victims into
silence. Unfortunately for some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims mange to break out from the cycle
of fear and terror. In People vs. Molero we emphasized that an intimidated person cowed into submitting to a
series of repulsive acts may acquire some courage as she grows older and finally state that enough, the depraved
malefactor must be punished.
We cannot therefore expect young Jacqueline to disregard the threat to her life and immediately cry rape in
the face of the threats of her father and his constant presence in their home.
Accused-appellant next asserts in his briefs that Jacqueline filed her complaint in Criminal Case No. 2386
only out of sympathy with, and by way of revenge for what her father had done to, her younger sister. We find it
opportune to discuss, together with his contention, the lame excuse of the defense before the trial court that
Jacqueline and Jinky filed their complaints because they suffered beatings from accused-appellant. We find that
the motive imputed to the sisters are grossly implausible and insufficient to make them falsely charge their own
father. It is highly inconceivable that they would claims having been raped just because their father spanks them
whenever they commit mistakes.
Mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge
that would only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their own family and make them the object of
gossip among their classmates and friends. It is unbelievable that Jacqueline would fabricate a serious criminal
charge just to get even with her father and to emphasize with her sister. The sisters would not contrive stories of
defloration and charge their own father with rape unless these stories are true. For that matter, no young Filipina
of decent repute would falsely and publicly admit that she had been ravished and abused considering the social
stigma thereof.[37]
At their tender age, Jacqueline and Jinky needed sustenance and support from their father. They certainly
were aware that they would be deprived of a provider once their accusations against him are proven. In fact, the
consequences of filing a case of rape are so serious that an ordinary woman would have second thoughts about
filing charges against her assailant. It requires much more for a thirteen-year old or a twelve-year old provincial
lass to devise a story of rape, have her private parts examined, subject herself to the indignity of public trial and
endure a lifetime of redicule. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological
depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would at least put her own father for the rest of
remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family into a lifetime of shame.[38]
Thus, the unfounded claim of evil motives on the part of the victims would not destroy the credibility
reposed upon them by the trial court because, as we have held, a rape victims testimony is entitled to greater
weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father.
[39]
Furthermore, the testimony of the victim who was only twelve years old at the time of the rape as to the
circumstances thereof must be given weight, for it is an accepted rule that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and of tender age are credible.[40]
Accused-appellant also faults the trial court for not duly appreciating the testimony of Jinky to the effect
that he only attempted to rape her and then desisted after she felt some pain. In relation to this, appellant

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 37

maintains that there was no rape in Criminal Case No. 2387 because of the absence of laceration on Jinkys
vagina as found after medicolegal examination.
It is axiomatic in criminal law that in order to sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female
genital organ is not required. It is enough that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ within labia of the
pudendum of the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without
rupture or laceration of hymen, suffices to warrant conviction for rape. The rupture of the hymen or laceration
of any part of the womans genitalia is not indispensable to a conviction for rape. Thus, a finding that the victims
hymen is intact and has no sign of laceration does not negate a finding that rape was committed.[41]
Jinky, being young and unschooled in the ways of the law, may have entertained the notion that complete
penile penetration is necessary when she declared that her father only attempted to rape her. She was, of course,
not in any position at legally distinguish consummated from attempted rape. This matter concerns a conclusion
of law addressed to the judgment of the court. The declaration of Jinky that her father inserted his penis into her
vagina and the finding of swelling on her labia are enough to prove that rape was committed as these are telltale
signs of entry into the vaginal lips.
Accused-appellant contends in his memorandum that the prosecution failed to prove the employment of
force and intimidation against complainants in both criminal cases. Corollary to his reliance on the absence of
force or intimidation, he asseverates in his brief that the absence of resistance from Jinky suffices to hold that
the sexual intercourse was voluntary. The defense then begs for this Courts liberality in considering that Jinky
was moved to engage in copulation by a spirit of adventurousness.
There is no doubt that the appellant had carnal knowledge of his two daughters. The fact of sexual
intercourse was indubitably shown by the testimony of Dr. Fontanares, and even by the alternative submission
of appellant that his sexual intercourse with Jinky was consensual. Clinging to his vain hope for acquittal, he
then claims that the element of force or intimidation essential in rape is lacking in the cases filed against him.
In direct refutation of appellants theory, we once again declare that in incestuous rape, it is not necessary
that actual force and intimidation be employed. It is sufficient that the accused exercised a pervasive influence
and control over the victim.[42] Even if there was no violence employed in sexual congress, the moral influence
of appellant over the complainant suffices to constitute it into the crime of rape.[43]
In People vs. Mabunga,[44] where we convicted the accused for raping his thirteen-year old daughter, we
held that:
x x x Hence, even assuming that force or intimidation had not been actually employed, the crime of rape was
nevertheless committed. The absence of violence or offer of resistence would not be significant because of the
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over the daughter which takes the place of violence
and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused having no blood relationship within the
victim.
The rationale for such a ruling can be found in our discourse in People vs. Matrimonio[45] to effect that:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 38

In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former moral ascendancy and influence over the
latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. That ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the fathers
parental authority, which the Constitution and law recognize, support and enhance, as well as from the from the
childrens duty to obey and observe reverence and respect toward their parents. Such reverence and respect
towards their parents. Such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children and are
recognized by law. Abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing her to do
whatever he wants.
Thus two forms of intimidation under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code were recognized in
Matrimonio, that is (1) threats and (2) overpowering moral influence. Accused-appellant exercised such moral
influence over herein complaints. Being the victims father, accused-appellant had that moral ascendancy and
influence over his daughters which, in itself was sufficient to intimidate and force them to submit to his desires.
[46]
The fact that no resistance was offered by Jinky did not any way qualify the coitus as freely consented to by
her. Judging accused-appellants threats and intimidation in the context of Jinkys understanding at the time of the
rape, it can readily be concluded that her will to resist was overcome by her fathers strong parental authority.
As we held in the aforecited case of Mabunga, in rape the manner, form and tenacity of resistance of the
victim therein are dependent on a number of factors, among which are the age and size of the victim, as well as
of the aggressor himself; the degree of actual force and intimidation employed; and., of utmost importance, the
relationship between the rapist and his prey. Complementary thereto, we ruled in People vs. Navarrete[47] that
It must be emphasized also that considering the relationship between father and daughter, the degree of force or
intimidation need not be the same as in other cases of rape where the parties involved have no relationship at all
with each other; because the father exercises strong moral and physical control over his daughter.
Parenthetically, we digress to observe that for rape to exist it is not necessary that the intimidation
employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.Intimidation must be viewed in light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of rape and not by any hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that
it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at the moment or thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the
incident. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the
victim fought off her attacker.[48]
With the previous beatings Jinky received from accused-appellant, resistance could not have been expected
from her. She dared not risk another whipping from her father should she defy his advances. Coupled with the
respect demanded from Jinky by her father no matter how unreasoning the gap between their ages, and Jinkys
own youthful immaturity, the lack of resistance from Jinky becomes easily understandable. And, if resistance
would after all be futile because of continuing intimidation, as in the strong moral dominance of accusedappellant, then offering none at all would not mean consent to assault as to make the victims participation in the
sexual act voluntary.[49]

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 39

The insistence of accused-appellant that Jinky consented to his advances is downright ridiculous. It is hard
to believe that a daughter would simply give in to her fathers lascivious designs had not her resistance been
overpowered.[50] If Jinky had consented to the sexual intercourse, she would have kept it to herself and not
denounce it immediately as rape. Jinkys crying during sexual act, and her evasion of her fathers advances the
following day, belie his pretense that she voluntarily participated in the intercourse. There is no showing
whatsoever that complainant Jinky is a sexually perverted woman or one of extremely loose morals.
Consent obtained by fear of personal violence is no consent at all.Though a man puts no hand on a woman,
yet if by the use of mental and moral coercion the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result
she dare not resist the dastardly act inflicted on her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him. [51] On
the other hand, it is hard to accept that Jinky was that audacious as to seek and satisfy wordly pleasures from her
own father. To cite Navarrete again, no daughter in her right mind would voluntarily submit herself to her own
father unless there was force or intimidation, as a sexual act between a father and a daughter is extremely
revolting.
On the matter of the imposable penalties in the crime of rape when attended by modifying circumstances, it
is opportune to make some clarifications in light of succeeding amendments to Article 335 of the Code. With
respect to simple rape, whether in the original codal provision of after the amendment thereto, the penalty being
the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua is not affected by the presence of ordinary mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. However, under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 4111 consisting of
the so-called qualified form of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, or
when an attempted or frustrated rape is accompanied by homicide, for which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death, the presence of generic mitigating or aggravating circumstances will determine whether the
lesser or the higher penalty will be imposed.[52]
Republic Act No. 7659 has added seven more attendant circumstances which, in effect also create other
variants of qualified rape punishable with the single indivisible penalty of death. In line with the immediately
preceding observation, the presence of ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances would be of no
moment since the death penalty shall be imposed regardless of the number of any of them. [53] The only possible
basis for a reduction of such penalty under the rules for graduating penalties under the code is the presence of a
privileged mitigating circumstances.[54]
Now, it used to be the accepted doctrine that in crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship was
always aggravating.[55] However, among the qualifying circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 is
the situation when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity of affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. Obviuosly, in such a factual milieu, relationship having been used as an element in that
qualified form of rape, the same circumstance cannot be used again to aggravate the penalty to be imposed on
the offender.[56]
In the case at bar, therefore relationship cannot be applied as an aggravating circumstance. However, we are
persuaded to affirm the attendance of intoxication as an aggravating circumstance on the additional finding that
it was habitual on the part of the accused-appellant.Indeed, he admitted in his memorandum [57] that he took
liquor to forget the memory of his wife ever since she died on August 28, 1991. Such admission together with

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 40

the declarations of his daughters and his own testimony in court that he was also inebriated on the two
occasions when he separately raped the victims, reasonably yields the inference that accused-appellant was a
habitual drunkard.
Yet, even on the remote assumption ex gratia argumenti that intoxication can be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor, its presence would not affect the two penalties imposed by the court below. Being
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death must be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. The rule, however, is slightly
different with respect to the civil liability.
On this point, we note that the lower court did not award moral and exemplary damages to either Jacqueline
or Jinky Tabugoca. Having suffered wounded feelings and social humiliation,[58] Jacqueline is entitled to an
award of moral damages therefor.[59] In view of the presence of an aggravating circumstance, exemplary
damages should also be awarded to her.[60] An appellate proceeding in a criminal case, whether at the instance of
accused or by mandatory provision of law, throws the whole case open for review, hence this modification by
reason of the oversight of the trial court.
On the other hand, while Jinky is entitled to actual or compensatory damages, no moral damages may be
awarded to her because no sufficient evidence was introduced in the court a quo which would have entitled her
thereto.[61] However, exemplary damages can be awarded to her since she has been correctly granted
compensatory damages and offense against her was committed with an aggravating circumstance.[62]
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGEMENT OF Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2386 and 2387 is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant
Cresencio Tabugoca is further ordered (1) in Criminal Case No. 2386, to pay Jacqueline Tabugoca the additional
amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 by way exemplary damages.
Two Members of the Court voted to impose on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, upon the finality of this decision, let the record of this case be forwarded immediately to the office of the
President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN ESTEPANO, RODNEY ESTEPANO
and RENE ESTEPANO, accused-appellants.
DECISION

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 41

BELLOSILLO, J.:
ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney,
Dante and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo died during the trial and before
judgment could be rendered. Dante was never apprehended hence, as against him, the case was archived. After
trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only Ruben, Rodney and Rene were found
guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the
heirs of EnriqueBalinas in the amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages and P9,500.00 for actual damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[1]
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that on 16
April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, he was on his way home in Barangay IV, Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met Dominador Estepano at the BM
Trucking compound. At this juncture, according to Florencio, Lopito started to talk to Dominador while he and
Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach
with a guinunting.[2] Ruben who was armed with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a
bolo, followed suit in hacking Enrique.While this was happening, Dominador told his companions, You better
kill him![3]
Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, while he was walking
home with Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound
near the house of Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw two (2) persons, both naked from
the waist up, pass by. He recognized one of them to be Rodrigo Estepano. Soon after, he heard a couple of
splashing sounds and a ring, whichmade him turn around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo from
the neck of Enrique. He also saw another person, who was armed with a cane cutter, standing near the fallen
Enrique. He asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador replied that that was the result of
intense hatred. He then hurriedly left for home. On the way he met some military men and told them about the
incident. The military men assured him that they would report the matter to the police authorities.[4]
Dominador Estepano gave his own version of the incident. According to him, on 16 April 1991, at around
ten oclock in the evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They were about to eat supper when
he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the window and saw
Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground Rodrigo hastily fled. There was no other person in
the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim was and saw the latters firearm. He picked it up and
when Chief of Police Balquin arrived, he turned over the firearm to him.[5]
Robert Hautea[6] and Luz Cuepas,[7] both residents of Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of
Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten
oclock in the evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City attending to his wife who earlier
underwent a caesarian operation.[8] Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were at home sleeping
when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only thirteen (13) years of age then, testified that he came to know

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 42

about the incident that same night when his mother awakened him to inform him about it. [9] Rodney, on the
other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed Enrique Balinas.[10]
The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that the trial court erred: (a) in giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco; (b) in finding the existence of conspiracy in the commission
of the crime charged; and, (c) in finding them guilty of murder.[11]
On the first assigned error, accused-appellants argue that the trial court accorded too much credence to the
testimony of Florencio Tayco notwithstanding that some substantial points of his testimony were not
corroborated by Lopito Gaudia who was also present at the crime scene. Florencio maintained that aside from
Rodrigo, the other Estepanos, Dante, Rodney, Ruben and Rene, also attacked Enrique. Lopito, on the other
hand, asserted that he saw Rodrigo with only one companion at the time of the incident.[12]
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, who of
the witnesses to disbelieve or whose testimonies to accept. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted,[13] which is not true in the present case.
The clear and convincing testimony of Florencio Tayco positively points to accused-appellants as the killers
of Enrique Balinas. Florencio testified that he was only two arms length away from the victim [14] as well as from
the assailants.[15] Thus, it was unlikely that he could not have recognized the latter considering that he was a
resident of the place and thus familiar more or less with the faces of its townsfolk. He was positive in
identifying Rodrigo as the person who first stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a bolo, [16] followed by Ruben,
Dante, Rodney and Rene, each hacking the victim one after the other while the victim was already lying down.
[17]
He was also positive in identifying the respective weapons used by the malefactors. [18] As there was no
indication that Florencio was moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and
his testimony must be given full faith and credence.[19]
Florencios account, in a way, was bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Quintin Napoles, the physician who
made a post mortem examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed:
Multiple hack wounds left face and neck with fracture of cervical vertebrae; stab wound left anterior chest and
right posterior lumbar region, non-penetrating.Dead on arrival.[20]
On the basis of his medical findings, Dr. Napoles opined that there could have been more than one kind of
weapon used in killing the victim - one sharp pointed and another sharp bladed.[21]
It is undisputed that both Florencio Tayco and Lopito Gaudia were present at the crime scene when the
incident happened. However, as clearly shown by their testimonies, it was only Florencio who saw the entire
incident. What Lopito witnessed was only that which transpired when he turned around upon hearing some

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 43

noise. Naturally, their impressions on the incident would vary. In other words, the alleged conflicting
testimonies between the two eyewitnesses as claimed by accused-appellants are more imagined than real.[22]
With respect to the defense of alibi, we agree with the trial court that it must fall. Well entrenched is the
rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the courts due to
the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness.[23]
Appellant Ruben Estepano would impress us that in the evening of 16 April 1991 he was at the provincial
hospital attending to his wife who had a caesarean operation, and never left the hospital until the following
day. However, he did not introduce evidence that his wife was actually admitted in the hospital and that she was
discharged therefrom only on 17 April 1991 to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime when the incident
happened.[24] The other appellants, Rodney and Rene, on their part, testified that they were asleep when the
incident happened. These testimonies are not sufficient to outweigh their positive identification by one of the
prosecution witnesses.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for accused-appellants to prove that they were somewhere else when
the crime was committed. They must likewise demonstrate that they were so far away that they could not have
been present at the place of the commission of the offense or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.[25] They were not able to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus
criminis considering the proximity of the places where they alleged to be and the place where the victim was
murdered. For alibi to be believed, credible and tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at
the scene of the crime is indispensable.[26]
On the second issue, accused-appellants contend that there was no solid ground to establish conspiracy
among them because their identities as authors of the crime were not proved by clear and convincing evidence,
and that their participation in the crime was not sufficiently established in the light of conflicting testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.[27]
We do not agree. The factual findings of the trial court, through the credible testimony of prosecution
witness Florencio Tayco, clearly established their identities as the assailants as well as the participation of each
of them, not to mention the weapons used for the attack. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was committed, [28] and the concerted acts of the accused to obtain a common
criminal objective signify conspiracy.[29] In the case at bar, the overt acts of accused-appellants in taking turns in
hacking Enrique Balinas clearly and adequately established conspiracy. It can be inferred therefrom that they
acted in unison in the pursuit of their common criminal design which was to kill the victim Enrique Balinas.[30]
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano guilty of
murder as the killing was attended by treachery.The evidence shows that they suddenly and unexpectedly
attacked the victim while the latter was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking to Dominador
Estepano. There was treachery because the following requisites concurred: (a) the culprits employed means,
methods or forms of execution which tended directly and specially to insure their safety from any defensive or
retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which meant that no opportunity was given the latter to do so;
and, (b) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. [31] The penalty

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 44

of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed on them in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.[32]
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense.Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised Penal Code, a person
over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that he
acted with discernment. The minor referred to here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise.[33]
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant Rene Estepano
acted with discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only attempted to establish, as it
did, Renes presence at the crime scene and his supposed participation in the killing of Enrique Balinas. Thus Q: Aside from Ruben Estepano alias Texas and Dante Estepano who helped in attacking Enrique Balinas,
were there other persons involved or helped aside from these two?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many more (who) helped?
A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.
xxxx
Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by Texas (Ruben)?
A: Cane cutter (espading).
xxxx
Q: How about Rene?
A: Bolo.[34]
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not in any way attempt to show
his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and
whether he participated therein.[35] Accordingly, even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by
virtue of his age.[36] The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to
extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern.But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.
The damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim must be modified. The P100,000.00
granted by the trial court for moral damages must beREDUCED to P50,000.00 considering that the purpose for
such award is not to enrich the heirs but to compensate them for the injuries to their feelings.Conformably with
prevailing jurisprudence, an additional award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Enrique Balinas must
also be given.[37]

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 45

Finally, the heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased, and the
absence of documentary evidence to support a claim therefor does not prevent recovery of such damages. [38] The
testimony of Marietta Balinas, the victims wife, on the earning capacity of her husband is enough to establish
the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life expectancy of Enrique Balinas applying the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality is as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).
[39]
Since Enrique was 34 years of age at the time of his death,[40] then his life expectancy was 30.66 years.
At the time of his death, Enrique was earning P2,000.00 a month as househelper of a certain Dr.
Sancho[41] so that his annual income wasP24,000.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted as reasonable
and necessary living expenses to arrive at his net earnings. Prescinding from the foregoing, we deduce that his
net earning capacity was P367,920.00 computed as follows:
net earning life gross reasonable
capacity (x) = expectancy x annual less & necessary
income living expenses
x = 2 (80 - 34) x [24,000.00 12,000.00]
3
= 30.66 x 12,000.00
= P367,920.00
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and
RODNEY ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are accordingly sentenced
each toreclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of their victim Enrique
Balinas y Gran the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P9,500.00 as
actual damages andP367,920.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in the absence of proof that he acted with
discernment; consequently, his immediate RELEASEfrom confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this
Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Doquena [68 Phil. 580 (1939)] (NO FULL TEXT FOUND)
Facts: Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the
yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a
Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach. Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped
Doquena on the nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to resume
playing volleyball. Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his
cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's request for a fight and
resumed playing. Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court held
that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 46

a 7th grade pupil, one of the brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted
him of the crime of homicide. The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches
the age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or not there was
discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into consideration:
a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed.
b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
c) The time he had at his disposal
d) The degree of reasoning of the minor
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted with discernment
Held: Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the discernment for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating circumstance. However, the DISCERNMENT
that constitutes an exception to the exemption fromcriminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine,
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference between right
and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by therecords in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and even during the trial.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140794. October 16, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICARDO AGLIDAY y TOLENTINO, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act. Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proven, recklessness
disappears.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the September 14, 1997 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos
City (Branch 57) in Criminal Case No. SCC 3054. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 47

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing consideration, the court finds the accused Ricardo T. Agliday guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00).
The PNP Bayambang[,] Pangasinan is directed to turn over the shotgun to the Firearm and Explosive Division,
Camp Crame, Quezon City.[2]
This case originated from the April 22, 1999 Information,[3] in which Ricardo Agliday y Tolentino was
accused of parricide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 25, 1999, in the evening, at [B]arangay Nalsian Sur, [M]unicipality of Bayambang,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot his son Richard V.
Agliday with a shotgun, unlicensed causing his death shortly thereafter due to [c]ardio respiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock, gunshot wound, pt. of entry at the (L) upper inner quadrant of gluteus, 3 x 3 cm. (+)
contusion collar, as per Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Rod Alden Tamondong, M.D., medical officer III,
Region I Medical Center, Arellano St., Dagupan City, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.[4]
On arraignment, appellant, assisted by Atty. Bernardo S. Valdez, pleaded not guilty.[5] After trial in due
course, the lower court rendered the assailed Decision.Atty. Carlito M. Soriano, counsel for appellant, filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 22, 1999.[6]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General summarized the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:
Prosecution witness Conchita Agliday, wife of appellant Reynaldo Agliday, testified that about 8:00 oclock on
the evening of February 25, 1999 while washing dishes in the kitchen of their house, her son Richard Agliday
was shot with a shotgun by her husband-appellant Ricardo Agliday (pp. 4-5, tsn, July 5, 1999). As a result, her
son Richard fell on his belly; her husband-appellant ran away. Although shocked, Conchita was able to rush out
of her house to call for help. Richard was first brought to the Sto. Nio Hospital, then to the San Carlos General
Hospital, and finally to the Region I Hospital in Dagupan City (pp. 5-6, id.).
Before the shooting, Conchita and her husband quarreled over her working as a laundrywoman (p. 7, id.). Her
son, Richard, at the time of his death, was only nineteen (19) years old and in 4th year college (p. 9, id.).
Prosecution witness Rey Agliday, another son of appellant, testified that he was in their house resting on a
wooden bed at the time of the incident in question (p. 3, tsn, June 18, 1999). Rey saw his father-appellant shoot
his brother Richard with a shotgun, as he was about four (4) meters from them (p. 4, id.).
Before the shooting incident, Rey recounted [that] his mother and his father-appellant had a quarrel, but he did
not interfere. His brother Richard, on the other hand, intervened and for that reason appellant got his shotgun

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 48

and shot Richard.Appellant surrendered to the barangay captain who accompanied him to the police
authorities. Rey executed a sworn statement (Exhibit A) on the shooting incident (p. 5, id.).
Dr. Rod Alden Tamondong, medical health officer, Region I Medical Center, Dagupan City declared that he
attended to the medical needs of Richard Agliday.Richard came in looking very pale, weak, and semi-conscious
(p. 3, tsn, July 13, 1999). He died at the emergency room.
Dr. Tamondong found a gunshot wound at the left buttock of the victim which had no point of exit; he also
found multiple metallic objects therein based on the contusion color of the wound and the x-ray result (pp. 4-5,
id.). He stated that the cause of the victims death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to the decrease of the
circulating blood of the victim (pp. 4-5, id.). But he did not issue a medical certificate as he was then on official
leave; he only issued a death certificate (Exhibit D) (p. 5, id.).[8]
Version of the Defense
Appellant, in his Brief,[9] submits his own narration of the events:
Appellant Ricardo T. Agliday is a barangay tanod of Nalsian Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan.
Sometime on February 25, 1999, at or about 8:00 oclock in the evening, appellant was at the first floor of his
house. He was cleaning a homemade shotgun which he intended to bring to [his] night patrol in their barangay,
with fellow barangay tanods.
While his wife Conchita and his son Richard were about to go upstairs, and while appellant was cleaning the
homemade shotgun, the gun accidentally went off and Richards buttock was hit.
Appellant went near his son and embraced him. Appellant and some relatives brought Richard to the Sto. Nino
Hospital at Bayambang, Pangasinan. They later transferred him to the San Carlos General Hospital. Finally,
they brought him to the Region I Medical Center at Dagupan City, where he expired.
Thereafter, appellant returned to Bayambang, Pangasinan. He directly went to the house of Barangay Captain
Jose Matabang, Jr. to whom he voluntarily surrendered. The barangay captain brought the appellant to [the]
police station of Bayambang, Pangasinan, with the homemade shotgun which [had] accidentally hit Richard.[10]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Faced with two conflicting versions of the facts, the trial court gave credence to the prosecution witnesses
who gave straightforward, spontaneous, sincere and frank accounts of the events that had unfolded before their
very eyes. Because of their relationship with appellant, there was no reason for them to testify falsely against
him. The first witness (Rey) was appellants son who was the victims brother, while the other witness (Conchita)
was appellants wife who was the victims mother.
The defense of appellant that what happened was an accidental shooting was disbelieved by the trial
court. It viewed such stance as his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from the consequences of his acts.
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Issues

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 49

Appellant submits the following issues:

First Assignment of Error
The Honorable Court a quo erred in its findings of facts which[,] had they been in accordance with the
evidence adduced, will suffice to support a judgment of acquittal for accused-appellant.[12]
Second Assignment of Error
The Honorable Court a quo erred in convicting accused appellant [of] parricide.[13]
This Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses despite his
avowals to the contrary. He claims that it should have believed him because he had absolutely no reason or
motive to kill, much less shoot, his own son whom he considered to have had a very bright future. He further
alleges that the corroborating testimonies of Jose Matabang and SPO1 Emilio Opina, who were not related to
the parties and had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against him, were more credible than those of his wife
and other son.
We disagree. Long settled is the rule in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, an appellate court will normally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court. [14] That is, unless
the lower court has reached conclusions that are clearly unsupported by evidence, or unless it has overlooked
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would affect the results.[15]
Matabangs testimony was basically what appellant had told him and, hence, biased and limited. The
testimony of Opina -- that he had been told by Conchita that the shooting was accidental -- was contradicted by
her own statements in open court that she was still in shock when the police officer conducted the preliminary
investigation. Such statements taken ex parte, like affidavits, are held as inferior to testimonies given in open
court.[16] Thus, we find no ground in the case at bar to overturn the factual findings of the trial court.
Second Issue: Accident as an Exempting Circumstance
Appellant protests the trial courts ruling that his defense of accidental shooting was fabricated. According
to him, he was cleaning the shotgun that he would have used for the evening patrol with other barangay tanods
when he accidentally touched the trigger and hit Richard, who was going up the stairs into the house with
Conchita.[17] He therefore contends that he should be acquitted on the basis of the exempting circumstance of
accident under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Revised Penal Code.
We are not persuaded. Both the trial court and the solicitor general rejected this defense on the basis of the
eyewitness testimonies of Conchita and Rey.Under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Code, criminal liability does
not arise in case a crime is committed by [a]ny person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 50

an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The exemption from criminal liability under
the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal intent.
The declarations of innocence by appellant are contradicted by the testimonies of his wife and son. On the
witness stand, Conchita recounts the incident as follows:
Q: You said that you were at home on February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening; what were you
doing if you can still remember?
A: I was washing dishes, sir.
Q: While doing so, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident?
A: My son was shot by my husband, sir.
Q: Where did your husband [shoot] your son?
A: In the kitchen, sir.
Q: What weapon did your husband use in shooting your son?
A: Shotgun, sir.[18]
In her Sworn Statement given to SPO1 Emilio Opina of the Bayambang Police Station, she declared:
04. Q: Will you please narrate to me briefly all you know about the incident you are referring to?
A: That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening o[n] February 25, 1999 while I and my husband Ricardo
Agliday y Tolentino were quarreling in connection [with] his drinking (liquor) habit[,] my son Richard
V. Agliday tried to [pacify] us but my husband, instead of listening, x x x got his gun [from] the bed
where we are sleeping and shot our son Richard V. Agliday."[19]
Rey corroborated his mothers testimony that his brother was shot by their father. His testimony proceeded
as follows:
Q: On February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, do you remember where you were?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you on that day and [at that] time?
A: I was under the house resting on a wooden bed, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: While you were under your house resting do you remember if there was any unusual incident that
happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident?
A: My brother was shot by my father, sir.
Q: How far where you when your father shot your brother?
A: About four (4) meters, sir.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 51

Q: What weapon did your father use in shooting your brother?

A: A shotgun, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Where was your mother, Conchita at the time your father shot your brother Richard?
A: She was there and they were both quarreling, sir.
Q: They were both quarreling before the incident happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And while your father and mother were quarreling what did you do?
A: I did not interfere[;] it was my brother who intervene[d] between them that is why my father got his gun
and shot my brother, sir.[20]
Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the
following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an
injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. [21] For an accident to
become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. [22] The act of firing a shotgun at another is not a
lawful act.
An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about
through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. [23] It connotes the
absence of criminal intent.Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons overt acts. [24] In
the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the
quarrel between the former and Conchita. It must also be pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun that would
not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it,
showing a clear intent to fire it at someone.
The Resolution[25] dated April 22, 1999, filed by 4th Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emilio R. Soriano, reads
thus:
[O]n the evening of February 25, 1999 at about 8:00 oclock, complainant and her husband were then quarreling
in connection with his liquor drinking habit. While they were quarreling, their son Richard intervened and tried
to pacify his father who [was] under the influence of liquor. Apparently angered and not listening to his son, he
proceeded inside their bedroom and took his gun and thereafter shot his son Richard who was trying to pacify
them. After seeing her son being shot by her husband, complainant ran outside and called for help. x x x.
After carefully considering the uncontroverted evidence adduced by complainant, undersigned sufficiently finds
a probable cause for [p]arricide with the use of an unlicensed firearm x x x.[26]
Appellant contends that since he was only negligent, he should have been convicted, not of parricide, but
only of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.[27]
We disagree. Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act
from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 52

performing or failing to perform such act. Past jurisprudential cases of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide were as follows: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who got killed by the accidental
discharge arising from negligent handling; (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones house and killing
a neighbor who, at just that moment, leaned over a balcony front; and (3) firing a .45 caliber pistol twice in the
air to stop a fist fight; and, as the fight continued, firing another shot at the ground but, after the bullet
ricocheted, hitting a bystander who died thereafter.[28]
Intent is not lacking in the instant case. Appellants external acts prove malice or criminal intent. A
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence.[29]
In People v. Belbes,[30] the Court found no reckless imprudence in the shooting of a student who, in the act
of destroying the schools bamboo wall, had been caught by a policeman who was responding to a report that
somebody was causing trouble in a school affair. The policemans action cannot be characterized as reckless
imprudence, because the shooting was intentional. The accused had intended to fire at the victim and in fact hit
only the latter. In this case, resenting his sons meddling in his argument with his wife, appellant purposely took
his gun and shot his son.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed DecisionAFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418
February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CECILIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as
follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation
shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and
afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown.
The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased to the forest,
there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime
should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and
costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts. The
accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro
Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant
took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at
work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream to see

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 53

how the alteration which he had made in the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other
side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the
deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the riceharvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to
hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance from the
shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the
question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There
is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point. The
uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens
and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased
to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying
something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to
anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be
found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have
something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And
after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I
heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my
companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree
not far from where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about
the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was a
relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead
body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were
found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The
defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his
laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a little way toward
the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and
removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the
body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow
laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the
witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused,
who testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That
evening the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon
grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place where it
had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of
the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 54

he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel him to do
so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the
body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and told the story
substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased had
been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity
and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no
motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden
quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man
were shot at the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall
appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without
liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm,
there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417;
Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep.,
875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any
question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is
upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that
for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental
or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits
the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it
is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 55

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent)
which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody
ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y
Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay
the heirs of the victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages andP100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.[1]
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy Santos and John Doe
alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and
killed her.[2]
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,[3] Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong
remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.
These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul Vincent
Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas
Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about
one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point,
Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the
two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher
kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still
on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 56

Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion
entered the sidecar.When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the
tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the
incident.[4]
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was
hired for P120.00[5] by a certain Boy Santos,[6] his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would drive
him to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. [7] However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed
him to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.
[8]
Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot ofMerced Drugstore at the public market.
[9]
Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya
alighted on the pretest of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled
with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Dodong Bisaya.
[10]
Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle prevented
him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before boarding the tricycle Jun
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting,
Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him
to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario overheard his passengers
saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were cogon grasses. [11] Upon arriving at
Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the
incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.[12] Del Rosario then went home.[13] Because of the threat,
however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police.[14]
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him to
death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of
threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos, Ernesto Jun Marquez
and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy among co-accused
"Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not
considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.[15]
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art.
12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He
was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from
leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them
escape after the commission of the crime.[16]
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be
considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it fell short
of the test required by law and jurisprudence.[17]
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 57

not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my
act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the
act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[18]
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an armed
man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He
could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same
circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a
person whom he only saw for the first time that day.[19]
Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was Boy Santos
who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing
her.[20] A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the case, particularly the testimonies
of the witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was Jun Marquez who ran after the victims helper
and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct examination Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir x x x x
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir x x x x
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who grappled the same
from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man was then kicking the
lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was then lying on the
ground, sir x x x x
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance of about
one and a half meter?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir x x x x
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
A: They went away, sir x x x x
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the tricycle?

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 58

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driverwhile the other man entered the sidecar,
sir.[21]
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene conducted by
the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding the gun fired at
the victim?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding the gun chased the
helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir.
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the man holding the
gun shot the victim, sir.[22]
On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified
Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?
xxxx
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.
xxxx
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the gun?
A: Yes, sir.[23]
On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that
Q: x x x x On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo
Nalagon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nitas Drugstore at Gen. Tinio
St.?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 59

Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said they to whom are you referring?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?
A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.
Q: And what about Jun Marquez?
A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
Court: Did you not see any shooting?
A: There was, sir.
Q: Who was shot?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir x x x x
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was wrong and
illegal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the possession of Boy Santos x
xxx
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to escape that was
the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir.[24]
On cross-examination, accused further stated
Q: After shopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag of
the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 60

Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?

A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down x x x x
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me,sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir x x x x.
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the possession of the
handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir x x x x[25]
Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the incident occurred
is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should not do
anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your other three coaccused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim going
towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.[26]
Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him and
threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserted that it was Jun Marquez who shot the victim and sat
behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was grabbed,
her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then
sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the
testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced that Jun
Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that a helper of the lady was
chased by the other man and that this other man could not be Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to
whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos
never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that Boy Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him
with violence and prevent him from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for Boy Santos
to stay in the tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle
and helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with Dodong Bisaya
and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that Boy Santos opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his
preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind.[27]
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in front of the tricycle of
witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were transpiring
inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by Boy Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 61

and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del
Rosario tricycle was not transparent.[28]
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him was
real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the
moment of automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere
instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability since by
reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime
scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his participation in the
orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario
facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his
passengers was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper of the victim and the
shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his
tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;[29] that the accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him
and under his control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny
his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the
crime.[30]
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more persons
come to an agreementconcerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The objective of the
conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for
concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose or for common and joint purpose and design.Its
manifestation could be shown by united and concerted action.[31]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in
utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of
minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more
persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual
meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[32] Nevertheless,
mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established,
not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to
establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the
getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no inkling of
the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 62

merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the
scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement
concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same." [34] Therefore, in order to convict the
accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is insufficient proof to show
cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.[35] The only incriminating evidence against del
Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the
same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security
because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would, be killed should he shout for help. No complicity
can be deduced where there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of
robbing and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim.[36]
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or to
the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. [37] It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a
family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get involved in
the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. [38] As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was
the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his cross-examination Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and
was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers
on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location
and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag
and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out
transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the
house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening,
accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The
investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All
the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on
May 16, 1996.He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.[39]
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they
were afraid that he might attempt to escape.[40]

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 63

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.It is well-settled that it encompasses
any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.[41] This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA
7438[42] to include"the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated inconnection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or
investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and
understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of
his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was
already undereffective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a
suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del
Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even
before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law
and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court provides:[43]
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro[44] we held that when a police officer sees
the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is
deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 64

accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of
del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following
the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be
a large measure of immediacybetween the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there
was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must
be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must
have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the
crime.[45] Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained,
the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime
had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a
quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any
objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this
case.[46]
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in the
process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must
acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons
with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused
was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in
the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate
RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of
Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6082
March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 65

C.W. Ney for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of "illegal and arbitrary detention"
of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be no doubt of the lawful authority of
the defendant, in the exercise of his functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness
which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the evidence, the alleged offense with which
the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for the making of arrest without
warrant, under the doctrine laid down in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed, unless the evidence discloses that
having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the
complaining witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought before the proper
judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can
gather from the extremely meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the
peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days were expended in doing, so, but it was
conclusively proven at the trial that at the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his
auxiliary were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat. The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all
practicable dispatch, the prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining municipalities
for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being due to the fact that the written complaint, which
was intrusted to the policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not appear why the
prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume
that in this respect the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the weather, or the like,
which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of record, made the journey by boats safer and more
commodious sometimes to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed
to considerable inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this
record upon which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the
prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully
authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the offense for which the
arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community where
the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the
peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a
particular case of a defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary,
or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 66

neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant must be reversed and he is hereby
acquitted of the offense with which he is charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186
September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence
alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had
thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the
appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature
because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw
her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and
visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very
weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being
asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she
was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called
Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the
body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president
of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed
still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing
his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in
her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child
was not his but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his
conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her
house at the time and on the date above-stated.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 67

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was
not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the
appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he
maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of
man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at
least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it,
to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis
Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol she considers him her husband
as he considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was
pregnant and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the
birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the
child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the
place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact
she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made
any admission to said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This
illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had
upon giving birth, coupled with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event;
and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach
her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her
or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to
constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket
where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by
doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person
who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was
aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having

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been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors
attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said
appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of
which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection
with this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 34917
September 7, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuao, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a
fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal
penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below
in its judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in
court the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of
Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since
been dismissed from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the
customhouse without the knowledge of the customs secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated
by a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was
partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is
above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other
prosecution witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government
witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of
Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service
agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

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7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from
Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan
Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and
the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation
of opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the
costs, despite the presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful
inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating
from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in
Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from
a vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at
his office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief
of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table,
the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive
shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and
put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later,
Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not
about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to
Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said
accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay
Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan,
which the Naviera Filipina a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to
Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already
been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive
P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the
customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad
informed the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and
remained there until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment,
but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and
the 30 cases remained on board.

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The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the
manifests, Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter
instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the
P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers
ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be
better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that
night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se
Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can
take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary,
of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to
discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's
house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the
fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in
the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one
Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the
evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer
went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the
window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived,
Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium,
who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might
come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him
where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were
3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who
said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy
were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered
that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered,
no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which
was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why
didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were
not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the opium,
Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good
business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by
Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next
morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was
handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and
arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and
B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After
having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 71

Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging
on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to
the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary
headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked
Nos. 11 to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium
confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the
truth as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any
questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those " pointing
towards the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he
induced him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu
it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug;
that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of
customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if
Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after
he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of
P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter
answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload
it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not
have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at
first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the
opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th,
because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu
personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the
refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of
Juan Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to
the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of
the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad,
collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were
dismissed from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those
proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in
section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the
Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it
does not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).

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Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the
defendants' statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in
shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by
unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the
testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the
Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the
defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu
pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion,
however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo,
that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question.
Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port
of Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not
take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained
the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited
drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its
introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them
carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the
smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the
courts of the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons
into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent
the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in
that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if
the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact
that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and
where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 73

liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases
holding the contrary.
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the
opium in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs,
Joaquin Natividad who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their
enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the
transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the
Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is
induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service
pretended to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better
to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of
the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46638 July 9, 1986
AQUILINA R. ARANETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, finding
the accused appellant guilty of the crime of bribery. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of conviction, We hereby find the defendant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code; and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, We hereby
impose upon her the penalty of imprisonment consisting of four (4) months and twenty-one (21)
days and a fine of P 100.00. The defendant shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification from holding office. With costs.
Atty. Aquilina Araneta was charged with violation of Section 3, Subsection B of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in an information which reads:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1971, in the City of Cabanatuan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then employed
as Hearing Officer in the Department of Labor, with station at Cabanatuan City, and therefore, a
public officer, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand and receive for
herself the amount of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency, from one Mrs.
Gertrudes M. Yoyongco, as a condition and/or consideration for her to act on the claim for
compensation benefits filed by the said Mrs. Gertrudes M. Yoyongco pertaining to the death of

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 74

her husband, which claim was then pending in the office wherein the abovenamed accused was
employed and in which, under the law, she has the official capacity to intervene.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the respondent appellate court in its decision as follows:
Complainant Gertrudes M. Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of the
National Irrigation Administration assigned as instrument man at the Upper Pampanga River
Project. Upon the death of her husband on April 27, 1971, she approached the appellant, a
hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the
procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the requirements, she prepared the
application forms and attachments and filed them with the Workmen's Compensation Unit at San
Fernando, Pampanga. (pp. 213, TSN, October 3, 1973).
After a few days, the complainant went back to San Fernando to verify the status of her claim.
She was informed that the death certificate of her husband, their marriage contract and the birth
certificates of their children were needed. She secured these documents and brought them to San
Fernando. She was told that her claim papers had been forwarded to Cabanatuan City,
particularly to the appellant, for consolidation of the requirements. So she went to see the
appellant. (pp. 13-18, TSN, October 3, 1973).
When she saw the appellant, the complainant was told that she had to pay P 100.00 so that her
claim would be acted upon. The complainant told the appellant that she had no money then, but
if the appellant would process her claim she would give her the P100.00 upon its approval. The
appellant was adamant. She would not agree to the complainant's proposal. According to her, on
previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they failed to live up to them.
(pp. 18-24, TSN, October 3,1973).
The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco, erstwhile chief of the Criminal
Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, to inform him of the demand of the appellant.
Col. Yoyongco gave the complainant two 50-peso bills (Exhibits B and B-1 ) and instructed her
to go to Col. David Laureaga, Provincial Commander of Nueva Ecija, for help. (pp. 24-25, TSN,
October 3, 1973).
After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito Carlos to entrap the
appellant. The two 50-peso bills were marked with the notations 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2',
photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder. With this preparation, Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno,
CIC Balcos and the complainant proceeded to the office of the appellant. When they arrived
thereat, the appellant was talking with three persons who had a hearing before her. They allowed
the three persons to finish their business with the appellant. After the group had left, the
complainant and CIC Balcos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the
appellant. Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno stationed themselves outside the room and observed events
through a glass window. Aside from the appellant, the complainant and CIC Balcos, there were
three other persons inside the office. These were Atty. Herminio Garcia, Renato de Lara and
Gregorio Ocampo. The complainant again requested the appellant to process her claim. The
appellant countered by asking her if she already had the P100.00. In answer, the complainant

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brought out the two 50-peso bills from her bag and handed them to the appellant. As the
appellant took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand and told her she was under
arrest. Whereupon, Lt. Carlos and Sgt. Beleno immediately entered the room and helped in the
arrest of the appellant. (pp. 3-12, TSN, November 6, 1973).
The appellant was brought to the PC headquarters where her hands were examined with a special
light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination was witnessed by Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Talavera. The result was positive. (pp. 12-13, TSN, November 6, 1973).
On the other hand, the petitioner presented her own version of the facts:
On her part, the appellant testified that there was indeed an offer of P 100.00 by the complainant.
She declined the offer and never touched the bills when they were laid on her table. If she was
found positive for ultra-violet powder, it was because CIC Balcos rubbed the bills on her hand
and dress. He did it four times once at her office, once at the Milky way Restaurant and twice at
the PC Headquarters. (Decision, Court of Appeals, Annex "A", p. 5)
When the complainant went to the office of the appellant in Cabanatuan City, she demanded the
release of the decision of her case, but appellant told her that she cannot do so for the reason that
she is only a hearing officer to receive evidence about the claim for compensation due to the
death of her husband, and the real office to decide the case is that Workmen's Compensation
Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga. The complainant went to her brother-in-law, Col. Yoyongco,
Chief of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine Constabulary, Cabanatuan City to inform
him of the demand of the appellant for P100.00. Col. Yoyongco gave complainant two fifty
(P50.00) peso bills. After listening to the complainant, Col. Laureaga instructed Lt. Carlito
Carlos to entrap appellant by the use of fifty (P50.00) peso bills which were marked with the
notation 'CC-NE-l' and 'CC-NE-2', photographed and dusted with ultra-violet powder, the two
fifty-peso bills. After this preparation Lt. Carlos, Sgt. Beleno and the complainant proceeded to
the office of the complainant. When they arrived in the place the complainant was talking to the
3 persons who had then a hearing before her. After the appellant finished the hearing the
complainant and the CIC Balgos who pretended to be the complainant's nephew approached the
appellant. Then the complainant again requested the appellant to process her claim by this time
the complainant took the 2 fifty-peso bills from her bag and gave to the appellant but the
appellant pushed the money, and CIC Balgos grabbed her hand and told her appellant was under
arrest. The appellant was brought to the headquarters where her hands were examined with
special light for the presence of ultra-violet powder. The examination was witnessed by the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cabanatuan City and the result was positive. (TSN, pp. 12- 13,
November 6, 1973)
On the other hand, Renato de Lara, a witness for the appellant testified that he was in the office
of the appellant at the time the incident took place and he saw the amount of P100.00 being
offered by the complainant to the appellant but the latter refused to accept the money. When
appellant refused, CIC Balgos took it, rubbed it on the hand of the appellant and announced that
he was arresting her.

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Appellant further testify (sic) that complainant offered P100.00 to her to expedite the preparation
of the decision of her claim and said complainant put two fifty peso bills in her table after which
she was arrested and investigated and a complaint was filed against her for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After trial, the lower court convicted the petitioner as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Atty. Aquiline R. Araneta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information and hereby sentences her to suffer
imprisonment for ONE (1) YEAR, with perpetual disqualification from public office, and to pay
the costs. The P100.00 consisting of two fifty-peso bills which were marked as Exhibits 'B' and
'B-l' are hereby ordered returned to Mrs. Gertrudes Yoyongco who owns them.
As indicated earlier, the respondent appellate court modified the decision of the lower court and convicted the
petitioner instead of the crime of bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner now assigns the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE
BASIS OF ENTRAPMENT EVIDENCE DEVISED BY MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY IN CABANATUAN CITY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER OF BRIBERY
WHERE SUCH CRIME WAS NOT CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION FILED BY THE
FISCAL AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Relative to the first error, the petitioner submits that the criminal intent originated in the mind of the entrapping
person and for which reason, no conviction can be had against her.
This argument has no merit.
The petitioner confuses entrapment with instigation, We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
... There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension
of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused was induced to commit the crime (People vs. Galicia, [CA], 40 OG 4476). The
difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment,
the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The Idea and the resolve to commit the
crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and
suggests to the accused who adopts the Idea and carries it into execution.
The legal effects of entrapment and instigation are also different. As already stated, entrapment
does not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 77

Even more emphatic on this point is People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng (56 Phil. 44) where this Court ruled
that the mere fact that the Chief of Customs Secret Service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally
imported opium through the customs house, in order to assure the seizure of the said opium and the arrest of its
importers is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter. In that case, this Court quoted with approval
16 Corpus Juris, p. 88, Sec. 57, which states that:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that
it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation of persons seeking
to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him free from the influence of the instigation of the detective. ...
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that she was denied due process of law because she
was not charged with bribery in the information but for a crime falling under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Again, this argument is erroneous. The contention of the petitioner was squarely answered in United States vs.
Panlilio (28 Phil. 608) where this Court held that the fact that the information in its preamble charged a
violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the
Penal Code. To the same effect is our ruling in United States vs. Guzman (25 Phil. 22) where the appellant was
convicted of the crime of estafa in the lower court, but on appeal, he was instead convicted of the crime of
embezzlement of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740.
As long as the information clearly recites all the elements of the crime of bribery and the facts proved during the
trial show its having been committed beyond reasonable doubt, an error in the designation of the crime's name
is not a denial of due process.
In United States vs. Paua (6 Phil. 740), this Court held that:
The foregoing facts, duly established as they were by the testimony of credible witnesses who
heard and saw everything that occurred, show beyond peradventure of doubt that the crime of
attempted bribery, as defined in article 387, in connection with Article 383 of the Penal Code,
has been committed, it being immaterial whether it is alleged in the complaint that section 315 of
Act No. 355 of the Philippine Commission was violated by the defendant, as the same recites
facts and circumstances sufficient to constitute the crime of bribery as defined and punished in
the aforesaid articles of the Penal Code.
Our review of this decision shows that the crime for which the petitioner was convicted has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 78

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the respondent
court is AFFIRMED without costs.
Considering however, that this case has been pending since 1971, that the amount involved is only P100.00 and
that the defendant-appellant is a mother of four, it is recommended that the petitioner either be granted
executive clemency or be given the privilege of probation if she is qualified.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Ministry of Justice for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.M. Nos. R-278-RTJ & R-309-RTJ May 30, 1986
ATTY. ENRICO M. CABRERA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES, Regional Trial Court, Naga City, respondent.
Emerito M. Salva for respondent in A.M. R-278-RTJ.
PER CURIAM:
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX in Naga City, stands charged in these two cases
which were jointly investigated by Intermediate Appellate Court Justice Vicente Mendoza, as per the Court's
resolution of April 25, 1985. In the first numbered case, he is charged with indirect bribery, arising from the
allegation that he received, on January 22, 1985, the sum of Pl,000.00 from a party-litigant in a case then
pending before his court. In the second numbered case, he is charged with acts unbecoming of a judge, in that
he allegedly tried to solicit testimonials from practicing attorneys in his court, attesting to his integrity and
competence.
Justice Mendoza, after conducting the investigation and hearing the parties and their witnesses, submitted the
following report and findings dated May 2, 1986:
The Facts
On January 16, 1985, the complainant Enrico Cabrera, gave a sworn statement to the National
Bureau of Investigation in Naga City, denouncing the respondent Judge James B. Pajares for
having allegedly asked money from him in connection with his case. Cabrera said that in
September, 1984 Judge Pajares intimated to him that he needed money. Cabrera said he gave
P1,000.00 to the respondent judge because the latter had been unduly strict, preventing him from
making statements during the trial of his case.
It appears that the complainant is the defendant in Civil Case No. R-751 which the respondent
judge was trying. The case was filed by the complainant's father, Juan Cabrera, and by his half
brothers and sisters, for the annulment of the sale made to the complainant of about 28 hectares
of land in San Juan, Canaman, Camarines Sur. (See Exhs. 6 and 7-B) Cabrera said he had been
advised by his counsel, Atty. Roberto Verdadero, to accommodate any request for money from
the respondent so that he would not be unduly hard on the complainant. In September, 1984,
according to the complainant, Judge Pajares intimated to him that he needed money. Following
his counsel's advice, Cabrera said he expressed willingness to help the judge financially and, the

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 79

following day after their meeting, gave him P1,000.00. However, according to Cabrera, after two
months (i.e., before Christmas of 1984), Judge Pajares again told him that he needed money.
Cabrera said the judge saw him in front of the Han of Justice in Naga City and called him. It was
then, according to him, that he decided to denounce the judge to the authorities. Cabrera asked
the assistance of the NBI in entrapping Judge Pajares.
The sworn statement of the complainant, which contains the foregoing, is marked as Exhibit N.
On January 17, 1985, Cabrera gave another statement (Exh. O) to the NBI in which he said he
was submitting ten P100.00 bills (or P1,000.00) for marking, for use in the entrapment.
The bills were marked with orange fluorescent crayon and dusted with orange fluorescent
powder by the NBI. At the same time, NBI Regional Director Epimaco Velasco asked the NBI in
Manila to send to Naga City a female agent, between 35 and 40 years old, to take part in the
entrapment. (Rollo II p. 23; transcript pp. 4749, Aug. 12,1985)
On January 22, at 8:15 in the morning, the complainant saw Judge Pajares in the latter's chamber
in the Hall of Justice. He was accompanied by NBI agent Angelica V. Somera whom he
introduced as his wife. After exchanging amenities with the judge, the complainant informed the
judge that he had decided not to settle the case and instead proceed with the trial. For this reason,
he told judge that he had filed early that morning a motion for the reconsideration of the judge's
order in Civil Case No. R-751, appointing a surveyor to delineate a portion of the land in dispute
which Cabrera would give to his half brothers and sisters in settlement.
NBI Agent Somera testified that Judge Pajares later asked 'O ano na ngayon ang atin,'
whereupon, according to her, Cabrera got the envelope containing the marked money from her
and handed it to Judge Pajares. Cabrera then rushed out of the chamber on the pretext that he
forgot the keys in the car and gave the signal to five waiting NBI agents, Somera said that, as
soon as they got in, NBI Agent Manuel Tobias asked her where the money was. She pointed to a
diary on the table of Judge Pajares, between whose pages the envelope handed to the judge was
found inserted. The diary was seized by NBI Agent Artemio Sacaguing. (Exh. A; Transcript pp.
74-75, 93- 94, 98, Aug. 12, 1985, Exhs. B and C).
The envelope contained the marked bills. Upon examination by an NBI Forensic Chemist,
Leonor C. Vallado, it was established that the envelope and the ten P 100.00 bills were the same
envelope and P100 bills previously marked by the NBI. (The ten P100.00 bills are marked
Exhibits D-1 to D-10, the envelope in which they were contained as Exhibit D, and the diary, in
which the envelope was found inserted, is marked Exhibit J, while the pages between which the
envelope was found are marked as Exhibits J-1 and J-2.) Judge Pajares was likewise examined
and found positive for orange fluorescent powder on the thumb and index fingers of the left
hand. The diary was similarly found positive. (Exhs. K, L, and M Transcript pp. 48-49, 118, Aug.
12, 1985)
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Judge Pajares accepted the envelope containing Pl,000.00.
There is no question that the envelope was handed to him by Cabrera and that he took it.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 80

However, Judge Pajares claims that he took the envelope because he thought the money was
intended for the surveyor I who had been appointed to prepare a survey plan of the land in
dispute. Judge Pajares says that when he realized it was for the surveyor he threw the envelope
back to Cabrera telling him, 'Bakit mo sa akin 'yan ibibigay? Ikaw ang magbigay niyan kay
Surveyor Palaypayon.' (Why will you give it to me? You be the one to give it to Surveyor
Palaypayon.') According to the judge, the envelope fen on the open pages of his diary and that is
where the NBI agents recovered it. Parenthetically, the surveyor's fee was P2,000.00, and would
have been defrayed equally by Cabrera and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-751, with each
party giving a down payment of P500.00.
On the other hand, the complainant claims that Judge Pajares took the envelope containing the
money and placed it between the pages of the diary as shown in the photographs. Exhs. C-2 and
B-2, taken by NBI photographer Diosdado Belen shortly after the NBI agents got inside the
chamber.
Findings
There is reason to believe that the respondent judge accepted the money and that he knew it was
being given to him by reason of his office.
First. The evidence shows that after receiving the envelope with the money, the respondent judge
did not really try to return it to Cabrera, as he claims he did, but that instead he placed it between
the pages of his diary. This is the testimony of NBI Agent Angelica V. Somera. In her affidavit,
Somera stated:
5. That after receiving the envelope containing the marked money, Judge
PAJARES immediately placed or inserted the same between the pages of a brown
covered book known as 'BUSINESS DAILY 85' which was on top of his table.
Somera's affidavit (Exh. A), executed on January 22, 1985, shortly after the entrapment of the
respondent, was presented as her testimony in chief. In addition, during the investigation of this
case, she testified and identified the photographs, marked Exhibits C, C-1, B, and B-1, as those
taken during the entrapment of the respondent judge. The photos show the diary with the
envelope containing the money placed between its pages. Somera Identified the hand shown in
the photograph, marked Exhibit B-1, as that of NBI Agent Artemio Sacaguing in the attention of
seizing the diary. (Transcript, pp. 92-98, Aug. 12, 1985)
For his part, Sacaguing confirmed that the hand in the photograph (Exh. B-1) was his and that he
was in the act of picking the diary from the table of Judge Pajares in the photo in question. (Id.,
pp. 50-51). He testified that, as soon as he and his companions got inside the judge's chamber,
Manuel Tobias, the chief agent of the NBI sub-office in Legaspi, asked Somera where the
envelope was and, upon being told where it was, ordered him to seize the diary. (Transcript, pp.
51-54, Aug. 12, 1985)
The respondent judge denies this. He said he took the envelope being handed to him
'instinctively' ' but realizing it contained money which was intended for the surveyor, he
immediately threw it back to Cabrera. According to Judge Pajares, the envelope fell on the open

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 81

pages of his diary * where it was found by the 'balding agent' (Manuel Tobias), who took the
diary with the envelope inside, and then put it under his arm. Later, Judge Pajares says, the NBI
agent placed the diary on his table and made it appear as though it had always been there, with
the envelope containing the money placed between its pages. (Transcript, pp. 175-177, Oct. 22,
1985)
Melquiades Volante, the branch clerk of court of the respondent judge, signed an affidavit on
January 29, 1985, corroborating the respondent's claim that the respondent tried to return the
envelope containing money to the complainant Enrico Cabrera. However, the following day,
January 30, Volante executed another affidavit (Exh. V) repudiating the earlier one. He said he
was pressured into signing the first affidavit by the respondent and that the fact is that he left the
chamber of the respondent judge as soon as he had shown Cabrera and Somera in and did not see
the incident under investigation. Volante denied that he swore to the first affidavit in the presence
of Fiscal Salvador Cajot.
No weight may, therefore, be given to the first affidavit of Volante. To be sure, the respondent's
claim is also confirmed by the janitor Constancio A. Elquiero. This witness was inside the
chamber when the NBI staged its operation. (See Elquiero's affidavit, dated January 29, 1985,
marked Exh. 10-A) However, the testimonies of the NBI agents (Somera, Tobias and Sacaguing),
as above summarized, deserve greater credence than Elquiero's testimony. These witnesses are
law enforcement agents who must be presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their
functions. In addition, there are circumstances which militate against the claim of the respondent
judge. First, the photographs (Exhs. B, B-1, C and C-1), which show how the diary, with the
envelope in it, was found by the NBI agents, were taken within seconds of the arrival of the
agents inside the judge's chamber. (Transcript, pp. 102-103, Aug. 12, 1985). In fact the
respondent complained that as the NBI agents barged into his office, pictures were taken.
(Transcript, pp. 72-73, Oct. 22, 1985). This circumstance rules out the possibility that any of the
NBI agents might have seized the diary and later placed the envelope between its pages. Indeed,
the photographs (Exhs. C, G and B) appear to be snapshots of the events as they happened, rather
than formal pictures.
Second, the plan to entrap the respondent appears to have been cleared with the Executive Judge,
Hon. Juan B. Llaguno, before whom the complainant swore to his statement (Exh. N) of January
16, 1985. It is not likely that Judge Llaguno would approve the 'frame-up' of a colleague. Nor is
it likely that NBI Regional Director Epimaco A. Velasco would authorize a 'frame-up'
considering that, according to Judge Pajares himself, Velasco is his 'close friend.' (Transcript, p.
196, Oct. 22, 1985)
During the investigation, an attempt was made to show that it was not possible for Sacaguing to
have found the envelope between the pages of the diary, because the envelope (Exh. D) was
folded in four parts so that if inserted thus, it would leave an opening of about two inches
between the pages of the diary. (Transcript, p. 36, Aug. 12, 1985) The argument seems to be that
if the envelope was no longer folded when found inside the diary, it must be because, when

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 82

Judge Pajares flung it at Cabrera, it spread out. The further argument is then made that it was in
this condition when an NBI agent took it and placed it between the pages of the diary.
Sacaguing, who seized the envelope, testified that he found it laid flat, not folded, between the
pages of the diary. (Id., pp. 54-55) While the evidence indicates that the envelope was folded into
four parts when Somera handed it to Cabrera (Id., p. 57; transcript, p. 125, Aug. 26, 1985), it is
probable that when it was handed to the respondent judge it was no longer so. The crease marks
are not pronounced, indicating that the envelope was folded only rightly, so that when Judge
Pajares received it, it probably spread out.
Second ** The respondent said he was outraged by the attempt to frame him up, and he
protested. (Transcript, pp. 174-175, Oct. 22, 1985) Yet the photographs taken on the occasion of
his arrest show him smiling. (See Exhs. B, G and H). Of course, he explained that he was smiling
in 'derision,' (Id., p. 175) and that by nature he is jolly (Id., p. 183). A smile, however, is not a
normal reaction to express outrage.
Third ... The respondent's claim that he thought the money was the complainant's share of the
surveyor's fees is inconsistent with his (the respondent's) admission that the complainant had told
him of his decision not to settle the case. The respondent judge himself said that he had
appointed Engineer Palaypayon to prepare a survey plan for the purpose of segregating the four
hectares which Cabrera would cede to his brothers and sisters in the event of a settlement, As
Cabrera had changed his mind and in fact had filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
respondent judge's order, there was no reason for the respondent judge to believe that the money
was Cabrera's share of the surveyor's fees. The respondent's claim that a survey plan was anyway
needed for the 'final disposition of the case' has no basis, because what the plaintiffs are seeking
is the annulment of the sale of lands to Cabrera on the theory that the sale was simulated.
Conclusion
The distinction is commonly drawn between instigation and entrapment. In the former, where
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an
offense which he otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused
cannot be held liable But, in entrapment, where the criminal intent or design to commit the
offense charged originates in the mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the commission of the crime, the accused cannot justify his conduct. (See People v.
Vinzol (CA) 47 O.G. 294; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 [1958]). As has been said,
instigation is a 'trap for unwary innocent,' while entrapment is a 'trap for the unwary criminal.
(Sherman v. United States, supra, at 372)
In the case at bar, there is no claim that the complainant and the NBI agents instigated the
commission of the crime by the respondent. Rather, the respondent's claim is that he was the
victim of a 'frame-up', 9 claim that, as already shown, is without basis. Hence, it is unnecessary
to determine whether the indirect bribery was instigated by the law enforcement agents. What
took place on January 22, 1985 was an entrapment.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 83

While there is evidence of indirect bribery, however, there is none to support the other charge of
acts unbecoming of a judge.
Investigating Justice Mendoza's above statement and analysis of the evidence and a review of the records fully
support the finding that "respondent Judge accepted the money and that he knew it was being given to him by
reason of his office." The Court has time and again stressed that members of the judiciary should display not
only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and
suspicion. (Quiz vs. Castano 107 SCRA 196; Montemayor vs. Collado, 107 SCRA 258) The Court had likewise
stressed in De la Paz vs. Inutan (64 SCRA 540) that "the judge is the visible representation of the law and, more
importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. They see in him an
intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests, ... . Thus, for the judge to return that regard, he must
be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful
to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law." (See also Fonacier-Abano vs. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538).
The Court approves the investigator's recommendation in his report that respondent Judge be acquitted for lack
of evidence of the second charge of having committed acts unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.
But the Court is constrained to disapprove his recommendation as to the first charge of indirect bribery which is
fully supported by the evidence that respondent Judge "be suspended from office for 2 years and 4 months,
taking into consideration the penalty prescribed in art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code." The penalty of 2 years
and 4 months imprisonment provided for the criminal offense of indirect bribery may not be equated with the
penalty of separation from the judicial service which is the proper applicable administrative penalty by virtue of
respondent Judge's serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary and the public interest.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to return the ten P100.00 bills (Exhibits D-1 to D-10) to
the complainant Atty. Enrico M. Cabrera. This decision is immediately executory.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 84

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City.
The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in
Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp.
Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as
members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and
the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan
District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit
set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills [3]-- as money for the buy-bust
operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with
his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. [4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the
target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying
one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from
his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of
the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his
associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's
flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
"Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks
of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." [8] The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked
bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun"
is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana
leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the
PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio
Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of
his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There
were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied
knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 85

their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered
him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he
gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3
Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about
three minutes.Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and
they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he
was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her
house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men
say that they found a carton box.Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open
and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car.
They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood
store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was
at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day,
accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her
husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed
them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson,
and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she
and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a
man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and
took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.They asked her about a box on top
of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green
straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box
and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge
against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial
court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to
death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the
present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4
of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the
penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act
No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

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'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or
mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun"
and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for
destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the
New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional
Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEURBUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS
FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF
THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH
DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE
POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM
HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE
SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]

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The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine
that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly
liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the
formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law.[19] It also took off from a
spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons
into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution against him. [21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by
Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept:
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission
by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer." [23] It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or
the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the
government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative
activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a
criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no
conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished
the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the
crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must
be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature
of a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing
sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts
to the government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a
majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to
determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to
commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
[32]
All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness
in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. [33] The
predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 88

unwary criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive
inducement.[36] Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. [37] This test was first authoritatively laid
down in the case ofGrossman v. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of
the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. [39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements
used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the
crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. [40] The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit the offense; [41] for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person
would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct,
such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,[43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or
pleas of desperate illness, are not. [44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an
entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has
been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning
law enforcement improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the
crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of
the officer's conduct would be on a normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of
judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what
his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless
confronted with inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely
the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police,
may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was
proper.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd
and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment.Some states in the United States
now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests. [51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida Supreme Court
declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then
the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. [53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New
Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may
successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for
which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. [55] The hybrid approaches
combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking
opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime
in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard

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Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We
accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look
for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. [57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned
as "most reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives
after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police
officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that
there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony,
there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. [60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61] we
convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We
stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to
Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to
have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug
and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng [63] we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act
from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy
solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense
is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the
influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a
thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed
independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner
or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the
larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of
liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the
contrary."[65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,
[66]
the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The
instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan. [67] In People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals
further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.
Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary
to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence.Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the
accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. [72] To determine whether there

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is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the
predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v.
Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by
examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's
membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous
convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang
strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke
marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining
his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in
buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like
anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.[78] They are not the
traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in
se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior
directed, not against particular individuals, but against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against
society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. [81] These offenses
are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for
any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita,to be willing to assist in
the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of
these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own
officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an
undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system
breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of
drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant
himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves,
the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help
maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with
unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers'
motivations are legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to
their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases [84] where we
observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons,
particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative
ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding
drug cases.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of
the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful
search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest,
illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common
motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 91

sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of
illegal means."[88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the
individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the
criminal law through lawless enforcement. [90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of
abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. [92] The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust"
money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the
police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense
in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as
advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later
returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility
was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony was
corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the
confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police.[93] It is well-settled that except
when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, [94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to
testify falsely against the appellant,[95] or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed
the entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative
of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where
the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source
of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution
proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the
marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was
actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom
agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 92

together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana
when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10)
bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of
marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with
eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box showed
to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was
handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite
reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought
it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it
to the PCCL, your Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as
Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 93

Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95, also
Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there are
other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a
piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our
Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the
corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were
marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one
hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains
credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar
did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buybust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana
from the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

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(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation,
the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the
box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [105] The rule is, however, not absolute.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; [107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
[108]
(3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;[110] (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed,
however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct
testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money
which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

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Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house,
she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily
chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you
were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you your role
in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.

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Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the amount
of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved
the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth.Is that what you are
trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." [115] The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [116] A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not
point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her
co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, [119] with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. [121] The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement

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officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. [127] In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 98

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo
galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by
Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in
possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua already
retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 99

ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or
a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw
that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the
Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the
prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
[130]
x x x."
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant
Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria
named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view
of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton
box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana
because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination, however, he admitted that
he merelypresumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust
marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as
to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.
[133]
PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items
other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant

C R I M 1 A R T . 1 2 . . . P a g e | 100

Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the
box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
was in violation of the law and the Constitution. [135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana [137] was found in the house of accusedappellant Gaddao does not justify a finding thatshe herself is guilty of the crime charged.[138] Apropos is our
ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself."[140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a
prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging fromP500,000.00 to P10
million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale
took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus
delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration
of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams
of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer.The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetuamust be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a
Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.