YOUTH GANGS AND UNIONS:

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES

Lorine A. Hughes and James F. Short, Jr.

This paper revisits James Jacobs' interest in prison gangs. We first address crimi-
nologists' neglect of labor corruption, then discuss the street and prison gangs with
which Jacobs was concerned and societal responses to them. Subsequent trends in
street gangs and efforts to control them are reviewed and compared to recent orga-
nized crime control efforts. Special attention is given to civil gang injunctions (CGIs),
the most popular civil remedy for street gangs, and special problems they create for
prison gang members who return to their communities. Research and policy in this
area require that the great variety among communities as well as street and prison
gangs be recognized.

Introduction

Before he became interested in union corruption and racketeering, James Jacobs'

historical and sociological study, Statesville, was a landmark examination of insti-
tutional and social change as seen through the evolution of a maximum security
prison in Illinois. Among the major factors influencing the prison was a large in-
flux of street gang members during the late 1960s and early 1970s (Jacobs, 1974,
1977).' Although Jacobs' work changed conventional views of this population and
of the role of street gangs in prisons, the challenge to traditional understandings
about what would happen when those prisoners returned to their communities was
largely unrecognized (Fleisher and Decker, 2001a, 2001b). Today, after decades of
unprecedented growth in prison populations, community re-entry of incarcerated
felons is again a hot topic, and gangs are an important but largely unexplored part
ofthe problem.
Mobsters, Unions, and Feds provides an opportunity to revisit Jacobs' interest
in gangs in light of subsequent developments, and to assess the feasibility and
possible effectiveness ofthe types of legal remedies he recommends for labor union
corruption and racketeering as they might apply to street gangs. Here, again, Jacobs
challenges conventional wisdom and practice, for while the criminal law has been
the traditional recourse of law enforcement for both street gang members and cor-
rupt union officials and racketeers, in the latter case his analysis leads him to the

43
44 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

conclusion that, in combination with appropriate criminal prosecutions, civil trust-

eeships have been the most effective of proposed remedies. This paper briefly dis-
cusses the gangs with which Jacobs was concerned, exploring the reasons behind
their failure to achieve the type of sophistication, success, and power of Cosa Nostra.
We then compare the war on organized crime to recent gang-control efforts, in-
cluding civil alternatives to the traditional sole reliance on criminal sanctions of
street gang members, giving special attention to civil gang injunctions (CGIs), the
civil remedy most often employed by local jurisdictions. We conclude with obser-
vations concerning special and growing problems posed by gang member re-entry
to society following incarceration.

Criminologists, Union Corruption/Racketeering, Street and Prison Gangs

Early in Mobsters, Unions, and Feds, Jacobs notes that "Sutherland and Cressey's
best-selling general criminology text does not even mention labor corruption or
labor racketeering" (Jacobs, 2006: xii). A later edition of that classic text (co-
authored by David Luckenbill) notes only that organized crime operations have
infiltrated some unions and businesses, observing that officials may conspire "with
a businessperson or labor leader to cheat the public" (Sutherland, Cressey, and
Luckenbill, 1992: 229). More recent texts do little better.^
Donald Cressey's neglect of this issue is puzzling in light of the critical role he
played as a consultant to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, his authorship of "The functions and structure of crimi-
nal syndicates" (Cressey, 1967), and his influence on legislation that resulted in
enactment of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1979
(RICO). Cressey appears later to have repudiated RICO perhaps because he felt it
would be more subject to abuse than traditional criminal and civil remedies. Some
broad statutes have in fact been struck down on constitutional grounds. Cressey
might also have been troubled by the focus of RICO on individual responsibility
rather than organizations as legal actors. Discussing "Symbiotic Relationships be-
tween Criminals and Others," Cressey (with David Ward, 1969) noted that many
criminal behaviors and behavioral characteristics "might well be the properties of
organizations, subcultures, and groups—not of individuals . . ." (p. 915). Argu-
ments and documentation in Theft of a Nation (Cressey, 1969) and Criminal Orga-
nization (Cressey, 1972) also take the position that entities such as criminal
organizations were more than the sum of participating individuals.
Jacobs' early work on street gangs in prison clearly indicated that the gangs
were more than the sum of their individual members: "in Illinois prisons the in-
mate organization is best understood as an extension of an identical organization
imported from the streets of Chicago"' (1974: 397); and, discussing the adjust-
ments required of new inmates, he states: "To the extent that adjustment needs to
be made to the contingencies of incarceration, the adjustment is a group rather than
an individual phenomenon" (p. 408).
Youth Gangs and Unions 45

Once established in the prison, Chicago's major street gangs recruited actively
among unaffiliated inmates. By virtue of superior numbers and increasing organi-
zational sophistication and political consciousness, minority gangs soon came to
dominate inmate social organization."* They dominated prison staff, as well. After
several months of observing and interviewing inmates and prison staff, Jacobs con-
cluded that the gangs had been able "to force their definition of the situation onto
the lower levels of the staff" (p. 407). Importantly, he later noted that the gangs
"brought with them a sense that they -WQve political prisoners, together with high
expectations about the kinds of deference they could demand of institutional au-
thorities" (Jacobs 1977: 146; emphasis added to original).
Political alliances of street gangs are not new, as muckraking journalists and
Chicago School sociologists noted many years ago (Landesco, 1929; Riis, 1890,
1902; Steffens, 1931; Thrasher, 1927/1963). Although early accounts emphasized
the mutual interests and usefulness of gangs to politicians and political machines,
studies conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s reported little political conscious-
ness or interest in politics among street gang members in Chicago (Short, 1976;
Short and Mo land, 1976). Change occurred with the emergence of the supergangs,
the civil rights movement. President Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty," and sig-
nificant support from private foundations and institutions and governmental agen-
cies. Interpretation of these changes vary greatly, however, depending upon the
perspective of the interpreter (Dawley, 1979; Fry, 1969,1973; Miller, 1974; Skolnick,
1969; Sherman, 1970; Short, 1976; United States Senate, 1968).
What is not in dispute is that the expansion of three black gangs—the Blackstone
Rangers (later the Black P. Stone Nation), the Devil's Disciples (also referred to as
the Black Gangster Disciple Nation), and the Vice Lords, who renamed themselves
the Conservative Vice Lords—was accompanied by their stated intentions to "go
conservative," that is, become legitimate.^ These goals received material and moral
support from a variety of public and private institutions, including grants from
foundations, the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), and the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). HEW and private
foundations provided support for Youth Organization United, which was organized
to promote and coordinate self-help programs among minority youth in several
cities. An OEO grant of nearly a million dollars funded the Youth Manpower Project
in Chicago, designed ostensibly to provide academic skills to ghetto youth and to
secure jobs for them in private industry (Jacobs, 1977; Short, 1976).
The theory on which these and other programs were developed was that street
gangs, indigenous to their communities and possessing at least minimal leadership
and organizational structure, had the potential to lift their members—and perhaps
other young people—out of poverty and crime by means of education and job
training and placement. Projects such as Youth Manpower clearly failed, however,
as did many of the fledgling businesses and community initiatives launched by the
gangs. Defenders of the projects attributed failure to resistance by police and local
authorities (Fry, 1973) or to the lack of expertise required of such enterprises
46 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

(Dawley, 1979; Short, 1976). Critics charged that the projects were riddled with
fraud and that the gangs used government resources as a front to their continuing
criminal activities. The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Committee on Government Operations (named the McClellan committee, after
its chairman. Senator John McClellan) documented massive fraud in the Man-
power project and the tortured path by which the grant from the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity was secured (United States Senate, 1968).'' Running throughout
the committee hearing documents are the political struggles between The Woodlawn
Organization (TWO, which received the grant). Reverend Fry (minister ofthe church
in which many gang meetings occurred), and Chicago officialdom, including the
Police Department and the Mayor's office. Although the committee's findings were
tainted by charges of committee bias and harassment by police and other authori-
ties (Skolnick, 1969),'' the troubles it highlighted were followed shortly after, in
1969, by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's "war on gangs" (gangresearch.net).*
Controversy continues concerning both the programs and official responses to them,
including charges that some prominent gang leaders were "framed" by officials.
The extent of political consciousness and activity among gangs, past and present,
is a matter of much conjecture and little concrete information. During the period
immediately preceding Jacobs' prison research—the late 1960s—Chicago street
gangs grew rapidly and changed dramatically, as race-related rioting occurred in
the city and in many other U.S. cities. The behavior of street gangs during these
riots provided ammunition for both sides of arguments concerning the performance
and motivations of gang members. When the Blackstone Rangers allegedly helped
"cool" Chicago's south side following the death of Martin Luther King, supporters
ofthe gangs and their critics reacted. Reverend Fry averred, with approval, that this
was the gangs' "way of saying 'You have to reckon with us because, if we cannot
stop one (a riot), well, you know the alternative.' This was a naked display of power"
(quoted in Skolnick 1969:168). The Violence Commission Report (Skolnick, 1969)
considered gang behavior, along with student militancy (black and white) and Black
Panther demands for political and cultural autonomy, as reflective of the black
liberation movement. Meanwhile, in order to document gang misbehavior and re-
fute the rationale of the program and the rationalizations of local supporters, the
McClellan committee produced testimony ofa former member ofthe Blackstone
Rangers, a reported interview ofthe president ofthe Rangers (from the Cook County
Jail), and a psychologist who had worked briefly with the OEO program. Although
not addressing the role of gangs specifically, the Chicago Tribune chimed in by
condemning all black student protest as "designed to keep the schools in convul-
sion" and as a tool "to generate a revolutionary climate" (Skolnick, 1969: 374).
Perhaps the most balanced appraisal of what happened during the late 1960s was
provided by Walter Miller, who distinguished between the "militant model" (e.g.,
the Black Panthers) and a "social betterment model" of politicization exemplified
by the Blackstone Rangers, the Devils Disciples, and the Vice Lords (Miller, 1974:
232). Miller argued that:
Youth Gangs and Unions 47

the predicted transformation of American youth gangs never occurred. Even during the
peak period of politieization, the actual proportion of youth gangs involved was small,
with the great majority of gang youth remaining essentially unaffected by political/
social activism. Even among those most affected, there is little evidence that activism
replaced illegal and/or violent pursuits; rather, traditional activities such as theft, as-
sault, extortion, and various "hustles" were carried on in conjunction with, and fre-
quently as an intrinsic part of, political and social reform undertakings (pp. 232-233,
emphasis in original).

The prospect of politically militant gangs, or of gangs aggressively pursuing

social betterment, clearly threatened entrenched political power outside of, as well
as within, the prison. However, the extent to which members of street gangs who
were not incarcerated shared the beliefs, expectations, and militancy of the gang
leaders and members observed by Jacobs in the prison is unclear—or, if they did,
how long such commitment lasted. While Miller (1974,1976) believed it was short-
lived, John Hagedorn and others argue that the social upheavals ofthe 1960s were
followed by even more massive changes that "created fertile conditions for the
growth of gangs" and in some cases their institutionalization as "permanent social
actors in communities, cities, and nations...." (Hagedorn, 2005: 154; see also
Hagedorn 2006).'
When incarcerated militant gang members returned to their communities, some
became politically involved. Political activism of gangs peaked during the 1980s
and 1990s, when the Black Gangster Disciple Nation (BGDN, with the "Gangster
Disciple" changed to "Growth and Development"), under the leadership of Larry
Hoover, launched and actively participated in 21st Century Voices of Total Em-
powerment (VOTE), which promoted voter-registration and other types of political
activism and community betterment programs.'" Except for the most extreme cases,
however, political activism by street gang members has occurred within the politi-
cal system rather than in opposition to it." Perhaps the most well-known contem-
porary example of political transformation among street gangs involved the
Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN) in New York. Between 1995
and 1999, hundreds of Latin Kings and Queens rallied around a charismatic leader
emerging out of prison, Antonio Fernandez (a.k.a. King Tone), anti-establishment
sentiments, self-betterment, and a newfound sense of ethnic identity and righteous-
ness (Brotherton and Barrios, 2004). Ultimately, however, the ALKQN was unable
to sustain itself as a sociopolitical movement. As happened to its predecessors in
Chicago, the Nation finally succumbed to mounting external pressures, inadequate
community support, and internal contradictions. Since then, no street gang has
come close to achieving the same level of politicization.

Contemporary Street Gangs

Contemporary street gangs vary in many ways and are unlikely to respond in the
same way to control-oriented strategies and programs. Too often, gangs are conflated
48 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

with organized crime groups and subjected to criminal sanctions without regard to
such variation. Although some gangs are akin to Cosa Nostra and other criminal
organizations in that they have long histories, are primarily comprised of "others,"
and engage in crime and violence, few resemble the labor racketeers described by
Jacobs and targeted by civil RICO trusteeships. While the latter were politically
well-connected and focused primarily on manipulating legitimate businesses and
public trust in order to exact large monetary profits, today's street gangs are mainly
about belonging, identity, and status (Klein, 1995).'^
"Criminal organizations such as the Gangster Disciples, Crips, Bloods, MS-13,
and Latin Kings are dangerous entities. But these groups are an anomaly in the
gang world; they represent the worst of what gangs can become, not what most
gangs are" (Papachristos, 2005: 55). Most modern-day gangs, like their counter-
parts in the 1960s and 1970s, appear to have little access to the political and eco-
nomic power structure. Gangs typically develop in marginalized contexts, and most
gang members participate in small-time and relatively unorganized street hustles.
Few contemporary gangs attempt to penetrate conventional businesses or other-
wise present a legitimate front; even fewer have succeeded.
Street gangs typically are not tightly knit groups of criminals, but like organized
crime they constitute a significant social problem. Large and important variations
exist among gangs, however, and what works to control criminal organizations
may not work for the majority of street gangs, and vice versa. "Treating all gang
members like mafia kingpins or terrorist masterminds is overestimating people
who, more often than not, are petty delinquents" (Papachristos, 2005: 55). Although
street gangs that most closely resemble organized criminal groups present special
law enforcement and community problems, it would be unwise and perhaps coun-
terproductive to focus primarily on those few.

Community and Law Enforcement Strategies of Gang Control

Wyrick and Howell (2004) note that although a very large number of gang con-
trol programs and strategies have been mounted, continuing gang problems make it
clear that neither easy nor quick solutions exist. They advocate a "comprehensive
community-wide approach" involving long-term prevention, intervention, and sup-
pression efforts, combined with "sound program documentation and evaluation"
(p. 25). Malcolm Klein and Cheryl Maxson's (2006) masterly review of nearly 60
of the best-documented programs (some ongoing, others no longer operating) re-
ports that few if any of these have been rigorously evaluated. Moreover, suppres-
sion of existing gangs or preventing young people from joining gangs were primary
goals of most programs, with intervention occurring in only about one-third of
those examined. The majority of the programs have focused on changing individu-
als rather than groups (only 11 in the latter category); none dealt with gang struc-
tures, and only six with group processes. An even dozen addressed community
contexts, of which only three were concerned with changing groups.
Youth Gangs and Unions 49

Klein's thoughtful assessment of approaches to handling gang problems, put

forth more than a decade ago, remains salient. While conceding that some pro-
grams have achieved temporary reductions in gang membership and prevented some
young people from joining gangs, he concluded that "(e)ven if the whole reservoir
of potential gangs were exhausted in the next years, other group formations . . .
provide a new potential supply for the proliferation of gangs" (Klein, 1995: 212).
Klein's rationale, reflecting consensus among those who have studied gangs most
carefully, was—and remains—that gangs reflect universal needs among young
people for status, identity, and companionship. When legitimate means of achiev-
ing these are not found in the community, the seeds for troublesome youth groups
are sown. Indeed, even when legitimate avenues for the expression of such needs
are available, unsupervised youth groups form as a normal part of growing up. It is
the manner in which communities react to them that is most critical to how these
young people choose their identities and how they organize and establish status
criteria. The fact that large numbers of gang members have been convicted of crimes,
as is now the case, poses special problems for law enforcement and for communities.
Despite the relative neglect of community contexts, Klein observed that gang
control programs appear to have cycled through from an early emphasis on com-
munity-level programming to prevention, treatment, and then suppression, and back
again to focus on communities (Klein, 1995: 136-137, 152 ff). To the extent that
this is the case, communities—residents, institutions, businesses, and so on—bear
special responsibilities for gang and crime control. Among law enforcement and
others steeped in the tradition of suppression, civil remedies are perhaps the clearest
realization of the importance of the community in addressing the gang problem.

Criminal vs. Civil Remedies as Applied to Street Gangs

The suppression model of gang control reached its zenith in the 1980s, when
allegations of a gang-crack nexus coincided with a growing tendency among fed-
eral and local law enforcement agencies to blur the distinction between organized
crime and youth street gangs (Klein, 1995). At about the same time that state legis-
latures throughout the country began enacting anti-gang laws modeled after crimi-
nal RICO statutes,'^ "several early civil remedy cases captured the attention of the
public and law enforcement community, and catapulted the use of civil remedies
from relative obscurity to mainstream crime prevention" (Mazerolle and Roehl,
1998: 3-4). Recognizing that criminal sanctions had failed to stop the advance of
gangs and gang crime, a number of jurisdictions determined to supplement use of
tKe" criminaf law with civil remedies. Rather than triisteesffips^ civil gang injuric-
tions (CGIs) have been the favored civil alternative.'''
Pioneered in California during the early 1980s, CGIs are an increasingly popu-
lar, albeit controversial, gang control strategy. CGIs typically involve a legal suit
being brought by police and prosecutors against a gang that is alleged to pose a
nuisance to the local community, as evidenced by criminal records and "declara-
50 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

tions" gathered from police and community residents (Maxson, Hennigan, and
Sloane, 2003). "The suit asks that named members (and usually the rest of the
gang) be prohibited, within a specified geographic area, from a range of activities,"
both legal and illegal (Maxson, 2004: 377). If legal criteria are met, the presiding
civil court judge issues a preliminary injunction, which becomes permanent if the
defendants fail to file a response to the lawsuit within the specified time period or
do not prevail in civil court proceedings.'^ Gang members who then violate the
conditions of the injunction may be incarcerated and/or fined. In some cases, the
prosecuting attorney also pursues "probation conditions" that were not specified
in the CGI. These include "search and seizure" provisions, prohibition of associa-
tion with other gang members, and even "exclusion" from neighborhoods (L.A.
City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section, 1995: 327).
In what may be the latest trend in the "war" against gangs, CGIs are being imple-
mented or sought in a growing number ofjurisdictions in California and elsewhere
in the country (Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2003). Much of their appeal stems
from the shift of proceedings from criminal to civil courts, where legal safeguards
favoring defendants are less burdensome (Geis, 2002). Criminal justice agents and
others in the field also believe that the injunctions provide them with a powerful
new tool against enjoined gangs (and perhaps other gangs in the area), signifi-
cantly reducing their criminal activities and the fear and aggravation they inspire
among law-abiding community residents.'*
As with civil remedies to organized crime, CGIs are intended to break up offen-
sive groups and prevent crime by eliminating the type of activity that typically
"precedes and furthers" such behavior (L.A. City Attorney Gang Prosecution Sec-
tion, 1995: 326). The stated goals and arguments of CGI supporters reflect Wilson
and Kelling's "Broken Windows" theory and its emphasis on problem-oriented
policing, quality of life concerns, and "prevalent and low-key troubles" rather than
serious crimes (Stewart, 1998:2252). Beyond these, however, the hope is expressed
that CGIs may also achieve their effects through a process of deterrence, both
general and specific, and by promoting collective efficacy in the community, re-
ducing criminal opportunities, and/or disrupting criminogenic group processes
(Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2005; Mazerolle and Roehl, 1998), including
weakening gang identity and decreasing "levels of participation in gang-related
behavior, especially among noncore members" (Maxson et al., 2005: 582).
Although civil gang injunctions have been heralded by some media and local
authorities as an "unqualified success," they remain controversial (see Boga, 1994;
Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane, 2003; Whitbread and Mazza, 1999). Because gang
members may be prosecuted for otherwise legal behaviors—loitering, carrying
pagers, flashing gang signs, wearing gang clothing, associating with other gang
members—and are not granted the same due process protections as in criminal
prosecutions, critics contend that the injunctions violate fundamental civil rights
and thus are unconstitutional. Except for cases involving vague or overly broad
statutes,''' however, courts consistently have indicated a willingness to weaken the
Youth Gangs and Unions 51

civil liberties of a few in favor of enhanced public safety and reclaiming public
spaces. Concerns over the disproportionate impact of CGIs on black and Hispanic
youth have likewise failed to create substantial legal waves; and they are unlikely
to present significant challenges in the future provided they effectively counter the
public nuisance posed by gangs and are widely supported by community residents,
most of whom are themselves people of color (see Stewart, 1998).
Unfortunately, the issuance of CGIs has far outpaced systematic program evalu-
ation, and the few existing studies have produced conflicting results. Two of the
three studies that compared pre—and post-CGI crime rates reported discouraging
findings, with substantial increases in crime following the issuance of an injunc-
tion (Maxson and Allen, 1997; American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of South-
ern California, 1997). However, the Inglewood injunction studied by Maxson and
Allen "was not enforced because of the department's failure to provide resources
when federal funds were depleted," and the ACLU study of the San Fernando Val-
ley injunction has been challenged on methodological grounds (Maxson, Hennigan,
and Sloane, 2003: 256). The third study, conducted in Los Angeles County, re-
ported a five to ten percent reduction in violent crimes—but not property crimes—
across 14 injunctions sites (Grogger, 2002). There was no evidence of displacement
to neighborhoods outside the targeted areas. Only one study (Maxson, Hennigan,
and Sloane, 2005) has examined the community impact of CGIs. Survey responses
from residents in five San Bernardino neighborhoods revealed "positive evidence
of short-term effects in the disordered, primary injunction area [Upper Flats], in-
cluding less gang presence, fewer reports of gang intimidation, and less fear of
confrontation with gang members" (Maxson et al., 2005: 578). Yet, few intermedi-
ate or long-term effects were observed. There was also evidence of increased gang
activity and heightened concern with gangs in the less disordered, secondary in-
junction area.
Given the shortage of rigorous program evaluation, definitive conclusions about
the efficacy of CGIs and community support for them are not possible. However,
Jacobs' review of civil RICO suits suggests that the effects of CGIs are probably
more variable than is suggested by the volumes of anecdotal evidence employed in
their defense. When applied to unions corrupted by organized crime, civil rem-
edies produced disparate results, with success largely dependent on a fortunate
"confluence of factors, some well planned and executed, others merely fortuitous"
(Jacobs: 182). CGIs can be expected to have equally diverse effects in the gang
world, with its even greater variability in organizational structures and patterns of
behavior. Although flexibility is one of the primary strengths of civil remedies, as
Jacobs notes (see also Maxson, Hennigan, and Sloane 2003), CGIs are not a silver
bullet, to be put into action and left to finish the job on their own. As is the case of
civil RICO trusteeships, "success is very hard to achieve" (Jacobs, p. 252).

Effective trusteeships need immense pre-planning; comprehensive analysis of the spe-

cific labor racketeering problem; careful attention to the civil RICO complaint and
52 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

settlement; proper empowerment and financing of the trusteeship; shrewd choice of a

trustee; a well-thought-through program of reform; an evaluation strategy and patience.

The demands of community-based gang problems are no less daunting. In addi-

tion to long-term investment of time, personnel, and resources, intimate knowl-
edge of communities as well as enjoined gangs and communities is necessary, and
success is by no means assured. It is clear, as well, that promotion of collective
efficacy in communities requires the active participation of local residents (see
Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbasch, and Earls, 1997).
Lip-service is often paid to "community mobilization" and "restoration of critical
municipal services which are essential for improving the quality of life for resi-
dents of the neighborhood" (L.A. City Attorney Gang Prosecution Section, 1995:
329), but there is little evidence of its achievement following the issuance of CGIs.
Jacobs observes that RICO trusteeships attempt to democratize the unions and the
contexts in which organized crime flourishes. In contrast, CGIs tend not to be em-
bedded within a larger program of neighborhood reform. Like most anti-gang strat-
egies, the perception underlying CGIs is that gangs are the cause, rather than a
symptom, of poor neighborhood health, and their elimination will be curative.
Approaches that address the underlying conditions that give rise to gangs and gang
banging clearly involve more than superficial signs of neighborhood disorder and
disrepair. CGIs aimed primarily at fixing "broken windows" are little different
from previous gang suppression efforts that have failed repeatedly (but see Maxson,
Hennigan, and Sloane, 2003).

Prisoner Re-Entry, Communities, and CGIs: Paradox or Opportunity?

Jacobs' study of Statesville Penitentiary was prescient of what was to come in

prisons and in the larger society as gangs proliferated in communities throughout
the land and came to dominate inmate organization in many prisons.'* For a variety
of reasons, however, neither prison gangs nor their members' homecoming experi-
ences have received much scholarly attention (Fong and Buentello, 1991). Mark
Fleisher and Scott Decker—both with extensive research and policy-related gang
experience—note that little, if any, prison gang data exist and that data concerning
what happens to former prison gang members when they return to their communi-
ties are rarer still (Fleisher and Decker, 2001a, b)."
David E. Olson and Brendan D. Dooley's (2006) critical review of studies of the
latter type is instructive, however. Olson and Dooley note that:

First, only juvenile offenders have been studied, and juveniles account for a relatively
small proportion of those arrested and are an incomplete representation of the gang
population in the United States. Second, probation is the most frequently imposed sen-
tence on convicted offenders in the United States, and this literature has not considered
the role of gang membership in probationer recidivism. Finally, prior research inconsis-
Youth Gangs and Unions 53

tently operationalizes recidivism, ranging from rearrest to reincarceration to self-re-

ported involvement in delinquent behavior (p. 248).

Olson and Dooley compared 3,364 adult probationers and 2,534 adult parolees
released from supervision or incarceration in the state of Illinois in November,
2000. Controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and criminal and substance
abuse histories, they found that gang members among probationers were more than
three times as likely to be arrested after two years than were non-gang probation-
ers. In contrast, parolee gang members were only 20% more likely to be rearrested
than their non-gang counterparts. Olson and Dooley note that probationers consti-
tute a much more heterogeneous population than parolees, especially in their criminal
and drug abuse histories, and that this may account for the large recidivism differ-
ence between the populations. Gang membership was less prevalent among proba-
tioners (6 percent) than among parolees (24 percent), thus providing law enforcement
with a more distinctive gang target population among probationers, especially in
urban areas where gangs tend to be concentrated. The study had no data on pos-
sible police targeting of gang members. Nevertheless, it is clear that gang member-
ship poses special problems for law enforcement and for crime control.
A major weakness of studies on what happens to gang members when they re-
turn home, including Olson and Dooley's, is their exclusive focus on recidivism.
The studies tell us little about why gang membership is associated with higher rates
of rearrest. Although police crackdowns surely are part of the answer, Fleisher and
Decker (2001a, 2001b) point to special problems associated with the integration of
gang members into the community following incarceration, including limited job
prospects, substance abuse problems, poor neighborhood conditions, and contin-
ued gang identification. More research is needed concerning how community cul-
tures and available economic and social niches vary among racial and ethnic
populations and how they affect the problems and integration of returning felons
(see, e.g., Finestone, 1967). In addition, more than "only a rudimentary knowledge
of the . . . interplay between street gangs and prison gangs" is required (Fleisher
and Decker, 2001b: 2). Some prison gangs more closely resemble criminal organi-
zations than the street gangs of their origin, but some of the most infamous con-
temporary street gangs trace their origins to an institutional setting. Although prison
gangs and their street counterparts often operate quite differently and have only
limited contact with one another (see, e.g., Brotherton and Barrios, 2004 for a
description of the New York City Latin Kings), the extent of communication be-
tween the two may be increasing and influencing both the nature of street gangs
and what happens to prison gang members upon their release. As Jacobs (2001: vi)
notes, "[t]he worst-case scenario is that prison gangs serve to strengthen gangs on
the street." As more street gang members are incarcerated, this may well happen.
Although CGIs may be intended to disrupt the flow of communication between
prison and street gangs, by sending more gang members to prison the effect may be
just the opposite. In addition, problems faced by released prisoners may be exacer-
54 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

bated when they are enjoined from associating with known gang members, some
of whom may be family members and the only readily available resource for hous-
ing, finding employment, and social support. Private association is also inherently
difficult to police effectively. To the extent that a CGI strategy is employed to aid in
the suppression of gang activities, community alternatives to association with gangs
also must be provided. Failure to do so may make it impossible for the returning
prison gang member to adjust to his (or her) life on the outside without turning to
negative street elements, thereby furthering the connection between gangs inside
and outside prison walls.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The limited success of governmental "wars" against organized crime, as well as

drugs, is likely to be replicated with respect to ongoing efforts to eradicate gangs.
Just as corrupted labor unions experienced widely differing impacts of civil RICO
trusteeships, the ubiquity and diversity of unsupervised youth group formation and
the persistence of forces associated with their criminal behavior do not lend them-
selves to blanket policies and solutions. In Mobsters, Unions, and Feds, Jacobs
builds a strong case for more careful fact-finding and better understanding of tar-
geted unions prior to the implementation of a customized program of control and
reform. We concur with regard to gangs.
Viewing gangs as simply another type of organized crime (or, more recently,
terrorist units) requiring "gang busting" (akin to "union busting") may be appro-
priate for the small subset of gangs that conform most closely to images popular-
ized by the media and some law enforcement officials. The problem with such an
approach, however, is that it neglects the vast majority of gangs and the wide diver-
sity among them. Rather than conflating street gangs with organized crime and
treating them all alike, the historical and contemporary contexts, as well as the
behavior, structures, leadership, and prison connections, of particular gangs must
be understood if gang control programs are to be effective. Although the crimino-
logical research literature on street gangs is vast and growing (see, e.g., Klein and
Maxson, 2006; Short and Hughes, 2006; Spergel, 1995), knowledge of these im-
portant issues has been limited by inadequate conceptualization and methodolo-
gies that characterize the study of gangs. Mobsters, Unions, and Feds exemplifies
the type of analysis needed to move gang, as well as union, research forward. Gang
research also requires comparative designs (Klein, 2006), sensitivity to issues of
causality (Katz and Jackson-Jacobs, 2004; Short and Hughes, 2006) in the
contextualist tradition associated with Frederic Thrasher and the Chicago School
(Hughes, 2006), as well as rigorous evaluation of intervention efforts across mul-
tiple sites and at different points in time. We are once again indebted to James
Jacobs.
Youth Gangs and Unions 55

Notes

1. Jacobs published other important research concerning problems in prisons and of prison life,
e.g., stratification and conflict among inmates (1976), race relations and prisoner subculture
(1979), prisoners' rights (1980), the guard's world and the implications of these and other de-
velopments (1983).
2. Another early text, published originally in 1943, discusses "racketeering" among both business
and labor organizations, observing that "If capital is the grandparent of the racket, labor is at
least its uncle" (Barnes and Teeters, 1945: 30). The treatment is more anecdotal than system-
atic, however, and focused primarily on violations of criminal laws.
3. The consensus among street gang researchers suggests that this statement overestimates the
organizational character and strength of street gangs. The prison gangs studied by Jacobs seem
clearly to have been better organized, and with greater control over their members, than were
the same gangs on the street (see Klein 1995; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965), a function largely of
the general level of control that is possible in such "total institutions."
4. Jacobs notes that "the percentage of black inmates increased from 47 percent in 1953 to 75
percent in 1974" (Jacobs, 1977: 160).
5. The gang world during this period was in fact more fluid than this comment suggests, with
many branches of these and other gangs in the mix. Most were focused primarily on defending
local turf. However, the goals and ambitions of the Stones, Lords, and Disciples also stirred
interest among other gangs which felt that they, too, deserved a part of the action. In 1967, the
Conservative Vice Lords were incorporated in the state of Illinois as a non-profit organization,
"claiming 8,000 members in 26 divisions" (Sherman, 1970: 29). Similar membership claims
were made on behalf of the Stones and the Disciples.
6. Among those whose assistance Senate committee acknowledged was Virgil Peterson, long-
time chairman of the Chicago Crime Commission. Peterson's report for the year 1968 is a
litany of street gang attacks on rivals and on community citizens (Peterson, 1969). Earlier, he,
too, had written a book about Chicago crime and politics, including substantial material on
labor corruption and racketeering (Peterson, 1952).
7. Following hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field, McClellan wrote a book about the committee's findings, vigorously de-
fending the role of Congressional investigating committees and discussing its findings
(McClellan, 1962). No such book followed hearing on the activities of street gangs, although
the hearings were equally sensational.
8. Chicago Gangs (gangresearch.net), a web cite developed by John Hagedorn, features news
stories, interviews, lectures, and other research on the history of gangs.
9. These changes include "worldwide urbanization," the retreat of the social welfare state, global
economic changes, and the "redivision of space in cities" (Hagedorn, 2005: 154). The result,
Hagedorn argues, is that "(g)angs and other groups of armed young men occupy the vacuum
created by the retreat of the social welfare policies of the state," and there is a "strengthening of
cultural (resistance) identities" among marginalized young people (including gang members)
and others (Ibid.). Hagedom's 2005 article is reprinted, with minor changes, in Short and Hughes
2006, which in addition to reviewing other relevant developments and literature attempts to
"move gang research forward" in this and other respects.
10. 21 st Century VOTE, formed as "a vehicle for gang political involvement firmly in the Chicago
tradition," ran an unsuccessful aldermanic campaign for "a former enforcer for the Gangster
Disciples" in 1994 (Donaldson, 2006).
11. The most notorious examples of former gang member opposition to the system are al Qaeda
terror suspect Jose Padilla and Jeff Fort, who perhaps was the most charismatic leader of the
Blackstone Rangers and was in Statesville when Jacobs conducted his study. After his release
from Statesville, Fort embraced Islam, formed a new organization (El Rukn), and was impli-
cated in planning for terrorist attacks within the United States. Padilla's and Fort's early street
gang membership had little if any relationship to these later activities (see Papachristos, 2005).
Their experiences with authorities as a result of their gang activities quite likely embittered
them, however.
56 Trends in Organized Crime/Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 2006

12. Fleisher's (2001; also 2006) study ofthe adult female Stones, Disciples, and Lords in North
Champaign, Illinois, found that although gang membership promoted bonding, friendships
easily crossed gang boundaries. Moreover, no gang member knew all of the members of her
gang. Regrettably, we do not have comparable research on male gang members.
13. The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act is one example of anti-gang
legislation modeled after RICO. It was developed in California and subsequently adopted by
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana (Johnson, Webster, and Connors, 1995; see also
Bjerregaard, 2003).
14. Given the typically fluid nature of gang organization, trusteeships would in any case have been
inappropriate.
15. Since most gang members lack sophistication in the ways of lawyers, and street gangs rarely
are organized in such a way as to respond to lawsuits, this very likely removes effective legal
protection of gang members targeted by CGIs.
16. See Mazerolle and Roehl (1998) for a discussion of the "rapid development and acceptance of
civil remedies for crime prevention and control" more generally (p. 3).
17. The Supreme Court has struck down statutes that are too vague to provide sufficient notice as
to what constitutes inappropriate behavior and/or are so broadly written as to provide police
with unlimited discretion (e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 1999) (Geis, 2002; Strosnider, 2002).
18. Mark Fleisher, a foremost student of contemporary prisons, warns against generalizing from
early prison gang studies because prisons now are more professionally governed, and the be-
havior of prison gangs is more effectively controlled than in the past. The more severe problem,
he argues, is to be found in large city jails, which are even more over-crowded than prisons, and
less effectively administered (personal communication).
19. Regrettably, the effects of gang membership are rarely, if ever, considered in general studies of
prisoner reentry (e.g.. Urban Institute, 2006).

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