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Title: On the Ethics of Naturalism
Author: William Ritchie Sorley
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Language: English
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Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1884

ON THE
ETHICS OF NATURALISM
BY
W. R. SORLEY, M.A.
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; AND EXAMINER IN
PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXV

_All Rights reserved_

PREFATORY NOTE.
The Deed of Foundation of the Shaw Fellowship provides that "it
shall be in the power of the Senatus Academicus of the University of
Edinburgh to require the holder of the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship,
during the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of it, to deliver in
the University of Edinburgh a course of Lectures, not exceeding four,
on any of the subjects for the encouragement of the study of which
the Fellowship has been founded." The following pages consist of four
lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, in accordance with
this provision, in the month of January 1884.
Since their delivery, the argument of the lectures has been revised,
and in some places enlarged. I have also thought it better to modify
their original form by dividing the discussion into chapters.
W. R. S.

CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy,
(_a_) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view,
(_b_) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy,
2. The inquiry into the ethical end,
(_a_) Fundamental,
(_b_) Implies a new point of view,
(_c_) Distinct from other ethical questions,
() From the inquiry into the methods of ethics,
() From mor l psychology nd sociology,
3. Scope of the present inquiry,

PAGE
1
1
3
5
5
7
9
10
13
14

PART I.
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
CHAPTER II.
EGOISM.
Definition of
Psychologic l
1. Its theory
Referring

N tur lism,
hedonism,
of ction m
iguous,
to--

20
21
22

(_ _) Actu l consequences of ction,

(_
_) Or its expected consequences,
(_c_) Or its present ch r cteristics,
2. Ethic l inferences from this theory,
3. Tr nsition from psychologic l to ethic l hedonism,
4. Possi
le o
jections considered,

23
23
24
25
31
37

CHAPTER III.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.
1. Difference of the st ndpoints of individu l nd St te,
41
2. Connection
etween egoism nd utilit ri nism ccording to Benth m, 45
(_ _) Utilit ri nism not politic l duty,
46
(_
_) Nor
mor l duty,
47
(_c_) Nor insisted on s religious duty,
49
(_d_) Nor sufficiently motived in priv te ethics,
50
3. Exh ustive ch r cter of Benth m's tre tment from his point of
view,
51
(_ _) The religious s nction (P ley),
53
(_
_) Limits of the politic l s nction,
54
(_c_) Uncert inty of the soci l s nction,
55
(_d_) And of the intern l s nction so f r s result of the
soci l,
56
4. Mill's logic l defence of utilit ri nism,
57
(_ _) Distinction of kinds of ple sure,
58
(_
_) Am
iguities in his proof,
60
5. Actu l tr nsition to utilit ri nism,
62
(_ _) Recognition of symp thy,
64
(_
_) The ide of equ lity,
69
6. The two sides of utilit ri n theory without logic l connection,
73
7. Summ ry of the ethic l consequences of psychologic l hedonism,
75
CHAPTER IV.
MORAL SENTIMENT.
1. A uniform psychologic l theory not supplied
y the opponents of
ethic l hedonism,
2. The non-hedonistic theory of ction,
3. Ethics m de to depend on the mor l sense,
(_ _) As h rmony of impulses,
(_
_) As sep r te sensitive f culty,
(_c_) As n intern l l w,
4. The ethics of mor l sentiment medi ting theory,

78
84
89
90
92
100
105

PART II.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
CHAPTER V.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.
1. Gener l ch r cteristics of the theory of evolution,
An ssertion of the unity of life,
Prim rily historic l,
ut c p
le of ethic l pplic tion,

107
109
110

2. The development of mor lity,

(_ _) Historic l psychology,
Its difficulties,
Its result,
(_
_) Development of society,

116
116
117
123
124

CHAPTER VI.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.
Be ring of the theory of evolution,
1. On theories depending on mor l sentiment or intuition,
(_ _) Ethic l v lue of mor l sentiments ffected
y their
origin,
(_
_) Org nic ch r cter of mor l sentiments,
Result nt ttitude of evolutionism to intuitionism,
2. On egoism: rel tion of egoism to ltruism,
(_ _) Soci l n ture of the individu l,
(_
_) Limits to concili tion of egoism nd ltruism,
() Continued existence of competition,
() Different nd conflicting degrees of ltruism,
() Altruism of interest and altruism of motive,
() Weakness of altruistic feelings,
(_c_) Tenency of evolution oppose to egoism,
Evolution not the basis of psychological heonism,
Nor of ethical heonism,
3. On utilitarianism,
Moification of the utilitarian metho,
An of its principle,
Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism,
(_a_) As prescribing an unprogressive ieal,
(_b_) As a theory of consequences,
(_c_) As relate solely to sensibility,

126
127
130
132
133
134
135
141
142
143
143
146
148
148
150
152
153
155
155
156
160
161

CHAPTER VII.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.
1. Alliance of evolutionism an heonism,
(_a_) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of
life,
(_b_) From interpreting life by pleasure,
2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life an pleasure,
3. Objections to this argument,
(_a_) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain,
() From the neg tive n ture of ple sure,
() From the f cts of hum n life,
(_
_) Th t the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to
ple sure,
() Incompleteness of the evolutionist rgument,
() The pessimist doctrine th t life tends to misery,
(_ _) The hypothesis of the unconscious,
(_

_) The n ture of volition,
(_cc_) The f cts of hum n progress,
Individu l progress,
Soci l progress,
4. The psychologic l n lysis of ple sure nd p in in rel tion
to evolutionist ethics,

164
164
165
167
168
169
171
172
172
173
175
176
177
179
179
181
186

(_ _) The su
jective n ture of ple sure nd p in,

(_
_) The conditions of ple sure nd p in,
(_c_) Applic tion of the theory of evolution,

187
190
197

CHAPTER VIII.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
Necessity of inquiring into the ethic l end suggested
y the theory
of evolution,
1. Ad pt tion to environment,
(_ _) As the end for present conduct,
Opposed to progress,
Does not fully represent evolution,
(_
_) As descri
ing the ultim te condition of life,
Result nt
solute code,
() A
str ct principles of soci l rel tion,
() Person l end only defined s d pt tion,
() Cannot be shown to lead to happiness,
(_c_) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end,
2. End suested by the tendency to variation,
(_a_) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation,
(_b_) Standard for measurin development found in complexity
of act and motive,
() Antinomy
etween soci l nd individu l ends,
() Psychologic l defects,
3. Development or incre se of life s the end,
(_ _) Su
jective st nd rd: most persistent impulses,
C nnot define life without n o
jective st nd rd,
(_
_) O
jective st nd rd: defined in two w ys,
() Conformity to the type,
Which c n
e reduced to-() A
und nce nd v riety of vit l power,
Th t is, to the su
jective st nd rd,
Summ ry s to the evolutionist end,
(_ _) Difficulty of reconciling individu l nd soci l ends,
(_
_) Hedonistic interpret tion of evolution not possi
le,
(_c_) No independent ethic l ide l,

201
203
207
207
209
210
211
212
213
213
217
221
222
227
231
232
236
242
244
247
248
251
253
256
256
257
259

CHAPTER IX.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
1. Principles involved in theory of evolution,
2. Unsuccessful pplic tion of these principles to ethics,
(_ _) The principles
eing tre ted empiric lly,
(_
_) No logic l tr nsition h ving
een effected from efficient
to fin l c use,
3. Difference
etween c us lity nd teleology,
4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution,
(_ _) Attempt to tr ce the genesis of self-consciousness,
(_
_) Attempt to tr ce mor lity from reflex ction,
5. The unity of self-consciousness,
(_ _) As m king possi
le the tr nsition from knowledge to
mor lity,
(_
_) As determining the ch r cter of the ethic l end,
(_c_) As showing th t the re lis tion of the end must
e
progressive,

263
264
265
267
269
277
278
283
284
284
286
291

THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM.

CHAPTER I.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
[Sidenote: 1. Connection of ethics with theoretic l philosophy.]
[Sidenote: (_ _) Dependence of ethic l on theoretic l points of view]
[Sidenote: (_ _) teleologic l,]
[Sidenote: (_
_) jur l,]
[Sidenote: (_c_) empiric l:]
It is common rem rk th t writer's ethic l doctrine is throughout
conditioned
y his ttitude to the pro
lems of theoretic l
philosophy. The m in lines of dispute in questions of ethics m y

e reg rded s prolong tions of the controversies which rise in
met physics nd psychology. The Re lism or Ide lism which m rks
specul tive system re ppe rs in its ethics, whilst differences in the
psychologic l n lysis of ment l st tes, or concerning the rel tion
of ple sure to desire, re grounds of distinction
etween schools
of mor lists. And not only re the speci l controversies of ethics
decided in different w ys,
ut the scope of the whole science is
differently conceived, s the specul tive st ndpoint ch nges. Thus,
not for one school only,
ut for whole period in the history
of reflection, ethics w s reg rded s n inquiry into the highest
hum n good. Opposed schools greed in looking from this point of
view, however much they might differ from one nother in defining
the n ture of th t highest good. At other times, ccording to the
prev iling view, to investig te nd system tise the rules of conduct
h s exh usted the scope of ethics--controversies
eing c rried on s
to the n ture of those rules, nd their source in extern l uthority
or in the intern l revel tion of conscience. Ag in, ethic l inquiry
h s
een pp rently identified with the n lysis nd history of
the mor l ffections nd sentiments; while purely extern l point
of view seems to
e sometimes dopted, nd ethics held to
e n
investig tion of the historic l results of ction, nd of the forms,
custom ry nd institution l, in which those results find perm nent
expression.
[Sidenote: to
e connected
y philosophy.]
These different w ys of looking t the whole su
ject proceed from
points of view whose effects re not confined to ethics,
ut m y
e
followed out in other lines of investig tion. They correspond to
ide s which domin te different types of thought nd form different
philosophic l st ndpoints. The first st rts from teleologic l
conception of hum n n ture, s n org nism consciously striving
tow rds its end. The second ssimil tes ethics to system of

leg l en ctments, nd is connected with the jur l conceptions of

theology nd l w. The two l st re concerned to show th t the
su
ject-m tter of ethics re f cts which h ve to
e tre ted
y the
ordin ry inductive nd historic l methods. These different points
of view, however, re to
e reg rded s complement ry r ther th n
s conflicting, lthough their complete synthesis must
e worked
out in the region of gener l philosophy, nd not on purely ethic l
ground. Philosophy h s thus to de l with the notions which determine
the scope nd ch r cter of ethic l thought; nd in this w y it
must necess rily p ss from the purely specul tive to the pr ctic l
point of view. If it is the
usiness of philosophy to
ring into
r tion l order the m teri l supplied
y experience, cosmic l nd
nthropologic l, it c nnot
e without
e ring on the function of m n
s source of ction in the world. The question, Wh t re the ends
m n is n tur lly fitted to tt in? or--if we prefer so to express
it--Wh t re the ends he ought to pursue? is not merely s n tur l
s the question, Wh t c n m n know of the world nd of himself?
But the two questions re insep r
ly connected. To know m n is to
know him not only s thinking
ut lso s n ctive
eing; while to
solve the pro
lem of the ends of m n implies knowledge
oth of his
n ture nd of the sphere of his ctivity.
[Sidenote: (_
_) Ethics necess ry to complete philosophy.]
Much distrust is often expressed of met physics. But it is not denied
th t the philosophy--whether met physic l or not--in which our
most comprehensive view of the world finds its re soned expression,
c nnot neglect th t spect of things in which m n is rel ted to his
surroundings s source of ction. Recent ethic l liter ture is
itself proof of this f ct. In its specul tive developments,
oth
re listic nd ide listic, the philosophy of the present d y h s m de
the ende vour to connect its conceptions of the world of thought nd
n ture with the ends contempl ted s to
e re lised in the re lm of
ction. Wh tever difficulties m y
e involved in the tr nsition from
the "is" to the "ought to
e," it is yet implied th t the tr nsition
requires to
e m de, not merely in order th t hum n ctivity m y
e
shown to
e r tion l,
ut th t re son itself m y
e justified
y
le ving nothing outside its sphere.
We must m ke no ttempt, therefore, to dr w line of
solute
sep r tion
etween the first two of the three questions in which,
s K nt s ys,[1] ll the interests of our re son centre. The "Wh t
ought I to do?" of ethics is for ever f lling
ck on the "Wh t c n I
know?" of met physics. The question of pr ctice must ccordingly
e
tre ted throughout in connection with the question of knowledge. If
we use K nt's distinction
etween specul tive nd pr ctic l re son,
we must lw ys
e r in mind th t it is the s me re son which is in
one reference specul tive, in nother pr ctic l.[2] We re not t
li
erty to ssume with Butler[3] th t "mor lity ... must
e somewh t
pl in nd e sy to
e understood: it must ppe l to wh t we c ll
common-sense." Nor m y we presuppose, s Hutcheson did,[4] th t it is
su
ject "
out which little reflection will discover the truth."
The question must
e looked upon not so much s one of immedi te
pr ctic l s of scientific interest, nd re son is to
e reg rded s
the only court of ppe l.
[Sidenote: 2. The inquiry into the ethic l end]
[Sidenote: (_ _) fund ment l,]

The form just quoted, in which K nt st tes the pro
lem, is not

ltogether free from m
iguity. "Wh t ought I to do?" m y
e t ken
to signify, Wh t me ns should I dopt for the tt inment of some end
presupposed, perh ps unconsciously, s the end to
e sought? But
it is evident, not only th t this is not wh t K nt himself me nt

y the question,
ut th t, s thus put, it necess rily implies
further nd deeper question. Not the discovery of the me ns,
ut the
determin tion of the end itself--the end which c nnot
e interpreted
s mere me ns to some further end--is the fund ment l question of
ethics. It is only
y misconception th t this c n
e thought to
e
trivi l question. To s y, s recent scientific writer does,[5]
"th t h ppiness in one disguise or nother is the end of hum n life
is common ground for ll the schools," is either to ignore wh t the
schools h ve t ught,[6] or else to use the word "h ppiness" merely
s nother n me for the highest good. But, even were it still the
c se, s it w s in the time of Aristotle, th t ne rly ll men were
greed s to the n me of the highest good, nd th t the common
people nd the cultured like c lled it h ppiness, the difference s
to wh t they me nt
y the term would still rem in. To s y th t the
ethic l end is h ppiness is, to use Locke's terminology, "trifling
proposition"; for in so doing we merely give it n me[7]-- nd one
which the controversies of philosophy h ve surrounded with confusion.
Th t the end is h ppiness in ny definite sense, for ex mple, s the
gre test
l nce of ple sure over p in, _m y_
e perfectly true,
ut
st nds very much in need of proof. Th t h ppiness is the highest
ethic l end c n
e ssumed s true only when "h ppiness" is nothing
more th n n

revi ted expression for "the highest ethic l end."
[Sidenote: (_
_) implies

new point of view,]

A difficulty of more r dic l kind meets us, t the very outset

of our inquiry, in the distinctively ethic l notion expressed
y
the word "ought." V rious ttempts h ve
een m de to surmount or
circumvent this difficulty; nd some of these will come under
consider tion in the sequel. The very notion of conscious ctivity
cont ins the ide of
ringing
out something which does not yet
exist. It involves
purpose or end. The notion "ought," it is true,
me ns more th n this: it implies n o
lig tion to pursue
definite
end or conform to definite rules, reg rded gener lly s coming from
n uthorit tive source. In this cle r nd full sense, "oughtness"
or duty is
comp r tively recent notion, foreign to the cl ssic l
period of Greek ethics. The force nd definiteness
elonging to the
modern conception of it re due to the juridic l spect which the
Stoic philosophy, Rom n l w, nd Christi n theology com
ined to
impress upon mor lity. But even the notion of purpose or end implies
"preference" of the end sought: the st te to
e re lised is looked
upon s "
etter" or "more to
e desired" th n the existing st te.
We m y sk for the re son of this superior desir
leness;
ut the
nswer must soon f ll
ck upon the ssertion of something held to
e
desir
le in itself. The question which we re lw ys sking, nd
c nnot help sking, "Why is such nd such n end to
e pursued
y
me?" or "Why ought I to follow such nd such course of conduct?"
must soon le d to the ssertion of n ultim te end.
[Sidenote: the tr nsition to which requires investig tion;]
This end, therefore, must not
e sought for some ulterior end, nor
desired s me ns to s tisfy ny other desire. But it is still
necess ry to inquire into the w y in which the end, held to
e
ultim te in pr ctic l reg rd, st nds rel ted to the constitution

of m n nd his environment. And the question to which I would dr w

ttention, s the fund ment l pro
lem of ethics, is, Wh t is th t
which men h ve v riously c lled h ppiness, the highest good, the
ethic l end? or, more precisely, How c n tr nsition
e m de from
the notions of theoretic l philosophy to the determin tion of th t
ethic l end? No ssumption is m de, t st rting, s to the n ture
of this end, or the m nner of rriving t it. It m y
e tr nsient
st te of feeling, or perm nent type of ch r cter; or it m y
y its
very n ture defy ex ct definition,--the ide itself
eing perfected
s its re lis tion is progressively ppro ched. In ny c se it
requires to
e
rought into connection with the ultim te conceptions
of thought nd existence.
This question of the ethic l end _or_ highest good is thus
fund ment l in ethic l science, nd upon it ll other questions in
ethics fin lly depend. But it is e sy to see th t it does not cover
the whole field, nd th t the other points of view lre dy referred
to h ve legitim te pplic tion. Ethics h s not only to determine
the end,
ut to pply it to pr ctice, nd so to decide s to wh t
is right or wrong in p rticul r ctions, nd virtuous or vicious in
ch r cter. And, in ddition to the two questions thus implied--the
question s to the ethic l end, nd th t s to the pplic tion of it
to pr ctic l ff irs--there is nother dep rtment of inquiry which
h s h d pl ce ssigned to it in most ethic l systems, nd which h s
right to
e reg rded s
elonging to ethics. We m y investig te
the pl ce, in the individu l nd the community respectively,
oth of
the sentiments nd ide s nd of the soci l institutions nd customs
through which mor lity is m nifested; nd this inquiry covers the
twofold ground of wh t m y
e c lled mor l psychology nd mor l
sociology.
[Sidenote: (_c_) distinct from other ethic l questions:]
Of these three questions, the first forms the su
ject of inquiry
in the following p ges. It seems to me th t gre t p rt of the
o
scurity which surrounds ethic l rgument is due to confounding
these different questions. It is true th t no one of them is
without
e ring on the others;
ut it is none the less necess ry,
in discussing ny one of them, to keep its distinctness from those
others well in view. In inquiring into the found tion on which the
ethic l end is
sed, I do not intend to develop code of rules for
pr ctic l conduct or
theory of hum n virtue; nor sh ll I ttempt
to tr ce the origin nd n ture of mor l sentiments nd ide s, or of
the soci l institutions nd customs connected with mor lity. If these
su
jects h ve to
e introduced t ll, it will
e only in so f r s
they m y
e thought to decide, or tend to decide, the question more
immedi tely in view.
[Sidenote: () from inquiry into the methods of ethics.]
[Sidenote: Limit tion of this inquiry]
[Sidenote: (_ _) from necessity of investig ting
ltern tives,]

ll logic l

Thus it forms no p rt of the present inquiry to follow out the

pplic tion to conduct of different ethic l ends, or to exhi
it the
different pr ctic l systems to which different ends n tur lly le d.
It might seem indeed, t first sight, s if the development of their
pr ctic l consequences might solve the question s to the n ture of

the ends themselves. If we ssume cert in possi
le nd _prim f cie_

re son
le ethic l ends, nd then see wh t codes of mor lity they
will yield, surely (it m y
e thought) th t one which ffords the
most consistent nd h rmonious code for the guid nce of life will
e
the end to
e sought in preference to ll others. But in order th t
the criticism of wh t Professor Sidgwick h s c lled the methods of
ethics m y
e
le to nswer the question s to the end or principle
of ethics, cert in conditions must first
e complied with. In the
first pl ce, it is necess ry th t the ends or principles whose
pplic tions to conduct re to
e ex mined must not
e uncritic lly
ccepted from the fluctu ting mor lity of common-sense nor from the
commonpl ces of the schools,
ut must
e shown to
e " ltern tives

etween which the hum n mind" is "necess rily forced to choose when
it ttempts to fr me
complete synthesis of pr ctic l m xims, nd to
ct in perfectly r tion l m nner."[8]
[Sidenote: (_

_) from more th n one self-consistent code
eing
possi
le,]
But lthough this requisite is complied with, it will still
rem in possi
le, in the second pl ce, th t two or more of the
ssumed principles m y yield systems of pr ctic l rules perfectly
self-consistent, nd yet inconsistent with one nother.[9] It
would
e very h rd indeed to show th t
oth the theory of Egoistic
Hedonism, nd wh t is gener lly c lled Utilit ri nism, do not
succeed in doing so: nd thus the ex min tion of methods is not of
itself sufficient to settle the question of the end of conduct. And
since--to quote Mr Sidgwick[10]--it is " fund ment l postul te of
ethics th t either these methods must
e reconciled nd h rmonised,
or ll
ut one of them rejected," it follows th t the criticism of
methods le ds n tur lly up to n independent criticism of principles,
unless indeed it c n
e shown th t one method only yields
consistent code of pr ctic l rules.
[Sidenote: (_cc_) from its ssumption th t the true end must give
perfectly consistent rules.]
Even in this c se, however, if it led to the doption of the end
in question, it must
e
orne in mind th t the postul te would
e
implied th t the true ethic l end must
e
le to yield consistent
nd h rmonious system of rules for pr ctic l life. Without ltogether
denying this postul te, it yet seems to me th t it st nds in need
of qu lific tion. For in different circumst nces, nd t different
st ges of individu l nd soci l development, the pplic tion of the
s me ethic l end m y n tur lly produce different nd conflicting
courses of conduct. We must not st rt with ny such ssumption s
th t the r tion lity of the end consists in some sort of m them tic l
equ lity which ignores like the different environment with which one
ge nd nother surround different gener tions, nd the different
functions which one individu l nd nother h ve to perform in the
soci l whole. We must le ve open the possi
ility th t wh t is right
now m y
e wrong in nother ge; we must remem
er th t every
ody m y
not count for one, nd th t some people m y count for more th n one;
we must dmit th t we m y h ve sometimes to do to others wh t we
would not th t others should do to us. The only consistency we h ve
right to dem nd must le ve room for such v riety of different
conditions s to
e,
y itself, very insecure guide.
From the difficulty of complying with the
ove conditions, it
seems pr ctic lly impossi
le for the criticism of ethic l methods to

decide the question of the ethic l end. Even if the pplic tion to
conduct of every import nt end h s
een t ken ccount of, we re met
with the difficulty th t two or more mutu lly nt gonistic though
self-consistent pr ctic l codes m y pro

ly h ve
een developed,
while we re not even justified in ssuming th t in
ility to yield
system which will fit the complex circumst nces of life in
perfectly h rmonious m nner is sufficient ground for rejecting n end
shown in some other w y to
e re son
le.
[Sidenote: () distinct from mor l psychology

nd sociology.]

The l st dep rtment of ethics referred to--th t which h s to do with

the origin nd n ture of mor l sentiments nd soci l customs--h s

e ring on the question of the end of conduct in some respects more
import nt th n the investig tion of ethic l methods. For, where s the
l tter expressly ssumes cert in ends s _prim f cie_ re son
le,
the former inquiry, on the contr ry, is now frequently understood
to
e
le, without presupposing ny ethic l rel tions wh tever,
to tr ce the w y in which, from primitive feelings nd customs,
mor lity itself h s
een evolved. The psychologic l side of ethic l
inquiry h s lw ys h d n import nt pl ce with English mor lists.
At times, indeed, the question of the "mor l f culty" h s excited
so much interest s to divert ttention from the n ture of mor lity
itself. Mor l truth h s
een supposed to
e something known nd
indisput
le, the only question
eing how we c me to know it. But the
psychology of ethics, reinforced
y the knowledge sociology gives of
the development of mor lity, rises now to l rger issues. It ttempts
to show the genesis of the mor l from the non-mor l, to ccount thus
for the origin of ethic l ide s, nd even to determine wh t kinds of
ends re to
e striven fter. In this w y,
theory of the origin
nd growth of mor l sentiments nd institutions is m de to render
import nt help to more th n one of the theories which will f ll to
e
considered in the sequel.
[Sidenote: 3. Present inquiry limited]
[Sidenote: to theories depending on the hum n constitution,]
The present Ess y h s to inquire into the w y in which we m y
determine wh t the end of hum n conduct is,--into the
sis of
ethics, therefore. But I do not propose to offer n exh ustive
investig tion of ll the theories which h ve
een or m y
e st rted
in solution of the pro
lem. On the contr ry, I will
egin
y
excluding from the inquiry ll theories which seek the
sis of
ethics in something outside the constitution of m n s feeling
nd re soning gent:[11] not
ec use I contend th t ll such
theories re _prim f cie_ unre son
le,
ut
ec use it is t ny
r te the more o
vious course to seek to determine the function of n
org nism
y studying its inner constitution, th n
y h ving reg rd
to something which is extern l to it, nd does not ct upon nd
modify it s necess ry p rt of its environment. It is only when
this method h s
een tried nd h s f iled th t we should seek outside
us for some guide s to the p rt we ought to pl y in the universe.
For this re son I sh ll not t ke into consider tion the views of the

sis of ethics which find it in positive l w either divine or hum n,
except in so f r s they re shown to follow from the n ture of m n.
It is not necess ry for me to deny th t the source of ll mor l
o
lig tion m y
e the will of God, or the comm nds of the sovereign,
or the opinion of society, nd th t the highest mor l ide l m y
e
o
edience to such rule. But theories of this kind m ke ethics

merely n pplic tion of positive theology, or of legisl tion, or of

soci l sentiment, nd seem only to h ve n ppropri te pl ce when we
h ve f iled to find n independent
sis for ction.
The question which rem ins to
e put m y
e expressed in these terms:
C n we find in hum n n ture (t ken either lone or in connection with
its environment) ny indic tions of the end of hum n conduct, or, in
other words, of the principle on which hum n
eings "ought" to ct?
nd if so, in wh t direction do these indic tions point, nd wh t is
their signific nce? The nswer to this question will thus necess rily
depend on the view we t ke of the constitution of m n nd his
rel tion to his environment. And I purpose to
ring this discussion
within the necess ry limits
y considering the ethic l consequences
of one only of the two views into which philosophic l opinion is
divided.
[Sidenote: nd here to ethics of N tur lism,]
[Sidenote:

s distinguished from R tion l ethics.]

[Sidenote: N tur lism either individu listic]

[Sidenote: or historic l.]
Now the fund ment l principle of division in philosophic l opinion
lies in the pl ce ssigned to re son in hum n n ture.[12] According
to one theory, m n is essenti lly sensitive su
ject, though
le
to re son
out his sens tions--th t is, to ssoci te, compound, nd
comp re them. He is supposed to
e
uilt up of sense-present tions
ssoci ted with feelings of ple sure nd p in. Recipient of extern l
impressions which persist in ide nd re ccomp nied
y ple sure or
p in on his p rt, nd thus followed
y other ide s nd impressions,
m n's ment l constitution is expl ined without ttri
uting to re son
ny spont neous or productive function.[13] The other view differs
from this in ttri
uting spont neity to re son--m king it, in one w y
or nother, the source of forms of thought, principles, or ide s. The
former m y
e c lled the N tur listic, the l tter the R tion listic
view of m n: from th t follows N tur listic or N tur l ethics, from
this R tion listic or R tion l ethics. Into
oth these theories, in
theoretic l s well s in n ethic l spect, the historic l turn
of thought which h s ch r cterised recent inquiry h s introduced
profound modific tion. On the
sis of N tur lism, we m y either look
upon m n s n individu l distinct from other individu ls, s w s
done
y Epicurus nd Ho

es nd the m teri lists of the eighteenth
century, or we m y consider the r ce s itself n org nism, p rt
from which the individu l is unintelligi
le, nd look upon hum n
n ture s h ving
ecome wh t it now is through long process of
inter ction
etween org nism nd environment, in which soci l s well
s psychic l nd physic l f cts h ve influenced the result. This is
the view to the el
or tion of which Comte nd D rwin nd Spencer
h ve in different w ys contri
uted.[14] Wh t m kes the historic l
method of import nce philosophic lly, is not the mere f ct th t it
tr ces sequence of events in time,
ut the f ct th t,
y doing
so, it is
le to look upon e ch link in the ch in of events s
necess rily connected with every other, nd thus to reg rd s
system--or, r ther, s n org nism--wh t previous empiric l theories
h d left without ny principle of unity.
[Sidenote: R tion lism either individu listic]

[Sidenote: or univers listic.]

A simil r movement of thought h s introduced
like modific tion
into the R tion listic theory. According to older doctrines, the
individu l re son is mysteriously ch rged with cert in _ priori_
principles which re to us l ws of knowledge nd of ction; where s
the form of R tion lism which is now in the scend nt resem
les the
theory of n tur l evolution in this, th t s the l tter finds the
r ce more re l th n the individu l, nd the individu l to exist only
in the r ce, so the former looks upon the individu l re son s
ut
finite m nifest tion of the univers l re son, nd ttempts to show
the principles or constitutive elements of this univers l re son
or consciousness in their logic l or necess ry connection--le ving
open to empiric l investig tion the w y in which they h ve gr du lly
disclosed themselves in the individu l hum n su
ject, nd in the
expression of the collective life of the r ce. Thus, s N tur l
Ethics is divided into n individu listic nd n historic l view,
simil r distinction might
e m de in R tion l Ethics, though in
this c se it would
e more difficult to follow out the distinction
in det il; nd m ny ethic l systems c nnot
e s id to h ve kept
consistently either to one side of it or to the other.
In the following discussion I sh ll investig te the ethic l theory
which is founded on the
sis of N tur lism--working out nd
criticising in somewh t gre ter det il th t form of the theory which,
from the greement it l ys cl im to with the results of modern
science, pl ys so import nt p rt in contempor ry philosophic l
thought.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Werke, ed. H rtenstein (1867), iii. 532.
[2] Cf. K nt, Werke, iv. 237.
[3] Sermons, v., tow rds the end.
[4] Ess y on the P ssions nd Affections, p. iv.
[5] W. H. Rolph, Biologische Pro
leme, zugleich ls Versuch zur
Entwicklung einer r tionellen Ethik, 2d ed., p. 21.
[6] Not to mention K nt, the consistent opponent of every
eudmonistic principle, or the doctrines of
politic l ide list such
s M zzini (see Life nd Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference m y
e
m de to writer like W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific
point of view, nd yet holds th t "h ppiness is not to
e desired for
its own s ke."--Lectures nd Ess ys (1879), ii. 121, 173.
[7] "Auch dieser Begriff [Glckseligkeit] ist n sich ein
loss
form ler, der jede
elie
ige m teri le Bestimmung zulsst."--Zeller,
Ue
er Begriff und Begrndung der sittlichen Gesetze (1883), p. 23.
[8] Methods of Ethics,
ook i. ch p. i. 5, 3d ed., p. 11.
[9] "The rule, 'Let every one c re for me,' is quite s simple, nd,
in
logic l point of view, defines conduct s consistently nd
re son
ly s the rule, 'Love your neigh
our s yourself.'"--Leslie
Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.

[10] Methods of Ethics, I. i. 3, p. 6.

[11] The difference
etween Aristotle nd K nt in ethics is sometimes
expressed (see Trendelen
urg, Hist. Beitrge zur Phil., iii. 171
ff.) s if it consisted in the f ct th t the former investig ted
hum n n ture in order to find its (~es~), whereas he aer
sugh he sandard f acin in a ranscendena grund. There is
reasn fr his disincin in Kan's manner f saemen. Bu bh
may be regarded as invesigaing human naure. Their difference
raher cnsiss in he differen psiin and funcin assigned 
reasn in man. I is because Kan is fr he mmen king upn
reasn as smehing disinc frm human naure ha he says ha
"he grund f bigain is  be sugh, n in he naure f man
r in he circumsances in he wrd in which he is paced, bu _
priri_ simpy in he nins f pure reasn" (Werke, iv. 237). His
"meaphysica" view f ehics, hwever, fws frm he raina
cnsiuin f he human subjec and his experience, and des n
depend n any surce ha reay "ranscends" he reasn f man.
[12] Opinin is as divided accrding  he pace assigned 
reasn in he wrd,--his principe f divisin crrespnding ams
exacy wih he frmer.
[13] Thus i is he bjec f Hevius's firs _discurs_ "De
'espri"  prve ha physica sensibiiy and memry are he ny
prducive causes f ur ideas.
[14] Cme, by cnnecing ehics wih bigy; Darwin and Spencer, by
he dcrine f evuin.

PART I.
THE INDIIDUALISTIC THEORY.
CHAPTER II.
EGOISM.
[Sidene: Definiin f Nauraism.]
I is difficu  give an exac definiin r even descripin f
wha I have caed he "naura" view f man. Perhaps i may be
bes defined, negaivey, as he view which denies  reasn any
spnaneus r creaive funcin in he human cnsiuin. Fr his
definiin, if i si eaves he psiive descripin waning,
wi a eas make he cassificain in "naura" and "raina"
exhausive and muuay excusive. A he same ime i is  be
ned ha, n he hery f Nauraism, reasn is n suppsed 
be excuded frm a share in deermining quesins f cnduc r
he chice f ends. I wud, indeed, be impssibe  have even
he preence f an ehica hery wihu a cerain use f reasn.
Bu is funcin, in his case, is imied  he merey frma ne
f bringing differen presenains (r bjecs) and feeings in
cnnecin, and cmparing he differen saes f mind hus frmed
wih ne anher, n wih a reasn-given sandard.

[Sidene: Psychgica hednism.]

Since he funcin f reasn is hus resriced, and is cmpeency
 suppy an end fr, r principe f, acin is denied, we mus
seek his end eiher in he feeings f peasure and pain which
accmpany bh sensry and mr presenains,--percepins, ha
is  say, and acins,--r in he mre cmpex, r appareny
mre cmpex, emins f he mind. And he aer may eiher be
hemseves reducibe  feeings f peasure r pain accmpanying
presenains direcy peasurabe r painfu, and hence ransferred
by assciain  her presenains, r hey may be regarded as
smehw mives  acin which may be r ugh  be fwed n
heir wn accun. The Individuaisic Thery, herefre, is n
necessariy hednisic. I admis f a wfd view f he "naura"
man: ne which ks upn him as in essence a peasure-seeking,
pain-aviding anima; anher which regards him as having a variey
f impuses, sme f which are n direced  his wn peasure r
avidance f pain.
[Sidene: 1. Is hery f acin]
[Sidene: ambiguus,]
[Sidene: referring ]
The frmer view--psychgica hednism, as i is caed--caims
 be an exhausive anaysis f he mives f human cnduc,
perfecy genera indeed, bu ye vaid fr every case f acin.
I denies he pssibiiy f a man acing frm any her principe
han desire f peasure r aversin frm pain. The hery is, ha
i is a psychgica aw ha acin is mived by peasure and
pain, and ha nhing ese has mive-pwer ver i. If, hen, ne
peasure (r avidance f pain) is chsen in preference  anher,
i mus be eiher by chance,--an aernaive which has n ehica
significance--n significance, ha is, fr he guidance f vunary
cnduc,--r because he ne curse prmises, r seems  prmise,
he aainmen f a greaer baance f peasure han he her, r
is acuay a he ime mre peasan han ha her. Thus he
view ha peasure is he _ny_ mive f human acin is reay
idenica, fr ehica purpses, wih he hery sey expressed
in he aw ha acin fws he _greaes_ peasure.[15] I say
"sey expressed"; fr he aw as hus saed reay admis f
hree quie differen inerpreains, n aways disinguished wih
he precisin which such subjecs require.
[Sidene: (_a_) acua cnsequences f acin,]
[Sidene: r (_b_) is expeced cnsequences,]
[Sidene: r (_c_) is presen characerisics.]
(_a_) In he firs pace, he aw migh mean ha acin aways
fws he curse which, as a maer f fac, wi in he ng-run
bring he greaes baance f peasure  he agen. I is eviden
ha here is n grund in psychgy fr mainaining his view. Ye
i is a fair inerpreain f he "aw" f psychgica hednism,
as cmmny saed; and i is a eas an admissibe suppsiin
ha his meaning f he phrase has n been wihu effec upn
he uses  which he aw has been pu by sme f is uphders.

The secnd inerpreain f he aw--namey (_b_), ha acin is

aways in he direcin which seems  he agen ms ikey 
bring him he greaes baance f peasure, wheher i acuay
brings i r n--is he sense in which i appears  have been ms
cmmny aken when expressed wih any degree f accuracy. I is in
his sense ha--in anguage which ascribes greaer cnsisency 
men's cnduc han i usuay dispays--"ineres" is assered by
he auhr f he 'Sysme de a naure'  be "he se mive f
human acin."[16] The same view is adped by Benham;[17] and bh
James Mi and Jhn Suar Mi idenify desire wih peasure, r an
"idea" f peasure, in erms which are sufficieny sweeping, if n
very carefuy weighed;[18] whie he wi is said  fw desire,
r ny  pass u f is pwer when cming under he sway f
habi.[19] Si anher meaning may, hwever, be given  he "aw"
f psychgica hednism, accrding  which he dubfu reference
 he manifd peasures and pains, cnempaed as resuing frm
an acin, is g rid f, and (_c_) he agen is assered aways 
chse ha acin r frbearance which is acuay ms peasan,
r eas painfu,  him a he ime--aking accun, f curse,
f imaginaive peasures and pains, as we as f hse which are
immediaey cnneced wih he senses. I is in his inerpreain
f is aw ha psychgica hednism seems  be ms capabe f
defence, and in his sense i has been mre han nce saed and
defended.[20]
[Sidene: 2. Ehica inferences frm his hery,]
The ehics f he frm f Nauraism which is nw under examinain
mus be inferred frm he "aw" ha human acin fws he
greaes peasure, in ne r her f he abve meanings which ha
aw admis f. The aw is he daum r premiss frm which we are
 advance  an ehica cncusin. The "righ" is  be evved
frm he peasurabe; and he peasurabe, cnsequeny, cann be
made  depend upn he righ. I is cerainy rue f he cnduc
f ms men, "ha ur prspec f peasure resuing frm any
curse f cnduc may argey depend n ur cncepin f i as
righ r herwise."[21] Bu his presuppses ha here is a righ
independen f ne's wn peasure, and herefre des n appy 
an ehics based n he simpe hery f human naure pu frward by
psychgica hednism.
[Sidene: (_a_) in is firs meaning,]
[Sidene: (_b_)in is secnd meaning:]
[Sidene: privae ehics and egisain,]
[Sidene: (_c_) in is hird meaning.]
I is scarcey necessary  discuss he firs aernaive (_a_),
as n psychgis wud seriusy mainain i. A sciey cmpsed
f men cnsiued in he way i suppses men  be cnsiued,
wud be a cecin f raina egiss, mniscien in a ha
cncerned he resus f acin, and each adping unerringy a
every mmen he curse f cnduc which wud increase his wn
peasure he ms. The cnduc f any member f such a sciey
cud ny be mdified when--and wud aways be mdified when--he
mdified cnduc acuay brugh peasurabe resus  he agen:
never s as  make him prefer he pubic gd  his wn. The
secnd aernaive (_b_) admis f such mdificain aking pace

ny when i seems  he individua ha his mdified acin wi
prduce a greaer baance f peasure r smaer baance f pain
han any her curse f acin. Under his hery an individua
migh indeed prefer he pubic gd r anher man's gd  his
wn, bu ny hrugh his being deceived as  he acua resus f
his curse f acin. Ehics as deermining an end fr cnduc is
pu u f cur; hugh he saesman r he educar may mdify
he acins f hers by prviding apprpriae mives. If he "w
svereign masers, pain and peasure," "deermine wha we sha d,"
i is hardy necessary fr hem as " pin u wha we ugh 
d."[22] The end is aready given in he naure f acin, hugh an
enighened undersanding wi each men hw he greaes baance f
peasure may be bained. We can ny ge a a rue prescribing an
end by changing ur pin f view frm he individua  he sae.
I is bes fr he sae ha each individua shud aim a he
cmmn happiness; bu, when we ak f his as a mra duy fr he
individua, a we can mean is ha he sae wi punish a breach
f i. In he wrds f Hevius,[23] "pain and peasure are he
bnds by which we can aways unie persna ineres  he ineres
f he nain.... The sciences f mras and egisain can be
ny deducins frm his simpe principe." Accrding  Benham's
psychgy, a man is necessiaed by his mena and physica naure
 pursue a every mmen, n he greaes happiness f he greaes
number, bu wha seems  him his wn greaes happiness. And wha
he egisar has  d is, by judiciusy impsed rewards and
punishmens, especiay he aer,  make i fr he greaes
happiness f each  pursue he greaes happiness f a.[24] As
disinguished frm his "ar f egisain," "privae ehics"
cnsiss ny f prudenia rues prescribing he bes means  an
end predeermined by naure as he ny pssibe end f human acin:
i "eaches hw each man may dispse himsef  pursue he curse
ms cnducive  his wn happiness."[25] The cnsequences  he
hery f acin f he hird aernaive (_c_) are simiar: i ny
saes he aw wih mre appearance f psychgica accuracy. If
a man aways fws ha curse f acin which wi give him a
he ime he greaes (rea and imaginaive) saisfacin, i is
impssibe fr us  infer frm his naure an ehica aw prescribing
sme her end, wihu admiing a fundamena cnradicin in
human naure; whie  say ha he ugh  seek he end he aways
des and cann hep seeking, is unnecessary and even unmeaning.
Mdificain f characer may f curse be si brugh abu,
since he kinds f acin in which an individua akes peasure
may be varied ams indefiniey. Bu he mive made use f in
his educaive prcess mus be persna peasure; and he end he
egisar has in view in his wrk mus be he same,[26] hugh i
is fen quiey assumed ha fr him persna peasure has becme
idenified wih he wider ineress f he cmmuniy.
[Sidene: Resu f his ambiguiy,]
[Sidene: ehica hednism.]
The differen significains f which i admis shw ha he
psychgica aw ha acin fws he greaes peasure is by n
means s cear as i may a firs sigh appear. Prbaby i is he
very ambiguiy f he aw ha has made i appear  prvide a basis
fr an ehica sysem. When i is said ha greaes peasure is he
mra end f acin, his "greaes peasure" is ked upn as he
greaes pssibe baance f peasurabe ver painfu saes fr he
prbabe durain f ife: n he egisic hery, f he ife f he

individua; n he uiiarian hery, f he aggregae ives f a

men r even f a senien beings. Bu when i is said ha greaes
peasure is, as a maer f fac, aways he mive f acin, i is
bvius ha "greaes peasure" has changed is significain. Fr
if he same meaning were kep , n ny wud he psychgica
aw as hus saed be peny a variance wih facs, bu is vaidiy
wud render he mra precep unnecessary. I is even unmeaning 
say ha a man "ugh"  d ha which he aways des and cann
hep ding.[27] On he her hand, if he dube meaning f he
phrase had been ceary saed, we shud a nce have seen he
hiaus in he prf f egisic hednism--he gap beween he presen
(r apparen) peasure fr which ne des ac, and he greaes
peasure f a ifeime fr which ne ugh  ac--as we as he
addiina difficuy f passing frm egism  uiiarianism. If
greaes apparen peasure--r greaes presen peasure--is by an
inexrabe aw f human naure aways sugh, hw can i be shwn
ha we ugh  sacrifice he apparen  he rea--he presen
peasure ha is sma  he greaer fuure peasure? If he
individua necessariy pursues his wn peasure, hw can we shw ha
he ugh  subrdinae i  he peasures f he "greaes number"?
[Sidene: 3. Transiin frm psychgica  ehica hednism.
Righ acin wi impy]
[Sidene: (_a_) crrec esimae f cnsequences f acin,]
[Sidene: (_b_) and crrespnding srengh f feeing.]
I is a maer f fac, hwever, ha he psychgiss wh mainain
ha acin fws he greaes peasure--meaning by ha, greaes
apparen r greaes presen peasure--have in heir ehics made he
ransiin  an enighened Egism, r even  Uiiarianism. The
naure f he ransiin hus requires  be mre ceary pined
u. If he frmer inerpreain f he aw f psychgica
hednism cud be acceped, and a man's mive fr acin were aways
wha seemed  him ikey  bring him he greaes peasure n he
whe, ehics--wha Benham cas privae ehics--cud be reduced
(as Benham finay reduces i)  cerain maxims f prudence. T
be fuy acquained wih he surces f peasure and pain, and 
esimae hem crrecy, wud impy pssessin f he highes
(egisic) mraiy. If men cud be made  hink righy as  wha
heir greaes peasure cnsised in, hen righ acin n heir
par--ha is  say, he pursui f heir greaes peasure--wud
(accrding  Benham's psychgy) fw as a maer f curse.
Righ cnduc, hwever, is n s purey an affair f he ineec
as his wud make i. Indeed, Benham's psychgica assumpin
requires ny  be painy saed fr is incnsisency wih
he facs f human acin  becme apparen. The "vide meira
prbque, deerira sequr" expresses  cmmn an experience  be
s easiy expained away. The impuses by which acin is gverned
are n aways in accrdance wih wha he ineec decides 
be bes n a survey f he whe ife and is varied chances. In
judging he cnsequences f acin, a fuure gd is cmpared wih a
presen, regardess f he mere difference f ime by which hey are
separaed. Bu he springs which mve he wi are fen a variance
wih he decisins f he undersanding; and many men are unabe 
resis he srengh f he impuse  ac fr he peasure f he
mmen, hugh hey fresee ha a greaer fuure saisfacin wud
fw frm presen sef-denia.

I wud seem, hen, ha he facs f experience are sufficien 

shw ha a man's cnduc des n aways fw he curse which
he hinks ikey  bring him he greaes peasure n he whe.
Bu he view ha a man aways acs fr wha is ms peasan--r
eas painfu--a he ime cann be dismissed s easiy. I is n
enugh simpy  pin  he facs f human acin in rder  shw
ha his hyphesis is incnsisen wih hem. If we insanced he
sef-resrain in which s many pass heir ives frm day  day, i
migh perhaps be answered ha here is a persisen idea f duy, r
ve f repuain, r fear f scia sigma, he repressin f which
wud be mre painfu han he resrain i pus upn her impuses.
Even he maryr wh deiberaey pars wih ife isef fr he
sake f an idea, may be said  chse deah as he eas painfu
curse pen  him a he ime. I shud be brne in mind, hwever,
ha Prfessr Bain, he ms hrugh psychgis f Benham's
sch, refuses  admi his ine f defence fr psychgica
hednism, and hds ha, in acins such as hse referred ,
men are reay carried u f he circe f heir sef-regarding
desires.[28] Bu my presen purpse is n  discuss he meris
f any such psychgica hery, bu raher  invesigae is
ehica cnsequences. And fr his purpse he quesin requires 
be pu, hw a passage is effeced frm psychgica hednism  an
egisic--and even  a uiiarian--hery f ehics.
[Sidene: The psuae ha acin can be rainaised]
[Sidene: invves hese cndiins,]
If a man aways acs fr his greaes presen peasure, rea and
imaginary, i seems a far sep  say ha he "ugh"  ac--r in
any way  expec ha he wi ac--a each mmen fr he greaes
sum f peasure aainabe in he prbabe durain f his ife.
Bu n refecin, his may urn u  fw if we psuae ha
cnduc can be rainaised. Wha is mean by his egisic "ugh"
may be said  be simpy ha  he eye f reasn he peasure f
any ne mmen cann be regarded as mre vauabe han he equa
peasure f any her mmen, if i is equay cerain; and ha
herefre  ac as if i were is  ac unreasnaby. Man fais in
acing up  reasn in his sense, because his acin is n mived
by reasn, bu direcy by peasure and pain; and n by a mere
esimae f peasure and pain, bu by peasure and pain hemseves.
The psychgica hednis mus mainain ha he esimaes f fuure
peasure and pain ny becme mives by being n merey recgnised
(ineecuay) bu fe (eminay)--ha is, by hemseves
becming peasurabe r painfu. If he Egis cas any acin
irraina, i cann be because he mive which prduced i was n
he greaes peasure in cnsciusness a he ime. I can ny be n
he grund ha he greaes peasure in cnsciusness a he ime
is ikey  ead  a sacrifice f greaer peasure in he fuure;
and his mus be due eiher  ineecua misapprehensin r 
he imagined fruiin f fuure peasure n being srng enugh 
uweigh he peasure which cmes frm a presen simuus, and  he
imagined fruiin f he mre disan being weaker han ha f he
ess disan peasure. I is wing  a defec f he imaginain
n a man's par ha even wih cmpee infrmain he des n ac
"up  his ighs"--irraina acin being pary a cnsequence f
insufficien acquainance wih he nrma resus f cnduc, pary
due  defecive imaginain. Were a man's imaginain f fuure
peasure and pain as srng as his experience f presen peasure and
pain, and did he crrecy appreciae he resus f his cnduc,

hen his acin wud, f psychgica necessiy, harmnise wih he

preceps f egisic hednism.
[Sidene: he aer f which]
[Sidene: is incnsisen wih he naure f vunary acin.]
Egisic hednism may herefre, in a cerain sense, be said  be a
"reasnabe" end f cnduc n he hery f psychgica hednism;
i is he end which wi be made his wn by ha ideay perfec man
whse ineec can ceary see he issues f cnduc, and whse
imaginain f he fuure causes f sensibiiy is s vivid ha he
peasure r pain g frm anicipaing hem is as grea as if hey
were presen, r ny ess ivey in prprin as here is a risk f
heir n being reaised. Cnversey i wud seem ha ny ha man
can ac "reasnaby" in whm imaginain f peasure (r f pain) is
aready f equa srengh wih he acua experience f i. Bu, if
he "peasures f he imaginain" are as srng as hse f sense r
f reaiy, he aer bviusy becme superfuus; and i fws
ha he ideay perfec man is ef wihu any mive  aim a he
rea hing, since he can bain as much peasure by imagining i. The
cuured hednis mus, i wud seem, be abe -"Hd a fire in his hand
By hinking n he frsy Caucasus,
Or cy he hungry edge f appeie
By bare imaginain f a feas."
S far as feeing r mive  acin ges, n difference mus exis
fr him beween reaiy and imaginain. And hus, ahugh we may
admi ha, n his psychgica basis, cnduc when rainaised
agrees wih ha prescribed by egisic hednism, ye i can ny be
rainaised by a devepmen f he srengh f he imaginain,
which wud make he feeing which i brings wih i as srng as
ha which accmpanies a rea bjec, and hence ake away he mive
fr he pursui f he aer. The discrepancy beween represenain
and presenain which is necessary fr he sae f desire,[29]
is n nger presen. Hednism vindicaes is rainaiy ny n
cndiins which impy he fuiiy f acin ageher. I is n
merey ha he aainmen f he hednisic end in pracica cnduc
impies a srengh f imaginain f which n ne is capabe, bu
he cndiins f acing bh rainay and hednisicay, are
cndiins which wud parayse a aciviy.
[Sidene: 4. Pssibe bjecins  preceding argumen:]
The freging argumen may perhaps be bjeced  n w grunds. On
he ne hand, i may be said ha i ignres he vas cmpexiy f
human mive, and reas acin as if i were a simpe and absrac
hing. On he her hand, we may be reminded f he fac ha, whie
a men ac fr peasure, he mra quaiy f heir cnduc des n
depend n his fac, bu n he _kind_ f hings in which hey ake
peasure.
[Sidene: (_a_) cmpexiy f mive; bu i is psychgica
hednism which ignres his.]
S far as he firs bjecin is cncerned, i seems  me ha
he fau bengs  he psychgica hery f human acin, he
ehica cnsequences f which are under invesigain. I is his

hery which assers ha, hwever inerwven he hreads f impuse,

aversin, and habi may be, heir ms cmpex reains can be
reduced  he frmua, "greaes peasure, r eas pain, prevais."
I is n necessary, indeed, ha every acin shud be he
cnscius pursui f a peasurabe bjec aready befre he mind in
idea. Bu he hery, if cnsiseny carried u, impies ha he
acin which fws in he ine f a previusy frmed habi, des
s because he discmfr r pain f breaking hrugh he habi wud
be sufficien  cuner-baance any saisfacin ha migh resu.
The bjecin, herefre, f excessive simpiciy r "absracness,"
is ne which cann have greaer frce han when urged agains he
hery f psychgica hednism.
[Sidene: (_b_) difference in kind f peasurabe bjecs;]
[Sidene: bu his invves a reference  smehing ese han
peasure,]
[Sidene: which psychgica hednism des n admi f.]
Furher--and his is he secnd bjecin--he abve anaysis may
be cnsidered by sme n  have aken sufficien accun f he
difference in he bjecs in which a human being can ake peasure,
and f he fac ha he mra quaiy f men differs, n accrding
as hey ac fr peasure r n, bu accrding  he kind f acins
and sufferances in which hey find peasure. There can be n dub
f he imprance f his disincin fr quesins f pracica
mras. The man in whm "sefishness akes he shape f benevence,"
as i did in Benham, is infiniey beer han he man in whm i
reains he frm f sefishness. Bu he cnsiderain is impran
jus because i ges n he impied assumpin ha he hednisic
is n he chief aspec f cnduc, and ha here is a difference
beween curses f acin mre fundamena han he peasurabe r
painfu feeing aendan n hem. If he principes n which he
bjecin is funded were cnsiseny adhered  and fwed u,
hey wud make n peasure, bu smehing ese--ha, namey,
by which peasures differ frm ne anher in kind--he ehica
sandard. Bu if, in uimae anaysis, i is he peasure fe r
expeced ha mves  acin, i wud seem ha here is n way
in which he cncusin f he preceding argumen can be avided.
If peasure is he mive, i mus be _qu_ peasure--ha is 
say, eiher he greaes apparen peasure, r he greaes presen
peasure, is he mive. If difference f quaiy be admied, we
are inrducing a deermining facr her han peasure. Cerain
kinds f peasure may be beer han hers fr he race r fr he
sae. Bu hese differences mus be reducibe  erms f individua
peasure admiing f purey quaniaive cmparisns, befre hey
becme mives  acin.[30] Frm he pin f view f he whe,
we may say ha ne acin eads  a greaer sum f peasure han
anher. Bu, in judging he acin f individuas, a ha we can
say f i is, ha  ne man ne cass f acins gives peasure,
 anher anher: each man is equay fwing he curse f
acin which eiher (_a_) wi bring, r (_b_) seems  him ikey
 bring, he greaes peasure, r (_c_) is acuay ms peasan
a he ime. Frm he naure f he individua we can evve n end
beynd egisic hednism. And even his end can ny be made his
a each ccurrence f acin (assuming he firs aernaive (_a_)
 be incrrec) by enighening his ineec s ha (_b_) wi
crrespnd wih he acua greaes peasure, r by as enivening
his imaginain f fuure peasures and pains s ha (_c_) wi

crrespnd wih i; and his, as has been shwn, cud ny be
effeced under cndiins which are incnsisen wih he principes
f human acin.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] Meaning by "greaes peasure," greaes baance f peasure
ver pain, and hus incusive f he meaning "eas pain." I is he
expressin in erms f feeing f he saemen smeimes preferred,
ha "acin fws he ine f eas resisance"--a saemen 
which n excepin can be aken, nr any imprance awed, i i
be ransaed in definie psychgica anguage.
[16] "Ainsi rsque nus disns que _'inr es 'unique mbie
des acins humaines_, nus vuns indiquer par  que chaque
hmme ravaie sa manire sn prpre bnheur, qu'i pace dans
quequ'bje si visibe, si cach, si re, si imaginaire, e
que u e sysme de sa cnduie end 'benir."--Sysme de a
naure (1781), i. 268.
[17] "On he ccasin f every ac he exercises, every human being is
ed  pursue ha ine f cnduc which, accrding  his view f
he case aken by him a he mmen, wi be in he highes degree
cnribury  his wn greaes happiness."--Cnsiuina Cde,
bk i. 2; Wrks, ix. 5. The cninued exisence f he species is,
Benham hinks, a cncusive prf f his prpsiin.
[18] Thus, accrding  James Mi, "he erms 'idea f peasure'
and 'desire' are bu w names; he hing named, he sae f
cnsciusness is ne and he same. The wrd Desire is cmmny used
 mark he idea f a peasurabe sensain when he fuure is
assciaed wih i."--Anaysis f he Phenmena f he Human Mind,
J. S. Mi's edi., ii. 192; cf. Fragmen n Mackinsh (1835), p.
389 f. T he same effec J. S. Mi says: "Desiring a hing and
finding i peasan, aversin  i and hinking f i as painfu,
are phenmena enirey inseparabe, r raher w pars f he same
phenmenn; in sricness f anguage, w differen mdes f naming
he same psychgica fac."--Uiiarianism, 7h ed., p. 58.
[19] "Wi is he chid f desire, and passes u f he dminin f
is paren ny  cme under ha f habi."--Uiiarianism, p. 60.
[20] Thus Jnahan Edwards says: "When I say ha he Wi is as he
greaes apparen gd, r (as I have expained i) ha viin has
aways fr is bjec he hing which appears ms agreeabe, i mus
be carefuy bserved,  avid cnfusin and needess bjecin,
ha I speak f he _direc_ and immediae bjec f he ac f
viin, and n sme bjec  which he ac f wi has ny an
indirec and reme respec."--On he Freedm f he Wi, par i.
2; Wrks, i. 133. The maer is pu si mre ceary by he ae
Afred Barra: "Acin des n aways fw knwedge. Of curse
n: bu he dcrine [Hednism] des n require ha i shud; fr
i says, n ha we fw wha _is_ ur greaes pssibe peasure,
r wha we knw r 'hink'  be s, bu wha a he mmen f acin
is ms desired."--Mind, v. ii. 173; cf. Physica Ehics, p. 52 ff.
S Mr Sephen, Science f Ehics, p. 47: "I is mre accurae  say
ha my cnduc is deermined by he peasanes judgmen, han 
say ha i is deermined by my judgmen f wha is peasanes." The
negaive side f he same view was expressed by Lcke in his dcrine
ha acin is mved by he ms pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi.

29, 31), and disinguished by him frm he frmer view (b), ha he
"greaer visibe gd" is he mive (II. xxi. 35, 44).
[21] Sidgwick, Mehds f Ehics, 3d ed., p. 40.
[22] Benham, Principes f Mras and Legisain, chap. i., Wrks,
i. 1. Wih his saemen may be cmpared he asserin f Hevius:
"I sembe que, dans 'univers mra cmme dans 'univers physique,
Dieu n'es mis qu'un seu principe dans us ce qui a .... I
sembe qu'i ai di pareiemen 'hmme: ... Je e mes sus a
garde du paisir e de a dueur: 'un e 'aure veiern es
penses, es acins; engendrern es passins, exciern es
aversins, es amiis, es endresses, es fureurs; aumern es
dsirs, es craines, es esprances, e dviern des vris; e
pngern dans des erreurs; e aprs 'avir fai enfaner mie
sysmes absurdes e diffrens de mrae e de gisain, e
decuvrirn un jur es principes simpes, au dveppemen desques
es aach 'rdre e e bnheur du mnde mra."--De 'espri, III.
ix, uvres (e. of 1818), i. 293.
[23] De l'homme, concl. gn., uvres, ii. 608.
[24] Cf. Systme e la nature, i. 120: "La politique evrait tre
l'art e rgler les passions es hommes et e les iriger vers le
bien e la socit."
[25] Bentham, _op. cit._, chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879),
20; Works, i. 148.
[26] Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5.
[27] Sigwick, Methos of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3 e., p. 41; cf. Green,
Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9: "To a being who is simply a result of
natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning."
[28] Cf. The Emotions an the Will, 3 e., p. 293 ff.
[29] Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.
[30] Cf. J. Grote, 'Utilitarian Philosophy,' p. 20, note: "One kin
of pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferre to another, but
it must be because the pleasures classifie uner it generally excee
those uner the other in intensity, or some other of the elements of
value."

CHAPTER III.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.
[Sienote: 1. Different stanpoints of iniviual an state]
It still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical en in some
other way than by stuying iniviual human nature. We may, for
instance, looking from the point of view of the community, fix its
greatest happiness, instea of his own, as the iniviual's en. But
the ifficulty then arises of persuaing the iniviual--or, inee,

making it possible for him--to regar this impersonal goal as the

en of his conuct. For this purpose, Bentham seeme to look to the
exercise of aministrative control which, by a system of rewars
an punishments, will make the greatest happiness of the iniviual
coincie so far as possible with that of the community.[31] J. S.
Mill, on the other han, with his eyes turne to the subjective
springs of action, saw in the graual growth of sympathetic pleasures
an pains the means by which an iniviual's esires woul cease to
conflict with those of his neighbours.
It is in some such way that the transition is mae from Egoism to
Utilitarianism. The transition is mae: Bentham an his school are
an evience of the fact. But it is not therefore logical. It is,
inee, important to notice that we only pass from the one theory to
the other by changing our original iniviualistic point of view.
Having alreay fixe an en for conuct regarless of the ifference
between the iniviual at the time of acting an at subsequent times,
we procee to take the much longer step of ignoring the ifference
between the agent an other iniviuals. The question is no longer,
What is goo or esirable for the person who is acting? but, What is
best on the whole for all those whom his action may affect--that is
to say, for the community?
[Sienote: cannot be logically connecte]
[Sienote: through analogy of state to iniviual.]
[Sienote: Difference between one's own pleasure an the pleasure of
others]
But while it is comparatively easy to see how this transition
is effecte as a matter of fact, it is ifficult to establish
any logical connection between its ifferent stages, or to offer
any consierations fitte to convince the iniviual that it is
reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the community rather than
his own. Only that conuct, it may seem, can be reasonable which
irects an perfects the natural striving of each organism towars
its own pleasure. We may, of course, let our point of view shift from
the iniviual to the social "organism." An in this case, if the
"natural" en of each human being is his own greatest pleasure, the
en of the community, or organise boy of pleasure-seekers, will
naturally be conclue to be the greatest aggregate pleasure of its
members. Thus, if we can hypostatise the community, an treat it as
an iniviual with magnifie but human wants an satisfactions, then,
for this leviathan, the ethical en will correspon to what is calle
Utilitarianism or Universalistic Heonism. But, when we remember
that the community is mae up of units istinct from one another
in feeling an action, the ifficulty arises of establishing it as
the natural en, or as a reasonable en, for each of these units to
strive after the greatest pleasure of all. For it is evient that the
pursuit of the greatest aggregate pleasure may often interfere with
the attainment by the iniviual of his own greatest pleasure. On the
other han, the self-seeking action of the iniviual may no oubt
lea to a loss of pleasure on the whole; but then it is not his own
pleasure that is lost, only other people's. To the outsier--as to
the community--it may seem irrational that a small increase in the
pleasure of one unit shoul be allowe at the expense of a loss of
greater pleasure on the part of other units. But it seems irrational
only because the outsier naturally puts himself in the place of
the community; an neither takes account of the fact that to the

iniviual agent there is a funamental ifference between his own

pleasure an any one else's pleasure: for him the former is, an the
latter is not, pleasure at all.[32]
[Sienote: overlooke in arguing from egoism to utilitarianism.]
This funamental ifference seems to be overlooke when the attempt
is mae to argue logically from egoistic psychology (or even from
egoistic ethics) to utilitarianism. Inee, the hiatus in logical
proof is often only conceale by a confusion of stanpoints; an
J. S. Mill, while emphasising the istinction between moern
Utilitarianism an the oler Epicureanism, has even allowe his
official "proof" of utilitarianism--such proof, that is, as he
thinks the principle of Utility to be susceptible of--to rest on the
ambiguity between iniviual an social happiness.
[Sienote: 2. Connection between egoism an utilitarianism accoring
to Bentham:]
[Sienote: (_a_) Utilitarianism not a political uty,]
This ambiguity oes not seem to have been consistently avoie
even by Bentham. For the most part, inee, nothing can excee
the clearness with which he recognises the twofol an possibly
conflicting interests involve in almost every action. There is the
interest of the agent, an the interest of others whom his action
may affect. An he also hols that, in the case of ivergence of
interests, the iniviual will act for his own. "The happiness of the
iniviuals," he says,[33] "of whom a community is compose,--that
is, their pleasures, an their security,--is the en, an the sole
en, which the legislator ought to have in view--the sole stanar
in conformity to which each iniviual ought, as far as epens upon
the legislator, to be _mae_ to fashion his conuct. But whether it
be this or anything else that is to be _one_, there is nothing by
which a man can ultimately be _mae_ to o it, but either pain or
pleasure"--that is, of course, his own pain or pleasure. Here, then,
ethical Utilitarianism an psychological Egoism are both plainly
involve. A man, it is sai, can only pursue general happiness by its
being ientical with his own happiness. An as it is evient, an
amitte, that these two happinesses often iverge in the courses
of action naturally leaing to them, a man can only be beneficent,
rather than selfish, through some artificial arrangement which makes
beneficence to be for his interest:[34] in plain language (since
rewars are only of exceptional applicability), through his being
punishe for not being beneficent.[35] But, as Bentham clearly shows,
many cases of action cannot be safely touche by the legislator's
art. Such cases "unmeet for punishment" inclue not only the actions
which are beneficial or neutral in their results, but also actions
hurtful to the community, though they may elue such vigilance as the
state can contrive, or their restraint by punishment inflicte by the
state may constitute a greater evil than the offence.[36] _Probity_
may be exacte by the "persons state an _certain_" who happen to be
political superiors: except in rare instances, positive _beneficence_
can not. Utilitarian conuct, therefore, is not a "political uty,"
because it is not fully enforce by efinite punishment. The "art
of legislation" is inee sai to teach "how a multitue of men,
composing a community, may be ispose to pursue that course which
upon the whole is the most conucive to the happiness of the whole
community, by means of motives to be applie by the legislator."[37]
But the means here inicate are such as cannot fully compass the

attainment of the en. For the motives applie by the legislator

either cannot reach a large part of the extra-regaring conuct of
iniviuals, or coul only reach it by entailing greater evils than
those they woul be use to prevent.
[Sienote: (_b_) nor a moral uty,]
[Sienote: (_c_) nor insiste on as a religious uty,]
But if utilitarian conuct is not a political uty, it may seem
evient that it is at least a moral uty. Now a moral uty is sai
by Bentham[38] to be "create by a kin of motive which, from the
_un_certainty of the _persons_ to apply it, an of the _species_ an
_egree_ in which it will be applie, has harly yet got the name of
punishment: by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of
persons _un_certain an variable,--the community in general; that is,
such iniviuals of that community as he whose uty is in question
shall happen to be connecte with." In plain language, then, moral
uty simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours which follows
his conuct in so far as that conuct affects them isagreeably.
Such ill-will on the part of a man's neighbours may result from
success or from failure on his part, from a breach of etiquette, from
refusal to sacrifice to the caprice of those neighbours the wier
goo of the society whom his conuct affects (but to whom it may
be unknown), from eception or from telling the truth. In a wor,
the uty--that is, the punishment--is entirely uncertain: not only
as regars the persons applying it, its nature an its amount, but
also as regars the kin of actions to which it applies. They will
be actions unpleasant to the people who inflict the punishment, but
not necessarily hurtful to the common weal: since the immeiate
effects of an action are easily recognise, while its wier an
more lasting consequences are neither so apparent nor appeal so
surely to the interest of those who are cognisant of the action
an immeiately affecte by it. Moral uty, therefore, as Bentham
efines it, epening on, or rather ientical with, the ill-will
of one's neighbours, is inefinite an limite in its nature, an
can comman or sanction no such efinite an wie-reaching rule for
conuct as that a man shoul always act for the greatest happiness of
the greatest number of people whom his action may affect. Utilitarian
conuct, therefore, is neither a political uty nor a moral uty;
nor oes Bentham follow Paley in insisting upon it as a religious
uty "create by punishment; by punishment expecte at the hans
of a person _certain_--the Supreme Being." An "if he persists in
asserting it to be a uty--but without meaning it to be unerstoo
that it is on any one of these three accounts that he looks upon it
as such--all he then asserts is his own internal _sentiment_; all he
means then is that he feels himself _please_ or _isplease_ at the
thoughts of the point of conuct in question, but without being able
to tell _why_. In this case he shoul e'en say so; an not seek to
give an unue influence to his own single suffrage, by elivering it
in terms that purport to eclare the voice either of Go, or of the
law, or of the people."[39]
[Sienote: (__) nor sufficiently motive in private ethics,]
[Sienote: which can be reuce to pruence.]
This plain piece of avice which Bentham gives to Blackstone is
not often neglecte by himself. The motive, he once sai, of his
own exceptional evotion to the interests of the community was

that it please him. "I am a selfish man," he wrote, "as selfish

as any man can be. But in me, somehow or other, so it happens,
selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence."[40] But when the
matter is thus brought back from the regions of political, moral,
an religious uty, to the iniviual groun of "private ethics,"
we have still to refer to Bentham's own iscussion of the question,
"What motives (inepenent of such as legislation an religion may
chance to furnish) can one man have to consult the happiness of
another?"[41] Bentham at once replies--an inee the answer on his
principles is obvious enough--that there is no motive which always
continues _aequate_. But yet there are, he says, "no occasions
in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness
of other men." Such are "the purely-social motive of sympathy or
benevolence," an "the semi-social motives of love of amity an love
of reputation." A man is irectly move to promote the happiness of
others through the sympathetic feelings which make the happiness of
others in some egree pleasurable to himself; an he is inirectly
move to promote their happiness through his esire of their
frienship an goo opinion. So far, therefore, it is quite true that
"private ethics"--or what Bentham regars as such--"concerns every
member--that is, the happiness an the actions of every member of
any community that can be propose."[42] It certainly concerns their
happiness, but only in so far as this is a means to the happiness
of the agent. So that when Bentham says that "there is no case in
which a private man ought not to irect his own conuct to the
prouction of his own happiness an of that of his fellow-creatures,"
he shoul rather say that a man will[43] only irect his conuct to
the happiness of his fellow-creatures in so far as such action leas
to his own happiness. Private ethics, therefore, has to o with the
happiness of others only so far as this reacts on the happiness
of self; or, as Bentham ultimately efines it, in terms to which
no exception can be taken: "Private ethics teaches how each man
may ispose himself to pursue the course most conucive to his own
happiness by means of such motives as offer of themselves."[44]
*

[Sienote: 3. Bentham's treatment exhaustive from his point of view.]

Uner Bentham's hans "private ethics" is thus reuce to pruence,
at the same time that the author has faile to show why the general
happiness is to be aime at by the iniviual as a religious or
political or moral uty. Nor is this failure ue to any lack of skill
in following out the consequences which his premisses involve. The
arguments use against him have thus an equally vali application to
all who aopt the same general line of thought. For Bentham appears
to have seen as clearly as any of his isciples the ifficulty of
bringing the egoistic basis of his theory of human nature into
harmony with the universal reference require by his ethics. An the
criticism alreay offere of the way in which Bentham attempts to
bring about this connection may be shown not to be restricte to his
special way of putting the case.
It is necessary to remember that throughout this chapter we are
looking from the iniviual's point of view, an inquiring how far it
is possible to work from it in the irection of utilitarianism. Now
it is amitte that, in pursuing his own happiness, he is sometimes
le, an may be le on the whole, to neglect the general happiness.
A sufficient reason for following the latter--or an obligation to o
it--can therefore only come either from the supreme power or from

one's fellow-men, an from the latter either as organise in the

State, an expressing themselves by its constitute authorities,
or else by the vaguer metho of social praise an blame. Bentham's
classification of the possible sources or kins of uty into
religious, political, an moral [or social], is therefore a natural
consequence of the iniviualistic system.
[Sienote: (_a_) The religious sanction,]
[Sienote: relie on by Paley,]
[Sienote: inverts the relation between ethics an theology.]
The first of these possible sources of uty is inee only mentione
by Bentham, an then passe by. An yet it might seem that the
religious sanction is a more efficient motive-power than the social,
while it applies to regions of conuct which legal enactment cannot
reach. Without question, the operation of such a motive is capable of
bringing egoistic conuct into harmony with utilitarianism, or with
any other principle of action to which the sanction may be attache.
"Private happiness is our motive, an the will of Go our rule,"
says Paley;[45] an in this case such conuct will be obligatory as
the rule may arbitrarily etermine; while, whatever it may be, there
will be a strong enough motive to follow it. The whole fabric of a
moral philosophy such as Paley's, therefore, rests on two theological
propositions--that Go has oraine the general happiness as the
rule of human conuct, an that He will punish in another life those
who isregar that rule. The basis of morality is lai in a ivine
comman enforce by a ivine threat. Perhaps it will be generally
agree that Bentham acte wisely in not laying stress on this
application of the "religious sanction." Even those least incline
to theological agnosticism woul reject any such rough-an-reay
solution of the problem which eals with the relation of morality
to the ivine nature. Paley's metho of treatment, they woul say,
inverts the relation in which theism stans to morality. The ivine
will cannot be thus arbitrarily connecte with the moral law. It can
be conceive to approve an sanction such an object as the happiness
of mankin only when Go is first of all regare as a moral
being, an the happiness of mankin as an object of moral action.
If any relation of consequence can be asserte between them, the
general happiness is to be regare as a moral uty first, an only
afterwars as a religious uty.
[Sienote: (_b_) Limits of the political sanction.]
When he comes to the political sanction, Bentham's treatment wants
nothing in respect of fulness, an even those who o not agree
with his estimate of the infelicific character of many existing
institutions an enactments will amit that even the best-intentione
legislator cannot make utilitarian conuct a political uty. We must
bear in min here, also, the effect which iniviual esires an
opinions have not only on social jugments, but also on statute-law.
In arguing on the relation of the iniviual to the State, we are
too reay to forget that the State is represente by a legislator
or boy of legislators, an that we can never assume that in their
cases private interest has alreay become ientifie with the
larger interests of the community.[46] For were this the case, the
accusation of class-legislation or private interest woul not be
hear so often as it is.

[Sienote: (_c_) Uncertainty of the social sanction,]

A moern isciple of Bentham woul thus be compelle, just as
Bentham himself was, to make utilitarianism neither a political nor
religious but a "moral" uty, enforce by an foune on the shifting
an uncertain punishments or sanctions of society--what Professor
Bain escribes as "the unofficial expressions of isapprobation
an the exclusion from social goo offices."[47] But as a logical
proof of utilitarianism, this means is, if possible, weaker than the
preceing; for social opinion, though of somewhat wier applicability
than legal enactment, has probably been, for the most part, in even
less exact corresponence than it with the general happiness. The
social sanction is strict on inifferent points of etiquette, oes
not consult the general interests of mankin on points of honour, an
is lenient towars acts that the utilitarian moralist conemns.[48]
[Sienote: (__) an of the internal sanction so far as a result of
the social.]
Professor Bain, however, avances from the external isapprobation to
an internal sanction--looking upon conscience as one of the powers
which inflicts punishment, an lies at the source of the feeling of
obligation. But if conscience is only "an ieal resemblance of public
authority, growing up in the same iniviual min, an working to the
same en," it can, as little as its archetype, point to the maxim
of utilitarianism. Accoring to Professor Bain, it is through this
sentiment--at first a mere imitation of external authority--that the
iniviual becomes a law to himself, on recognising the utilities
that le to the imposition of the law.[49] But on this theory, in so
far as conscience continues to point to the conuct impresse upon it
by its external pattern, it fails to correspon with the utilitarian
maxim. If, on the other han, it is moifie by the comprehensive
an unselfish view of the effects of conuct which utilitarianism
emans, it must be at the expense of correcting its original
eicts, an so far iscreiting its authoritative claims.
[Sienote: Value of the social sanction]
[Sienote: apart from logical proof of utilitarianism.]
The "social sanction" woul be of much greater service if use to
show how a soliarity is brought about between the interests an
feelings of the iniviual an those of his neighbours, from which
the utilitarian maxim may be arrive at by a generalisation of his
principle of conuct as moifie by the social impulse. But this
woul not constitute a logical justification of utilitarianism: it
woul show how the principle has been arrive at, but without giving
a sufficient reason to the iniviual for aopting it. An this is
really the tenency of much recent iscussion--of Professor Bain's
theory of conscience as a reflex of the external orer, of George
Grote's analysis of the moral sentiment, an of Mill's octrine of
the progressive ientification of the iniviual's feelings with
those of his neighbours through the graual increase of sympathetic
pleasures an pains: for it was to this source that Mill looke for
the practical solution of the antinomy between his psychological an
ethical theories, though he himself trie to pass from one position
to the other by means of the "highway in the air" constructe by his
own logic.
*

[Sienote: 4. Mill's logical efence of utilitarianism:]

Mill's attempt to pass by a logical metho from psychological
heonism to utilitarianism is an instructive commentary on the
ifficulties which beset the transition. His work may be escribe
as a vinication of the utilitarian morality, first, from the charge
of sensualism; an seconly, from that of selfishness. An it is
largely owing to his polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looke
upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It is not sensual,
unless, inee, the pleasures of most men are of a sensual kin. So
far from being selfish, it is almost stoical in the suborination of
iniviual esires it enjoins. But Mill wishe to o more than clear
the character of utilitarian ethics. He wishe to show a logical
reason for utilitarians pursuing elevate pleasures rather than base
ones, an to emonstrate the connection of his moral imperative with
the principles which the school he belonge to lai own for human
motives. In both these respects his failure is conspicuous.
[Sienote: (_a_) istinction of kins of pleasure,]
[Sienote: etermine by authority,]
[Sienote: either can be reuce to ifference of quantity, or leas
to non-heonistic stanar;]
In the former eneavour, he went against Bentham by attempting to
raw a istinction in kin amongst pleasures--a istinction not
reucible to quantitative measurement. A higher egree of quality in
the pleasure sought was to outweigh any ifference in its amount or
quantity. With this moification, utilitarianism is mae to require
a suborination of the lower or sensuous nature to the higher or
intellectual nature. Pleasure, inee, is still the en; but the
"higher" pleasure takes preceence over the "lower," irrespective
of the amount of pleasant feeling that results. Pleasure is still
the stanar, but not the ultimate stanar; for a further appeal
has to be mae to the criterion that istinguishes one pleasure from
another, not as merely greater or less, but as higher or lower. As is
well known, Mill i not look either to the action or to the feeling
itself for this criterion. To have one so woul have implie an
acknowlegment that pleasure was no longer regare as the ultimate
stanar. He foun the criterion of superiority simply in the
opinion people of experience have about the relative esirability
of various sorts of pleasure. But such a criterion only pushes the
final question of the stanar one step farther back. Those people
of experience to whom Mill refers--who have trie both kins of
pleasure, an prefer one of them[50]--can they give no reason for, no
account of, their preference? If so, to trust them is to appeal to
blin authority, an to relinquish anything like a science of ethics.
But, if Mill's authorities can reflect on their feelings, as well as
feel, they can only tell us one or other of two things. Either the
so-calle "higher" pleasure is actually, as pleasure, so preferable
to that calle "lower," that the smallest amount of the one woul be
more pleasurable than the largest amount of the other; or else the
higher is calle higher, an is to be preferre to the lower--even
although the latter may be greater as pleasure--because of a quality
belonging to it over an above its character as pleasant feeling.
The former verict woul be in the first place paraoxical, an, in
the secon place, woul give up Mill's case, by reucing quality to
a quantitative stanar. Besies, it woul be no vali groun of

preference for men in general; since the pleasure of various actions

an states iffers accoring to the susceptibility of the subject.
Accoring to the latter verict, the characteristic upon which the
istinction of quality epens, an not pleasure itself, becomes the
ethical stanar.
[Sienote: (_b_) ambiguities in his proof of utilitarianism.]
In respect of his main contention, that utilitarianism is a theory of
beneficence, an not of pruence or of selfishness, Mill emphasise
even more strongly than Bentham has one the istinction between the
egoism which seeks its own things, an the utilitarianism accoring
to which everyboy counts for one, an noboy for more than one.
But when he attempte to connect this octrine logically with the
psychological postulates of his school, he committe a ouble error.
In the first place, he confuse the purely psychological question
of the motives that influence human conuct with the ethical
question of the en to which conuct ought to be irecte; an, in
the secon place, he isregare the ifference of en there may
be for society as a collective whole, an for each member of the
society iniviually. "There is in reality," he says,[51] "nothing
esire except happiness;" an this psychological theory is too
hastily ientifie with the ethical principle that happiness alone
is esirable, or what ought to be esire an pursue. Moreover,
"no reason," he says, "can be given why the general happiness is
esirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be
attainable, esires his own happiness." An this amission, which
seems as goo as saying that no reason at all can be given why the
iniviual shoul esire the general happiness, is only hel to be
a sufficient reason for it, through assuming that what is goo for
all as an aggregate is goo for each member of the aggregate: "That
each person's happiness is a goo to that person, an the general
happiness, therefore, a goo to the aggregate of all persons."[52]
*

[Sienote: Imperfect coherence of ethical an theoretical philosophy.]

It may appear strange to offer the preceing as the logical basis
of an ethical principle which has ha so wie an, on the whole,
beneficial an influence as utilitarianism. The explanation is to
be foun in the want of full coherence which often exists, an
is nowhere commoner than in English ethics, between an author's
practical view of life an the founation of psychology or
metaphysics with which it is connecte. It woul certainly be wrong
to imagine that Bentham's self-enying labours reste on a confusion
of stanpoints, or that Mill's moral enthusiasm ha no other support
than a logical quibble. To both of them, an to many others,
utilitarianism was an ethical cree influencing their lives, which
was scarcely connecte with the attempt to justify it logically. Such
reasons in its favour as they auce were rather after-thoughts for
the efence of their cree than the founations on which it was built.
[Sienote: 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism.]
The formula of utilitarianism cannot be expresse as the conclusion
of a syllogism or of an inuctive inference. It seems rather to
have been arrive at by the prouction--or the recognition--of a
sympathetic or "altruistic" sentiment, which was mae to yiel a
general principle for the guiance of conuct This process involves

two steps, which are consecutive an complementary, although the

positions they connect are not necessarily relate. The first step is
to overcome the selfish principle of action in the iniviual; the
secon to generalise it an obtain a principle for the non-selfish
action that results. Mill seems to be the only recent writer who,
in making this transition, aheres strictly to the psychological
heonism istinctive of his school. He looks to the influence of
eucation in increasing the feeling of unity between one man an his
neighbours, till iniviual action becomes merge in altruistic or
social action. "The social state," he says, "is at once so natural,
so necessary, an so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual
circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never
conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a boy."[53] This
is perfectly true, but oes not imply a sublation of selfishness. A
man "never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a boy;"
but it oes not follow from this that he will suborinate his own
interests to the interests of the other members when the two clash.
In cases of conflict the iniviual often tens to sacrifice the
goo of his neighbours to his own goo; an he may o so although he
fully recognises the social consequences of action, just because he
still remains at the ethical stanpoint which treats private goo
as superior to public. It is true, as Mill contens, that, "in an
improving state of the human min, the influences are constantly on
the increase, which ten to generate in each iniviual a feeling of
unity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, woul make him
never think of, or esire, any beneficial conition for himself, in
the benefits of which they are not inclue."[54] But this is not
sufficient to connect the two antagonistic poles of Mill's system.
It starts with assuming the notion of an "improving state" of the
human min, as etermine accoring to an ethical stanar not yet
arrive at; an it gives no vali account of the means by which
the improvement is to be brought about. It is prophetic of a time
when the motives of human nature will have been so moifie that
the antagonism between self an others will be no longer felt; but
it offers no practical solution of the antinomy suite to present
circumstances.
[Sienote: (_a_) recognition of Sympathy]
[Sienote: as isintereste, by Bain,]
The basis of the ethical sentiment by which the esires an actions
of a man are to be brought into harmony with those of his fellows
is investigate in a more thorough manner by Professor Bain an by
George Grote. But both of these writers stan on a somewhat ifferent
platform from the strict psychological heonism which Mill never
relinquishe. Thus Grote enumerates as "elementary tenencies of
the min," which ethical sentiment presupposes, an out of which it
is compoune, self-regaring tenencies, sympathetic tenencies,
benevolent affections, malevolent affections, an (though in a
smaller egree) love an hatre of those who cause pleasure an
pain to others;[55] an this without interpreting sympathy, in the
way that Mill oes, as having for its en the pleasures which come
with the gratification of the sympathetic impulse, or the removal of
the pain cause by its restraint. As Professor Bain argues, this
position of Mill's "is tenable only on the groun that the _omission_
of a isintereste act that we are incline to, woul give us so much
_pain_ that it is on the whole for our comfort that we shoul make
the requisite sacrifice. There is plausibility in this supposition."
But "the octrine breaks own when we try it upon extreme cases....

All that people usually suffer from stifling a generous impulse

is too slight an transient to be place against any important
sacrifice."[56] In recognising sympathy as a "purely isintereste"
impulse,[57] Mr Bain breaks loose at an important point from the
psychology of Bentham. He is inee only kept from a complete break
with it by the position he ascribes to sympathy as outsie of the
orinary sphere of voluntary action. Above all things, it woul seem
to be necessary that nothing shoul conflict with "our character as
rational beings, which is to esire everything exactly accoring to
its pleasure-value."[58] But sympathy obviously "clashes with the
regular outgoings of the will in favour of our pleasures;" so that it
ought to be place outsie voluntary action, an regare simply as
"a remarkable an crowning instance of the Fixe Iea."[59]
[Sienote: without being applie to etermine the ethical en,]
It is owing to its exclusion, as a fixe iea, from the sphere of
voluntary conuct, that sympathetic appropriation of the feelings
of others has little or no place assigne it by Professor Bain,
when he goes on[60] to escribe the way in which the moral opinions
of men have actually originate. They have, he hols, a twofol
source--the one arising from the necessity for public security, the
other being of sentimental origin. The former makes society orain
those acts an services require for its own preservation. The
latter leas to the confusion of this necessary element of morality
with the sentimental likes an islikes which may be characteristic
of ifferent people. These are "mixe up in one coe with the
imperative uties that hol society together;" an it is only when
"we isentangle this complication, an refer each class of uties to
their proper origin," that we can "obtain a clear insight into the
founations of morality."[61] Morality, therefore, is that which is
impose by society for its own preservation an security, an which
is sanctione by the punishments of society either in its "public
juicial acts," or "by the unofficial expressions of isapprobation
an the exclusion from social goo offices."[62] Of this external
law the moral sense or conscience is merely a subjective mirror
or copy. The uty of unselfishness is not connecte with the
isintereste impulse of sympathy, but is trace to the external
orer of society, which has foun it necessary to restrain the
self-seeking action of iniviuals--a restraint which has come to be
transferre to the consciences of the members of the society.
Mr Bain's theory falls back in this way upon external authority, just
as Bentham's i; an, for the same reasons, they are neither of
them able to prescribe the utilitarian principle of conuct. But, in
his assertion of the isintereste nature of sympathy, Mr Bain has
introuce--though he has not himself utilise--a fruitful principle,
by means of which a basis of moral sentiment may be foun by means of
which it is possible to escape from ethical as well as psychological
egoism.
[Sienote: an by Grote.]
This element of sympathy is most fully recognise in the instructive
analysis of ethical sentiment by the late George Grote. At the same
time, Grote oes not, like Aam Smith, for instance, attempt to
evolve the material characteristics of approbation an isapprobation
from this source. The mere putting of one's self in the place of a
spectator--or in that of the patient--instea of that of the agent,
is only a formal change, which will moify our jugments or feelings

without accounting for their actual content. But a uniform formal

element in all ethical sentiment is, accoring to Grote, a man's
"constant habit of viewing an juging of circumstances aroun
him," both from the point of view of the agent an from that of the
patient.[63] This twofol position is occupie by every iniviual.
He is an agent, an in that position his own interests an feelings
are separate from, an often at variance with, those of others. But
he is also a patient in respect of the actions of others, an in
that position his interests an his feelings are commonly in unison
with those of the majority. Hence a man is le constantly to aopt
ieally the point of view which is not actually his own at the time,
so that "the iea of the jugment which others will form becomes
constantly an inissolubly associate with the iea of action in
the min of every agent." In every community, certain actions are
visite with the amiration, esteem, an protection of the society;
certain other actions with the opposite feelings an results: so that
there arises "an association in my min of a certain line of conuct
on the part both of myself an of any other iniviual agent, with
a certain sentiment resulting from such conuct, an excite by it,
in the mins of the general public aroun us. It is a sentiment of
_regulate social reciprocity_ as between the agent an the society
amongst which he lives." An this sentiment, when enforce by a
sanction, constitutes the complete form of ethical sentiment.
As a complete explanation of the moral sentiments an jugments of
men, this theory oes not seem to be above criticism. It requires
not only an association between every personal action an the
feelings--sympathetically imagine by the agent--with which the
action will be regare by others, but it also implies that this
association has become so inseparable that the feeling appears as
an iniviual or personal one, istinguishe by the subject from
other sentiments which he has on consciously imagining himself in
the position of others. But it is referre to here as illustrating
what we fin in Mill, an, in a ifferent way, in Professor Bain,
that the first real step towars the utilitarian stanar is to make
the iniviual pass somehow or other to a stanpoint outsie his own
nature. In Mill this is one mainly by the assertion of the social
nature of man, in Grote by showing how a moral sentiment may be
arrive at by the combine action of sympathy an association.
[Sienote: (_b_) The iea of Equality]
[Sienote: necessary to regulate sympathy;]
The further influence require in the transition to utilitarianism
is the iea of equality. The best expression of utilitarian octrine
followe soon after the assertion of the equal rights of men which
signalise the politics of the en of last century in the French an
American revolutions. Bentham was permeate by the spirit of this
movement, however far he might be from accepting its abstractions
about natural rights. In his hans, too, utilitarianism was a
political rather than an ethical octrine. "Everyboy to count
for one an noboy for more than one" follows naturally from the
phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Without
this assertion of the necessity of an equal istribution, there is
no safeguar against sympathy being restricte an partial in its
operation. Inee the feeling of sympathy in itself is naturally
strongest towars those with whom one is in most frequent relation,
or connecte by numerous associative ties; an if left to itself,
it might therefore be expecte to give rise to the extene

selfishness of class or family interest, only relieve by a spasmoic

humanitarianism. This tenency is correcte by the ogma of human
equality, which ha been formulate as a juriical maxim in the Roman
_Jus Gentium_, but afterwars passe into a political cree, an
foun vent in the literature of the eighteenth century an in the
public events which marke its close.
[Sienote: influence of the iea on Bentham.]
The change which this notion of human equality--passe through has
been trace by Sir Henry Maine. "Where the Roman jurisconsult ha
written 'quales sunt,' meaning exactly what he sai, the moern
civilian wrote 'all men are equal' in the sense of 'all men ought to
be equal.' The peculiar Roman iea that natural law coexiste with
civil law an graually absorbe it, ha eviently been lost sight
of, or ha become unintelligible, an the wors that ha at most
conveye a theory concerning the origin, composition, an evelopment
of human institutions, were beginning to express the sense of a great
staning wrong suffere by mankin."[64] Now Bentham, however far
he may have been from trusting to the system of 'natural law,'[65]
was certainly not beyon the influence of the iea of human equality
which it carrie in its train; an, from his own point of view, he
laboure to efen it. In assimilating this iea, utilitarianism has
preserve one of the best results of the ol "law of nature," without
the ambiguity with which it ha formerly been use,[66] if in a sense
which amits of a somewhat narrow an abstract interpretation.
It is true that this oes not give exactly the result which is
usually escribe as utilitarianism. I have spoken of the notion of
equality as the regulator of sympathy--a canon in accorance with
which the sympathetic impulse is to be guie. Sympathy impels us
to relieve the pains an increase the pleasures of our fellow-men.
The principle of equality ictates that this sympathetic activity is
to be irecte to the happiness of all men equally. Every one whom
our conuct may be mae to affect is to count as a unit, an a unit
only. The istribution is not to be accoring to kinship of bloo
or social ties, though it is so much more in our power to promote
the happiness of those closely connecte with us, that it may fairly
occupy a larger share of our thought an energy than the happiness
of other people oes. Utilitarianism carries the application of the
principle of equality still farther, by looking upon self as a unit
whose happiness is to be regare as of exactly equal value with that
of any one else. With every iniviual reuce to the same ethical
worth, happiness is eclare to be the en of moral action, an
equality of istribution the rule for eciing between the claims of
competing iniviuals.
[Sienote: 6. The two sies of utilitarian theory not logically
connecte.]
It seems to me, therefore, that utilitarianism is a theory compoune
out of two quite ifferent elements. On the one sie the basis of the
theory has been lai by Bentham an Mill in a naturalistic psychology
which looks upon pleasure as the only object of esire. To this
there is superae the iea of equality, which is the istinctively
ethical element in the theory. But it is only by confusion that
the iea of equality--which Bentham expresses by the proposition
that the happiness of one man is to count for no more than the
happiness of another--can be suppose to be erive from the same
theory of human nature as that which ientifies pleasure an esire.

Utilitarianism only becomes a practicable en for iniviual conuct

when psychological heonism has been given up. It is futile to say
that one ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, unless it is possible for the iniviual to act for something
else than his own pleasure--that is, for an en which is for him
not pleasure at all. In a wor, utilitarianism, while maintaining
that the only thing worth esiring is pleasure, must at the same
time amit that pleasure is not the only object that can be or is
esire: otherwise, it can never avance from the egoistic to the
universalistic form.
This view receives confirmation from the way in which utilitarianism
is hel by the most eminent of living moralists. In the 'Methos
of Ethics,' the traition of Bentham is expressly unite with the
octrines of Butler an Clarke. Professor Sigwick agrees with
Bentham, an the long line of moralists from Epicurus ownwars,
in maintaining the octrine of ethical heonism, that pleasure is
the only thing ultimately esirable; but, with Butler, he rejects
the psychological heonism, accoring to which pleasure is the only
object of esire. So far from these two positions being inconsistent,
it is only through the secon that the first can be hel in its
universalistic form. The problem is, however, how to unite them. In
Professor Sigwick's theory, they are connecte by the application
of the ethical maxims of benevolence an equity, which an exhaustive
examination of ethical intuitions has left staning as axioms of
the practical reason. Though utilitarianism, therefore, is still
ahere to, it is on an expressly Rational groun, not on the basis
of Naturalism.
*

[Sienote: 7. Summary of ethical consequences of psychological

heonism:]
In this an the previous chapter, I have looke at human nature from
the point of view of psychological heonism, an have eneavoure to
show what ethical principles that theory leas to, or is consistent
with. The theory oes not eny that there is a great iversity
of capacities an interests in man. But it hols that, so far as
concerns conuct, they amit of being brought uner one general
law--that every action is subject to the rule of the "two sovereign
masters, pleasure an pain." It is evient, therefore, that if ethics
is to be connecte at all with psychology--if what ought to be
one is in any egree what can be one--the en of conuct must be
heonistic. The psychological fact cannot inee be without more ao
turne into a moral imperative. Yet this much may be amitte, that
if this interpretation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the
en prescribe can be nothing else than pleasure, or the avoiance of
pain.
[Sienote: (_a_) no logical connection with utilitarianism;]
The question, therefore, was how to etermine the pleasure which
is to be sought? An I have trie to show, in the chapter just
conclue, that utilitarianism oes not amit of being logically
arrive at from this point of view. It may inee, uner certain
circumstances,[67] be the guie of political or social enactments;
but these can only be mae to bear upon the conuct of iniviuals
by the sanctions which the State or Society has at its comman. The
iniviual can have as his maxim of conuct an en which correspons

with utilitarianism in two events only: when he is so constitute

as to fin his pleasure in the greatest aggregate pleasure of
mankin, or when the political an social sanctions are so complete
an searching as to make his iniviual interest an the collective
interest coincie. The former event is unfortunately too rare to be
taken into account in establishing a theory; the latter woul imply
an interference with iniviual liberty so impracticable that it
is not contemplate even in the most comprehensive of socialistic
schemes.
[Sienote: (_b_) amits of rational egoism]
[Sienote: only uner impossible conitions.]
Heonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism in ethics. But
even this theory, as the previous chapter has shown, has its own
ifficulties to meet. The antagonism of iniviual an universal has
not yet been got ri of. The ifficulty is no longer cause by the
conflict between one man an his neighbours: it is the ifference
between the feeling an action of a moment, an the sum of feelings
an actions which makes up a lifetime. It is true that, if we
amit that pleasure is the only thing worth pursuing, an that by
"pleasure" a man means "his own pleasure," there is so far no reason
for preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of another, except
as more certain or of greater amount or egree;[68] but this is to
start with ascribing a value to pleasure, an not with the simple
fact that pleasure is esire. If psychological heonism is our
starting-point--an we give to the theory the interpretation that
has the greatest verisimilitue--it is the greatest present pleasure
that rules. An, although the man of reflection will no oubt attempt
to estimate the future pleasure at its true value in comparison
with the pleasure actually present, this can never have full effect
upon his will. It has been shown, inee, that the realisation of
egoistic heonism is not merely unattainable from the point of view
of psychological heonism, but that it woul involve conitions
inconsistent with the nature of esire.
FOOTNOTES:
[31] Professor Bain istinguishes with greater clearness than his
preecessors, first, legal uty, or that the contravention of which
is punishe by the ministers of the state; seconly, moral uty,
enforce by the unofficial punishment of social isapprobation; an
thirly, the conuct which society leaves to iniviual choice,
without censuring either its commission or omission. Moral uty is
further istinguishe by him from the meritorious, or conuct which
society encourages by approval, without censuring its omission.
[32] Mr Gurney's attempt (Min, vii. 349 ff.) to rationalise the
utilitarian "ought" epens upon the assumption that the iniviual
feels a esire (not only for his own, but) for other people's
pleasure (p. 352). From the point of view of the psychological
heonist, however, this esire is only seconary an erivative,
epening upon the fact that it increases the pleasure of the
subject. "Your pleasure," the psychological heonist woul say,
"is esire by me _qu_ my pleasure." If, on the other han, it is
amitte that the iniviual has other ens than his own pleasure,
there seems no groun in psychological fact for limiting these ens
to something aime at because pleasurable to others. From this point
of view the first step in the establishment of an ethical theory

woul be an attempt to fin a principle of unity in the various ens

actually aime at by iniviuals, an recognise by them as "goo."
This is mae by Professor Sigwick, who, while allowing that "it is
possible to hol that the objective relations of conscious mins
which we call cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Freeom of
action, &c., are goo, inepenently of the pleasures that we erive
from them," maintains that "we can only justify to ourselves the
importance that we attach to any of these objects by consiering its
conuciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of conscious
(or sentient) beings" (Methos of Ethics, iii. xiv. 3, 3 e., p.
398). But Mr Sigwick's Utilitarianism epens on a Rational view of
human nature which is beyon the scope of the present iscussion. See
below, p. 74.
[33] Principles of Morals an Legislation, chap. iii. 1; Works, i.
14.
[34] As Paley put it, with characteristic plainness of statement, "We
can be oblige to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose
something by."--Moral an Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. ii.
[35] Cf. Bain, Emotions, p. 264: "I consier that the proper
meaning or import of these terms [Morality, Duty, Obligation, or
Right] refers to the class of actions enforce by the sanction of
_punishment_."
[36] Bentham, Principles of Morals an Legislation, chap. xix.
(xvii.), 9 ff; Works, i. 144 ff.
[37] Ibi., 20, p. 148.
[38] Fragment on Government, chap. v.; Works, i. 293. Cf. Principles
of Morals an Legislation, ch. iii. 5, p. 14, where the Moral
Sanction is sai to procee from "such _chance_ persons in the
community as the person in question may happen in the course of his
life to have concerns with."
[39] Bentham, Fragment on Government, _loc. cit._
[40] Works, xi. 95; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 137.
[41] Principles of Morals an Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii.), 7 ff.
[42] _Loc. cit._, 8, p. 144.
[43] "Ought" is inappropriate here accoring to Bentham's principles,
since there is no question of punishment inflicte by a political or
social or religious superior.
[44] _Loc. cit._, 20, p. 148.
[45] Moral an Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii.
[46] This is clearly recognise by Bentham: "The _actual_ en [as
istinguishe from the right an proper en] of government is,"
he says, "in every political community, the greatest happiness of
those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government are
exercise."--Constitutional Coe, book i., Intro., 2; Works, ix. 5.
[47] The Emotions an the Will, p. 264.

[48] Cf. Bain, The Emotions an the Will, p. 287. Professor Bain says
(Emotions, p. 276 n.), "we ought to have a written coe of public
morality, or of the uties impose by society, over an above what
parliament imposes, an this shoul not be a loosely written moral
treatise, but a strict enumeration of what society requires uner
pain of punishment by excommunication or otherwise,--the genuine
offences that are not passe over." This woul certainly be very
esirable, were it not from the nature of the case impracticable.
Popular jugment as to a man's conuct,--what society imposes,--is
one of the things most ifficult to preict: it is uner the
influence of most heterogeneous causes, personal, inustrial,
religious, political, &c. I o not think, for instance, that any one
coul safely unertake to escribe exactly the kin of actions which
will infallibly call forth the censure of British public opinion, or
that of the smaller an intersecting groups into which society is
ivie.
[49] Emotions, p. 288.
[50] I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two kins
of pleasure easily istinguishable. But the question is really much
more complicate.
[51] Utilitarianism, p. 57.
[52] Ibi., p. 53.
[53] Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of man
coul be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler, Sermons,
i.
[54] Utilitarianism, p. 48.
[55] Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6.
[56] The Emotions an the Will, 3 e., p. 295.
[57] Ibi., p. 111; cf. Min, viii. 55: "The important exceptions to
the law of Pleasure an Pain are (1) Fixe Ieas, (2) Habits, an (3)
Disintereste action for others."
[58] Emotions, p. 438.
[59] Emotions, p. 121.
[60] Ibi., p. 271 ff.
[61] Ibi., p. 273.
[62] Ibi., p. 264.
[63] Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.
[64] Ancient Law, 8th e., p. 93.
[65] Principles of Morals an Legislation, chap. ii. 14 n.
[66] The ambiguity of the phrase is explaine in an interesting
way in Sir H. Maine's account of the change from its juriical to

a political or ethical meaning. In some writers it seems to have a

thir an still ifferent signification. We must thus istinguish
(1) the juriical meaning, originating in the Roman "law common to
all nations," which ha arisen through the "constant _levelling_ or
removal of irregularities which went on wherever the prtorian system
was applie to the cases of foreign litigants," moifie subsequently
by the Greek conception of (~i o ~). (2) T
e poliical
meaning, 
a all men oug
 o be equal, aro e from 
e preceding.
Bu i noion of "oug
" eem ofen o depend on an idea of 
e
con iuion of naure according o w
ic
all men are acually born
equal--no only in rig
 , oon o be ob cured by
uman convenion,
bu al o in power or faculy, aferward unequally developed by
educaion. Hence (3) 
e naural meaning. T
e docrine of evoluion
and
erediy
ave made 
i view eem a range o u now a i
would
ave done o 
e Roman from w
om i wa illegiimaely
derived. Ye a one ime i eem o
ave been a umed, almo 
wi
ou que ion, 
a 
ere i bu lile difference in 
e naural
endowmen of differen men. T
i a umpion lay a 
e ba i of
Hobbe ' poliical 
eory--Levia
an, I. xiii. p. 60,--wa aed
in a more guarded form by Locke--On Educaion, 1; Work , ed. of
1824, i. 6,--and adoped almo  wi
ou qualificaion by Helviu ,
w
o, carrying ou Locke' meap
or of 
e oul a , a bir
, a
"abula ra a," aferward wrien over wi

e pen of experience,
ay : "Quinilien, Locke, e moi, di on : L'ingali de e pri
e  l'effe d'une cau e connue, e cee cau e e  la diffrence de
l'ducaion"--
e cau e of 
e exi ing inequaliy being aferward
aed a wofold: fir , 
e difference of environmen, w
ic
may be
called c
ance; and econdly, 
e difference of reng
in 
e de ire
for in rucion.--De l'
omme, II. i., III. i., I. xxii.; uvres, ii.
71, 91, 280. (Quintilian's statement, however, is even more guare
than Locke's. Cf. Opera, e. Spaling, i. 47.)
[67] That is, when (1) the legislature accurately expresses
the average feeling of all the members of the State; or (2)
the legislators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom
"selfishness" has taken the shape of benevolence.
[68] Although, as is well known, propinquity was hel by Bentham to
be an inepenent groun of istinction an preference.--Principles
of Morals an Legislation, chap. iv, sect. 2.

CHAPTER IV.
MORAL SENTIMENT.
[Sienote: 1. A uniform theory such as psychological heonism]
Psychological heonism possesses the merit of offering a simple an
uniform theory of mental action. It may amit conflicting accounts of
the kins of action an sufferance which actually give men pleasure
an pain,--a point on which, for example, Hobbes an J. S. Mill
iffer wiely. But it has one general formula for the relation of
feeling to action, which has been precise an clear enough to attract
many psychologists. The ethical consequences of the theory have,
inee, turne out--if the argument of the preceing chapters is
vali--to be neither so obvious nor so satisfactory as its aherents

have commonly suppose. But it must nevertheless be amitte that, if

psychology shows pleasure to be, as a matter of fact, the constant
en of action, it will be useless--even if it is not impossible--for
ethics to prescribe any other en.
[Sienote: not supplie by the opponents of ethical heonism,]
The opponents of ethical heonism have thus uniformly insiste that
the theory which makes pleasure the en an motive of all conscious
activity is imperfect; an this psychological question has been the
battle-fiel of many of the controversies, at any rate, of English
ethics. Psychological heonism has not, however, been confronte by
the English moralists with an oppose theory of equal simplicity,
nor can the controversy be sai to have le to a thorough analysis
of action. The psychological investigation has, in most cases,
been carrie no farther than the ethical interests at stake seeme
to require; an the preominance of these interests has perhaps
prevente the inquiry from being carrie out with complete freeom
from preconception on either sie.
A uniform theory uner which our various particular esires might
be brought may, inee, be sai to have been suggeste by Butler.
He meets the heonistic proposition that all esire is for personal
pleasure, by the octrine that no particular esire has pleasure as
its en, since all pleasure presupposes a previous esire in the
satisfaction of which it consists.[69] This theory, which may have
been erive from Plato,[70] an was afterwars use by Schopenhauer
to prove the negative nature of pleasure an consequent worthlessness
of life, is, however, a generalisation which cannot be mae to
inclue the whole facts to be taken account of.[71] Many pleasures
occur inepenently of any preceent esire. An what Butler ha
to show--an was really concerne to show--was that esire was not
exclusively irecte to objects thus inepenently foun to be
pleasurable: the contraictory, that is to say, an not the contrary,
of psychological heonism.
[Sienote: in maintaining the reality of non-heonistic activity.]
For this purpose Butler pointe to the whole class of affections
which, although they may also ten to private interest, have an
immeiate reference to the goo of others; an, in aition to
these, he contene for an original principle of benevolence towars
others in human nature, as well as of self-love or care for one's
own interests an happiness. This latter, he hel, so far from being
the sole principle of action, implie the existence of a number of
particular passions an affections, irecte immeiately to external
objects--the satisfaction of these esires giving pleasure, though
pleasure was not the en they aime at. Voluntary action is thus not
brought uner any common rubric; for, at the same time that the calm
principle of self-love is irecte to the agent's greatest pleasure,
the object of hunger, for example, is sai to be not pleasure but
foo, that of benevolence not personal pleasure but the goo of
others.
[Sienote: Non-heonistic action generalise by Herbart,]
[Sienote: from the tenency of ieas to self-realisation.]
The attempt to give unity to the non-heonistic view of esire has
come from a ifferent quarter. Uninfluence by the exigencies of

ethical controversy, which forme the entire motive of Butler's

investigation, Herbart an his school have worke out a theory of
esire, which has many points of comparison with that of Butler.
However much they may iffer from the English moralist--of whose
existence they are mostly ignorant--they are at one with him in
rejecting the maxim of psychological heonism, _nihil appetimus nisi
sub specie boni_; an their ifferences from him are largely ue
to their having gone further in their analysis of the facts, an
eneavoure to bring them uner a general principle.
Butler's view of the object of esire is istinguishe from the
Herbartian chiefly in two respects. In the first place, he ientifies
that object with the external or real thing, whereas Herbart is
careful to point out that it is a presentation or iea. In the
secon place, while Butler is content to postulate an original
tenency of our nature towars certain objects, Herbart attempts
to get behin this tenency, an explain the phenomena of striving
from the interaction of presentations. Over an above the orinary
hypothesis of natural realism, Butler's theory implies a sort of
pre-establishe harmony between our active tenencies an things
outsie the min, in virtue of which some of these things o, an
some o not, attract our esires. Herbart, on the other han,
attempts nothing less than a complete genetic account of mental
phenomena, explaining the facts of presentation, esire, an feeling
through "the persistence of presentation in consciousness an their
rise into clearer consciousness."[72] The phenomena of esire an
feeling are both accounte for by this mechanism of impelling an
inhibiting forces.[73]
[Sienote: This tenency recognise in the octrine of fixe ieas]
It woul be beyon the scope of this Essay to examine the above view
of the active sie of mental phenomena. For present purposes it is
enough to raw attention to the fact that the common euction of
the phenomena of esire an will from the feelings of pleasure an
pain is not the only "scientific" theory of human action, an that
it is rejecte on its merits by writers who have no hankering after
what the psychological heonist woul call the mystical element of
free-will. It is of interest to note, too, that Professor Bain,
in whose works the traitions of psychological heonism fin
their most careful expression, has moifie the octrine so as
to allow of esire of pleasure an avoiance of pain explaining
less than ha been formerly require of them. Outsie the circle
of heonistically-etermine motives, he recognises the influence
of the presentation or iea as a self-realising element in the
iniviual consciousness, apart from its pleasurable or painful
characteristics.[74] Those "fixe ieas," as Mr Bain calls them,
ten both to persist in the min, an to project themselves into
action, inepenently of pleasure an pain--or at least with a force
which is out of proportion to the pleasure they bring. As has been
alreay seen, it is by means of this octrine that he explains "the
great fact of our nature enominate sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity,
compassion, isinteresteness."[75] To the same category belongs
"much of the ambition an the aspirations of human beings.... A
certain notion--say of power, wealth, graneur--has fixe itself in
our min an keeps a persistent hol there." It is asserte, inee,
that the action of such fixe ieas "perverts the regular operation
of the will which woul lea us to renounce whatever is hopeless or
not worth the cost." An, certainly, their amission among mental
phenomena seems to imply the superposition of a new theory of action

upon the ol theory of psychological heonism. There is no isguising

the importance of the moification thus introuce. The name "fixe
iea" is misleaing if it be taken to imply that persistency an
tenency to action are properties belonging to a certain class of
ieas only. Mr Bain's octrine is foune on the hypothesis of the
ientity of the nervous centres which function in representation
an in sensation, an is therefore vali of all representations
or ieas. The characteristics of persistency, an of tenency to
action, are therefore normal characteristics of presentations,
though they may belong in an unusual egree to some ieas from
the relation these hol to the ominant cluster of ieas in the
iniviual consciousness. An if we thus attribute to all ieas
without exception the tenency to self-realisation, an recognise--as
we must--the relation of mutual assistance or inhibition which ieas
bear to one another in virtue of their being "presente" to the same
subject, we have grante the material out of which, in Herbart's
skilful "Mechanik es Geistes," the phenomena of feeling an esire
are woven.
*

[Sienote: 2. The non-heonistic theory of action.]

The view of iniviual human nature, which hols that all its esires
are not irecte to personal pleasure, thus claims consieration.
With its less restricte theory of action, this octrine may
seem to offer a larger means of etermining the appropriate en
of human conuct. In particular, the suggestion naturally occurs
that the ethical en will, on this theory, be something else than
pleasure.[76] But there is, nevertheless, no contraiction in
holing--as Mr Sigwick oes--that although other objects than
pleasure are actually esire, there is nothing else which can be
hel to be ultimately esirable, or the tenency to which can be sai
to have moral worth.
[Sienote: Difficulty of unifying the various impulses it implies,]
The ethical barrenness of psychological heonism has been seen to
result from its narrow an inflexible view of human nature. But
theories such as those now to be consiere have, in an ethical
regar, to overcome a ifficulty of another kin in the variety of
impulses which they amit upon the stage. The "objects" to which
these impulses or esires relate have as yet receive no further
characterisation than that they are objects of esire. An the
ifficulty of fining a principle by which some orer of preceence
or value amongst them may be etermine is just, in other wors, the
ifficulty of obtaining a moral stanar.
[Sienote: so as to etermine a stanar for action.]
The question oes not orinarily arise in the above form, because
the moral stanar is commonly taken for grante, an the various
impulses, affections, an ispositions are mae to erive their
ethical rank from their relation to that stanar. But this metho is
obviously inappropriate when the stanar is still to be ascertaine,
its etermination being the object of inquiry. An it may seem that
the constitution of man contains in itself a means of istinguishing
the moral value of its various elements, or of the actions to which
they lea, an thus furnishing a moral stanar or en for conuct.
This purpose seems to have been to some extent, though not quite

clearly, kept in view by the writers who, in last century, contene

against the selfish theory which ha been so cruely enunciate by
Hobbes. They attempte to show that selfishness was not the only, nor
even the most prominent, principle of action; an, from the system of
iverse principles which they foun implante in human nature, they
eneavoure to work out a theory of conuct.
[Sienote: This attempte by the English moralists,]
[Sienote: but along with a utilitarian criterion,]
[Sienote: an with egoistic arguments.]
Especially amongst the later English moralists--Aam Smith, for
instance--the question of the en or stanar came almost to rop
out of sight in the mist of the controversy regaring the nature
of the "moral sense" or "moral faculty"--the way, that is, in which
we become aware of the ifference between right an wrong. But in
Shaftesbury, Butler, an Hutcheson--the writers who formulate this
octrine of the moral sense--the attempt is mae to connect a theory
of the criterion of morality with the source of our knowlege of it.
Shaftesbury an Hutcheson both looke upon social welfare or the
general happiness as the en of moral conuct, an the criterion in
accorance with which moral character is ascribe to actions; at the
same time that their main contention was for the immeiateness of the
"sense" by which we perceive these moral qualities. An they sought
to establish the connection of the two octrines by means of the
benevolent feelings--which they hel to be original an inepenent
of private interest--an their immeiate approval by the reflex or
moral sense of the iniviual man. Similar ieas appear in Butler, at
the same time that he tene to make conscience or the moral sense
the stanar of morality, as well as the source of our knowlege of
it. They, as well as he, however, foun it necessary to come back
from the social or political to the iniviual point of view. Even
if their conception of "the goo" was not evolve from the nature
of the iniviual man, their philosophical stanpoint require them
to leave broaer groun, an show it to be the iniviual's natural
goal. An in oing this, their constant tenency is to revert to
egoistic arguments--emonstrating the complete harmony of virtue an
interest, or attempting to prove to the iniviual that his own
happiness consists in the exercise of the social affections. Thus
Shaftesbury tries to show, by an empirical collection of results,
that to have the "natural" (or social) affections too weak, or the
private affections too strong, is a source of misery,[77] as well as
the chief source of vice; an that, largely owing to the pleasure of
virtuous action, it is "to the private interest an goo of every
one to work to the general goo."[78] Hutcheson, again, evotes a
large portion of his most mature work to allay the suspicion "that in
following the impulse of our kin affections an the moral faculty
we are counteracting our interests, an abanoning what may be of
more consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation
or the applauses of others;"[79] while Butler, referring to virtuous
conuct, says, in a well-known passage, that "when we sit own in
a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other
pursuit, till we are convince that it will be for our happiness, or
at least not contrary to it."[80] Oppose as the whole school were to
the selfish theory of human action, they never spoke of any sacrifice
of private happiness as a thing to be looke for, or in any way taken
into account, in conuct which is the result of calm eliberation.
It is ifficult, therefore, to avoi the jugment passe upon them

by Schleiermacher, that "the English school of Shaftesbury, with all

their talk about virtue, are really given up to pleasure."[81]
[Sienote: 3. Ethics may be mae to epen on the moral sense.]
At the same time, their writings constantly suggest a theory of
morals which is neither oblige to aopt off-han a utilitarian
criterion of virtue, nor force to fall back upon the egoistic
sanctions of personal pleasure an pain. Their psychological theory
points to an ethical octrine in which pleasure is neither the sole
en of action, nor its sole motive. They o not, inee, make quite
clear the transition from the psychological to the ethical point
of view; an critics are still fon of confronting Butler with the
objection he anticipate--Why ought I to obey my conscience? The
apparent _petitio principii_ of Butler's answer, Because it is the
law of your nature, is ue to the way in which the teleological
stanpoint is introuce. The purpose of which (accoring to Butler)
man is the vehicle or realising organism is spoken of as a law
externally impose, an eriving its authority, not from its own
nature, but from the nature of its origin.
[Sienote: Different views of the nature of the moral sense.]
There woul seem to be one way only to surmount the ifficulty
arising from the variety of impulses of which the nature of man is
mae up, an that is by consistently following out the teleological
point of view. But what, the question is, is the final or
comprehensive en to which human nature points amist this iversity
of objects of striving? The octrine of the "moral sense" attempts
to answer the question. Now this moral sense may either be regare
as not itself a separate faculty, but simply an expression for the
harmony of human tenencies; or it may be looke upon as a separate
an superior capacity, which, again, may either be interprete in
terms of sense, or of the unerstaning--the former interpretation
leaing to its ientification with pleasure, the latter to its being
conceive as law.
*

[Sienote: (_a_) The harmony of impulses. Shaftesbury's theory.]

These ifferent methos were attempte by the English moralists--the
first, however, to a less extent than the others. But it inspire
much of Shaftesbury's work, though it cannot be sai to have been
consistently evelope by him. The conflict of impulses in man
was too obvious a fact not to be apparent even in Shaftesbury's
roseate view of life. He recognise, inee, not only private
or self-affections, promoting the goo of the iniviual, an
"natural" or social affections, which le to the public goo, but
also "unnatural affections," which tene to no goo whatever.[82]
The reference to consequences is thus mae prominent at once.
The last class of affections is conemne outright because of
its infelicific results; while an attempt is mae to prove from
experience that the courses of conuct to which the two former lea
coincie. Shaftesbury contene for a real organic union between the
iniviual an society; but, when he came to establish its nature,
he mae it consist in an asserte harmony of interests, while the
obligation to virtue was allowe to rest on its conuciveness to
personal pleasure. He sometimes spoke of virtue as ientical with the
harmonious evelopment of the affections of the iniviual man;[83]

but he expressly efine it as consisting in the iniviual "having

all his inclinations an affections ... agreeing with the goo of
his kin or of that system in which he is inclue, an of which he
constitutes a part."[84] An the two views can only be connecte by
proving that the harmonious evelopment of an iniviual's affections
will lea to the goo of the species: the proof of this epening
on a one-sie summation of consequences. Shaftesbury oes, inee,
throw out the iea that both the self-affections an the "natural" or
social affections become self-estructive when carrie out so as to
interfere with one another. But this, again, has only the previous
calculus of the results of conuct to support it. He cannot show
that the contraiction in the conception of a completely solitary
being belongs also to the conception of a juiciously selfish
being. The latter being loses the pleasures of virtuous action;
but perhaps he may gain greater pleasures in their room. He oes
not evelop his whole nature; but if that nature contains totally
infelicific passions, the evelopment of the whole nature is not to
be recommene.
Thus Shaftesbury is unable to reach a conception of man's nature
as a harmony of impulses just on account of the external point of
view which makes him treat it as an aggregate, though he contens
that it is an organism. His ingenious an subtle account of the
relations between the iniviual an society oes not really go to
the root of the matter, because, after all, it remains a calculus
of the results of action, not an analysis of its nature. An his
view of the affections constituting the iniviual system leaves
them wanting in the unity of organic connection. An effort is mae,
however, to supply this efect by means of the reflex affections
calle the "moral sense," to which he ascribes an oversight over the
other affections an their resultant actions. In what way, then, must
we regar the nature of this faculty an the important functions
assigne to it?
*

[Sienote: (_b_) A separate faculty. Hutcheson.]

[Sienote: Two questions regaring it:]
It was left to Shaftesbury's isciple, Francis Hutcheson, to
elaborate with thoroughness this conception of the moral sense as
a separate faculty. Hutcheson i not make any important aition
to the ieas of Shaftesbury an Butler. But he worke them out
more systematically; an in his last work, the 'System of Moral
Philosophy,' the protest against the egoism of Hobbes has foun
expression in a complete theory of human nature, in which the
"moral sense" is supreme, an the ens of conuct inepenent of
self-interest. Hutcheson, too, keeps more closely than either of his
immeiate preecessors to the way of looking at human nature which
is spoken of in this volume as "naturalistic." He rejects even more
eciely than Shaftesbury--much more so than Butler--any creative
function of reason in etermining the constitution an irection of
the moral sense.[85] The questions thus arise--(_a_) What is the
moral sense when not regare as a rational etermination of the
ens of conuct? an (_b_) To what etermination of ens or other
istinction between right an wrong in action oes it lea? On both
these points there is a ifference between his early 'Inquiry into
the Original of our Ieas of Beauty an Virtue' (1725), an the more
mature 'System,' publishe in 1755, eight years after his eath.

[Sienote: () N ture of this f culty: not re son;]

[Sidenote:

t first defined s feeling of ple sure or p in,]

Hutcheson is in e rnest with the rejection of re son s cre tive

force. The mor l sense is not, he s ys, source of new ide s.
Its o
jects re received in the ordin ry w ys
y which, through
"sens tion nd reflection," we come
y our knowledge.[86] But just
s we h ve
sense of
e uty in the forms of sensi
le o
jects, so
there is
mor l sense given us from which, in the contempl tion
of our ctions, we derive "still no
ler ple sures" th n those of
physic l sens tion. This mor l sense is " determin tion of our minds
to receive mi
le or dis gree
le ide s of ctions."[87] So f r,
therefore, it seems to
e simply ple sure in the contempl tion of
cert in ctions which, we s y, h ve " n immedi te goodness." "By
superior sense," s ys Hutcheson, "which I c ll mor l one, we
perceive ple sure in the contempl tion of such ctions in others,
nd re determined to love the gent ( nd much more do we perceive
ple sure in
eing conscious of h ving done such ctions ourselves)
without ny view of further n tur l dv nt ge from them."[88] The
signific nce of this position is e sily seen. It is not only me nt
to give criterion of mor l ction; it is lso
short cut to the
conclusion th t virtue is for our priv te interest. The disquieting
suspicion th t mor lity m y involve s crifice of individu l
h ppiness "must
e entirely removed, if we h ve
mor l sense nd
pu
lic ffections, whose gr tific tions re constituted
y n ture
our most intense nd dur
le ple sures."[89] The el
or te n lysis
of conduct nd enumer tion of the ple sures which v rious ffections
nd ctions
ring in their tr in, which Hutcheson g ve in his l test
work, were thus unnecess ry s long s the position w s m int ined
th t the mor l sense is emph tic lly ple sure or p in, nd th t the
ple sures it gives re the most intense nd dur
le we h ve.
There w s only n pp rent contr diction in this theory which
pl ced the test of mor lity in ple sure consequent upon mor l
ction, nd yet held th t such ctions were not performed from
interested motives. In the spirit of Butler's psychology, Hutcheson
contends[90] th t virtue is ple s nt only
ec use we h ve
n tur l
nd immedi te tendency tow rds virtuous ction; our true motive is
"some determin tion of our n ture to study the good of others;" nd
this, lthough not lw ys immedi tely ple s nt in itself, is yet
succeeded
y the c lm s tisf ction of the mor l sense. The re l
we kness of Hutcheson's position is the f t l one th t he c nnot show
th t it corresponds with f cts; th t the ple sures incident l to the
mor l sense outweigh ll others. Indeed, he defends his opinion in
their f vour only, in w y which reminds one of Mill's method in the
'Utilit ri nism,'
y m king every juror st nd side unless he h s
pledged himself to mor lity.[91] It is open to ny one, however, to
hold th t the ple sures of
enevolent ction nd the "relish" of the
mor l sense re not of sufficient hedonistic v lue to m ke up for
the restr ints they put upon conduct nd the enjoyments they o
lige
one to forego. Even if this position
e not correct, it is merely
mist ke in estim ting dou
tful qu ntities. The m n who chooses the
sm ller ple sure will
e the loser
y his mist ke;
ut we c nnot s y
th t the selfish m n is to
l me for not
eing
enevolent,
ec use
the ple sures of
enevolence nd the mor l sense re gre test, ny
more th n we could
l me the
enevolent m n for not
eing selfish,
if selfishness should turn out on the whole to le ve gre ter
hedonistic
l nce t the individu l's credit.

[Sidenote:

fterw rds spoken of s

judgment,]

[Sidenote:
ut this judgment llowed to depend on feeling.]

A more o
jective determin tion of the mor l sense is fterw rds given

y Hutcheson. Without professedly ch nging ground, he ce ses to spe k
of it s mere feeling of ple sure, nd c lls it judgment of
ppro
tion or dis ppro
tion. "It is," he s ys,[92] " n tur l nd
immedi te determin tion to pprove cert in ffections nd ctions
consequent upon them; or n tur l sense of immedi te excellence
in them, not referred to ny other qu lity perceiv
le
y our
other senses or
y re soning." Nor is this judgment of ppro
tion
consequent upon the feeling of ple sure the ffection or ction
produces in us. The ction is not "judged good
ec use it g ins to
the gent the ple sure of self- ppro
tion,
ut it g ins to him this
ple sure
ec use it w s ntecedently good, or h d th t qu lity which,

y the constitution of this sense, we must pprove."[93] But, in
ttempting to m ke cle r the n ture of this judgment, Hutcheson seems
to return, though not in so m ny words, to his e rlier position.
To seek

sis for the judgment in re son would h ve
een to m ke
the "mor l sense" wh t K nt fterw rds m de it, simply pr ctic l
re son. This, however, would h ve
een "met physic of ethics"
inconsistent with Hutcheson's whole position. He h d lw ys opposed
the n rrowly intellectu l view of mor lity in Cl rke nd Woll ston,
nd he h d no conception of the function of re son which would dmit
of n interpret tion of the judgment of ppro
tion
y n ppe l
to r tion l determin tion, depending upon n ide conceived s
inherent in the hum n constitution, nd to
e re lised in ction.
The judgment, therefore, is referred to "t ste or relish"[94]
for cert in ffections nd ctions, nd this he t kes no p ins to
distinguish from ple sure.
The n logy he seeks to dr w
etween the mor l sense nd our other
powers does not re lly f vour distinction of it from ple sure. "To
e ch of our powers," he s ys, "we seem to h ve corresponding t ste
or sense, recommending the proper use of it to the gent, nd m king
him relish or v lue the like exercise of it
y nother. This we see
s to the powers of voice, of imit tion, designing, or m chinery,
motion, re soning; there is
sense discerning or recommending the
proper exercise of them."[95] Th t is to s y,
esides the sense of
he ring, which h s to do with sounds, there must needs
e nother
sense which h s to do with our w y of he ring sounds;
esides the
sense of sight, which h s to do with form nd colour, there must
needs
e nother sense which h s to do with our w y of perceiving
form nd colour; nd so with every other ctivity, especi lly those
which proceed from our "highest powers." A doctrine such s this sets
no limits to the m nuf cture of ddition l senses. The whole view of
hum n n ture upon which it proceeds is one of me ningless complexity,
which serves the one good purpose only of showing how much ethics h s
suffered from defective psychology.
The ment l o
jects or present tions which re distinguished from
one nother
y the difference of their ch r cteristic qu lities,
nd which we therefore c ll colours, or sounds, or movements, re
ccomp nied
y v rying degrees of ple sur
le or p inful feeling;
nd it is possi
le to hold th t the mor l sense is
n me for such
feelings following in the tr in of those complexes of present tions
to which we give the n me of ctions, or of those other recurring
complexes we c ll ffections. This, pr ctic lly, w s the position

with which Hutcheson st rted in the 'Inquiry.' Benevolence ple sed us

nd selfishness p ined us; just s the t ste of sug r w s ple s nt,
nd th t of wormwood dis gree
le. Perh ps Hutcheson dep rted from
this theory,
ec use he s w th t if conduct w s m de m tter of
t ste, there would
e no sufficient re son for condemning selfishness
ny more th n n unusu l t ste. He therefore relinquished, or seems
to h ve relinquished, the view of the mor l sense s feeling of
ple sure or p in; nd under the influence, no dou
t, of Butler,
spoke of it s judgment of ppro
tion or dis ppro
tion. But he
fell
ck on his origin l theory
y m king this judgment depend on
" t ste or relish," which only lends itself to interpret tion s
peculi r feeling of ple sure.
[Sidenote: () The o
jects of the mor l sense: first s id to
e
ctions;]
[Sidenote:

fterw rds to
e ffections;]

The reflex n ture of the mor l sense is
rought out more distinctly
in the 'System' th n in the 'Inquiry.' In his e rlier work, Hutcheson
h d spoken of it s directly rel ted to _ ctions_. But it w s more
consistent with his m turer thought to reg rd it s h ving to do
with ment l powers or " ffections" in the first inst nce, nd with
ctions only indirectly or medi tely. "The o
ject of this sense,"
he s ys,[96] "is not ny extern l motion or ction,
ut the inw rd
ffections or dispositions;" nd this is m de
y him to ccount for
the discrep ncy which the deliver nces of the mor l sense show in
reg rd to ctions. It "seems ever to pprove nd condemn uniformly
the s me immedi te o
jects, the s me ffections nd dispositions;
though we re son very differently
out the ctions which evidence
cert in dispositions or their contr ries." This distinction is
pplied with unlimited confidence in its effic cy. By me ns of it
he would expl in the most fund ment l differences in the mor l code
of men nd n tions. Thus people un cqu inted with the industri l
improvements which give the ch r cter of perm nence to property,
m y "see no h rm in depriving men of their rtifici l cquisitions
nd stores
eyond their present use,"--th t is to s y, "no evil m y
ppe r in theft."[97]
But it is more import nt in nother respect; for it en
les the
uthor to void the difficulty of finding ny principle ccording
to which the mor l sense m y
e rel ted to the empiric l content of
ction. As long s the mor l sense w s simply spoken of s feeling
of ple sure, it could
e conveniently reg rded s the consequent
of extern l ctions. But if it is n intern l sense distinct from
ple sure, it is e sier to rel te it to wh t he c lls our intern l
powers or ffections th n to ction. The mor l sense, then, is to

e the regul tor of ll our powers; nd
y me ns of it Hutcheson
ttempts to reduce hum n n ture to sc le of mor lity.
[Sidenote:
ut its grounds of preference]
[Sidenote: m inly depend not on the n ture of the ffection,
ut on
its o
jects.]
It is to
e noted th t, in the cl ssific tion he offers,[98]
wh t re commonly c lled the virtues of c ndour, ver city, &c.,
re not ccounted virtues t ll,
ut only immedi tely connected
with virtuous ffections: these re identified with the "kind" or

enevolent ffections, directed to the h ppiness of sentient
eings.

Within the l tter there re two grounds of preference: the deli
er te

ffections re preferred to the p ssion te; those which re more
extensive in the r nge of their o
jects to the less extensive.
With reg rd to the former ground of preference, the "mor l sense"
of the community h s perh ps undergone some modific tion since
Hutcheson's time, nd looks upon enthusi sm with less suspicion th n
it formerly did. The other ground of preference scri
ed to the
mor l sense refers not so much to the ffection itself--which is
the direct or immedi te o
ject of the mor l sense-- s to the w y in
which the ffection is pplied, the num
er of the o
jects to which
it is directed. The ffection of
enevolence is the s me in n ture
whether its o
ject
e wide or restricted; though difference in this
respect profoundly influences the ctions to which it le ds. The
o
ject pproved or most pproved
y the mor l sense is therefore,
ccording to Hutcheson, utilit ri n conduct, or r ther, s he would
s y, the c lm disposition le ding thereto.[99] In this w y he o
t ins
principle for determining the mor lity of ctions;
ut only through
the r
itr ry ssertion th t this principle is immedi tely pproved

y the mor l sense. The connection of the mor l sense with n o
ject
such s univers l
enevolence could only
e m de out
y showing
r tion l, or t ny r te n org nic union
etween individu l
sentiment nd soci l well
eing; nd Hutcheson, like Sh ftes
ury,
h s no conception of ttempting this in ny other w y th n the
tr dition l one of exhi
iting the person l dv nt ges of
enevolent
conduct, nd the dis dv nt ges th t ccomp ny selfishness.
*

[Sidenote: (_c_) Third view of the mor l sense.]

[Sidenote: Butler.]
[Sidenote: Conscience n uthorit tive l w,]
Both Sh ftes
ury nd Hutcheson were often led str y
y tendency
to interpret f cts s they wished them to
e, r ther th n s they
were. Their view of the consequences of ction w s coloured
y their
optimism. Butler, too, in spite of the difference in his gener l
ttitude to the v lue of hum n life, w s not ltogether free from
simil r error. He thinks th t Sh ftes
ury "h s shown
eyond ll
contr diction th t virtue is n tur lly the interest of h ppiness,
nd vice the misery of such cre ture s m n."[100] But, in view of
p rticul r exceptions, or of ny one not
eing convinced of "this
h ppy tendency of virtue," he thinks it necess ry to emph sise the
"n tur l uthority of the principle of reflection." Conscience is,
he holds, p rt of our inw rd n ture;
ut it differs from the other
p rts of our n ture in smuch s it is not rel ted immedi tely to n
extern l o
ject,
ut to the ctions de ling with such o
jects, nd
to the dispositions le ding to those ctions. It is principle of
"reflex ppro
tion or dis ppro
tion," which is s id to h ve equ l
respect to
oth pu
lic nd priv te good. This tendency, however,
would seem to
e scert ined empiric lly. The deliver nces of
conscience re immedi te judgments s to the mor lity of ctions nd
ffections (for Butler spe ks of it s referring to
oth equ lly);
nd its reference to the ends which those ctions or the exercise of
these ffections m y ultim tely tend to would, therefore, seem to
e
indirect.[101] Butler w s c reful, moreover, not to spe k of it s
n sthetic or sensitive f culty,
ut s judgment. It is not
feeling of ple sure,
ut the revel tion of l w.

[Sidenote:

nd the criterion of mor lity.]

The pprov l of conscience is thus m de the criterion of mor lity.

But difficulty rises s to the w y in which we re to reg rd the
uthority which conscience is s id to c rry long with it. Butler's
utter nces here commonly imply teleologic l reference to n end
impl nted in hum n n ture, nd to
e discovered
y o
serving th t
n ture--the re lis tion of the end
eing o
lig tory,
ec use it is
shown to
e the purpose which the uthor of n ture h d in view in
m king m n s he is.[102] The uthority of conscience thus seems to

e derived from the divine purpose which it displ ys. It c rries
within itself
cl im to o
edience;
ut the justific tion of this
cl im depends on theologic l
sis. And hence the question of
the n ture nd origin of conscience is t once r ised, in order to
determine the legitim cy of its cl im to
e, r ther th n ny other
p rt of our constitution, divinely-impl nted guide.
[Sidenote: Teleologic l nd jur l views not reconciled, nor fully
developed.]
But more th n one current of thought runs through Butler's ethic l
tre tise. The theologic l reference is sometimes so used s to
m ke the o
lig tion to mor lity, nd even the n ture of mor lity,
depend on the will of God: though h rdly ccording to P ley's crude
method of seeking in the extern l revel tion of the divine comm nd
me ns of uniting the divergent interests of the individu l nd
of society. In gener l, Butler's ruling ide is the ide of the
system or unity of hum n n ture, for which he w s l rgely inde
ted
to Sh ftes
ury's reviv l of the Pl tonic conception. Conscience is
reg rded
y him s the expression of this unity. But its n ture is
never more deeply pro
ed. Its deliver nces re justified now
y
its supern tur l mission, nd now
y the more pros ic f ct th t it
le ds to our individu l interest[103]-- t ny r te, "if we t ke in
the future"--while it could not
e recommended s guide if it
did not.[104] On one side, therefore, Butler tends to
form of
theologic l utilit ri nism, such s w s common in his own d y, nd
w s fterw rds formul ted
y P ley.[105] On the other h nd, his
ethics more n tur lly llies itself with different theory, in which
the mor l l w is conceived s h ving its source in pr ctic l re son,
nd the n tur listic
sis of ethics is definitely
ndoned.
[Sidenote: 4. The ethics of mor l sentiment

medi ting theory;]

[Sidenote: expl n tion of its f cts ttempted
y theory of evolution.]

On the whole, it would ppe r th t the psychologic l ethics worked
out
y Sh ftes
ury nd his school occupies n insecure position

etween the view discussed in the two preceding ch pters nd th t
which scri
es to re son function in the form tion of o
jects of
desire. Sh ftes
ury nd his followers tried to strike out
middle
course
etween the theory th t ends of ction m y
e determined
y
re son, nd th t which looks upon ll desires s
eing desires for
o
jects s ple sur
le. They m de the ttempt to found system of
ethics on hum n n ture, nd they held th t th t n ture could not
e
ccounted for
y the simple psychologic l n lysis of the Epicure n
school s then represented
y Ho

es. On the other h nd, they did
not see their w y to dopt the "r tion l" ethics only known to them
in the
str ct form it h d received t the h nds of Cl rke nd
Woll ston. But their own theory of hum n n ture requires principle
of h rmony nd co-ordin tion mong the v rious impulses which they

were un
le to give s tisf ctory ccount of. It m y seem, however,

th t the ide of the development of m n with which we re now
f mili r, m y en
le us to overcome the difficulties which formerly
ppe red insurmount
le--showing the unity of hum n n ture, nd the
tendency of its ctivity. The gener l course of evolution, to which
ll life h s
een su
ject, is thought to h ve
rought
out h rmony

etween individu l nd soci l feelings, s well s
etween individu l
nd soci l interests, nd thus to h ve removed the o
st cles in
the w y of founding mor lity on the
sis of N tur lism. It is,
therefore, of import nce to ex mine with c re the ethic l
e rings of
the theory of evolution.
FOOTNOTES:
[69] "The very ide of n interested pursuit necess rily presupposes
p rticul r p ssions or ppetites; since the very ide of interest or
h ppiness consists in this, th t n ppetite or ffection enjoys its
o
ject."--Sermons, Pref.; cf. Serm. xi.
[70] Phil., 31 ff.; cf. Gorg., 495 f.; Rep., ix. 585.
[71] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44.
[72] Her
rt, Psychologie ls Wissensch ft, 104, Werke, vi. 74;
cf. W itz, Lehr
uch der Psychologie ls N turwissensch ft, 40, p.
418: "It is not difficult to recognise the
sis of desire in the
present tions
rought forw rd
y reproduction, nd, t the s me time,
held
ck
y n inhi
ition."
[73] With Her
rt's doctrine m y
e comp red Mr H. Spencer's view
of the genesis of feeling nd volunt ry ction, Principles of
Psychology, 2d ed., p rt iv. ch ps. viii. nd ix.
[74] Cf. note to J mes Mill's An lysis, ii. 383 f.
[75] The Senses nd the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344; cf. Ment l nd
Mor l Science, pp. 90, 91.
[76] "If there
e ny principles or ffections in the mind of m n
distinct from self-love, th t the things those principles tend
tow rds, or the o
jects of those ffections re, e ch of them in
themselves eligi
le to
e pursued upon its own ccount, nd to
e
rested in s n end, is implied in the very ide of such principle or
ffection."--Butler, Sermons, Pref.
[77] Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3.
[78] I
id., II. ii., conclusion.
[79] System of Mor l Philosophy, i. 99.
[80] Sermons, xi.
[81] Kritik der
isherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54.
[82] Inquiry, II. i. 3.
[83] Inquiry, II. i. 3; II. ii. 2.
[84] I
id., II. i. 1.

[85] "Wh t is Re son
ut th t s g city we h ve in prosecuting ny

end? The ultim te end proposed
y the common mor lists is the
h ppiness of the gent himself, nd this cert inly he is determined
to pursue from instinct. Now m y not nother instinct tow rds the
pu
lic, or the good of others,
e s proper
principle of virtue s
the instinct tow rd priv te h ppiness?"--Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115.
[86] Cf. System, i. 97; Inquiry, p. 124.
[87] Inquiry, p. 124.
[88] I
id., p. 106.
[89] Ess y on the N ture nd Conduct of the P ssions nd Affections,
with Illustr tions on the Mor l Sense (1728), p. xix.
[90] Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff.
[91] Introduction to Mor l Philosophy, tr nsl ted from the L tin, 2d
ed., 1753, p. 43; cf. Ess y on the P ssions nd Affections, &c., p.
128.
[92] System, i. 58.
[93] System, i. 53.
[94] I
id., i. 59.
[95] System, i. 59.
[96] System, i. 97.
[97] System, i. 93.
[98] System, i. 68 ff. With this m y
e comp red the el
or te
cl ssific tion of motives, ccording to their mor l qu lity, in Dr
M rtine u's 'Types of Ethic l Theory,' ii. 176 ff.
[99] System, i. 50.
[100] Sermons, Pref.
[101] Although it is not " t ll dou
tful in the gener l, wh t course
of ction this f culty or pr ctic l discerning power within us,
pproves.... It is ... justice, ver city, nd reg rd to the common
good."--Dissert tion on Virtue.
[102] Sermons, ii. iii.
[103] Sermons, iii. v.
[104] I
id., xi.
[105] Cf. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, i. 192.

PART II.

THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

CHAPTER V.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.
[Sidenote: 1. Gener l ch r cteristics of the theory of evolution:]
To relinquish the individu listic theory of ethics does not
necess rily imply
recourse to evolution. It m y still
e possi
le
to rest the found tion of ethics on the st te, without th t view of
the growth of the community nd of its connection with the individu l
which the theory of evolution involves. This, s h s lre dy
een
pointed out, w s, in p rt, wh t Benth m did; while n ttempt--in
some respects more el
or te still--to deduce mor lity from society
w s m de
y Ho

es. The theory of Benth m, nd of his successor
Professor B in, is indeed p rtly individu listic, p rtly soci l.[106]
In the former reference, ethics
ecomes
theory of prudence; in
the l tter, p rt of legisl tion. With Ho

es, on the other h nd,
the identific tion of individu l nd soci l interests is supposed
to
e
rought
out
y the
solute necessity, in order to person l
security, of supreme politic l power, into the h nds of which ll
men h ve greed to tr nsfer their rights to ll things. But
oth
Ho

es nd Professor B in might h ve voided o
vious difficulties h d
they h d the theory of evolution to ssist them, nd h d they thought
themselves justified in m king use of it.[107] For w nt of it the
former h s to expl in mor lity nd its
inding force
y me ns of the
fiction of n "origin l contr ct"; while the l tter h s to ccount
y
the ssoci tions of few ye rs for the h rmony of feeling
etween
the individu l nd the whole, nd for the good of the community
coming to
e so f ithfully reflected in the consciences of its
mem
ers. The theory of evolution,
y its doctrine of the heredit ry
tr nsmission of cquired modific tions, gives
scientific
sis for
this existing solid rity
etween m n nd society.
The gre t consensus of opinion mongst those who re
est qu lified
to judge-- mongst those who lone re qu lified to judge--m y
e
reg rded s h ving est
lished the cl im of the theory of evolution
to give the most s tisf ctory ccount of ll forms of n tur l life.
And it m y seem only dv ncing the theory
step further, or only
developing one of its pplic tions, to m ke it yield complete
expl n tion of hum n n ture, ment l s well s physic l. If ethics,
then, is to
e founded on
"n tur l"
sis, no theory would seem to

e complete which le ves evolution out of ccount.
[Sidenote:

n ssertion of the unity of life;]

In gener l, the theory of evolution is n ssertion of the unity of

life, or, in its widest form, of the unity of existence. Progressive
modific tions nd heredit ry tr nsmission of such modific tions
re, it is contended, sufficient to expl in the different forms
nd species which life now m nifests. The ssumption is speci lly
disc rded th t there re fixed differences
etween kinds of living
things m king it impossi
le for them ll to h ve developed from
simple germs, origin lly of like constitution, which h ve, in the
course of time,
ecome more heterogeneous nd complex, nd so given
rise to the we lth of org nic life. But this gener l doctrine, held

(wholly or in p rt) in modern times
y K nt, Wolff, nd L m rck,

needed to
e supplemented
y definite view of the w y in which
the progressive modific tions took pl ce; nd this required to
e
est
lished s re lly oper tive c use,
efore evolution could
receive scientific proof. This more speci l element of the theory
w s D rwin's contri
ution to the su
ject. Evolution, he showed,-- nd
herein consists his theoretic l dv nce on L m rck,--h s t ken pl ce

y the "n tur l selection" of org nisms, so modified s to fit them
for surviv l in the struggle for existence. Org nisms in which
dv nt geous modific tions h ve
een produced tend to survive, nd
to tr nsmit their modified structure to descend nts, while org nisms
in which such modific tions h ve not
een produced, re less
le to
preserve their life nd to h nd it on to successors. Older types, it
is true, rem in,
ut only in circumst nces in which their continued
existence does not seriously interfere with the org nisms which, in
the struggle for life, h ve developed
structure
etter suited to
their environment: when more perfect nd less perfect forms c nnot
exist together, only the
etter d pted survive.
[Sidenote: in first inst nce, historic l;]
[Sidenote:
ut implies
consequences.]

teleologic l spect, which m y h ve ethic l

The theory of evolution is thus prim rily the history of n order of

sequent f cts nd rel tions. It is n ccount of the origin or growth
of things, which ttempts to expl in their n ture nd constitution

y showing how they h ve come to
e wh t they re. But, in so doing,
it n tur lly reve ls the method nd tendency of this order. And it
is
y me ns of this its teleologic l spect th t we see how it m y

e possi
le for it not merely to tr ce the development of historic l
f cts, such s the feelings nd customs of men,
ut t the s me
time to m ke more re l contri
ution to ethics
y pointing out the
course of ction to which hum n n ture is d pted. It does not,
like the old teleology, ttempt to show th t e ch thing h s
een
formed with the design of su
serving some p rticul r purpose. On the
contr ry, it reverses this w y of looking t things. The fitness of
n org nism to fulfil ny definite end comes to
e reg rded s the
result not of conscious design, independent of the environment,
ut
of the modific tions produced on the org nism through the necessity
l id upon it
y its surroundings of d pting itself to them or
else dis ppe ring. Wh t the theory does show is, th t d pt tion
to environment is necess ry for life, nd th t org nisms un
le to
d pt themselves p ss w y. Ad pt tion to environment will thus
e
implied in, or
e n essenti l me ns tow rds, self-preserv tion
nd r ce-preserv tion, self-development nd r ce-development. And
should this preserv tion or development
e looked upon s the end of
conduct, the d pt tion to environment it implies m y help to define
nd ch r cterise the end.
Ag in: when n org nism d pts itself to its environment, it does so

y some modific tion
eing produced in its structure corresponding
to the modified function required
y the conditions of life. In this
w y, one org nism incre ses in complexity in cert in direction,
while nother org nism, in different circumst nces, lso develops
more complic ted structure, though one of different kind. Thus
org nisms, like to
egin with,
ecome heterogeneous in n ture
through exposure to different surroundings. At the s me time,
y
const nt inter ction with their environments, they
ecome more
definite nd coherent in structure. Incipient modific tions re

developed nd defined in different w ys
y different circumst nces,

nd the p rts of
living
eing re
rought into closer reciproc l
rel tions, nd thus welded into coherent org nic whole. This
is wh t Mr Spencer me ns when he s ys th t evolution implies
tr nsition from " n indefinite incoherent homogeneity to
definite
coherent heterogeneity":[108] the whole process
eing interconnected
in such w y th t these different spects of it--definiteness,
coherence, heterogeneity--incre se together nd imply one nother. By
this the inference would ppe r to
e suggested th t, if conduct is
to h rmonise with the conditions of evolution, this ch r cteristic
fe ture of it must
e recognised in the ethic l end.
[Sidenote: Distinction of its historic l nd ethic l spects.]
In s ying this, I m perh ps nticip ting results. But it is well to
show t the outset how the essenti lly historic l inquiry c rried
out
y the evolutionists m y suggest conclusions which re ethic l
in their n ture. To some, indeed, it will ppe r superfluous to h ve
spent even
sentence in suggesting _prim f cie_ c se for the
ethic l import nce of evolution. If there is one su
ject more th n
nother, it m y
e thought, which h s secured
pl ce for itself in
the scientific consciousness of the d y, it is the evolution-theory
of ethics. Without question, the phr se h s
een received into the
scientific voc
ul ry;
ut there is
good de l, even in the offici l
liter ture on the question, to m ke one dou
t whether it is lw ys
used with distinct conception of its me ning. When reference is
m de to the "ethics of evolution," no more is sometimes me nt--though
gre t de l more should
e me nt--th n n historic l ccount of the
growth of mor l ide s nd customs, which m y provide ( s Mr Stephen
expresses it) " new rmoury wherewith to encounter cert in pl usi
le
o
jections of the so-c lled Intuitionists." This, however, would only
ffect the ethic l psychology of n opposed school. The profounder
question still rem ins, Wh t
e ring h s the theory of evolution,
or its historic l psychology nd sociology, on the n ture of the
ethic l end, or on the st nd rd for distinguishing right nd wrong in
conduct? The nswer to this question will
e the "reconstruction"
nd "deeper ch nge" which Mr Stephen holds to
e necess ry.[109] It
is the m
iguity of the su
ject--or r ther its twofold r nge--which
h s m de the pplic tion of evolution to ethics look so o
vious,
nd m de discussion of the e sier question frequently do duty
for solution of the more difficult. The ethic l writings of the
evolutionists, indeed, often confuse the pro
lems of history nd
theory in w y which presents the s me difficulty to the critic s
the works of the corresponding school in jurisprudence. In
oth, the
writers seem disinclined f irly to put to themselves the question s
to the kind of su
jects to which so fruitful method s th t which
h s f llen into their h nds is ppropri te: wh t its conditions re,
nd whether it h s ny limits t ll. Every one is now f mili r with
the evils of hypothetic l history, nd with the iniquity of the
prover
i l philosophic offence of constructing f cts out of one's
inner consciousness. The historic l jurists deserve no little credit
for the thoroughness with which this h s
een enforced
y them;
perh ps, too, the s me lesson m y
e le rned from the f cts of the
development of mor lity. But it m y
e questioned whether we re
not t the present time more pt to confuse f ct nd theory in the
opposite w y: whether the science of l w is not sometimes lost sight
of in the history of leg l institutions, nd ethics in d nger of

eing identified with the development of mor l sentiments nd customs.
We m y n tur lly expect the theory of evolution to throw light on

such questions s the growth of mor l feelings nd ide s, nd of

the customs nd institutions in which mor lity is expressed nd
em
odied. But to show the process mor lity h s p ssed through in
the individu l mind nd in society still le ves the question s to
the end of conduct un nswered. It is necess ry, therefore, to keep
cle rly
efore us the distinction
etween the historic l nd the
ethic l pro
lem, if we would successfully tt ck the su
ject of the

e ring of the theory of evolution on this fund ment l question of
ethics. To the theory of evolution we re inde
ted for the opening
up of new field of investig tion--the historic l tre tment of
conduct. But it is one thing to descri
e the w y in which men h ve
cted in the p st: to determine the end for their ction now is quite
different pro
lem; nd there is no re son why the distinction
should
e overlooked. The interest which
elongs to the history of
mor lity is not solely nor m inly due to its
e ring on questions

eyond the historic l sphere. Th t its results will not
e without
rel tion-- nd th t of n import nt kind--to questions of theory m y
well
e expected. But it c n only tend to confusion if we tre t the
development of mor lity, in the hum n mind nd in society, from
preconceived ttitude--dogm tic or gnostic--tow rds the centr l
pro
lem of ethics.
*

[Sidenote: 2. The development of mor lity: (_ _) historic l

psychology.]
The w y in which the theory of evolution is pplied to ethic l
psychology is e sy enough to underst nd in principle, though complex
nd o
scure in m ny of its det ils. We h ve only to postul te th t
ment l s well s
odily tr its dmit of modific tion, nd th t
modific tions once produced c n
e tr nsmitted to descend nts,[110]
nd it t once follows th t sentiments nd ide s le ding to ctions
which promote life will
e encour ged nd developed
y n tur l
selection. Thus p rent l nd fili l feelings, once origin ted, m y
h ve
een developed through those f milies nd tri
es in which they
were strongest, presenting more united, nd therefore stronger,
front g inst hostile influences. The feelings of tri
l symp thy
nd p triotism, too, m y h ve h d simil r history. Those r ces in
which they were strongest would, other things
eing equ l, o
t in
the m stery over nd extermin te other r ces in which they were
rel tively we k. The comp ctness of the community would even
e
promoted
y th t fe r of the politic l nd of the religious control
in which the feeling of o
lig tion is s id to h ve h d its root.
In gener l,
enevolence nd symp thy mongst
people give it
solid rity from which it derives stronger position, so th t in turn
the
enevolent nd symp thetic feelings g in free scope to develop
nd exp nd.
[Sidenote: Its difficulties: the origin of new feelings,]
[Sidenote:

nd of the mor l consciousness;]

But the working out of this theory is not without its own
difficulties. In the first pl ce, the f ctor in the theory of
evolution which c n
e most cle rly tr ced--the principle of n tur l
selection--is not itself source of ch nge or of the production
of new results. It is only the me ns
y which dv nt geous ch nges
re preserved nd dis dv nt geous ch nges p ssed
y. The initi tive
in these ch nges comes either from the unequ l pressure of the

environment or from some tendency to v ry in the org nism itself.

Now, if we suppose cert in mor l rel tions nd the feelings
corresponding to them to exist in society, nd to tend to gre ter
cert inty nd fulness of life on the p rt of those who possess them,
such rel tions nd feelings will
e f voured
y the oper tion of
n tur l selection, nd will gr du lly
e ssimil ted into the tissue
of the soci l org nism. But this does not ccount for the origin of
mor lity gener lly nor of ny p rticul r mor l rel tion; it merely
shows how, h ving
een somehow origin ted, it h s n tur lly come
to persist. There re thus re lly two points to
e considered in
tr cing the development of mor l ide s--the question of origin nd
the question of persistence. The l tter is ccounted for
y n tur l
selection; the former must
e
rought under the o
scure l ws of
v ri tion, l ws so o
scure th t v ri tions in n ture re frequently
spoken of s if they took pl ce
y ch nce. These two questions
re involved t e ch st ge in the progress of mor lity. But it is
t the initi l st ge th t the question of origin is of gre test
import nce: when the ttempt is m de to show how, in the course of
time, nd
y the id of purely physic l nd
iologic l l ws, feelings
nd conduct, from
eing merely n tur l nd reflex, h ve cquired
mor l ch r cter--when, in
word, the mor l is
eing evolved out of
the non-mor l. A difficulty comes to the front here which sc rcely
rises when we re simply tr cing the v rious ph ses through which
the mor l consciousness h s p ssed, nd the v rious forms in which
mor l conduct nd feelings h ve expressed nd em
odied themselves.
The l tter su
ject is o
viously within the scope of the theory of
evolution, if th t theory pplies to the processes of the hum n mind
nd society s well s to those of extern l n ture. And, lthough
e ch st ge involves modific tion to
e ccounted for not
y n tur l
selection,
ut
y the l ws of v ri tion, yet the v ri tion is within
f cts of the s me order, nd cre tes no more difficulty th n the
successive modific tions of living tissue which h ve
een implied
in the evolution of org nic n ture. But the tr nsition from the
non-mor l to the mor l is tr nsition to
different order of f cts
or--perh ps we should r ther s y--to different w y of looking t
f cts, nd should not
e ssumed to
e process of the s me kind nd
explic
le
y the s me method of investig tion s the p ss ge from
one f ct to the simil r f ct which immedi tely follows it. It m y
e
comp red, perh ps, to the tr nsition from the sphere of inorg nic
m tter to th t of life. At the s me time, it is frequently m int ined
th t we unduly limit the pplic tion of the l w of evolution if we
deny its power to show how mor lity h s developed out of customs
nd institutions whose origin c n
e tr ced to purely n tur l or
non-mor l c uses. And, for present purposes, it is sufficient to h ve
pointed out th t this does not necess rily follow from the dmission
th t evolution pplies to ment l nd soci l processes s well s
to the f cts of extern l n ture. It is not my o
ject to criticise
ny doctrine of the development of mor lity;
ut, st rting with the
position t ken up with reg rd to it
y the theory of evolution, to
inquire wh t conclusions it m y le d to s to the end of ction.
[Sidenote: the development of feelings

p rt from n tur l selection.]

A further difficulty h s to
e met
y the theory of the development

of mor lity, which is in sense complement ry of the initi l
difficulty encountered in differenti ting the mor l from the
non-mor l. This further difficulty w its it t
su
sequent st ge
of development when the extension nd refinement of mor l feeling
seem to h ve gone on in circumst nces where there is no room for
n tur l selection to work. Thus it h s
een dmitted th t the feeling

of symp thy, nd the h
itu l exercise of mutu l good offices mong

mem
ers of community, strengthen th t society, nd m ke it fit to
prev il in the struggle for existence over other simil r societies,
the mem
ers of which re not so much t one mongst themselves in
feeling nd in ct.
But s
enevolence nd symp thy widen, nd
ecome less closely
connected with definite ssoci tion of individu ls, such s the
f mily or tri
e, nd there ce ses to
e p rticul r
ody to the
welf re of which these soci l feelings contri
ute, the oper tion of
the l w of n tur l selection
ecomes less cert in. This l w only
tends to conserve nd perfect the feelings in question, in virtue of
the f ct th t the ssoci tions to whose good they le d re successful
in the struggle for life over other ssoci tions the mem
ers of which
re not nim ted
y like feelings. The one ssoci tion lives nd
exp nds, while the others re un
le to m int in themselves g inst
the encro chments of their neigh
ours, nd thus f ll to pieces. The
l w of n tur l selection, therefore, comes into pl y only when there
re competing org nisms struggling g inst one nother for the me ns
of su
sistence nd development. Not only is it the c se, therefore,
th t the symp thy which ids the we k who re un
le to t ke c re of
themselves, does not seem to
e of the kind th t would contri
ute
to success in the struggle for existence;
ut the more gener l nd
c tholic our symp thies re, the less will the l w of evolution
help to preserve nd develop them--
ec use the less will they tend
to promote the welf re of one riv l ssoci tion r ther th n th t of
nother. Thus the growth of re lly unrestricted symp thy with men
s men c nnot h ve
een promoted in this w y. The "enthusi sm of
hum nity" which nim ted the e rly Christi ns, the self-renouncing

rotherhood of Buddh , the (~h th ~) ttbuted
to me ke Xe oc tes[111] ho h d eed themseves om the
stoc tc ejudces o Athe s, the "c t s ge es hum " o
the Stocs,--such ee gs s these coud ot h ve bee e cou ged,
y moe th they coud h ve bee oduced, by the oe to o
tu  seecto . Fo, hoeve much they te d to eev te the hum
ch  cte, d to omote hum h  ess, they do ot dv ce the
e e o o e body o me to the excuso o some othe cometto
 the stugge o exste ce.[112]
But, though the   o tu  evouto c ot ccou t, by
suvv  o the ttest, o y ogess m de by u ves 
be evoe ce, yet t m y ex  the v ue scbed to the ee g
o be evoe ce, he ts object s the  my o the commu ty.
Besdes-- s h s e dy bee o ted out-- tu  seecto  ys
mes  t tve got om esehee: t does ot tse oduce
modc to s; t o y chooses out  vou be o es d dds them
togethe he oduced. It  ys mes  dee de t modc to
o the og sm; ts  t s to seect the modc to s best
tted to omote e. He ce the mee  ct o be evoe ce be g
u ves sed s ot  tse om y o the theoy o tu 
seecto , y moe th s the  ct o ts be g exte ded om the
 my to the tbe. O y, the  tte exte so s o e hch t
eetu tes, the ome s ot. No sect o the theoy o evouto
seems be to ccou t o exte so o the ee g o u ves 
be evoe ce mo g dee t eoe o thoughout dee t socetes.
Ths ee g h s ethe te ded to omote the e e o the  ce
m ted by t to the excuso o othe comet g  ces--o thee
e o comet g  ces hom t coud ect-- o c t be sho th t
t m kes the  dvdu s ossess g t tte to  ge successu  
g  st oos g oces, th othe  dvdu s.[113]

[Sde ote: Its esut: shos the soc  tue o the  dvdu .]

A t om such sec  dcutes, hoeve, com  tve sychoogy
h s shed e ght o the me t  stuctue o the  dvdu .
The  cts t b gs o d sho th t the tue o the  dvdu 
m c ot be ex  ed thout t k g  to ccou t the e to s
 hch he st ds to socety by bth, educ to , d bus ess.
He s, om the st, suou ded by, d dee de t uo , othe
 dvdu s, d by set o est bshed us ges d  sttuto s
hch mody hs e; d he s co ected th these  such  y
th t t s mossbe to co sde hm s meey cted uo by them
d  ue c g them  tu . He h s bee oduced by, d h s become
 t o them. Hs hysc  d me t  stuctue be s the m ks o
the s me  ue ces s those by hch hs so-c ed e vo me t h s
bee omed. He s ce  the "tssue" o hch the body soc 
s comosed. Ths  s  ty ecog sed, t s tue, beoe the
theoy o evouto h d bee e bo ted. But the og c tue o
the soc  u o s co med by th t theoy, d eected  to
sce tc ve o hum e.
[Sde ote: (b) Deveome t o socety.]
No the v ous se tme ts hch b g o e m  to me t  u o th
othes ct th ge test  cty he me e co ected th o e
othe by some de te mutu  bo d such s th t hch oms the
 my, the c , o the to . The  dvdu 's ee g o sym thy
th hs eghbous both omotes ths soc  u o d dee ds uo
t. But t s ch  ctestc o the theoy o evouto to ut the
exte  sect st--the soc  customs d  sttuto s-- d to
evove om them the coeso d g se tme ts d de s. Not od
o thought o oe, t hods, s to be eg ded s the og o
mo ty: "Im A  g   de Th t." The hoe comosed o these u ts
bou d togethe by ecocty o ee g d u cto s temed the
"soc  og sm"; d h t h s bee c ed mo  socoogy shos the
 y  hch the out d oms hch exess d embody mo ty h ve
go u d become  t o t.
I ths co ecto , the theoy o tu  evouto t ces the
ocess by hch, om the udme t y beg  gs o socety, the
membes comos g t h ve g du y become moe cohee t mo gst o e
othe, e ted  de te  ys  ste d o meey by ch ce, d
moe dee t ted  u cto . Cet  udme t y oms--such s
the  my ( ts udest stuctue)-- d the coeso d g  st cts
e esuosed. A d om ths b ss the og o  sttuto s
d customs, otc , egous, d  dust , s t ced. I
deveo g these v ous customs d  sttuto s, o g th the
coeso d g se tme ts, the couse o soc  evouto h s h d
the eect o g du y b g g out d cutv t g those ee gs
d te de ces  the  dvdu  hch omote the e e o the
og sm, he othe  dvdu  te de ces, hoste to soc 
e e, h ve bee eessed. Not sym thy d be evoe ce o y,
but ho esty, teme ce, justce, d  the od y soc 
d eso  vtues, m y h ve the tu  hstoy t ced 
ths  y--by sho g ho they h ve co tbuted to the e o the
 dvdu , o o the socety, o o both.[114] Though the oe to
o uey tu   s, the cked e "cut o om the e th,"
he the "eect em   t" d e ve the ossesso s to the
chde . Ths s obvous esut o tu  seecto . Fo those
commu tes e  ys ttest to suvve  hch e ch membe, 

ee g d  ct, s most t o e th the hoe. The _te de cy_ o

evouto seems to be to oduce ot meey de  but ctu 
de tc to o  dvdu  d soc   teests,  hch e ch m
 ds hs o good  th t o the st te.
FOOTNOTES:
[106] The soc  b ss o ethcs s emh ssed by Poesso B  
hs P ctc  Ess ys (1884), . 155: "'Ho s socety to be hed
togethe?' s the st co sde to ; d the socoogst-- s
co sttuto -bude, dm st to, judge--s the eso to
g e th the obem. It s th hm th t  , obg to ,
ght, comm d, obede ce, s cto , h ve the og d the
ex to . Ethcs s mot t sueme t to soc  o otc 
 . But t s st de tme t o  . I y othe ve t s
m ze, mystey, hoeess embome t."
[107] Wthout de y g th t t s ossbe to y the theoy o
evouto to m d, Poesso B  hods th t, s  ct, mo 
se tme t h s ot become og c d heedt y--"th t thee e o
mo   st cts oey so c ed."--The Emoto s d the W, 3d
ed., . 56.
[108] Fst P ces, 4th ed., . 380.
[109] Sce ce o Ethcs, . v.
[110] It oud seem th t the t smsso o me t  u tes o y
t kes  ce  the om o moded hysc  stuctue (c. G. H.
Lees, Pobems o Le d M d, 1st sees, . 164). But,  e
eg d t s est bshed th t evey me t  ch ge h s stuctu 
modc to coeso d g to t, the ossbty o me t  evouto
d  het ce ese ts o e dcuty.
[111]  , V. H., x. 30.
[112] I co sce ce h s o othe u cto th th t ssg ed to t by
Cod, Lectues d Ess y, . 169, "the esev to o socety
 the stugge o exste ce," the t c eve e ch u ves 
be evoe ce o escbe "dutes to ds  m k d."
[113] A dcuty o othe k d s suggested by Poesso
B  , ho hods th t the "e sue o m evoe ce" s ot o y
e  eeme t  the hum co sttuto , but ge te th oud be
tu y c ed oth by the co dto s d couse o deveome t.
"It s em ked by M Se ce," he s ys, "th t t  s ecess y o
the ogess o the  ce th t destuctve ctvty shoud ot be
  u, but o the hoe e su be. I o t o  ct, hoeve,
the e sue o destucto h s go e much beyo d h t these ods
exess, d much beyo d h t s dv t geous to the coectve
 teest o m s d o hum be gs ke. The ostve deght
 sue g h s bee t  st ges too ge t."--The Emoto s d
the W, . 66. So   om dot g ths gume t, hoeve, I must
co ess myse st mo gst the u co v ced eg d g the "e sue
o m evoe ce."
[114] Ths subject s c euy dscussed  M Stehe 's 'Sce ce o
Ethcs.'

CHAPTER VI.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.
[Sde ote: Be  g o the theoy o evouto o evous ethc 
theoes.]
Beoe go g o to  ue  to the ostve co tbuto s to
ethcs hch the theoy o evouto h s to oe, t s ecess y
to co sde the e to t be s to the eced g  dvdu stc
systems o mo s. It  s by  y o  vestg to s  sychoogy d
 the theoy o socety, th t t st beg to  ue ce ethc 
tu  y
thought. A d, t st sght, t e ed to come s
o o e o the oosed schoos, de ded by the sde t oosed,[115]
ecomed th oe ms by th t  voued th ts e dsh. But
s ce the st shock o   ed d e sed suse, thee h ve
bee umous o dsse so  the es' c m; d the dstbuto
o  tes h s o become m tte o dcuty. The doct e o
evouto , st sezed uo o ebutt g the gume ts o the
 tuto  mo sts, h s bee ou d to t som  the th to
destoy the system; d the utt  sm  hose  teests the
e co toves  e o  s emoyed, seems to h ve bee subjected
to
  e ocess o t som to . The be  g o evouto o
egosm m y e  to be eve moe u d me t . Fo the  het ce
by  dvdu  o the u tes cued by hs cestos m y be
thought to est bsh sce tc y the theoy o the u ty o the
 ce, d,  do g so, to m ke the sesh system o co duct
cho sm.
[Sde ote: 1. O theoes dee d g o mo  se tme t o  tuto .]
It s ot ecess y to ex m e t y e gth the c to o
evouto to the theoes hch co stuct ethc   ces o the
b ss o mo  se tme t, bec use these theoes h ve bee ou d
ethe to esove themseves  to subte om o egostc hedo sm,
o ese to est the ethc  system o
teeoogc  co ceto ,
hch t sce ds the " tu stc" ve o m . Evouto h s ts
o ex to to gve o the seem gy  tutve ch  cte o mo 
de s--sho g ho the mmed te ecessty o the  dvdu  o
the ese t d y m y be eco ced th the emc  og  the
me t  hstoy o the  ce. It ttemts thus to su t both egosm
d  tuto sm by the s me doct e o the og c u o betee
 dvdu s.
The he ome o co sce ce d the mo  se tme ts h d bee bought
o d to sho th t the og o mo ty  s  dee de t o the
exee ce o the e su be o   u esuts o cto : th t
cet  cto s d t ts o ch  cte ee mmed tey oved
d o ou ced to be ght by the  dvdu  co sce ce, d cet 
othes s  exc by but   by ds oved d o ou ced to
be o g. Ths he ome o o mo  ob to o ds ob to h d
 deed bee thought by some-- s h s bee e dy see --to be o y
sec  ee g o e sue o   . Eve s such, hoeve, t
o ted to
ecu  h mo y o sym thy betee the ee gs o
the  dvdu  d the otu es o socety. Fo the e sue o  
o the  dvdu   s see to be excted by cto s d dsosto s
hch mght be sho to  vove the commo  teests, but ee

thout e to to hs o .
[Sde ote: Og d hstoy o mo  se tme ts d  tuto s
t ced by evouto .]
Eve o the "emc "  teet to o them, such  cts o the
 dvdu  m d ee  eed o ex to ; d the theoy o
evouto h s t ke  h d to sho ho the e-est bshed h mo y
ge u. The esuts o ths ex to e, o couse, ot ut
o d s ex   g the  cts  y, o dev g them o e ty,
but s e b g us to see the tue  ce d be  g  the
eco omy o hum tue. I t c g the og d hstoy o the
" tustc" d "mo " se tme ts o the  dvdu , the theoy o
evouto h s ths e d  ve. It oes--so t s ote s d--tems
o comomse betee the " tuto " d the "emc "
sychoogy o mo s. It  dmt the mmed te d  tutve
ch  cte  the  dvdu  o the se tme ts hch ode emcsm
h d ted to m ke out to be comoste, go g u  e ch eso out
o the m te s oded by hs e vo me t, d the exee ces
to hch he  s subjected. The theoy o evouto co te ds o
emcsm o
 ge sc e, hch  moe cosey co ect the
 dvdu  th the  ce, d both th the e vo me t.
[Sde ote: Be  g o ths o the v dty:]
The uesto thus ses, Wh t be  g h s ths sychoogc  o
"sychogo c " theoy o the ethc  v dty o mo   tuto s
d se tme ts? It cet  y does ot oo th t they e o o
mo  v ue, meey bec use the og c be t ced to sme
eeme ts o exee ce. They oud ose ethc  mot ce o y 
t ee st o  sho th t the v dty dee ded o the
ot be g deved om, o comou ded out o, othe eeme ts. As
Poesso Sdgck s ys, "Those ho dsute the uthoty o mo  o
othe  tuto s o the gou d o the dev to , must be eued
to sho, ot meey th t they e the eects o cet  c uses,
but th t these c uses e o
k d th t te d to oduce  v d
bee."[116]
But h t the theoy o evouto h s to detem e th eg d to
mo   tuto s o se sbtes oud seem to be ot so much the
ethc  v dty o  v dty, s the  ge d m e o the
ethc  c to . It ttemts to sho th t  tcu  mo 
bees o ee gs h ve bee og ted d omed by cet 
exte  customs beo g g to the co dto s o soc  o  my
e. These customs h ve messed themseves uo the me t 
stuctue, d e e   the  dvdu   the sh e o og c
te de ces to cet  cto s, o c sses o cto s, d o veso
to othe cto s, ccom ed by coeso d g me t  se tme t--o
judgme t--o ob to o ds ob to . Thus the  dvdu 
comes  st ctvey to ee--o to judge,--"A ought to be do e," "B
ought ot to be do e." No the evouto st, s I co ceve, does
ot oceed to  e th t such judgme ts e  v d bec use he h s
sho ho they og ted--does ot co cude (to use M Sdgck's
ods) th t "_ _ oosto s o the om 'X s ght' o 'good,'
e u tustothy;" but he does sk  h t  y the hstoy o these
judgme ts ects the c to .[117]
[Sde ote: (_ _) dee t soc  co dto s om hch they m y h ve
esuted,]

(_ _) He ecog ses,  the st  ce, th t  such judgme ts e

the tu  esut o
cet  soc  co dto , d th t thee
s, theeoe, some ob bty th t the s me k d o soc  st te
coud ot co t ue to exst ee those mo  judgme ts h btu y
dseg ded  co duct. They h ve esuted om cet  st te
o socety, d h ve bee ssumed-- te  suce t exee ce,
eh s--to be eued o the st bty o th t st te, so th t
evey cto oosed to these mo  judgme ts  ob by te d
to e ke soc  bo ds. But the evouto st's co cuso s e ot
estcted to such ge e tes. He m y sho th t cet  mo 
judgme ts o se tme ts h ve h d the og om the h bts o
u o betee  dvdu s, d o esect o the ghts o oety,
hch h ve obt  ed  evey e tvey em e t socety, d hch
m y theeoe be  eed to be ob by ecess y o the co t ued
exste ce o y commu ty; th t cet  othe se tme ts o
 tuto s h ve desce ded to ese t  dvdu s om customs hch
h ve ot bee so u ves   the hstoy o socetes, though the
commu tes ossess g them h ve sho ge te oe o vt ty
th those  hch they ee bse t; he othes, g  , m y be
t ced to  sttuto s hch, om the occ so  d u ogessve
ch  cte, m y be sho to be ethe ecess y o be ec .
[Sde ote: d co seue t dee ce  the v ue o co duct;]
The evouto st  theeoe co te d th t dee t degees
o v ue o the egu to o co duct beo g to dee t
mo   tuto s o c sses o them. I o e c ss s h btu y
dseg ded, he m y sset th t hstoc  evde ce goes to sho
th t socety    to eces, d the e o m become, 
the exessve ods o Hobbes, "sot y, oo, sty, butsh, d
shot." The dseg d o othe c ss  ob by e d to moe
ec ous exste ce, o o e ess ed th the exee ces hch
m ke u e; he oosto to thd c ss, so   om be g
hutu o d geous, m y emove u ecess y estcto s, d d
the deveome t both o the  dvdu  d o socety.
[Sde ote: (_b_) the og c ch  cte.]
(_b_) Thee s seco d o t hch  so be ecog sed by the
evouto st. Athough these  tuto s h ve bee deved, they
e o og c, d the ds e  ce om the hum m d s
 st ctve te de ces to ds o g  st cto c o y be so
d   u. The ocess must  vove cet  mou t o oss: t
the s me tme, t s ot ocess th t c be e sy voded. As
soo s the e so o the  st ctve te de cy s  ued  to, t
s e ke ed s  st ct. We  ss om the cto tse to the e d
t s tted to subseve; d,  the  st ctve cto s ot the
most o te, o h s hutu esuts, e h ve e dy e ched the
st ge  hch the  st ct s checked, d beg s to yed to cto
dected by  ce. Yet t des out o y g du y, d, so to
se k, te
stugge. No does t seem ossbe to sset th
co de ce, s mtg t g ths stugge, th t the sto gest muses
  ys be those hch e ecess y o dv t geous to the
exste ce o socety. Fo t s commo exee ce th t the mo 
 tuto s hch e d to co duct th t h s ce sed to seve uose,
d the  te  s cto s hch oo dseg d o them, e ote
eve moe oeu th those hch otect such vtues s justce
o ve cty.
[Sde ote: Resut t tttude o evouto sm to  tuto sm.]

Fom the eced g gume t t oos th t t c ot be hed th t

mo   tuto s e  v d bec use evoved. The evouto st
 cet  y go vey   o g, s M Sdgck o ts out, 
he m  t  s th t "ge e  demo st to o the deved ess
o deveoed ess o ou mo   cuty s deu te gou d o
dstust g t." I ste d o hod g th t,  e succeed  t c g
the og o  tuto , t s theeby dscedted, he  dmt
th t the mee  ct o ou ossess g y mo   tuto shos th t
the h bts o cto om hch t  s deved h ve bee em e t
e ough to e ve the t ces o the me t  stuctue, d th t the
co duct to hch t e ds, ke the custom om hch t c me, 
ot destoy socety, but, o the co t y,  ob by te d to ts
em e ce. The ge e  tttude o the evouto -theoy to mo 
 tuto s s theeoe, te , vey sm  to th t hch M
esut o hs e bo te ex m to o
Sdgck h s e ched s
the m xms o commo -se se. It s tttude o tust moded by
ctcsm. I both e  s m de om the xoms themseves: 
the o e c se, to the hstoc  ge ess d the  cts  hch
they og ted;  the othe, to the se ch g test o ogc 
co sste cy, d the c  bty o be g ed to co duct. But
the theoy o evouto ,  t succeeds  t c g the og o ou
mo   tuto s, does seem to  vove the b do me t o the od
 tuto  method hch cceted them s ues o co duct om hch
o e  coud be t ke .
*

[Sde ote: 2. Be  g o the theoy o evouto o egosm.]

The theoy o evouto t soms  tuto sm by the  y  hch
t co ects the  dvdu  th the  ce. Its st eect uo
egosm s sm . The tue o the  dvdu  m s o exhbted
s dey dee t om th t hch the ode  dvdu stc theoy
used to de  th. The  tte s tyed by the m be st tue
to hch Co d c[118] com es the ece t subject, s yet
u ected by se se-messo s. The v ety o me t  e hch
s ctu y met th s ccou ted o by the dee t k ds o
exee ces dee t me  ss though; d the co seue t dee ce
 the souces o e sue d   ccou ts o the dvese  es o
ctvty hch hum be gs oo out. But the theoy o evouto
shos th t hum tue s   tey v ed, ot o y though the
v ety o ccumst ces, but though the v ety o  heted
dsosto s. O e  dvdu  s ot meey co ected th othes
though co sde be sm ty o exee ce but uo eu y
ch  cteess b ss; but he s og c y e ted to  the membes
o the  ce, ot o y bo e o the bo e d esh o the esh,
but m d o the m d. He s co ected th othes by
thous d
subty  teove the ds o emoto hch e te  to hs e, d
u te hs deses d ctvtes th the u cto s o the  ge
og sm o hch he s membe.
[Sde ote: Re to o egosm to tusm s ected by t: (_ _)
tue o the  dvdu  soc ,]
[Sde ote: but ot cometey soc .]
The theoy o evouto h s thus mot t co tbuto to m ke
to the uesto o the e to betee egosm d tusm. It
h s em  ed o t to sho hstoc y ho the  dvdu  s so

co ected th the commu ty th t the good, o the e sue, o the

o e c ot be co sdeed  t om th t o the othe. Fom the
o -evouto st o t o ve t  s  ys oe to sho ho the
 dvdu  dee ded o socety, ho hs  ts coud o y be sued
by t, d ho the secuty d h  ess o evey o e ee bou d u
th those o hs eos. The  dvdu stc theoy  s thus be
to gve  sots o egostc e so s hy eoe shoud  duge 
h t s o c ed tustc co duct. Se  s see to be " oo
ce te o
m 's cto s," d o y chose by the shot-sghted
eso , ho theeby mssed both the good to hmse th t ooed
om hs eghbous' ebe g, d the ecu  e sue o sym thy
d be evoe t cto . But the theoy o evouto h s sho ho the
to th gs h ve deveoed togethe  the  ce: st, the ctu 
sod ty betee the  dvdu  d the hoe; d seco dy, the
subjectve eecto o the s me  ct, sym thy th the ee gs
o othes. Whe e sk, theeoe, hethe t s ou o e sue
(o good) o th t o othes th t e ought to m t, e e o ted
to the g du  obte to o the dst cto betee the  teest
d ee gs o the  dvdu  d those o the hoe. Wee ths
cometey ccomshed, thee eed be o moe uesto bout the
m tte. I co duct th egostc motve o m  ys esuted
 tustc eu y th egostc eects, d  tustc
co duct h d  ys egostc eu y th tustc co seue ces,
t oud eve the be tte moe th v  subtety to sk hethe
egosm o tusm  s to be the e  e d o co duct. But , 
ddto to the de tty o  teests, thee ee so de tty
o motve o ee g,[119] the uesto oud be o o ge   ce
t . Fo thee oud ce se to be ethe
subjectve dst cto
 motve betee egosm d tusm, o objectve dst cto
 the couses o co duct to hch they ed. A d t s just bec use
ths de tc to s m esty  comete--bec use ethe the
 teests o the deses o the  dvdu  h mo se th y degee
o ex ct ess th those o hs eos--th t e must ex m e ho  
the co ceto o the soc  og sm s
tue exesso o the
co ecto o  dvdu s.
[Sde ote: Dee ce betee the  dvdu  d soc  og sms]
At most, the theoy o og c evouto c m ke out th t thee
s te de cy to ds the de tc to o the  teests o the
 dvdu  th those o socety. It c ot demo st te comete
de tc to . The commu ty h s  deed bee c ed og sm,
d the  dvdu  soke o s ce  the tssue o hch t s
comosed; but e must vod ess g ths ogy to the o t o
be k g. Amo g so m y o ts o sm ty betee socety d
 dvdu  og sm, thee s o e esse t  dst cto ,--the soc 
og sm h s o ee gs d thoughts but those o ts  dvdu 
membes--the co scous ce te s  the u t, ot  the hoe;
hee s, he e eg d the  dvdu  og sm d ts co sttue t
membes, co scous ess s see to exst o y  the hoe, ot 
e ch seve  u t. The bse ce o "soc  se soum"[120] shoud,
theeoe, m ke us hest te to de ty the e ds o  dvdu  th
those o coectve cto . Evey ce  the  dvdu  body h s
e-hstoy o ts o , besdes  t k g o the e o the
og sm; d, dd t ossess the e so hch "ooks beoe d
te," t mght ob by dot egostc tttude, d object to
the subod to o ts v te  teests to the good o the hoe.
I the s me  y, the m y  dvdu  ves hch m ke u the soc 
og sm--s ce e ch o them ossesses
se  te co scous ess-- e
t to dseg d the e o the  ge hoe hose membes they e.

No h t the theoy o utt  sm eues s, th t the h  ess

o e su be co scous ess o the commu ty o o the  ce, ot
th t o the  dvdu , be m de the e d; d those ho m ke egosm
the e d o ethcs, commo y m  t  th t the ge e  h  ess s
the e d o otcs.[121] The  dvdu  s ot  deed eued to be
e tey u sesh o " tustc"  cto . He s ot togethe
obdde to seek hs o th gs, o e jo ed to seek o y the
th gs o othes; d evouto st utt  sm,  deed, oud te
hm to seek hs o h  ess  the h  ess o the commu ty. But
the obvous em k must be bo e  m d, th t socety, the soc 
og sm, c ot exee ce h  ess. Hoeve t m y esembe the
 dvdu  og sm  the m e o ts goth, the modes o ts
ctvty, d eve ts e to to ts como e t membes, yet t
c ot ee e sue o   s  dvdu  does. The "h  ess o
the commu ty" does ot me the h  ess o the soc  og sm,
but s o y co cse omu o the ggeg te h  esses o the
 dvdu s comos g t.
[Sde ote:  esect o ee g.]
Whe t s s d, theeoe--ethe s
otc  o ethc 
theoy--th t the h  ess o socety s the e d o co duct, the
e d escbed s tustc  the th soc . Its object s ot
og sm, but ggeg te o  dvdu s. A cet  og s to
o socety m y e d to  ce se  ths ggeg te h  ess, d
so be ecess y o the tt  me t o the e d; but  the e d s
h  ess, the soc  og sm d ts ebe g e o o ge the
th g c ed o, but the ge test ggeg te o e sues o the  t
o ts membes.
[Sde ote: Theoy o obg to smed,  u ves stc e d
ved t.]
So o g, theeoe, s the e d s e sue, t must h ve eee ce
to  dvdu s. The utt  m y ty to esu de the ge t to
seek the e sues o othes s  they ee hs o --eu g
hm thus to seek hs e d out o hmse, d the cce o hs o
e sues. A d, he e co t ue to hod e sue to be the e d,
the evouto -theoy c go o uthe th ths. It seemed to h ve
m de out og c u ty betee dee t  dvdu s, though
eco c to betee the
hch t mght be ossbe to eect
v  ethc   ces o egosm d tusm. But the ee g o
e sue s just the o t hee  dvdu sm s sto gest, d 
eg d to hch m k d,  ste d o be g og sm  hch e ch
 t but subseves the uoses o the hoe, must  the be eg ded
s coecto o comet g d co-oe t g u ts. It s tue th t
the soc   cto  the  dvdu  e s bought  to sce tc
cog s ce by the theoy o evouto . It shos the  y  hch
hs  teests d ee gs dee d uo othes. A d , though the
 ue ce o
otc  st do t, o o some  tuto o e so ,
u ves stc ethcs h s bee e dy ved t, t c b g
o d the og c u o o  dvdu  d socety s me s o
e oc g the soc  e d uo the  dvdu  ge t. I ths  y the
theoy o evouto m kes co tbuto to ethcs t ctc 
o t hee the  dvdu st theoy  ed. Fo ethcs must ot est
co te t th o t g out e d o co duct o st d d o mo ty,
thout gv g e so to the  dvdu  hy he shoud m ke ths
e d hs o --th t s, deveo g doct e o obg to . I m y
cue t theoes, ot by  the commo oms o utt  sm, the
to th gs e ot ecess y co ected, s ce the st d d s xed

om the o t o ve o the hoe, d obg to h s eee ce to

the  dvdu . The deveome t o mo ty m y e  to sho ho
the to st do ts c be co ected. I t coud be m de out th t
the h  ess o the commu ty d o the  dvdu  e de tc ,
st d d o mo ty hch m de the ggeg te h  ess the e d
mght be eg ded s c y g ts o obg to th tse:
otcs d ethcs oud (o the hedo stc theoy) be h mo sed.
A d,  so   s evouto h s bought the  dvdu  d socety
 to cose ecoc  dee de ce, t h s esse ed the  ctc 
dcuty o b g g bout ths co c to , o--to se k th the
utt  s--o m k g the st d d o mo ty suy doct e
o obg to . At ese t, hoeve, the couse o hum deveome t
s   om h v g e ched the o t t hch ctu  h mo y betee
the  ce d e ch membe o t s est bshed; d t oud theeoe
st be subject o  uy hethe the theoy o evouto coud
ovde b ss o mo  obg to , eve ee the mo  st d d o
the e d o co duct s ts ctoy est bshed. But,  detem  g
ths  tte uesto , e  d th t the bove sychoogc  d
socoogc   vestg to s h ve o o ge the s me degee o v ue
s beoe. I the theoy o obg to , evey  ct bought o d by
evouto to sho the h mo y o  dvdu  d soc  e e m kes
the  y e se o est bsh g the e so be ess o the usut
o soc  e ds by the  dvdu . But om these  cts o  st
deveome t e h ve so to detem e e d o ese t d utue
cto . A d ths uesto c ot be soved meey by sho g ho
mo ty h s deveoed, though th t deveome t m y om mot t
 t o the evde ce om hch ou co cuso s e to be d  .
[Sde ote: (_b_) Lmts to comete co c to o egosm d
tusm:]
[Sde ote: () co t ued exste ce o cometto ;]
The h mo y o  teests d the h mo y o ee gs eued o
the emc  eco c to o egosm d tusm s co dto
hch eeds o y to be st ted to sho ho   t s om be g
e sed  ese t ccumst ces. The co st t stugge  voved 
the couse o evouto thos doubt eve o ts utm te tt  me t.
The ue h s  ys bee th t the bette-eued og sm ssets
d m  t  s ts suem cy o y by v ush g the og sms hch
e ot so e eued. Co ct d cometto h ve bee co st t
 ctos  deveome t. The ese t ccumst ces o the  dvdu 
h ve bee detem ed o hm by the   o hoste  teests betee
dee t commu tes, d betee dee t membes o the s me
commu ty; d hs me t   het ce h s bee  gey omed by
the emoto s coeso d g to ths v y. Peh s the ecessty
o co ct h s dm shed th the dv ce o evouto ; but t
s st suce ty ge t to m ke cometto o e o the che
om tve  ue ces   dust  d otc  e. A d the c uses
om hch the stugge o  teests ses e so co st t--the
mutc to o deses d o des g  dvdu s kees so e
 dv ce o the me s o s tsy g deses--th t t s doubtu
hethe the couse o evouto s tted to b g bout comete
h mo y betee dee t  dvdu s. It oud most seem th t the
"mov g eubum"  hum co duct,  hch thee s o c sh o
dvese  teests, c ot be exected to be bought bout much beoe
the tme he the hysc   ctos o the u vese h ve e ched the
st ge  hch evouto e ds.
[Sde ote: () different nd conflicting degrees of ltruism;]

Besides, it does not do to spe k s if the only ltern tive to egoism

were comprehensive ltruism. M n is
mem
er of f mily, tri
e,
n tion, the r ce. His ltruism, therefore, m y t ke the n rrow
form of f mily feeling, or it m y extend to tri
l feeling, or to
p triotism, or even rise to devotion to hum nity. And these do not
merely supplement one nother: they re often conflicting principles
of conduct. Action for the s ke of the f mily m y frequently
e most
unsoci l; the keen p triot ignores the rights of other peoples;
the "citizen of the world" is too often str nger to the n tion l
spirit. Further, when civilis tion grows complex, the s me m n is
mem
er of m ny intersecting societies-- church, tr de, p rty
org nis tion[122]-- nd h s to
l nce the cl ims which e ch of
these h s upon him. The su
l tion of egoism would still le ve to
e
determined the different sh res which these v rious soci l wholes
h ve in m n's symp thies, nd their different cl ims upon his
conduct.
[Sidenote: () the altruism of interest and the altruism of motive;]
Any theory of society will show how the ood of the individual is
not merely a part of the ood of the whole, but reacts in various
ways upon the oranism of which he is a member. But, in the case of
any one individual, the results of acts done for his own ood (or
pleasure), and the results of those done for the ood (or pleasure)
of the whole, do not correspond with any exactness, and often widely
divere. If, then, the individual is consciously aimin at his own
ood (or pleasure), it is--if we look from the point of view of
individualistic ethics--only an incidental and fortuitous result of
the action when it promotes the common ood. When we reconise the
social factor in the individual, this judment must be modified. The
evolution-theory shows how he has become so constituted that much
that pleases him individually, must of necessity benefit society at
lare. But there are obvious limits to the harmony. The pleasure or
interest of the individual is often the reverse of advantaeous to
society. It may be the case that in seekin his own private ends, he
is yet, to use the words of Adam Smith, "led by an invisible hand
to promote an end which was no part of his intention."[123] But,
if so, the end is invisible as well as the hand that points to it.
And the ood of society can be said to be the natural and uniform
consequence of the individual's action, only when he consciously
makes it his end. In a word, the true altruism--or, as we miht call
it, usin a word appropriated to another purpose--the true socialism
is when the ood of others or of society is pursued for its own
sake; and this is to be distinuished from the false or imperfect
altruism, in which the same outward result is aimed at, because it
is seen to be the most prudent way of promotin one's own ood.
Thus Mr Spencer's elaborate arument[124] to show that conduct of
purely eoistic tendency, equally with conduct of purely altruistic
tendency, is insufficient and self-destructive, does not reach beyond
the external results of action, and leaves it possible for both end
and motive to be still eoistic. If "morality is internal,"[125]
the discussion proves no ethical proposition at all. The eoism of
external prudence may indeed be transcended by reconisin that the
pleasures and pains of others are sources of sympathetic feelin
in ourselves. But a subjective or emotional eoism remains. And if
the fact that we "receive pleasure from the pleasure of another
man"[126] is our reason for seekin his pleasure, we shall cease to
seek it when a means of reater pleasure offers. In human life as at
present constituted, no secure principle of conduct can be based on

the areement of individual with social ood; for, if they divere,

as they often do, there is no standard left for determinin their
competin claims.
[Sidenote: () altruistic feelings weak,]
It will not o to ivie all men, as Mr Stephen seems to o,[127]
into two classes, typifie by the reasonable an therefore
sympathetic man who has struck a bargain with society to take "common
stock of pains an pleasures," an the systematically selfish man
who "must be an iiot." For most men belong to neither of those two
classes: their bargain with society has not been fully complete, an
can be withrawn from temporarily when circumstances make withrawal
convenient, though this process cannot be carrie on inefinitely
without greatly weakening the sympathetic feelings. The majority
of men are neither entirely sympathetic nor yet "systematically
selfish": they are unsystematically sympathetic an unsystematically
selfish. Such men have the sensibilities that give "leverage"
to the moralist.[128] But it is futile to tell them to be more
sympathetic, or entirely sympathetic. For sympathetic feelings cannot
be prouce at will: they can only come with that slow moification
of the character brought about by conuct. Shall we then say that
a man shoul in all cases of conuct prefer the pleasure of the
whole or of others to his own pleasure? If a man were to o so,
then perhaps, by consistent self-abnegation, altruism might become
pleasant, an both the man himself an his escenants become
more sympathetically constitute? This perfection of altruistic
sympathies is looke forwar to by Mr Spencer as characteristic of a
subsequent--the final--stage of evolution. When that perio comes,
men will compete with one another for the few remaining opportunities
of self-sacrifice.[129] At present, Mr Spencer argues, pure altruism
is suicial. The iniviual whose sympathetic nature is unevelope
may, however, go further, an ask what right we have to say that "the
moral law" is "conformity to the conitions of social welfare,"[130]
rather than to those of iniviual welfare? Evolution, it woul seem,
oes not suffice to prove this proposition, which appears, on the
contrary, to be a survival of the social or political way of looking
at things inherite from the utilitarian theory. But the point to be
prove is why I ought to aopt this stanpoint when consiering what
the en of my action is to be. An this point stans in nee of proof
here as much as in utilitarianism, an seems almost equally estitute
of it.
[Sienote: an may be restraine by reflection.]
Feelings leaing to altruistic conuct are unoubtely possesse by
the average man at his present stage of evelopment. Yet the being
who is able to reflect on the feelings possesse by him, an compare
the characteristics of ifferent emotional states, an the activities
following from them, has alreay before him the possibility of
transcening them. He is able to estimate their value in terms of
simpler--or of other--feelings; an the man who rigorously oes so by
the test of personal pleasure an pain manifests the spirit of the
egoistic heonist--a spirit which the theory of empirical evolution
oes not seem able to exorcise.
[Sienote: (_c_) Tenency of evolution to supplant egoism. Evolution
not the basis of psychological heonism,]
At the same time the _tenency_ of the evolution-theory is not to

support but to supplant egoism. Neither the basis of psychological

heonism on which egoism is usually mae to rest, nor the inepenent
arguments which have been urge for its ethical theory, are rawn
from the facts of evelopment. The theory of evolution may, inee,
be mae to suggest that non-heonistic action has arisen out of
heonistic: "That all affections are generate by association
with experience pleasure--only that the association is mainly
_ancestral_ in the case of 'affections' proper. The im remembrance
of ancestral pleasures, the force of ancestral habit, prouces that
propension of which Butler speaks, isproportionate to (istinct)
expectation an (personal) experience of pleasure."[131] But this
view will be rejecte by the pure egoist,[132] who must maintain
that the pain of acting contrary to ancestral habit woul in every
case be greater than the expecte pleasure foregone by following
it. Accoring to the view suggeste, all eliberate volition woul
still be regare as heonistically etermine, though other motives
than pleasure may affect action through having been inherite
from cases of ancestral conuct in which they tene to personal
pleasure. Even were it shown, however, that altruistic conuct has
been evelope out of egoistic, the fact of its evelopment woul
not alter its present characteristic. If action now is not always
move by pleasure an pain alone, it becomes a question of merely
historical interest to trace its genesis to conuct to which our
ancestors were heonistically impelle. The fact remains that the
original simplicity of motive has been broken into, an something
else than personal pleasure amitte to have sway. But it oes not
seem to have been mae out that action in the early stages of human
life was completely egoistic, any more than that it is so now. "From
first to last," as Mr Spencer puts it,[133] self-sacrifice seems to
have been involve in the preservation of each successive generation
of iniviuals. We inherit propensities to action which have been
evolve from an initial stage in which there was no conscious
istinction between egoism an altruism, though both tenencies
were present an were necessary for the continue existence of the
species. The feelings inherite by the egoistic heonist are assesse
by him at their pleasure-value. But such feelings woul never have
been acquire by his ancestors, ha they teste each germinal emotion
in the same way, an so restraine self-sacrifice for offspring an
fellow-men. Perhaps they i not clearly see or realise what their
pleasure consiste in, or accurately istinguish it from family or
tribal welfare; but, through this eficiency of imagination, the
feelings were able to grow an perpetuate themselves, which have
tene to the preservation an consoliation of society.
[Sienote: nor of ethical heonism.]
Nor can we gather from evolution any ethical argument leaing to
egoism as the principle or en for conuct; an it is worthy of
remark that the proof attempte by the late Mr Barratt is unaffecte
by his recognition of the theory of evolution as applie to min,
epening on efinitions an axioms which hol (if at all) for
the iniviual man. Pleasure is efine by him as "that state of
consciousness which follows upon the unimpee performance (as such)
of its function by one or more of the parts of our organism;"[134]
an the goo is forthwith ientifie with pleasure, by its being
shown that it is a "state of consciousness," an that it "results
from the ue performance of function (as such)."[135] But the
"ue[136] performance of function" is itself a state or states
of consciousness; an in it, not in any sequent or concomitant
circumstances, the goo may consist. The goo, we may say, is not

pleasure, but the (~nrg ~) of whch pl sur s only th

consqunt or complton. Ths s not mr quston of words. For
"du prform nc of functon" c nnot b m surd by th rsult nt
or ccomp nyng flng of pl sur: th most prfct functonng,
just bc us t h s bcom h btu l, h s oftn th slghtst
ccomp nmnt of pl s nt flng. Th w y n whch th rgumnt
s put n 'Physc l Ethcs' s thus wll fttd to brng out th
fund mnt l ntthss btwn thc l systms ccordng s thy
pl c th good n th ctv lmnt of functon, or n th p ssv
lmnt of pl sur bl flng whch ccomp ns functonng. Th
thory of voluton sms to h v ld m ny of th wrtrs who h v
ppld t to thcs to th othr sd of th ntthss th n th t
dhrd to by Mr B rr tt. Thy rcogns thc l v lu s blongng
to "du prform nc of functon," r thr th n to th pl sd st ts
of conscousnss whch follow; nd n ths w y thr thory l ds
thm byond hdonstc thcs.[137]
[Sdnot: 3. B rng of th thory of voluton on utlt r nsm]
It h s bn rgud th t th thory of voluton s, n tndncy,
hostl to th gostc prncpl. H d gosm bn consstntly
rcognsd nd ctd upon durng th cours of hum n dvlopmnt,
th f turs of soc l lf whch most promot co-opr ton nd
progrss would nvr h v bcom prsstnt. But th s m objcton
c nnot b urgd g nst unvrs lstc hdonsm. It s tru th t
ths h s not bn th nd consstntly md t n th p st. Thos
from whom our soc l nstncts r nhrtd c nnot b crdtd wth
h vng h d thr th gnr l h ppnss or soc l voluton n vw.
Socty nd nsttutons furthrng th common good wr not th
work of prmtv utlt r ns plottng for th gr tst h ppnss
of th gr tst numbr. Thy h v com down to us from tms whn
soc l org ns ton w s forcd upon mn by th rud logc of f cts
whch xtrmn td trbs n whch th bond of unon w s w k;
nd thy h v bn gr du lly modfd by th prssur of xtrn l
crcumst ncs nd th growng nflunc of mnt l concptons of
wh t s bst. But th dopton of gnr l h ppnss s th nd of
cton would not h v h d th s m ffct on soc l voluton, s th
dopton of prson l h ppnss s th nd would h v h d. It would
h v dd nd not h v hndrd th growth of th flng of unty
mong th mmbrs of trb or st t, s wll s h v ld to th
rcognton of th ndvdu l s subordn t to th soc l org nsm.
It m y thus sm qut n tur l to look to utlt r nsm s gvng
th nd for rflctv cton, nd yt to hold long wth t wh t s
loosly c lld th thcs of voluton.
[Sdnot: h s ld to ts modfc ton]
[Sdnot: n mthod,]
But ths frst tttud of voluton to utlt r nsm w s not fttd
to b prm nnt; nd th "st rt"[138] Mr Spncr got on bng cl ssd
wth nt-utlt r ns must h v bn rp td n th xprnc
of othr mor lsts s thy found thmslvs drftng from thr
ncnt moorngs. Mr Spncr's dffrnc from th utlt r ns s
not such s to l d hm to rjct or modfy thr prncpl. H
m nt ns, s strongly s thy do, th t "th ultm tly suprm nd"
s "h ppnss spc l nd gnr l."[139] But h ds grs wth thm
n mthod, holdng th t, owng to th ncommnsur blty of m n's
dffrnt pl surs nd p ns, nd to th ncommnsur blty of th
pl surs nd p ns of on m n wth thos of othrs, coupld wth th

ndtrmn tnss of th m ns rqurd to r ch so ndtrmn t n

nd, h ppnss s not fttd to b th mmd t m of conduct.[140]
But nothr mthod s opn to us. For "snc voluton h s bn,
nd s stll, workng tow rds th hghst lf, t follows th t
conformng to thos prncpls by whch th hghst lf s chvd,
s furthrng th t nd."[141] It s possbl "to dduc, from th
l ws of lf nd th condtons of xstnc, wh t knds of cton
ncss rly tnd to produc h ppnss, nd wh t knds to produc
unh ppnss."[142] Gr tst pl sur, th t s to s y, s th nd. But
t s so mpossbl to comp r dffrnt knds of pl sur, dffrnt
popl's pl sur, nd dffrnt m ns for obt nng m xmum of t,
th t t s not pr ctc l nd for mng t. No doubt s xprssd
th t gr tst h ppnss s th ultm t nd; lthough no good r son
s gvn for holdng th t t s. But t s n ndtrmn t nd, nd
nds to b ntrprtd by th cours of voluton whch s hld to
tnd to t. It s not too much to s y, thrfor, th t Mr Spncr s
only nomn lly utlt r n. Hs thc l prncpls r not rrvd
t by n stm t of th consquncs of cton, but by dducton
from th l ws of th t "hghst lf" whch s now n procss of
voluton. Ths ll nc btwn volutonsm nd hdonsm wll b
x mnd n th followng ch ptr. At prsnt t s ncss ry to
consdr th r sons whch h v ld othr volutonsts to look upon
th nw mor lty s suprsdng th utlt r n nd.
[Sdnot: nd n prncpl.]
[Sdnot: (_ _) Id l of utlt r nsm objctd to s
unprogrssv.]
Mr Spncr's "dssnt from th doctrn of utlty, s commonly
undrstood, concrns," h tlls us,[143] "not th objct to b
r chd by mn, but th mthod of r chng t." In othr wrtrs,
howvr, th thory of voluton h s not only suppl ntd th mthod
of utlt r nsm, but lso ld to modfc ton of ts prncpl.
Th objctons thy h v t kn to t m y prh ps b summd up by
s yng th t thy consdr utlt r nsm to look upon conduct
from mch nc l, nst d of from n org nc pont of vw. It
prscrbd conduct to
m n s f h wr
m chn wth
crt n
knd nd qu ntty of work to turn out. Hs n tur w s lookd upon
by t s fxd, nd hs soc l condtons s unv ryng; nd th
d l st bfor hm w s thrfor unprogrssv--somthng th t
h w s to do or to gt, not somthng th t h w s to bcom. "If
consstntly ppld," t h s bn rcntly rgud, "utlt r nsm
sms rrvoc bly commttd to
strotypd nd unprogrssv
d l."[144] Accordng to Mr Stphn, t "consdrs socty to b
formd of n ggrg t of sml r hum n bngs. Th ch r ctr of
 ch molcul s rg rdd s const nt." It c n, thrfor, gv
tst whch s " pproxm tly ccur t" only, whch dos not llow
for th v r ton of ch r ctr nd of soc l rl tons.[145] To
th s m ffct Mss Smcox m nt ns th t t "mght p ss mustr
n thory of soc l st tcs, but t br ks down ltogthr f w
sk ts hlp to construct thory of soc l dyn mcs."[146] Ths
wrtrs do not sm to h v m d t qut cl r, howvr, n wh t
w y utlt r nsm ssums st ton ry condton of hum n n tur,
nd so formul ts conduct n w y unsutd to progrssv st t.
To s y smply th t th gr tst h ppnss of th gr tst numbr s
th nd, s not n tslf nconsstnt wth progrssv st t of
hum n n tur. It s tru th t, n ll th nthus sm for nd blf
n progrss to b sn n wrtr such s J. S. Mll, thr s
const nt go l lw ys st to t n th possbl m xmum of pl s nt

flng. It would not h v bn nconsstnt for hm, howvr, to

look upon hum n n tur s c p bl of dvlopng nw suscptblts
for pl sur. Progrss s m d by ncr sng th mount of pl sur
ctu lly got. And so f r, th d l tslf s crt nly fxd, whl
progrss conssts n ts gr du l r ls ton. But thr s no spc l
vrtu n h vng n d l whch s tslf progrssv. A progrssv
d l smply m ns n d l whch s ncompltly comprhndd, nd
th comprhnson of whch procds gr du lly wth ts r ls ton.
At ny tm th dfnton of such n d l c n only b tnt tv:
wth th ctu l ssml ton of ch r ctr to t, th ntllct coms
to gr sp ts n tur wth ncr sng cl rnss. I do not myslf thnk
th t w c n xpct to h v mor th n such
tnt tv nd progrssv
comprhnson of th mor l d l of hum nty. But w must not t k
objcton to thory bc us t gvs t onc
cl r nd dfnt
vw of th fn l nd of conduct: though w must not rfr n from
nqurng how th nd s known.
[Sdnot: Forc of th objcton whn ttmpt m d to ntrprt
gr tst h ppnss,]
[Sdnot: by showng th w y n whch mn c n obt n h ppnss,]
But th b rng of th objcton to utlt r nsm bcoms pp rnt
whn w try to gv som dfnt m nng to th nd gr tst
h ppnss. If w r contnt to rcv t s smply vry
gnr l--or r thr bstr ct--xprsson for our d l, nothng nd
b s d, xcpt to put th quston, whch h s bn lr dy skd,
How w c m by such n d l? Th dffculty rss whn w ttmpt
to pply th d l to pr ctc. Wth mn of fxd ch r ctr n n
unch ngng socty, our w y mght b comp r tvly cl r. But,
whn both ch r ctr nd soc l rl tons v ry, nd thr v r ton
xtnds to suscptblty to pl sur nd p n, nd dpnds on th
ctons doptd to obt n th nd, utlt r nsm m y wll pp r
to b wthout prncpl by whch to dtrmn btwn dffrnt
knds of conduct. To n objcton sml r to ths, but t kn from th
old pont of vw, th t w h v no tm bfor ctng to sum up th
pl sur bl nd p nful consquncs of our ctons, Mll rpld
th t thr h d bn " mpl tm--n mly, th whol p st dur ton
of th hum n spcs"[147]--n whch to stm t th flcfc
rsults of conduct. Th v r blty of f culty nd functon m ks
ths nswr l ck convncng powr. Yt, prh ps, w r pt t
prsnt to dsrg rd th r l v lu of ths collctv xprnc
of th r c. Tru, hum n n tur s not const nt; yt crt n of
ts qu lts r prsstnt nd const nt nough not to l v us
n doubt s to whthr, s y, murdr nd thft r bnfc l or
njurous to h ppnss. Thr r t l st crt n ctons, nd,
stll mor, crt n bstntons, upon whch hum n scurty--th b ss
of h ppnss--dpnds. But t would sm th t thos "scond ry l ws"
m y b mor proprly rg rdd s condtons of lf th n m ns to
pl sur.
[Sdnot: nd

m xmum of t.]

Th dffculty, howvr, coms most cl rly to th front whn w
ttmpt to dfn th m xmum, nd th t not for n ndvdu l or
gnr ton only, but for th r c. It s not h ppnss mrly, but
gr tst h ppnss, th t s th utlt r n nd. Is thr ny w y,
thn, of dtrmnng how th m xmum of h ppnss s to b obt nd
for gnr tons whos ch r ctrs, though nhrtd from prsnt
ndvdu ls, m y b modfd lmost ndfntly? Th vry xstnc

nd numbrs of ths futur gnr tons r problm tc; nd Mll,

s s wll known, spnt much of hs nrgy n tryng to convnc
th prsnt gnr ton to rstrct th numbrs of th nxt. Evn on
th fund mnt l quston s to whthr h ppnss s to b obt nd
by th rstrcton of dsrs or by th s tsf cton whch l ds to
thr rcurrnc nd ncr s, no prncpl c n b xtr ctd from
utlt r n thcs. Th thory of voluton h s shown how dsrs
m y b uprootd n th ch r ctr of th r c, though thy rm n to
th nd n th prsnt ndvdu ls; but n  ch c s utlt r nsm
would rqur us to sum up nd stm t th rl tv dv nt gs of
rnunc ton nd s tsf cton,-- problm whch th modf blty of
hum n ch r ctr sms to m k mpr ctc bl. Thus, vn f crt n
ruls of lvng m y b scrt nd, nd justfd by th utlt r n
prncpl, t would sm th t th nd of gr tst h ppnss for
th r c of m n, or th sntnt cr ton gnr lly, must rm n
" bstr ct." Thr sms no prncpl through whch t m y b ppld
to conduct--no hop of n ccur t stm t of rsults--whn th
v r blty of th ndvdu l nd of soc l rl tons s t kn nto
ccount.
[Sdnot: (b) Objcton to utlt r nsm s
consquncs;]

thory of

Connctd wth ths s th ssrton th t mor lty must h v n

nw rd, not n xtrn l st nd rd. Th volutonsts r nclnd
to condmn utlt r nsm s thory of consquncs, d lng
solly wth work producd. Accordng to Mll, "utlt r n mor lsts
h v gon byond lmost ll othrs n ffrmng th t th motv
h s nothng to do wth th mor lty of th cton, though much
wth th worth of th gnt."[148] And ths sms to b just wh t
volutonsm objcts to. Evn th worth of th gnt s, ccordng to
utlt r nsm, only tndncy to prform th ctons c lld mor l:
" good or b d dsposton" s s d to b " bnt of ch r ctr from
whch usful or from whch hurtful ctons r lkly to rs."[149]
Ag nst ths vw Mr Stphn m nt ns th t "th ttmpt to scur
n bsolut nd mmut bl mor l l w n ts xtrn l sh p must b
llusory. Th mor l l w c n b st td uncondton lly whn t s
st td n th form 'B ths,' but not whn t s st td n th form
'Do ths.'"[150] Ths, howvr, pp rs to xprss th m ttr n
w y not fr from dffculty. Th org nc vw of conduct wll objct
not only to consdrng cton p rt from ch r ctr, but lso to
consdrng ch r ctr p rt from cton. W must tr t conduct s
whol: nd, n ordr to do so, w must tr t t s both rsng out
of nd formng ch r ctr; nd w must tr t ch r ctr not s mr
potnt lty, but s t r lss tslf n conduct. Th w knss of
th utlt r n thory s ts mthod of tr tng ctons mrly n
rspct of thr rsults: th volutonst must show how rsults r
connctd wth motvs,--how ch r ctr nd conduct r dffrnt
spcts of whol.
[Sdnot: (c) nd

s rl td solly to snsblty,]

[Sdnot: of whch thr s no common m sur.]

Th dffrnc of th volutonst vw from utlt r nsm coms
out t nothr pont. Th l ttr pl cs th st nd rd nd tst of
conduct n ts ffcts on th snsblty. Th bst s th t whch
brngs most pl sur. Utlt r ns r now, for th most p rt, r dy
to dmt th t, to b n  rnst wth thr thory, thy must rjct
Mll's ttmpt to dstngush qu lts mong pl surs. "If mor lty

s to b dfnd by h ppnss, w must, of cours, llow ll knds

of h ppnss to count, nd to count qu lly so f r s thy r
ctu lly qu l. W must rckon th pl surs of m lvolnc s wll
s thos of bnvolnc."[151] Of hs own pl surs--of th rl tv
mounts of pl sur h gts from v rous sourcs-- ch m n s th
fn l judg. On m n prfrs "push-pn" to potry, nothr potry to
"push-pn"; nd nthr h s rght to c ll th othr mst kn. If
w r to m t th gr tst m xmum pl sur, thrfor, w must
not strv for wh t r commonly c lld "hgh" pl surs r thr th n
"low" pl surs, xcpt s gr tr n ntnsty. If w must h v
st nd rd, th judgmnt of th (~phrnims~) fr which Mi
cnended mus be superseded by he judgmen f he average man. If
peasure is he ny end, and saisfacin is simpy anher name
fr i, hen i is painy incrrec  say ha "i is beer 
be a human being dissaisfied han a pig saisfied; beer  be
Scraes dissaisfied han a f saisfied."[152] As has been urged
frm he evuinis pin f view, "here is n cmmn measure f
happiness  enabe us  say ha he mre perfec being enjys
mre f i han he ess."[153] There seems ne way ny in which
uiiarianism can bring is mra idea in harmny wih he
upward endency caimed fr isef by evuinis ehics--and ha
is, by mainaining ha he peasures inciden  wha are regarded
as he higher funcins are he peasures which exce hers in
respec f "fecundiy": hey are he surce f fuure peasures,
and are frequeny inexcusive even in heir presen enjymen. The
difficuy in making his asserin is jus ha hese "higher"
peasures are bu sighy appreciaed by he majriy f men, and
can hardy be said  be peasures fr hem a a. Bu here he
hery f evuin, whse adherens have been acing he par f
he candid friend  uiiarianism, mus cme  is aid, and admi
ha human naure may be s mdified in he fuure as  aw f he
"highes" becming as he "greaes" f peasures. The argumen in
he muh f he uiiarian is perhaps a smewha arbirary ne,
since i cud be appied equay we  any cass f peasures.
The nin f "higher," as appied eiher  cnduc r  peasure,
has been acceped frm curren mra pinin. Bu he hery f
evuin has se isef  expain his nin, and  devep a
hery f mraiy in harmny wih is wn scienific psiins, and
free frm he defecs which i has fund in her sysems. Hw far
i cnribues  he deerminain f he ehica end wi frm he
subjec f invesigain in he fwing chapers.
FOOTNOTES:
[115] Cf. Miss Cbbe, in 'Darwinism in Mras, and her Essays'
(1872), p. 5.
[116] Mehds f Ehics, III. i. 4, 3d ed., p. 211.
[117] Cf. Prfessr F.
335 ff. Apar frm he
insincs,  which Mr
meaning hey wi have
frm he pin f view

Pck, "Evuin and Ehics"--Mind, i. pp.

bearing f a uiiarian es n inheried
Pck refers, I have ried  shw wha
fr he evuinis wh judges hem sey
f his hery.

[118] Trai des sensains, uvrs (1798), vol. .

[119] It s to condton of ths sort th t phr s such s
Clfford's "trb l slf" (Lcturs nd Ess ys, . 111) would pply.

[120] Cf. Spncr, Prncpls of Socology, . 479.

[121] Cf. B rr tt, "Ethcs nd Poltcs"--Mnd, . 453 ff.
[122] Cf. Stphn, Scnc of Ethcs, p. 113.
[123] W lth of N tons, book v. ch. .
[124] D t of Ethcs, ch p. x.
[125] Stphn, Scnc of Ethcs, p. 155; cf. Spncr, D t
Ethcs, p. 120.

of

[126] Stphn, Scnc of Ethcs, p. 226.

[127] Scnc of Ethcs, p. 263.
[128] Cf. Ibd., p. 442.
[129] D t of Ethcs, p. 253
[130] Scnc of Ethcs, p. 349.
[131] F. Y. Edgworth, Old nd Nw Mthods of Ethcs (1877), p. 11.
[132] Cf. A. B rr tt, Mnd, . 280.
[133] D t of Ethcs, ch p. x.
[134] Physc l Ethcs, p. 12.
[135] Ibd., p. 17.
[136] In th word "du" n d of worth s nvolvd. Prob bly
Mr B rr tt m nt by "du prform nc" on whch m d th f culty
corrspond wth ts mdum (cf. Physc l Ethcs, p. 9); but ths
ntroducs nw st nd rd of v lu.
[137] Th tr nston nvolvd n p ssng from "pl sur" to
"prform nc of functon" or "lf" s th nd of conduct, m y b
llustr td by th followng p ss g from Mr P tr's 'M rus th
Epcur n' (1885, . 163): "R lly, to th ph s of rflcton
through whch M rus w s thn p ssng, th ch rg of 'hdonsm,'
wh tvr ts r l wght mght b, w s not proprly pplc bl t
ll. Not pl sur, but fulnss of lf, nd 'nsght' s conductng
to th t fulnss--nrgy, choc nd v rty of xprnc--ncludng
nobl p n nd sorrow vn--lovs such s thos n th xqust
old story of Apulus; such sncr nd strnuous forms of th
mor l lf, s Snc nd Epcttus--wh tvr form of hum n lf,
n short, w s mp ssond nd d l: t w s from ths th t th
'nw Cyrn csm' of M rus took ts crtron of v lus. It w s
thory, ndd, whch mght rghtly b rg rdd s n gr t dgr
concdnt wth th m n prncpl of th Stocs thmslvs, nd
vrson of th prcpt 'Wh tsovr thy h nd fndth to do, do t wth
ll thy mght'-- doctrn so wdly pplc bl mong th noblr
sprts of th t tm; nd s wth th t ts mst kn tndncy would
l n th drcton of knd of dol try of mr lf, or n tur l
gft or strngth--_l'doltr ds t lnts_."
[138] "Th not n quston gr tly st rtld m by mplctly

cl ssng m wth nt-utlt r ns. I h v nvr rg rdd myslf s

n nt-utlt r n."--Mr Spncr's lttr to J. S. Mll, prntd n
B n's Mnt l nd Mor l Scnc, p. 721.
[139] D t of Ethcs, p. 173; cf. p. 30.
[140] Ibd., pp. 154, 155.
[141] Ibd., p. 171.
[142] Lttr to J. S. Mll, n D t of Ethcs, p. 57.
[143] Lttr to J. S. Mll, n B n's Mnt l nd Mor l Scnc, p.
721.
[144] J. T. Punnt, "Ethc l Altrn tvs"--Mnd, x. 95.
[145] Scnc of Ethcs, p. 363.
[146] N tur l L w: An Ess y n Ethcs (1877), p. 101.
[147] Utlt r nsm, p. 34.
[148] Utlt r nsm, p. 26.
[149] Ibd., p. 27 n.
[150] Stphn, Scnc of Ethcs, p. 385.
[151] Ibd., p. 361.
[152] Mll, Utlt r nsm, p. 14.
[153] Smcox, N tur l L w, p. 101.

CHAPTER VII.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.
[Sdnot: 1. All nc of volutonsm
w ys:]

nd hdonsm ffctd n two

Th ll nc btwn Evolutonsm nd Hdonsm m y b rrvd t

from thr of th two ponts of vw whch r bng brought nto
conncton: m y b thr n ttmpt to brng th hdonstc nd nto
th dfnt rgon of l w rv ld by th voluton of lf; or m y
rsult from th nd vour to gv cl rnss nd prsu svnss to n
thc l nd whch voluton tslf sms to pont to.
[Sdnot: (_ _) gr tst h ppnss to b obt nd by conformng to
l ws of lf or of voluton;]
Th formr pont of vw s rprsntd n Mr Spncr's rjcton
of mprc l utlt r nsm, nd substtuton for t of
pr ctc l
nd whch s not nunc td n trms of pl sur. H ppnss s stll
rg rdd by hm s th suprm nd; but th tndncy to t s not

to b doptd s th nd n pr ctc l mor lty. Thr r crt n

condtons to soc l qulbrum whch "must b fulflld bfor
complt lf--th t s, gr tst h ppnss--c n b obt nd n ny
socty."[154] Thus th form of "r ton l utlt r nsm" whch h
nd vours to st blsh "dos not t k wlf r for ts mmd t
objct of pursut," but "conformty to crt n prncpls whch,
n th n tur of thngs, c us lly dtrmn wlf r."[155] H vng
dducd "from th l ws of lf nd th condtons of xstnc wh t
knds of cton ncss rly tnd to produc h ppnss, nd wh t knds
to produc unh ppnss," w r to rcogns ths dductons " s
l ws of conduct ... rrspctv of drct stm ton of h ppnss
or msry."[156] Th ssumpton s thus dstnctly m d th t th
tndncy of lf s to h ppnss, nd th t th l ws of ts voluton
yld pr ctc l prncpls by followng out whch th gr tst
h ppnss m y b obt nd, wthout ttmptng th mpossbl t sk of
stm tng drctly th flcfc nd nflcfc rsults of conduct.
[Sdnot: (_b_) thc l nd of voluton ntrprtd by pl sur.]
St rtng wth th volutonst pont of vw, but wth n oppost
stm t of th rl tv v lu for pr ctc of th nds suppld by
volutonsm nd by hdonsm, lk dntfc ton of thm mght
sm dvs bl. Th "ncr s of lf" to whch voluton tnds
m y b rg rdd s not mrly n ccount of th ctu l procss of
xstnc, but s prncpl of cton for conscous bng. In
ths w y som such thc l mpr tv s "B
slf-conscous gnt
n th voluton of th unvrs"[157] m y b formul td. Yt s
th "voluton of th unvrs" s somwh t l rg concpton,
nd ts l ws r not cl r to vry on, t m y sm ncss ry th t
th nd should b xpl nd by tr nsl ton nto bttr-known trms.
And ths m y b don f th conduct whch promots lf most s, t
th s m tm, th conduct whch ncr ss pl sur most. In ths
w y, lthough th ultm t nd s lf, or, n v str phr s, "th
voluton of th unvrs," th pr ctc l nd s pl sur. Th mor l
v lu of conduct wll dpnd on ts tndncy to ncr s th b l nc
of pl sur ovr p n. Th thcs of voluton wll b rducd to
hdonsm.
Ths w y of dtrmnng th volutonst nd s put forw rd s
logc l possblty r thr th n s rprsntng th vws of
ny p rty. Th contrbuton whch th thory of voluton h s to
offr tow rds th dtrmn ton of th thc l nd, h s not yt
rcvd th t dfnt xprsson whch would justfy our p ssng
by ny logc l ntrprt ton of t, on th ground of ts not
bng ctu lly doptd by thc l wrtrs. Yt t would sm th t
th bov pont of vw s not ltogthr forgn to volutonst
mor lty. Th prsrv ton or dvlopmnt of th ndvdu l--or of
th r c--whch s put forw rd s n xprsson both for th ctu l
cours of voluton nd th subjctv mpuls corrspondng to t,
s oftn ssumd to gr t  ch stp wth th dsr for pl sur,
nd, whn th st g of rflctv conscousnss s r chd, to b
dntc l wth th pursut of m xmum of pl sur.[158] In ths
w y t s ssumd th t th prsrv ton nd dvlopmnt of lf tnd
lw ys to pl sur, nd th t th nd or tndncy of voluton s
bng fulflld whn th gr tst pl sur s wsly sought. It s
thrfor ncss ry to nqur how f r th corrspondnc btwn
lf nd pl sur, or btwn dvlopmnt nd pl sur, ctu lly
holds, th t w m y s whthr t s possbl for th on to t k th
pl c of th othr n dtrmnng th nd for conduct.

[Sdnot: 2. Evolutonst
pl sur.]

rgumnt for concomt nc of lf

nd

Now t s rgud, from th pont of vw of voluton, th t, t kng

for gr ntd th t pl sur motvs cton, th org nsms n whch
pl sur bl cts concdd wth lf-prsrvng or h lth-promotng
cts must h v survvd n th struggl for xstnc t th
xpns of thos org nsms whos pl sur bl ctvty tndd to
thr dstructon or to th hndr nc of thr ffcncy.[159] Th
ssumpton n ths rgumnt, n ddton to th const nt postul t
of n tur l slcton, s smply th t pl sur s chf motv of
cton; th concluson to whch t l ds s, th t thr s
bro d
corrspondnc btwn lf-prsrvng nd pl sur bl cts--th t th
prsrv ton nd dvlopmnt of lf r pl sur bl. It s ncss ry
to x mn wth c r th v ldty of ths mport nt rgumnt wth
rfrnc to th tt cks th t m y b m d on t from th pssmst
pont of vw; nd, f ts doctrn of th corrspondnc of lf
nd pl sur s not ntrly rronous, to nqur furthr whthr
ths corrspondnc c n b m d to st blsh n nd for conduct, n
ccord nc wth th thory of voluton, by m surng lf n trms
of pl sur.
[Sdnot: 3. Objctons to ths rgumnt:]
Wh t thn s to b s d of th supposd "conflct btwn Eudmonsm
[Hdonsm] nd Evolutonsm" whch v. H rtm nn[160] opposs to th
optmst doctrn th t voluton h s tndd to m k lf nd pl sur
concd?
Th problm of Pssmsm rsolvs tslf nto two qustons whch
dmt of bng kpt dstnct: (_ _) Th frst s, Dos lf on
th whol gv, or c n t gv, b l nc of pl sur? Ths s
th fund mnt l quston of th v lu of lf s put by thos,
whthr optmsts or pssmsts, who ssum th t "v lu" m ns
"pl sur-v lu." If t b nswrd n th ng tv, th hdonstc
d l must b th rducton of th dvrs b l nc to th zro-pont
of flng strvn ftr by E strn sctcs, but, to ll pp r nc,
obt nd only nd most  sly by d th.[161] (_b_) Th scond
quston s, Dos th voluton of lf l d to n ncr s of
pl sur nd dmnuton of p n? Ths s th quston brought nto
promnnc n rcnt dscussons, nd of most mport nc for th
prsnt nqury; nd upon n ffrm tv nswr to t Evolutonst
Hdonsm s pl nly dpndnt. To both qustons v. H rtm nn gvs n
nswr n th ng tv.
[Sdnot: (_ _) th t lf c nnot brng mor pl sur th n p n;]
(_ _) If th pssmst vw of lf s corrct, Mr Spncr
holds,[162] thn "th ndng of n undsr bl xstnc bng th
thng to b wshd, th t whch c uss th ndng of t must b
ppl udd." And ths s so f r tru, though not ncss rly tru n
th w y Mr Spncr thnks. For ths undsr bl xstnc c nnot,
prh ps, b brought to fn l concluson mrly by ndng th
ndvdu l lf: ths would only l v room for othr ndvdu ls
to fll th v c nt pl cs. Annhl ton s th nd not drctly for
th ndvdu l, but for th r c. Not lf tslf, ccordng to
Schopnh ur, but th wll to lv, s to b klld n th ndvdu l
m n. Evn ths cod of mor ls, H rtm nn thnks, s rmn nt of

th f ls, pr-volutonst ndvdu lsm, nd would hndr th

cours of th unvrs, by l vng th g m to b pl yd out by th
rm nng ndvdu ls whos wlls wr not strong nough to curb or
kll thmslvs. It s mst k to thnk th t th wll to lv whch
pulss through ll xstnc c n b nnhl td by th phnomn l
ndvdu l. Th ndvdu l's duty s not to sk for hmslf th
p nlssnss of nnhl ton or p ssonlss Nrwn , but to jon n
th c slss p nful strvng of n tur, nd, by contrbutng to th
dvlopmnt of lf, to h stn ts rrv l onc mor t th go l of
unconscousnss. Th slf-dstructon, not of th ndvdu l wll,
but of th cosmc or unvrs l wll, s th fn l nd of cton.
Ap rt from th mt physc l vw of thngs wth whch ths stm t
of th v lu of lf s connctd, nd whch m y b rg rdd prh ps
s ts consqunt r thr th n ts c us,[163] th pssmst doctrn
h s doubl found ton, n psychology nd n th f cts of lf.
[Sdnot: () from th ng tv n tur of pl sur,]
Psychologc lly, t sms to b bst supportd by Schopnh ur's
doctrn of wll or dsr s n ncss nt p nful strvng, pl sur
bng mrly th ng tv of ths p n, nd lw ys comng short of
compltly s tsfyng t. But ths poston nvolvs doubl rror
n psychologc l n lyss, nd s rlnqushd vn by H rtm nn,
though h stll rg rds pl sur s n ll c ss s tsf cton of
dsr. Dsr s tslf mrly
scond ry or drvd f ct n hum n
n tur, consqunt on th nhbton of volton l nrgy.[164] Th
pl surs w c ll p ssv r ndpndnt of t; nd thos whch
ttnd upon ctvty, but r not thmslvs p rt of th nd of
cton, r lso njoyd wthout bng strvn ftr n ordr to
s tsfy w nt. Furthr, t s mst k to look upon th pl sur
of tt nmnt s mr ng ton of th p n of dsr. Th p nful
lmnt n dsr coms from th nhbton of th ttmptd
r ls ton of n d l objct. In uns tsfd dsrs, t s tru,
th p n s n proporton to th strngth of th rstr nd longng.
But, f th nhbton s ovrcom, th p n s not qu l to th
strngth of th dsr, but only to th mount of opposton th t h s
to b conqurd n s tsfyng t. Hnc, not only r thr othr
pl surs th n thos of s tsfd dsr, but vn th pl sur got
from such s tsf cton s somthng mor th n
mr rcompns for
th p n ccomp nyng th dsr.
[Sdnot: () from the f cts of hum n life;]
The support got
y pessimism from the f cts of hum n life is
more difficult to estim te t its true v lue. It is o
vious th t
ple sure nd p in re intermingled in lmost every experience; nd
the proportion in which they re mixed v ries gre tly in different
circumst nces nd ccording to the suscepti
ilities of different
persons. If we sk num
er of people whether life is on the whole
ple s nt to them, not only do we receive v riety of nswers which
it is h rd to sum up nd ver ge,
ut the nswers we get re pt
to reflect the feeling of the moment r ther th n to represent n
imp rti l estim te of the ple sure nd p in of lifetime. Thus
experience seems un
le to give us trustworthy nswer s to the
ver ge ple sure-v lue of life;
ut, if its verdict is correct, th t
to some life is ple s nt, though to m ny p inful, this shows th t
surplus of p in does not follow from the n ture of life, nd thus
destroys the position of thoroughgoing pessimism, which looks upon
this s the worst of ll possi
le worlds.

[Sidenote: (_
_) th t the evolution of life does not tend to

ple sure.]
(_
_) It m y still
e m int ined, however-- nd this is the position
which chiefly concerns us here--th t the course of evolution does
not tend to incre se the ple sure in life t the expense of the p in
in it, nd th t, therefore, even lthough ple sure nd evolution m y

oth of them
e possi
le ends of conduct, they re ends which point
in different directions nd le d to different courses of ction.
[Sidenote: () Incompleteness of the evolutionist rgument.]
It is necess ry for the evolutionist who holds th t the development
of life does not tend to incre sed ple sure, to meet the rgument
lre dy dduced[165] to show their correspondence. Nor does th t
rgument seem to
e ltogether
eyond criticism. To comp re progress
or development with ple sure, we ought to know ex ctly wh t is
me nt
y
oth terms. Yet it is impossi
le to h ve cle r notion of
progress without n ide of the end to which it tends, nd this h s
not yet
een o
t ined. It is l rgely on ccount of the difficulty
of o
t ining such n ide th t some evolutionists seem to h ve
een
driven to me sure progress in terms of ple sure, just s, owing to
the difficulty of estim ting nd summing up ple sures, some hedonists
h ve
een induced to me sure them
y the progress of evolution. Wh t
we h ve now to see is whether the correspondence ssumed
etween
progress nd ple sure ctu lly exists. And, to void the t utology of
s ying th t progress is incre se of life, we must judge of it simply

y empiric l o
serv tion of the n ture of hum n ctivity nd of the
course of hum n ff irs.
Now the ttempted identific tion of ple sur
le nd life-promoting
ctivities rests on n incomplete ccount of the motives nd results
of ction. For, in the first pl ce, even dmitting th t ple sure nd
void nce of p in re the only motives to ction, the influence of
n tur l selection h s not prevented ctions hurtful to life
eing
sometimes ccomp nied
y ple s nt sens tions. Its tendency to do
so h s
een much more effective in the lower orders of nim l life
th n in the higher. The l tter, especi lly m n, possess the power of
representing ide l st tes in the im gin tion, nd re thus
le to
void ctions hurtful to life, lthough these ctions re ple s nt
t the time. For the hurtful consequences of the ction m y
e so
vividly represented in ide s to outweigh the influence of the
present ple sure which could
e got from its enjoyment.[166]
And further, the n lysis of volition involved in the rgument seems
to
e insufficient. For there re other springs of ction to
e
t ken ccount of th n ple sure nd its opposite. H
it, imit tion,
nd interests of more comprehensive kind th n desire of ple s nt
feeling, re ll motives to ction. It is true th t ple sure is
lw ys felt in the successful perform nce of n ction, nd it is
lso true th t the inhi
ition of will is lw ys p inful;
ut it
is none the less incorrect to look either upon the ple sure th t
follows from the ction, or the p in th t would
e the result of
its inhi
ition s, in ordin ry c ses, the motive. It is motives of
different kind th n ple sure, such s imit tion[167] nd the
influence of ide l ends, which most often le d to progress. And
the progress th t is due to such motives c nnot
e me sured
y its
effect in incre sing ple sure, nor ssumed to m ke ple sure nd
life correspond. Other ctivities less dv nt geous in n ture in

ll respects
ut this, might, so f r s the re soning goes, le d to

equ l or to more ple sur
le consequences. At the
est, therefore,
the
ove rgument only proves gener l tendency tow rds the
coincidence of ple sur
le ctions with ctions which promote life;
it does not show th t the incre se of life c n
e ccur tely me sured

y ple sure. The process of n tur l selection might kill off ll
org nisms whose desires led them norm lly to ction hurtful to life.
But sufficient evidence h s not
een
rought forw rd to show th t
it is fitted to produce n ex ct proportion
etween progress nd
ple sure.
[Sidenote: () The pessimist doctrine th t life tends to misery:]
[Sidenote: (_ _) the hypothesis of the unconscious;]
H rtm nn, however, ttempts to strike more fund ment l
low th n
this t the presupposition involved in the rgument for evolutionist
hedonism. For he contends th t, throughout ll life, the gre t pulse
of progress is neither, on the one h nd, desire for ple sure, nor,
on the other, the more complex nd v ried motives just referred to,

ut th t it is the incess nt striving tow rds fulness of life
y
univers l unconscious will, which is m nifested in ll things, nd
which is for ever pressing onw rds tow rds conscious re lis tion,
reg rdless of the incre se of p in which the course of evolution
implies. But this hypothesis of unconscious will is not justifi
le
met physic l principle got t
y the n lysis of experience, nd
necess ry for its expl n tion, though lying
eyond it. It is
"metempiric l," or r ther mythic l, c use interpol ted into the
processes of experience. Hence the nt gonism in which it st nds to
psychologic l f ct: its disreg rd of the effect of ple sure s
powerful motive in volition; nd its neglect of the o
vious truth
th t function so re cts upon org n th t ll ctions h ve simply

y continu nce tendency to
e performed with gre ter e se, nd
therefore to yield in their perform nce incre se of ple sure. The
smoothness nd precision with which it works m y, indeed, le d to
function
eing performed unconsciously, nd thus without either
p in or ple sure. But the norm l exercise of conscious ctivity is
uniformly ple sur
le.[168]
[Sidenote: (_

_) the n ture of volition;]
While giving up Schopenh uer's doctrine of the merely neg tive
ch r cter of ple sure, H rtm nn yet contends th t "etern l limits"
re set
y the very n ture of volition, which m ke it impossi
le
to h ve world with more ple sure in it th n p in. But his
rguments[169] come very f r short of proving his c se. For, in the
first pl ce, to s y th t the stimul tion nd we rying of the nerves
imply the necessity of cess tion of ple sure s well s of p in,
is to confuse complete st tes of consciousness with the su
jective
feeling which ccomp nies e ch st te. It is not true th t one ever

ecomes we ry of ple sure: to t lk s if there were one cl ss of
nerves for ple sure, nd nother for p in, is
surd. But every
ment l st te, however ple sur
le to st rt with, tends to
ecome
monotonous, we risome, or p inful. Ple sure thus requires
ch nge
from one ment l st te to nother: to s y th t it requires ch nge
from ple sure to something else is contr diction in terms. It is
the o
jects or ctivity th t require to
e v ried, not the feeling
of ple sure. Ag in, in the second pl ce, it is true th t ple sure
is to
e reg rded s indirect _in so f r s_ it is entirely due
to the cess tion of p in, nd not to inst nt neous s tisf ction

of will. But it does not do to reg rd the ple sure s ltogether

indirect when, lthough the cess tion of p in is necess ry for its
production, it is itself something more th n this cess tion. The
inhi
ition of will often prevents the re lis tion of n o
ject which
is very much more th n recompense in ple sur
le qu lity for the
p in of the restr int; nd lthough the ple sure only rises from
the remov l of this p inful st te of inhi
ition, there is
direct
nd positive g in over nd
ove the gr tific tion of h ving p in
removed. In the third pl ce, H rtm nn rgues th t the s tisf ction
of will is often unconscious, where s p in is _eo ipso_ conscious.
But, even dmitting the re lity of unconscious will or desire, which
this rgument involves, it does not follow th t ple sure nd p in re
differently ffected in reg rd to it. If p in is _eo ipso_ conscious,
so lso is ple sure; if the s tisf ction of unconscious desire gives
no ple sure, neither does the
sence of such s tisf ction give
p in.[170] It is true, s H rtm nn dds in the fourth pl ce, th t
desire is often long nd the joy of s tisf ction fleeting;
ut this
refers not so much to ment l ple sures s to those connected with
physic l ppetite. Of them it is true th t
"These violent delights h ve violent ends,
And in their triumph die."
But in the higher ple sures with more perm nent o
jects of pursuit,
lthough the desire m y
e long-continued, the ple sure does not
dis ppe r in the moment of gr tific tion.
It would seem, therefore, th t the pessimist psychology, in tre ting
ple sure in different w y from p in, mist kes the true n ture
of
oth s simply "pol r extremes"[171] of feeling, nd prevents
the rgument
eing f ced which h s
een
rought forw rd to show the
incre sing correspondence of ple sure nd life.
*

[Sidenote: (_cc_) the f cts of hum n progress:]

The f ilure of the psychologic l rgument m kes the whole
urden of
the proof of pessimism rest upon the rgument from historic l f cts.
And the ttempt h s
een definitely m de to show, from o
serv tion
of the course of hum n ff irs, th t the progress of the world
tends to misery. It is necess ry, therefore, to sk whether it c n

e est
lished th t the f cts included under the v gue term "hum n
progress" h ve norm l tendency either to incre se ple sure or to
ct in the opposite w y. Now progress is
ch r cteristic
oth of the
individu l nd of society;
ut ple sure only
elongs to the former,
so th t n nswer to the question whether individu l progress tends
to incre se the surplus of ple sure over p in, still le ves unsettled
the question s to the effect of soci l progress.
[Sidenote: individu l progress;]
It seems evident th t
oth the physic l nd ment l development of the
individu l imply gre ter d pt
ility to, nd correspondence with,
the extern l world, nd th t, on ccount of this development, there
is less unple s nt friction
etween outer nd inner rel tions, nd
me ns re t h nd for o
t ining o
jects of desire with less exertion
th n formerly. But, t the s me time, the incre se of knowledge nd
of skill lw ys implies not merely the me ns of s tisfying old w nts,

ut the cre tion of new ones: we see more of the evil in the world

th n our foref thers did, nd there re more venues
y which it

c n ppro ch us, if we h ve lso more effective me ns for voiding
wh t we dislike. And, lthough knowledge
rings with it not only the
ple sure of gr tified curiosity,
ut th t recognition of
univers l
order which frees the mind from the evils
red
y
elief in the
fickleness of n ture, yet this ll-perv ding sense of l w h s so
regul ted our
eliefs nd methods of rese rch th t science itself m y
seem to h ve lost the peculi r freshness of interest th t
elonged
to its e rlier st ges; while the feelings c lled forth
y
vision
of the divine presence in the world, find
ut
poor su
stitute
in the su
lime region of "cosmic emotion." Further, the widening
of the symp thetic feelings nd their consequent ctivities, nd
the refinement of the whole sensitive n ture
y which it responds
more quickly nd ccur tely to emotion l stimuli, h ve m de the
present gener tion more suscepti
le to
oth p in nd ple sure th n
its predecessors. But H rtm nn's rgument th t the duller nervous
system of the s v ge r ces (N turvlker) m kes them h ppier th n the
civilised (Culturvlker),[172] le ves out of sight the new sources of
ple sure s well s p in th t re opened up to refined sensi
ility.
According to H rtm nn, the sthetic sensi
ilities m y
e source
of p inless ple sure: yet even their cultiv tion c nnot
e s id to

e m tter of pure g in to their possessors; for the p in of discord
is to
e set g inst--in his opinion, it outweighs--the ple sure of
h rmony. On the whole, then, it would ppe r th t the evolution of
the individu l le ds to gre ter possi
ilities
oth of ple sure nd of
p in. The refinement of the intellectu l nd emotion l n ture opens
up wider r nges of
oth kinds of feeling; nd we re driven to look
m inly to the improvement of the soci l environment for the me ns of
incre sing ple sure nd diminishing p in.
[Sidenote: soci l progress:]
[Sidenote: industri l,]
But to estim te the hedonistic v lue of soci l progress is still
more difficult t sk th n the preceding. For the m rch of ff irs h s
often little reg rd to its effect on the h ppiness of the gre ter
num
er of people concerned. Industri lly, it m y
e thought th t
the incre se in the mount of we lth produced ffords
v stly
gre ter me ns of comfort nd luxury. Yet, it is dou
tful whether
this incre se h s lw ys
een sufficient to keep p ce with the
growth of popul tion; nd it is cert in th t every society whose
territory is limited, must, when its num
ers h ve incre sed
eyond
cert in point,
egin to experience the diminishing returns which
n ture yields for the l
our expended upon it. Indeed, the tendency
to n excess in the r te of incre se of popul tion over th t of
me ns of su
sistence is one of the chief c uses which m ke it so
difficult to ssert th t civilis tion tends to gre ter h ppiness.
But, even lthough the ver ge qu ntity of we lth
e gre ter now th n

efore, it must
e remem
ered th t we lth is me sured
y its mount,
where s h ppiness depends on the equ lity with which th t mount
is distri
uted.[173] Yet the present industri l _rgime_ tends to
the ccumul tion of immense we lth in
few h nds, r ther th n to
its proportion te incre se throughout the community. The industri l
progress which incre ses the we lth of the rich, h s little to
recommend it if it le ves the "l
ouring poor" t
st rv tion-w ge.
"And wh t if Tr de sow cities
Like shells long the shore,
And th tch with towns the pr irie
ro d

With r ilw ys ironed o'er,"-if the popul tion c n
e divided into plutocr ts nd prolet ri te?
Moreover, the very n ture of economic production seems to imply n
opposition
etween soci l progress nd individu l well
eing. For
the former, in dem nding the gre test possi
le mount of produce,
requires n excessive nd incre sing speci lis tion of l
our.
E ch worker must perform th t oper tion only to which he h s

een speci lly tr ined, or which he c n do
est. And in this w y
industri lism tends to occupy the gre ter p rt of the w king hours
of n incre sing proportion of hum n lives in the repetition of
short series of mech nic l movements which c ll out
re minimum
of the f culties of the worker, dw rf his n ture, nd reduce his
life to mere succession of the s me monotonous sens tion.[174] In
spite, therefore, of immense improvements in the gener l conditions
of well
eing, it is still difficult to s y th t the h ppiness of the
ver ge hum n life h s
een much incre sed
y the m rch of industri l
progress.
[Sidenote:

nd politic l.]

A more hopeful view m y, perh ps,
e t ken of the effect of politic l

progress. The incre se of popul r government gr tifies the desire for
power, nd, in some c ses, even tends to
more efficient m n gement
of ff irs. Still more import nt in its effect on h ppiness is
the gre ter security for life nd property which the gr du l
consolid tion of politic l control h s
rought
out. It would seem,
too, th t the h rsher fe tures of the struggle
y which this dv nce
t kes pl ce h ve
een modified; nd th t the w r of politics h s

ted in fury more th n the w r of tr de. On the whole, therefore,
the tendency of modern politic l rule ppe rs to
e tow rds n lmost
unmixed g in in respect of h ppiness,--
y the security it ffords for
life nd property,
y its wide distri
ution of politic l power, nd

y the room it gives for individu l freedom. Yet the l st of these
results--in the _l issez-f ire_ system of industri lism to which it
h s led, nd which, in spite of m ny modific tions, is still in the
scend nt--h s effects of
more dou
tful ch r cter.
This mere reference to one or two of the le ding fe tures of
progress would not
e sufficient to support thesis either s to
its
enefici l or
neful tendency. But evidence enough h s
een
led to show th t the effects on ple sure of individu l nd soci l
development re of mixed kind,--th t culture nd civilis tion
h ve neither the tendency to misery which H rtm nn follows Rousse u
in ttri
uting to them,[175] nor, on the other h nd, th t ste dy
correspondence with incre sing ple sure which would
e required to
est
lish the position of evolutionist hedonism.
[Sidenote: Necessity of choosing
etween evolutionism nd hedonism.]
It follows, therefore, th t, without dopting pessimist view, we
must still m ke our choice
etween evolutionism nd hedonism. The
course of evolution--so f r s experience helps us to underst nd
it--c nnot
e me sured
y incre se of ple sure. Nothing is s id here
to show th t it is not perfectly consistent to hold th t the mor l
feelings nd ide s, the customs to which they h ve given rise, nd
the institutions in which they re em
odied, h ve
een produced
y
the ordin ry l ws of evolution, nd yet to m int in th t the mor l
end for reflective
eings is the hedonistic or utilit ri n end. It
m y
e possi
le, th t is to s y, to
e n evolutionist in psychology

nd sociology, t the s me time th t one is

hedonist in ethics. But
it is not llow
le to dopt ple sure s the end, nd yet spe k of it
s determined
y evolution. Evolution c n determine no such end until
it
e shown th t the progress it connotes implies proportion te
incre se of ple sure.
Such is the conclusion to which we re led
y consider tion of the

e rings of evolution upon the incre se of ple sure nd p in. But
this rgument requires to
e supplemented
y the more s tisf ctory
method of n independent n lysis of ple sure in rel tion to the
development of hum n n ture; nd from this n lysis we m y hope to
discover how f r the theory of evolution is consistent with the
ethics of hedonism.
*

[Sidenote: 4. The psychologic l n lysis of ple sure

rel tion to the ethics of evolution.]

nd p in in

The rel tive nd tr nsient n ture of ple sure h s
een urged s n

o
jection g inst ny form of hedonism
y m ny philosophers since
the time of Pl to. And the rgument h s of l te ye rs
een
rought
forw rd in w y which shows th t the c lculus of "ple sures" nd
"p ins" which Benth m's ethics implies is much less cert in nd
e sy th n its uthor supposed. This h s
een m de cle r
oth
y the
su
tle n lysis c rried out
y the l te Professor Green, nd
y
Professor Sidgwick's ex min tion of the difficulties which
eset the
"hedonistic c lculus." It does not ppe r, however, to h ve
een m de
out th t the n ture of ple sure proves hedonism to
e impossi
le s
the end of conduct. But it m y, perh ps, ppe r th t the c se is
ltered when we consider the m tter in the light of the evolutionist
form of hedonism now under ex min tion, nd estim te from this point
of view the ethic l
e rings of the psychologic l n lysis of feeling.
[Sidenote: (_ _) The purely su
jective n ture of ple sure;]
[Sidenote: its connection with o
jective st tes of mind,]
[Sidenote: through which it m y
e m de the end of conduct.]
The difficulty of defining ple sure or p in is not the s me s the
difficulty or impossi
ility of defining ny element ry sens tion.
For the l tter is connected in definite w ys with other simil r
sens tions, c n
e comp red nd ssoci ted with them, nd
y
such ssoci tion go to m ke up n o
ject or thing. But ple sure
nd p in re neither o
jects nor p rts of o
jects: they c nnot

e distinguished from or ssoci ted with the impressions of the
senses so s to constitute n o
ject. They c n only
e spoken of
s n ffection of the percipient nd ctive su
ject, different
in kind
oth from the o
jects it knows nd the cts it performs:
e ch c n only
e defined s the opposite of the other. Ple sure nd
p in re not re l phenomen with distinguish
le existence of
their own, like sens tions, conceptions, or ctions; they h ve no
tr ce of o
jectivity wh tever,
ut re, s H milton puts it,[176]
"su
jectively su
jective": "ple sure is not f ct, nor is p in
f ct,
ut one f ct is ple sur
le, nother p inful."[177] Ple sure,
therefore, is
mere feeling of the su
ject, concomit nt with the
sensory or motor present tions which,
y re son of their presence
to consciousness, we c ll o
jects or ctions. It is not something

y itself which we c n choose r ther th n something else, s we m y

select
pe ch inste d of n pple. It c n only
e m de the end of
conduct in n indirect w y. We must im not t ple sure _per se_,
ut
t o
jects which we h ve re son to
elieve will
e ccomp nied
y
ple sur
le feeling. Ple sure nd p in, s it h s
een urged,[178]
re not qu ntities th t c n
e dded nd su
tr cted. It is not the
ple sur
le or p inful feeling,
ut the perception l or cognitive
elements in the ment l st te of which it is n element, th t dmit of
plur lity nd me surement. But we m y foresee th t one ment l st te
will
e ccomp nied
y ple sur
le, nother
y p inful feeling, nd,
on th t ccount, we m y choose the former. In gre t num
er of c ses
we re further
le to m ke
qu ntit tive estim te, nd to s y th t
the ple sur
le feeling ccomp nying one o
ject or ction is more
intense th n th t ccomp nying nother, nd thus to choose one o
ject
r ther th n nother, not merely
ec use one is ple sur
le while the
other is p inful,
ut (in c ses where
oth re ple sur
le)
ec use
it is supposed th t the one will yield more intense or more prolonged
ple sure th n the other. If this
e true, the purely su
jective
n ture of ple sure does not m ke it impossi
le for it to
e t ken
s the pr ctic l end of conduct for the individu l--however inex ct
nd tent tive m ny of its estim tes must
e--though it will shortly
ppe r th t its n ture unfits it to
e the end on the theory of
evolution.
The difficulty rises when we ttempt to interpret,
y me ns of
ple sure, the incre se nd development of life to which the course
of evolution tends, nd which is sometimes put forw rd s the end
which the evolution-theory prescri
es for conduct. And the difficulty
lso meets us when we seek to expl in the conception of m ximum of
ple sures s the end,
y me ns of the conception of evolution.
As long s we re content to look upon hum n n ture s consisting
of const nt sources of ctivity nd enjoyment, nd h ving fixed
suscepti
ilities for ple sure nd p in, it is e sy to dopt the
incre se of ple sure nd diminution of p in s our im. But the
c se is ltered when we t ke into consider tion the f ct th t m n's
ctions nd sensi
ilities re su
ject to indefinite modific tion.
Ple sure, s we h ve seen, is feeling of the su
ject dependent upon
the o
jects, sensory nd motor, present t ny time to consciousness.
These o
jects lone c n
e our end;
ut we m y im t cert in of
them r ther th n others, simply on ccount of their ple sur
le
ccomp niment. It m y h ppen, however, th t n o
ject or ction t
one time ple sur
le
ecomes p inful t nother time, nd th t wh t
is now p inful ce ses to
e so nd
ecomes ple sur
le. In this c se
our course of ction, if motived
y ple sure, would h ve to
e
entirely ch nged, our pr ctic l ethics revised nd reversed. And,
lthough no sudden lter tion such s this ever t kes pl ce, the
theory of evolution shows th t gr du l modific tion of the kind is
going on.
[Sidenote: (_
_) The conditions of ple sure nd p in:]
The conditions of ple sure nd p in, physiologic l nd psychologic l,
re m tter of dispute; nd the dispute is complic ted
y the
confusion of the physiologic l with the psychologic l pro
lem.
It will
e evident, however,--if only we keep different things
cle r of e ch other,--th t
oth kinds of expl n tion re possi
le,
nd th t they re distinct from one nother. The question of the
nervous ntecedents nd concomit nts of feeling is one thing, nd
quite distinct from the question which now rises of the ment l
ntecedents or concomit nts of feeling. And here the theories which

h ve ttempted gener lis tion of the phenomen re, in the light

of recent inquiry, m inly two: the theory th t ple sure follows,
or is the sense of, incre se of life, nd th t which holds it to

e the concomit nt of unimpeded conscious functioning or of medium
ctivities.
[Sidenote: () Ple sure not defin
le
vit lity;]

s the sense of incre sed

The former theory[179] might
e put forw rd s indic ting how it is

possi
le to institute connection
etween ple sure nd evolution.
But it h s
een lre dy shown th t neither the ctu l f cts of life,
nor the tendencies to ction, c n
e so interpreted s to m ke their
n ture nd development correspond, with ny degree of ex ctness,
with ple sure nd its incre se.[180] Nor is it possi
le to m ke out
th t every p in corresponds to loss of vit lity, every ple sure
heightens it. On the contr ry, the ssertion th t ple sure-giving
ctions nd life-preserving ctions coincide, is due to
h sty
gener lis tion which c nnot include ll the f cts. Th t it holds
throughout consider
le extent is true. Ple sure is, t ny r te,
usu l ccomp niment of the norm l processes of the development of
life; nd p in re ches its clim x in de th. But yet there is

ro d
m rgin of experience for which the gener lis tion is incorrect. There
re numerous c ses of p inful nd ple sur
le sens tions which c nnot

e shown to
e, respectively, destructive of, nd
enefici l to,
vit lity. As Mr B in, who lw ys keeps the f cts in view, dmits,
with reg rd to the feelings connected with the five senses, "we
c nnot contend th t the degree of ugmented vit l energy corresponds
lw ys with the degree of the ple sure."[181] The s me discrep ncy
m y
e o
served in more complex experiences. The effort fter
fuller life, whether physic l or ment l, even when its ultim te
success is not dou
tful, m y
ring more p in th n ple sure; while the
life which never str ins its powers tow rds the limits of endur nce,
m y experience lmost uninterrupted ple sure:
ut such ple sure is
the sure her ld of the process of degener tion.
[Sidenote: () m y
e held to depend on medium or norm l functioning.]
The theory th t ple sure follows incre sed vit lity, nd p in
decre sed vit lity, is supplemented or opposed in modern psychology

y the theory th t feeling depends on function: th t ple sure is the
concomit nt of medium ctivities,[182] or of conscious functioning,
which is unimpeded nd not overstr ined[183]--p in ccomp nying the
opposite condition. The o
jection urged g inst this view, th t it
le ves the so-c lled "p ssive ple sures" out of ccount, seems to
e
m de without sufficient consider tion of wh t is me nt
y ttri
uting
p ssivity to ple sure. All th t such n expression c n denote, would
ppe r to
e th t, in the ple sur
le experience referred to, no
exercise of the muscles is implied, not th t such n experience c n
t ke pl ce without ny conscious ctivity on the p rt of the su
ject.
At the s me time, the theory th t ple sure in ll c ses depends
upon function, must
e dmitted to
e o
liged to c ll in the id of
hypothesis in order to expl in ll the f cts. If the gener lis tion
required
y the theory c n
e m de out, it must
e
y emph sising
the f ct th t feeling is never properly reg rded s purely p ssive,

ut implies su
jective re ction; nd
y supposing th t the v ri tion
of feeling
etween ple sure nd p in depends on
difference in the
ch r cter of this su
jective re ction. At the s me time, the complete
ccur cy of this gener lis tion is not of vit l import nce here, s
it is m inly with the feeling which m nifestly results from ctivity

or functioning th t we re concerned.
[Sidenote: Modific tion of ple sur
le ch r cteristics of o
jects]
Whether ple sure depends upon incre se of vit l energy, or upon
unimpeded or medium functioning, it must
e su
ject to modific tion
long with the conditions under which life m y continue nd incre se,
or the modes of ctivity which m y
e c rried on without opposition
nd in moder tion. This const nt modific tion of the o
jects in
which one t kes ple sure, or which give one p in, is, indeed, f ct
which must
e dmitted
y ny theory of feeling. A st te of mind m y

e t first ple sur
le;
ut, if it
e long-continued, the ple sure
will give w y to the p in of monotony. The s me is true of p inful
st te of mind: its continu nce does not prolong the s me intensity
of p inful consciousness,
ut the sensi
ility
ecomes dulled nd
the p in diminishes. The tr nsition is still more striking in the
c se of motor ctivities. In le rning to w lk, or to ride, or to
pl y ny instrument, the first experiences re those of p inful
effort. Gr du lly, however, the co-ordin tions of movement required
ent il less nd less p in, till the feeling p sses over into its
opposite, nd we h ve ple sur
le sense of successful effort nd
well- d pted functioning. But, just s p in g ve w y to ple sure, so
ple sure itself su
sides, the ction
ecomes merely reflex nd p sses
out of consciousness ltogether, unless it
e so long continued s
to produce f tigue--th t is, p in. H
it, s Dumont rem rks,[184]
intensifies perceptions,
ut we kens ple sure nd p in.
[Sidenote: suggests th t feeling depends on o
jective intensity.]
These re psychologic l f cts--not mere theories--which hold true
even of the individu l experience. But they h ve led psychologists
to the theory, supported
y v st mount of direct experiment, th t
there is no o
ject or ction which c n
e s id to
e
solutely nd
in itself either ple s nt or p inful.[185] The feeling of ple sure
or p in ccomp nying the o
ject is function of its intensity in
rel tion to the su
ject. This proposition c nnot, indeed,
e fully
demonstr ted reg rding e ch simple sens tion: to the emotions
into which intric te rel tions of perceptions enter, it does not
pply, till their complexity h s
een reduced. Some sens tions nd
perceptions re cert inly felt s p inful in ny intensity in which
they re distinctly present to consciousness. But, lthough this
is re l difficulty, it does not seem insuper
le. The inst nces
which Mill cites[186] to throw dou
t on the gener lis tion th t
qu lity of feeling depends on intensity re unfortun tely chosen for
his purpose. For--to t ke his ex mple--the t ste of rhu
r
is to
m ny not p inful
ut ple s nt; nd, indeed, every c se of cquired
t ste shows th t ple sure nd p in c n
e modified through h
it nd
custom, nd suggests th t, even in the c se of those sens tions which
re p inful in ny form we h ve
een
le to experience them, there
is degree of intensity
elow which they would, if experienced,
e
ple s nt. Experiment h s proved of the m jority even of sensi
le
qu lities, nd n logy le ds us to conclude of ll, th t there is
degree in which e ch m y
e ple s nt, nd
degree in which e ch
m y
e p inful, nd,
etween them, --re l or im gin ry--zero-point
of feeling, where there is neither ple sure nor p in. This must, it
is true,
e received s hypothesis only;
ut it is
hypothesis
which is suggested
y wide r nge of f cts, nd which is
le to
include even those f cts with which it is seemingly inconsistent,

y supposing th t could their intensity
e indefinitely diminished
without their p ssing out of consciousness, these sens tions would

re ch point fter which they would
e felt s ple s nt nd not s

p inful. Further, experiment shows th t this dividing-point which
sep r tes the two poles of feeling is not lw ys pl ced t the s me
degree of intensity, th t it differs not only for every o
ject,

ut for e ch individu l su
ject s well, nd th t it undergoes
modific tion in the course of the su
ject's development.[187]
Wh t is true of sense-perception is still more evident reg rding
those experiences in which the ctivity of the su
ject is more
o
viously involved. As ny function m y, if c rried
eyond cert in
degree of intensity,
e p inful, so ny function consistent with life
m y
e source of ple sure.
*

[Sidenote: (_c_) Applic tion of the theory of evolution:]

[Sidenote: ny conduct consistent with conditions of life will come
to
e ple sur
le;]
From the preceding discussion two things m y
e inferred: first, the
dependence of ple sure nd p in on the su
ject- ctivity, whether the
ctivity
e th t of perception or of wh t is specific lly c lled
ction; nd secondly, the modific tion of ple sure nd p in, nd
tr nsition from one to the other, long with the modific tion of
th t su
ject- ctivity. To the pplic tion of
oth these conclusions
there m y
e limits;
ut their gener l ccur cy does not seem
dou
tful. Wh t the doctrine of evolution dds to this is its
proof of the indefinite modifi
ility of hum n function. "It is
n essenti l principle of life," Mr Spencer wrote,[188]
efore he
h d rrived t his gener l theory of evolution, "th t f culty to
which circumst nces do not llow full exercise diminishes; nd th t
f culty on which circumst nces m ke excessive dem nds incre ses;"
nd to this we must now dd, "th t, supposing it consistent with
m inten nce of life, there is no kind of ctivity which will not

ecome source of ple sure if continued; nd th t therefore
ple sure will eventu lly ccomp ny every mode of ction dem nded

y soci l conditions."[189] It is, he holds, "
iologic l truth,"
th t "everywhere f culties djust themselves to the conditions
of existence in such wise th t the ctivities those conditions
require
ecome ple sur
le."[190] The v st periods of time over
which evolution stretches re sc rcely needed to show how ple sure
m y
e m de to follow from lmost ny course of ction consistent
with the continu nce of life. The ch nge of h
its which often
t kes pl ce in the history of n tion, nd even in the life of n
individu l, m kes this sufficiently o
vious. But, if we still think
of m king tt inment of ple sure the end of conduct, the doctrine of
evolution must give us p use. It h s
een lre dy rgued th t, given
cert in sources of, nd suscepti
ilities for, ple sure, the course
of evolution h s not
een such s to produce n ex ct coincidence

etween them nd the ctions which further life. But it would seem
th t, given h
its of cting which re consistent with the conditions
of life, nd which re system tic lly c rried out, these will not
f il to grow ple s nt s the org nism
ecomes d pted to them. At the

est, it is difficult enough to s y, even for the individu l, whether
one im gined o
ject or course of ction will exceed nother in
ple sur
le feeling or not. But, when we remem
er th t function nd
feeling m y
e modified indefinitely, it is impossi
le to s y wh t
course of conduct will produce the gre test mount of ple sure for
the r ce. T king in ll its effects, we c nnot s y th t one w y of

seeking ple sure is
etter--th t is, will
ring more ple sure--th n
nother. Be ring in mind the modific tions which evolution produces,
it seems impossi
le to guide the ctive tendencies of m nkind tow rds
the go l of gre test ple sure, except
y s ying th t the gre test
ple sure will
e got from the gre test mount of successful, or of
unrestr ined, or of medium ctivity.
[Sidenote: m ximum ple sure only defin
le in terms of life.]
If, then, we h ve
een seeking to define the evolutionist end
y
interpreting it in terms of ple sure, it ppe rs th t we h ve only
succeeded in m king the round of circle: ple sure s the end is
seen to
e only defin
le s life or ctivity, lthough it w s
dopted s the end in order th t
y its help we might discover wh t
life or ctivity me nt s the end for conduct. We m y, perh ps, still

e
le to hold to form of hedonism, if we turn our ttention from
the r ce to sm ll portion of present m nkind. In spite of the
modifi
ility of function nd its p r site feeling, we m y still
e

le to s y th t such nd such course of ction is likely to
ring
most ple sure to the individu l or even to the f mily. But we c nnot
extend such me ns of interpreting the ethics of evolution to the
r ce, where the possi
ility of modific tion is indefinitely gre t,
nd the p in incurred in initi ting
ch nge counts for little in
comp rison with its su
sequent results. If we continue to look from
the evolutionist point of view, the question, Wh t conduct will on
the whole
ring most ple sure? c n only
e nswered
y s ying th t
it is the conduct which will most promote life-- n nswer which
might h ve
een more s tisf ctory h d it not
een to give me ning
to this end "promotion of life" th t it w s interpreted in terms of
gre test ple sure. The evolution-theory of ethics is thus seen to
oscill te from the theory which looks upon the _summum
onum_ s
ple sure, to th t which finds it in ctivity. It cont ins elements
which m ke it impossi
le for it to dhere to the former ltern tive.
The comprehensiveness of its view of life m kes it un
le to dopt
ple sure s the end, since ple sure ch nges with every modific tion
of function. And it h s now to
e seen whether the empiric l method
of interpret tion to which it dheres will llow of its notion of
life or ctivity ffording
s tisf ctory end for conduct.
FOOTNOTES:
[154] D t of Ethics, p. 171.
[155] D t of Ethics, p. 162.
[156] I
id., p. 57.
[157] Cf. A. B rr tt, in Mind, ii. 172 n.
[158] As illustr ting this I m y refer to G. v. Giycki, Philosophische
Consequenzen der L m rck-D rwin'schen Entwicklungstheorie (1876),
p. 27: "Wir h
en o
en die Erh ltung und Frderung des Le
ens des
Individuums und der G ttung ls d s eine Ziel der Einrichtung des
geistigen Org nismus gekennzeichnet." P. 58: "Auf d s Stre
en n ch in
sich
efriedigtem psychischen Le
en [th t is to s y, ple sure] sind
lle nim len Org nismen ngelegt." In his popul r ess y, 'Grundzge
der Mor l' (1883), Dr Giycki's principle nd method re utilit ri n.
With the
ove m y
e comp red Guy u, Esquisse d'une mor le s ns
o
lig tion ni s nction (1885), p. 15: "L' ction sort n turellement
du fonctionnement de l vie, en gr nde p rtie inconscient; elle

entre ussitt d ns le dom ine de l conscience et de l jouiss nce,

m is elle n'en vient p s. L tend nce de l'tre persvrer d ns
l'tre est le fond de tout dsir s ns constituer elle-mme un dsir
dtermin."
[159] Spencer, D t of Ethics, p. 82 f; Principles of Psychology,
125, 3d ed., i. 280; Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 83. The
simplicity of this rgument will
e ppreci ted if we consider the
difficulty Comte experienced in trying to re ch
simil r conclusion.
See Positive Philosophy, Miss M rtine u's tr nsl tion, ii. 87 ff.
[160] Cf. Phnomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins, pp. 701, 708.
[161] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 127.
[162] D t of Ethics, p. 26.
[163] Cf. V ihinger, H rtm nn, Dhring und L nge (1876), p. 124.
[164] Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 216.
[165] See
ove, p. 167 f.
[166] Cf. Fiske, Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (1874), ii. 332 f.
[167] "Imit tion," ccording to K nt (Grundlegung zur Met. d. Sitten,
Werke, iv. 257), "h s no pl ce t ll in mor ls;" nd this is true
if the n ked l w of duty--or respect for it--is the sole ethic l
motive. But if mor lity consists in the tt inment of n ide l which
is
eing gr du lly re lised in m n, mor l v lue will not
e denied to
the motive which le ds the individu l to f shion his own n ture fter
th t in which mor lity h s tt ined more complete re lis tion.
[168] See the concluding p ges of this ch pter.
[169] Philosophie des Un
ewussten, 6th ed., p. 660 ff.
[170] Cf. Sully, Pessimism, p. 226 n.
[171] Cf. J. W rd, Journ l of Specul tive Philosophy, xvi. (1882),
377.
[172] Phil. d. Un
ewussten, p. 747.
[173] Benth m, Theory of Legisl tion (
y Dumont, 1876), p. 103 ff.
Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, 2d ed., p. 469, finds in this
n inst nce of We
er's l w. Thus, the m n with 100 receives the
s me ple sure on receipt of 1, s the possessor of 1000 does on
receiving 10. As Wundt rem rks, however, this is only true within
cert in limits. Sixpence m y give more ple sure to

egg r who is
never f r from the st rv tion-point, th n the cle ring of million
to B ron Rothschild. Further th n this, the l w only st tes n
"
str ct" truth. For the suscepti
ility to ple sure is not only
very different in different individu ls,
ut this difference depends
on m ny other circumst nces th n the mount of we lth lre dy in
possession,--such s origin l emotion l suscepti
ility, &c.
[174] Cf. Comte, Positive Philosophy, ii. 144.
[175] Phn. d. s. B., p. 640.

[176] Lectures on Met physics, ii. 432.

[177] L. Dumont, Thorie scientifique de l sensi
ilit, 2d ed., p.
83; cf. F. Bouillier, Du pl isir et de l douleur, 2d ed., p. 29 ff.
Reference m y lso
e m de to the le ding psychologic l text-
ook.
"D s Gefhl," s ys Volkm nn (Lehr
uch der Psychologie, 127, 3d ed.,
ii. 300), "ist nmlich keine eigene Vorstellung ne
en den nderen
(es gi
t keine eigenen 'Gefhlsvorstellungen'), j
erh upt g r
keine Vorstellung." Professor B in's view is different,
ut does
not ltogether prevent him from cknowledging the su
jectivity of
feeling: "Without intellectu l im ges cle rly recollected, we do not
remem
er feelings; the reproduction of feeling is n intellectu l
f ct, nd the groundwork is intellectu l im gery."--Emotions, p. 63.
[178] Cf. Green, Introduction to Hume, ii. 7.
[179] Cf. Spinoz , Ethic , iii. 11, schol.; Ho

es, Levi th n, i. 6,
p. 25; B in, The Senses nd the Intellect, p. 283. Professor B in's
st tement is c refully gu rded: "A very consider
le num
er of the
f cts m y
e
rought under the following principle--n mely, th t
st tes of ple sure re connected with n incre se, nd st tes of p in
with n
tement, of some, or ll, of the vit l functions."
[180] As Mr Spencer llows,
of m nkind, then, there h s
nd involved der ngement of
nd
enefici l ctions, nd

Psychology, 126, i. 284: "In the c se

risen, nd must long continue,
deep
the n tur l connections
etween ple sures

etween p ins nd detriment l ctions."

[181] The Senses nd the Intellect, p. 286. The L w of Conserv tion

is incomplete, Mr B in holds, nd must
e supplemented
y the L w of
Stimul tion (p. 294).
[182] Spencer, Psychology, 123, i. 277: "Gener lly spe king,
then, ple sures re the concomit nts of medium ctivities, where
the ctivities re of kinds li
le to
e in excess or in defect;
nd where they re of kinds not li
le to
e excessive, ple sure
incre ses s the ctivity incre ses, except where the ctivity is
either const nt or involunt ry."
[183] H milton, Lectures, ii. 440: "Ple sure is the reflex of the
spont neous nd unimpeded exertion of power of whose energies
we re conscious. P in, reflex of the overstr ined or repressed
exertion of such
power." Cf. Aristotle, Eth. N., vii. 12, p. 1153
14, x. 4, p. 1174
20.
[184] Thorie scientifique, p. 78.
[185] Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., p. 470; Fechner, Vorschule der
Aesthetik, ii. 243 f.
[186] Ex m. of H milton's Philosophy, 5th ed., p. 559.
[187] See Fechner, _loc. cit._
[188] Soci l St tics, p. 79.
[189] D t of Ethics, p. 186.
[190] Mind, vi. 85.

CHAPTER VIII.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
[Sidenote: W nt of h rmony
etween evolutionism nd hedonism.]
In showing the import nt
e ring which evolution h s on the c uses
of ple sure, the rgument of the preceding ch pter h s lso m de
cle r th t the ends of evolutionism nd of hedonism c nnot
e m de
to expl in one nother. The theory which st rts with m ximum of
ple sure s the ultim te end,
ut points to the course of evolution
s showing how th t end is to
e re lised, is confronted
y the
f ct th t the development of life does not lw ys tend to incre sed
ple sure, nd th t the l ws of its development c nnot therefore
e
s fely dopted s m xims for the tt inment of ple sure. The s me
o
jection m y
e t ken to the method of interpreting the evolutionist
end
y me ns of the ple sur
le results of conduct. The two do not
correspond with th t ex ctness which would dmit of one doing duty
for the other s pr ctic l guide. And
further difficulty h s
een
shown to st nd in the w y of this method. For, on coming to n lyse
ple sure, we find th t it m y,
y h
itu tion, rise from ny--or
lmost ny--course of conduct which the conditions of existence dmit
of. The evolutionist, therefore, c n h ve no surer ide of gre test
ple sure--even lthough this m y not
e
very sure one--th n th t
it will follow in the tr in of the gre test or most v ried ctivity
which h rmonises with the l ws of life.
[Sidenote: Necessity of investig ting independent evolutionist end.]
We must therefore fors ke the method of eclecticism, nd inquire
whether the theory of evolution c n m ke ny independent contri
ution
tow rds determining n end for conduct. We re frequently told th t
it prescri
es s the end "preserv tion," or "development," or "the
he lth of the society." But to o
t in
cle r me ning for such
notions, we must see wh t definite content the theory of evolution
c n give them,--without considering, t present, the grounds for
tr nsforming them into ethic l precepts. Now, it m y
e thought-- nd
the suggestion deserves c reful ex min tion--th t we m y find in the
ch r cteristics of evolution itself[191] n indic tion of the end
which org nisms produced
y nd su
ject to evolution re n tur lly
fitted to tt in. These ch r cteristics must therefore
e p ssed
under review, th t their ethic l
e rings m y
e seen.
*

[Sidenote: 1. Ad pt tion to environment: necess ry for life;]

1. The first condition of development, nd even of life, is
correspondence
etween n org nism nd its environment. The w ste
implied in the processes which constitute the life of n org nised

ody h s to
e supplied
y nutriment got from surrounding o
jects.
It requires food, ir, light, nd he t in due proportions in order
th t its v rious org ns m y do their work. When these circumst nces
ch nge, either it d pts itself to the new conditions or de th
ensues. Thus "we find th t every nim l is limited to cert in

r nge of clim te; every pl nt to cert in zones of l titude nd

elev tion,"[192]--though nothing differs more mong different species
th n the extent of n org nism's d pt
ility to v rying conditions.
A definite org nism nd medium suit
le to it re c lled
y Comte
the two "fund ment l correl tive conditions of life"; ccording to Mr
Spencer they constitute life. "Conformity" is
solutely necess ry

etween "the vit l functions of ny org nism nd the conditions in
which it is pl ced." In this conformity there re v rying degrees,
nd "the completeness of the life will
e proportion te to the
completeness of the correspondence."[193] Even when life is not
ltogether extinguished, it is impeded
y imperfect d pt tion.
Where extern l circumst nces m ke the tt inment of nourishment
difficult nd prec rious, life is shortened in extent, nd, within
its limits, more occupied with simply m int ining its necess ry
functions--less full, v ried, nd ctive. The s me holds good whether
the extern l circumst nces re n tur l or soci l,-- pplies equ lly
to those whose energies re exh usted in the production of

re
livelihood from nigg rd soil nd unpropitious clim te, nd to
those who, under ch nged conditions, feel the h rdship of d pting
themselves to new soci l medium.
[Sidenote: spoken of s the ethic l end;]
[Sidenote: defines the notion of self-preserv tion.]
Sh ll we s y, then, th t the end of hum n conduct is d pt tion
to environment? This seems to
e the position t ken up
y some
evolutionists. In the l ngu ge of von B er,[194] "the end of ends
is lw ys th t the org nic
ody
e d pted to the conditions of the
e rth, its elements nd me ns of nutriment;" nd Mr Spencer holds
"th t ll evil results from the non- d pt tion of constitution to
condition."[195] The hedonism which Mr Spencer definitely ccepts
s his ethic l principle prevents him, indeed, from fully dopting
the theory of hum n ction which von B er seems to reg rd s the
result of the doctrine of evolution. Yet complete d pt tion of
constitution to condition is held
y him to
e ch r cteristic of th t
perfect form of life to which evolution tends, nd the l ws of which
re to
e our guides in our present imperfect soci l condition. In
working out his theory of ethics, he descri
es cts s "good or
d
ccording s they re well or ill djusted to ends," identifying
the good with "the conduct furthering self-preserv tion," nd the

d with "the conduct tending to self-destruction."[196] The notion
of self-preserv tion thus introduced is n tur lly suggested s the
end su
served
y the ctivity of n org nism
eing djusted to
surrounding conditions. Self-preserv tion, therefore, r ther th n
d pt tion to environment, will
e reg rded s the end, with which
d pt tion will
e connected s the essenti l me ns.
This notion of self-preserv tion h s pl yed rem rk
le p rt in
ethic l nd psychologic l discussion since the time of the Stoics.
It withdr ws ttention from the rel tive nd tr nsient feeling of
ple sure to the perm nence of the living
eing. Thus, with the
Stoics, the notion of self-preserv tion w s ccomp nied
y n
ethics hostile to indulgence in ple sure; while, on the other h nd,
in Spinoz nd in Ho

es, ple sure w s recognised s the n tur l
consequence of self-preserving cts--the former defining it s
tr nsition from less to gre ter perfection, the l tter s the
sense of wh t helps the vit l functions. The theory of evolution
h s, of course, not only its distinctive contri
ution to m ke to
the connection
etween self-preserv tion nd ple sure-- su
ject

lre dy referred to,--
ut lso shows how n incre sing h rmony h s

een produced
etween cts which tend to self-preserv tion nd
those which tend to soci l-preserv tion. With Mr Spencer these two
points re united. His doctrine th t the "conduct which furthers
r ce-m inten nce evolves h nd-in-h nd with the conduct which
furthers self-m inten nce"[197] is prelimin ry to the est
lishment
of the proposition th t the highest life is one in which egoistic
nd " ltruistic" cts h rmonise with one nother nd with extern l
conditions: "the life c lled mor l is one in which this moving
equili
rium re ches completeness or ppro ches most ne rly to
completeness."[198]
[Sidenote: Self-preserv tion nd soci l-preserv tion.]
As h s
een lre dy pointed out,[199] it is not the c se, in
the present st te of hum n life, th t egoistic nd ltruistic
tendencies, even when properly understood, lw ys le d to the
s me course of conduct; nd even the theory of evolution does not
do w y with the necessity for "compromise"
etween them. But,
even h d the theory of evolution overcome the opposition
etween
the individu l nd soci l st ndpoints, much would still rem in to

e done for the purpose of constructing system of ethics, or
determining the ethic l end. It seems
etter, therefore, to p ss
over t present the conflict of competing interests. According to
P sc l, "the entire succession of men, the whole course of ges,
is to
e reg rded s one m n lw ys living nd lw ys le rning."
And this is suggestion which the theory of evolution only st tes
more definitely, though it c nnot completely vindic te it. On this
supposition, self-preserv tion _is_ soci l-preserv tion, nd the
possi
ly divergent interests of the individu l nd the whole re left
out of ccount. The end for the r ce then is, ccording to the theory
most explicitly st ted
y von B er, st te of "moving equili
rium":
nd to this st te of ff irs we re t le st, Mr Spencer holds,
indu
it
ly tending. In the fin l st ge of hum n development, m n
will
e perfectly d pted to the conditions of his environment, so
th t, to e ch ch nge without, there will
e n nswering org nic
ch nge. The ide l which seems to
e held up to us is th t of
time
in which there will
e no more irksome fretting in the m chinery
of life, nd circumst nces will never
e unpropitious,
ec use the
org nism will never
e w nting in correspondence with them.
[Sidenote: (_ _) As the end for present conduct: opposed to progress;]
If this d pt tion
e dopted s the pr ctic l end for conduct
under present conditions, nd not merely s descri
ing f r-off
ide l to which we re supposed to
e tending, m n m y continue to
m nifest l w of progress,
ut its initi tion will
e from extern l
conditions. If " d pt tion to environment" is consistently m de the
end, ctivity will h ve to
e restricted to suiting one's powers
to n extern l order of n ture, nd desire will h ve to
e cur
ed
when it does not
ring the me ns of s tisf ction long with it.
"Bene l tere" will g in
e n equiv lent for "
ene vivere," nd
h ppiness will h ve to
e sought in withdr w l from the distr ctions
of politic l life, nd in the restriction of desire. It is str nge
to see the theory which is supposed to
e
sed upon nd to ccount
for progress, returning in this w y to n ide l simil r to th t in
which the post-Aristoteli n schools took refuge mid the decline of
politic l nd intellectu l life in Greece. The end which Stoic nd
Epicure n like sought in complete em ncip tion from the conditions
of the extern l world,[200] is now, in more scientific phr se, m de

to consist in complete h rmony with these conditions. But, in their

pr ctic l results, the two theories would seem sc rcely to differ. It
is not stonishing, therefore, if this gospel of renunci tion finds
little f vour mong pr ctic l men in our d y. It is seen th t, if
m n h s not w nts, he will m ke no efforts, nd th t, if he m ke no
efforts, his condition c n never
e
ettered. Thus soci l reformers
h ve often found th t the cl sses they h ve tried to elev te did not
feel the evil of their lot s their
enef ctors s w it, nd they h ve
h d to cre te w nts
efore ttempting to s tisfy them.[201] And the
pr ctic l tendency finds its counterp rt in specul tive opinion, so
th t, where s Epicurus pl ced h ppiness in freedom from w nts, modern
hedonism usu lly considers m n the h ppier the more w nts he h s
nd is
le to supply.[202]
[Sidenote: does not fully represent the theory of evolution.]
This pr ctic l tendency
rings out the truth th t it is not only
y
the su
ordin tion of self to circumst nces, nd the restriction of
desire to present me ns of s tisf ction, th t the required h rmony

etween outer nd inner rel tions c n
e
rought
out. The other
ltern tive is open: circumst nces m y
e su
ordin ted to self. For
this l tter ltern tive the theory of evolution seems re lly to le ve
room s much s for the former. It is excluded only when
one-sided
emph sis is l id on the necessity of d pt tion to environment. For
evolution implies gr du lly incre sing heterogeneity of structure
s the prelude to perfect greement with circumst nces: "the limit
of heterogeneity tow rds which every ggreg te progresses is the
form tion of s m ny speci lis tions nd com
in tions of p rts s
there re speci lised nd com
ined forces to
e met."[203] The end
of evolution is correspondence
etween inner nd outer which is
not produced
y the e sy method of
oth
eing very simple,
ut
which is consistent with, nd indeed requires, the complexity nd
heterogeneity produced in
oth
y const nt inter ction.[204] The
gre ter this complexity, the more filled with sens tion, emotion, nd
thought life is, the gre ter is wh t Mr Spencer c lls its "
re dth."
But, if " d pt tion" is still reg rded s expressing the end, then,
the more perfect this d pt tion is, the less room seems left for
progress, nd the end of hum n conduct is pl ced in
st te of moving
equili
rium in which ction t kes pl ce without
j r nd without
distur
ing the pl y of extern l conditions.[205]
*

[Sidenote: (_
_) As descri
ing the ultim te condition of life,]

This end of " d pt tion" is looked upon
y Mr Spencer not s
representing the conduct prescri
ed
y mor lity in present
circumst nces,
ut s descri
ing the ultim te condition of hum n
life. As such, it is the found tion of his A
solute Ethics--th t
"fin l perm nent code" which " lone dmits of
eing definitely
formul ted, nd so constituting ethics s science in contr st with
empiric l ethics."[206] The "philosophic l mor list," he tells us,
"tre ts solely of the _str ight_ m n. He determines the properties of
the str ight m n; descri
es how the str ight m n comports himself;
shows in wh t rel tionship he st nds to other str ight men; shows
how community of str ight men is constituted. Any devi tion
from strict rectitude he is o
liged wholly to ignore. It c nnot
e
dmitted into his premisses without viti ting ll his conclusions.
A pro
lem in which _crooked_ m n forms one of the elements is
insolu
le
y him."[207]

[Sidenote: complete correspondence with environment.]

[Sidenote: Result nt
solute code of ethics]
[Sidenote: () l ys down
individu l to society;]

str ct principles for rel tion of

[Sidenote: () f rther only defines end of conduct s d pt tion;]

How, then, re we to conceive the n ture or conduct of the "str ight
m n"? To
egin with, it is m de cle r th t his de lings re only with
str ight men; for there re no "crooked men" in the ide l community.
"The coexistence of perfect m n nd n imperfect society is
impossi
le; nd could the two coexist the resulting conduct would not
furnish the ethic l st nd rd sought."[208] "The ultim te m n is one
in whom this process [of d pt tion to the soci l st te] h s gone so
f r s to produce correspondence
etween ll the promptings of his
n ture nd ll the requirements of his life s c rried on in society.
If so, it is necess ry implic tion th t there exists n ide l code
of conduct formul ting the
eh viour of the completely- d pted m n in
the completely-evolved society." This is the code of A
solute Ethics,
whose injunctions lone re "
solutely right," nd which, " s
system of ide l conduct, is to serve s st nd rd for our guid nce
in solving, s well s we c n, the pro
lems of re l conduct."[209]
At the outset, we were required to "interpret the more developed

y the less developed;" [210] the conclusion sets forth th t the
less developed is to
e guided
y the more developed, the re l
y
the ide l. Now, ethics "includes ll conduct which furthers or
hinders, in either direct or indirect w ys, the welf re of self
or others."[211] Thus A
solute Ethics, like Rel tive Ethics, h s
two divisions, person l nd soci l. As to the l tter, Mr Spencer
formul tes cert in principles of justice, neg tive
eneficence, nd
positive
eneficence,[212] which descri
e the h rmonious co-oper tion
of ide l men in the ide l st te. These principles m y perh ps
e
c p
le of modified pplic tion to the present st te of society,
in which there is conflict of interests: lthough Mr Spencer's
represent tion of them--which is still, however, incomplete--suggests
the
elief th t they re not so much guides which the ide l gives to
the re l, s suggestions for the construction of Utopi g thered
from the requirements of present soci l life. But, supposing the
"h rmonious co-oper tion" of individu ls to
e thus provided for,
wh t is the person l end? nd wh t, it might
e dded, is the soci l
end, if society h s ny further function th n regul ting the rel tion
of its units to one nother? A
solute ethics does not seem to
e
le
to give much guid nce here. "A code of perfect person l conduct,"
we re told, "c n never
e m de definite."[213] There re v rious
types of ctivities, ll of which m y
elong to lives "complete
fter their kinds." But yet "perfection of individu l life" does
imply "cert in modes of ction which re pproxim tely like in ll
c ses, nd which, therefore,
ecome p rt of the su
ject-m tter of
ethics." We c nnot l y down "precise rules for priv te conduct,"

ut only "gener l requirements." And these re: to m int in the

l nce
etween w ste nd nutrition, to o
serve rel tion
etween
ctivity nd rest, to m rry nd h ve children.[214] This is "how the
str ight m n comports himself." Ap rt, therefore, from the suggestion
thrown out th t m n's function m y
e the re lis tion of type of
ctivity complete fter its kind-- suggestion to
e considered in
the sequel-- ll th t we c n s y of the "completely- d pted m n" would
seem to
e th t he will
e d pted to his circumst nces.

[Sidenote: () cannot be shown to lead to happiness.]

We have a riht to demur if the pleasures of the final condition of
equilibrium be held up to our imaination as a reason for aimin at
it. That it is "the establishment of the reatest perfection and
most complete happiness,"[215] seems an unwarrantable assumption.
Yet it is throuh this assumption that an apparent harmony between
Mr Spencer's hedonistic ethics and his view of the tendency of
evolution is brouht about. It is not at all certain that the result
of perfectly adapted function is reat increase of pleasure. It
is true that all the pains of disharmony between inner desire or
feelin and outer circumstances would, in such a case, disappear;
but with them also there would be lost the varied pleasures of
pursuit and successful strule. It cannot even be assumed that
other pleasures would continue as intense as before. For, as acts
are performed more easily, and thus with less conscious volition,
they radually pass into the backround of consciousness, or out of
consciousness altoether; and the pleasure accompanyin them fades
radually away as they cease to occupy the attention. "Where action
is perfectly automatic, feelin does not exist."[216] The so-called
passive pleasures miht still remain. But the fact of effort bein
no loner necessary for the adjustment of inner to outer relations
miht have the effect of makin the "movin equilibrium" still called
"life" automatic in every detail. Indeed, if the suestions of the
'First Principles' are to be carried out, it would seem that the
movin equilibrium is "a transitional state on the way to complete
equilibrium,"[217] which is another name for death.[218] So far,
therefore, from heihtened pleasure bein the result of completely
perfect adjustment of inner to outer relations, this adjustment would
seem to reach its natural oal in unconsciousness--a conclusion which
may commend itself to those of Mr Spencer's disciples who take a less
optimist view of life than their master.
It seems evident, therefore, that to take adaptation to environment,
or self-preservation as interpreted by adaptation, as the end of
conduct, is to adopt an end which cannot be shown to be desirable
on the round of yieldin a maximum of happiness or pleasure. And
it is almost with a feelin of relief that one finds Mr Spencer's
confidence in the tendency of evolution so far shaken as to admit
of his sayin that "however near to completeness the adaptation
of human nature to the conditions of existence at lare, physical
and social, may become, it can never reach completeness."[219]
"Adaptation to environment" must, at any rate, be kept quite distinct
from any theory of ethics which takes pleasure as the end of life;
and it cannot consistently determine any result as of ethical value
on account of its pleasurable consequences. The oal it sets before
us, and in which human proress ends, is conformity with an external
order. The modification of these external conditions by human
effort is to be justified ethically by the opportunity it ives for
brinin about a fuller areement between the individual or race and
its environment. The result is a stationary state of human conduct,
correspondin with, or a part of, that eneral "equilibration" to
which, accordin to Mr Spencer, all evolution tends. But this theory,
which places the oal of conduct in what seems to be the actual
tendency of evolution, ains no real support from this apparent
harmony of ethics with eneral philosophy. It may be ranted that
the evidence of physical laws oes to show that the evolution of
the solar, or even stellar, system is towards a condition in which
the "movin equilibrium" will at last pass into a form in which

there is no further sensible motion, and the concentration of matter

is complete. But to infer from this that the theory which places
the end of conduct in a similar equilibrium shows the harmony of
morality with the tendency of existence in eneral, would really
involve a confusion of the two different meanins of "end." The end
or termination of all thins may be equilibrium, motionlessness, or
dissolution, but this is no reason why the end or aim of conduct
should be a similar equilibrium.
Indeed, to say that we ouht to promote the end of evolution, and
that this end is annihilation, is inconsistent with the postulate
always implied by the ethics of evolution--the postulate that
conduct should promote evolution because life is desirable,[220] and
increase of life comes with the proress of evolution. Nor is it of
any assistance to reply to this by sayin that the dissolution in
which evolution ends may be only the prelude to another process of
evolution in which life will radually proress till it aain reaches
equilibrium. For, in the first place, this is only a problematical
suestion--is not, to speak in Mr Spencer's lanuae, "demonstrable
_ priori_ by deduction from the persistence of force," as the
tendency of present evolution to equilibrium is held to be; and
secondly, the new process, if it were to come about, would have
to bein aain the slow ascent from the lowest run of the ladder
of existence: so that, in aidin evolution towards the oal of
equilibrium, we should be only uidin it to the old startin-point
which has now, after many a painful strule, been left far behind.
*

[Sidenote: (_c_) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end:]

[Sidenote: tendency to variation in all oranisms,]
But further, it would seem that the theory of evolution itself is not
fairly represented by a view which emphasises the fact of adaptation
to environment to the exclusion of that of variation. The latter is
as necessary to proressive development as the former. Adaptation
to environment miht seem to be most nearly complete when oranism
and environment were both so simple as to be hardly separate. The
polype, which is scarcely different from the sea-water it inhabits,
miht seem by correspondence with its medium to be near the maximum
of adaptation, thouh at the very beinnin of life. It may be solely
because the environment is subject to numerous chanes that the
oranism of simple structure cannot maintain life. But it is only
throuh its own inherent power of variation that proress in oranic
life is possible. Perfect correspondence with the environment was
not reached by simple oranisms, not only on account of the want of
uniformity in their surroundins, but also because there is in every
oranism a tendency to variation throuh which the modifications are
produced which natural selection takes hold of. Did oranisms not
tend to vary in function and structure, no proressive modification
would be possible. Those fittest to live would be selected once for
all, and all but those adapted to the environment weeded out.
It is not necessary for our present purpose to have any definite
theory of the obscure laws by which this variability is
overned.[221] It is enouh that natural selection requires the
strikin out of new modifications as well as the transmission of
those already produced.[222] It may be the fact that variation is,
in the last resort, due to chanes in surroundin circumstances,

to the unequal incidence of external forces upon a finite

areate.[223] But, with livin bodies as now constituted, it has,
at any rate as proximate cause, a twofold source. It may be due to
the direct effect of external forces, or it may be caused by the
enery stored up in the oranism in rowth.[224]
[Sidenote: consciously directed in man.]
In man the outo of this force is conscious; and, by means of his
conscious or intellient volition, overned by interests of various
kinds, he can anticipate and modify the action of natural selection.
The law that the fittest oranism survives may perhaps work in man
as in the lower animals, if only we ive a wide enouh meanin to
"fittest," so as to admit even of the weak bein made fit throuh the
sympathy and help of the stron. Natural selection becomes dependent
upon variations of a kind different from those in the merely animal
world, so that its practical effect may be in some cases apparently
reversed. We thus see how it is that even Darwin holds that in
moralised societies "natural selection apparently effects but
little,"[225] at the same time that we may not be inclined to deny
the truth of Schffle's contention[226] that, althouh circumstances
differ, the law of action remains the same. Schffle points out how,
as we rise in the scale of life, especially as it is manifested in
human society, the oranisation becomes more delicate, and other than
merely natural facts have to be taken account of, so that the fittest
to live in the new social and intellectual environment is no loner
the man of reatest physical strenth and skill.
The theory of natural selection as applied to the ordinary spheres
of plant and animal life, may perhaps, for some purposes, nelect
consideration of the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation
in the oranisms whose rowth it describes. But, when the variation
in the behaviour of the oranism becomes conscious and desined,
there is thereby produced a preliminary indication or determination
of the lines on which natural selection is to work. And, before the
theory of evolution can ive a full account of the ethical in man, it
must distinuish consciously-determined from merely natural action,
and ive an analysis of what is implied in the former. We must bear
in mind that it may be the case that the round and possibility of
proress and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human conduct--which
"adaptation to environment" has been unable loically to explain or
leave room for--are to be found in this differentiatin fact of
conscious activity. But we must first of all see whether, from the
empirical characteristics of variation, we can extract an ethical end
or any uide for conduct.
*

[Sidenote: 2. End suested by this tendency to variation]

[Sidenote: (_a_) prescribes self-development rather than
self-preservation,]
2. "The lower animals," says a writer on bioloy, "are just as well
oranised for the purposes of their life as the hiher are for
theirs. The tape-worm is relatively quite as perfect as the man,
and distinuished from him by many superior capabilities."[227] It
is incorrect to look upon the evolution of animal life as workin
upon one line, so that the different kinds of livin beins can be
arraned, as it were, in an order of merit, in which the oranisation

of the hiher animal plainly excels that of the lower. The conditions
of life are manifold and various enouh to permit of the existence of
many species equally perfect in relation to their environments. The
fact that we are still able to speak of one species or one animal as
hiher than another, is not owin to the one bein better adapted to
its environment than the other, but is supposed rather to be due to
the hiher forms havin "their orans more distinctly specialised for
different functions."[228] Even Mr Spencer, for whom equilibrium is
the oal of life, implicitly admits that "adaptation" alone is not
the end of human action, by his doctrine that the deree of evolution
may be measured by the complexity of the adjustments it effects
between oranism and environment. The end, therefore, it may be
said, is no loner the mere "self-preservation" found in adaptation
to environment, but the "self-development" which implies temporary
disharmony between oranism and surroundins.
For "self-preservation" and "self-development," thouh frequently
spoken of as identical, are really distinct and often opposed
notions--the former denotin a tendency to persist in one's present
state of bein, while the latter implies more or less chane. It may
be held, however, that for an oranism such as man to persist in
his state of bein, implies modification of his faculties, and that
this modification involves development. For any oranism to exist
apart from chane is, of course, impossible. Life is only known to
us as a series of chanes. But that chane does not necessarily mean
development or "chane to a hiher condition." Deradation is as
well known a fact as development; and between the two, there is room
for a state of existence of which it is difficult to say whether it
improves or deteriorates. And whatever may be intended by the phrase,
"self-preservation" points to a state of this kind rather than to an
improvin condition. The notion of "self-development" has therefore
a richer content than that of "self-preservation"; but just on this
account it cannot be explained by a reference to the nature of thins
as they are.
[Sidenote: thus takin account of variability]
It is true that self-development can only o on by a continuous
process of adjustment; but it is also necessary for it that this
tendency to adaptation should be continually hindered from becomin
complete or lapsin into equilibrium. It is here that the function
of variation comes in. On the one side there is this tendency to
vary after a fashion often without any apparent reard to external
conditions; on the other side, there is the action of the external
conditions selectin and favourin those variations which brin the
oranism into closer correspondence with them. The wide rane over
which the theory of natural selection applies is due to the fact
that the environment is never uniform and never constant, so that
modifications on the part of the oranism have a chance of suitin
its varied and chanin character. Its chanes, moreover, are often
the result not so much of any absolute alteration in external
circumstances, as of a new relation between them and livin beins
havin been brouht about. For the enormous reproductive faculty
of most oranisms makes them multiply so rapidly as to press ever
more and more closely aainst the limit of subsistence, and thus to
produce competition for the means of livin. Hence the fresh lines
of development oriinated by each oranism have to be tested by
their correspondence with a constantly chanin medium. The altered
circumstances ive the modifications which oranisms are for ever
strikin out an opportunity of perpetuatin themselves.

[Sidenote: which complicates the tendency to correspondence with

environment,]
By each new variation the existin relation between oranism and
environment is disturbed. The variation may, however, prove its
utility at once by a more exact correspondence than before with
the requirements of external conditions. But, in what are called
the hiher rades of life, variations from the type are sometimes
not immediately useful, althouh they may ultimately become
most advantaeous.[229] Were it not for the remarkable power of
persistence possessed by the hiher animals, the modified oranism
would be unable to hold its own. The reat majority of such eccentric
or extraordinary variations do, as a matter of fact, soon disappear,
because unable to prove their utility. But others of them, either by
the power they ive the oranism to mould circumstances to itself,
or by their appropriateness to the reater complexity which comes
with the increased number of livin oranisms, and the more delicate
readjustment it requires, prove themselves to be fitter to live than
if no variation had taken place and the precedin state of relative
equilibrium had been maintained. The hiher adjustment of life to
its surroundins, which marks each stae of advancin evolution, had
its beinnin in the rupture of the oriinal simpler harmony that
previously existed.
[Sidenote: especially in human conduct.]
If we compare human conduct with that of animals lower in the oranic
scale, it becomes evident that there is a broad difference between
the two in this, that actions in the former are purposed, performed
with a definite end in view; whereas, in the latter, they seem to be
the blind result of impulse, and there are sliht, if any, traces of
purpose. In activity of the latter kind, natural selection works in
the ordinary way by choosin for survival the animals which behave so
as best to suit their environment. But actions done with a view to an
end may anticipate the verdict of this natural law. The aent may see
that conduct of a particular kind would conduce to the promotion of
life, while conduct of a different kind would render him less fit to
live; and, as a consequence, the former action may be chosen. In this
way development may be anticipated, and the present order of affairs
may be disturbed, more or less forcibly, in order to brin about a
foreseen better state of thins.
We are thus able to see more clearly how it is that the theory of
evolution may be thouht to ive rise to two different ethical ends.
The first of these is the theory already criticised, "adaptation to
environment," which corresponds to the notion of self-preservation.
But this end, as we have seen, only takes one side of the theory of
evolution into consideration--nelects the tendency to variation
which evolution postulates, and which, in the hiher oranisms,
becomes purposed. The other end which seems to be suested by the
theory of evolution takes account of this tendency to variation, and
may be said to correspond to the notion of self-development; but
this end it is harder to define. Adaptation we can easily understand
by a reference to the environment to which life is to be adapted.
This involves a knowlede of the conditions of the environment, but
nothin more. Development can be measured by no such standard. On
the one hand it implies an independent, or relatively independent,
tendency to variation. On the other hand, however, it is necessary
that the disharmony with environment, in which this tendency to

variation may bein, should not be excessive and should not be

permanent; for without a certain amount of adaptation to environment
no oranism can live. The extent of initial disharmony which is
possible, or is useful, varies accordin to the versatility of the
faculties of each individual oranism, and to its place in the
scale of bein; but throuhout all existence it is true that want
of adaptation beyond a certain varyin deree is fatal: "a mode of
action entirely alien to the prevailin modes of action, cannot
be successfully persisted in--must eventuate in death of self, or
posterity, or both."[230]
[Sidenote: (_b_) Standard for measurin development]
By what standard, then, can we measure development? We have
already seen, from the "formula," as it is called, or definition,
of evolution, that it implies an advance to a state of increased
coherence, definiteness, and heteroeneity, by the double process
of differentiation of parts, and interation of these parts into a
whole by the formation of definite relations to one another. The
notions of coherence amonst parts and of increased definiteness of
function and structure are easily understood. But the heteroeneity
postulated is a more complex notion,--has, in the first place, a
double reference, "is at the same time a differentiation of the parts
from each other and a differentiation of the consolidated whole from
the environment;"[231] and secondly, is manifested in livin beins
in increased complexity of every kind--of structure, form, chemical
composition, specific ravity, temperature, and self-mobility.[232]
Can we then apply this at once to ethics, and say that the most
developed--that is, the most moral--conduct is that which is most
definite, coherent, and heteroeneous? This doctrine has at least the
merit of not leavin out of siht so fundamental a characteristic
of evolution as the tendency to variation; and, without bein
consistently held to, it is the burden of much of Mr Spencer's 'Data
of Ethics,' where it is illustrated and defended with reat inenuity.
[Sidenote: found in deree of complexity of act and motive.]
That moral conduct is distinuished by definiteness and
coherence--that it works towards a determinate end, and that its
various actions are in areement with one another and parts of
a whole--may be admitted. But this is at most a merely formal
description of what is meant by morality in conduct. To say that
conduct must be a coherent whole, and must seek a determinate end
by appropriate means, leaves unsettled the question as to what this
end should be, or what means are best fitted to attain it. But, when
we o on to say that as conduct is more varied in act,[233] more
heteroeneous in motive,[234] it is hiher in the moral scale,
we seem to have ot hold of somethin which may be a uide for
determinin the ethical end. The mark of what is hiher in evolution,
and consequently in morality, will be reater heteroeneity or
complexity.[235]
[Sidenote: Difficulties of the theory:]
This conclusion follows from an attempt not merely to treat "moral
phenomena as phenomena of evolution," but also to find the "ultimate
interpretations" of ethics "only in those fundamental truths which
are common to all" the sciences, physical, bioloical, psycholoical,
socioloical.[236] Now the fundamental truths which these sciences
have in common are those only which are most abstract. But as we

pass from mere relations between matter and motion to life, and
from life to self-consciousness, we have somethin different from
these fundamental truths with the addition of certain others not
fundamental: we find that thins are not merely more complex; but
are chaned in aspect and nature. Even thouh it be true that the
new phenomena may still admit of analysis into the old simpler
terms, and that life, mind, and society may be interpreted as
redistributions of matter and motion,[237] it must yet at least be
admitted that the chane passed throuh is one similar to those which
Mill compared to chemical composition: the new compound differs
fundamentally in mode of action from the elements out of which it was
formed. Now, in sayin that the most complex adjustments of acts to
ends are the hihest kinds of conduct, and that we should be uided
by the more complex in preference to simpler motives, this obvious
difficulty is passed over. It is true that Mr Spencer, in chapters
rich in suestion, and filled with skilfully chosen illustrations,
has passed in review the various aspects of conduct accordin as we
look at it from the point of view of the physical environment, of
life, of mind, or of society. But when these different aspects are
brouht toether and compared, it becomes clear that the attempt to
jude conduct by reference to the "fundamental truth" that evolution
implies an advance towards reater complexity, must necessarily end
in failure.[238]
[Sidenote: () ntnomy producd by t btwn th soc l nd
ndvdu l nds;]
In th frst pl c, thr s not bl dscrp ncy btwn th
bologc l nd th socologc l spct. For th complt dvlopmnt
of th ndvdu l lf mpls th t vry functon should b
fulflld, nd th t ts fulflmnt should ntrfr wth th
prform nc of no othr functon. "Th prform nc of vry functon
s, n sns, mor l oblg ton." "Th d lly mor l m n ... s
on n whom th functons of ll knds r duly fulflld,"--th t s
to s y, "dsch rgd n dgrs duly djustd to th condtons of
xstnc."[239] A fully volvd lf s m rkd by multplcty nd
complxty of functon. And, f from th ndvdu l w p ss to th
soc l org nsm, w fnd th t th s m truth holds. Th st t, or
org nsd body of ndvdu ls, h s m ny functons to prform; but t
c n only prform thm n th most ffcnt w y through th functons
of ts ndvdu l mmbrs bng spc lsd. From th soc l pont
of vw, thrfor, th gr tst possbl dvson of l bour s
m rk of th most volvd nd prfct communty. And ths dvson
of l bour mpls th t  ch ndvdu l, nst d of prformng
vry functon of whch h s c p bl, should b m d to rstrct
hmslf to th t t whch h s bst, so th t th communty m y b
th g nr from th tm nd xrton th t r s vd, nd th skll
th t s producd, by th most conomc xpndtur of ndvdu l
t lnt. Thus soc l prfcton pp rs to mply
condton of
thngs nconsstnt wth th t dvlopmnt of on's whol n tur
whch, from th bologc l pont of vw, h s just bn dfnd s
ch r ctrstc of th d lly mor l m n. It sms, ndd, nvt bl
th t ny such bstr ct prlmn ry noton of dvlopmnt s th t
whch would tst t by ncr s of complxty must f l n such
c s s ths whr thr s no quston btwn th comptng cl ms
of two phnomn on th s m lvl, but whr h rmony s w ntd
btwn th dffrnt spcts th s m phnomn prsnt whn lookd
t from th pont of vw of th ndvdu l nd from th pont of
vw of th whol.

[Sdnot: () its psychologic l spect]

[Sidenote: confounds complexity of structure with indirectness of
origin,]
There is still gre ter difficulty in pplying this criterion, when
we come to the psychologic l spect of mor lity--the spect most
prominent in modern philosophy from the reviv l of independent
ethic l specul tion till the time of K nt. According to Mr Spencer,
"the cts ch r cterised
y the more complex motives nd the more
involved thoughts, h ve ll long
een of higher uthority for
guid nce."[240] But the l ter or more dv nced in ment l evolution
is not lw ys more complex in structure; for it is ch r cteristic
of ment l development th t the processes
y which result h s

een rrived t gr du lly dis ppe r on ccount of the diminished
ttention they receive, so th t there rem ins wh t is, so f r s
psychic l structure is concerned, simple ment l st te. Complexity
of structure nd indirectness of origin re thus re lly two different
ch r cteristics of st tes of mind, which frequently go together,
ut
frequently p rt comp ny.[241] When Mr Spencer, ccordingly, goes on
to s y[242] th t "for the
etter preserv tion of life the primitive
simple present tive feelings must
e controlled
y the l ter-evolved
compound nd represent tive feelings," he is re lly p ssing to
different st nd rd without giving up the former. The symp thy with
injured Zulus or Afgh ns which would
e pproved
y Mr Spencer[243]
m y
e more indirect, represent tive, or re-represent tive feeling,
th n the sentiments which led to British inv sion, nd, s such, m y

e more to
e commended. But it would
e r sh to s y th t symp thy
with the "British interests" supposed to
e t st ke--interests of
commerce, nd of the
l nce of politic l power, s well s those
rising from the su
tle effect of n tion l prestige--is less complex
th n the feeling of symp thy with people dispossessed of its
territory. The l tter feeling m y
e more indirect or represent tive,
s implying n im gin tive ppropri tion of the circumst nces of
nother community;
ut, so f r s structure is concerned, it is
composed of f r fewer nd simpler component elements th n the feeling
for British interests.
[Sidenote: neither of which c n serve s n ethic l st nd rd.]
Nor, on the other h nd, c n we llow ourselves to t ke refuge in the
conclusion th t, if the more complex emotion c nnot
e held to
e

etter mor lly, then th t which is l ter in evolution m y t le st

e reg rded s of higher uthority th n the e rlier evolved feeling.
According to Mr Spencer, the m n who o
t ins
y fr ud the money to
support his f mily is to
e condemned,
ec use, lthough we dmit the
cl im his f mily h ve upon him, "we reg rd s of superior uthority
the feelings which respond to men's propriet ry cl ims--feelings
which re re-represent tive in higher degree nd refer to more
remote diffused consequences."[244] But were this the ground of
distinction, we ought lso to reg rd the feelings prompting m n
to distri
ute his fortune in ny foolish enterprise " s of superior
uthority" to those which prompt him to support his f mily, if only
the former re "re-represent tive in higher degree," nd their
consequences more "remote" nd "diffused." M ny of the gre test
evils which infect soci l life nd w rp the mor l feelings of
men, re evils which re only possi
le s the result of
highly
dv nced civilis tion nd
refined nd delic te org nis tion of
the mind. The f ctitious sentiments r ised
y su
tle c suistry
with the effect of confusing the ordin ry distinctions of right nd

wrong re, in lmost ll c ses, more indirect nd re-represent tive

th n the feelings in h rmony with the mor l consciousness of the
community which they set side in the individu l conscience. So
o
vious, indeed, re o
jections of this kind--o
jections, th t is
to s y, t ken from the impossi
ility of so pplying the criterion
s to construct work
le system of mor ls--th t Mr Spencer
virtu lly relinquishes his own theory, t lking of it s true only
"on the ver ge,"[245] nd even llowing th t it is in some c ses
suicid l.[246]
As it c nnot
e held th t the more complex in evolution is of gre ter
uthority th n the less complex, nor th t the l ter in evolution h s
such uthority over the e rlier, we must dmit th t the so-c lled
"fund ment l ch r cteristics" of evolution, which find
pl ce in
its definition or "formul ," re un
le to determine its v lue in n
ethic l reg rd. The richness of life, physic l, intellectu l, nd
soci l, h s indeed
een produced only s the result of long course
of development, nd
y the ssimil tion of m ny v rious elements
into complex org nis tion;
ut its v lue c nnot
e me sured either

y the test of mech nic l complexity, or
y the length of time it
h s t ken to evolve. We must therefore seek some other method of
giving
me ning to evolution in the region of mor l v lues; nd we
find Mr Spencer himself re lly f lling
ck in his discussion on
the more gener l nswer to our question, th t the end of evolution
is life: "evolution
ecomes the highest possi
le when the conduct
simult neously chieves the gre test tot lity of life in self,
offspring, nd fellow-men."[247] Since it ppe rs, then, th t the
ch r cteristic of complexity or v riety is s uns tisf ctory
criterion of mor lity, s the notion of " d pt tion to environment"
w s found to
e, we must sk for some further interpret tion of the
notion of "development" or "incre se of life" when reg rded s the
end of conduct.
*

[Sidenote: 3. Further
life s the end.]

ttempt to define development or incre se of

[Sidenote: Biologic l definition of life insufficient.]

3. The ethics of evolution--in wh tever form we h ve s yet found
it--h s lw ys proceeded on the ssumption th t life is desir
le,
nd th t it h s v lue which m kes its pursuit nd promotion
re son
le mor l end. How this fund ment l ethic l ssumption[248]
is to
e justified, I do not t present inquire. But the question
must now
e f ced--Wh t is me nt
y "life" when we s y th t
its "incre se" or "development" is the mor l end, nd spe k of
its "gre test tot lity" in
w y th t implies th t it dmits of
qu ntit tive me surement? The
iologic l definition of life is
itself m tter of dispute. But, even were such
definition s th t
proposed
y Mr Spencer greed to, it would
e insufficient to provide
st nd rd for hum n conduct. The very gener lity which m y m ke it
fit to st nd s definition, or t le st
str ct description, of
life, renders it t the s me time inc p
le of serving s criterion

y which the v rious modes of the m nifest tion of life m y
e
judged. One point, however, gener lly emph sised
y the theory of
evolution, m y
e dmitted. The life which hum n conduct "ought" to
incre se is not merely th t of one individu l m n,
ut the whole
life of the community--"self, offspring, nd fellow-men"--with which
the individu l life is
ound up. Evolution h s shown how the growth

of the individu l h s
een so dependent upon th t of the whole
ody

of society th t it is impossi
le to sep r te their interests. At
the s me time, no complete identity h s
een
rought
out, nd it
rem ins one of the gre test difficulties of ny empiric l theory to
h rmonise their competing cl ims. For rgument's s ke, however, nd
to dmit of the qu lity of the end
eing investig ted p rt from
consider tions s to the method of distri
ution, the question m y
e
discussed s if n tur l selection h d produced complete solid rity

etween the life of the individu l nd th t of the r ce.
Wh t criterion h ve we, then, of the development of hum n n ture or
life? The nswer t once suggests itself th t the higher evolution
of life c n
e ccur tely me sured
y the mount of ple sure got

y living
eings. But this view h s
een ex mined in the preceding
ch pter, nd found to
e unsupported
y sufficient evidence; so th t
we re driven to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion th t will
give me ning to the phr se "development" or "incre se of life," when
prescri
ed s the ethic l end.
[Sidenote: He lth s the end either used to interpret ple sure,]
Nor is the m tter m de ny cle rer
y s ying th t the "he lth" of
society is the end we ought to promote.[249] This h s
een put
forw rd s n interpret tion of the hedonistic principle, which

rings th t principle into ccord with the theory of evolution.
As such, however, it seems open to f t l o
jections. Given s
n expl n tion of "ple sure," it f lls
ck upon the notion of
"life"; for he lth c n only
e defined s th t which conduces to
continued nd energetic life. Further th n this, there is speci l
difficulty in dopting he lth s the proxim te end where ple sure
is the ultim te end. Even if we could ssert th t he lth lw ys
le ds to ple sure, it is not evident th t it is
etter known, or
more e sily m de the end, th n ple sure. For of present ple sure
we h ve st nd rd in our own consciousness from which there is no
ppe l. And, lthough the v lue of
series of ple sures is much
h rder to estim te, there is lso no slight difficulty in s ying
wh t will promote the efficiency or he lth of n org nism. Besides,
the question rises whether he lth re lly corresponds with ple sure;
nd this is, in nother form, the question which h s
een lre dy
nswered in the neg tive,--whether life c n
e me sured
y ple sure.
[Sidenote: or f lls
ck on the notion of life.]
On the other h nd, if "he lth" is to
e t ken not s n expl n tion
of or me ns to ple sure,
ut s
su
stitute for the notion of
"life," then we h rdly get
eyond our origin l terms. "He lth" must

e interpreted simply s th t which le ds to strong nd continued
life: so th t the only inform tion to
e got from the new term is
th t the life we re to promote must
e vigorous nd long; nd this
w s lre dy implied in s ying th t it is the incre se or development
of life th t is the end. It will not do to identify the notion
with the mere
l nce of physiologic l functions which, in common
l ngu ge, ppropri tes to itself the term "he lth." We must include
the he lth of the soul s well s the he lth of the
ody, nd the
he lth of society s well s the he lth of the soul. The
l nce of
ment l nd soci l, s well s of physiologic l, functions, is implied
in the complex life of whose evolution we form
p rt. To s y th t we
re to promote this
l nce of v rious functions, is to s y nothing
more th n th t we re to promote the life into which physic l nd
ment l nd soci l f ctors enter. The ttempt to rrive t n end for

conduct,
y consider tion of the ch r cteristics of evolution, h s

een m de without success. It h s
een found, too, th t "development"
or "incre se of life" does not dmit of tr nsl tion into the l ngu ge
of hedonism: nd the question thus rises, how we re to define this
end, which we re un
le to interpret in terms of ple sure.
[Sidenote: W ys of determining incre se of life or n tur l good,]
Wh t me ning c n
e given to the notion "incre se of life" s the
end of conduct, without interpreting life in terms of ple sure? C n
we, the question m y
e put, re ch "n tur l" good s distinct from
"sensi
le good" or ple sure? We must disc rd t the outset ny such
"r tion l" view of n ture s g ve colour to the Stoic doctrine
y
identifying n ture with the univers l re son. And we must equ lly
void the doctrine th t re son regul tive of conduct is m nifested
in the constitution of m n either in distinct f culty, such s
"conscience," or in the due regul tion of the v rious impulses.
Trendelen
urg's teleologic l conception of hum n n ture, for
inst nce, implies r tion l element which could not
e got from
the c us l sequence tr ced
y evolution.[250] For he determines the
essence of m n
y reference to the inner end of his constitution,
nd postul tes n org nic unity of impulses which, in the form of
conscience, protests g inst self-seeking ction on the p rt of ny
single impulse. But no other hier rchy of motives c n
e dmitted
here th n th t produced
y the n tur l l w of evolution; nd this
l w c n only show how one impulse, or cl ss of impulses, h s
ecome
more uthorit tive,
y showing how it h s
ecome stronger or more
persistent: the other methods of evolving this uthority on the

sis of n tur lism, do so
y me ns of the ple sur
le or p inful
consequences of motives nd ctions.
[Sidenote: either su
jective or o
jective.]
There re two w ys in which, on most or ll ethic l theories, the
ttempt m y
e m de to distinguish "good" from "
d" conduct. We
m y either look to su
jective motive or impulse s giving the
me ns of distinction, or we m y test conduct
y its conformity
with n o
jective st nd rd. If we like to m ke use of the terms
self-preserv tion nd self-development, then these m y refer either
to the su
jective impulse which urges m n to preserve or develop
his life, or to some o
jective st nd rd for estim ting ctions
ccording s they ctu lly tend to prolong life or enrich it. Both
these possi
ilities re open to the theory of evolution. Although
the su
jective impulse is, of course,
property of the individu l,
it m y
e the result of the whole course of soci l development, nd
thus t ke in others s well s self in the r nge of its pplic tion.
It is therefore necess ry to ex mine
oth methods of determin tion
with some c re, especi lly s we re in no little d nger of re ching
n illusory ppe r nce of conclusiveness
y llowing the su
jective
st nd rd to rest on the o
jective, nd the o
jective, in turn, on the
su
jective.
[Sidenote: (_ _) Su
jective st nd rd: most persistent impulses;]
To
egin with the su
jective side. It m y
e thought th t we c n
point to some impulse, tendency, motive, or cl ss of motives in
the individu l mind
y following which the evolution of life will

e promoted, nd th t we re thus
le to solve the question of
pr ctic l ethics, though our conception of wh t the evolution of life
connotes m y still
e in w nt of ex ct definition. As lre dy pointed

out, such n impulse (unless it depends on n o
jective st nd rd)

must c rry its own uthority with it
y its strength or persistency.
The c se would, of course,
e perfectly simple, if we could ssert
th t the c rrying out of ll impulses in one's n ture w s to
e
pproved s tending to the development of life. Could this ssertion

e m de, there might
e no difficulty in ethics, or r ther, there
might
e no ethics t ll,
ec use there would
e no difficulty in
conduct. It is o
vious, however, th t the development of one n tur l
tendency often conflicts with th t of nother in the s me individu l,
s well s with the tendencies of other individu ls. The course of
evolution h s no dou
t tended to modify, though it h s not rooted
out, the impulses which re most prejudici l to individu l nd soci l
welf re. But the incre se of w nts s well s s tisf ctions which it
h s
rought
out in hum n n ture, m kes it dou
tful whether it h s
on the whole tended to diminish the conflict of motives.
[Sidenote: implies distinction
etween perm nent

nd tr nsient self;]

Ag in, when it is s id th t m n should "
e himself," or th t this

is his "strongest tendency,"[251] there is n implicit reference
to distinction
etween
perm nent nd
tr nsient, or
etter
nd worse self, nd it seems to
e im gined th t this distinction
c n
e reduced to difference in degrees of strength. But evolution
h s not en
led us to o
vi te Butler's o
jection to t king the
"strongest tendency"--me ning
y this the tendency which is t ny
time strongest-- s representing "n ture." For it is n undeni
le
f ct th t the tendency which for
time is the strongest--it m y even

e th t which is strongest throughout n individu l life--frequently
le ds to diminution of vit l power on the p rt of the gent, s
well s to interference with the free exercise of the vit l powers
of others. Some dv nt ge is g ined, perh ps,
y su
stituting for
"strongest" the ne rly equiv lent phr se "most persistent" tendency.
All those impulses which h ve in the p st served to promote life
h ve
een chosen out nd stored up s
sort of perm nent
sis for
the hum n f
ric; where s other impulses, not so dv nt geous in
their effects, h ve
less perm nent influence, though they re not
less re l. The more regul r or persistent cl ss of impulses m y,
therefore, (the ide is)
e t ken s representing the course of the
evolution
y which they h ve
een produced.
[Sidenote:
ut includes non-mor l impulses in the former,]
To l rge extent this distinction of two cl sses of impulses is
justified. There seems no dou
t th t the soci l, nd wh t re usu lly
termed mor l, feelings h ve tendency to return into consciousness
fter ny tempor ry depression or exclusion, which is not sh red

y some of the feelings with which they most commonly conflict.
Other impulses, not usu lly cl ssed s mor l, no dou
t sh re this
ch r cteristic of persistency or recurrence. "The wish for nother
m n's property," s ys D rwin, "is s persistent
desire s ny th t
c n
e n med." The selfish feelings h ve o
viously this persistent
ch r cter. But n evolutionist m y perh ps m int in th t it is one
of the defects of ordin ry mor l opinion th t it depreci tes the
necessity nd v lue for life of the selfish feelings, just
ec use
they re so strong s to st nd in need of no encour gement. And it
is not necess ry th t the evolutionist mor lity should gree t ll
points with ordin ry mor l opinion or mor l intuition. It recognises,
or ought to recognise the gency of immor l s well s mor l forces,
dmitting th t it is
y the ction of
oth of these th t m n s he is
t present h s
een produced, lthough the principle of the surviv l

of the fittest h s tended, though
y no me ns uniformly, tow rds the

elimin tion of the immor l f ctor. We m y dmit, therefore, th t
there is pressure on the will of the ver ge individu l tow rds
cert in kinds of conduct r ther th n others, or, put more precisely,
th t while ll cts re performed in consequence of pressure on the
will, the pressure tow rds cert in kinds of cts is
perm nent force
which, lthough overcome for the time, lw ys tends to re ssert
itself, while the tendency tow rds other cts inconsistent with these
is more intermittent nd v ri
le, nd does not re ssert itself
in the s me w y. But this su
jective experience is so limited in
ccur cy nd extent s to
e n unfit test of mor lity.
[Sidenote: is restricted to previous h
its of
[Sidenote:

cting,]

nd c nnot define n ture of mor lity.]

In the first pl ce, selfish conduct is s necess ry for the

preserv tion nd development of m n s " ltruistic" conduct, nd must
therefore h ve given rise to n equ lly gre t nd persistent pressure
on the will: so th t the su
jective criterion of persistency le ves
untouched wh t is often reg rded s the most difficult question of
mor ls, the
l nce of soci l nd individu l cl ims. In the second
pl ce, this su
jective tendency is only recurrence of ntecedent
dv nt geous ch r cteristics, nd does not le d us
eyond the _st tus
quo_, so th t, if ny progress is to
e m de in the future, it will

e only possi
le through the pressure of new extern l conditions: no
function is left for ny ethic l ide l which points
eyond p st nd
present h
its of ction. In the third pl ce, su
jective tendency
only en
les us to s y gener lly th t some cts or tendencies re
more persistent th n others, without giving ny further description
of wh t sort of cts these re. Were these tendencies or impulses
perfect guide to conduct, this defect would
e of little pr ctic l
consequence. It would prevent our h ving definite ethic l theory
only in circumst nces in which no ethic l theory would
e likely
to
e sked for. But the line
etween the more nd less persistent
motives is
n rrow nd shifting one. The impulses which re the
residu of dv nt geous ncestr l ctions re counter cted
y other
impulses, residu of ctions which would not
e counted s mor l,
though we inherit tendencies to them
ec use they formed re l
p rt of our ncestr l ctivity. We therefore st nd in need of some
ch r cteristic
y which to distinguish the one cl ss of tendencies
from the other. And s the only su
jective ch r cteristic is th t of
strength or persistency, nd this h s
een found insufficient, n
o
jective st nd rd is shown to
e necess ry.
[Sidenote: Thus su
jective st nd rd

cknowledged to depend on]

The impossi
ility of the su
jective test doing duty lone without

support from some o
jective criterion, is pr ctic lly cknowledged
y
the writer who h s discussed this p rt of the su
ject with gre ter
penetr tion th n ny other investig tor on the s me lines. "The
ver ge m n," it is s id, "feels the pressure upon his own individu l
will of ll the unknown n tur l sequence of motive which c used his
ncestors to do on the whole more often the right thing th n the
wrong"[252]--or, s we must re d it without o
jective ssumption, "to
do on the whole more often one cl ss of cts th n nother." The right
must
e defined simply s th t to which this "speci l feeling in the
su
ject is directed," nd it therefore
ecomes necess ry "to discover
wh t descriptions of cts inspire this feeling."[253] Thus, with
gre ter f cility th n would
e permitted to
critic, we re m de to

p ss from the su
jective to the o
jective method of determin tion.

[Sidenote: (_
_) O
jective st nd rd:]
The question, Wh t is right? is thus relinquished for the question,
Wh t is good? Good is s id to
e of three kinds--n tur l, sensi
le,
nd mor l. But s
y sensi
le good is me nt ple sure,[254] nd
ple sure is not the end, nd s
y mor l good is me nt "the pursuit
of n tur l good under difficulties,"[255] it follows th t n tur l
good is the end we seek. We h ve thus to determine, s ex ctly
s m y
e, this o
jective st nd rd c lled n tur l good. It is
interpreted in two w ys, which, however, m y
e "not necess rily
inconsistent": () "the perfection of the type s it is," nd ()
"the
solute
und nce nd v riety of vit l power."[256]
[Sidenote: () Conformity to the type.]
[Sidenote: The type defined s wh t
est serves its purpose]
This phr se, "the perfection of the type s it is," is somewh t
misle ding. When "the perfection of the type" is s id to
e the end,
we n tur lly reg rd the type s something th t needs to
e
rought to
perfection, nd _ex hypothesi_ is not perfect t present, or " s it
is." But if "the perfection of the type _ s it is_" is the st nd rd,
this implies, unless the st nd rd itself is f ulty, th t the type is
lre dy perfect, nd, therefore, th t the perfection spoken of is
the ch r cteristic of thing which conforms to the type, nd not
something to which the type h s to conform. This interpret tion is
confirmed
y the f ct th t imperfection is defined s "only dep rture
from the cl ss type."[257] Pl inly, then, the o
jective st nd rd
me nt is conformity to the type. Wh t, then, is the type? Concerning
things m de
y rt the nswer is e sy. The type, s Mr Stephen puts
it, represents the "m ximum of efficiency,"[258] or, s we m y s y,
is th t which most fully re lises the purpose for which the thing
w s formed. The
est
ow is th t which shoots truest nd f rthest
with rel tively sm ll expenditure of strength
y the rcher; th t
which
est re lises the purpose of

ow is the typic l
ow. A
simil r expl n tion of types m y
e given reg rding nim ls modified

y rtifici l selection. The typic l pointer or hunter c n
e defined
from this teleologic l point of view; nd, s long s people lived
in the
elief th t ll things were m de for m n, it w s n tur l to
fix the type of e ch cl ss
y reference to the hum n purpose it
could
est su
serve. So lso, s long s people think th t, whether
ll things were m de for m n or not, ll things m y
e m de use of

y him, there will
e tendency tow rds the s me nthropomorphic
interpret tion of types. If, then, the typic l products of rt, nd,
to l rge extent, the typic l products of n ture, re those which

est serve hum n purposes, or
est correspond with hum n ide ls, how
sh ll we define the typic l m n himself--the type which it is our
perfection to conform to? "Every re soning gent," it m y perh ps

e llowed,[259] "represents cert in type;"
ut the type c n no
longer
e defined merely s "m ximum of efficiency," for it is the
end or purpose of this efficiency which now requires determin tion.
In defining the typic l m n, we must h ve no ide of fin l c use or
purpose which is not rooted in the n ture of his org nism.
How, then, sh ll we now determine the type in conformity to which
perfection consists?[260]
[Sidenote: or s the norm l,]

[Sidenote: or s wh t h s strongest vit lity or

th t is,]

ids development,

The first nswer to this seems to
e, th t the type is wh t is

norm l,--"wh t we h ve le rned to reg rd s the norm l development
of o
jects
elonging to" the cl ss.[261] But the norm l m y h ve
either of two me nings--it m y, in the first pl ce, me n the usu l
or custom ry. This, however, would m ke the typic l m n me n the
ordin ry or ver ge m n; nd the ide l of conformity to the type
would
e reduced to doing the custom ry thing, nd not trying to
e

etter th n one's neigh
ours. But it is evident th t this st tion ry
mor lity does not represent properly wh t is fund ment l in the
theory of evolution: "wh tever other duties men m y cknowledge,
they do not look upon it s duty to preserve the species _in
st tu quo_."[262] If n tur l science te ches one thing more cle rly
th n nother, it is th t the type, like the individu l, is not
perm nent,
ut the su
ject of gr du l modific tions. If the type
is wh t is norm l, we must me n
y "norm l" something else th n
custom ry. But the only other me ning of the word seems to imply
reference to
rule--either rule imposed from without, or n inner
constitution or order. If the former ltern tive is dopted, then
we m y use nother definition of Mr Stephen's, nd s y th t "the
typic l org nism is ... th t org nism which is
est fitted for ll
the conditions of life, or, in other words, which h s the strongest
vit lity;"[263] nd thus h ve to f ll
ck either on the notion of
" d pt tion to environment," or on th t of "strongest vit lity"--the
notion we re seeking to interpret. If the other me ning, which the
reference to
rule m y convey,
e dopted, then we re met
y the
f ct th t the inner order or constitution which is to
e our guide,
c n (from our present empiric l point of view) me n nothing different
from the line of development. And s we h ve lre dy seen th t it
is uns tisf ctory to interpret this s equiv lent to d pt tion
to environment, or to incre se of definiteness, coherence, nd
heterogeneity, this principle of conformity to the type is reduced to
the gener l principle which we h ve
een ttempting to define more
ex ctly--incre se of life.
[Sidenote: () A
und nce nd v riety of vit l power,]
[Sidenote: which f lls
ck on the su
jective st nd rd.]
Thus the first determin tion of n tur l good s "perfection of the
type" is seen to reduce itself to the second, "
solute
und nce
nd v riety of vit l power." For the ddition l st tement, which
m kes the highest excellence consist in "conformity to the type s
it is going to
e,
ut s, except in few chosen specimens, it is
not yet discerni
le to
e,"[264] is uns tisf ctory. For to those
"few chosen specimens" the end would seem to
e simply to rem in s
they re-- conclusion which is h rdly consistent for writer who
reg rds mor lity s continu l progress tow rds higher life,
process of "clim
ing."[265] And, for the gener lity of men, there
must
e some st nd rd for determining wh t is "going to
e," nd for
certifying th t the "few chosen specimens" h ve re lised this st te
in its perfect form. Thus "conformity to the type s it is going
to
e," equ lly with "perfection of [conformity to] the type s it
is," seems to
e
ut nother w y of s ying "
und nce nd v riety
of vit l power," or, more fully st ted, "the possession of
und nt
f culties, ctive nd p ssive, fully developed, nd in regul r nd
equ l exercise."[266] The question thus comes to
e how we re to

determine this "
und nce of f culties." We c nnot do so
y reference

to such ch r cteristics s incre se in the num
er nd complexity of
these f culties; for criterion of this kind, s we h ve seen, is of
no ssist nce in deciding the most fund ment l ethic l questions.
To s y th t these f culties must
e "regul r nd equ l" in their
exercise, is to give merely form l c non. For how the equ lity
nd regul rity re to
e
rought
out,--which f culties re to
e
supreme nd which su
ordin te--wh t me ning equ lity c n h ve in
view of the dmitted diversity in
m n's n ture,-- re questions
left ltogether undetermined. And to descri
e the ide l or perfect
universe s one in which there is no conflict or collision,[267] is
to give description which is neg tive s well s merely form l.
We re thus o
liged to f ll
ck on su
jective criterion, nd s y
th t the
und nt life which it is the end of conduct to promote
is m n's strongest tendencies, or the gre test num
er of these.
N tur l good is determined
y "preferring out of ll the rudiment ry
possi
ilities existing in n ture, the com
in tion th t h rmonises
the gre test num
er of the strongest tendencies."[268] We set out,

e it remem
ered, to o
t in ch r cteris tion of those cts to
which the most persistent tendencies of hum n n ture le d us; nd
the conclusion we h ve rrived t is, th t they re the cts which
h rmonise the gre test num
er of the strongest tendencies. The
o
jective st nd rd is thus reduced to the su
jective st nd rd, which
it w s
rought in to expl in nd support.
[Sidenote: Strongest tendencies the result of p st ctivities,]
Now these strongest tendencies, in the h rmonious pl y of which
n tur l good or perfection is s id to consist, re themselves the
result of the courses of conduct which h ve
een most vigorous
nd successful in ncestr l org nisms, nd they m y therefore,
perh ps,
e t ken s surviv l nd index of the ntecedent st te
of hum n n ture. The re lis tion--or, r ther, continu tion--of
hum n n ture s it h s
een nd is, seems thus to
e the ide l
which empiric l evolution is
le to set
efore conduct,--with this
form l modific tion, th t, while the v rious impulses re, so f r s
possi
le, to h ve free pl y given them, they should
e developed in
h rmonious m nner. It seems dou
tful how f r this tendency tow rds
h rmony is properly suggested
y, or consistent with, evolution,
which h s implied ce seless struggle of opposing forces. At ny
r te, evolution does not seem competent to give ny principle of
rel tive su
ordin tion
etween the v rious impulses, such s might
dd re lity to the form l principle of h rmony. But wh t it is
essenti l to l y stress on here is, th t the only end which empiric l
evolution seems
le to est
lish is conformity to hum n n ture s it
is--the tendencies in it which re strongest nd most persistent.
[Sidenote:

nd thus give no ide l for progress.]

We thus see th t the ttempt to expl in on empiric l grounds wh t

is me nt
y positing "life," or "incre se nd v riety of life,"
s the end of ction, is pr ctic lly reduced to m king the most
persistent impulses of hum n n ture the guide of conduct. But these
impulses, it h s
een shown, re only the surviv l or remn nt of
p st st ges in the course of development, not nticip tions of
future st ges: so th t evolution is in this w y inc p
le of giving
n ide l of progress s the end for conduct, nd the l st word it
seems
le to give us s guide for ction is th t we should tre d
in the pl ces where the footprints of ncestr l conduct h ve left
the deepest impress. The ide l of such system is summed up in

the new Be titude, "Blessed is he th t continueth where he is." It

is pro

ly just
ec use the empiric l spect of evolution seems
so little
le to yield n end for hum n conduct corresponding to
the ctu l course of evolution--which h s
een progress--th t no
thorough ttempt h s
een m de to develop
system of mor ls from the
principle just re ched. It is true th t systems h ve
een worked out

y mor lists who h ve t ken hum n n ture s their st nd rd, nd th t
Trendelen
urg, t ny r te, expressly includes historic l development
in his conception of m n. But
oth Trendelen
urg nd
mor list like
Butler (who h s s yet no conception of the gr du l modific tions of
hum n ch r cter nd tendencies produced
y evolution) h ve view
of hum n n ture essenti lly distinct from th t which h s
een c lled
the "n tur listic" view.[269] For
oth ssume
definite r tion l
org nis tion of impulses simil r to th t t ught in Pl to's n logy

etween the individu l m n nd politic l constitution, so th t the
whole n ture, or hum n n ture s whole, c nnot
e identified with
the impulses which strength t ny time m kes most persistent,
ut
depends upon the r tion l llotment of function nd me sure to e ch.
*

[Sidenote: Summ ry.]

[Sidenote: Difficulty of reconciling individu l nd soci l ends.]
In summing up the rgument of the preceding ch pters, it is necess ry
to refer g in to the discussion c rried on in ch pter vi. on the
rel tion
etween egoism nd ltruism s ffected
y the theory of
evolution. This discussion w s not inserted in order to throw n
ddition l o
st cle in the w y of o
t ining n ethic l end from the
empiric l theory of evolution. It is n integr l p rt of n ttempt
to estim te the ethic l v lue of the evolution-theory. The ntinomy

etween the individu l nd soci l st ndpoints c nnot
e solved
y
theory of mor lity which does not recognise th t the individu l,
in his r tion l n ture, is not opposed to other individu ls,
ut
in re lity one with them. The theory of evolution cert inly seems
to go long w y tow rds est
lishing the unity of the individu l
with the r ce, nd in su
stituting n org nic connection
etween
them, in pl ce of the lmost contingent reciproc l rel tions spoken
of in e rlier empiric l theories. But when we come to inquire into
this unity of org nic connection, ttempting still to keep to the
purely empiric l point of view, we find th t the old difficulties
return, th t it must
e recognised th t the connection is empiric lly
incomplete, nd th t it gives w y t the very pl ces where firm

sis for the theory of mor ls is required. It w s in this w y th t,
quite p rt from this opposition
etween the individu l nd the
whole, the empiric l ch r cter of the theory prevented our getting
from it ny cle r nd consistent notion of the ethic l end it le ds
to.
[Sidenote: Hedonistic interpret tion of evolution not possi
le.]
It ppe red t first th t the ethics of evolution, when interpreted
empiric lly, might
e e sily reconciled with the older theory of
hedonism,
y identifying life with ple sure--holding th t the
highest or most evolved life is th t which cont ins most ple sure,
nd th t incre se of ple sure is therefore the end of conduct. In
this w y the end of evolutionism would
e reduced to the end of
utilit ri nism. Some utilit ri ns, on the other h nd, sought to get
rid of the difficulties of their c lculus,
y the ssumption th t

the gre test ple sure would
e found
y following the direction of
evolution. But, round
oth points of view, nd the correspondence
they ssumed to exist
etween ple sure nd evolution, speci l
difficulties were seen to g ther. Any hedonistic theory might
e
met
y the ssertion th t life is essenti lly
p inful experience,
nd ple sure un tt in
le; nd lthough the grounds on which this
ssertion w s m de seemed to
e distinctly erroneous, nd hedonism
did not ppe r to
e n impossi
le theory of conduct, yet simil r
o
jection told with gre ter force g inst the com
in tion of
evolutionism nd hedonism. For it holds the dou
le position th t the
end is to promote life, nd th t life is to
e promoted
y dding to
ple sure; or else, th t the end is ple sure,
ut th t ple sure is to

e got
y following evolution. It postul tes, therefore, th t the
progress of life tends, nd tends even in
proportion te degree,
to the incre se of ple sure. Yet we could o
t in no proof th t this
progress does, s m tter of f ct, incre se ple sure in ny regul r
w y. On the contr ry, the f cts of experience seemed to show th t
life nd ple sure do not dv nce proportion tely, nor even lw ys
concomit ntly. But still more import nt nd fund ment l o
jection
to the hedonistic form of evolutionism w s deduced from the n ture
of ple sure itself; for it c n
e modified indefinitely, nd lw ys
follows in the w ke of function. Thus the sole intelligi
le ccount
we c n give of wh t conduct will
ring the gre test ple sure is, th t
it is the conduct which c lls forth the gre test mount of successful
energising, th t which employs the gre test num
er nd the strongest
of the hum n f culties. Hence, inste d of
eing
le to me sure life

y ple sure, we were driven to interpret ple sure in terms of life.
[Sidenote: No independent ethic l ide l fforded
y the theory of
evolution.]
And perh ps t first sight it seemed th t the theory of evolution
could le d us
eyond the ple sure-
sis of older N tur lism. But,
when the m tter w s ex mined more closely, without dep rting from the
empiric l point of view, it w s found th t the notions put forw rd
were uns tisf ctory, th t they did not represent the progressive
n ture of the course of evolution, nd th t their pp rent force
fell w y
efore logic l n lysis. It
ec me evident, in the first
pl ce, th t no ppropri te end of hum n conduct could
e derived
from the n ture of evolution in gener l. It is true th t d pt tion
to environment is necess ry for life;
ut to put forw rd such
d pt tion s the end for ction, is to set up pr ctic l go l which
corresponds
ut ill with the f cts from which it professes to
e
t ken, m king the theory which is supposed to ccount for progress
est
lish no end
y pursuit of which progress
ecomes possi
le for
hum n ction. Further th n this, it neglects f ctor in evolution
s necess ry to it s is d pt tion to environment--the element,
n mely, of v ri tion. A theory which took the l tter s well s the
former of these f ctors into ccount seemed, in the next pl ce, to

e given
y those gener l ch r cteristics which re s id to m rk ll
progress--incre se of definiteness, coherence, nd heterogeneity.
But from these, g in, it w s found impossi
le to elicit
coherent
nd consistent rule for determining right nd wrong in conduct, or
definite end for ction: they were too
str ct nd mech nic l to
suit the living org nism of hum n conduct; nd we were thus driven

ck on the more gener l st tement th t "life" or the "incre se of
life" is the end fter which we should strive. In inquiring into the
me ning which could
e given to this end, without interpreting it
s ple sure, it w s found, fter tr cing it through v rious forms
of expression, th t it reduced itself to m king m n's strongest

nd most persistent impulses
oth st nd rd nd end. And this proved

to
e not only n uncert in nd shifting guide for conduct,
ut
n imperfect represent tion of wh t w s to
e expected from
progressive,
ec use evolutionist, ethics. For these persistent
impulses could only
e reg rded s the surviv l of p st ctivities,
nd consequently, cont ined no ide l
eyond th t of continuing in
the old p ths, nd re-tre ding n lre dy well-
e ten course. Just
s from the extern l end of d pt tion to environment, so from this
intern l or su
jective principle, no ide l for progress, nor ny
definite end of ction, could
e o
t ined.
It would ppe r, therefore, th t the theory of evolution--however
gre t its chievements in the re lm of n tur l science--is lmost
resultless in ethics. It only rem ins now to inquire whether this
w nt of competency to determine pr ctic l ends m y not
e due to the
superfici lity of the ordin ry empiric l interpret tion of evolution,
which h s hitherto
een dhered to.
FOOTNOTES:
[191] T king evolution in its widest sense, since the theory of
evolution does not "imply some intrinsic proclivity in every species
tow rds higher form."--Spencer, First Principles, App. p. 574;
Principles of Sociology, i. 106.
[192] Spencer, Principles of Biology, i. 73.
[193] I
id., i. 82.
[194] Reden (1876), ii. 332.
[195] Soci l St tics (1850), p. 77.
[196] D t of Ethics, p. 25.
[197] D t of Ethics, p. 16.
[198] I
id., p. 71.
[199] See
ove, ch p. vi. p. 137 ff.
[200] Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, 3d ed., III. i. 454, 470.
[201] L ss lle's tir de g inst the "verd mmte Bedrfnisslosigkeit"
of the Germ n workm n is
c se in point.
[202] L nge, Gesch. d. M teri lismus, 2d ed., ii. 458.
[203] Spencer, First Principles, p. 490.
[204] An spect of Mr Spencer's ethic l theory which will
e
considered in the sequel: p. 228 ff.
[205] Cf. A. B rr tt, Physic l Ethics, p. 294, where mor lity is
pl ced in "re son
le o
edience to the physic l l ws of n ture."
[206] D t of Ethics, p. 148.
[207] Soci l St tics, quoted in D t of Ethics, p. 271.

[208] D t of Ethics, p. 279.

[209] I
id., p. 275.
[210] D t of Ethics, p. 7.
[211] I
id., p. 281.
[212] These re ex mined
y Mr F. W. M itl nd, in n incisive
criticism of "Mr H. Spencer's Theory of Society," Mind, viii. 354
ff., 506 ff.
[213] D t of Ethics, p. 282.
[214] I
id., p. 283.
[215] First Principles, p. 517.
[216] Spencer, Psychology, 212, i. 478.
[217] First Principles, p. 489.
[218] "A complete equili
rium of the ggreg te is without life, nd
moving equili
rium of the ggreg te is living."--Principles of
Sociology, i. 106.
[219] D t of Ethics, p. 254.
[220] Spencer, D t

of Ethics, p. 26.

[221] D rwin, Origin of Species (1859), pp. 43, 131, 466.

[222] Spencer, Biology, i. 257.
[223] First Principles, p. 404 f.
[224] Cf. Clifford, Lectures

nd Ess ys, i. 101.

[225] Descent of M n, 2d ed., p. 137, cf. pp. 198, 618; cf. A. R.

W ll ce, Contri
utions (1870), p. 330.
[226] Viertelj hrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., i. (1877), 543 ff.
[227] Rolph, Biol. Pro
l., p. 33.
[228] D rwin, Origin of Species, p. 336.
[229] Thus D rwin, Descent of M n, p. 51, spe king of the " dv nt ge
to m n" it must h ve
een "to
ecome

iped," s ys: "The h nds nd
rms could h rdly h ve
ecome perfect enough to h ve m nuf ctured
we pons, or to h ve hurled stones nd spe rs with
true im, s long
s they were h
itu lly used for locomotion nd for supporting the
whole weight of the
ody; or, s
efore rem rked, s long s they
were especi lly fitted for clim
ing trees." The h nds h d to lose
their dexterity for the l tter purposes
efore they could cquire
the more delic te djustments necess ry for skill in the former. The
tr nsition w s of course gr du l one;
ut the initi l v ri tions
required would seem to h ve
een t first unf vour
le to m n's
ch nces in the struggle for existence, though it w s through them
th t he rose to his pl ce t the summit of the org nic sc le.

[230] Spencer, D t

of Ethics, p. 280.

[231] Spencer, Biology, i. 149.

[232] i
id., i. 144.
[233] Spencer, D t of Ethics, p. 71: "Briefly, then, if the conduct
is the
est possi
le on every occ sion, it follows th t s the
occ sions re endlessly v ried the cts will
e endlessly v ried
to suit--the heterogeneity in the com
in tion of motions will
e
extreme."
[234] Spencer, D t of Ethics, p. 106: "The cts ch r cterised
y the
more complex motives nd the more involved thoughts, h ve ll long

een of higher uthority for guid nce."
[235] Cf. Clifford, Lectures nd Ess ys, i. 94 f., where simil r
definition is given in nswer to the question, "Wh t is the me ning
of _
etter_?"
[236] Spencer, D t

of Ethics, p. 63.

[237] Cf. Spencer, First Principles, p. 566.

[238] So f r s the following criticism m y ppe r to pply to Mr
Spencer, nd not merely to possi
le w y of defining mor l conduct,
it is necess ry to
e r in mind the words of his pref ce to the 'D t
of Ethics': "With view to cle rness, I h ve tre ted sep r tely some
correl tive spects of conduct, dr wing conclusions either of which

ecomes untrue if divorced from the other."
[239] Spencer, D t

of Ethics, p. 75 f.

[240] D t of Ethics, p. 106.

[241] Although Mr Spencer holds th t represent tiveness v ries s
definiteness, nd me sures complexity, including th t complexity
implied
y incre sing heterogeneity.--Principles of Psychology, ii.
516 f.
[242] D t of Ethics, p. 113.
[243] Cf. Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.
[244] D t of Ethics, p. 123.
[245] D t of Ethics, pp. 107, 129.
[246] I
id., p. 110.
[247] D t of Ethics, p. 25; cf. L nge, Ges. d. M t., ii. 247.
L nge's st tement is noteworthy: "Die menschliche Vernunft kennt kein
nderes Ide l, ls die mglichste Erh ltung und Vervollkommnung des
Le
ens, welches einm l
egonnen h t, ver
unden mit der Einschrnkung
von Ge
urt und Tod."
[248] The "ende vour to further evolution, especi lly th t of
the hum n r ce," is put forw rd s "new duty"
y Mr F. G lton,
Inquiries into Hum n F culty nd its Development (1883), p. 337.

[249] D rwin, Descent of M n, p. 121; Stephen, Science of Ethics,

p. 366. E rlier th n either of these writers, Dr Hutchison Stirling
suggested He lth s pr ctic l principle to
e set g inst the
n rchy of individu lism. But with him, it is not n empiric l
gener lis tion of the tendency of evolution. It is s "the outw rd
sign of freedom, the re lis tion of the univers l will," th t "he lth
m y
e set t once s sign nd s go l of the h rmonious oper tion
of the whole system-- s sign nd s go l of
re lis tion of
life."--Secret of Hegel, ii. 554.
[250] N turrecht uf dem Grunde der Ethik, 2d ed., 1868.
[251] Cf. E. Simcox, N tur l L w, p. 97.
[252] Simcox, N tur l L w, p. 86.
[253] I
id., p. 87.
[254] I
id., p. 90.
[255] I
id., p. 99.
[256] Simcox, N tur l L w, p. 104.
[257] I
id., p. 87.
[258] Science of Ethics, p. 76.
[259] Science of Ethics, p. 74.
[260] Even were we to succeed in getting
s tisf ctory view of the
type, we should still h ve to le ve room for the individu lity of
e ch person, which is such th t his function must differ in m nner
corresponding to his peculi r n ture nd surroundings (cf. Lotze,
Grundzge der pr ktischen Phil., p. 13 f.)
[261] Simcox, N tur l L w, p. 88.
[262] I
id., p. 100.
[263] Science of Ethics, p. 120.
[264] Simcox, N tur l L w, p. 104.
[265] I
id., p. 103.
[266] I
id., p. 89; cf. J. T. Punnet, Mind, x. 91: "Wh t the
progress-principle m kes its im nd end is not complexity,
ut the
highest nd choicest fruits of complexity--the h rmonious unfolding
of ll the l tent c p cities of m n."
[267] "Of re l tendencies"--N tur l L w, p. 98. But wh t tendencies
re not re l?
[268] N tur l L w, p. 98.
[269] Cf. Trendelen
urg, N turrecht, p. 45: "Von der philosophischen
Seite k nn es kein nderes Princip der Ethik ge
en ls d s
menschliche Wesen n sich, d. h., d s menschliche Wesen in der Tiefe

seiner Idee und im Reichthum seiner historischen Entwickelung. Beides

gehrt zus mmen. Denn d s nur Historische wrde
lind und d s nur
Ide le leer."

CHAPTER IX.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
The peculi rity of the conclusion we h ve re ched is, th t the theory
which is used to expl in the n ture of progress, seems un
le to give
ny c non or end for conduct which points out the w y for progressive
dv nce. The view of hum n n ture
ec me uns tisf ctory just t the
critic l point--when we ttempted to get t knowledge of its end
or fin l c use, which would give unity nd purpose to ction. To s y
th t the end is incre se of life or function ppe red
merely form l
notion unless we defined life s ple sure, while ple sure itself
w s found to
e unintelligi
le except s perform nce of function.
This uncert inty seems to indic te
cert in superfici lity in the
ordin ry empiric l w y of looking t evolution.[270]
[Sidenote: 1. Principles involved in the theory of evolution.]
The principles involved in the theory of evolution re, in
rief,
s follows. In the first pl ce, it shows th t there is tendency,

rought
out
y n tur l selection, for org nisms to h rmonise with
or
ecome d pted to their environment-- tendency, th t is to
s y, tow rds unity of org nism nd environment, nd, in so f r s
extern l conditions re uniform, tow rds gener l unity of life.
In the second pl ce, the theory implies v ri tion in org nisms,
produced either
y the unequ l incidence of extern l forces, or
y
the spont neous ction of the org nism, or
y
oth c uses com
ined.
The mere incre se in the num
er of living org nisms le ds to
modific tion of the conditions of life
y which new v ri tions re
encour ged. And this tendency to v ri tion in org nisms--not merely
the diversity of extern l environment--is perpetu lly complic ting
the conditions which the former tendency, th t tow rds unity, helps
to
ring into h rmony. It thus h ppens th t there is, in the third
pl ce, continu l process of re djustment nd oscill tion
etween
the tendency tow rds unity nd th t tow rds v riety, which, through
opposition nd concili tion, produces continuity in n ture. E ch
newly formed unity
etween org nism nd environment is
roken
y
new v ri tion of the org nism or of the environment, which further
complic tes the pro
lem to
e solved
y the unifying process, nd
gives scope for more intric te nd more comprehensive re djustment.
Unity, V riety, nd Continuity re thus the three principles implied
in the theory of evolution.[271]
[Sidenote: 2. Unsuccessful

pplic tion of these principles to ethics;]

It is from these principles th t the ttempt h s
een m de to show

the ethic l
e ring of evolution. The first of them, Unity, is
represented in the theory th t would m ke d pt tion to environment
the end of conduct; nd the second is represented ethic lly in
the doctrine suggested
y Mr Spencer, th t the degree of mor lity
depends on the degree of complexity in ct nd motive. But
oth of
these views re o
viously one-sided, even from the point of view of

empiric l evolution. T ken together, the principles on which they

depend m ke up th t l w of continuous nd progressive dv nce which
m y
e reg rded s expressing the essenti l ch r cteristic of the
theory. And from this more gener l nd ccur te expression of it,
we might h ve expected to h ve
een
le to elicit the contri
ution
which evolution h s to m ke to the determin tion of the ethic l end.
But fter ex mining the v rious forms which it m y t ke, we h ve

een un
le to o
t in from it principle of ction.
[Sidenote: (_ _) the principles
eing tre ted s derived from
experience,]
In inquiring into the re son which h s m de the theory of evolution
seemingly so
rren in its ethic l consequences, the first point
which requires ttention is th t the ch r cteristics of Unity,
V riety, nd Continuity re tre ted
y it not s principles involved
in development,
ut s theories inferred from, or superinduced upon,
the f cts of development. We re led
y f cts to suppose cert in
hypothetic l l ws--n mely, th t org nisms tend to h rmony with their
environment,
ut th t there re cert in c uses promoting v ri tion,
nd, consequently, th t the history of ll life is th t of
continuous process tow rds more comprehensive uniformities, p ssing
lw ys into more intric te v ri tions. Addition l f cts re comp red
with these hypothetic l c uses, nd,
y their
ility to expl in such
f cts, the hypotheses re r ised to the position of l ws of n ture,
nd re confidently pplied to ccount for new phenomen of the s me
kind. But when we p ss
eyond f cts lying immedi tely on the pl ne
of those from which our l ws h ve
een g thered, it is to follow n
insufficient n logy if we interpret them
y theories only shown to

elong to the former order. And this
ecomes still more o
vious when
the ch nge is not merely to
different order of f cts,
ut to
different w y of looking t f cts, s is the c se in the tr nsition
from the point of view of knowledge to th t of ction.
[Sidenote: not

s depending on

principle implied in experience;]

But there is nother w y in which the principles of Unity,

V riety, nd Continuity m y
e reg rded. Inste d of
eing simply
gener lis tions g thered from experience nd depending upon it,
they m y
e founded on
principle which is itself the
sis of the
possi
ility of experience. Of course, no one would think of denying
th t it is to the ccumul ted m ss of experienced f cts th t these
l ws owe their prominence in modern scientific opinion, nd their
ccept nce
y the judgment of the
est scientists. But the process
y
which m n h s
een led to l y hold of such principles is one thing;
their logic l position in rel tion to experience quite nother. Our
definite recognition of the l ws m y very well
e the result of
experience, t the s me time th t the principle of Continuity is
presupposed in our h ving experience t ll. As long s we kept to
the ground from which we st rted, nd did not ttempt to get
eyond
the c tegories of c us lity nd reciprocity, our progress might
seem to
e e sy enough. Although their logic l rel tions m y
e
misconceived, the l ws re, of course, ctu lly there, in experience:
their pplic tion to the successive phenomen of n ture rem ins the
s me, nd m y
e duly pprehended. The extension of f cts into l ws
is expl ined
y the scientific im gin tion, nd we do not st y to
inquire into the conditions on which the scientific im gin tion
works nd h s pplic
ility to experience. But, when we try to
p ss from efficient c use to the notion of purpose or of mor lity,
we find ourselves driven
ck on the fund ment l constitution of

knowledge, nd see th t it is only through the unifying nd rel ting

ction of self-conscious su
ject th t knowledge is possi
le or
things exist for us t ll. And this is the re son why we re
le
to s y th t the Unity or Continuity of n ture is principle or l w
of experience.[272] Were th t principle not involved in knowledge,
there would
e no world of n ture for us t ll. The empiric l
interpret tion of evolution, which h s
een hitherto dopted, h s
m de the neg tive side of this truth sufficiently evident: it h s
shown th t we c nnot, on empiric l ground, re ch the end or purpose
of hum n n ture. The question thus rises, whether wh t m y
e c lled
the "met physic l" or "tr nscendent l" interpret tion of evolution
c n show the re son of this defect nd suggest remedy.
[Sidenote: (_
_) no logic l tr nsition
eing effected from efficient
to fin l c use.]
The insufficiency of the empiric l w y of looking t things is seen
most cle rly when we ttempt to m ke the tr nsition just referred
to, nd determine n end for conduct. It seems often to
e thought
th t, in pointing out the tendency of ff irs, we re, t the s me
time, prescri
ing the end tow rds which hum n ende vour ought to

e directed. Now, it is very difficult to s y how f r n empiric l
method en
les us to nticip te tendencies of this kind t ll. Even
from the historic l point of view the conditioning circumst nces re
so complic ted th t it is
y no me ns e sy to predict the result of
their com
in tion. It is rgued, however,
y Schffle,[273] th t we
re t le st
le to see s f r s the next st ge in the series of
historic l progress, nd this is thought to le d to the conclusion
th t we should m ke this next st ge of development our end: further
th n it we c nnot see, nd therefore need not provide. If, then, we
h ve no ultim te end for conduct, t le st we need never
e without
proxim te end-- nd one which is lw ys ch nging with the course of
events. Inste d, therefore, of s ying th t we should t ke no thought
for the morrow, the contention would seem to
e th t we should live
for the morrow
ut t ke no thought for the d y fter. But here the
ltered point of view is sc rcely conce led. From the discussion of
efficient c uses we proceed ll t once to decide upon ends or fin l
c uses. We h ve shown (let it
e gr nted) th t, t king ccount of
the present position nd mode of ction of the forces we re
le to
ex mine, they will modify the present st te of ff irs in
cert in
known m nner. To-d y we re in st te A; to-morrow we sh ll
e in, or
well on the w y tow rds, st te A
; therefore, runs the conclusion,
implied or expressed, we ought to m ke A
our end. But this is more
th n f ll cy due to the confusion of the two me nings of "end." The
conclusion to which it le ds is inconsistent with, or t le st shows
the one-sidedness of, the premisses from which it w s dr wn. For, if
A
is re lly the next term in the series of historic l progress, our
m king it our end c n neither help nor hinder its re lis tion. If, on
the other h nd, there is re lly me ning in our m king the world-end
our own, then we c nnot
ring th t end, the re lis tion of which is
conceived s still in the future, under the c tegory of efficient
c us lity, nd s y with confidence th t it is the next st ge in the
course of events.
[Sidenote: 3. Difference
etween c us lity nd teleology.]
The ide does not work itself out in the s me w y s n efficient
c use works in the processes of n ture. We might indeed
spe k--perh ps with some intelligi
le me ning--of the tendency of
evolution
ecoming conscious in m n, nd then working tow rds its own

re lis tion s fixed ide . So f r s the simpler represent tions

re concerned, this mode of ction h s
een cle rly illustr ted
in Mr B in's writings; nd the ch r cteristic is not limited to
the less complex kinds of ment l o
jects. The ide is, in its own
n ture, force tending
oth to exist in consciousness nd to re lise
itself through the motor energies.[274] Consciousness of n end is
motive to ction. Thus the notion of fin l c use includes th t of
efficient c use;
ut the two re not converti
le. The ide of n end,

eing conceived
y re son, c nnot
e descri
ed simply s tendency

ecome conscious. It h s p ssed into the region in which v rious
conceptions re, or m y
e, competing g inst one nother, nd the
result nt is decided on upon grounds which m y
e c lled su
jective
since they proceed from conscious determin tion. However the l ws of
this conscious determin tion m y
e expressed, they re not to
e
identified with the n tur l sequence of events s it m y
e conceived
to exist independently of the individu l consciousness. Wh t seems
the tendency of things m y
e ltered or modified upon some ground
of preference
y the conscious su
ject. In p ssing therefore to the
working out of
r tion l or ment l ide --such s is implied in the
conception of n end--we c n no longer fully represent our notions
y
me ns of the determined tempor l succession c lled c us lity.
[Sidenote: These notions unconnected
y empiricism,]
Thus the empiric l st ndpoint le ves the c se incomplete. A m n
might quite re son
ly sk why he should dopt s m xims of conduct
the l ws seen to oper te in n ture. The end, in this w y, is not
m de to follow from the n tur l function of m n. It is simply
mode
in which the events of the world occur; nd we must, therefore,
give
re son why it should
e dopted s his end
y the individu l
gent. To him there m y
e no sufficient grounds of inducement to

ecome " self-conscious gent in the evolution of the universe."
From the purely evolutionist point of view, no definite ttempt h s

een m de to solve the difficulty. It seems re lly to go no deeper
th n Dr Johnson's reply to Boswell, when the l tter pl gued him to
give
re son for ction: "'Sir,' s id he, in n nim ted tone, 'it
is driving on the system of life.'"[275] When ny further nswer is
ttempted now to the question, it ppe rs to
e on hedonistic grounds.
[Sidenote: even with the

ssist nce of hedonism.]

But it is not cert in th t the next st ge of development will
ring

more ple sure long with it th n the present. Enough h s lre dy
een
s id of the difficulties nd uncert inties which surround ny ttempt
to interpret evolution s tending const ntly to incre sed ple sure.
It m y
e thought, however, th t, if neither optimism nor pessimism
is the conclusion to which we re led, the modified doctrine of wh t
is c lled Meliorism m y
e ccepted. And this theory--which holds
th t the world is improving, th t the
l nce of good over evil, or
th t of ple sure over p in, is on the incre se--might seem to form
convenient support to the present doctrine. For it m y ppe r to
follow from it th t, if the next st ge in the world-process--th t
tow rds which evolution is tending--is known, then we should m ke
it our end to cceler te this st ge, s it will
e one which
rings
with it

etter st te of ff irs th n the present. But not even the
most enthusi stic "meliorist" h s tried to show nything more th n
th t his doctrine holds true in gener l, nd th t, lthough progress
h s m ny receding w ves, the tide of hum n h ppiness is rising. But
we c nnot tell how gre t these receding w ves m y
e; nor m y we
s y th t our ction c n h ve no power to check them. It follows,

therefore, th t, in judging of ny speci l nd tempor ry movement

of events ( nd it is not pretended th t our nticip tory knowledge
of the future c n extend f r), we c nnot ssume th t the second
st ge will
e
etter th n the first, or th t volunt ry modific tion
of it--if th t
e possi
le--might not improve
oth the immedi te
result nd its l ter consequences. It
ecomes necess ry, therefore,
to comp re the v lue of the two
y the directly ple sur
le effects
they m y
e expected to h ve, so th t we re driven
ck to test the
course of evolution
y reference to some other principle. The further
we go in ex mining n empiric l theory, the cle rer does it
ecome
th t it c n m ke no ne rer ppro ch to the discovery of n ethic l
end, th n to point out wh t courses of ction re likely to
e the
ple s ntest, or wh t tendencies to ction the strongest: while this
c n only
e done within cert in limits. The doctrine of evolution
itself, when dded to empiric l mor lity, only widens our view of the
old l ndsc pe--does not en
le us to p ss from "is" to "ought," or
from efficient to fin l c use, ny more th n the telescope c n point

eyond the sphere of sp ti l qu ntity.
[Sidenote: New point of view introduced
y teleology]
We re ende vouring to get t the ide or end of hum n n ture in n
impossi
le w y when we ttempt to re ch it on purely empiric l lines,
nd think th t, if we work long enough on them, we re sure to come
to it. In the s me w y it w s formerly thought
y physiologists th t,
if we thoroughly ex mined the
r in with microscope nd sc lpel, we
should come upon the se t of the soul t l st, while psychologists
were f in to
elieve th t, in ddition to ll our present tions
of o
jects, we h d lso present tion of the su
ject or thinking

eing. The mist ke of
oth w s in im gining th t the soul w s thing
mongst other things, or present tion mongst other present tions,
inste d of the su
ject nd condition of there
eing either things or
thoughts t ll. Of simil r ch r cter is the ttempt to get t n
end or fin l c use without le ving the point of view of efficient
c us lity. Were it successful, it would reduce fin l c use to
mech nism. To look upon m n or upon n ture s m nifesting n end
implies n ide or notion of the o
ject s whole, over nd
ove
the mutu l determin tion of its v rious p rts, nd thus necessit tes
the contempl tion of it " s though n underst nding cont ined the
ground of the unity of the multiplicity of its empiric l l ws."[276]
It is the ttempt to get t n extern l purpose for o
jects of
experience th t h s m de teleology
e looked upon sk nce
y men of
science. A conception of this kind went f r to viti te physics in
the middle ges, till it w s, with justice, strictly excluded from
the scientific interpret tion of n ture
y the le ders of modern
philosophy.[277] But teleology does not st nd or f ll with this
extern l form of it, which t kes its illustr tions from the products
of the f ctory, not from the m nifest tions of life,[278] nd which
is re lly only mech nism misunderstood.
[Sidenote: necess ry in considering life,]
The conception of n end is forced upon us in considering life,

ec use then it is necess ry to t ke ccount of the
eing s
org nised, nd therefore s whole. In the investig tion of n ture,
on the other h nd, things m y
e pprehended without rel tion to
the conception of the whole; nd teleology, therefore, seems to
e
unnecess ry. The notion of purpose, it is often s id, is essenti l
to
iology,
ut out of pl ce in physic l science. But when we
look on the world s whole, the notion of end or purpose is

introduced, nd the functions of its v rious p rts conceived from

new point of view. And the end of n org nism c n only
e p rti lly
understood, when th t org nism is conceived s whole p rt from
its environment. It is only p rti l m nifest tion or ex mple of
the more perfect re lity in which things re to
e reg rded s not
merely conditioned nd conditioning,
ut s revel tions of purpose.
But, lthough the notion of purpose c nnot
e dispensed with in
considering org nic n ture, the teleologic l notions we form of
living things re imperfect nd "
str ct." Thus the org nism is
often, more or less explicitly, judged
y its utility for some hum n
purpose. In these c ses the end is cle rly n extern l nd dependent
one. And, when the d pt tion of its p rts is spoken of in rel tion
to its type or perfect form, conception is involved over nd
ove
wh t c n
e inferred from the n ture of the org nism in itself. The
notion of the end depends upon
r tion l ide l, which p sses
eyond
the c us l interrel tion of p rts to the conception of the org nism
s whole, whose function is necess rily rel ted to its environment.
[Sidenote:

nd life directly known only s self-conscious.]

Our knowledge of the ends of the lower nim ls is re lly much more
imperfect th n our knowledge of the hum n end. For the only life
we re lly know is self-conscious life, nd th t we re un
le to
ttri
ute to them. We know their life only
y conjecture, our
knowledge of it
eing
ut n
str ction from our own consciousness.
The ethic l, s Trendelen
urg puts it,[279] is the higher st ge of
the process, lower st ge of which is the org nic. The purpose,
which is conceived s
lind or unconscious in n ture,
ecomes
conscious nd volunt ry in m n. But our notion of the former
is simply n
str ction from the free nd conscious purpose
which ch r cterises our own ctivity. The conception of life is
only known to us s--is only-- n element or moment in our own
self-consciousness. And life which is not self-conscious c n only

e judged in rel tion to the self-consciousness which cont ins in
itself the expl n tion
oth of life nd of n ture. The germ of truth
in the old mech nic l teleology m y perh ps
e seen in this w y. For
it h d right on its side in so f r s it referred everything to the
self-consciousness m nifested in m n; it w s mist ken only in so f r
s it m de things rel tive to his needs nd desires. The teleologic l
nthropomorphism which judges ll things ccording to their
correspondence with hum n purposes, must
e tr nscended, equ lly
with the specul tive nthropomorphism which fr mes the unseen world
in the likeness of the phenomen of our present experience. But to
ttempt to esc pe from wh t is sometimes c lled nthropomorphism--the
reference of the n ture nd purpose of things to self-consciousness,
s expressive of the ultim te re lity--is to ttempt to esc pe from
thought itself, nd m kes one's thinking from the
eginning void nd
contr dictory.
[Sidenote: 4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution,]
Now this reference to self h s
een omitted in our consider tion
of empiric l evolution. We h ve t ken the purely o
jective ground
of science, nd we h ve dmitted wh t science h s told us of how
ll sorts of things c me to
e,--how m n ppe red on the e rth,
gr du lly d pted himself to his surroundings nd modified them--how
sentiments exp nded, customs grew, nd one institution developed
out of nother. But science shows us ll this only s n extern l
process of events in sp ce nd time-- process in which the
preceding determines e ch succeeding st te, nd ll p rts re united

together. It does not show us the process from the inside. And, in
the end, it c n do no more th n point tow rds, without re ching,
the comprehensive ide of whole,
y reference to which ide ll
the mem
ers of the whole re determined, in such
w y th t it is
insufficient to look upon one s c using nother, nd with the others
m king up the ggreg te; since e ch mem
er only exists for the s ke
of the whole, nd the ide of the whole precedes the p rts which
constitute it.[280] The teleologic l conception thus necess rily
le ds us
eyond the ordin ry c tegories of science,
y which ll
things re conceived s connected c us lly in sp ce nd time. But the
scientific theories th t we h ve
een discussing do not recognise
this ltered point of view; nd, without giving ny justific tion
for the ch nge of st ndpoint, l y down the mor l l w th t we ought
to im t the re lis tion of something which c n only
e descri
ed
s ment l conception or ide . Here
dou
le ch nge in point of
view is involved. We re no longer considering process going on
outside us, in which the reference to self m y
e f irly ignored,
ut
we put ourselves in rel tion to this extern l order: nd we do so,
not merely s cognitive,
ut s ctive-- s the potenti l source of
ctions which we s y "ought" to
e performed
y us.
[Sidenote: (_ _) m de cle r in the ttempt to tr ce the genesis of
self-consciousness.]
The ssumption involved in the former ch nge is th t m de
y
comp r tive or evolutionist psychology, when it ttempts to pl y the
p rt of theory of knowledge. The development of impressions nd
ide s is m de to p ss upw rds to more complic ted st ges, till it
re ches the point t which the individu l, conceived s determined

y extern l forces nd re cting upon them,
ecomes conscious
of itself s su
ject of knowledge nd source of ction. This
tr nsition from the c tegory of c us lity to self-consciousness is,
in some systems--th t of Mr Spencer, for ex mple--either conce led
or held to with no firm gr sp. Throughout his o
jective tre tment
of psychology, it would seem th t Mr Spencer is evolving mind or
self-consciousness out of the process in which simple rel tions of
m tter nd motion form the lowest st ge, nd reflex ction is th t
which ppro ches most ne rly to h ving ment l ch r cteristics. And,
from this o
jective point of view, he spe ks of his philosophy s
n interpret tion of "the det iled phenomen of life, mind, nd
society, in terms of m tter, motion, nd force."[281] But when he
discusses the su
jective side, he dmits th t it is entirely unique
nd _sui generis_,[282] nd dopts wh t is known s the "two spects"
theory--the theory th t mind c nnot
e ccounted for s derived from
m tter, ny more th n m tter c n
e ccounted for s derived from
mind,
ut th t they re
oth ph ses of one ultim te nd unknown
re lity.[283] This dmission involves pr ctic l cknowledgment
th t it is impossi
le to rrive t consciousness or t su
jectivity

y process of n tur l development. We must, it ffirms, postul te
two spects or ph ses of existence, or two lines of development,
connected pro

ly in their ultim te re lity,
ut, s known to us,
distinct from one nother, nd without mutu l influence.
[Sidenote: Reference to self-consciousness,]
The doctrine th t reference to self-consciousness is implied in
experience, m y perh ps
e m de cle rer
y considering criticism
to which it h s recently
een su
jected
y n
le psychologic l
writer. Professor W. J mes writes s follows:--

"The doctrine of the post-K nti ns, th t ll knowledge

is lso self-knowledge, seems to flow from this
confusion [
etween the psychologist's st ndpoint
nd the st ndpoint of the feeling upon which he is
supposed to
e m king his report]. Empiric lly, of
course, n w reness of self ccomp nies most of
our thinking. But th t it should
e needed to m ke
th t thinking 'o
jective' is quite nother m tter.
'Green- fter-red- nd-other-th n-it' is n
solutely
complete o
ject of thought, ide lly considered, nd
needs no dded element. The f ll cy seems to rise
from some such reflection s this, th t since the
feeling _is_ wh t it feels itself to
e, so it must
feel itself to
e wh t it _is_--n mely, rel ted to e ch
of its o
jects. Th t the l st _is_ covers much more
ground th n the first, the philosopher here does not
notice. The first _is_ signifies only the feeling's
inw rd qu lity; the l st _is_ covers ll possi
le f cts
_
out_ the feeling,--rel tion l f cts, which c n only

e known from outside points of view, like th t of the
philosopher himself."[284]
[Sidenote: though not itself

p rt of experience,]

[Sidenote: logic lly implied
y experience.]

Now it seems to me th t the re l confusion here is
etween the
point of view of experience, nd the point of view of reflection
on experience, nd th t it is not the "post-K nti ns" who confuse
the two points of view. The "post-K nti ns"--
y whom Professor
J mes me ns T. H. Green nd the writers commonly ssoci ted with
him--h
itu lly occupy the l tter st ndpoint. They do not hold
th t " ll knowledge is lso self-knowledge," in the sense th t
" n w reness of self ccomp nies most [or ll] of our thinking."
When we h ve this empiric l " w reness of self," our o
ject is
the more or less distinct contents of perception, &c., which m ke
up the empiric l ego. But this knowledge of the empiric l ego,
equ lly with knowledge of extern l n ture, implies logic lly the
ction of self-consciousness. When we reflect upon experience, one
const nt element is seen to
e implied in it--the reference to
su
ject of knowledge nd feeling. Cert inly "post-K nti ns" do not
im gine-- s Professor J mes seems himself to im gine nd to think
they do--th t feeling feels itself, or n o
ject knows itself.
"Green- fter-red- nd-other-th n-it" is for them, s for him, if not
" n
solutely complete o
ject of thought," yet rel tively complete.
It m y
e pprehended lone s p rt of experience. But reflection
on experience shows th t it, like ny other o
ject of thought,
depends upon
knowing su
ject. The "post-K nti ns" do not ssert
th t knowing n o
ject involves for the individu l knower ctu l
consciousness of wh t his knowledge implies, ny more th n they would
s y th t the "pl in m n" is lre dy
met physici n. But they hold
th t reflection on experience shows th t self-reference, or reference
to su
ject, is
logic l condition of there
eing experience
t ll. So f r from confusing the two st ndpoints, they require
c refully to emph sise their difference, lest the ctu l content of
st te of consciousness in the individu l m n
e held to
e equiv lent
to the grounds or conditions of th t st te of consciousness.
The re son why there is even n pp rent pl usi
ility in the
ttempt to get t n tur l development of self-consciousness, is

th t the reference to self is, from the outset, implicitly,
ut

logic lly, ssumed in tr cing the sequence of events which forms
the su
ject-m tter of the theory of evolution, while the course of
development does nothing more th n render its implic tion explicit.
Self-consciousness is not something th t exists p rt from the
world of known nd know
le o
jects, ny more th n it is itself
speci l dep rtment of this world of o
jects distinguish
le from, nd
determined
y, its surroundings. It is, on the contr ry, the supreme
condition of the world of o
jects h ving ny existence wh tever.
It is only through o
jects
eing
rought into rel tion with the
identic l nd perm nent su
ject of knowledge, th t there is unity in
n ture, or, in other words, th t there is known world of n ture or
experience t ll. The evolution of mind or self-consciousness out of
experience is, therefore, not merely to
e rejected s pro
lem too
intric te for psychologic l n lysis. It is
mist ke to think th t
it is possi
le pro
lem t ll; for it ttempts to m ke experience
ccount for nd origin te the principles on which its own possi
ility
depends.
[Sidenote: (_
_) m de cle r in the ttempt to tr ce mor lity from
reflex ction.]
But it is the second ch nge in point of view which needs speci l
emph sis here--the ch nge from the point of view of science to
th t of mor lity. T ken in its
re form, this is perh ps little
more th n confusion of thought. The f ct of things
eing of
cert in constitution, nd of their progress tending in cert in
direction, c nnot of itself supply l w for the exercise of our
ctivity. But the view is ssoci ted with
theory of the n ture
of hum n ction which seeks to
ring it into the strict line of
n tur l development. Just s empiric l psychology ttempted to
tre t self-consciousness s st ge in the evolution of experience
or knowledge, so the empiric l theory of mor lity, ided
y the
doctrine of evolution, tries to show how the ction which is c lled
mor l h s
een developed out of purely physic l or reflex ction.
But this theory of the development of mor l ction is re lly open to
the s me o
jection s th t which w s urged g inst the theory which
evolves self-consciousness from the unconscious. The o
jection to the
l tter w s, th t experience, itself constituted
y consciousness, is
m de to produce the condition of its own possi
ility; nd
simil r
confusion is involved in ttempting to develop mor l ction out of
merely physic l or reflex ction. The only c se of true psychic l or
conscious ction is th t in which there is conscious determin tion
of end nd me ns; nd ction of this kind implies the s me rel tion
to self-consciousness s th t
y which knowledge is constituted.
The rel tion is, however, m nifested in different w y: it is not
n pprehension of the m nifold of impression into the unity of
consciousness,
ut the extern lis tion of self-consciousness in
re lising conceived end or ide . Now, in so f r s physic l nd
psychic l f cts re phenomen of experience-- nd they h ve no other
existence, t le st none th t c n h ve ny intelligi
le me ning given
to it--they presuppose self-consciousness; for it is only in rel tion
to it th t experience is possi
le. Th t is to s y, their existence
logic lly implies reference to su
ject whose ctive extern lising
m nifest tion is the determin tion of me ns nd end which constitutes
mor l ( s distinguished from merely n tur l) ction. So f r,
therefore, from our
eing
le to tr ce the development of mor l
ction from the simpler phenomen of n tur l ction, we find th t
these, in their most rudiment ry form,
y virtue of their
eing
phenomen of experience, imply nd receive their re lity from the

self-consciousness which is the differenti ting qu lity
oth of

knowledge nd of mor l ction.
[Sidenote: 5. The unity of self-consciousness:]
[Sidenote: (_ _) s m king possi
le the tr nsition from knowledge to
mor lity;]
From this it follows th t, lthough, empiric lly, the ch nge
from the point of view of science to th t of mor lity is
tr nsition to different order of f cts, yet the p ss ge m y

e possi
le tr nscendent lly through self-consciousness. For in
self-consciousness we re ch the element of identity
etween knowledge
nd ction. It is, therefore, of import nce to underst nd the
n ture of this self-conscious ctivity in rel tion to knowledge
nd to ction. If the fund ment l ch r cteristic of knowledge is
the
ringing into rel tion to consciousness, then ll conscious
ction h s this ch r cteristic; for it determines self tow rds some
p rticul r line of ctivity--th t is to s y, tow rds n o
ject or end
which is there
y rel ted to consciousness. Action therefore, we m y
s y, is knowledge. And in the s me w y, on the other h nd, since the
rel ting to consciousness which constitutes knowledge c n only
e
reg rded s origin ted
y the su
ject, it follows, conversely, th t
knowledge is ction.[285] "We ct," s ys Spinoz , "only in so f r s
we know or underst nd." Action is
ut one spect or m nifest tion of
th t which, in nother spect or m nifest tion, is knowledge. But
the spect of self-consciousness we c ll knowledge nd th t we c ll
ction re different from one nother. In the former the rel ting
to consciousness in the definite forms of thought nd perception is
the prominent thing. In the l tter it is the re lising energy of the
self-conscious su
ject. The ordin ry distinction
etween knowledge
nd ction is therefore correct, if not pushed to the extent of
m king n
solute sep r tion
etween them: in the former we ide lise
the re l, in the l tter we re lise the ide l. But they re t one in
this, th t
oth involve self-conscious ctivity.
[Sidenote: (_
_) s determining the ch r cter of the ethic l end,]
The self-consciousness which in one rel tion is knowledge, in
nother ction, is thus the fund ment l f ct of hum n n ture; nd
on it, therefore, the ethic l end must
e
sed, if th t end c n

e disclosed
y the n ture of m n, nd is to express wh t is most
fund ment l in his n ture. Now, s knowledge finds its completion
when ll things re connected with one nother nd the su
ject in
definite system of rel tions, the end of completed self-conscious
ctivity c nnot
e different. In their fin l perfection, s in their
fund ment l n ture, the two re t one. As K nt puts it,[286] the
specul tive nd the pr ctic l re son re reconciled in the notion of
end. However virtue m y differ from knowledge in the processes of
ordin ry experience, the distinction only
elongs to their finite
re lis tion. An intuitive underst nding, or underst nding which, in
knowing, cre tes the o
jects of knowledge, is the highest conception
of re son. Yet the very notion of finite self implies th t neither
such knowledge nor such ctivity
elongs to it. In knowledge nd
ction, s properties of the ultim te self-consciousness, hum n

eings only p rticip te. It is only
y me ns of the l
orious methods
of o
serv tion nd inference th t they ppro ch the intuition of ll
things s unity in which perfect knowledge consists; nd, in the
s me w y, it is only
y the gr du l volition l d pt tion of me ns
to end th t they re
le, in some me sure, to contri
ute to the

re lis tion of self-consciousness in the world.

[Sidenote: s self-re lis tion,]
An end c n only
e m de our own when conceived s necess ry for
re lising or completing our ide of self. Conscious volition
only follows
conceived w nt, or recognition th t the self s
im gined--the ide l self--is not re lised in the ctu l self. The
ction is tow rds fuller working out of the ide of self; nd the
end m y therefore, in ll c ses of conscious ction,
e s id to
e
self-re lis tion, though the n ture of this end differs ccording
to e ch m n's conception of self. This m y
e expressed, s Green
expresses it,
y s ying th t "self-s tisf ction is the form of
every o
ject willed;
ut ... it is on the specific difference of
the o
jects willed under the gener l form of self-s tisf ction
th t the qu lity of the will must depend."[287] It ppe rs to
me, however, th t this st tement requires to
e gu rded
y n
expl n tion. The self-s tisf ction sought must not
e looked upon s
feeling,--for if it is, it c n only
e interpreted psychologic lly
s ple sure--
ut s simply conscious self-re lis tion. And this
self-re lis tion is the o
jective consciousness of n tt ined
end, which is ccomp nied
y,
ut is not the s me s, the feeling
of ple sure. Self-re lis tion is the end, not the ple sur
le
feeling which follows it; self-s tisf ction, not the "ple sure of
self-s tisf ction." In this w y, the common experience "th t the
o
jects with which we seek to s tisfy ourselves do not turn out
c p
le of s tisfying us,"[288] might
e expressed
y s ying th t
the method dopted for the re lis tion of self is often found in its
result to le d to incomplete, or even to illusory, self-re lis tion.
The question thus rises, Wh t is the true self th t is to
e
re lised, nd wh t is me nt
y the re lis tion of it? The will th t
wills itself is s
re
notion in ethics, s the thought th t
thinks itself is in met physics. The "good will," which K nt rightly
held to
e the only ultim te good, never ltogether esc ped this
form lity in K nt's own tre tment of it. His ide of hum nity s
re lm of ends w s limited
y his form l conception of the function
of re son, though it suggests the w y
y which the mere t utology
of will m y
e tr nscended. It is of the essence of finite will
th t its end is different from the re lis tion of the end. But the
r tion lity of the will implies th t it must im t nothing less
th n the h rmonious rticul tion of its whole ctivity in the unity
of self-consciousness.
[Sidenote:
ut s tr nscending egoism;]
It h s
een rgued
ove th t
oth knowledge nd mor lity re
expressions of self-conscious ctivity: in it these different
m nifest tions find n element of fund ment l identity. But it m y
e
m int ined, further, th t this "unity of self-consciousness" is not
merely the unity of the different st tes of n individu l,
ut th t
it is n element which tr nscends the difference
y which concrete
individu ls re distinguished from one nother. If this view c n
e
c rried out, it seems to le d us to ttri
ute to other men something
more th n "simil r consciousness"[289] to our own, nd to m ke us
look on ll self-conscious
eings s sh ring in, or m nifesting,
in v rious imperfect w ys, one identic l self-consciousness. From
this point of view, self-re lis tion would
e est
lished s no mere
individu l end. The first l w of mor lity would
e not the "n tur l"
impulse for e ch to t ke c re of himself in the struggle for life,


ut, on the contr ry, the su
l tion of th t distinction
etween the
p rticul r ego nd other individu ls which would dmit of the one
using the others s mere me ns to his own dv ncement. His true end
is the s me s theirs: the re lis tion of the self-consciousness
in which
oth p rt ke--its re lis tion, th t is to s y, not in
one individu l only,
ut wherever it is m nifested.[290] This is
the r tion le of wh t the empiric l theory of evolution tries to
est
lish
y pointing to the growing h rmony in feeling nd interest

etween the individu l nd society. Wh t evolution re lly shows is
the gr du l m nifest tion in ctu l volition of the identity of
n ture in ll men.[291] I do not s y th t this fund ment l identity
of n ture does w y with ll conflict
etween self-re lis tion in
one's self nd in others;
ut it does much, if it est
lishes the
principle th t the re lis tion of one's own n ture involves the
re lis tion of th t of others. As Schffle s ys, "the mor l l w is
the direction of the will to the genuinely hum n s hum nity;" nd
"this is
tr nscendent l element em
edded in the he rts of ll
men--though in its
sis only, for it is developed nd ripened in the
course of history."[292] And the more fully self-consciousness is
re lised, the cle rer does it
ecome th t its complete re lis tion
implies th t "kingdom of ends" spoken of
y K nt, in which ll
self-conscious
eings re t once su
jects nd sovereign.
[Sidenote: (_c_)
progressive.]

s showing th t the re lis tion of the end must
e

Further, self-re lis tion in
oth its spects-- s individu l nd s

soci l--is necess rily progressive. It is only t the highest st ge
of its development th t n ture
ecomes the org n of intelligence nd
mor lity.[293] And, just s knowledge expresses itself through the
forms of sp ce nd time, nd, therefore,
y gr du l collig tions of
f cts, so the conscious determin tion of ctivity is m nifested in
the world in n order of consecutive cts, nd is therefore su
ject,
in its m nifest tion, to the l ws of tempor l succession. It is the
p rt of system of met physics-- t ny r te, it does not
elong to
the present inquiry--to show how re son m nifests itself in sp ce
nd time, nd how, through the r tion lity of this m nifest tion,
everything in sp ce is nd cts only in rel tion to its environment,
nd through it, to the rest of the world, nd how e ch event in time
is the result of preceding events, nd determines those which follow
it. Wh t it thus shows the necessity of is the process of evolution;
nd it is
ec use this process is determined
y re son th t the world
is the o
ject of knowledge nd the sphere of mor l ction. Evolution
is thus not the found tion of mor lity,
ut the m nifest tion of the
principle on which it depends. Mor lity c nnot
e expl ined
y me ns
of its own development, without reference to the self-consciousness
which m kes th t development possi
le. However v lu
le m y
e the
inform tion we get from experience s to the gr du l evolution of
conduct, its n ture nd end c n only
e expl ined
y principle th t
tr nscends experience.
THE END.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.
FOOTNOTES:
[270] The empiric l interpret tion of evolution is th t dopted
y
the m jority of evolutionists,
ut is not essenti l to the truth of
the theory. A protest g inst it is entered
y Mr W ll ce, though in

the somewh t crude form of postul ting supern tur l interference for
the production of cert in cl sses of phenomen (cf. Contri
utions to
the Theory of N tur l Selection, p. 359), t the s me time th t his
conception of n ture does not seem to differ otherwise from th t of
Hckel.
[271] The reference in the
ove to K nt, Werke, iii. 438 ff., is
o
vious;
ut it is nevertheless true ccount of the principles
involved in the theory of evolution.
[272] Cf. Stirling, Secret of Hegel, ii. 615: "One gr nd system,
unity of type, ll this must
e postul ted from the very constitution
of hum n re son;
ut from the very constitution of experience s
well, it c n never
e re lised in experience."
[273] B u und Le
en des soci len Krpers, ii. 68.
[274] Cf. Fouille, Critique des systmes de mor le contempor ins, p.
13 ff.
[275] Boswell's Life of Johnson, ch p. liv.
[276] K nt, Werke, v. 187 (Kr. d. Urt., Einl. iv.)
[277] Desc rtes, Princ. phil., iii. 3, i. 28; B con, De ugm., iii.
5, Novum org num, ii. 2.
[278] Cf. K nt, Werke, v. 387 (Kr. d. Urt., 65).
[279] Historische Beitrge zur Philosophie, iii. 165.
[280] Cf. Hegel, Wissensch ft der Logik, iii. 228.
[281] First Principles, 194, p. 556.
[282] Principles of Psychology, 56, i. 140.
[283] I
id., 272, 273, i. 624 ff.
[284] Mind, ix. 21.
[285] From " ction" in this its ultim te me ning s equiv lent to
origin tion
y the su
ject, it is necess ry to distinguish " ction"
s phenomenon in the extern l world. The l tter is one of the
modes in which the rel tion of o
jects is known to us, the former
ch r cteristic of knowing. The ctive n ture of knowledge is worked
out in n interesting w y in Professor S. S. L urie's 'Met physic
nov et vetust ,'
y "Scotus Nov nticus" (1884).
[286] Werke, iii. 538; cf. Ad mson, Philosophy of K nt, p. 138.
[287] Prolegomen to Ethics, p. 161.
[288] Prolegomen to Ethics, p. 165.
[289] Sidgwick, "Green's Ethics," Mind, ix. 180.
[290] This is implied in Hegel's well-known imper tive, "Be
nd respect others s persons."--Phil. d. Rechts, p. 73.

person

[291] Thus Hffding m int ins th t "the highest ethic l ide " is "the
ide of the hum n r ce s
re lm of person lities."--Grundl ge der
hum nen Ethik ( us dem dnischen), p. 74.
[292] B u und Le
en des soci len Krpers, i. 173.
[293] Cf. H. Sie
eck, Philosophische Mon tshefte, xx. 340.
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Gutnbrg-tm lctronc works

nd Rdstrbutng Projct

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1.B. "Projct Gutnbrg" s

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th work, you must comply

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* You provd
full rfund of ny mony p d by
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usr who notfs

rcpt th t s/h
Gutnbrg-tm
or dstroy ll

cops of th works possssd n physc l mdum nd dscontnu

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f or dstrbut
Projct
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1.F.1. Projct Gutnbrg voluntrs nd mploys xpnd consdr bl
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scond
opportunty to rcv th work lctronc lly n lu of
rfund. If
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1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You gr to ndmnfy nd hold th Found ton, th
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ccord nc wth ths grmnt, nd ny voluntrs ssoc td wth th
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th followng whch you do or c us to occur: ( ) dstrbuton of ths
or ny Projct Gutnbrg-tm work, (b) ltr ton, modfc ton, or
ddtons or dltons to ny Projct Gutnbrg-tm work, nd (c) ny
Dfct you c us.
Scton 2. Inform ton

bout th Msson of Projct Gutnbrg-tm

Projct Gutnbrg-tm s synonymous wth th fr dstrbuton of

lctronc works n form ts r d bl by th wdst v rty of
computrs ncludng obsolt, old, mddl- gd nd nw computrs. It
xsts bc us of th fforts of hundrds of voluntrs nd don tons
from popl n ll w lks of lf.
Voluntrs nd fn nc l support to provd voluntrs wth th
ssst nc thy nd r crtc l to r chng Projct Gutnbrg-tm's
go ls nd nsurng th t th Projct Gutnbrg-tm collcton wll
rm n frly v l bl for gnr tons to com. In 2001, th Projct
Gutnbrg Ltr ry Archv Found ton w s cr td to provd
scur
nd prm nnt futur for Projct Gutnbrg-tm nd futur
gnr tons. To l rn mor bout th Projct Gutnbrg Ltr ry
Archv Found ton nd how your fforts nd don tons c n hlp, s
Sctons 3 nd 4 nd th Found ton nform ton p g t
www.gutnbrg.org

Scton 3. Inform ton

bout th Projct Gutnbrg Ltr ry Archv Found ton

Th Projct Gutnbrg Ltr ry Archv Found ton s non proft

501(c)(3) duc ton l corpor ton org nzd undr th l ws of th
st t of Msssspp nd gr ntd t x xmpt st tus by th Intrn l
Rvnu Srvc. Th Found ton's EIN or fdr l t x dntfc ton
numbr s 64-6221541. Contrbutons to th Projct Gutnbrg Ltr ry
Archv Found ton r t x dductbl to th full xtnt prmttd by
U.S. fdr l l ws nd your st t's l ws.
Th Found ton's prncp l offc s n F rb nks, Al sk , wth th
m lng ddrss: PO Box 750175, F rb nks, AK 99775, but ts
voluntrs nd mploys r sc ttrd throughout numrous
loc tons. Its busnss offc s loc td t 809 North 1500 Wst, S lt

L k Cty, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Em l cont ct lnks nd up to

d t cont ct nform ton c n b found t th Found ton's wb st nd
offc l p g t www.gutnbrg.org/cont ct
For

ddton l cont ct nform ton:

Dr. Grgory B. Nwby
Chf Excutv nd Drctor
gbnwby@pgl f.org

Scton 4. Inform ton bout Don tons to th Projct Gutnbrg

Ltr ry Archv Found ton
Projct Gutnbrg-tm dpnds upon nd c nnot survv wthout wd
spr d publc support nd don tons to c rry out ts msson of
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frly dstrbutd n m chn r d bl form ccssbl by th wdst
rr y of qupmnt ncludng outd td qupmnt. M ny sm ll don tons
($1 to $5,000) r p rtcul rly mport nt to m nt nng t x xmpt
st tus wth th IRS.
Th Found ton s commttd to complyng wth th l ws rgul tng
ch rts nd ch rt bl don tons n ll 50 st ts of th Untd
St ts. Compl nc rqurmnts r not unform nd t t ks
consdr bl ffort, much p prwork nd m ny fs to mt nd kp up
wth ths rqurmnts. W do not solct don tons n loc tons
whr w h v not rcvd wrttn confrm ton of compl nc. To SEND
DONATIONS or dtrmn th st tus of compl nc for ny p rtcul r
st t vst www.gutnbrg.org/don t
Whl w
h v not
g nst
ppro ch

c nnot nd do not solct contrbutons from st ts whr w

mt th solct ton rqurmnts, w know of no prohbton
ccptng unsolctd don tons from donors n such st ts who
us wth offrs to don t.

Intrn ton l don tons r gr tfully ccptd, but w c nnot m k

ny st tmnts concrnng t x tr tmnt of don tons rcvd from
outsd th Untd St ts. U.S. l ws lon sw mp our sm ll st ff.
Pl s chck th Projct Gutnbrg Wb p gs for currnt don ton
mthods nd ddrsss. Don tons r ccptd n
numbr of othr
w ys ncludng chcks, onln p ymnts nd crdt c rd don tons. To
don t, pl s vst: www.gutnbrg.org/don t
Scton 5. Gnr l Inform ton About Projct Gutnbrg-tm lctronc works.
Profssor Mch l S. H rt w s th orgn tor of th Projct
Gutnbrg-tm concpt of lbr ry of lctronc works th t could b
frly sh rd wth nyon. For forty y rs, h producd nd
dstrbutd Projct Gutnbrg-tm Books wth only loos ntwork of
voluntr support.
Projct Gutnbrg-tm Books r oftn
dtons, ll of whch r confrmd
th U.S. unlss copyrght notc s
ncss rly kp Books n compl nc
dton.

cr td from svr l prntd

s not protctd by copyrght n
ncludd. Thus, w do not
wth ny p rtcul r p pr

Most popl st rt t our Wb st whch h s th m n PG s rch

f clty: www.gutnbrg.org

Ths Wb st ncluds nform ton bout Projct Gutnbrg-tm,

ncludng how to m k don tons to th Projct Gutnbrg Ltr ry
Archv Found ton, how to hlp produc our nw Books, nd how to
subscrb to our m l nwslttr to h r bout nw Books.