EN BANC

[G.R. No. 58876. November 27, 1990.]

ANICETO RAMOS, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
Recto T . Racho for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; TRIAL; DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED TO BE A STATE WITNESS, EXPRESSLY LEFT TO THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT; EFFECT OF ERROR IN THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION. The
discharge of an accused in order that he may be utilized as a state witness is expressly left to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the
rule exist (People v. Ibanez, etc., Et Al., 92 Phil. 936 [1953]). For the law seeks to regulate the manner of
enforcement of the regulations in the sound discretion of the court. The grant of discretion in cases of this
kind under this provision was not a grant of arbitrary discretion to the trial courts, but such is to be
exercised with due regard to the correct administration of justice. (People v. De Atras, 28 SCRA 389 [1969]).
It has, however, been ruled that while it is the duty of the trial judge to exercise a sound discretion in
conformity with the provisions of the statute, if he fails in the performance of his duty, or errs in the exercise
of his discretion in this regard, such error does not relieve from criminal responsibility the guilty participants
who are not discharged to be used as witnesses, any more than a similar error in the weighing of the
evidence submitted at the trial which results in the acquittal of one of several co-accused, who was in truth
and in fact a guilty participant in the crime charged against them, will afford a claim of exemption from
criminal liability by the other accused who were properly convicted (United States v. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 666
[1918]). While the discharge of Benavidez as state witness under the circumstances, was not in accordance
with Section 9(d), Rule 119, nonetheless, in line with settled rulings and precedents, his testimony has to be
admitted. But in accepting the testimony of a co-accused-turned-state witness, this Court is not unmindful
of the principle that in such a case, the testimony of the witness should be received with great caution and
should be carefully scrutinized (People v. Gongora, 8 SCRA 473 [1963]).
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE EXISTENCE THEREOF, SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED IF LOGICAL AND BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; NEED NOT BE PROVED BY
DIRECT EVIDENCE. It has been ruled that the findings of the trial court on the existence of conspiracy
should not be disturbed where such findings are not only logical but also because they are based on
evidence appearing in the record (People v. Arhis, 144 SCRA 691 [1986]). Similarly, jurisprudence supports
the contention that it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence as the same can be
inferred from acts of the accused (People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 73 [1988]). Thus, conspiracy exists where the
evidence on record shows that the questioned documents were prepared and processed by the government
officials involved in connection with the performance of their official functions and duties and the anomalous
transactions could not have been made possible without the connivance of the persons concerned (Bernabe
v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 683 [1988]). In the case at bar, the testimony of Benavidez is duly
corroborated by physical evidence such as the vouchers, the instructing notes, the postal money orders, as
well as the incriminating letters, all of which persuasively show the criminal conspiracy among the four
postal officials.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; RULE AND EXCEPTION ON THE EXISTENCE THEREOF; ELEMENT OF
MALICIOUS INTENT, SUPPLIED BY THE ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE AND IMPRUDENCE. In general, evil
intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts,
honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception, however,
is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent.
The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence (People v. Pacana,
47 Phil. 55 [1924]). In the case at bar, the negligence if not criminal intent of appellant in paying the
vouchers in question, is beyond question.
4. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; ACTING IN OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER ISSUED BY A
SUPERIOR, NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF LAW AND THE OFFICER IS NOT AN
IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR. Neither can petitioner be declared as having merely obeyed a lawful order
issued by a superior officer; there being a clear violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of

Posts, while Galinato, on whose order Ramos supposedly paid the questioned vouchers, was not even his
immediate supervisor.

DECISION

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari of the decision dated November 6, 1981, of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
in Criminal Case No. 918 promulgated on November 11, 1981, finding Aniceto Ramos and his co-accused,
Constantino Galinato, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of Malversation of
Public Funds Through Falsification of Public Documents and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from nine (9) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen
(13) years, seven (7) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to suffer perpetual
special disqualification, to pay a fine of P9,720 and to indemnify the Government of the Philippines (Bureau
of Posts) in the amount of P9,720 (Rollo, pp. 90-100).
Accused Aniceto Ramos y Javate was a regular employee of Postal Region I (Exhibits "A", "A-1" and "A-2")
and assigned as Postmaster of Bauang, La Union from 1970 to December, 1976. Accused German Samonte y
Jacildo was an employee in the same Postal Region I (Exhibits "B" and "B-1") and assigned as Postmaster of
the Nalinac Post Office, Bauang, La Union, from May 1975 until August 15, 1976 when he was reassigned in
Naguilian, La Union, until his resignation on September 28, 1977. Accused Constante Galinato y Marinas was
likewise employed in the same Postal Region I as Supervising Postal Service Officer I (Exhibits "D" and "D1").
Under Circular No. 40 dated September 18, 1974 of the Acting Postmaster General, motorcycle allowance for
letter carriers using motorcycles in the delivery of mails was increased to P60.00 a month effective July 1,
1974. Authority was given to postmasters to allow the letter carriers concerned to collect their allowance
from postal collections at the increased rate to be charged as budgetary expenses (Exhibit "J").
Implementing the aforesaid Circular No. 40, the Chief of Finance and Management Division, Bureau of Posts,
in a memorandum to the Acting Postal Regional Director, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, directed that
payment of motorcycle allowance of letter carriers be allowed from "the postal collections of the postmaster
concerned where the letter carrier is assigned effective the date when the letter carrier actually used the
motorcycle in the delivery of mails." This memorandum was circularized by the Officer-in-Charge of Postal
Region I per Circular No. 3 dated February 19, 1976. It was there specifically stated that "payment of
motorcycle allowance of letter carriers shall be made by the postmaster under whose office said employees .
. . are assigned which must be certified in the voucher or payroll as the case may be." (Exhibit "J-1")
Pursuant to the memorandum of the Regional Director of Postal Region I dated August 11, 1976 (Exhibit
"G"), Regional Auditing Examiner Rodolfo Ramirez y Rodriguez conducted an audit examination of the
accounts of the postmasters in the Province of La Union, among them the postmaster of Nalinac Beach and
Bauang Post Offices. In the course of his examination, Mr. Ramirez discovered spurious vouchers (Exhibits
"E", "E-1" to E-23") in the Bauang Post Office covering payments of motorcycle gasoline allowance of letter
carriers not assigned to that particular post office, and similar spurious vouchers (Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F6") in the Nalinac Beach Post Office. The postmasters assigned in Bauang and Nalinac who made the
payments of the vouchers were accused Aniceto J. Ramos and German J. Samonte, respectively. Examiner
Ramirez submitted a memorandum dated September 14, 1976 to the Regional Director on his examination
of the Nalinac Beach Post Office and other post offices in La Union (Exhibit "H"), and a separate
memorandum dated October 14, 1976 on his examination of the Bauang Post Office (Exhibit "I-1"). In both
memoranda, the discovery of spurious claim vouchers representing payments of motorcycle allowance of
letter carriers not assigned to either Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post Offices was reported. This discovery was
reported to the Central Office, Bureau of Posts, in Manila which forthwith disallowed the forged claim
vouchers paid by Postmasters Aniceto Ramos and German Samonte and recalled the credit advances
previously issued to them relating to the said irregular vouchers (Exhibits "K" and "K-1"). Examiner Ramirez
also sent a demand letter to accused Postmaster Aniceto Ramos for the restitution of the shortage found in
his accounts amounting to P13,320.00 (Exhibit "L").
On February 18, 1990, the petitioner-appellant was charged, together with Constante Galinato and Ernesto
Benavidez, with Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents in an information

filed by Tanodbayan Prosecutor Jose G. Ferrer with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 918) which
reads:
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"That on or about the period comprised from November 28, 1975 to July 19, 1976, inclusive, in the
Municipality of Bauang, La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court,Accused ANICETO RAMOS, then a postmaster of the Post Office of Bauang, La Union, having been
appointed and qualified as such, and therefore, an accountable officer responsible for public funds collected
and received by him in the exercise of his duties and functions, and conniving, confederating and conspiring
with his co-accused CONSTANTE GALINATO, then Supervisor and Acting Chief of the Operations Division of
the Regional Office of the Bureau of Post, San Fernando, La Union, did then and there, wilfully, feloniously,
unlawfully and fraudulently misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away the total sum of ELEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P11,640.00), Philippine Currency, and converted and appropriated
the same for their personal use and benefit, by making it appear that David Bisoy, Gavino Apilado, Florencio
Ramos, Bienvenido Edralin, Pepito Samson, Dante Biscocho, William Olano, Dionisio Ochinang, Hector
Centeno, Celestino Gasmen, Bienvenido Yaba, Hilario Guzman, Gabriel Alconis, Lucino Bravo, Jose Taclas,
Leonardo Frando, Alejandro Piaoan, Gil Blanco, Nicencio Barlahan, Benito Mangawang, Ernesto Gumawid,
German Estoesta, Matias Dumo, Simplicio Lusan, and Gregorio Villanueva, all letter-carriers and employees
of the Bureau of Post, Region I, had filed and claimed their motorcycle allowances allegedly covered by
Vouchers Nos. D-1, D-2,D-3, D-4,D-11,D-12, D-18, D-19, D-21, D-22, D-23, D-24, D-25, D-26, D-28, D-40,
D-41, D-42, D-70, D-76, D-77, D-86, D-99 and D-100, respectively, when in truth and in fact they did not,
as all their signatures on the aforesaid vouchers are all forged and falsified, and that neither of them (lettercarriers) received or benefited from the payments of proceeds thereof, Accused CONSTANTE GALINATO
caused the presentation and payment of the falsified vouchers, Accused ERNESTO BENAVIDEZ presented the
falsified vouchers to, and received payment from, his co-accused, ANICETO RAMOS, and that accused
ANICETO RAMOS certified to the correctness of the claim for motorcycle allowances and paid for the same
although he doubted the authenticity of the signatures of the supposed claimants, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of ELEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY PESOS
(P11,640.00), Philippine Currency, and to the interest of the public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW." (Original Record, pp. 1-2)
Upon arraignment, Accused Galinato, Ramos and Benavidez pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 918
(Original Record, pp. 26, 27 and 28). Trial ensued.
At the instance of the prosecution, Accused Ernesto Benavidez, an audit examiner of the Bureau of Posts in
Region I, was discharged from the Information in all the cases and utilized as one of the Peoples witnesses.
In Criminal Case No. 918, out of the twenty-five (25) letter-carriers named in the information, only twenty
(20) testified. They all disowned their supposed signatures in the vouchers ascribed to them, denied having
filed any claim for motorcycle allowance for the periods and received the amounts reflected therein or
authorized anybody to file any claim for them, or rendered service in the Bauang, La Union Post Office.
The principal witness for the prosecution against petitioner Aniceto Ramos, the sole appellant in this case, is
the discharged accused turned state witness, Ernesto Benavidez y Blanco, who testified as follows: From
1970 to 1980, he was an employee of the Bureau of Posts where he started as Accounting Clerk I, then as
Senior Clerk and later as Audit Examiner from June 16, 1976 to July, 1980. When he was assigned in the
Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts at San Fernando, La Union from 1973 to 1980, his immediate superior
was the Chief of the Administrative Division, Bernardo Tugade. He denied having been under the direct
supervision of accused Constante Galinato. He met for the first time Constante Galinato in 1973 and,
thereafter, they had been meeting in the Regional Office almost everyday. It was sometime in May, 1975
that Galinato and a certain Blandino Gabriel, a buyer in the Regional Office, invited him to a round of drinks
at the Symphony Restaurant, San Fernando, La Union. Because of his need for money, he agreed to deliver
fake motorcycle allowance vouchers. The said vouchers were to be prepared by Blandino Gabriel and
Francisco Asporias and to be delivered by him to either the Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post Office. The
proceeds of the vouchers would be divided in the following manner: 10% to Gabriel; 30% to the
Postmaster; 50% to Galinato; and 10% to him (Benavidez). On June 2, 1975, he met Gabriel at Galinatos
office and with Galinato proceeded to the Nalinac Beach where he was given fake vouchers by Galinato in
the name of Crispin Fangon, signed by Samonte. Thereafter, postal money order checks payable to Galinato
were issued. He was then introduced as Galinatos trusted man. Another delivery of fake vouchers were
made by Galinato on June 25, 1975 to Samonte which was followed on July l5, 1975. Benavidez was
instructed later by Galinato to deliver gasoline allowance vouchers to either Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post
Office. The voucher was in the name of Santiago Asuncion, signed by Samonte who paid the amount to

Benavidez in postal money order. It was encashed by Benavidez upon the order of Galinato when he
returned to the regional office. Two more notes with similar instructions were given to him on different
occasions (Exhibits "N" and "N-1"). The vouchers given to him with the notes were Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E3", "E-5" to "E-14", "E-16" to "E-19", "E-22" and "E-23", and Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-6", which were all
signed by Gabriel Asporias and Galinato above the printed phrase "Signature of Creditor." He brought the
vouchers (Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-3", "E-5" to "E-14", "E-16" to "E-19", "E-22" and "E-23") to Bauang
Postmaster Aniceto Ramos who signed them and gave him the corresponding amounts of the vouchers,
some in cash and some in postal money orders, less Postmaster Ramos 30% share in each voucher. The
rest of the proceeds, amounting to 70% of the face value of the vouchers was turned over by him
(Benavidez) to Galinato who gave him (Benavidez) his 10% share and 10% to Gabriel. As to the other
vouchers (Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-6"), he delivered them to Postmaster Samonte at the Nalinac Beach Post
Office. Samonte signed the vouchers and paid him their value, some in plain cash and the others in postal
money orders (Exhibits "P", "P-1" to "P-8") less the 30% share of Samonte in each voucher. Some of the
postal money orders (Exhibits "P", "P-1" to "P-3", "P-7" and "P-8") were issued in his name (Benavidez) as
payee, while Exhibits "P-4" to "P-6" in Galinatos name as the payee, all of these postal money orders were
signed by Samonte as Issuing Employee." All the persons whose names appear as "Remitter" were
fictitious. On his return to San Fernando, he delivered the cash and the postal money orders to Galinato who
signed those issued in his (Galinatos) name (Exhibits "P-4" to "P-6"). He was instructed by Galinato to cash
all the postal money order checks. Galinato then gave him his 10% share. Benavidez further claimed that
sometime in May, 1986, Accused Samonte and Ramos went to the Regional Office looking for Galinato but
failed to meet him because Galinato had been designated Acting Postmaster of Baguio City. Learning this,
Ramos and Samonte each prepared a letter (Exhibits "O" and "O-1") and asked him to deliver to Galinato
which he did.
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner Aniceto Ramos to testify in his behalf. His version is as
follows: Sometime in November, 1975, Benavidez presented to him a voucher of Benito Mangawang for
P960.00 and a note from Ernesto Ochavez, the Special Disbursing Officer of Region I, urging him to pay the
voucher. He paid it to Benavidez who told him that Mangawang was a letter carrier. He met Benavidez again
in December, 1975. This time, Benavidez presented to him some more vouchers for payment, followed by
still other vouchers the last of which was either in June or July, 1976. These vouchers were Exhibits "E" to
"E-23." They were already signed by the creditors when presented to him. Although the payees were not
presented, were unknown to him and he knew them to be not assigned in his office, he paid the vouchers to
Benavidez in good faith on the strength of the letter of Ochavez and two (2) letters from Constante Galinato
(one of them is Exhibit "9-Ramos") handed to him by Benavidez which instructed him to pay the vouchers
and enter them in his record of collections. That letter of Ochavez and the other letter of Galinato were
taken by District Postal Inspector Natalio Robles. Further bases of his action were the credit advices (Exhibits
"8-A" to "8-H-Ramos") he received from the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts which did not disallow any
of the previous paid vouchers. About 3 or 4 vouchers were paid in money orders which he entered in his
record of collections while the rest were paid in cash duly entered in his record of payments. He did not
deduct any amount or receive any share from these vouchers he paid. From November, 1975 to June or July,
1976, his accounts were periodically audited but not one of those vouchers was disallowed. But after the
August, 1976 audit of his accounts by Auditor Rodolfo Ramirez, the said vouchers were disallowed. He then
sent telegrams to all the creditors/payees in the vouchers asking them to return the payments to him
(Exhibits "4" to "4-N-Ramos"). He disowned Exhibit "O", the letter dated May 6, 1976, ascribed to him by
Benavidez as not his letter, pointing out that the signature therein is not his. He made several signatures
before the Court to show that none matched the signature in aforesaid letter (TSN, February 5, 1981, pp.
43-76).
After trial, the respondent court found accused-appellant together with Constante M. Galinato guilty, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
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"WHEREFORE, in new of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

x

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2) In Criminal Case No. 918, finding the accused Aniceto J. Ramos and Constante M. Galinato guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of
Public Document, as defined and penalized in Article 217, No. 3, and Article 171, No. 2, in relation to Article
48, all of the Revised Penal Code, without mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from NINE (9)
YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision mayor, as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS,

SEVEN (7) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to suffer perpetual special
disqualification, to pay a fine of P9,720 and to indemnify the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(Bureau of Post) in the same amount of P9,720;
x

x"

(Original Record, p. 399; Decision, p. 31)

Petitioner is the only accused-appellant who elevated this case to this Court and raised the following
assignment of errors:
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I
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ERNESTO BENAVIDEZ, AN
ACCUSED TURNED STATE WITNESS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER ACCUSED.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT PETITIONER HAS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER MERELY OBEYED A LAWFUL ORDER
ISSUED BY A SUPERIOR OFFICER.
I.
Petitioner contends that a perusal of the information filed against the accused would readily show that
Ernesto Benavidez played a very major and a substantial role in the aforesaid cases; among which are the
following: (a) it was Ernesto Benavidez himself who personally caused the preparations of the alleged
spurious vouchers and (b) it was Ernesto Benavidez himself who, in all instances personally collected and
received from the postmasters concerned all of the amounts represented by the alleged spurious vouchers.
Nonetheless, despite the objection of his co-accused that Benavidez was the most guilty and would,
therefore, not qualify as state witness under Rule 119, Section 9(d), the latter was discharged as such, on
the ground that the prosecution cannot prove the offenses charged without him.
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The discharge of an accused in order that he may be utilized as a state witness is expressly left to the sound
discretion of the court. Thus, Section 9 of Rule 119, as amended, provides as follows:
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"SEC. 9. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the
commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one
or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state
witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
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(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies
the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
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The Court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist (People v.
Ibanez, etc., Et Al., 92 Phil. 936 [1953]). For the law seeks to regulate the manner of enforcement of the
regulations in the sound discretion of the court. The grant of discretion in cases of this kind under this
provision was not a grant of arbitrary discretion to the trial courts, but such is to be exercised with due
regard to the correct administration of justice. (People v. De Atras, 28 SCRA 389 [1969])
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It has, however, been ruled that while it is the duty of the trial judge to exercise a sound discretion in
conformity with the provisions of the statute, if he fails in the performance of his duty, or errs in the exercise
of his discretion in this regard, such error does not relieve from criminal responsibility the guilty participants
who are not discharged to be used as witnesses, any more than a similar error in the weighing of the
evidence submitted at the trial which results in the acquittal of one of several co-accused, who was in truth
and in fact a guilty participant in the crime charged against them, will afford a claim of exemption from
criminal liability by the other accused who were properly convicted (United States v. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 666
[1918]).
While the discharge of Benavidez as state witness under the circumstances, was not in accordance with
Section 9(d), Rule 119, nonetheless, in line with settled rulings and precedents, his testimony has to be
admitted. But in accepting the testimony of a co-accused-turned-state witness, this Court is not unmindful
of the principle that in such a case, the testimony of the witness should be received with great caution and
should be carefully scrutinized (People v. Gongora, 8 SCRA 473 [1963]).
Petitioner called attention to the fact that the oral testimony of Benavidez is so replete with inconsistencies
and with allegations that are contrary to human nature and experience that they should not have been given
credence by the court. Thus, it was pointed out that Benavidez executed three sworn statements dated
December 2, 1976; September 8, 1978; and October 28, 1980, the latter reiterated almost verbatim in the
oral testimony given to the Tanodbayan; all of which are contradictory with one another; and admitted by
the witness himself to be false except the last one given to satisfy the investigator at the particular time who
promised to give him immunity from suit. Likewise, it was noted that Benavidez produced several
typewritten notes purportedly signed by accused Galinato, who ordered him to deliver the vouchers to
Ramos and Samonte, a practice considered absurd and improbable for if indeed there had been a prior
arrangement between Galinato, Benavidez and postmasters Ramos and Samonte, there would not have
been a need for the presentation of said typewritten notes.
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There appears to be no dispute that had the Tanodbayan relied solely on the testimony of Benavidez to
establish the guilt of appellant, it might have failed to prove the latters guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
But it will be noted that the testimony of Benavidez was corroborated by the admissions of appellant Aniceto
Ramos himself, to wit: (a) that he paid the questioned vouchers when presented to him by Benavidez
although they were already signed by the supposed creditors who were not presented to him; (b) that
aforesaid creditors were unknown to him and more importantly; (c) that he knew the supposed payees were
not assigned to his office, obviously in violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of Posts and
Implementing Regional Circular No. 3 of Postal Region I providing that payment of such allowance "shall be
made by the Postmaster under whose office said employees . . . are assigned which must be certified in the
voucher or payroll . . . The certification shall include . . . the kind, make and serial number of the
motorcycle." (Exhibit "J-1", Rollo, pp. 93-94). Ramos only excuse is that he paid the vouchers in good faith
and on the strength of the letter of Ochavez and two (2) letters from Constante Galinato handed to him by
Benavidez, which instructed him to pay the vouchers. However, the provision of Regional Circular No. 3 is
explicit and unmistakable. His alleged lack of knowledge thereof is inexcusable, if not improbable considering
that the said circular is directly connected with his duties.
Neither can he avail of the defense that none of his previous paid vouchers were disallowed in audit. Aside
from the fact that the questioned vouchers were spurious and cannot be legalized by the Central Office, the

records show that the credit advices were based on the reports of payment submitted by Ramos without the
corresponding vouchers attached, so that the Central Office would not be in a position to determine whether
or not the payees are letter carriers assigned to the Bauang Post Office of Ramos (Rollo, pp. 97-98).
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, corroboration of the testimony of Benavidez by the
inculpatory evidence tending to connect and/or implicate Ramos with the offense, is evident. More than that,
as found by the Sandiganbayan, they lend credence to the testimony of Benavidez as to the existence of
conspiracy among the accused (Rollo, p. 95).
II.
It has been ruled that the findings of the trial court on the existence of conspiracy should not be disturbed
where such findings are not only logical but also because they are based on evidence appearing in the
record (People v. Arhis, 144 SCRA 691 [1986]).
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Similarly, jurisprudence supports the contention that it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct
evidence as the same can be inferred from acts of the accused (People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 73 [1988]).
Thus, conspiracy exists where the evidence on record shows that the questioned documents were prepared
and processed by the government officials involved in connection with the performance of their official
functions and duties and the anomalous transactions could not have been made possible without the
connivance of the persons concerned (Bernabe v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 683 [1988]).
As testified by Benavidez, conspiracy was first established at their first meeting at the Symphony Restaurant
where Galinato convinced Benavidez to join them in the criminal scheme, their subsequent meetings, the
preparation of the fake vouchers and their presentation to the two postmasters Samonte and Ramos, herein
petitioner, culminating in the payment of said fake vouchers.
The involvement of Ramos in this conspiracy, is shown by his payment of the questioned vouchers to payees
unknown to him and not assigned to his post office, in violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 and
Regional Circular No. 3 of Postal Region I. The vouchers were presented by Benavidez and honored by
Ramos despite their obvious spurious nature, lending credence to the testimony of Benavidez that they were
effected in pursuance of a previous arrangement among the accused: Galinato, Samonte and Ramos.
Further confirming aforesaid agreement was the letter of Ramos (Exhibit "O") to Galinato urging Galinato to
send him more vouchers. Ramos disowned the signature on the letter and wrote for comparison three (3)
specimens, none of which were similar to the questioned signature. The Sandiganbayan, however, found
that the questioned signature is similar to Ramos signatures on the vouchers he admitted he had signed.
In any event, the testimony of Benavidez is duly corroborated by physical evidence such as the vouchers,
the instructing notes, the postal money orders, as well as the incriminating letters, all of which persuasively
show the criminal conspiracy among the four postal officials.
III.
In general, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The
exception, however, is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent
to criminal intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence
(People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 55 [1924]). In the case at bar, the negligence if not criminal intent of appellant in
paying the vouchers in question, is beyond question.
IV.
Neither can petitioner be declared as having merely obeyed a lawful order issued by a superior officer; there
being a clear violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of Posts, while Galinato, on whose
order Ramos supposedly paid the questioned vouchers, was not even his immediate supervisor.
chanrobles law library

In view of the foregoing considerations, no cogent reason could be found to reverse the findings and

conclusion of the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed and the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan finding herein
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 918 is Affirmed in toto with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 00-3-50-MTC. July 21, 2003]

REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE MUNICIPAL

TRIAL COURT, BOCAUE, BULACAN
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

On account of an anonymous letter dated January 3, 2000 received by the Office

of the Court Administrator (OCA) complaining against Judge Lauro G. Bernardo
(respondent), presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan,
about his deplorable attitude and inefficiency in the disposition of cases, the Judicial
Audit Team of the OCA conducted on February 8-11, 2000 an audit in the said court.
[1]

The report dated March 3, 2000 submitted by the audit team showed that 963
cases (847 criminal and 116 civil/other) were pending in the court as of February 8,
2000, the status of which are shown in the following tabulation:
[2]

CASE
STATUS/STAGE
OF
PROCEEDINGS
With decisions for
promulgation
Submitted for
decision
With incidents for
resolution
On trial/Set for
hearing
Set for pre-trial

TOTAL

CRIMINAL

CIVIL

126

86

40

504

446

58

39

34

For arraignment
of accused
Set for
preliminary
conference
For preliminary
investigation
For ex parte
reception of
evidence
With orders for
compliance by
parties
Subject of
inhibition of
Judge Bernardo
Without further
action or setting
despite the lapse
of considerable
length of time
With warrants of
arrest/summons
TOTAL

71

71

126

126

12

52

52

963

847

116

In light of the report, and on recommendation of the OCA, this Court, by Resolution
of May 2, 2000, directed:

(a) [respondent] (1) to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice,
why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him
for his failure to decide/resolve within the reglementary
period reckoned from February 11, 2000 (last day of audit)
the following one hundred and three (103) cases
submitted for his decision, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 90-

333, 92-215, 93-013, 93-208, 93-210, 94-067, 070-94, 94202, 94-210 to 94-212, 94-218, 94-227, 94-234, 94-282,
94-283, 94-399, 94-403, 94-438, 94-441, 94-461, 94-503,
94-508, 94-553, 94-595, 94-602, 94-652, 94-659, 95-001,
95-002, 95-051, 94-052, 95-170 to 95-172, 95-189, 95218, 95-431, 95-505, 95-749 to 95-752, 96-268, 96-417 to
96-420, 96-431, 96-437 to 96-440, 96-489, 96-761, 97258, 97-259, and Civil/other Cases Nos. 94-2294, 952357, 96-2513, 96-2541, 96-2602 to 96-2613, 96-2615,
96-2616, 96-2619 to 96-2625, 96-2671, 97-2678, 972716, 97-2730, 98-2882, 98-2899, 98-2907, 98-2924, 982941, 98-2942, 99-2953, 2960, LRC-P-98-05 and LRC-P-9806, and the pending motion in Civil Case No. 95-2466; (2)
to DECIDE immediately the aforementioned one hundred
and three (103) cases and the pending motion in Civil
Case No. 95-2466, including the following twenty-three
(23) cases submitted for his decision, to wit[:] Criminal
Cases Nos. 94-120, 94-174 to 94-179, 95-035, 95-069 to
95-071, 95-092 to 95-096, 95-281, 97-397, 97-640, 97872, 98-544 and 99-220 and Civil Case No. 96-2497, and
the following seven (7) cases with motions for resolution,
to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-360, 99-654, 99-678, MM039 and MM-075 and Civil Cases Nos. 94-2191 and 993073, although these cases were still within the period to
decide/resolve as of audit, otherwise his salaries will
be WITHHELD effective May, 2000, and will be released
only upon showing proof that he has rendered his
decisions and/or resolutions in the aforestated cases; (3)
to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice, why no court
sessions are scheduled on Tuesdays, in the afternoon of
Mondays and Thursdays, and in the morning of
Wednesdays; (4) to immediately TAKE APPROPRIATE
ACTION on the following twelve (12) cases which were not
further acted on or without further setting, to wit: Criminal
Cases Nos. 98-803, 99-693, MM-024, MM-033 and MM034, and Civil Cases Nos. 98-2922, 99-2964, 99-3074, 993075, 99-3076, 99-3077 and 99-3081, and on the
following eleven (11) criminal cases in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993, re:
Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases, to wit: Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-246, 99-339, 99-259, 99-269, 99-336, 99-

367, 99-368, 99-369, 99-380, 99-421 and 99-428; (5)

to AVOID unnecessary delay in the issuance of writs of
execution of final judgments; (6) to REFRAIN from
conducting lengthy preliminary investigation of cases
cognizable by his court; and (7) to SUBMIT within fifteen
(15) days from notice corresponding reports of his
compliance with the preceding directives; and
(b) Clerk of Court Ma. Fe O. Dimagiba, same court, (1)
to INFORM this Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, within five (5) days from notice, whether or
not the joint decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-179 and
95-180 [has] been promulgated as scheduled on February
21, 2000; and (2) to CAUSE the proper accomplishment of
certificates of arraignment of the accused in criminal
cases and the attachment thereof to the corresponding
records of cases.
[3]

Complying with paragraph (b) of the above directiveresolution of this Court, the
MTC of Bocaue Clerk of Court Ma. Fe O. Dimagiba, by 1st Indorsement dated May 30,
2000, informed that the joint decision in Criminal Case Nos. 95-179 and 95-180, which
was scheduled for promulgation on February 21, 2000, was reset to February 28, 2000
in view of the absence of Public Prosecutor Frederick F. Malapit; was again reset to
April 10, 2000 in the absence of proof of service of the subpoena and notice sent to the
accused and her counsel; and was finally ordered entered into the docket of the court
on April 10, 2000 in view of the absence of the accused and her counsel despite due
notice.
[4]

[5]

[6]

For his part, respondent filed on August 7, 2000 a motion for extension of time to
submit his explanation and comment on the matters subject of this Courts May 2, 2000
Resolution. To the motion respondent attached a status report of the cases mentioned
in the resolution and his alleged written request for further extension of time to
resolve/decide the pending cases audited as of February 2000 which was included in
his Certificate of Service [for February, March and April 2000] and for which [he] is still
awaiting approval. By resolution of July 3, 2000, this Court granted the motion for
extension.
[7]

[8]

[9]

On August 1, 2000, respondent filed a motion for additional extension of time to

comply with this Courts May 2, 2000 Resolution. To the motion he attached his
Certificate of Service for June 2000 wherein he claimed that a request was made x x x
for extension of time to render decision on the cases therein listed.
[10]

By Resolution of August 21, 2000, this Court granted the second motion for
extension, with warning that no further extension would be allowed.
[11]

On October 30, 2000, respondent again filed a motion for last and ultimate
extension of time to comply with the May 2, 2000 Resolution which was, by
Resolution of November 22, 2000, granted with warning that it would definitely be the
last extension.
[12]

[13]

Respondent finally filed on February 1, 2001 an undated Manifestation of

Compliance to the May 2, 2000 Resolution wherein he stated that the 103 cases
enumerated in paragraph (a) (1) thereof have been decided except for Civil Case Nos.
97-2716, 98-2882, 98-2942 and 98-2953, and that he had already decided the 23
cases submitted for decision and resolved the 7 cases with motion for resolution
mentioned in paragraph (a) (2) of the same resolution. As to the 23 cases mentioned
in paragraph (a) (4) of the resolution, he stated that appropriate action had already been
taken and the therein listed 11 cases had been archived in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases).
[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Complying with paragraph (a) (3) of still the same resolution, respondent explained
that no court sessions were held on Tuesdays, Monday afternoons, Wednesday and
Thursday mornings because with respect to criminal cases, no prosecutor is available
on said days and time, and with respect to civil cases, only one day sufficed for
hearing them. Respondent hastened to add, however, that when the court is not in
session, he conducts preliminary examination of witnesses for purposes of issuing
warrants of arrest and preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court; solemnizes marriages; and resolves pending motions and writes decisions
of cases. Further, respondent informed that in compliance with this Courts Resolution,
he has avoided delays in the issuance of writs of execution on final judgments and
refrained from conducting lengthy preliminary investigations/examinations.
[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

By Memorandum of May 4, 2001, the OCA recommended that respondent be:

[22]

xxx

(a) DIRECTED to
(a-1) SUBMIT within ten (10) days from notice copies
of the decisions promulgated/rendered in the
following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 95-001, 95-002,
95-051, 95-052, 95-431 and 95-505 and Civil Cases
Nos. 97-2678, 95-092 to 096, 97-640, 97-782 and
the resolutions in Criminal Nos. 99-360, 99-654, 99678, MM-039, MM-075 and Civil Cases Nos. 94-219
and 99-3073, and
(b-1) INFORM this Court through the Office of the
Court Administrator within ten (10) days from notice,
the actual dates when the decisions in the following
cases were promulgated/rendered: Criminal cases

Nos. 94-202, 94-282, 94-283, 94-339, 94-403, 94461, 94-553, 94-595, 96-431, 96-489, 96-761 and
97-258 to 259; and Civil Cases Nos. 95-2357, 972730, 98-2907, 98-2941, 94-120, 95-035, 97-397
and 98-544.
(b) ADVISED that he should file a formal request for
extension of time for approval of the Court and not
just indicate in his Certificate of Service said request;
and
(2) the 1st Indorsement dated 30 May 2000 of Clerk of Court Ma. Fe
Dimagiba be considered satisfactory compliance with the resolution
dated 2 May 2000. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
which this Court approved by Resolution dated July 11, 2001.
On August 27, 2001, respondent submitted another undated Manifestation of
Compliance to this Courts July 11, 2001 Resolution to which he attached duplicate
original/photocopies of his decisions in the cases mentioned therein except for Criminal
Case Nos. 95-092 to 95-096 which he claimed to be still pending trial but were
erroneously included as having been decided. He also stated that beginning October
2001, a formal request for additional time to render/promulgate decisions would be filed
for approval by this Court.
[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

By Memorandum of April 3, 2002, the OCA recommended that the matter be redocketed as a regular administrative matter which recommendation this Court finds
well-taken.
[27]

Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The Constitution in fact
mandates that lower courts should resolve cases within 3 months, clearly intended to
prevent delay in the administration of justice which erodes the faith and confidence of
our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.
[28]

Respondent did not indicate in his undated Manifestation of Compliance when he

decided a total of 115 cases. Unquestionably though, they were decided beyond the
reglementary period. Why he did not comply with the reglementary period of 90 days to
render a decision, he did not also explain.
[29]

When judges are unable to render a decision within the required period, they are
not without remedy. It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in
meritorious cases, especially when difficult questions of law or complex issues are
involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day
period. In respondents case however, he never requested for additional time to decide
the cases submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the OCA, the only instance
[30]

that he attempted to seek approval for additional time was when he submitted
certificates of service after the conduct of the audit.
[31]

This Court notes that as found by the OCA and reflected in the record on hand, the
following reasons aggravated the delay of respondent in the disposition of cases:

1. Sessions are held only three days a week;

2. Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993 was
not faithfully complied with;
3. Cases cognizable by the court still go through the
preliminary investigation process; and
4. Failure to properly observe the following circulars:
a) Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1998,
reiterated in Administrative Circular 10-94 dated June
29, 1994 regarding effective docket control; and
b) Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, reiterated in
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15,
1999 regarding the guidelines to insure the speedy
disposition of cases.
Respondents delayed disposition of a big number of cases reflects the cramming
done by him in rendering of decisions, which should not be the manner in which judges
should render decisions. For decision-making entails a thorough study of the evidence
presented and the applicable laws for each case.
The administrative complaint against respondent arose in 2000. Hence, Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, before it was amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took
effect on October 1, 2001, applies, for the amendment cannot apply retroactively.
Section 10 of said Rule 140 provides for the following:
[32]

Section 10. Sanctions.

xxx

B. If the respondent is found culpable of having committed a less

serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for one (1) to two (2) months and twenty-nine days;
or

2. A fine not less than P10,000 but not more than P19,999.
xxx
WHEREFORE, Judge Lauro G. Bernardo is adjudged administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering decisions and is hereby FINED in the amount of P19,000.00,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be filed in the records of Judge
Bernardo.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 02-10-628-RTC. October 1, 2004]

REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 5, ILIGAN CITY
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5, Iligan City on May 29, 2002.
The Report states:

Based on the records actually presented to and examined by the

audit team, the court has a caseload of two hundred thirty-three
cases as of May 29, 2002 (129 criminal cases and 104 civil/other
cases) . . .
...
The . . . cases submitted for decision are still within the
reglementary period within which to decide except Civil Case No.
4681 entitled Alferes vs. MCC for Nullity of Certificate of Sale which
was submitted for decision August 26, 2001 but remained
unresolved as of audit date . . .
...

Also, there are cases with pending motion or incident which remain
unresolved although still within the reglementary period . . .
...
There are likewise seven (7) cases without any further action and/or
no further setting was undertaken by the court for a considerable
length of time, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 8231, 8515, 7876 and
8955 and Civil Cases Nos. 5525, SP 5691 and SP 5858.
Further, Civil Cases Nos. 5431 and 5286 may already be archived in
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, dated June 21,
1993, Re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 9384 entitled People vs. A.
Palomar for Violation of PD 1866, the accused was arraigned on April
23, 2002. A motion for reinvestigation was filed by the accused on
May 4, 2002 and one of his grounds in his motion for reinvestigation
is that he was not yet arraigned. Considering that the prosecution
did not object to the motion of the accused, the court allowed the
same when it issued an Order dated May 17, 2002 directing the City
Prosecutor to terminate the supposed reinvestigation within thirty
(30) days. Is this not contrary to the rules considering that a motion
for reinvestigation should be taken prior to arraignment of the
accused? In this case, the accused was already arraigned.
[1]

Based on said report, the Court, on December 9, 2002, directed Judge Maximino
Magno-Libre, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Iligan City: (1) to
explain his failure to decide within the reglementary period Civil Case No. 4681,
entitled Alferes vs. MCC; (2) to inform the Court whether he has decided Criminal Case
No. 8309 and Civil Cases Nos. 3716, 3999, 4371 and 5845 within the ninety-day period
and resolved the pending motions or incidents in Civil Cases Nos. 4751, 5663, 5672,
5726 and 5917 within the reglementary period; (3) to submit to the Court certified copies
of the decisions/resolutions in the cases aforementioned fifteen days from their
promulgation; (4) to take immediate action in Criminal Cases Nos. 8231, 8515, 7876
and 8955 and Civil Cases Nos. 5525, SP 5691 and SP 5858; (5) to take appropriate
action in Civil Cases Nos. 5431 and 5286; and (6) to explain why Criminal Case No.
9384, entitled People vs. A. Palomar for Violation of P.D. No. 1866 was still allowed to
be reinvestigated notwithstanding the fact that the accused therein was already
arraigned.
[2]

In a letter dated February 27, 2003, Judge Libre submitted his explanation as
follows:

2. That except in Civil Cases No. 3716 and Civil 06-3999 all the other
cases mentioned in the said resolution had been
terminated/resolved and issues or incidents had been acted upon by
the undersigned, they are to wit:
Case No.
1.

Civil Case
No. 4681

Name & Nature of the Case

Alfredo Alferez vs. Mla
Cordage Co.
For: Declaration of Nullity
of Cert. of Sale & other
related documents &
Damages

Date Resolved/
Action Taken

Annex

Decided based on
Compromise
Agreement last June
7, 2002

Note: After the parties have submitted their evidences in writing, counsel for the plaintiff
informed the court that they are going to enter into compromise agreement which will be
submitted to the court for approval. Parties eventually submitted their compromise
agreement on June 7, 2002 which was approved by the Court on the same date.
2.

3.

Crim.
Case No.
8309

People of the Phils. vs.

Rudelino Ablin

Civil Case
No. 4371

Development Bank of the

Phils. vs. Alejo T. Uy

Dismissed last
October 2, 2002

Decided last Nov.

20, 2002

For: Violation of R.A. 6425

For: Deficiency Claim with

Prel. Attachment
4.

Civil Case
No. 5845

Elpedio Kwan vs. Ellen

Dumanhug

Decided based on
the merits last
November 26,
2002

5.

Civil Case
No. 4751

Isabel Racasa vs. Iligan Light

& Power Inc.

Decided on the
merits on Nov. 26,
2002

6.

Civil Case
No. 5663

Sultan Baguan M. Mamiscal

& Adelaida L. Mamiscal vs.
Gregorio T. Lluch & Sons, Inc.
For: Rescission and Sum of
Money with Damages

Motion filed by
plaintiff seeking
with leave to
amend plaintiffs
complaint was

F
G&
H

resolved in an
orders (sic) issued
dated May 30,
2002 and April 11,
2002. This case
was also set for
pre-trial on March
31, 2003 as per
order of the court
dated Feb. 20,
2003
7.

Sp. Proc.
No. 5672

In the matter of the Intestate

Estate of the Late Ana
Tabimina Halibas v. Miguel
Halibas

Dismissed last
Sept. 9, 2002

8.

Civil Case
No. 5726

Spouses Pimaco L. Dumaug

& Virginia C. Dumaug

The motion seeking

admission for
amended answer
has been resolved
in an order issued
on May 30, 2002.
The case is set for
continuance of pretrial on April 10,
2003 as per order
of the court dated
Feb. 18, 2002.

For: Specific Performance

with Prel. Injunction &
Damages

9.

Civil Case
No. 5917

Lian Hong Co., Inc. rep. by

Jason Sy vs. Sps. Constancio
& Annette Baliog

Decided last Nov.

29, 2002

J&
K

For: Collection of a Sum of

Money
10.

Crim. Case
No. 8231

People of the Phils vs.

Armando Monion alias Apiot,
Ronilio Monion, et al.

Dismissed last July

8, 2002

11.

Crim. Case
No. 8515

People of the Phils vs. Bobby

Madarieta, et al.

Archived last Sept.

25, 2002

For: Robbery

12.

Crim. Case
No. 7876

People of the Phils vs.

Manuel Agbu, Eric Ello,
Danilo Saligumba, et al.

Pleaded guilty last

Sept. 11, 2002

Consolidated to
RTC 02 on Sept. 11,
2002

For: Robbery
13.

Crim. Case
No. 8985

People of the Phils vs. Regina

Flores
For: ESTAFA thru falsification
of Private Document

14.

Civil Case
No. 5525

Rosie Maus, in her capacity

as member of the Board of
Director of Abalos AgroIndustrial Corp. vs. Abalos
Agro Industrial Corp., Lucina
A. Ferraren, Herminia
Labarro, et al.

Dismissed last
January 23, 2003

15.

Sp. Proc.
No. 5691

In the matter of the Petition

for allowance of will of
Segundina Vitalis Benitez vs.
Arturo Benitez

Probate of Will
Granted last June
14, 2002

For: Probate of Will

16.

Sp. Proc.
No. 5858

In Re: Petition for

cancellation of entry in the
Birth Certificate of Walter Ala
Sy Roa Simeon Roa, Jr. vs.
The Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City

Probate of Will
Granted last June 4,
2002

17.

Civil Case
No. 5431

Paul Joseph B. Deleste &

Cristina B. Deleste vs. Rajah
Travel Corp.

Dismissed last July

2, 2002

Dismissed last July

8, 2002

For: Damages
18.

Sp. Civil
Action No.
5286

Employees of the
Department & Environment
& Natural Resources
Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office No.
XII-A (DENR-CENRO XII-1A

Iligan City) numbering to 139

rep. by Basher Mangodato,
Mana Datumanong,
Cayamura Abdulcarim &
Redobor Pango vs. The Dept.
of Environment & Natural
Resources (DENR) National
Office of Diliman Quezon City
19.

Crim. Case
No. 9384

People of the Phils vs.

Palomar

Pleaded guilty last

Sept. 16, 2002

In Civil Case No. 3966, entitled Rural Transit of Mindanao, Inc. vs.
Lian Hong Company For: Damages and Civil Case No 3716, entitled
Rogelio Villaruz vs. Rural Transit of Mindanao Inc. Counsel of the
Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3716 and counsel for the defendant in Civil
Case No. 3966 has filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to
file their memoranda. Court has granted the motion and they are
given up to March 4, 2003 within which to file said memoranda,
attached is the order dated Feb. 17, 2003 marked as Annex W.
However, whether the counsel will file the memoranda, undersigned
Presiding Judge will decide the case immediately . . .
[3]

In the said letter, Judge Libre also asked for the understanding and compassion of
this Court.
[4]

In a Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Courts Second Division referred the said
letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for its evaluation, report and
recommendation.
[5]

In a Memorandum dated September 23, 2003, OCAs Deputy Court Administrator

Christopher O. Lock recommended that Judge Libre be directed to inform this Court
whether he has already decided Civil Cases Nos. 3716 and 3999, to submit copies of
the decisions thereof, and to further comply with the Resolution of December 9, 2002
which directed him to explain why he allowed the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
9384 despite the fact that the accused was already arraigned on April 23, 2002. He
likewise requested that his office be allowed to submit its report and recommendation
within thirty days from receipt of the full compliance of Judge Libre with the resolution of
December 9, 2002.
[6]

Judge Libre thereafter submitted his letter dated December 1, 2003 which states as
follows:

Civil Case No. 3716 was already decided last March 31, 2003. Please
take note that we dont have a civil case docketed as No. 3999

raffled to our sala and registered in our docket of civil cases. What
we have is Civil Case No. 3966 and this is also already decided last
March 3, 2003. As to Criminal Case No. 9384, this was also already
decided last September 16, 2002. In fact, the accused in this case
after his conviction, applied for probation and this was given due
course last September 19, 2002.
As a matter of fact, this matter was already reported by our Clerk of
Court to the Office of the Court Administrator, as shown by the
monthly reports hereto enclosed as Annexes A and B. For Civil Cases
Nos. 3716 and 3966 covered by Annex A, this was covered by the
report of March 2003, while for Criminal Case No. 9384 covered by
Annex B, this was covered by the monthly report of September
2002
[7]

The Court, through its Resolution dated February 4, 2004, noted the above quoted
letter of Judge Libre. It also noted that Judge Libre has not complied with the Resolution
dated December 9, 2002, which ordered him to explain why he allowed the
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 despite the fact that the accused had been
arraigned.
[8]

Judge Libre then submitted his letter dated March 23, 2004, stating as follows:

This is in reply to your communication in connection with the

resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 4, 2004 that I
explain why I allowed the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384
when the accused was already arraigned.
This did happen through inadvertence, because of the
misrepresentation of the accused when he filed his motion for a
reinvestigation. He alleged in paragraph 1 of his motion that he had
not yet been arraigned. In fact, the attending fiscal confirmed this
fact that the accused was not yet arraigned, for when she was
sound (sic) off she even signified that she has no objection to the
grant of reinvestigation. This fact is shown by the written motion of
accused for reinvestigation, copy of which is hereto attached . . .
Because of the aforesaid misrepresentation and the added fact that
the fiscal did not oppose the motion, but even acceded to the grant
of reinvestigation, I issued the order granting the reinvestigation
copy of which is hereto attached . . .

At any rate, the investigating fiscal also informed the undersigned

that she overlooked the fact that the accused in this case was
already arraigned . . .
Because of this development, this case was immediately tried and
since the accused opted to withdraw his former plea of not guilty
and entered a plea of guilty, judgment was rendered against him,
but because the sentence that was promulgated carries a penalty of
prision correctional (sic), he was granted probation.
Be that as it may, the undersigned respectfully submits that when
he made the error in this regard, it was in good faith and this was
being done not to cause unnecessary delay in the administration of
justice. To be more candid, the inadvertence that was involved here
was due to the fact that the undersigned is so saddled with so many
cases, for he had been assigned to the only Commercial Court and
The Special Intellectual Property Court in our multi sala set up.
I therefore respectfully pray that my inadvertence here will be
treated with a degree of human consideration and leniency.
[9]

On July 13, 2004, the OCA submitted its report, pertinent portions of which read as
follows:

Careful scrutiny of the compliance of Judge Libre shows that he

incurred delay in the disposition of the following cases, to wit: Civil
Case Nos. 4681, 4371, 5845, 4751, Criminal Case No. 8309 and Spl.
Proc. No. 5672. All other cases enumerated in the Resolution dated 9
December 2002 had already been acted upon by Judge Libre and
had attached proofs of his compliance with the directives. With
regard to Criminal Case No. 9384, we deem it more prudent and
appropriate to remind Judge Libre to be more cautious and
circumspect regarding motion seeking reinvestigation or of similar
import in order to avoid any occurrence that may be looked upon as
unprocedural if not irregular in the dispensation of justice.
Judges are mandated to decide cases within the reglementary
period.
Failure to decide on time constitutes inefficiency and merits
administrative sanctions. Under Sec. 9 (1), in relation to Sec. 11 (B)
of the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which took effect on

October 1, 2001, the imposable penalty for undue delay in rendering

a decision may either be (a) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. (Report on the Judicial audit conducted in the
MTCC Branches 1, 2 and 3, Mandawe City, A.M. No. 02-8-188 MTCC,
July 17, 2003).
Without any doubt, Judge Libre violated his mandate. He failed to
decide the above cases submitted for decision within the required
period for resolution. The Honorable Court have been sympathetic to
request made by judges for extension of time for deciding cases and
other incidents related thereto. He should have asked for an
extension and such request is generally granted.
It has been noted however, that of the 233 cases pending at the
RTC, Branch 5, Iligan City, as of the time of audit, Judge Libre
incurred delay in deciding only six (6) cases which were then found
submitted for decision. After having been appraised of the cases,
Judge Libre proved to have acted with dispatch in order to comply
with the directive of this Honorable Court by rendering judgments
thereon though with incurred delay. It has also been noted that this
is the first time that Judge Libre was found to have committed an
infraction and is to compulsorily retire on October 10, 2004. The
Honorable Court had in several cases considered attending
circumstances in applying the corresponding penalty on erring
judges. (Vicente Pichon vs. Judge Lucilo C. Rallos, etc., A.M. No. RTJ02-1680, January 28, 2003; Re: Judicial Audit Report conducted in
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Kidapawan City).
[10]

The OCA then recommended that:

a) the compliance of Judge Maximino M. Libre, RTC, Branch 5,

Iligan City be NOTED;
b) the report on the judicial audit in the RTC, Branch 5, Iligan City
be redocketed as a regular administrative matter against
Judge Libre and that he be held liable for inefficiency in the
disposition of cases and be imposed a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with WARNING that a

repetition of the same or similar act(s) will be dealt with more

severely;
c) Judge Libre be REMINDED to be more prudent and circumspect
in the performance of his mandated duty as a dispenser of
justice.
[11]

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that respondent be
fined the amount of P5,000.00 but not as to his negligence in granting the
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 after the arraignment of the accused therein.
Failure of a judge to decide and resolve cases on time is an outright disregard of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly
and decide cases within the required period. They are tasked to perform all their
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness as prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.
[12]

[13]

When a judge assumes office, duties and restrictions are cast upon him that are
peculiar to his position. He should be punctual in the performance of his duties, exhibit
an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed on him, and prompt
in disposing all matters submitted to him.
[14]

As we stated in Cadauan vs. Judge Alivia,

[15]

Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial duty of a

member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in our courts
is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be
compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment of
providing all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial
and to a speedy disposition of cases.
[16]

This is because delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of
the people in the judiciary, lowers its standard and brings it into disrepute. As is often
stated, justice delayed is justice denied. Thus, the periods within which decisions and
resolutions should be rendered should not to be treated lightly.
[17]

[18]

It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases,
especially when difficult questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant
judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day period. All that a
judge really needs to do, in cases of great difficulty, is to request for an extension of time
over which the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic. Judge Libre, however,
did not avail of such remedy, which only manifests his failure to be on top of the cases
assigned to him.
[19]

[20]

The OCA observed, however, that out of the 233 cases pending before the sala of
Judge Libre, only six cases were decided beyond the reglementary period. And after
calling his attention on the matter, Judge Libre acted with dispatch and immediately

resolved the said cases. This is also the first time that Judge Libre has committed any
infraction throughout his career as a judge, which will end with his compulsory
retirement on October 10, 2004.
For these reasons we agree with the recommendation of the OCA that the penalty
for the delay of Judge Libre to render his decision should be mitigated accordingly and
should be imposed a fine only in the amount of P5,000.00.
[21]

Anent Criminal Case No. 9384, Judge Libre explains that the accused in Criminal
Case No. 9384 stated in his motion for reinvestigation dated May 7, 2002 that he has
not yet been arraigned. The fiscal also did not object with the motion as manifested by
her signature in the accuseds written motion.
[22]

Upon audit however, it was discovered that the accused was already arraigned on
April 23, 2002.
Although it is unusual for a trial court to grant a reinvestigation after the accused
had been arraigned, the Court has consistently allowed the trial court to grant
reinvestigation, in the exercise of its sound discretion, even after arraignment.
[23]

As succinctly explained by the former Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, to wit:

[24]

A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired

jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge and to him
alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the
Fiscal may interfere with the Judges disposition of the case, much
less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or
innocence of the accused for the court is the sole judge of that.
Courts are, however, called upon to exercise great restraint in
granting any reinvestigation with the consequent delay involved,
since the weighing and evaluation of such evidence in defense of
the accused against the States evidence is best left to its judgment
and its verdict rather than to that of the prosecution. To ferret out
the truth, trial is to be preferred to a reinvestigation.
WHEREFORE, Judge Maximino Magno-Libre is found guilty of delay in the
disposition of cases and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126814. March 2, 2000]

JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, RAFAEL T. FLORES, HERMINIO C. ELIZON,

ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. GIL. P. FERNANDEZ,
SR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 217 and Benigno S. Montera, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to enjoin further
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66607-08, and to annul the Order, dated
August 27, 1996, of Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, which
denied petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations.
Petitioner Judy Carol L. Dansal was the Department Manager of the Enforcement,
Investigation, and Prosecution Department of the National Food Authority ("NFA"), with
office address at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City. Petitioner Rafael T. Flores was
the Assistant Manager of the said department of NFA. Petitioner Herminio C. Elizon was
the chief of the Security Division of the same department of NFA, while Petitioner
Arnulfo S. Soloria was a security officer of the said department of NFA. Respondent
Benigno S. Montera, on the other hand, was employed with the Enforcement,
Investigation, and Prosecution Department of NFA.
[1]

On December 16, 1991, respondent Montera filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging the herein petitioners and one Ronaldo Vallada, a
casual security guard of NFA, with the offense of estafa through falsification of public
document.
On January 14, 1992, petitioners were required by the Office of the Ombudsman to
submit their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence. Petitioners
complied. On April 1, 1992, respondent Montera sent in a reply-affidavit.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner Dansal was directed to submit her verified answer to
respondent Monteras additional charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019.
On September 9, 1992, petitioner Dansal submitted her answer with a counter-charge.
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Dansal filed her rejoinder to respondent Monteras
reply-affidavit, after which the cases were ripe for resolution.
[2]

On May 30, 1994, or after one (1) year and four (4) months, the office of the
Ombudsman came out with its Resolution, copy of which petitioners allegedly received
on February 5, 1996. Said Resolution ruled:
[3]

"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that

respondents Judy Carol Dansal, Rafael Flores, Herminio Elizon, Arnulfo
Soloria, Ronaldo Vallada be prosecuted for one count of estafa through
falsification of public document.
In addition thereto, a separate information for violation of Section 3(e) of
R. A. No 3019 be filed against respondent Judy Carol Dansal alone while
the additional charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No 3019 against
the other respondents be dismissed for lack of merit."
[4]

On May 13, 1996, after the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
aforesaid cases were referred to the deputized prosecutor of Quezon City, together with
two Informations, dated October 20, 1995 and January 15, 1996, respectively, accusing
Judy Carol L. Dansal of estafa through falsification of public document, and violation of
Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019; and the other petitioners of estafa through falsification
of public document.
[5]

On July 18, 1996, petitioners interposed a Motion to Quash, contending that the delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation violated their constitutional rights to due
process and to a speedy disposition of their cases.
[6]

On August 27, 1996, the respondent court denied the said motion, ruling thus:
"After careful evaluation of the grounds raised by the accused in their
Motion to Quash viz--viz the Opposition filed by the prosecution, finding no
basis in fact and in law to warrant the quashal of the two informations
against the accused, as there appears no unreasonable delay in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation amounting to violation of the
accuseds constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of
the cases, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED. Reset the arraignment
and pre-trial anew on November 25, 1996 at 8:30 oclock in the morning."
[7]

Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition under Rule
65 with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
theorizing that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH,
FINDING NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW TO WARRANT THE
QUASHAL OF THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS AGAINST THE
PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHEN HE ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT
THERE APPEARS NO UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF
THE PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND
TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASES."
[8]

On December 18, 1996, without giving due course to the Petition, the Court required the
respondents to comment and denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order.
[9]

In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, the Solicitor General recommended
the granting of the petition.
[10]

The accusation against the petitioners is based on the "Affidavit of Complaint" alleging
that petitioners falsified the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ronaldo Vallada, by
making it appear that the latter reported for work during the month of July 1991 when, in
truth and in fact, he did not so report, and that the petitioners collected the amount of
P2,244.04 paid on the basis of the falsified DTR.
In their answer, petitioners countered that the imputation against them is a mere
harassment by complainant Benigno S. Montera, so as to silence, embarrass and
destroy their (petitioners) credibility, and that the complainant lodged the complaint
because prior to the filing thereof, petitioner Dansal initiated an investigation of the
complainant for alleged irregularities involving the latters daily time record, which
investigation was set by petitioner Dansal after Ronaldo Vallada admitted having
illegally punched in the Bundy Clock the DTRs of several employees and the
complainant, who requested him to do so, and as a result, an administrative case was
instituted against the complainant before the Director for Legal Affairs, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1-05-92 for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
[11]

Placing reliance on the ruling in the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, petitioners seek
redress for what they theorized upon as a violation of their right to due process and
[12]

speedy disposition of their cases by reason of the alleged unreasonable delay of the
preliminary investigation against them.
The petition is barren of merit.
To begin with, the petition is flawed by the failure of petitioners to move for
reconsideration of the assailed Order. Settled is the rule that, except in some
recognized exceptions, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non to the filing of a petition for certiorari. The rationale behind the rule is to give the
respondent court an opportunity to correct its supposed mistake and to rectify its
questioned Order.
[13]

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies"
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid
constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of
justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case";
includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords
broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial.
It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only
the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision
applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.
[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

Section 16 was first given flesh and blood in the Tatad case, which also involved a
petition seeking to reverse an order of the trial court denying a motion to quash the
Information. Applying Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the Court opined in
that case:
"x x x We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence
to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the
fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process
clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973

and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the

petitioners constitutional rights."
[18]

But the concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term
and a flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay.
[19]

In the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by petitioners has
been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason
thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such
delay. The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a partys right to present evidence and either in a plaintiffs
being non-suited or the defendants being pronounced liable under an ex parte
judgment.
[20]

[21]

The Court believes, and so holds, that the aforecited doctrine laid down in Tatad vs.
Sandiganbayan is inapplicable in light of the attendant facts and circumstances in this
case. Records disclose that the original complaint against petitioners was brought
before the Office of the Ombudsman on December 16, 1991. The same was deemed
submitted for resolution on January 15, 1993. On May 30, 1994, the investigator issued
a Resolution finding a probable cause, which finding was later approved by the
Ombudsman. Petitioners were furnished a copy of the said Resolution on February 5
and 6, 1996. On June 30, 1996 were filed the Information dated October 20, 1995,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, and the other Information dated January
15, 1996, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608.
[22]

The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more than
one year and four months to finish. But such a happenstance alone, or any like delay,
for that matter, should not be cause for an unfettered abdication by the court of its duty
to try cases and to finally make a determination of the controversy after the presentation
of evidence. In Francisco Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court had this to
say:
[23]

"While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly
from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always
zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not
attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally
important right to public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a
result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to
us that the delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the
accused but the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed

to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was
not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of
factual basis, we hold it proper and equitable to give the parties fair
opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the
premises."
The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not operate as to
deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases or
generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair
opportunity to present their side.
Contrary to the stance of the Solicitor General, the delay adverted to in the cases under
consideration does not measure up to the unreasonableness of the delay of disposition
in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, and other allied cases. It cannot be said that the petitioners
found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of the delay
and without more.
In Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan et al., this Court ruled that:
[24]

"x x x the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when, without
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such
factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by
the delay. The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not
be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right
to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case"
From the facts and circumstances at bar, the Court cannot glean any grave abuse of
discretion tainting the denial by the respondent court of petitioners motion to quash.

The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him. But such
duty should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of
thoroughness and correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the
nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient
government service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of government
personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.
[25]

As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, the Rules of Procedure of the

Ombudsman do not specifically prescribe a period within which a criminal complaint
may be investigated and decided. But the same Rules adopt the Rules of Court on
Preliminary Investigation, as modified by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman.
Under the Rules of Court, the Investigating Officer has ten (10) days from submission
of the case to come out with the resolution.
[26]

[27]

But it bears stressing that the period fixed by law is merely "directory", although it can
not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. The records of the
case do not show any such complete disregard. In like manner, the circumstances
averred in the petition do not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
performance by the Ombudsman of his functions, especially those involving the review
of numerous resolutions and recommendations of his investigating officers.
[28]

In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full blown trial
where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law and/or other
constitutionally guaranteed rights. But here, the Court finds none.
[29]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the respondent Regional Trial Court is
hereby ordered to attend with dispatch to the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607,
entitled"People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal, Rafael T. Flores, Herminio
T. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria", and Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608, entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal". No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1253. July 11, 2001]

Spouses KIAT & TERESA REAPORT, petitioners, vs. Judge EFREN S.

MARIANO, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2, Zamboanga
City, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Justice delayed is justice denied. A magistrate who deliberately consents to or abets

needless, groundless and obviously unmeritorious motions for postponement, especially in
ejectment cases, is administratively liable.
Statement of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition[1] filed by Spouses Kiat and Teresa Reaport praying for the
REMOVAL/DISCHARGE from office and/or other disciplinary sanctions against Judge Efren S.
Mariano of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 2. The Petition stems from his
alleged violation of Section 7 of the New Rules on Summary Procedure and Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Facts

The facts in the present case are aptly summarized in the Court Administrators
Report[2] dated November 16, 1999, as follows:
xxxxxxxxx

Complainants, x x x allege that:

a. On March 6, 1995, they, together with Spouses Nilo and Lourdes Uro, filed an ejectment case
(unlawful detainer) against Spouses Guillermo B. Natividad, Jr. and Elsie C. Natividad with
the MTC, Zamboanga City. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4862, and
later raffled to Branch 2 of the said court presided by respondent;
b. On April 25, 1995, summons under the New Rule on Summary Procedure and copies of the
complaint were duly served on defendants;
c. On May 3, 1995, defendants filed their Answer;
d. In an Order dated July 4, 1995, respondent set the subject ejectment case for preliminary
conference on July 26, 1995 or exactly eighty-four (84) days after the answer of the
defendants was filed;

e. On July 24, 1995, defendants filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that the
ejectment case be suspended or held in abeyance on the ground that there [was] a case (Civil
Case No. 4406) pending before the RTC, Branch 12, Zamboanga City involving the same
parties;
f. On November 6, 1995, respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the subject ejectment case
for lack of jurisdiction although the defendants only prayed for the suspension of the
proceeding therein and said dismissal was appealed with the RTC, Zamboanga;
g. In a Resolution dated March 10, 1996, Judge Vicente L. Cabatingan, RTC, Branch 15,
Zamboanga City reversed and set aside the aforesaid Order, holding that:

. . . firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action

questioning the ownership of property will not abate
ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments
therein. The rationale for the rule is that an ejectment suit
involves only the issue of material possession or possession
de facto. There may be identity of the parties and subject
matter but not of the cause of the action or the relief prayed
for. (San Pedro vs. CA, 235 SCRA 145, 146);
h. On April 23, 1996, the MTC, Branch 2, Zamboanga City received the complete records of the
subject ejectment case from the appellate court (RTC, Branch 15, Zamboanga City); and
i. From April 23, 1996, up to the present (March 1997), or for a period of eleven (11) months,
respondent Judge made a mockery of the New Rules on Summary Procedure by setting the
subject ejectment case several times for preliminary conference, only to cancel the same
upon motion/s for postponement/resetting filed by the defendants.

Complainants assert that respondent Judge is guilty of violating the

mandate of Sections 7 and 19 (i) of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. According to them, the Order of the respondent Judge
setting the preliminary conference only on July 26, 1999 or exactly
eighty-four (84) days after the Answer was filed on May 3, 1995,
contravened the provision of Section 7, supra, which provides thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later
than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases

shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent

with the provisions of this Rule.
In addition, complainants alleged that for almost two (2) years or
from May 3, 1995 up to March 1997, no preliminary conference took
place.
Finally, complainants allege that the act of the respondent of
granting several motions for postponement/resetting of the
scheduled preliminary conference on the ground that the defendants
counsel, Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Sr., was sick without any medical
certificate attesting to such fact, as required by the Rules of Court,
violated the provision of Section 19 (i), supra, prohibiting dilatory
motions for postponement. Complainants further assert that
defendants counsel was not Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Sr. but the law
partnership of Castillo and Castillo and that even if in reality Atty.
Castillo, Sr. was sick, the preliminary conference could have taken
place with another member of the firm in attendance.
xxxxxxxxx

Respondent argued that the material allegations in the complaint

[were] false, baseless and malicious. He admitted that although
there was delay in the proceedings, the same was not his fault. In
support of his argument he alleged that:
3. The fact and truth of the matter being that petitioners and
counsel contributed [i]n great measure to such delay because (a)
petitioners complete address in Metro Manila [had] not [been] given
or indicated in the Complaint for ejectment, for the purpose of
notice; (b) their lawyer, Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, when he left the City
of Zamboanga to run [for] his dear life never left any forwarding
address nor that of his clients[,] and lawyers in Zamboanga City
could not provide the court with the desired information; (c) Atty.
Abelardo A. Climaco, Jr. entered his appearance for plaintiff Spouses
Nilo C. Uro and Lourdes Uro only and he informed the court that he
[did] not have the other plaintiffs, petitioners herein, and he [did]

not have the address of Atty. Balicanta in Manila nor that of the
other plaintiffs in Manila. The undersigned does not know the
petitioners and does not remember having seen them in his court.
4. Atty. Rosendo M. Castillo, Sr., attorney-in-fact and counsel for the
defendants in the ejectment suit, suffered a stroke and was
hospitalized at the Zamboanga A.E. Colleges Community Hospital,
for many days, and up to now, has not fully recovered from his
illness;
5. The court tried to know and get the exact address of petitioners in
Manila to send them notices, as well as their lawyer, but to no avail,
as no lawyer here could furnish information on the matter;
xxxxxxxxx

7. The subject ejectment case was called several times for pre-trial
conference, but had to be postponed due to the absence of counsels
and parties (petitioners and defendants), and on those occasions,
only Mr. Nilo C. Uro was present, but he never informed the court of
the exact address of his co-plaintiffs in [M]anila, much less of the
fact that he was designated as their attorney-in-fact. What more, no
objection was interposed to the motions for postponement and the
court granted them in the interest of justice. Atty. Climaco also
requested x x x postponements;
8. On February 11, 1997, Atty. Climaco registered objection to the
motion for postponement filed by Atty. Rosendo U. Castillo, Jr. after
the court asked him if he was not objecting to the motion because
the court desire[d] to terminate the proceedings at the earliest
possible time because of the many cases he ha[d] to attend to;
9. Again, it was only on March 25, 1997 [that] for the first time, x x x
plaintiff Nilo C. Uro brought out and submitted to his counsel, Atty.
Climaco, in open court, a copy of the Special Power of Attorney
executed in his favor by the petitioners on July 24, 1995. Apparently,
there [was] some kind of concealment of material facts done with

evil intent to leave the court in limbo and them blame the Judge for
the delay.
Respondent asserts that his integrity, competence and
independence of mind were attested to by his record as a lawyer
and as a judge. According to him, thirteen (13) lawyers
recommended him to the City Mayor for appointment to the position
of City Legal Officer, resulting in his appointment as such. The IBP,
Zamboanga City Chapter, recommended him for appointment to the
Judiciary. The RTC and MTC judges and the City Prosecutor of
Zamboanga City certified to his moral character, competence and
independence of mind.
Respondent alleges that the filing of the instant administrative
complaint against him was done in order that herein complainants[]
counsel, Atty. Balicanta, could get back at him since he suffered
some setbacks in his court.
Finally, respondent avers that the subject ejectment case had
already been decided by him on May 27, 1997.[3]
In his Memorandum-Report, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo made the
following evaluation:

It is evident from the record that respondent does not deny the fact
that he had set the preliminary conference, for the first time, 84
days after the filing of the defendants answer. Neither does he deny
the fact that no preliminary conference was conducted for two years
after the issues had been joined with the filing of the answer. This
delay, complainants lament, was principally caused by respondents
grant of the many motions for postponement filed by Atty. Rosendo
Castillo, Jr., of the Castillo and Castillo Law Offices. These motions
were grounded on the alleged continued illness of Rosendo Castillo,
Sr., of the same law firm, who had originally appeared for said
defendants.

Had respondent been more aware of the purposes underlying the

adoption of the Summary Procedure in first level courts, he would
not have countenanced such long delay. It certainly was within his
powers to order Atty. Castillo, Jr. to appear for the defendants since
the latter were being represented by a law firm to which he
belonged. Or he could have validly required the said defendants to
secure the services of a substitute counsel considering that the date
of the recovery of their counsel was not certain.
xxxxxxxxx

That respondent violated the provisions of Section 19 of the Rule on

Summary Procedure is patent. One of the prohibited pleadings and
motions listed by said rule is [a] dilatory motion for
postponement. The repeated grant of the defendants motions for
postponement based on the ground that their counsel was ill, can be
clearly characterized as dilatory and as such were prohibited
pleadings under the rule referred to above. This [was] aggravated
by the fact that respondent did not require the presentation of the
medical certificate under oath attesting to the counsels inability to
attend trial.
The inordinate liberality of respondent in granting the repeated
motions for postponement based on the same ground, which
resulted in his failure to terminate the preliminary conference for
two years, effectively set at naught the very purpose of adopting the
summary procedure in ejectment cases where the continued
occupation of the disputed premises results in irreparable damages
to the person who may be ultimately entitled to its
possession. Respondent, by his inaction, had brought this result
about. For this failure, he must be disciplined.[4]
The court administrator then made this recommendation:

x x x [A] FINE in the amount of P5,000.00 [should] be imposed on

respondent Judge Efren S. Mariano for his failure to observe the Rule

on Summary Procedure, with a warning that a repetition of the same

or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely.[5]
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the court administrator.

Petitioners contend that respondent judge contravened Sections 7 and 19 (i) of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure by setting the preliminary conference relative to their complaint
for ejectment[6] 84 days after the Answer[7] was filed. Moreover, the holding of the preliminary
conference was postponed several times and was finally held only after almost two
years. Section 7, however, requires that such conference should be held not later than 30 days
after the last answer has been filed.
For his part, respondent maintains in his Comment [8] that the delay complained of was not
his fault, but was due to petitioners failure to indicate their full address in their Complaint. Also,
their counsel, Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, had not left any forwarding address when he left
Zamboanga City. Likewise, counsel for the defendants, Atty. Rosendo M. Castillo Sr., had asked
for several postponements because of illness.
After due consideration of all attendant circumstances, this Court finds respondent guilty of
violating Sections 7 and 19 (i) of the Rules on Summary Procedure. We quote Section 7 below:

Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. - Not later

than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary
conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases
shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference
shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant
who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not
apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common

cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at

the preliminary conference.
Section 19 (i) reads as follows:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings,

motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by
this Rule:
xxxxxxxxx

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement; x x x.

Respondent does not deny that after the last Answer had been filed, the preliminary
conference was first set only after 84 days and actually held only after almost two years. He was
duty-bound to comply with the summary rules, considering that their very purpose is the speedy
disposition of cases falling under the procedure. Yet, his actions clearly and directly contravened
them.
Consequently, respondent also violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that judges should administer justice without delay. Delay in the
disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges
are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them.[9]
The flimsy explanations of respondent do not detract from his liability, considering the very
long delay incurred. More important, the delay could have been avoided had he exercised more
diligence and determination in disposing of the case.
Although the Rules provide that notice should be served on both counsel and parties, the
requirement is deemed to have been complied with when notice is served on the counsel of
record, who in turn is bound to inform the client or else be liable for administrative sanctions. In
the alternative, the absent plaintiffs could have been declared non-suited and the preliminary
conference held with the rest of the plaintiffs in appearance.
Respondent judge should not have accommodated so many Motions for Postponement filed
by the then ailing Atty. Rosendo Castillo Sr. Because a law firm (Castillo & Castillo), to which
the latter belonged, was really representing the defendants, there certainly were other competent
lawyers who could have handled the matter. Respondent, however, continued to entertain and
grant several Motions for Postponement based on the same ground. He did not even ascertain the
gravity of counsels illness or require the presentation of a medical certificate.

Respondent judge was instead quite liberal, too liberal, in granting postponements which
greatly contributed to the long delay in the disposition of petitioners ejectment suit. In Arquero v.
Mendoza,[10] this Court said that when the motion for postponement based on illness is not
supported by documentary evidence such as a medical certificate, the grant of postponement is
without sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Efren S. Mariano is hereby found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and ORDERED to pay a fine of P5,000 for failure to comply with the Rules on
Summary Procedure. He is sternly warned that the commission of the same or a similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1502. August 6, 2003]

ANASTACIO E. GAUDENCIO, complainant, vs. Judge EDWARD D.

PACIS, MTC, Branch 3, Marilao, Bulacan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Complainant Anastacio E. Gaudencio filed charges against respondent Judge

Edward D. Pacis of the Municipal Trial Court of Marilao, Bulacan, Branch 3, for
inefficiency, absenteeism and incompetence.
In a letter-complaint dated June 30, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief
Justice, complainant states that he has a case dragging on for years before the sala of
respondent. Complainant attributes the delay to respondents constant resetting of
hearings, inefficiency, absenteeism and inexpertise in the field of law.
[1]

In his comment dated October 4, 1999, respondent characterizes the complaint to

be a mere demolition job against him. Respondent avers that the alleged complainant is
a fictitious person; he is neither a party nor a witness in any of the cases pending in his
sala. Respondent denies having been absent, except when he attended a monthly
meeting conducted by the Executive Judge of Malolos, Bulacan. He disclaims re-setting
an arraignment, except when an accused has no lawyer and asks for one of his own
choice. Respondent adds that the only instances when pre-trial and trial of cases are
[2]

reset are when witnesses are absent, or when the public prosecutor is absent. In both
cases the re-setting is always with the acquiescence of the parties, respondent states.
On the matter of his caseload, respondent explains that he has inherited 766 cases
from his predecessor and that about 40 to 100 cases are added monthly. He explains
that as of October 4, 1999, he had 593 pending cases, which he avers to be very low
compared to [those in] other first class municipalities. As to his schedule, he says he
conducts preliminary investigations daily from Monday to Friday, subject to the
availability of witnesses. For civil cases, he holds hearings on Mondays, Tuesdays and
Wednesdays, or any day except Thursday, subject to the availability of the parties and
counsels, or as agreed upon by both parties.
[3]

Then Court Administrator, Alfredo Benipayo, referred the complaint and respondents
comment to Executive Judge Danilo Manalastas of the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, for
investigation, report and recommendation. For the investigation, Judge Manalastas
sought the assistance of Mario F. Fumera, Jr., Court Interpreter of the RTC, Branch 7,
Bulacan, who posed as a representative of a litigant. The staff of respondent informed
Mr. Fumera that respondent conducts preliminary investigations every Monday, Tuesday
and Wednesday, hears civil and criminal cases every Thursday, while Friday is a free
day.
[4]

In a follow-up report dated October 11, 1999, the investigating judge confirmed his
initial report that respondent is usually absent on Friday; he holds hearings of civil and
criminal case only every Thursday, conducts preliminary investigations only in the
morning of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and leaves his office afterwards. Further,
the investigating judge found that respondent regularly sets more than thirty cases for
the once a week hearing on Thursday mornings, but only two or three of these cases
are actually heard for each sitting due to time constraints. The investigating judge
reported he interviewed law practitioners in Bulacan, they characterized respondent as
indifferent in regard to disposing speedily cases pending before his sala. Finally, Judge
Manalastas recommended an audit of cases pending before the MTC of Marilao,
Bulacan, to be conducted by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator to find
out the actual number of the backlog of cases in respondents court.
[5]

Deputy Court Administrator Jose Perez seconded Judge Manalastas

recommendation for the conduct of judicial audit. According to DCA Perez, said audit
will lay the basis as to whether or not Judge Pacis should be held administratively liable.
He adds that in respondents six years as a judge, this is not respondents first brush
with an administrative complaint. In OCA IPI No. 01-1092-MTJ entitled Abelardo S.M.
Rosales vs. Judge Edward D. Pacis, still pending investigation, the latter was charged
with Gross Ignorance of Procedure.
[6]

By order of this Court, Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo organized an audit

team to conduct a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases pending before
respondents sala. In his report dated March 10, 2000, the Court Administrator
enumerates the irregularities found in respondents sala:
(a.1) failure to decide Civil Cases Nos. 814 to 816 within the reglementary period to
decide;
(a.2) failure to set in the court calendar or take further action after lapse of considerable
period of time the following Civil Cases Nos.: 831, 811, 875, 918, 872, and
914;
(a.3) failure to resolve the following criminal cases after the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, to wit: 99-520, 99-521, 99-558, 99-388, 99-532, 99526, 99-529, 99-501, 99-502, 99-547, 99-548, 99-482, and 99-465 to 99475;
(a.4) failure to observe the guidelines set forth under paragraph no[s]. I and IV,
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 specifically on the
observance of session hours and adherence to the policy on avoiding
postponements;
(a.5) not holding court session [o]n the following dates: October 1, 8, 14, 15, 22,
November 5, 12, 16, 19, 26 and December 3, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29,
all in the year 1999;

xxx
The Court Administrator also reported that respondent failed to:
xxx

(b) Undertake the appropriate action, pursuant to

Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993,
re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases, on the following
criminal cases with pending warrant of arrest, to wit: 99268 to 99-270, 99-091, 99-104, 99-054, 99-082, 99-017 to
99-033, 99-258, 9983, 9534, 9964, 10005 to 10008, 99050, 99-088, 99-218 and 99-080.
[7]

As summarized by the Court Administrator, hereunder is the corresponding

explanation of the respondent:

a. Failure to decide Civil Case Nos. 814 and 815 to 816 within the
reglementary period - he stated that Civil Case No. 814 was decided
on July 24, 1997 and Civil Case Nos. 815 and 816 were decided on
21 July 1997 by the then Acting Judge Amante Bandayrel.
b. Failure to set in the court calendar or take further action after
lapse of considerable period of time Civil Case Nos. 831, 811, 875,
918, 872 and 914 - Judge Pacis gave the following explanations to
wit:
(b.1) In Civil Case Nos. 831, 811 and 872 which involves collection
cases, the plaintiff corporation was given authority to serve the
corresponding summons to the defendants.
(b.2) Anent Civil Case Nos. 875 and 918 plaintiffs representatives
were given authority to cause the service of summons to the
defendants.
In all the above-mentioned cases Judge Pacis reasoned out that
during the time of the judicial audit and physical inventory of cases
conducted, no returns have yet been made by the plaintiffs
representatives so he could not act on these cases yet.
(b.3) With regard to Civil Case No. 914 according to Judge Pacis, the
same has been decided on 26 June 2000.
c. Failure to resolve the following Criminal Cases after the conclusion
of the preliminary investigation to wit: 99-520, 99-521, 99-558, 99388, 99-532, 99-526, 99-529, 99-501, 99-502, 99-547, 99-548, 99482 and 99-465 to 99-475 - these cases were still under preliminary
investigation during the months of November and December 1999
and the accused on these cases were given ample time within which
to file their respective counter-affidavits and supporting documents,
accordingly, the court has to wait or defer further action on the
cases before concluding the preliminary investigation.

d. Failure to observe guidelines set forth under paragraph Nos. I and

IV, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated 15 January 1999
specifically on the observance of session hours and adherence to
the policy on avoiding postponements and for unduly granting
motion for postponements or repeated resetting in court calendar these alleged infractions should not be taken against him due to the
following:
(d.1) The Assistant Prosecutor assigned in his sala is available only
for one-half (1/2) a day a week and only in the afternoon, and the
worst part of it is that most of the time she fails to appear during the
scheduled trial/hearing, thus, reducing the number of sessions in a
month from two (2) days to one and one-half (1 1/2) days a month.
(d.2) There are only few practicing lawyers who appear in his court
and the public attorney assigned to his court usually moves for a
resetting of the trial.
(d.3) The trial/hearing were also reset by mutual agreement of the
parties.
(d.4) A case has to be postponed also because the parties have not
received their respective notices on time, most especially when
notices were sent thru the post office.
(d.5) The Police Officers who were tasked to cause the services of
the notices, subpoenas/summons are no longer given the privilege
to use the free postage mailing thus the court encounters the
difficulty of waiting for the return of service.
(d.6) There are also instances when court processes were served by
the Process Server and returned with a notation that the addresses
cannot be found at the given address or unknown within the
community.
e. Relative to not holding court sessions on the following
dates: October 1, 8, 14, 15, 22, November 5, 12, 16, 19, 26 and

December 3, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29 all in the year 1999, he
stated that:
(e.1) October 1, 8 and 22; November 5, 12, 19 and 26 and
December 17, 1999, these dates fell on a Friday and were supposed
to be motion day but lawyers still prefer to appear in the Regional
Trial Court. Counsels of litigants, particularly in civil cases prefer
Monday to Wednesday and refuse to set any hearing on these dates.
The court accordingly cannot set any hearing/trial or motions on the
criminal cases because of the unavailability of an Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, who is available on a Thursday afternoon.
(e.2) On October 14 and 15, he attended the Philippine Trial Judges
League Convention held in Bacolod City where he is the Public
Relations Officer and convention coordinator.
(e.3) On November 16, the court held a hearing regarding Civil Case
No. 810 entitled Teodorico Rivera vs. Pedro Manalang.
(e.4) December 3 this was the date set for the Oath Taking of the
Officers of the Philippine Trial Judges League where he is a
coordinator and the Public Relations Officer.
(e.5) December 16, was the date set for the Christmas Party of the
Municipal Trial Court Judges of the Province of Bulacan.
(e.6) December 21, 22, 27 and 29, the lawyers refused to set their
cases for hearing/trial however according to Judge Pacis the court
set a pre-trial in December 23 but the parties failed to appear. He
added that on December 28, a B.P. 22 case was set for clarificatory
hearing.
f. Relative to the directive to Judge Pacis to undertake the
appropriate action, pursuant to Administrative Circular 7-A-92 dated
21 June, 1993 re: Guidelines in Archiving of Cases with pending
warrant of arrest to wit: 99-268 to 99-270, 99-091, 99-104, 99-054,

99-082, 99-017 to 99-033, 99-258, 9983, 9534, 9964, 10005 to

10008, 99-050, 99-088, 99-218 and 99-080 he informed the Court of
the following action he had taken:
(f.1) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-091, 99-104, 99-054, 99-218, 9983 and
9534 were archived on February 4, 2000;
(f.2) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-082, 99-258, 99-080, 99-050, 9964,
10005 to 10008 were archived on April 4, 2000;
(f.3) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-268 to 99-270 were not archived
because after the judicial audit conducted on 6 January, 2000, a
motion for issuance of an alias warrant was filed by the Private
Prosecutor and the accused was arraigned and the case is still
active;
(f.4) Criminal Case No. 99-017 and 99-033 were not also archived
because after judicial audit, accused posted bail bond on 9 February
2000 and the pre-trial was terminated on 5 October 2000. The case
is still active.
(f.5) Criminal Case No. 99-088 was not archived but forwarded to
RTC, Malolos, Bulacan on 12 January 2000.
[8]

On September 3, 2001, considering the abovecited explanations of Judge Pacis

and Ms. Esguerra, the OCA recommended that the explanations be deemed
satisfactory.Judge Edward D. Pacis was, however, advised to: (a) observe strict
adherence to the guidelines set forth under paragraphs I and IV of Administrative
Circular 3-99, dated January 15, 1999, and refrain from frequent granting of motions for
postponement; and (b) regularly conduct hearings to avoid giving the public the
impression that the Hon. Judge is remiss in the performance of his judicial functions.
[9]

It must be stressed in this regard that guidelines for trial courts have been
repeatedly circularized, precisely to obviate possible public misimpression concerning
the prompt conduct of judicial business.
Circular No. 13 issued on July 1, 1987, has set the Guidelines in the Administration
of Justice. In particular, Section 1 of the guidelines for trial courts states:

1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. - Punctuality in

the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative. Trial judges
should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of
service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial,
specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m.
as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme
Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of B.P. 129.
Early on, Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14, issued October 22, 1985,
similarly provides:

5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall hold
daily sessions from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted by a skeletal force, also on
rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent
matters.
Further, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 mandates the
Strict Observance Of Session Hours Of Trial Courts And Effective Management Of
Cases To Ensure Their Speedy Disposition. Thus-

To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must

be faithfully observed:
I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from 2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M.,
from Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to the
conduct of trial, while the hours in the afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the
conduct of pre-trial conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or
orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the merits, whenever rendered
necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circulars in
specified cases.

xxx
II. Judges must be punctual at all times.

xxx

IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and
needless delay.

xxx
VI. All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98, entitled
Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493 (An Act to Ensure a
Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes) issued by the Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
on 11 August 1998 and which took effect on 15 September 1998.

These cited circulars are restatements of fundamentals in the Canons of Judicial

Ethics which enjoin judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties,
recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are of value, and that if
the judge is not punctual in the performance of his functions, he sets a bad example to
the bar and tends to create public dissatisfaction in the administration of justice.
[10]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edward D. Pacis of Municipal Trial Court of

Marilao, Bulacan, Branch 3, is hereby ADVISED AND ADMONISHED to be more
prompt and conscientious in the performance of his duties, with the stern warning that
any repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[MTJ-02-1458. October 10, 2002]

SOCORRO R. HOEHNE, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN R.

PLATA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

On 4 August 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator received the lettercomplaint of complainant Socorro Hoehne charging respondent Judge Ruben R. Plata,
Presiding Judge of Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Santiago City, with delay

in resolving the motion for execution she filed in Civil Case No. I-261. The case is for a
sum of money and damages.
The procedural and factual antecedents in this matter are as follows:

On 13 February 1995, respondent Judge Plata rendered in Civil Case

No. I-261 a decision ordering the defendants Dr. Filipinas Abundo
and Atty. Marino A. Abundo, Sr., to pay jointly and severally plaintiff
JVE Lending Investor, represented by complainant Hoehne, (1) the
sum of P6,000 plus the stipulated interest at the rate of 5% per
month until fully paid; (2) the sum equivalent to 15% of the total
amount due as and for attorneys fees; and (3) the cost of the suit.
[1]

On 17 April 1998, the plaintiff, through counsel Atty. Arturo

Catacutan, filed a motion for the execution of the above judgment.
However, on 20 April 1998, defendant Atty. Abundo, on his own
behalf and on behalf of defendant Dr. Abundo, his wife, filed an
opposition to the motion. The opposition was based on the
following grounds: (1) the motion was not dated and did not contain
a notice of hearing in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court; (2) the issue of the exorbitant rate of interest raised
in defendants answer was not resolved in the decision; and (3) the
issue of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 116 should also be
resolved.
[2]

[3]

In his comment dated 3 September 1999, Judge Plata claimed that

the writ of execution prayed for by complainant Hoehne on behalf of
plaintiff JVE Lending Investor was already issued on 14 June 1999. Its
last lawyer, Atty. Cirilo Bravo, was furnished with a copy of the
writ. Judge Plata further asserted that the lack of communication
between complainant Hoehne and plaintiffs counsel was the cause
of her failure to be updated with the status of the case.
In her reply of 27 September 1999, complainant insisted that she
was diligent in following up the motion for execution; but she was
always told by the clerk of court to wait, as the writ was not yet
issued. She was not furnished with a copy of the writ; although she
received on 6 September 1999 copies of the alias writ of execution
and sheriffs return.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the instant
case be redocketed as an administrative matter and that Judge

Ruben R. Plata be ordered to pay a fine of P1,000 (per Section 11[b]

of Rule 140, Rules of Court) with stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
On 16 January 2002, we required the parties to manifest whether
they would submit this case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed by them. In her manifestation of 11 February 2002,
complainant Hoehne answered in the affirmative.
On 5 March 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Admit Supplementary
Pleading/Answer. He claims that he knows well that Atty. Marino Abundo

belongs to a different breed of law practitioners. He has the

penchant of filing cases against judges whenever he got disgruntled
by their orders or decisions. This is the spectre that constantly
looms over the mind of the respondent whenever he tackles a case
wherein Atty. Abundo has entered his appearance. One has to be
cautious, less [sic] he will be included in the ABUNDOs LIST.
He then elaborated on the procedural vicissitudes of the case relative to the motion for
execution of judgment. He alleged that an opposition thereto was filed by Atty.
Abundo.The motion for execution was set for hearing on 28 May 1998. The branch clerk
of court sent through registered mail notices of hearing to Atty. German Balot, the
plaintiffs original lawyer, and to the defendants. On that date only Atty. Abundo
appeared. Another hearing was set on 23 and 25 of June 1998. This time the notice of
hearing was sent to Atty. Arturo Catacutan by registered mail; Atty. Abundo, on the
other hand, received the notice of hearing personally. Yet, none of the parties
appeared on both dates. The hearing of the motion was further reset to 15 July 1998,
notices of which were served personally on Atty. Abundo, and by registered mail to Atty.
Catacutan. On that date only Atty. Abundo appeared. The hearing of the motion was
again reset to 23 September 1998. Only Atty. Catacutan appeared; he asked for ten
days within which to file his comment to the opposition filed by Atty. Abundo. Another
hearing was set on 29 October 1998, but despite prior notice none of the parties
appeared.
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Respondent Judge further explained that he waited for the comment of Atty.
Catacutan which the latter promised and undertook to submit. However, Atty. Catacutan
did not submit any.
The motion for execution was again set for hearing on 3 December 1998, 13
January 1999, 10 February 1999 and 23 March 1999. The notice of hearing sent to Atty.
Catacutan for the January hearing was returned with a notation on the face of the
envelope MOVED. Since then the clerk of court sent the notices to Atty. Catacutan at
his last known address. In all these settings Atty. Abundo and Atty. Catacutan did not
appear.
[8]

The court further set anew for hearing the motion for execution on 7 April 1999 and
12 May 1999. Atty. Cirilo Bravo entered his appearance for the plaintiff and asked for
the resetting of the hearing to 24 May 1999. The court set the hearing on 26 May
1999. A notice of that hearing was, however, mistakenly sent to Atty. Catacutan; hence
no hearing was conducted on said date.
[9]

[10]

Finally, a hearing of the motion was calendared on 14 June 1999. On that date Atty.
Bravo appeared, but Atty. Abundo did not. This time the motion was heard, and Atty.
Bravo submitted it for the resolution of the court. On that same date the respondent
Judge issued a writ of execution.
[11]

A Return of Writ of Execution with a Request for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution was submitted on 3 September 1999. Separate motions for the issuance of
an alias writ were filed by complainant Hoehne and Atty. Bravo, which were opposed
by Atty. Abundo. An alias writ of execution was issued on 16 September 1999.
[12]

[13]

[15]

[14]

[16]

Respondent Judge further asserted that the various settings for the hearing of the
motion for execution were made to give the parties the opportunity to ventilate their
cause and to comply with the requirements of due process. The delay in the resolution
of the motion was attributable to the parties themselves. The plaintiffs constant change
of lawyers which resulted in confusion in the mailing of the courts orders, notices of
hearing, and the writ also contributed to the delay.
From the foregoing antecedents, the culpability of respondent Judge for undue
delay in resolving the motion for execution, which amounted to gross inefficiency and
neglect of duty, is beyond dispute.
Defendants did not appeal from the respondents decision of 13 February 1995 in
Civil Case No. I-261. It had thus become final and executory. A motion for execution
was filed on 17 April 1998, to which an opposition was filed by the defendants on 20
April 1998. Respondent Judge should have heard the motion at the first instance it was
set for hearing, i.e., on 28 May 1998, the date fixed by the defendants in their
opposition. The resolution of the motion was a matter of duty on the part of the
respondent. It was not a complicated matter; he could not revise or modify the
judgment. The defendants could not ask for the reconsideration of the judgment, as
their time to do so or to move for relief from judgment or to appeal had already
lapsed. Despite all these, respondent Judge simply reset the hearing of the patently
uncontroversial motion for execution, thereby unduly prolonging the long journey of a
very simple case for recovery of a sum of money or payment of an indebtedness.
Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon judgment or order that disposes of the
action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal
has been perfected. After a decision has become final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the prevailing party.
[17]

Respondents attempt to take refuge behind both parties failure to appear during the
scheduled hearings of the motion deserves no merit. Judges should, at all times, remain
in full control of the proceedings and adopt a firm policy against improvident
postponements; more important, they should follow the time limit for deciding cases.

They should act with dispatch in resolving pending incidents so as not to frustrate and
delay the satisfaction of a judgment.
[18]

[19]

Respondent should have been attentive to his duty to enhance speedy

administration of justice. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods.
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated 15 January 1999 directs:

To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must

be faithfully observed:
...
IV. There should be [a] strict adherence to the policy on avoiding
postponements and needless delay.
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors, for
public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable,
the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party.
[20]

Noteworthy is respondent judges statement in his Motion to Admit Supplementary

Pleading/Answer that he knows well that Atty. Marino Abundo belongs to a different
breed of law practitioners [who] has the penchant of filing cases against judges
whenever he got disgruntled by their orders or decisions. Judge Plata should not have
succumbed to the tactics employed by Atty. Abundo. A judge cannot dispense justice
evenly when somebody can pressure him.
In the recent case of Monterola vs. Caoibes, Jr., this Court imposed the penalty of
fine in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000) for gross ignorance of
procedural law and unreasonable delay in the issuance of an order for the execution of
judgment.
[21]

That the respondent finally issued the writ of execution on 14 June 1999 is of no
moment because undue delay and prejudice had already been done. It may be recalled
that in A.M. No. 98-3-119-RTC, respondent was severely reprimanded for failure to act
with dispatch on the criminal and civil issues pending in his court. Accordingly, we adopt
the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, with the modification that
the penalty is hereby increased from P1,000 to P10,000.
[22]

Finally, it appears evident that Atty. Abundo used his opposition to the motion for
execution as a device to reopen the case or delay the execution of the decision which
had long been final and executory. This is a prima facie violation of Rule 12.04 of Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall not
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment, or misuse court processes.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds respondent Judge Ruben R.
Plata of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Santiago City, Isabela, liable for
unreasonable delay in the issuance of a writ of execution of a judgment, which amounts
to gross inefficiency and neglect of duty, and sentences him to pay a FINE of Ten
Thousand (P10,000) Pesos, with STERN WARNING that the commission of the same
or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Court further ORDERS Atty. Marino A. Abundo, Sr., to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice of this Resolution why he should not be administratively
sanctioned for violation of Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524
FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :
CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,

namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,

SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents. Promulgated :
September 14, 2005

x-----------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino,
Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an
action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land
Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners
and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among
these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the
respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest

Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the

respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by
public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing
motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents
Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was
granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the
respondent heirs of del Mundo because the substituted service of
summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to
dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only
after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of
del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial
court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare
allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial
proper.
In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order
of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15 th day thereafter or on
March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1,

1998, the trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five
days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal [4]and
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of
appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. [5] This was received
by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.[6]
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal
of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998
since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court
denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their
notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the
February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to

the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under
the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for
the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such
legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and
executory.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned

decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6,
2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules,
petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the
appellate court:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD
PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING
AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT
HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR
FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR

NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL

DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST]
ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES
DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL
ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY
PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA
280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING
THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND
THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within

which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often
leads to the loss of the right to appeal. [10] The period to appeal is
fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as amended,
provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the
notice of judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
the notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new
trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days

from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final
judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment
that dismisses an action.[12]
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1,
1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed
as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed
their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their
motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of

which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to
appealthe February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the
July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the
trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion
was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was
likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed
within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed
the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised
there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case
of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the order
denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final
order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view

that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the
start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in
fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice
of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial court.
On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998),
petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead opted to file a
motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only
interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period. [15] It ruled that
petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the
notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR.
Petitioners, however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules
to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period
to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this rule in
similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.
[17]

The rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public

policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the

judgments and awards of courts must become final at some definite
time fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving
upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30)
days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal
bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set
aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be
deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last
day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the
day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the
denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously

consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period
to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial
Reorganization[20] that drafted BP 129, the raison d etre behind the
amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the
efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have since required strict
observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal, [22] and only in very
exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority
v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is

an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure

should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on occasion advised
the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the
right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
free from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule,
periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed
unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice. There, we
condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due
course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful
of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the
Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with,
our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity
of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare
cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there
always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave
injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of
procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the
full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. [25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all
courts.[26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even

establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process,

and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals
to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43[28] and
45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to
afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. [30]
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasijudicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of
appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22,
1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for

reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule

41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be
taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order
appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It
should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes that
the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of
judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we
already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the
motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section
39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15
days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal

(in

this

case

March

3-18,

1998)

remains

and

the

requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15

days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or
rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted

from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of

notice of final order appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of
appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final
order)

denying

his

motion

for

new

trial

or

motion

for

reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed

of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or
five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was
well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
[34]

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso

(Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even
referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 142762. March 04, 2005]

LILANY YULO y BILLONES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513 and its Resolution dated March 16,
2000.
[1]

[2]

The facts, as culled from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals are:
Sometime in August 1992, Lilany B. Yulo, petitioner, and Josefina Dimalanta went to
the house of Myrna Roque, private complainant, in Caloocan City. Josefina, introduced
to Myrna petitioner Yulo as her best friend and a good payer. Josefina told Myrna that
petitioner wanted her checks encashed. In view of Josefinas assurance that petitioner is
trustworthy, Myrna agreed to encash the checks. Petitioner then issued to Myrna three
checks: (a) Equitable Bank (EB) Check No. 237936 in the amount of P40,000.00,
postdated September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No. 237941 in the amount of P16,200.00;
and (c) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 656602 in the amount
ofP40,000.00, postdated November 18, 1992.
When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks, they were
dishonored. The EB checks were Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, while the BPI check
was stamped Account Closed.
As Myrna did not know petitioners address, she immediately informed Josefina
about the dishonored checks. The latter told Myrna not to worry and repeated her
assurance that petitioner is her best friend and a good payer. Myrna tried to get
petitioners address from Josefina, but the latter refused and instead made the
assurance that she will inform petitioner that the checks were dishonored.

When no payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against petitioner

with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
On August 23, 1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan City
Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, same city, for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774, 44775, and 44776.
When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charges. The cases were then consolidated and jointly heard.
Petitioner admitted having issued the checks in question but claimed that she
merely lent them to Josefina. In turn, Josefina delivered the checks to her friend who
showed them to a jeweler as show money. It was understood that the checks were not
to be deposited. Petitioner vehemently denied having any transaction with Myrna.
Petitioner also claimed that that when she issued the checks, she knew she had no
funds in the banks; and that she was aware that the checks would be dishonored if
presented for payment.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused LILANY YULO y BILLONES,

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-44774, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to
indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of P16,200.00,
representing the face value of Equitable Bank Check No. 227941, and to pay the
costs;
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-44775, to an to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to
indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of P40,000.00,
representing the face value of Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 656602,
and to pay the costs;
(3) In Criminal Case No. C-44776, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to
indemnify the offended party Myrna Roque in the amount of P40,000.00,
representing the face value of Equitable Bank Check No. 237936, and to pay the
costs.

Pursuant to Rule 114, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, as

amended, the bail bond of the accused is cancelled and the accused
is hereby committed to the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.

[3]

Upon appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the Decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignments of error:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES;
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. EVEN IF THE
REQUISITES THEREFORE ARE NOT COMPLETE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH THE LATTERS DECISION WAS
BASED ON THE UNCORROBORATED, INCREDIBLE, AND UNNATURAL
STATEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ALTHOUGH THE TESTIMOMY OF
THE ACCUSED WAS SUPPORTED BY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE.[4]

The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals violated
petitioners right to a speedy trial; and (2) whether the same court erred in holding that
the prosecution has proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolved her motion
for reconsideration only after three (3) years from its filing. Such inaction violates her
right to a speedy disposition of her case.
In his comment, the Solicitor General counters that the Appellate Court has
explained satisfactorily why petitioners motion for reconsideration was not resolved
immediately.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:

SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of

their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all
officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the
concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In
applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances of each case.
[5]

[6]

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. To determine whether the right has been
violated, the following factors may be considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused;
and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
[7]

[8]

[9]

In the instant case, we agree with the Solicitor General that the delay was
sufficiently explained by the Court of Appeals. The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17513, Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the pendency of
petitioners motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997. However, the case was
assigned to Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on February 28, 2000 and
brought to her attention on March 2, 2000. We note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole
only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the motion. Clearly, she did not incur any
delay. We, therefore, rule that there has been no violation of the petitioners right to a
speedy trial.
On the second issue, petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Not all the elements of the offense of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 were adequately established. For one, Myrna Roque, private
complainant, did not send her any notice of dishonor. It was Josefina whom Myrna
contacted, not her. For another, petitioner merely lent the checks to Josefina to be
shown by her friend to a jeweler.
Petitioners arguments are simply untenable.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are: (1) the
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the

knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficient funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
[10]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution has proved all the
elements of the offense.
Petitioner admitted having issued the three dishonored checks for value. Her
purpose was to encash them. She also admitted that at the time she issued the checks,
she was aware that she had only P1,000.00 in her account with the Equitable Bank and
that her BPI account was already closed. Significantly, what Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
penalizes is the issuance of a bouncing check. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes, but the act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored
upon presentment for payment. The purpose for which the check was issued and the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance are immaterial. What is primordial is that
the issued checks were worthless and the fact of worthlessness was known to the
petitioner at the time of their issuance, as in this case. This is because under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.
[11]

[12]

We likewise find no reason to sustain petitioners contention that she was not given
any notice of dishonor. Myrna had no reason to be suspicious of petitioner. It will be
recalled that Josefina Dimalanta assured Myrna that petitioner is her best friend and a
good payer. Consequently, when the checks bounced, Myrna would naturally turn to
Josefina for help. We note that Josefina refused to give Myrna petitioners address but
promised to inform petitioner about the dishonored checks.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. Settled is the rule that
factual findings of the trial court which have been affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and will not be disturbed
absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances
which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. This exception is not present
here. That Myrna was the sole witness for the prosecution is of no moment. There is no
law requiring that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated. The rule in
this jurisdiction is that the testimony of witnesses is weighed, not numbered, and the
testimony of a single witness, if found trustworthy and credible, as in this case, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
[13]

[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 31, 1997 and its Resolution dated March 16, 2000, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513,

sustaining the Joint Decision of the trial court in Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774, C44775, and C-44776 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.