GAMBOA VS AGUIRRE AND ARANETA

FACTS:
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo Gamboa and
respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr. and Juan Araneta were leveled Negros
Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in
August 1995, the governor designated as Acting Governor for the duration of the
former's official trip abroad until his return. When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to
preside therein in view of his designation as acting governor and asked him to
vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, seven
members of the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four
others voted against it. Respondents filed before the lower court a petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the governor re-assumed his
office. The trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that
he is the acting governor. Petitioner filed a petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gamboa, while serving as acting governor, temporarily
relinquished the powers, fictions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor,
including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP
HELD:
Yes. The Local Government Code provides that the vice governor shall be the
presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the governor
and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case
of permanent vacancy. When the vacancy however is merely temporary, the vice
governor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations)
and perform the duties and functions of the governor.
When the vice governor exercises the powers and duties of governor, he does
not assume the latter's office. He only acts as the governor but does not become
the governor. His assumption of powers of the provincial chief executive does not
create a permanent vacancy in his position as vice governor. Thus, he does not
relinquish not abandon his position and title by merely becoming an acting
governor.
A vice governor who is concurrently an acting governor is actually a quasigovernor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives
and powers, he is deemed considered as a non member of the SP for the time
being. The offices of provincial governor and vice governor are essentially
executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform
functions partaking of a legislative character. This is clear from the law when it
provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the SP, which is the
legislative body of the province.
The governor is not included in the SP members and thus, local executive power

is vested alone in the governor.

Art. 49(b) of the Local Government Code provides that in the event of the inability
of the regular presiding officer to toe side at the sangguniang session, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. Therefore, the vice governor who became an acting
governor cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the office,
since the nature of it calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them
TALAGA VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was
conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was
challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga
disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which
Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already
served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
HELD:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently,
it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second
term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three
consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he
was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is
not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term
thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall
election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.
GANZON VS CA

FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary
of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based
on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about
600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA
affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local
autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present
Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego,
can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation,
and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a
mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein
it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration
law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from
this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of
supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by
imposing a 600 day suspension.