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Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 17

Alexander K. Koch

Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London

In addition to learning the material covered in the reading and the lecture, students should

know the meaning of the terms private and hidden information, symmetric and asymmetric information, as well as adverse selection;

understand the intuition underlying problems of adverse selection;

be able to derive market equilibria under complete information;

be able to derive market equilibria under imperfect but symmetric information;

be able to derive market equilibria under asymmetric information;

understand the efficiency consequences of adverse selection;

be able to identify real-world situations in which adverse selection occurs.

Required reading:

Akerlof, George A., 1970, The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market

mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488500.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533\%28197008\%2984\%3A3\%3C488\

%3ATMF\%22QU\%3E2.0.CO\%3B2-6

Supplementary reading:

Chapter 13: Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, 1995, Microeconomic Theory (Oxford University Press: Oxford).

E-mail: Alexander.Koch@rhul.ac.uk.

Introduction

In many economic situations there is uncertainty about the quality of products or other important characteristics. Often such a situation is characterized by hidden information: one

individual or a group of individuals has private information, i.e., is better informed about

economically relevant aspects than others. Examples are:

In a market it is often the case that the selling party has better information about the

product than the buying party.

A bank deciding on whether to grant a commercial loan to a customer typically knows

less than the customer about the customers business. In particular, this means that the

customer has a better idea than the bank about the riskiness of the loan, having more

precise information about the probability of the business becoming bankrupt and loan

not being (fully) recoverable.

An insurance company offering automobile liability policies typically knows less about

the driving skills and habits of its potential customers than they do.

Workers applying for a job typically have a clearer idea of their skills and work habits

than potential employers do.

Such information asymmetries can lead to a problem called adverse selection which may cause

markets to shut down partially or even fully, despite potential gains from trade. We will use

Akerlofs (1970)1 famous example of the used car market to illustrate the problem of adverse

selection. Suppose that there are only two types of cars, good cars and bad cars (lemons),

where the fraction of all cars that are lemons is = 1/2. Assume that buyers and sellers in

this market are risk-neutral and that there are more potential buyers than used cars. A buyer

would be willing to buy a good car for 10, 000 but only pay 5, 000 for a lemon. Suppose

that a seller would part with a good car for 9, 000 and with a lemon for 3, 000.

Consider first the situation where nobody knows whether a car is a lemon or not. Then, a

buyers willingness to pay for a car of average quality is

value to buyer of car = (value to buyer of a lemon) + (1 ) (value to buyer of a good car)

= 7, 500.

1

George Akerlof was awarded the 2001 Nobel Prize for this path-breaking paper together with Michael

A sellers reservation price is the value he or she attaches to a car of average quality,

E[value to seller of car] = (value to seller of a lemon) + (1 ) (value to seller of a good car)

= 6, 000.

Since there is Bertrand competition among buyers for used cars, the market price is 7, 500

and all sellers trade their cars.

Now consider the situation where the seller knows the quality of his or her car while buyers

cannot distinguish quality when they purchase a used car. Thus, the buyer must ask him or

herself Why is this person willing to sell the car to me? Suppose a car was offered at price

the buyer is willing to pay for a car of average quality, , 7, 500. Clearly all sellers with a

lemon would sell at that price. however, no seller with a good car would be willing to sell

since they would want to charge at least 9, 000. Thus, trade of used cars can only occur at a

price of 5, 000 and only lemons are traded. This leads to a loss of welfare since the potential

gain from trade of 1, 000 per good used car are not realized. Akerlof argues that adverse

selection might explain why there is a bigger difference in prices between new and used cars

than could plausibly be justified by the decline in usage value due to age.

With these ideas in mind, we will now turn to a model that puts a little more structure on

the problem of adverse selection. As we will see, with more quality levels adverse selection

can lead to a partial breakdown of markets despite potential gains from trade because of the

possibility of the bad [goods] driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out

the not-so-good Akerlof (1970, p. 490).

Model

Consider a market with m sellers (mathematically speaking, a mass of m) and (a mass of)

n > m buyers. Suppose that each seller owns one unit of a good. The quality of the sellers

goods is distributed according to distribution F on the interval [q, q], 0 < q < q. We will

assume that F is a uniform distribution2 , that is

0 f or

q<q

qq

F (q) =

qq f or q q q

1 f or

q > q

2

(1)

f (q) =

f or

q<q

f or q q q

f or

(2)

q > q

v(q, t) = q x + t

(3)

where x {0, 1} is the amount of the good owned, q is the quality of the good, and t is the

amount of money the seller has. That is, a seller who owns a good of quality q has a reservation

price of q.

Each buyer is interested in buying at most one unit of the good. Buyers maximize expected

utility with Bernoulli utility function

u(q, t) = q x + t.

(4)

That is, each buyer is willing to pay up to q for a good of quality q.4

2.1

Complete information

We start off analyzing the benchmark case where both buyers and sellers can observe the

quality of goods (complete information). Each quality level q is visible to buyers and thus can

be viewed as a separate market. Consider a seller who owns a good of quality q. She values

the good less than the buyers since q < q. Thus, there is a potential gain from trade of

(1 ) q.

Recall that an expected utility maximizer faced with a lottery described by the random variable

x

= (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ; p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ) has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function

n

X

U (

x) =

pi u(xi ),

i=1

where pi is the probability of outcome xi and u() is the agents Bernoulli utility function. If the lottery involves

a continuous random variable x

with outcome x [x, x

], distributed according to a distribution F with density

f , the expected utility is

U (

x) =

x

In this lecture we assume for simplicity that individuals are risk-neutral, i.e. u00 () = 0 and the von NeumannMorgenstern utility only depends on the expected value of the random variable describing possible outcomes.

4

We assume that buyers are not credit constrained so that they can pay any price p to acquire the good,

thus lowering their utility by p.

Let us first clarify what we mean, when we speak of an equilibrium in this context.

Definition 1 (Market equilibrium under complete information)

In a market equilibrium the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. All market participants maximize their utility, taking prices as given.

2. All markets q [q.

q ] clear:

X(p , q) = X s (p , q) = X d (p , q).

(MC)

The first condition states that all market participants are rational as well as self-interested and

operate under the assumption that their behavior does not affect prices. The second condition

is a standard market-clearing assumption: the number of goods traded in the market for

quality level q at the equilibrium price p , X(p , q), must equate the demand for goods at this

price, X d (p , q), with the supply of goods at this price, X s (p , q).

Since there are more potential buyers than there are goods (n > m), each seller can extract

the full surplus by charging a price of q for the good.5 Thus, in equilibrium the market will

clear at each quality level q at a price of p (q) = q and all goods change hands:

Z q

X(p (q), q) f (q) d q = m.

q

Note that the resulting allocation is Pareto-optimal since all gains from trade are realized,

and sellers are strictly better off than before while buyers are no worse off than if no trade

had occurred.6 The surplus created by trade under complete information (CI) is (see (6) for

derivation of E[q])

S CI =

m (1 ) q f (q) d q = m (1 ) E[q] = m (1 )

q

q + q

.

2

(5)

Proposition 1

Under complete information, in a market equilibrium

all goods are traded,

p (q) = q;

S CI = m (1 )

q+q

2 .

5

Buyers are in Bertrand competition with each other for the good since not all buyers demands can be

6

This also follows from the First Fundamental Welfare Theorem, which states that a competitive equilibrium

is necessarily Pareto optimal if markets are perfectly competitive and there is complete information (i.e., markets

are complete).

2.2

Now consider the situation where both buyers and sellers (symmetric information) do not know

the quality of a particular good (incomplete information) to be traded. Since the quality of

goods is not distinguishable by any market participant at the time of trade, they are perfect

substitutes and there will only be one price for all goods traded in the market (i.e., there

is only one market instead of markets q [q, q] under complete information). The expected

quality of a good owned by a seller is

Z

E[q] =

q f (q) d q =

q

q

q2 q 2

q2

q

dq =

=

q q

2 (

q q) q

2 (

q q)

(

q q) (

q + q)

q + q

.

=

2

2 (

q q)

(6)

q + q)/2.

Supply of goods

As long as the market price falls short of the sellers reservation price, E[q], no one will be

willing to sell. In contrast, all sellers will be happy to sell if the price exceeds their reservation

price, leading to supply m. If the market price equals the sellers reservation price, they are

indifferent between selling and not selling so that supply will be any amount between [0, m].

Thus, the supply of goods is

X (p)

=0

f or p < E[q]

[0, m] f or p = E[q]

=m

(7)

f or p > E[q]

What is the expected quality of goods supplied? Since information is symmetric, the expected

quality of goods that are supplied at price p, denoted by Q(p), is equal to the expected quality

of all goods owned by sellers, E[q] for any price p at which sellers are willing to sell. If no

goods are sold, the quality is not defined: it is not possible to compute the expected value of

nothing. Hence,

Q(p)

= E[q]

f or p E[q]

(8)

Buyers are not able to discriminate among the goods offered by sellers. However, they know

that sellers also cannot distinguish the quality of goods (symmetric information). Moreover,

buyers know the distribution of qualities across sellers, F , and are aware of the sellers preferences. Based on this information, buyers form beliefs about the expected quality of goods

sold in the market at the going price p, which we denote by Qe (p). If Qe (p) > p all n buyers

will want to buy a unit of the good since each would be willing to pay up to Qe (p) for it.

Thus, the amount demanded at these prices is X d (p) = n. In contrast, if Qe (p) < p no buyer

wants to purchase a good, leading to X d (p) = 0. Finally, if Qe (p) = p buyers are indifferent

between purchasing the good or not so that any level of demand X d (p) [0, n] is consistent

with maximizing behavior by buyers. To summarize,

=n

f or Qe (p) > p

X d (p)

[0, n] f or Qe (p) = p

=0

f or Qe (p) < p

(9)

Market equilibrium

We need to enrich our equilibrium concept to accommodate the incompleteness of information:7

Definition 2 (Market equilibrium under incomplete information)

In a market equilibrium the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. All market participants maximize their expected utility, taking prices as given.

2. Markets clear:

X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ).

3. Market participants have rational expectations:

Qe (p) =

q

otherwise

(MC)

(RE)

The last condition states that buyers correctly anticipate seller behavior and can therefore

compute the expected quality of goods offered in the market at any given price. This means

7

This definition ignores some technicalities. For our purposes this loose definition will suffice. A rigorous

definition of equilibrium requires a game-theoretic foundation. The model that we analyze belongs to the class

of games of incomplete information to which one usually applies the concept of Bayesian Equilibrium. Roughly,

it states that in equilibrium the actions of each individual are best responses to the equilibrium actions of the

other players (i.e., the equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium). Because information is incomplete the concept also

demands that players beliefs about those aspects of the game for which information is incomplete are logically

consistent (which means that players are good statisticians who can apply Bayes rule). See, for example,

Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 9 (Chapters 7-8 introduce the fundamental concepts of game

theory).

that Qe (p) = Q(p) for any price for which sellers are offering a positive amount of the goods.

For prices p for which no goods are offered Q(p) is not defined: it is not possible to compute

the expected value of nothing. Thus, rational expectations do not pin down values for

Q(p) in this case and we have a degree of freedom.

Our model allows for any price p 0. As we saw, seller behavior can be perfectly characterized

for any such price by (7). However, to characterize buyer behavior using (9) we need to assign

a value to Qe (p) for prices where X s (p) = 0. Since we want a complete model that gives

predictions on the behavior of buyers and sellers for all possible price levels, we resolve this

technical issue by adding an assumption. For prices at which no goods are offered beliefs are

simply set to the lowest possible quality level:

Assumption:

Qe (p) = q

X s (p) = 0.

There are expected gains from trade for all units of the good since the sellers reservation

prices are lower than the expected utility of buyers from owning the good: E[q] < E[q].

As under complete information, since n > m, each seller can extract the full expected surplus

by charging a price of p = Qe (p ) = Q(p ) = E[q] for the good. This satisfies condition (RE).

All sellers will sell their good at the equilibrium price so that X s (p ) = m. Because n > m > 0,

the only way to equalize supply and demand is at quantity X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ) = m.

This satisfies condition (MC): any demand between 0 and n i.e., also demand equal to m < n

is consistent with maximizing behavior because buyers are indifferent between buying and

selling at p = E[q]. The surplus created by trade under incomplete but symmetric information

(IS) is equal to the one under complete information: S IS = S CI . In our model we are taking

an ex ante viewpoint, where utilities are evaluated before quality becomes known. Thus, we

have an ex ante Pareto-optimal allocation.8

Proposition 2

Under incomplete but symmetric information, a market equilibrium exists in which

all goods are traded,

p = E[q] = (

q + q)/2;

S IS = S CI = m (1 )

q+q

2 .

8

Clearly, ex post a buyer who acquired a good that turns out to have quality q < p will be worse off than

if no trade had occurred (while the seller is better off) so that the equilibrium allocation will not be ex post

Pareto optimal as well.

share of all sellers for which q p/: F(p/)

F

F (1) = 1

p

F

p q

Q ( p ) = E [q q p / ]

Taking stock of our results so far, we see that introducing imperfect information per se does

not lead to inefficient outcomes. All gains from trade are realized despite uncertain quality.

What matters is whether information is symmetric or not. In the next section we will see that

inefficiencies may arise once information is asymmetric.

2.3

Asymmetric information

Under this scenario the seller knows the quality of the good she owns, q, while potential buyers

do not (asymmetric information). Since the quality of goods is not distinguishable by buyers,

all sellers goods are perfect substitutes to buyers. Thus, as in the last section there will be a

single market price for all goods traded in the market.

Supply of goods

Recall that the reservation price of a seller who owns a good of known quality q is q, 0 <

< 1. At a given market price p only sellers with a good for which p q are willing to

sell. This is equivalent to q p/. Thus, at price p all sellers who own a good of quality no

bigger than p/ sell, while all other sellers hold on to their good. Figure 1 illustrates how to

obtain the share of sellers who are willing to sell at price p in the population of sellers. The

9

left panel plots the density function f . All sellers who own a good with quality not exceeding

p/ make up a fraction of the total population m equal to the ratio of the small hatched

box to the larger one that contains it. The surface of each of these boxes can be read off the

distribution function F . For example, the large box has a total surface equal to one, F (

q ) = 1,

since all sellers (mass m) own a good of quality that does not exceed the maximum possible

quality q. Thus, the distribution function F allows us to directly measure the proportion of

the population of sellers (total mass m) for whom q p/ as

p/

Z

F (p/) =

f (q) dq.

q

F for the uniform distribution is given in (1) and allows us to compute the quantity of goods

supplied at price p:

X s (p) = m F (p/) =

f or

m (p q)

(

q q)

p < q

f or q p q

f or

(10)

p > q

To compute the expected quality of goods that are supplied at a price p, we need to compute

the expected quality of the good, given that q p/: Q(p) = E(q|q p/). As a first step,

we write down the conditional density (see Appendix B):

f (q) =

p q f or q p/

F (p/)

g(q|q p/) =

0

f or q > p/

(11)

Since at prices p > q all goods are offered, a traded good then has expected quality equal

to the unconditional expectation Q(p) = E[q] =

q+

q

2 .

p/

Z

Q(p) = E(q|q p/) =

p/

q g(q|q p/) d q =

q

p2

2

q2

q

dq

p q

2 (p q)

p + q

,

2

p [ q, q].

(12)

Q(p)

not defined

f or p < q

n p+ q q+q o

= min

f or p q

2 , 2

(13)

(Check that Q(p) given by equation (13) indeed is equal to the unconditional expectation at

q = q.) We see that under asymmetric information not only the quantity supplied in the

market, X s (p), but also the average quality of goods offered, Q(p), depend on the market

10

price. At a price p the marginal seller is offering quality level p/. If the price increases,

both quantity and average quality rise because sellers with higher quality goods now find it

worthwhile to also sell their good, pushing up the quality of the marginal seller and adding

to the quantity on the market. Moreover, the lower the taste of the sellers for their good, ,

the higher the average quality offered on the market for any given price (and the higher the

potential gains from trade). The average quality offered in the market reaches its maximum

level the average quality of all goods in the economy only if the market price exceeds the

reservation price of the owner of the highest quality item, q.

Demand for goods

Buyers are not able to discriminate among the goods offered by sellers but know that sellers

are aware of the quality of their own good. Unfortunately, there is no way to verify the claim

that sellers makes about the quality of her good, and buyers need to rely on the distribution

of qualities across sellers, F , and their knowledge of sellers preferences. Based on this information, buyers form beliefs, Qe (p), about the expected quality of goods sold in the market at

the going price p. As in the previous section, demand is given by

=n

f or Qe (p) > p

X d (p)

[0, n] f or Qe (p) = p

=0

f or Qe (p) < p

(14)

Market equilibrium

The definition of a market equilibrium is as in the case of incomplete but symmetric information, given by Definition 2. That is, in a market equilibrium the following conditions must be

satisfied:

1. All market participants maximize their expected utility, taking prices as given.

2. Markets clear:

X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ).

3. Market participants have rational expectations:

Qe (p) =

q

otherwise

11

(MC)

(RE)

To see whether a market equilibrium exists in which a positive amount of the good is to

be traded, we examine whether X(p ) > 0 can be made compatible with the equilibrium

conditions.

Condition (MC) tells us that in equilibrium X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ).

From the supply schedule in (10) we know that X s (p) > 0 if and only if p > q since

otherwise no seller is willing to offer the good. Hence, in equilibrium

p > q.

(15)

From the demand schedule in (14) we see that the market can clear at a positive quantity

if and only if Qe (p ) = p :

if Qe (p ) > p we have excess demand, X d (p ) = n > m X s (p );

if Qe (p ) < p we have zero demand, X d (p ) = 0;

if Qe (p ) = p condition (MC) can be satisfied since then for any value of p we

have X d (p ) [0, n], n < m, while X s (p ) (0, m], depending on p .

Hence, in equilibrium

Qe (p ) = p .

(16)

Q(p ) = Qe (p ) = p .

(17)

Thus, using (17) and (15) in conjunction with the supply schedule (10),

p + q q + q

,

= p .

min

2

2

n p + q q+q o

q

q+

Case 1: p = 2 = min

2 , 2

Case 1 arises if and only if p q. Together with p =

parameter must take on a value

q+

q

2 q .

q+

q

2

(18)

p =

q + q q + q

>

> q,

2

2

12

since

0 < < 1.

Case 2: If >

p

q

2 1 .

q

q+

2 q

we have that p =

p + q

2

= min

n p + q

2

q

q+

2

o

. This implies that

p =

since

p > 0

2 1

q > q,

and thus

2 1

q>

1 > .

To sum up,

p =

q+

q

2

q

2 1

f or

f or >

q+

q

2 q

q+

q

2 q

(19)

Plugging p into equation (10), case 1 leads to trading of all goods since p q > q:

X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ) = m,

for

q + q

.

2 q

Then, the surplus created is S AI = S IS . In other words, if sellers have a sufficiently low taste

for their own good, i.e. a low , asymmetric information does not lead to a problem of adverse

selection. All goods are traded and all potential gains from trade realized as in the case of

symmetric information.

In case 2 not all sellers trade in equilibrium,

X(p ) = X s (p ) = X d (p ) = m

2 (1 ) q

< m,

(2 1) (

q q)

for

>

q + q

.

2 q

Z p /

p + q

q + q

AI

S =

(1 ) q f (q)d q =

< S IS = m (1 )

.

2

2

q

In case 2 sellers value their own goods sufficiently much (high ) so that owners of high quality

goods are not willing to trade at the prices for which lower quality goods trade. Since sellers

have private information about the quality of their goods a problem of adverse selection arises,

where goods of higher quality are not traded.

Proposition 3

Under asymmetric information, a market equilibrium exists in which all goods are traded if

and only if

q+

q

2 q .

Then

p q > q,

If >

and

S AI = S IS .

q+

q

2 q ,

X(p ) = m

2 (1 ) q

< m,

(2 1) (

q q)

p =

q

,

2 1

13

and

S AI =

p + q

< S IS .

2

45

E[q ]

E[q ]

Q( p)

q

p*

45

Q( p)

q p *

Thus, in contrast to the settings of complete information and incomplete but symmetric information, a market equilibrium in which all goods are traded only exists if

q+

q

2 q

(panel (b)

of Figure 2). Whenever the taste for quality of buyers and sellers does not diverge this much,

adverse selection drives out higher quality goods (panel (a) of Figure 2). This prevents the

full potential gains from trade to be realized, lowering the realized surplus from S IS to S AI .

Adverse selection becomes more severe, the more aligned the tastes of buyers and sellers are,

i.e., the closer is to unity (moving the point where the supply quality schedule Q(p) reaches

its maximum to the right).

From our results so far, we can see that adverse selection tends to drive out higher quality

goods. For all prices p < q the average quality offered in the market, q(p) is lower than the

average quality of all goods potentially available for sale, E[q]. Due to the quality uncertainty

for the buyers one price has to fit all goods. However, at prices lower than q owners of

higher quality goods prefer not to sell their goods, lowering the average quality of those goods

which are available for sale. This nicely confirms the intuition described by Akerlof of the

bad [goods] driving out the not-so-bad driving out the medium driving out the not-so-good.

A potential remedy to situations where adverse selection would arise is that sellers offer buyers

warranties. This allows buyers to inspect the good and return it if the quality does not match

14

x ~ U [x, x ]

f

F

1

1

xx

that claimed by the seller. In the next lecture we will study another mechanism for reducing

uncertainty about quality: signaling.

Appendix

A

The uniform (or rectangular) distribution has constant probability over its support. A random

variable x follows a uniform (or rectangular) distribution, x U [x, x

], if it has constant

probability over its support [x, x

]. Its probability density function or just density (see

panel (a) in Figure 3) is given by

f (

x) =

0

1

x

x

f or

x<x

f or x x x

f or

15

x>x

(20)

f ( x)

f ( x x T ) = F (T )

F (T )

x T

x >T

f (x )

Thus, the cumulative distribution function (see panel (b) in figure 3) is9

0

f or

x<x

xx

F (x) =

x

x f or x x x

1

f or

x>x

(21)

The conditional density of x given that it takes on realizations lower than T is just the value

of the unconditional density normalized by F (T ) (see Figure 4):

f (x) f or x T

F (T )

g(x|x T ) =

0

f or x > T

(22)

The normalization is necessary since by definition the probabilities under a probability distribution sum up to one. With a continuous random variable this simply means that the area

R

under the density is equal to one: f (x) d x. Indeed, for the conditional distribution above

9

Rt

Recall that F (t) measures the area under the density function up to point t, i.e., F (t) = P rob(x t) =

f (x) d x.

16

g(x|x T ) d x =

f (x)

dx =

F (T )

RT

f (x) d x

F (T )

RT

= R

T

f (x) d x

= 1.

(23)

f (x) d x

Recall that the expected value of a continuous random variable x with probability density

function f is computed as

Z

E[x] =

x f (x) d x.

(24)

Z

x g(x|x T ) d x.

x g(x|x T ) d x =

E[x|x T ] =

(25)

References

Akerlof, George A., 1970, The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market

mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488500.

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, 1995, Microeconomic Theory

(Oxford University Press: Oxford).

17

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