EVIDENCE AND TRIAL TECHNIQUE ATTY.

QUICHO, 3C
1.
OVERVIEW OF THE SUBJECT
2.
DEFINITION (RULE 128, SECTION 1)
3.
SCOPE (RULE 128, SECTIONS 2, 4)
4.
ADMISSIBILITY (RULE 128, SECTION 3)
People vs. Wagas
GR No. 157943 4 September 2013
People vs. Lauga
GR No. 186228 15 March 2010
FACTS:
Appellant Lauga was charged of qualified rape by his
daughter. Testimonies revealed that the victim was left alone at
home while his father was having drinking spree at the
neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because appellant
has the habit of mauling her mother every time he gets drunk.
Her only brother also went out with some neighbors.
At around 10pm, appellant woke up the victim, removed
his pants and slid inside the blanket covering the victim and
removed her pants and underwear. Appellant had warned the
victim not to shout for help. He proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her daughter by threatening her with his fist and a
knife. Soon after, the victims brother arrived and saw her
crying. Appellant claimed he scolded the victim for staying out
late. The two decided to leave the house.
While on their way to their maternal grandmothers
house, victim recounted to her brother what happened to her.
They later told the incident to their grandmother and uncle who
sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. Banting found
appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He was
invited to the police station to which he obliged. Appellant

admitted to Banting that he indeed raped her daughter because

he was unable to control himself.
The trial court convicted the accused for qualified rape.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of
the trial court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellants extrajudicial confession
without counsel admissible in evidence?
HELD: Negative.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch
groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by
the local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy
Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities
delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the
color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise
known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.
Even if the extrajudicial confessions were not admitted as
evidence, it does not warrant the acquittal of the accused. The
appellants conviction is upheld because of the strong evidence
showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

170338
23 December 2008

GR No.

Anti-Wire Tapping Act

Salcedo-Ortanez vs. CA
GR No. 110662 4 August
1994
Ramirez vs. CA GR No. 93833 28 September 1995
Ganaan vs. IAC GR No. L-69809 16 October 1986
Arrests, Searches, and Seizures
Pollo vs. CSC, et al. GR No. 181881 18 October 2011
People vs. Aminnudin
GR No. 74869 6 July 1998
People vs. Mengote GR No. 87059 22 June 1992
People vs. Laguio
GR No. 128587 16 March 2007
People vs. Dela Cruz GR No. 182348 20 November
2008
Human Security Act of 2007
Republic vs. Roque GR No. 204603 24 September
2013
Rule on Examination of Child Witness
People vs. UgosGR No. 181633 12 September 2008
People vs. Santos
GR
Obedencio vs. Murillo
February 2004
People vs. Bisda
GR
People vs. Caete
GR
People vs. Mendoza GR
November 2002
People vs. Hermosa GR

No. 172322 8 September 2006

A.M. No. RTJ-03-172322
5
No. 140895 17 July 2003
No. 142930 28 March 2003
Nos. 143844-46 19
No. 131805 7 September 2011

JUDICIALNOTICE
GHoldings,Inc.vs.NationalMinesandAlliedWorkersUnionLocal
Facts:
MaricalumMining(MMC)wasincorporatedbytheDBPandthePNB
on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque Mining. DBP and PNB
transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization
becauseithadbecomeanonperformingasset.PursuanttothePurchaseand
Sale Agreement between G Holdings (GHI) and Asset Privatization Trust
(APT),APbought90%ofMMCssharesandfinancialclaims.Theseclaims
were converted into 3 promissory notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI
totaling500MandsecuredbymortgagesoverMMCsproperties.
Almostfouryearsthereafter,alabordisputearosebetweenMMCand
NAMAWU,withthelattereventuallyfilingwiththeNationalConciliation
andMediationBoardanoticeofstrike.TheSecretarydeclaredthatthelayoff
wasillegalandthatMMCcommittedunfairlaborpractice.Hethenordered
thereinstatementofthelaidoffworkers,withpaymentoffullbackwagesand
benefits,anddirectedtheexecutionofanewCBA.
Then Acting Department of Labor and Employment Secretary,
directedtheissuanceofapartialwritofexecutionandorderedthesheriffsto
proceedtothepremisesfortheexecutionofthesame.
The writ was not fully satisfied because MMCs resident manager
resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE Secretary
PatriciaSto.TomasissuedanAliasWritofExecutionandBreakOpenOrder
(Sto. Tomas Writ). The respondent acting sheriffs implemented the Sto.
TomasWritandleviedonthepropertiesofMMClocatedatitscompoundin
NegrosOccidental.
GHIfiled withtheRTC aSpecialCivilAction forContemptwith
PrayerfortheIssuanceofaTemporaryRestrainingOrder(TRO)andWritof
PreliminaryInjuctionandtoNullifytheSheriffsLevyonProperties.
Issue:
WhetherornottheJudicialNoticeRulecanbeapplied.

Held:
Yes.JudicialnoticemustbetakenbythisCourtofits Decisionin
MaricalumMiningCorporationv.Hon.ArturoD.BrionandNAMAWU,in
whichweupheldtherightofhereinprivaterespondent,NAMAWU,toits
laborclaims.Uponthesameprincipleofjudicialnotice,weacknowledgeour
Decision in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset
PrivatizationTrustv.GHoldings,Inc.,inwhichGHIwasrecognizedasthe
rightfulpurchaserofthesharesofstocksofMMC,andthus,entitledtothe
delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These
companynotes,consistingofthree(3)PromissoryNotes,werepartofthe
documentsexecutedin1992intheprivatizationsaleofMMCbytheAsset
Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly contains
stipulations establishing and constituting in favor of GHI mortgages over
MMCs real and personal properties. The stipulations were subsequently
formalized in a separate document denominated Deed of Real Estate and
ChattelMortgageonSeptember5,1996.Thereafter,theDeedwasregistered
onFebruary4,2000.
Wefindbothdecisionscriticallyrelevanttotheinstantdispute.Infact,
theyshouldhaveguidedthecourtsbelowinthedispositionofthecontroversy
attheirrespectivelevels.Torepeat,thesedecisionsrespectivelyconfirmthe
rightofNAMAWUtoits laborclaimsandaffirmtherightofGHItoits
financialandmortgageclaimsovertherealandpersonalpropertiesofMMC,
as willbeexplainedbelow.TheassailedCAdecisionapparentlyfailedto
considertheimpactofthesetwodecisionsonthecaseatbar.Thus,wefindit
timelytoreiteratethat:courtshavealsotakenjudicialnoticeofpreviouscases
todeterminewhetherornotthecasependingisamootoneorwhetherornota
previousrulingisapplicabletothecaseunderconsideration.
Inthislight,allthemoredoesitbecomeimperativetotakejudicial
noticeofthetwocasesaforesaid,astheyprovidethenecessaryperspectiveto
determinewhetherGHIissuchapartywithavalidownershipclaimoverthe
propertiessubjectofthewritofexecution.InJuabanv.Espina,weheldthatin
someinstances,courtshavealsotakenjudicialnoticeofproceedingsinother

casesthatarecloselyconnectedtothematterincontroversy.Thesecasesmay
besocloselyinterwoven,orsoclearlyinterdependent,astoinvokearuleof
judicialnotice.Thetwocasesthatwehavetakenjudicialnoticeofareofsuch
character,andourreviewoftheinstantcasecannotstrayfromthefindings
andconclusionstherein.
SpousesLatipvs.Chua
Facts:
Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a
commercialbuilding,locatedatNo.158QuirinoAvenuecornerRedemptorist
Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. Rosalie filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and
MoshieraLatip(SpousesLatip).Rosalieattachedtothecomplaintacontract
ofleaseovertwocubiclesinRoferxaneBldg.,signedbyRosalie,aslessor,
andbySpousesLatip,aslesseesthereof.
AyearafterthecommencementoftheleaseandwithSpousesLatip
already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the
spousesaletterdemandingpaymentofbackrentalsandshouldtheyfailtodo
so,tovacatetheleasedcubicles.WhenSpousesLatipdidnotheedRosalies
demand,sheinstitutedtheaforesaidcomplaint.

IntheirAnswer,SpousesLatiprefutedRosaliesclaims.Theyaverred
that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as
evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of
P2,570,000.00.
SpousesLatipasseveratedthatsometimeinOctober1999,Rosalieofferedfor
saleleaserightsovertwo(2)cubiclesinRoferxaneBldg.Havinginmindthe
brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted
RosaliesoffertopurchaseleaserightsinRoferxaneBldg.,whichwasstill
underconstructionatthetime.AccordingtoSpousesLatip,theimmediate
paymentofP2,570,000.00wouldbeusedtofinishconstructionofthebuilding
givingthemfirstpriorityintheoccupationofthefinishedcubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were

finished,SpousesLatipoccupiedthemwithoutwaitingforthecompletionof
five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they
signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject
cubicles.Thus,theyweresurprisedtoreceiveademandletterfromRosalies
counselandthesubsequentfilingofacomplaintagainstthem.
Issue:
WhetherornotthetakingofthejudicialnoticeoftheCAisproper.
Held:
No. As previously adverted to the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and
upholdingtheejectmentofSpousesLatip,tookjudicialnoticeofthealleged
practiceofprospectivelesseesintheBaclaranareatopaygoodwillmoneyto
thelessor.
Onthispoint,StateProsecutorsv.Muroisinstructive:

I.Thedoctrineofjudicialnoticerestsonthewisdom
anddiscretionofthecourts.Thepowertotakejudicial
noticeistobeexercisedbycourtswithcaution;care
must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptlyresolvedinthenegative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have

threematerialrequisites:(1)themattermustbeoneof
commonandgeneral knowledge;(2)itmustbe well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain;and(3)itmustbeknowntobewithinthe
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guideindeterminingwhatfactsmaybeassumedtobe
judiciallyknownisthatofnotoriety.Hence,itcanbe
saidthatjudicialnoticeislimitedtofactsevidencedby
publicrecordsandfactsofgeneralnotoriety.

Tosaythatacourtwilltakejudicialnoticeofafactis
merelyanotherwayofsayingthattheusualformof
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
courtassumesthatthematterissonotoriousthatitwill
not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge.Themerepersonalknowledgeofthejudge
isnotthejudicialknowledgeofthecourt,andheisnot
authorizedtomakehisindividualknowledgeofafact,
notgenerallyorprofessionallyknown,thebasisofhis
action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
matterswhicharecommonlyknown.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take

judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
whicharegenerallyacceptedbymankindastrueand
arecapableofreadyandunquestioneddemonstration.
Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications,arejudiciallynoticed,providedtheyareof
such universal notoriety and so generally understood
that they may be regarded as forming part of the
commonknowledgeofeveryperson
Fromtheforegoingprovisionsoflawandourholdingsthereon,itis
apparentthatthematterwhichtheappellatecourttookjudicialnoticeofdoes
notmeettherequisiteofnotoriety.Tobeginwith,onlytheCAtookjudicial
noticeofthissupposedpracticetopaygoodwillmoneytothelessorinthe
Baclaranarea.NeithertheMeTCnortheRTC,withtheformerevenrulingin
favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common knowledge or
notoriouslyknown.

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the

necessityofattachingdocumentaryevidence,i.e.,theJointAffidavitofthe
stallholders,toRosaliesappealbeforetheCA.Inshort,theallegedpractice
stillhadtobeprovenbyRosalie;contraveningthetitleitselfofRule129of
theRulesofCourtWhatneednotbeproved.

CorinthianGardensvs.SpousesTanjangco
Facts:
RespondentsspousesReynaldoandMariaLuisaTanjangco(theTanjangcos)
own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No.
242245and282961respectively,locatedatCorinthianGardensSubdivision,
QuezonCity,whichismanagedbypetitionerCorinthianGardensAssociation,
Inc.(Corinthian).Ontheotherhand,respondentsspousesFrankandTeresita
Cuaso(theCuasos)ownLot65whichisadjacenttotheTanjangcoslots.

Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation

surveywasnecessary.AsGeodeticEngineerDemocritoDeDios(Engr.De
Dios), operating under the business name D.M. De Dios Realty and
Surveying,conductedalltheprevioussurveysforthesubdivision'sdeveloper,
CorinthianreferredEngr.DeDiostotheCuasos.Before,duringandafterthe
construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted periodic ocular
inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans
pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian.
Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the
servicesofC.B.Paraz&ConstructionCo.,Inc.(C.B.Paraz)asbuilder,their
perimeterfenceencroachedontheTanjangcosLot69by87squaremeters.

Noamicablesettlementwasreachedbetweentheparties.Thus,the
TanjangcosdemandedthattheCuasosdemolishtheperimeterfencebutthe
latterfailedandrefused,promptingtheTanjangcostofilewiththeRTCasuit
againsttheCuasosforRecoveryofPossessionwithDamages.

Eventually, the Cuasos filed a ThirdParty Complaint[8] against

Corinthian,C.B.ParazandEngr.DeDios.TheCuasosascribednegligenceto

C.B.Parazforitsfailuretoascertaintheproperspecificationsoftheirhouse,
and to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted
Corinthianforapprovingtheirrelocationsurveyandbuildingplanswithout
verifyingtheiraccuracyandinmakingrepresentationsastoEngr.DeDios'
integrityandcompetence.TheCuasosallegedthathadCorinthianexercised
diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a
boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that
Corinthianshouldalsobeheldanswerableforanydamagesthattheymight
incurasaresultofsuchconstruction.
Issue:
WhetherornottheCAhaslegalbasistoincreaseunilaterallyandwithout
prooftheamountprayedforintheComplaint.
Held:
CitingSiav.CourtofAppeals[272SCRA141,May5,1997],petitioners
arguethattheMTCmaytakejudicialnoticeofthereasonablerentalorthe
generalpriceincreaseoflandinordertodeterminetheamountofrentthat
maybeawardedtothem.Inthatcase,however,thisCourtreliedontheCA's
factualfindings,whichwerebasedontheevidencepresentedbeforethetrial
court.Indeterminingreasonablerent,theRTCthereintookaccountofthe
followingfactors:1)therealtyassessmentoftheland,2)theincreaseinrealty
taxes,and3)theprevailingrateofrentalsinthevicinity.Clearly,thetrial
courtrelied,notonmerejudicialnotice,butontheevidencepresentedbefore
it.
Indeed,courtsmayfixthereasonableamountofrentfortheuseand
occupation of a disputed property. However, petitioners herein erred in
assumingthatcourts,indeterminingtheamountofrent,couldsimplyrelyon
theirownappreciationoflandvalueswithoutconsideringanyevidence.As
wehavesaidearlier,acourtmayfixthereasonableamountofrent,butitmust
stillbaseitsactionontheevidenceadducedbytheparties.

In Herrera v.Bollos [G.R.No.138258, January 18,2002], the trial court

awardedrenttothedefendantsinaforcibleentrycase.ReversingtheRTC,
thisCourtdeclaredthatthereasonableamountofrentcouldbedeterminednot
bymerejudicialnotice,butbysupportingevidence:

x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in

controversy. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public
knowledge,orwhicharecapableofunquestionabledemonstration,oroughtto
beknowntojudgesbecauseoftheirjudicialfunctions.Beforetakingsuch
judicialnotice,thecourtmustallowthepartiestobeheardthereon.Hence,
therecanbenojudicialnoticeontherentalvalueofthepremisesinquestion
withoutsupportingevidence.

Truly,merejudicialnoticeisinadequate,becauseevidenceisrequired
foracourttodeterminetheproperrentalvalue.ButcontrarytoCorinthian's
arguments,boththeRTCandtheCAfoundthatindeedrentwas duethe
Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property.ThisuniformfactualfindingoftheRTCandtheCAwasbasedon
the evidencepresented below.Moreover,in Spouses Catungalv.Hao,we
considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the
particularcircumstancesofeachcase.Wenotedthereinthattherespondent
denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful possession, of their
propertyforalmostadecade.

Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of

possessionanduseoftheirpropertyformorethantwodecadesthroughno
faultoftheirown.Thus,wefindnocogentreasontodisturbthemonthly
rentalfixedbytheCA.

Alltold,theCAcommittednoreversibleerror.
SocialJusticeSocietyvs.Atienza
Facts:
PetitionersSocialJusticeSociety,CabigaoandTumbokonsoughttocompel
respondent Hon. Atienza, then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce
OrdinanceNo.8027.Thisordinancereclassifiedtheareadescribedtherein

from industrial to commercial, and directed the owners and operators of

businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operatingtheirbusinesseswithin6monthsfromthedateoftheeffectivity.
Among the businesses situated in the area as the socalled Pandacan
Terminalsoftheoilcompanies.InitsMarch7,2007decision,theCourt
upheldthevalidityoftheordinance.
Chevron,ShellandPetronfiledtheirrespectivepetitionsintheRTC
attacking the validity of the ordinance. A writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunctionwasgranted.
In2006,thecitycouncilofManilaenactedOrdinanceNo.8119,also
knownastheManilaComprehensiveLandUsePlanandZoningOrdinanceof
2006. Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC asking for the
nullification oftheordinance.Petron filed its owncomplaint onthesame
causesofaction.ThecourtissuedaTROinfavorofPetron.Duringtheoral
arguments, the parties submitted to this Courts power to rule on the
constitutionalityandvalidityofOrdinanceNo.8027despitethependencyof
theconsolidatedcasesinvolvingtheissuesintheRTC.
Issue:
WhetherornottheCourtisrequiredtotakejudicialnoticeoftheordinance.
Held:
No,theCourtisnotrequiredtotakejudicialnoticeoftheordinance.The
March2007decisiondidnottakeintoconsiderationthepassageofOrdinance
No.8119whichwasapprovedbyrespondentinJune2006.Thesimplereason
wasthatheCourtwasneverinformedaboutthisordinance.
Whilecourtsarerequiredtotakejudicialnoticeofthelawsenactedby
Congress,therulewithrespecttolocalordinancesisdifferent.Ordinancesare
not included in the enumeration ofmatters covered by mandatory judicial
noticeunderSection1,Rule129oftheRulesofCourt.
Although,Section50ofRA409providesthatallcourtssittinginthecity
shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang
Panglungsod]thiscannotbetakentomeanthatthisCourt,sinceithasitsseat

in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the
ordinanceonitsown,relievingthepartyofanydutytoinformtheCourtabout
it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial
noticeofmunicipalordinances,acourtisnotrequiredtotakejudicialnotice
ofordinancesthatarenotbeforeitandtowhichitdoesnothaveaccess.The
partyaskingthecourttotakejudicialnoticeisobligatedtosupplythecourt
withthefulltextoftherulesthepartydesiresittohavenoticeof.Counsel
shouldtaketheinitiativeinrequestingthatatrialcourttakejudicialnoticeof
anordinanceevenwhereastatuterequirescourtstotakejudicialnoticeof
localordinances.
Theintentofastatuterequiringacourttotakejudicialnoticeofalocal
ordinance is to remove any discretion a court might have in determining
whetherornottotakenoticeofanordinance.Suchastatutedoesnotdirect
thecourttoactonitsowninobtainingevidencefortherecordandaparty
mustmaketheordinanceavailabletothecourtforittotakenotice.

payments on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services in the

aggregate sum of P3,875,139.65, with no zerorated sales. Toshiba
subsequentlysubmittedtotheBIRonJuly23,1997itsamendedVATreturns
forthefirstandsecondquartersof1997,reportingthesameamountofinput
VAT payments but, this time, with zerorated sales totaling
P7,494,677,000.00.

On March 30, 1999, Toshiba filed with the OneStop Shop Inter
AgencyTaxCreditandDutyDrawbackCenteroftheDepartmentofFinance
(DOFOneStopShop)twoseparateapplicationsfortaxcredit/refundofits
unutilizedinputVATpaymentsforthefirsthalfof1997inthetotalamountof
P3,685,446.73.

Thenextday,onMarch31,1999,ToshibalikewisefiledwiththeCTA
aPetitionforReviewtotolltherunningofthetwoyearprescriptiveperiod
underSection230oftheTaxCodeof1977,asamended.
UponbeingadvisedbytheCTA,ToshibaandtheCIRfiledaJoint
StipulationofFactsandIssues.

JUDICIALADMISSIONS
ToshibaInformationvs.CommissionerofInternalRevenue
Facts:
Toshibaisadomesticcorporationprincipallyengagedinthebusiness
of manufacturing and exporting of electric machinery, equipment systems,
accessories,parts,components,materialsandgoodsofallkinds,including
thoserelatingtoofficeautomationandinformationtechnologyandalltypes
ofcomputerhardware andsoftware,suchas butnot limited toHDDCD
ROMandpersonalcomputerprintedcircuitboard.Itisregisteredwiththe
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Economic Zone
(ECOZONE) export enterprise in the Laguna Technopark, Inc. It is also
registeredwithRegionalDistrictOfficeoftheBureauofInternalRevenue
(BIR)inSanPedro,Laguna,asaVATtaxpayer.
InitsVATreturnsforthefirstandsecondquartersof1997,filedon
April14,1997andJuly21,1997,respectively,ToshibadeclaredinputVAT

Issue:
WhetherornotToshibawillbegrantedtaxcredit.
Held:
Yes.Theadmissionhavingbeenmadeinastipulationoffactsatpre
trialbytheparties,itmustbetreatedasajudicialadmission.UnderSection4,
Rule129oftheRulesofCourt,ajudicialadmissionrequiresnoproof.The
admissionmaybecontradictedonlybyashowingthatitwasmadethrough
palpablemistakeorthatnosuchadmissionwasmade. TheCourtcannot
lightlysetasideajudicialadmissionespeciallywhentheopposingpartyrelied
upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact
already admitted. An admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedingsdoesnotrequireproof.

Intheinstantcase,amongthefactsexpresslyadmittedbytheCIRand
ToshibaintheirCTAapprovedJointStipulationarethatToshibaisaduly
registeredvalueaddedtaxentityinaccordancewithSection107oftheTax

Code,asamended[,]thatissubjecttozeropercent(0%)valueaddedtaxon
itsexportsalesinaccordancewiththenSection100(a)(2)(A)oftheTaxCode,
asamended.TheCIRwasboundbytheseadmissions,whichhecouldnot
eventuallycontradictinhisMotionforReconsiderationoftheCTADecision
datedOctober16,2000,byarguingthatToshibawasactuallyaVATexempt
entity and its export sales were VATexempt transactions. Obviously,
ToshibacouldnothavebeensubjecttoVATandexemptfromVATatthe
sametime.Similarly,theexportsalesofToshibacouldnothavebeensubject
tozeropercent(0%)VATandexemptfromVATaswell.
TheCIRcannotescapethebindingeffectofhisjudicialadmissions.

TheCourtdisagreeswiththeCourtofAppealswhenitruledinits
Decision dated August 29, 2002 that the CIR could not be bound by his
admissions in the Joint Stipulation because (1) the said admissions were
madethroughpalpablemistakewhich,ifcountenanced,wouldresultin
falsehood,unfairness andinjustice;and(2)theStatecouldnotbeputin
estoppelbythemistakesofitsofficialsoragents.ThisrulingoftheCourtof
Appeals is rooted in its conclusion that a palpable mistake had been
committedbytheCIRinthesigningoftheJointStipulation.However,this
Courtfindsnoevidenceofthecommissionofamistake,muchmore,ofa
palpableone.
Cuencovs.TalisayTouristSportsComplex
Facts:
Cuencoleasedfromrespondentsforaperiodoftwo(2)years,from
May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994, the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to be
operatedasacockpit.Theleasewasextendedforanotherfour(4)years,or
untilMay8,1998.

UndertheContractofLease,itwasstipulatedthatpetitionershall,like
agoodfatherofthefamily,maintainingoodconditionthefurniture,chattels
andallotherequipmentandshall,atalltimes,keeptheleasedpremisesclean
andsanitary.Forthispurpose,petitionerwouldallowtherespondentsbuilding
supervisororhisauthorizedrepresentativetomakearegularspotinspection

of the leased premises to see to it that these stipulations are strictly

implemented.Anydamagecausedtothefurniture,chattels,equipmentand
partsoftheleasedpremisesshallbetheresponsibilityofpetitionertorepair
andcompensate.Furthermore,petitionerwouldgiveadepositequivalentto
six(6)monthsrentaltoanswerforwhateverdamagesmaybecausedtothe
premisesduringtheperiodofthelease.

Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a

public bidding for the lease of the property. Petitioner participated in the
bidding.Theleasewaseventuallyawardedtoanotherbidder,Mr.RexCuaqui
Salud.Thereafter,petitionerwrotefour(4)demandletterstorespondents.
Asallofhisdemandlettersremainedunheeded,onOctober21,1998,
petitionerfiledaComplaintforsumofmoney,damagesandattorneysfees.
Hemaintainedthatrespondentsactedinbadfaithinwithholdingtheamount
ofthedepositwithoutanyjustifiablereason.
Issue:
Whether ornot a judicial admissionduring the pretrial is conclusive and
bindinguponapartymakingtheadmission.
Held:
Yes.Theadmissionduringthepretrialisbindingandconclusiveupon
therespondent.Theyareboundbytheadmissionsmadebytheircounselat
thepretrial.
Apartymaymakejudicialadmissionsin(1)thepleadings,(2)during
thetrial,byverbalorwrittenmanifestationsorstipulations,or(3)inother
stagesofthejudicialproceeding.Thestipulationoffactsatthepretrialofa
case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions
requirenofurtherproofandmaybecontrovertedonlyuponaclearshowing
thattheadmissionsweremadethroughpalpablemistakeorthatnoadmissions
weremade.Thus,theadmissionsofpartiesduringthepretrial,asembodied
inthepretrialorder,arebindingandconclusiveuponthem.

Respondentsdidnotdenytheadmissionmadebytheircounsel,neither
didtheyclaimthatthesamewasmadethroughpalpablemistake.Assuch,the
stipulationoffactsisincontrovertibleandmayberelieduponbythecourts.

Thepretrialformspartoftheproceedingsandmattersdealtthereinmaynot
be brushed aside in the process of decisionmaking. Otherwise, the real
essence of compulsory pretrial would be rendered inconsequential and
worthless.Furthermore,anactperformedbycounselwithinthescopeofa
generalorimpliedauthorityisregardedasanactoftheclientwhichrenders
respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or
representationisconclusiveuponthepersonmakingitandcannotbedenied
ordisprovedasagainstthepersonrelyingthereon.
SocialJusticeSocietyvs.Atienza
EXTRAJUDICIALCONFESSION
Peoplevs.Muit
Facts:
Oneafternoon,Julaton,arelativeofFerraerarrivedatthelattershouse
withPanchoSr.,PanchoJr.,Dequilloandother4men.Julatonintroduced
themtoFerraer.PanchoSr.saidtoFerraerthattheywantedtousehishouse
asasafehousefortheirvisitor.Theysaidthattheirlineofworkiskidnap
forransom.TheyplannedthecrimeinFerraershouseandwaitedforthecall
fromRomeotoinformthemwhenthevictimwouldbeattheconstructionsite.
ThegroupreceivedacallfromRomeoninformingthemthatthevictimwas
alreadyattheconstructionsite,andsotheywenttheretocarryouttheirplan.
Attheconstructionsite,Muitandothermembersofthegrouppointedtheir
gunsatthevictimandhiscompanionandorderedthemtolieprostrateonthe
ground. After getting the keys ot the Pajero from Seraspe (driver of the
Pajero),theyforcedthevictimtoboardthevehiclewithMuitdrivingit.They
immediately reported the kidnapping of the victim to the police and the
kidnappers were intercepted by the group led by Supt. Arcadio. The
kidnappersrefusedtosurrenderandengagedthepoliceinashootoutinwhich
thevictimwasamongthecasualties.Muitwasoneofthetwopersonswho
survivedtheshootout,buthewasapprehendedbythepolice.
Theprosecutionpresentedthefatherofthevictim,Ferraerasstate

witnessandextrajudicialconfessionsofPanchoJr.,andDequillowhichwere
executedwiththeassistanceofAtty.Mallare.Muitexecuted2extrajudicial
confessions:thefirststatementwasmadeinwhichhewasassistedbyAtty.
VergaraandthesecondstatementwasmadewithassistanceofAtty.Solomon
andwitnessedbyhisuncleandhisbrother.ThedefensepresentedDequillo,
PanchoJr.andMuitwhouseddenialsandalibisastheirdefense.PanchoJr.
and Dequillo said that they were tortured and forced to sign the written
confessionoftheirparticipationinthecrimes.Ontheotherhand,Muitdenied
havinhknowledgeofthecrimeanddeniedknowingthepersonswhosenames
appearedinhis2extrajudicialconfessions.
Issue:
Whetherornottheextrajudicialconfessionsoftheappellantsareadmissible
asevidenceagainstthem.
Held:
Yes, the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho Jr., Dequillo and Muit
strengthenedthecaseagainstthem.Thereisnothinginrecordtosupportthe
claimthattheyweretorturedintoexecutingtheirextrajudicialconfessions.
One of the indications of voluntariness in the execution of appellants
extrajudicialstatementsisthateachcontainsmanydetailsandfactswhichthe
investigatingofficerscouldnothaveknownandcouldnotandcouldnothave
supplied,withouttheknowledgeandinformationgivenbyappellants.
Rule130Sec.33.Confession
Thedeclarationofanaccusedacknowledginghisguiltoftheoffense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be
giveninevidenceagainsthim.
Therulethatanextrajudicialconfessionisevidenceonlyagainsttheperson
making it recognizes various exceptions. One exception is where several
extrajudicialstatementshavebeenmadebyseveralpersonschargedwithan
offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said

confessions,thefactthatthestatementsareinallmaterialrespectsidenticalis
confirmatoryoftheconfessionofthecodefendantsandisadmissibleagainst
otherpersonsimplicatedtherein.Theyarealsoadmissibleascircumstantial
evidence againstthepersons implicatedthereinto show theprobabilityof
theiractualparticipationinthecommissionofthecrime.Therefore,theroles
whichMuitandhiscompanionsplayedintheactualcommissionofthecrime
were described in their statements. As for Dequillo, he was the one who
procuredthegunsusedbythegroup.PanchoJrservedasthedriverofthe
backupvehicleandRomeowasthegroupsinformant.Theyshouldbeheld
liablebecauseoftheexistenceofconspiracydulyproved.
TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthedecisionofCA.

Peoplevs.Satorre
Facts:
Appellant Herminiano Satorre alias Emiano Satorre, a 19year old
farmer,waschargedwithMurderforkillingRomeroPantiliganwiththeuse
ofa.38paltikrevolver.
Onarraignment,appellantpleadednotguilty. Trialonthemerits
thenensued.
GliceriaSaraum,wifeofthevictimRomeroPantilgan,testifiedthatat
2:00a.m.ofMay25,1997,sheandhertwochildrenwereasleepinsidethe
house of her parents at Tagaytay, Calidngan, Carcar, Cebu. Her mother,
FloridaSaraum,wasalsointhehouse. Herhusband,Romero,wentoutto
attend a fiesta. While she was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot.
Gliceriagotupandwentouttotheporch,whereshefoundherdeadhusband
lyingontheground.Bloodoozedoutofagunshotwoundonhishead.
RufinoAbayata,abarangaykagawad,testifiedthataround7:00a.m.
ofMay25,1997,hisfellowbarangaykagawad,PioAlvarado,fetchedhim
fromhishouseand,together,theywenttoverifyareportregardingadead
personontheporchoftheSaraumresidence.Uponconfirmingtheincident,

theyreportedthemattertotheCarcarPolice. Rufinofurthernarratedthat
appellantsfather,AbrahamSatorre,informedthemthatitwasappellantwho
shotPantilgan. Theylookedforappellantinthehouseofhisbrother,Felix
Satorre, at Dumlog, Talisay, Cebu, but were told that he already left.
Nevertheless, appellants brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to
Rufinoshouseandsurrenderedthegunwhichwasallegedlyusedinkilling
Pantilgan.
FlavioGellenarratedthatheaccompaniedappellantandhisfather,
Abraham,totheBarangayCaptainwhereappellantadmittedkillingPantilgan.
Thereafter,appellantwasdetained.
Corroborating Gelles story, Cynthia Castaares, Barangay Captain,
testifiedthatAbrahamSatorreandGellebroughtappellanttoherresidence
whereheconfessedhavingkilledPantilgan.Appellantallegedlyinformedher
thathekilledPantilganbecausethelatterstruckhimwithapieceofwood.
Thatsameevening,shewenttotheCarcarPoliceStationwithappellantwhere
she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant voluntarily
narratedthathekilledPantilganwiththeuseofahandgunwhichhewrestled
fromhispossession.
Dr.PlebiaVillanueva,MunicipalHealthOfficerofCarcar,Cebucertifiedthat
thecauseofPantilgansdeathwasgunshotwound.
BonifacioAyag,NBIBallistician,testifiedthatthedeformedbullet
takenfromPantilgansheadwoundwasfiredfromthegunsurrenderedby
appellantsbrotherstotheCarcarPolice.
Denyingthechargesagainsthim,appellantclaimedthathewasasleep
insidehishouseatthetimeoftheincident.HeallegedthatRufinoAbayata
hadagrudgeagainsthimbecauseofanincidentwhenhetiedRufinoscowto
preventitfromeatingthecorninhisfarm.Hedeniedhavingconfessedtothe
killingofPantilgan.Hedisclaimedownershipoverthepaltik.38revolverand
stated that he could not even remember having surrendered a firearm to
Castaares.
Abraham Satorre corroborated appellants testimony. He denied having
accompaniedappellanttoCastaareshousetosurrenderhim.

Appellants brother, Rosalio Satorre, claimed that he never

accompaniedappellanttoCastaareshousetosurrender.Hisotherbrother,
Felix,alsotestifiedthatheneversurrenderedanyfirearmtoanybody.
Issue:
Whetherornottheconfessionwasvalidlymade.
Held:
Onthequestionofwhetheraconfessionismadevoluntarily,theage,
character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was made must be
considered. Much depends upon the situation and surroundings of the
accused. This isthepositiontakenbythecourts,whateverthetheoryof
exclusionofincriminatingstatementsmaybe.Theintelligenceoftheaccused
orwantofitmustalsobetakenintoaccount. Itmustbeshownthatthe
defendantrealizedtheimportofhisact.
Inthecaseatbar,appellantwasa19yearoldfarmerwhodidnoteven
finishfirstgrade. Grantingthathemadetheconfessioninthepresenceof
BarangayCaptainCastaares,hemaynothaverealizedthefullimportofhis
confessionanditsconsequences.Thisisnottosaythatheisnotcapableof
makingtheconfessionoutofadesiretotellthetruthifpromptedbyhis
conscience. What we are saying is that due to the aforesaid personal
circumstancesofappellant,thevoluntarinessofhisallegedoralconfession
maynotbedefinitivelyappraisedandevaluated.
Atanyrate,anextrajudicialconfessionformsbutaprimafaciecaseagainst
thepartybywhomitismade.Suchconfessionsarenotconclusiveproofof
thatwhichtheystate;itmaybeprovedthattheywereutteredinignorance,or
levity, or mistake; and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only
cumulativeproofwhichaffordsbutaprecarioussupportandonwhich,when
uncorroborated,averdictcannotbepermittedtorest.
Appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed
Pantilgan.Hisstatementwasnottakennorwashisconfessionreducedinto
writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on the prosecutions
accountthatappellantfreelyandvoluntarilyconfessedkillingPantilgan. It
raisesquestionsnotonlyastothevoluntarinessoftheallegedconfession,but

alsoonwhetherappellantindeedmadeanoralconfession.
Aconfessionisnotrequiredtobeinanyparticularform.Itmaybe
oralorwritten,formalorinformalincharacter.Itmayberecordedonvideo
tape,soundmotionpictures,ortape.However,whilenotrequiredtobein
writingtobeadmissibleinevidence,itisadvisable,ifnototherwiserecorded
byvideotapeorothermeans,toreducetheconfessiontowriting.Thisadds
weighttotheconfessionandhelpsconvincethecourtthatitwasfreelyand
voluntarilymade.Ifpossibletheconfession,afterbeingreducedtowriting,
shouldbereadtothedefendant,haveitreadbydefendant,havehimsignit,
andhaveitattestedbywitnesses.
Indeed,anextrajudicialconfessionwillnotsupportaconvictionwhere
itisuncorroborated.Theremustbesuchcorroborationthat,whenconsidered
in connection with confession, will show the guilt of accused beyond a
reasonabledoubt.Circumstantialevidencemaybesufficientcorroborationof
aconfession.Itisnotnecessarythatthesupplementaryevidencebeentirely
freefromvariancewiththeextrajudicialconfession,orthatitshowtheplace
of offense or the defendants identity or criminal agency. All facts and
circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible to
corroborateextrajudicialconfession.

POSITIVEIDENTIFICATION
PeoplevsCachuela
Facts:
OnJuly23,2004,IbaezwenttoWeaponsSystemCorporation(WSC)on
board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales
Representative,thathewastheonewhoboughtagunbarrelatthecompanys
gunshowinSMMegamall.
Ataround9:00a.m.ofJuly26,2004,HenessyarrivedatWSCandrangthe
doorbell,butnooneopenedthedoor.Shewenttothebackoftheofficewhere
thefiringrangewaslocated,andcalledZaldyGabao,anotheremployeeof

WSC.ZaldyansweredfrominsidethestorebutHenessydidnotunderstand
what he said. Henessy returned to the front door and called again. Zaldy
repliedthathecouldnotopenthedoorbecausehishandsweretied.Henessy
calledRaymundoSian,thecompanysoperationsmanager,andinformedhim
thatZaldys hands hadbeentied.After onehour,thepolice arrived; they
openedthegateatthebackusingacetylene.WhenHenessyandthepolice
enteredthepremises,theysawthatZaldyhadbeenhandcuffedtothevault.
Zaldyinformedthepolicethatthecompanysgunsmith,RexDorimon,was
insidethefiringrange.Thepoliceenteredthefiringrange,andsawthelifeless
bodyofRex.4Dr.VoltaireNuludconductedanautopsyonthebodyofRex,
andfoundthatthevictimsufferedseveralgunshotwoundsonthehead,thorax
andabdomen,causedbya.45pistol.5
TheNationalBureauofInvestigation(NBI)receivedaninformation
fromanassetthatthegroupofCachuelawasinvolvedintherobberyofWSC
andinthekillingofoneofitsemployees;andthatCachuelahadbeenlooking
forprospectivebuyersoffirearms.TheNBIformedanentrapmentteamand
proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the operation. Upon their arrival,
MelvinNabilgasapproachedthemandtoldthemthathehadbeensentby
CachuelaandIbaeztolookforbuyersoffirearms.Thepoliceintroduced
themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an entrapment
operationagainstthesuspectsoftherobberyatWSC.Nabilgassurrenderedto
thepolice,andgavethenamesoftheotherpersonsinvolvedinthecrime.
Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that
Nabilgashadalreadytalkedtothebuyers,andthattheywouldliketoseethe
firearmsbeingsold.Cachuelasetupameetingwiththebuyersatagasoline
stationinNaic,Cavite.
TheNBIconductedafollowupoperationonIbaezwhomtheasset
alsocontacted.Ibaezdirectedtheassettobringtheprospectivebuyerstohis
residenceinImus,Cavite.TheNBIagentswenttoImusandtheremetIbaez
whomtheysawinsideaNissanCaliforniacarbearingplateno.PMN645.
Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and asked Ibaez where the
firearmswere.Ibaezbroughtouttwo(2)firearms,andshowedthemtothe

agents.Theagentsaskedwhetherthegunshadlegaldocumentation;theythen
arrestedIbaezwhentheysensedthathewasalreadybecomingsuspicious.
Atthe NBIMain Office,Zaldypointedtotheappellants,during a
policelineup,asthepersonsresponsiblefortherobberyatWSCandforthe
killingofRex.Nabilgasalsoexecutedahandwrittenconfessionimplicating
theappellantandZaldyinthecrime.
TheprosecutionfiledanInformationforrobberywithhomicidebefore
theRTCagainsttheappellants,NabilgasandZaldy.Theaccusedallpleaded
notguiltyonarraignment.Trialonthemeritsensuedthereafter.Duringtrial,
Zaldydied.
In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants
guiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthespecialcomplexcrimeofrobberywith
homicide,andsentencedthemtosufferthepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.
Issue:
Whetherornottheguiltoftheaccusedwasprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Held:
Yes.TheSupremeCourtupheldthedecisionoftheCA.TheCAruled
that the totality of these circumstances point to the appellants as the
perpetrators of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. It
disregardedtheappellantsdefensesofalibi,denialandframeupforbeing
selfserving.TheCAlikewisefoundunmeritorioustheappellantsargument
that the firearms confiscated from them were inadmissible in evidence,
pointingoutthattheseizuresweretheresultoflawfulentrapmentoperations.
Itfurtherheldthattheappellantsfailedtoimputeanyillorimpropermotive
againstthepoliceofficerswhoconductedtheentrapmentoperations.
In view of the inadmissibility of Zaldys outofcourt identification
andNabilgasextrajudicialconfession,theprosecutionscaserestspurelyon
circumstantial evidence. Conviction can be secured "on the basis of
circumstantial evidence if the established circumstances constitute an
unbrokenchainleadingtoafairandreasonableconclusionprovingthatthe
accusedistheauthorofthecrimetotheexclusionofallothers."Therecanbe
convictioniftheprosecutioncanestablishtheappellantsparticipationinthe

crimethroughcredibleandsufficientcircumstantialevidencethatleadstothe
inescapable conclusion that the accused, and none other, committed the
imputedcrime.
"Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstancesfromwhichthemainfactinissuemaybeinferredbasedon
reasonandcommonexperience.UnderSection4,Rule133oftheRevised
Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
followingrequisitesconcur:(a)thereismorethanonecircumstance;(b)the
factsfromwhichtheinferencesarederivedhavebeenestablished;and(c)the
combinationofallthecircumstancesunavoidablyleadstoafindingofguilt
beyondreasonabledoubt.Thesecircumstancesmustbeconsistentwithone
another,andtheonlyrationalhypothesisthatcanbedrawntherefrommustbe
theguiltoftheaccused."
Inourview,nodoubtexists,basedontheappellants'actions,thattheir
primaryobjectivewastorobWSC,andthatthekillingofRexwasdoneon
occasion,orbyreason,oftherobbery:first,IbaezwenttoWSConJuly23,
2004,andinquiredfromHenessyaboutthescheduleandtheratesofthefiring
range,theamountofthemembershipfeeofthecompanysgunclub,thedays
whentherearemanypeopleinthefiringrange,andwhethershewastheonly
femaleemployeeofthecompany;second,whenHenessyarrivedatWSCat
9:00a.m.onJuly26,2004,Zaldyinformedherthathecannotopenthefront
door because his hands were tied; third, Henessy called the companys
operationsmanagerandinformedhimthatZaldyhadbeentied;fourth,the
policesawZaldyhandcuffedtothevaultwhentheyopenedthebackgate;
fifth,thepolicesawthelifelessbodyofRexlyingonthefloorwithseveral
gunshot wounds when they entered the firing range; sixth, the operations
managerdiscoveredthat53gunsandseveralammunitionshadbeenmissing
fromthegunstore,includinga.9mmBernardelliwithserialnumberT1102
03E000151anda.45Glock30withserialnumberFML245;seventh,the
NBIagentscaughtCachuelatryingtosellthe.9mmBernardelliwithserial
numberT110203E000151inanentrapmentoperationinCavite;eighth,the
NBIagentscaughtIbaeztryingtosellthe.45Glock30withserialnumber

FML 245 and a .45 Llama with serial number 04490Z in a followup
entrapmentoperationinCavite;ninth,CachuelaandIbaezwereunableto
explainhowtheycameintopossessionofthestolenfirearms;tenth,Police
InspectorArminAustria,thePNPForensicFirearmExaminer,foundthatthe
98piecesof.45firedcartridgecasesfoundatthecrimescenewerefiredfrom
the.45Llamawithserialnumber04490ZrecoveredfromIbaez;andfinally,
Dr.NuludconductedanautopsyonthebodyofRex,andfoundthatthevictim
sufferedseveralgunshotwoundsonthehead,thorax,andabdomencausedby
a.45pistol.

Peoplevs.Villacorta
Facts:
Julie Gil was charged with the crime of Destructive Arson with
Homicide.ShesetfireonaresidentialhouselocatedatNo.603SulucanSt.,
Sampaloc,insaidcity,ownedbyANGGEARGUELLES,bythenandthere
pouringkeroseneonamattressplacedinaroomofsaidhousethenoccupied
bythesaidaccusedandigniteditwithalighter,knowingittobeoccupiedby
oneormorepersons,therebycausingasaconsequencethereof,damagetothe
saidhouseandadjacenthouses.Ontheoccasionandbyreasonofsaidfire,
oneRODOLFOCABRERA,aresident/occupantofsaidhousesustainedburn
injurieswhichwerethedirectandimmediatecauseofhisdeath.
Issue:
Whetherornottheguiltoftheaccusedwasprovenbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Held:
Yes. The perpetrator can be established through positive
identification.
Positiveidentificationpertainsessentiallytoproofofidentityandnot
persetothatofbeinganeyewitnesstotheveryactofcommissionofthe
crime.There are two types of positive identification.A witness may

identifyasuspectoraccusedinacriminalcaseastheperpetratorofthe
crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the
crime.This constitutes direct evidence.There may, however, be
instanceswhere,althoughawitnessmaynothaveactuallyseenthevery
actofcommissionofacrime,hemaystillbeabletopositivelyidentifya
suspectoraccusedastheperpetratorofacrimeasforinstancewhenthe
latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediatelybeforeandrightafterthecommissionofthecrime.Thisis
the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantialevidence,which,whentakentogetherwithotherpiecesof
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to the only fair and
reasonableconclusion,whichisthattheaccusedistheauthorofthecrime
to the exclusion of all others.If the actual eyewitness are the only ones
allowedtopossiblypositivelyidentifyasuspectoraccusedtotheexclusionof
others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness,
becauseitisbasicandelementarythattherecanbenoconvictionuntiland
unlessanaccusedispositivelyidentified.Suchapropositionisabsolutely
absurd,becauseitissettledthatdirectevidenceofthecommissionofacrime
isnottheonlymatrixwherefromatrialcourtmaydrawitsconclusionand
findingofguilt.Ifresorttocircumstantialevidencewouldnotbeallowed
toproveidentityoftheaccusedontheabsenceofdirectevidence,then
felons would go free and the community would be denied proper
protection.[Emphasissupplied][PeoplevsGallarde]
Shewasthepersonwhohadthemotivetocommitthecrime,andthe
series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her
neighborhood the fire that started in her room, and her actuations and
remarksduring,aswellasimmediatelybeforeandafterthefiresufficiently
pointstotheaccusedappellantastheauthorofthesaidcrime.

OFFEROFCOMPROMISE
Peoplevs.Erguiza
Facts:
OnJanuary5,2000,ataround4:00o'clockintheafternoon,AAA,a
thirteenyear old first year high school student, together with her friends,
siblingsJoyandRickyAgbuya,wenttothemangoorchardlocatedattheback
ofZZZElementarySchooltogatherfallenmangoes.Whentheywerebound
for home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAAs short pants got
hookedonthefence.AAAaskedJoyandRickytowaitforherbuttheyran
awayandlefther.

While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly
grabbedandpulledher.Pokingaknifeatherneck,Larrythreatenedtohurt
herifshewouldmakeanoise.

AccusedappellantdraggedAAAtowardsaplacewhereatamarind
treeandotherthornyplantsgrow.ThenLarryremovedhismaongpantsand
forcedAAAtoliedownonthegrassyground.Thereafter,heremovedher
shortpantsandpanty,mountedhimselfontopofherandinsertedhispenis
intoherprivatepartsandmadepushandpullmovements.Helikewiseraised
AAAs sando and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when accused
appellantenteredherandshefeltsomethingstickyinherprivatepartafter
Larrymadethepushandpullmovements.

LarrytoldAAAnottotellanybodyabouttheincidentotherwisehe
wouldkillherandallthemembersofherfamilyandthenheranaway.

AAAlingeredforawhileattheplaceandkeptcrying.Havingspent
hertears,sheworeherpantyandshortpantsandproceededtotheadjacent
storeofherAuntBethwhowasasleep.Afterstayingforsometimeatthe
store,AAAdecidedtocome(sic)home.Uponreachinghome,shedirectly
wenttobed.FearingLarry'sthreat,AAAkeptmumontheincident.
OnApril7,2000,BBBbroughtherdaughterAAAtohergrandmother
(BBB'smother),ahilotresidinginXXX,Tarlac,toconsultherontheunusual
palpitationonthemidportionofAAA'sthroatandtheabsenceofhermonthly
period.AfterexaminingAAA,hergrandmothertoldBBBthatherdaughter

waspregnant.

BBBaskedAAAwhowasthefatherofherunbornchildbutAAA
refusedtotalk.Aftermuchprodding,andinthepresenceofherUncle,Rudy
Domingo,AAAfinallyrevealedthatshewasrapedbyaccusedappellant.

OnApril8,2000,AAA,accompaniedbyhermotheranduncle,went
tothepoliceheadquartersinYYY,Pangasinantoreporttheincident.Thenthe
policebroughthertoYYYDistrictHospitalwhereDr.JamesSison,Medical
OfficerIIIofsaidhospitalconductedtheexaminationonMichelle.Dr.Sison
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution's evidence is were substantial to held
respondentguilty.
Held:
Theprosecution'sevidencedoesnotpassthetestofmoralcertainty.
No.Thecourtofappealsfailedtotakeintoconsiderationofjuanita
andjoy.JuanitasupportedthealibiofLarrythathewasnotinthecrimescene
atthetimeAAAtoldthecourtbecauseLarrywaswithhertogetherwith
Larry'swifeaftergivingbirthfrom5pmupto3am.Whilejoy'stestimony
regardinghernotleavingAAAwhenherpantsgotstuckisdirectlycontrary
towhatAAAtoldthecourtthatJoylefther.AlsoJoytestifiedthattherewas
notatimethatjoytaggedalongherbrothertotheorchard.Withthissaid,the
CourtheldthatLarryidnotguiltyofrape.

DOCUMENTEDALIBI
Lejanovs.People
Facts:
OnJune30,1991EstrellitaVizcondeandherdaughtersCarmela,nineteen
yearsold,andJennifer,seven,werebrutallyslainattheirhomeinParaaque
City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a group of

suspects,someofwhomgavedetailedconfessions.Butthetrialcourtsmelled
aframeupandeventuallyorderedthemdischarged.Thus,theidentitiesofthe
realperpetratorsremainedamysteryespeciallytothepublicwhoseinterests
werearousedbythegrippingdetailsofwhateverybodyreferredtoasthe
Vizcondemassacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI
announcedthatithadsolvedthecrime.ItpresentedstarwitnessJessicaM.
Alfaro,oneofitsinformers,whoclaimedthatshewitnessedthecrime.She
pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez,PeterEstrada,Miguel"Ging"Rodriguez,andJoeyFilartasthe
culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessoryafterthefact.RelyingprimarilyonAlfaro'stestimony,onAugust
10,1995thepublicprosecutorsfiledaninformationforrapewithhomicide
againstWebb,etal.1
Issue:
Whetherornot Webbpresented sufficientevidenceto provehis alibiand
rebutAlfarostestimonythatheledtheothersincommittingthecrime.
Held:
TheSupremeCourtAcquittedtheWebbetalandreversedthelower
courtsdecisions.Theprosecutionfailedtoprovetheirguiltbeyondreasonable
doubt.
Forapositiveidentificationtobeacceptable,itmustmeetatleasttwocriteria:
a. The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness;and
b. The witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherentlycontrived.
TheSupremeCourtfoundthatAlfaroandhertestimonyfailedtomeet
theabovecriteria.ShedidnotshowupattheNBIasaspontaneouswitness
botheredbyherconscience. Shehadbeenhangingaroundtheagencyfor
sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealingonthem.Andalthoughhertestimonyincludeddetails,Alfarohad

prioraccesstothedetailsthattheinvestigatorsknewofthecase. Shetook
advantageofherfamiliaritywiththesedetailstoincludeinhertestimonythe
clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass
frames,forexample,justsoshecanaccommodatethecrimescenefeature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and
satisfactoryevidencethat:
a.Hewaspresentatanotherplaceatthetimeoftheperpetrationofthecrime,
and
b.Thatitwasphysicallyimpossibleforhimtobeatthesceneofthecrime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded
documentary alibi presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches
Alfarostestimonynotonlywithrespecttohim,butalsowithrespecttothe
otheraccused.For,iftheCourtacceptsthepropositionthatWebbwasinthe
USwhenthecrimetookplace,Alfarostestimonywillnotholdaltogether.
WebbsparticipationistheanchorofAlfarosstory.

ADMISSIONBYCONSPIRATOR
Tamargovs.Awingan
Facts:
Atty.FranklinV.Tamargoandhiseightyearolddaughter,GailFranzielle,
wereshotandkilledataround5:15p.m.ofAugust15,2003alongNueva
StreetcornerEscoltaStreet,Binondo,Manila.Thepolicehadnoleadsonthe
perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executedanaffidavitdatedSeptember12,2003.HestatedthatacertainLucio
ColumnatoldhimduringadrinkingspreethatAtty.Tamargowasordered
killedbyrespondentLloydAntipordaandthathe(Columna)wasoneofthose
whokilledAtty.Tamargo.HeaddedthathetoldtheTamargofamilywhathe
knewandthatthesketchofthesuspectcloselyresembledColumna.
Afterconductingapreliminaryinvestigationandonthestrengthof
Gerons affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a resolution dated
December5,2003findingprobablecauseagainstColumnaandthreeJohn

Does.OnFebruary2,2004,thecorrespondingInformationsformurderwere
filedagainstthemintheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila,oneassigned
toBranch27forthedeathofAtty.FranklinTamargo,andtheothertoBranch
29forthedeathoftheminorGailFranzielle. Columnawasarrestedinthe
province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for
detentionandtrial.
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.)
executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out"
during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias
"Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as
mastermindsrespondentLicerioAntiporda,Jr.andhisson,respondentLloyd
Antiporda.TheformerwastheexmayorandthelatterthemayorofBuguey,
Cagayanatthattime.Whenthekillingtookplace,LicerioAntipordawasin
detentionforakidnappingcaseinwhichAtty.Tamargowasactingasprivate
prosecutor.
Issue:
WhetherornottheCAerredinfindingthatJudgeDagunahadcommitted
graveabuseofdiscretionindenyingthewithdrawaloftheInformationsfor
murderagainstrespondents.
Held:
No,theCAdidnotcommitanerrorinfindingthatJudgeDagunahad
committedgraveabuseofdiscretion.
Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial
confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence
againstrespondentsinviewoftheruleonresinteraliosacta.
Resinteraliosactaalterinocerenondebet.Theruleonresinteralios
actaprovides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration,oromissionofanotherConsequently,anextrajudicialconfession
isbindingonlyontheconfessant,isnotadmissibleagainsthisorherco
accusedandisconsideredashearsayagainstthem.Thereasonforthisruleis
that:onaprincipleofgoodfaithandmutualconvenience,amansownacts
arebindinguponhimself,andareevidenceagainsthim.Soarehisconduct

and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorizedstrangers;andifapartyoughtnottobeboundbytheactsof
strangers,neitheroughttheiractsorconductbeusedasevidenceagainsthim.
Anexceptiontotheresinteraliosactaruleisanadmissionmadebya
conspiratorunderSection30,Rule130oftheRulesofCourt:
Admissionbyconspirator.Theactordeclarationofaconspiratorrelating
totheconspiracyandduringitsexistence,maybegiveninevidenceagainst
thecoconspiratoraftertheconspiracyisshownbyevidenceotherthansuch
actordeclaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator
relatingtotheconspiracyandduringitsexistencemaybegiveninevidence
againstcoconspiratorsprovidedthattheconspiracyisshownbyindependent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the
admissionofaconspiratormaybereceivedagainsthisorhercoconspirators,
itisnecessarythat(a)theconspiracybefirstprovedbyevidenceotherthan
theadmissionitself(b)theadmissionrelatestothecommonobjectand(c)it
has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.Otherwise,itcannotbeusedagainsttheallegedcoconspirators
withoutviolatingtheirconstitutionalrighttobeconfrontedwiththewitnesses
againstthemandtocrossexaminethem.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on
recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged
conspiracy.Therewasnootherprosecutionevidence,directorcircumstantial,
whichtheextrajudicialconfessioncouldcorroborate.Therefore,therecanted
confessionofColumna,whichwasthesoleevidenceagainstrespondents,had
noprobativevalueandwasinadmissibleasevidenceagainstthem.

SIMILARCONDUCT
BankofCommercevs.Manalo
Facts:
BostonBank,nowpetitioner,filedtheinstantpetitionforreviewoncertiorari
assailingtheCArulings.Itmaintainsthat,asheldbytheCA,therecordsdo
notreflectanyscheduleofpaymentofthe80%balanceofthepurchaseprice,
orP278,448.00.Petitioner insists that unless theparties hadagreedonthe
mannerofpaymentoftheprincipalamount,includingtheothertermsand
conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or
contract to sell.47Petitioner avers that the letter agreement to respondent
spouses dated August 22,1972 merely confirmed their reservation forthe
purchaseofLotNos.1and2,consistingof1,740.3squaremeters,moreor
less,atthepriceofP200.00persquaremeter(orP348,060.00),theamountof
the downpayment thereon and the application of theP34,887.00 due from
Ramosaspartofsuchdownpayment.
Issue:
Whetherornotpetitioneroritspredecessorsininterest,theXEIortheOBM,
asseller,andtherespondents,asbuyers,forgedaperfectcontracttosellover
theproperty.
Held:
No.Acarefulexaminationofthefactualbackdropofthecase,aswell
astheantecedentalproceedings constrains ustoholdthatpetitionerisnot
barredfromassertingthatXEIorOBM,ononehand,andtherespondents,on
theother,failedtoforgeaperfectedcontracttosellthesubjectlots.
ThereisnoevidenceonrecordtoprovethatXEIorOBMandthe
respondentshadagreed,afterDecember31,1972,onthetermsofpaymentof
thebalanceofthepurchasepriceofthepropertyandtheothersubstantial
termsandconditionsrelativetothesale.Indeed,thepartiesareinagreement
thattherehadbeennocontractofconditionalsaleeverexecutedbyXEI,

OBMorpetitioner,asvendor,andtherespondents,asvendees.
Ontheotherhand,therecordsdonotdisclosethescheduleofpayment
ofthepurchaseprice,netofthedownpayment.Considering,however,the
ContractsofConditionalSale(Exhs."N,""O"and"P")enteredintobyXEI
withotherlotbuyers,itwouldappearthatthesubdivisionlotssoldbyXEI,
under contracts to sell, were payable in 120 equal monthly installments
(exclusive of the downpayment but including precomputed interests)
commencingondeliveryofthelottothebuyer.
Thebarefactthatotherlotbuyerswereallowedtopaythebalanceof
the purchase price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly
installments does notconstitute evidencethatXEIalsoagreedtogivethe
respondentsthesamemodeandtimelineofpaymentoftheP278,448.00.
UnderSection34,Rule130oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,evidence
thatonedidacertainthingatonetimeisnotadmissibletoprovethathedid
thesameorsimilarthingatanothertime,althoughsuchevidencemaybe
receivedtoprovehabit,usage,patternofconductortheintentoftheparties.
Habit,custom,usageorpatternofconductmustbeprovedlikeany
other facts. Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit
evidence of usage, of habit or pattern of conduct, the offering party must
establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that
ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conductthatissemiautomaticinnature.Theofferingpartymustallegeand
provespecific,repetitiveconductthatmightconstituteevidenceofhabit.The
examplesofferedinevidencetoprovehabit,orpatternofevidencemustbe
numerousenoughtobaseoninferenceofsystematicconduct.Meresimilarity
ofcontractsdoesnotpresentthekindofsufficientlysimilarcircumstancesto
outweighthedangerofprejudiceandconfusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and
sufficientlyregular,thekeycriteriaareadequacyofsamplinganduniformity
ofresponse.Afterall,habitmeansacourseofbehaviorofapersonregularly
represented in like circumstances. It is only when examples offered to
establishpatternofconductorhabitarenumerousenoughtoloseaninference

of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are
adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response or ratio of reaction to
situations.
As a consequence, respondents and XEI (or OBM for that matter)
failedtoforgeaperfectedcontracttosellthetwolots;hence,respondents
havenocauseofactionforspecificperformanceagainstpetitioner.Republic
ActNo.6552appliesonlytoaperfectedcontracttosellandnottoacontract
withnobindingandenforceableeffect.
CORPUSDELICTI
Rimorinvs.People
Facts:
OnOctober12,1979,Col.PanfiloLacson,thenChiefofthePolice
IntelligenceBranchoftheMetrocomIntelligenceandSecurityGroup(MISG
forbrevity),receivedinformationthatcertainsyndicatedgroupswereengaged
in smuggling activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further
revealedthattheactivities[werebeing]doneatnighttimeandthesmuggled
goodsinadeliverypanelanddeliverytruck[were]beingescortedbysome
policeandmilitarypersonnel.Hefieldedthreesurveillancestakeoutteams
thefollowingnightalongRoxasBoulevardandBonifacioDrivenearDelPan
Bridge,wherebytheyweretowatchoutforacargotruckwithPlateNo.T
SY167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the basis of his
investigation,[itwasdiscoveredthat]thetruckwasregisteredinthenameof
TeresitaEstacioofPasayCity.
At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col.
Lacson and his men returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting
himself at the immediate vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port
Area,Manila,becauseasperinformationgiventohim,thesaidcargotruck
willcomeoutfromthepremisesofthe2ndCOSACDetachmentinsaidplace.
COSACstandsforConstabularyOffShoreAntiCrimeBattalion.Thenight
watchlastedtilltheweehoursofthefollowingmorning.About3:00a.m.an
Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It

returnedbefore4:00a.m.ofsameday.
Ataround5minutesbefore4:00oclockthatmorning,agreencargo
truckwithPlateNo.TSY167cameoutfromthe2ndCOSACDetachment
followedandescortedcloselybyalightbrownToyotaCoronacarwithPlate
No.GR433andwith4menonboard.Atthattime,Lt.Col.PanfiloLacson
hadnoinformationwhatsoeveraboutthecar,sohegaveanorderbyradioto
hismentointerceptonlythecargotruck.Thecargotruckwasintercepted.
Col.LacsonnoticedthattheToyotacarfollowingthecargotrucksuddenly
madeasharpUturntowardstheNorth,unlikethecargotruckwhichwas
goingsouth.Almostbyimpulse,Col.LacsonscaralsomadeaUturnand
gavechasetothespeedingToyotacar,whichwasrunningbetween100KPH
to120KPH.Col.Lacsonsoundedhissiren.Thechaselastedforlessthan5
minutes,untilsaidcarmadeastopalongBonifacioDrive,atthefootofDel
PanBridge.Col.Lacsonandhismensearchedthecarandtheyfoundseveral
firearms,particularly:three(3).45cal.Pistolandone(1)armaliteM16rifle.
HealsodiscoveredthatT/Sgt.ErnestoMiacowasthedriveroftheToyotacar,
and his companions inside the car were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel
BalitaandSgt.RobartoloAlincastre,thefourofthemallbelongingtothe2nd
COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be equipped with mission
orders.
When thecargo truckwith Plate No.TSY167was searched,305
cases ofbluesealoruntaxedcigaretteswerefoundinsidesaidtruck.The
cargotruckdriverknownonlyasBoywasabletoescapewhiletheother
passengers or riders of said truck were apprehended, namely: Police Sgt.
ArturoRimorinofPasayCityPoliceForce,Pat.FelicisimoRietaofKawit
PoliceForce,andGonzaloVargas,acivilian.
Issue:
Whether or not it was necessary to present the seized goods to prove
thecorpusdelicti.
Held:
No.FailuretopresenttheBlueSealcigarettesincourtisnotfatal.
TheCourt,onseveraloccasions,hasexplainedthatcorpusdelictireferstothe

factofthecommissionofthecrimecharged15ortothebodyorsubstanceof
thecrime.16Initslegalsense,itdoesnotrefertotheransommoneyinthe
crime of kidnapping for ransom17or to the body of the person
murdered.18Hence, to prove thecorpus delicti, it is sufficient for the
prosecutiontobeableshowthat(1)acertainfacthasbeenprovensay,a
personhasdiedorabuildinghasbeenburned;and(2)aparticularpersonis
criminallyresponsiblefortheact.19
Sincethecorpusdelictiisthefactofthecommissionofthecrime,thisCourt
hasruledthatevenasinglewitness'uncorroboratedtestimony,ifcredible,
may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor.20Corpus
delictimayevenbeestablishedbycircumstantialevidence.21
BoththeRTCandtheCAruledthatthecorpusdelictihadbeencompetently
establishedbyrespondent'sevidence,whichconsistedofthetestimoniesof
credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt22issued by the Bureau of
Customsfortheconfiscatedgoods.
The Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
againstpetitioner.
SOORDERED.
OBJECTEVIDENCE
DNAEvidence
Lucasvs.Lucas
GRNo.190710
Peoplevs.Umanito GRNo.172607

6June2011
16April2009

Facts: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused

Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang,
La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito appealed the
decision of the appellate court to this court. In its 2007 Resolution, the Court
acknowledged "many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."
"Among the many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense, the
disharmony on a certain point stands out. Appellant, on one hand, testified that
although he had courted AAA, they were not sweethearts. Therefore, this testimony
largely discounts the possibility of consensual coitus between him and AAA. On the
other, AAA made contradictory allegations at the preliminary investigation and on the

witness stand with respect to the nature of her relationship with appellant. First, she
claimed that she met appellant only on the day of the purported rape; later, she
stated that they were actually friends; and still later, she admitted that they were
close".
At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had
resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as
"BBB". In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court
deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB greatly
determinative of the resolution of the appeal.
This case was remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence in accordance
with the terms of said Resolution, and in light of the fact that the impending exercise
would be the first application of the procedure, as provided in A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC,
15 October 2007.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation whose qualifications as an expert was properly established adopting the
following procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the reference sample
form. Thereafter, the chemists informed them that buccal swabs will be taken from
their mouth and five (5) droplets of blood will also be taken from the ring finger of
their inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3) times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to serve as label of
the three buccal swabs placed inside two (2) separate envelopes that bear their
names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand of the subject
sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown envelope for air drying
for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional identification;
h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela Cruz and
Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Oplana, in that order, were made to sign as witnesses to
the reference sample forms and the finger prints of the subject sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA papers were placed
inside a white envelope and sealed with a tape by the NBI Chemists;

k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben dela
Cruz, Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their
signatures on the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger prints on the sealed
white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope and placed it in a
separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on their identification
places and reference forms.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists adopted the
following procedure: (1) Sampling which is the cutting of a portion from the media
(swabs and FTA paper); (2) then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release
the DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the solution, it was further processed
using the formarine chain reaction to amplify the DNA samples for analysis of using
the Powerplex 16 System, which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA
samples. The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes; (3) After
the target, DNA is multiplied, the amplified products are analyzed using the genetic
analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System has 16 markers at the same time. It is highly
reliable as it has already been validated for forensic use. It has also another function
which is to determine the gender of the DNA being examined.
"FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis(DNA) using the Powerplex 16 System
conducted on the above-mentioned, specimens gave the following profiles; There is a
COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of
Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB]. (Exhibits "A" and "B").
REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% Probability of
Paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological Father of [BBB]"
RTC &CA: Guilty of Rape
Issue: Whether or not the accused is the father of his rape victim. Can the DNA test
can be used as evidence against him for the crime of rape.
Held: The accused filed a motion to withdraw appeal and it was granted. The SC
terminated the case is now closed and terminated. By filing such motion, Umanito is
deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding
him guilty of the crime of rape. |||
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court). The
disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not

object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
Umanito's defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion that while he had
courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a general theory on his part that he
did not engage in sexual relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced
a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child
she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped
by Umanito.

HabeasCorpusCaseReynaldoDeVilla
November2004

GRNo.158802

17

FACTS:
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo
de Villa the Supreme Court found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza (12
yrs and 10 mos of age), his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusin perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral
damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative
child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the
question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could
determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child, Leahlyn.
Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This
information was apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test
and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a
result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21,
2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. The Motion

was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the
Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that
DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator
asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn readily agreed and
did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who
immediately labeled the cup as "Container A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing labels
and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by
Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that
given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save
for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003,
which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose
samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyn's.
ISSUSE: Whether or not the DNA analysis shows that petitioner is not the father of
Leahlyn and thus based on the fact that Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged
rape, cannot stand and must be set aside.
Whether or not a new trial may be granted to consider the alleged newly
discovered DNA evidence.
HELD:
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the
issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an
entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her
child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we ruled that the fact or not of the
victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or

not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.
Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by
some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.

exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it.

In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn
Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the
victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child.

In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the
trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered
evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have
been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of
child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if
it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza,
this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of the
petitioner on this basis.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until
the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the
existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on
the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding
upon petitioner.

Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner relies upon erroneous legal grounds in
resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time,
and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment
of conviction becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an
available remedy.

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by
petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to
outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his
conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive
identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the
pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore,
the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa
should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on
a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was
based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newlydiscovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding
petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back
as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented by
the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or
jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that
said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if
admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party

*** If sir asks about the Habeas Corpus, say that it is not applicable on this case. Very
broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a
person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
has been withheld from the person entitled thereto. The most basic criterion for the
issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If
an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus
is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used
to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having
duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through
some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.

Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of
habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent
case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction
is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment
of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his
petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the
absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive
penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of
findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of
habeas corpus proceedings.

Peoplevs.Vallejo

GRNo.144656

9May2002

FACTS:
At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year
old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbors house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario,
Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with
her lessons. Aimees house, where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four
to five meters away from Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house
of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour
later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which
accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit
to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant went back to the
latters house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon nap,
she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida that
Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons
because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida
looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she was not there, either. At
about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbors house, and
|||

there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmates
house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had
not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at
about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that
Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in
her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of July 10,
1999, a Saturday, until the early morning of the following day, July 11, 1999, a
Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 oclock in the morning
of July 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied
to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the compuerta by a certain Freddie
Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter.
Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her
neck.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as
he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have
already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July
10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared.
Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of
the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek
swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan
found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing Blood Type A, similar to that
of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O.
Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But
when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was
threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the
body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy waters, hence
contaminated.
RTC: Gerrico Vallejo Guilty of Rape with homicide. Senteced to death and directed to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of 100,000 as civil indemnity and
50,000 as moral damages.
Automatic Review of the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA samples were admissible as evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive.
The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can

still convict the accused considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial
evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case
and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her
genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and
unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence
sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the
victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the
evidence sample and the reference sample.The samples collected are subjected to
various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three
possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different
sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or
discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples
have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons
including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol.
Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different
sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source
(inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst
proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider,
among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they
were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed
in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests.

Tijingvs.CourtofAppeals GRNo.126901

8March2001

FACTS:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered
nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the

laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo,

Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for
an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she
asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the
child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find
them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll
and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three
days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved
by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse
would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem
even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled
and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time
after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin
Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.
She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son.
To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses namely: Lourdes
Vasquez who assisted in the delivery of Edgardo Tijing Jr.in her clinic in Sta. Ana,
Manila. She supported her testimony with clinical records and Benjamin Lopez
(brother of Tomas Lopez) declared that her brother could not have possibly fathered
John Tomas Lopez because the latter was sterile due to an accident where the latter
bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain
and eventual loss of Child bearing capacity.
RTC: Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted. Alleged birth of John Thomas Lopes is an
impossiblity. Trial Court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity.
CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:

1) Wether or not Habeas Corpus is a proper remedy.

2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing Jr. And John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of the petitioners.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person
withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper
legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter
be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in
habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the
parents and by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of
Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the
clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence
directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a
child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years
of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no
offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was
filed by Thomas Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register
Law), the attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days
after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed
in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is
a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both
in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor
and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the midwife who
attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
(The part where DNA was mentioned in the decision)
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility
and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short

tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the
father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to
establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge.Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is
not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful
to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

Peoplevs.Yatar

GRNo.150224

19May2004

FACTS:
Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,Kathylyn Uba (17 years old), were on the ground
floor of their grandmother's house, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga.
They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the
letter to Joel earlier that morning.
On that same day, Judilyn and Joel, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she
intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she
would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita
Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
Later that day, Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the
house of Isabel. They saw Joel at the back of the house. They went inside the house
through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked Joel what
he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house
of his mother.
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw
appellant descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang
and run towards the back of the house. She later noticed Joel, who was wearing a
white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the
house of Isabel Dawang.
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw Joel when he called her near her house. This time,
he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She
noticed that Joels eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her
husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband then

arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of
Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the
lights in her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The
door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked
Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door
was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark,
she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the
naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her
husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and
saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her
stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel,
Cion, called the police.
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman
was found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa
went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab
wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals
beside her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt
splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, Joel denied any knowledge of Kathylyns
death, however, he was placed under police custody.
Joel asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, that Joel was
running away. Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police
Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters
away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. He was charged
with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned Joel pleaded "not guilty."
CA:
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide and was
sentenced to Death. Under the law, cases having a penalty of Death shall be
submitted for automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving much weight to the evidence
presented by the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
HELD:
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted. The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in
light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if
no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented
by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
Subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellants gene type. DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly
accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal
investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime
or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin
tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime
scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victims body during the assault. It must also be noted that appellant
in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open court
on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel. Appellant further argues that the DNA
tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground
that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.This
argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented. Appellants twin defense of denial and
alibi cannot be sustained.

ElectronicEvidence
Peoplevs.Enojas
GRNo.204894

10March2014

ZALDY NUEZ VS. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO

A.M. No. CA-05-18-P// Ephemeral Electronic Communication
FACTS:
Complainant Zaldy Nuez filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ordered complainants reinstatement but
a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the
CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job
pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, Nuez
sought the assistance of respondent Cruz-Apao after learning of the latters
employment with the CA from her sister.
Nuez communicated to the respondent through telephone conversation and text
messages. A week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told
complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the
person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for
P1,000,000.00.Complainant said that he did not have that kind of money since he
had been jobless. He sought the assistance of Imbestigador of GMA Network. The
crew of the TV program accompanied him to Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion.
Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still
asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her. Upon learning that
respondents offer of a favorable decision in exchange for P1,000,000.00 was still
standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in
cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person
at the Jollibee at UN Avenue. Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was
previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
Respondent called Atty. Gepty, her immediate superior in the CA with whom she
confessed that she asked for money and was entrapped by police offers.
As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the
text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter
asked for P1,000,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision of the formers pending
case with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages sent by respondent Cruz-Apao may be
admitted as evidence
HELD: Yes, the text messages by Cruz-Apao may be admitted as evidence.
Section 1(k) Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
Ephemeral
electronic
communication
refers
to
telephone
conversations, text messagesand other electronic forms of
communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.
Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony
of a person who was (1) a party to the same or (2) who has personal
knowledge thereof..
In this case, Nuez was the recipient of the text messages from respondent and
therefore had personal knowledge on the contents and import of the text messages.
Thus, his testimony with regard to the contents of text messages can prove the
ephemeral electronic communications between him and the respondent. The
testimony of complainant was corroborated by Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador
who was present when the parties met in person. She was privy to the parties actual
conversation.
The respondent admitted that the cellphone number reflected in Nuezs cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, doubt respondent may
have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she
and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between
her and complainant.
Respondent admitted some of the messages which are not incriminating but claimed
that she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with
complainant. Respondents testimony consisted of bare denials and self-serving
claims.
Text messages which respondent claimed that she did not remember:
a. Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue, corner U.N. Avenue.
Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita o isama mo si Len David.
b. "Di pwede kelan mo gusto fixed price na iyon."

c. Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung gagawa. Wala ako doon."
d. "Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera".
e. Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit iyon."

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan.
He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of
her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.

Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondents confession immediately after the

entrapment, supports the finding that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the
activity she is being accused of. Having worked for the government for 24 years, 19
years of which have been in the Court of Appeals, she should have known that court
employees are hell to the strictest standards of honesty. The Supreme Court held
that respondent should be dismissed from government service.

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to
the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone
numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
to meet her at the Lorentess Resort where he was intercepted and arrested. They
searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
Ponente: ABAD, J.

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology,

testified as an expert in information technology and computer graphics. He testified
that the picture in question had two distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture
was fake and the face on it had been copied from the picture of Irish.

FACTS
Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became onand-off sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish
broke up with him.

Rustan denied the allegations. He said that he was helping Irish to identify
the prankster sending her malicious messages. Rustan claims that he got back
obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have
originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who
sent the obscene picture to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to
convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about
to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to
the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two
cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it
was to ask him to leave her alone.

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent
the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the memory
card that contained them because she was jealous and angry. But, while the woman
in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A.
Further, the face of the woman in different exhibits could not be seen. Irish denied
that she was the woman in those four pictures.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia

message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irishs
face superimposed on the figure sent by Rustan. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003.

RTC: RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. the RTC
found Irishs testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience. The
crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges
with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.
CA: CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules on Electronic Evidence is applicable in this case.
RULING:
No, it is not applicable in this case. Rustan claims that the obscene picture
sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it
should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly,
Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A,
for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial
proceedings, and administrative proceedings. The Court denies the petition and
affirms the decision of the CA.
Electronic Evidence
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA,
JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and
WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, respondents
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Facts:
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated
by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged
petitioner's(NPC) Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International
Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for
damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages
caused on petitioner's power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of
evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V"
together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents
Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to
petitioner's formal offer of evidence.
The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the
photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the
original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. But as rightly
pointed out in defendant Wallem's Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox

copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2

of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which
a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the
term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data
message".
RTC: The RTC issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from
the records petitioner's Exhibits "A-V" and its submarkings. Exhibits "S" and its submarkings are also DENIED admission for lack of proper identification since the
witness who brought these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present when
the photos were taken and had not knowledge when the same where taken.
MR-denied. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public respondent Judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the admission of its Exhibits.
CA: Denied the petition for review for certiorari. There is no gainsaying the fact that
the respondent judge acted within the pale of his discretion when he denied
admission of said documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the
contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
documents themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein,
and the petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its
original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
Petition for Review for Certiorari to SC under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopies NPC offered as formal evidence before the
trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Petitioner maintains that an
"electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is
produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the section's catchall proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means".
Held: Denied the petition and Affirmed the Ruling of the CA.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This
would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information
contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as

proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a

paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly,
the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will
reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By
no stretch of the imagination can a person's signature affixed manually be considered
as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper
printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the
offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential
that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as
decreed in the law.
The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best
evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of
evidence. Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the ORIGINAL writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public
officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy
of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the
predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the
part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of
routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair

preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or

destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide
but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or
places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the
photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made
in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the above quoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility of
the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

ParaffinTest
CELESTINO MARTURILLAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
FACTS:
There are two versions of the facts that are discussed in this case. One from
the prosecution while the other from the defense. According to the prosecution which
happened on Nov 4, 1998 a shooting incident happened and Artemio Pantinople was
killed by a certain captain which is the appellant in this case. One of those who
testified was Lito Santos who was Artemio's kumpare . He testified that he invited the
victim to eat supper at their house. After eating with Lito, the victim then went out.
While Lito was still eating he heard a gunshot from a distance about 10meters and
then saw Artemio clasping his chest and started to walk back on Lito's Kitchen.
Artemio while holding for his last breathe shouted " Tabangi ko Pre, Gipusil ko ni
Kapitan" (Help me, I was shot by the Captain). However, he did not actually saw who
shot Artemio. Later on, he saw the victim's wife who said " Kapitan, bakit mo binaril
ang aking asawa" and repeatedly cried for help. Lito then assisted Ernita.
Ernita also testified and said that she saw the Kapitan carrying a M-14 rifle.
She also said that she felt that he also had companions due to sound of the
crackings while walking to the grass. The place of the killing is well illuminated due to
the lamp of Lito's store and it was full moon. No barangay tanod was able to help so
she waited for the arrival of the police. The police then armed with the information
filed against the appellant was apprehended. According to the post mortem report,
the victim died due to gunshot wound that went through his body. His heart and lungs
were lacerated and some small digested particles were even seen that shows that
the victim just had dinner. Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the
assailant must have been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he
fired his gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio
indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body.
According to the Defense, Marturillas was not the one who killed the victim. He said
that he went there at the scene of the crime when a tanod reported to him that a

person was killed. He said that he was only accused by the victims wife and he was
not the one who killed Artemio. A paraffin test was made by the PNP against
Celestino Marturillas(suspect) but the result was negative for gunpowder nitrates. On
the same day a complaint for homicide was filed againt Marturillas. The witness for
the defense, Ronito Bodero testified that when the shooting incident happened he
said that appellant is still at his house and he saw unidentified armed men fleeing
from the crime scene.
RTC:
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of petitioner had been
established beyond reasonable doubt. According to the appellate court, he was
positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately after
the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had
been shot by the captain, clearly established the latter's complicity in the crime.
No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their
positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that
they were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives,
and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be
more credible.
CA: Affirmed RTC
ISSUE:
1) Whether the prosecution's evidence is credible
2) Whether it is sufficient to convict him of homicide.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Celestino Maturillas for homicide and
damages modified.
1. The Prosecutions Evidence is Credible due to the following
Positive Identification
This Court has consistently held that given the proper conditions the
illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or
starlight is considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons. In this case,
the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were
sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to
identify him as the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule
that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.

But even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with
the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her identification of him.
Since the circumstances in this case were reasonably sufficient for the identification
of persons, this fact of her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could have
erred in identifying him. Those related to the victim of a crime have a natural
tendency to remember the faces of those involved in it. These relatives, more than
anybody else, would be concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the
malefactor before the law.
Dying Declaration
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances
surrounding the declarant's death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions
of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant competent
to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established by
the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their place. It
was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the dying
declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.
Res Gestae
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the
spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These
statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An
important consideration is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the
statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the
mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a
startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting influence
of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any prior
opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration concerned
the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latter's statement was correctly appreciated as
part of the res gestae.

2. Evidence is sufficient
The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the
conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to
his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his death and
of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with the proven facts
presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of
the crime charged.
These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who
shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an eyewitness
saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victim's fall, the
reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the
victim. http://online.cdasia.com/jurisprudences/9807?hits%5B

%5D%5Bid%5D=9807&hits%5B%5D%5Btype
%5D=Jurisprudence&path=%2Fjurisprudences%2Fsearch&q
%5Bcitation_finder%5D=&q%5Bfull_text%5D=&q
%5Bissue_no%5D=&q%5Bponente%5D=&q%5Bsyllabus
%5D=&q%5Btitle%5D=marturillas+vs+people&q
%5Butf8%5D=%E2%9C%93&q%5Byear_end%5D=&q
%5Byear_start%5D= - footnote57_0 Further establishing petitioner's
guilt was the definitive statement of the victim that he had been shot by
the barangay captain.
Clearly, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure,
conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not
diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a
conscious process of reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial,
vis--vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker

VideoAsEvidence
PhotographasEvidence
Josevs.CourtofAppeals

of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its
driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel
Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed
Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a
coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham
survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In addition,
he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which
caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto,
instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners MCL and
Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the
deceased John Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL alone.
On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo,
registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent
and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The facts show that
Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party and therefore no sleep and
can be assailed that he was not fit to drive the car. The pictures taken of the two
vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane
and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was
positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an
indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was overtaking at the time, the
car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact.
RTC: The trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil
cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages,
P24,000.00 for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita
Macarubo then appealed

GRNo.11844142

18January2000

FACTS: Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operatorlessee of a public utility bus (Bus 203). On February 22, 1985, at 6 am Bus 203, then
driven by petitioner Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John
Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. As a result

CA: Reversed the RTC Ruling making MCL and Armando Jose Liable to the private
respondents
ISSUE: whether or not it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who
was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court
also dismissed the two cases filed against MCL and Armando Jose as well as the
third-party complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo. The Court upheld the trial court

in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's testimony which

was obviously biased and unsupported by any evidence. Physical evidence prevails
over testimonial evidence, where the physical evidence established ran counter to
the testimonial evidence. The Court also ruled that private respondents' failure to
prove Jose's negligence during the trial is fatal to prove MCL's vicarious liability
because before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be
established. With regard to the dismissal of the third-party complaint by MCL against
Juanita Macarubo, the Court, however, held that the mere allegation of MCL that
John Macarubo is the "authorized driver" without further alleging that he was the son,
ward, employee, or pupil of the registered owner is not sufficient to make the latter
vicariously liable for negligence under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MCL should
have presented evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of
John Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under
existing laws.

DOCUMENTARYEVIDENCE
Macuavs.Avenido GRNo.173540
22January2014
Dantisvs,Maghinang
GRNo.191696
10April2013
Peoplevs.Alcober GRNo.192941
13November2013
EdsaShangrilavs.BFCorporation
GRNo.145842
27 June
2008
Facts:
This case stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement
for the Execution of Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project that ESHRI
and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1,
1991. The contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the
work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then
re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for
that month's progress billing.
In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
collection procedure BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the progress billing to
ESHRI's Engineering Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of the Progress
Payment Certificate with the Head of the Quantity Surveying Department; and (3)
following-up of the release of the payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF adhered

to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the period from May 1, 1991 to
June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work Summary, the
monthly progress billings, including an evaluation of the work in accordance with the
Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) and the detailed valuations contained in the
Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that
the values of the WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the section
"Change Orders".
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress
billings following the procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13,
ESHRI paid BF PhP86,501,834.05.
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not
re-measure the work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let
alone remit payment for the inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed
having been misled into working continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave
the assurance about the Progress Payment Certificates already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993,
before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages. EcTIDA
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1
to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund
the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and turning up
with inferior work accomplishment.
RTC:
RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to the payment
of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money
corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances,
rendered judgment for BF.
CA:
Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of
law raised by petitioners in their appeal. particularly in admitting in evidence
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs.
Held:
No.

Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the
admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the
complementing PMIs and the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before being
allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the
basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence, conformably to
the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the layingthe-basis requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into
evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it
could not present the original of the documents since they were in the possession of
ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF despite requests. The only actual rule
that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing
must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents
is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror; EaHcDS
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented
as in the case of loss. CScTDESecondary evidence of the contents of a written
instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or
document itself. 18 A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a
writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the
custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain
explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence. In our
view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents
in question as secondary evidence.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to
wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a
request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded
sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.

Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception
under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary
evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original document's
execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document's
unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. While perhaps not on all fours
because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People is very much
apt, thus:
. . . To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing
is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that
the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce
the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the
party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary
evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may
be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in
the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the
party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce It or
refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

Gawvs.ChuaGRNo.160855

16April2008

Facts:
Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business
enterprises namely: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia
Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, namely, Santos Chua; Concepcion
Chua; Suy Ben Chua; Chua Suy Phen; Chua Sioc Huan; Chua Suy Lu; and Julita
Chua. On June 19, 1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven
children as his only surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chin's death, the net worth of
Hagonoy Lumber was P415,487.20.
On December 8, 1986, his surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co, wherein the heirs
settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: one-half thereof will pertain to the
surviving spouse, Chan Chi, as her share in the conjugal partnership; and the other
half, equivalent to P207,743.60, will be divided among Chan Chi and the seven
children in equal pro indiviso shares equivalent to P25,967.00 each. In said
document, Chan Chi and the six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and
waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.

In May 1988, petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio
Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which they will
use for the construction of their house in Marilao, Bulacan. The parties agreed that
the loan will be payable within six months without interest. On June 7, 1988,
respondent issued in their favor China Banking Corporation Check No. 240810 for
P200,000.00 which he delivered to the couple's house in Marilao, Bulacan. Antonio
later encashed the check.
On August 1, 1990, their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed of Sale
over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber for a consideration of
P255,000.00 in favor of respondent.
Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent
within the designated period. Respondent sent the couple a demand letter, dated
March 25, 1991, requesting them to settle their obligation with the warning that he will
be constrained to take the appropriate legal action if they fail to do so.
Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
against the spouses Gaw with the RTC. The complaint alleged that on June 7, 1988,
he extended a loan to the spouses Gaw for P200,000.00, payable within six months
without interest, but despite several demands, the couple failed to pay their
obligation.
In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw
contended that the P200,000.00 was not a loan but petitioner's share in the profits of
Hagonoy Lumber, one of her family's businesses. According to the spouses, when
they transferred residence to Marilao, Bulacan, petitioner asked respondent for an
accounting, and payment of her share in the profits, of Capital Sawmills Corporation,
Columbia Wood Industries Corporation, and Hagonoy Lumber. They claimed that
respondent persuaded petitioner to temporarily forego her demand as it would offend
their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To insure
that she will defer her demand, respondent allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her
share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber.
With leave of court, the spouses Gaw filed an Answer (with Amended
Compulsory Counterclaim) wherein they insisted that petitioner, as one of the
compulsory heirs, is entitled to one-sixth (1/6) of Hagonoy Lumber, which the
respondent has arrogated to himself. They claimed that, despite repeated demands,
respondent has failed and refused to account for the operations of Hagonoy Lumber
and to deliver her share therein.
RTC:
On February 11, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent.
CA:

The CA likewise found untenable petitioner's claim that Exhibits "H" (Deed of Sale)
and Exhibit "I" (Deed of Partition) were merely temporary paper arrangements.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in admitting in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of
Partition and the Deed of Sale in violation of the best evidence rule.
Held:
The petition is without merit.
The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when the content of such document is
the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to
account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with,
in the trial court's discretion, wheneverthe opponent
does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the
instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the
RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner
never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of
Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness
and due execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by
the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express the true
agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, the petitioner does not
contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous
agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only
temporary.
An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the
parties' rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the
parties. The parties' intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the
contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third
parties who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

DECSvs.delRosario

GRNo.146596

26January2005

Facts:
On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario,
Pacencia Del Rosario and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario ("respondents") filed
before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). Respondents alleged that
they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters ("Property") situated in
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name of
respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register
of Deeds. Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex ("KPPS")
under DECS was occupying a portion of the Property through respondents' tolerance
and that of their predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS
refused to vacate the premises despite their valid demands to do so.
In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPS's occupation of a portion of the
Property was with the express consent and approval of respondents' father, the late
Isaias Del Rosario ("Isaias"). DECS claimed that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a
portion ("Donated Site") of the Property to the Municipality of Sta. Maria
("Municipality") for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court
judge ("Judge Natividad"), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS
started occupying the Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary
educational needs of approximately 60 children between the ages of 6 and 8.
Because of the donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter
Donated Site. In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary
School.
During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted
the existence and execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"), Tax Declaration No.
6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax receipts in respondents' names for the years 1991 and
1992 (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"). On the other hand, respondents admitted the
existence of Judge Natividad's affidavit that he prepared the deed of donation (Exhibit
"1") and the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality's name (Exhibit "2"). Since
there was no dispute that the Property was registered in respondents' names, the
parties agreed to a reverse trial with DECSpresenting its evidence first to prove that
there was a valid donation to the Municipality.
RTC:
On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents'
complaint for recovery of possession. After a careful consideration of the facts at
hand, taking into account the credibility and reasonableness of the testimonies of the
witnesses, the court is of the opinion that the defense was able to prove the due

execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the
same, in accordance with Rule 130[,] Sec. 4.
CA:
The appellate court denied DECS' motion for reconsideration in the
Resolution dated 29 December 2000. The Court of Appeals held that DECS failed to
prove the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the
Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The Court of Appeals was
not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the
alleged "lost" deed of donation.
Issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE
OF THE DEED OF DONATION AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL ACCEPTING THE DONATION, AS WELL AS THE LOSS OF THE
DOCUMENTS AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR UNAVAILABILITY.
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic
copy of the deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil
Code. The duty to produce the original document arises when the subject of the
inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the
contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to
prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.
A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence
under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Section 3 reads:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) . . .;
(c) . . .;
(d) . . . .
In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the
original document itself. A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of
a written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it
cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror.
However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary
evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to
the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the
original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.
The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence
of the deed of donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the
mayor talked about the donation and that he witnessed the signing of the document.
However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read
and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the document that Isaias and
the mayor supposedly signed.
In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus' testimony does not help to establish the deed of
donation's existence, execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed
of donation. On cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that
Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad
himself. If at all, DECS offered Vidal De Jesus' testimony to establish the loss of the
deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a
copy of the deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed
was lost when the municipal office was transferred to a new building. DECS also
made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.
This leaves us with Judge Natividad's testimony. Judge Natividad testified
that he prepared and notarized the deed of donation. He further testified that there
was a municipal council Resolution, signed in the Office of the Secretary and of the
Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to the donor. He furnished
the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court
of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation.
DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution
accepting the donation. There is also no proof that the donee communicated in
writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the circumstance that DECS
constructed the school during Isaias' lifetime without objection on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments. What mainly

militates against DECS' claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of
donation may likely be found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to the
introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the existence and due
execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and due
execution of the document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.

PAROLEEVIDENCE
Marquezvs.EspejoG.R.No.168387||ParoleEvidence;Rule130Sec.9
FACTS:
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the
Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap
property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi) who is the husband of
respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by
petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz). The
respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
(RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged
properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the
properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI.
TCT No. T-62096 was issued for the Murong property and TCT No. T-62836 was
issued for the Lantap property. Respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots
from RBBI. The Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was
located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title
corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that
respondents took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals
from the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or
otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand,
respondent Nemi continued working on the other property the Lantap property
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. RBBI
executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer(VLTs) in favor of petitioners
Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the
subject thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by
TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price to RBBI, the DAR
issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
petitioners. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land

situated in Barangay Murong. The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991. More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in
favor of the respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor
of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint 20 before the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of
petitioners' CLOAs.
OIC-RARAD Decision: The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers
appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on
respondents' Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OICRARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the
other hand, since the petitioners' VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which
corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners' CLOAs
necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in
the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it
was a mere typographical error.
DARAB Decision: Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OICRARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to
petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents.
remiss in the
CA Decision: Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the
CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the
description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale
expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong
property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased. The CA
further ruled that as for petitioners' VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No.
T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional
description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was
considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical
description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property
since the same particularly describes the properties' metes and bounds.
ISSUE:
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
HELD:
The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,

the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The
original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the
document. 42 In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best
Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents.
It is admitted by the parties that the respondents' Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T62096 as its subject; while the petitioners' Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred
to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay
Murong. DSAICa The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents
adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of
Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the
parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T62836).
To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied
was the Parol Evidence Rule instead. evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at
bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between
RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9
specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties
and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument. 44 Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions
to the Parol Evidence Rule.
Here, the petitioners' VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity, it was squarely put in issue
that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties. The
resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties' respective
parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the
rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for
the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.

ACIPhil.,Inc.vs.CoquiaG.R.No.174466.July14,2008
Facts:
Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing
fiberglass, which is used in both commercial and industrial equipment for thermal and
acoustic insulation. In 1993, it ceased from using silica sand in the manufacture of
fiberglass and started using instead recycled broken glass or flint cullets to save on
manufacturing costs.
Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C. Coquia for the purchase of
one (1) lot of flint cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at a price of P4.20
per kilo under Purchase Order No. 106211 dated 6 October 1994. Several deliveries
made by respondent were accepted and paid for by petitioner at the unit price of
P4.20 per kilo as indicated in Purchase Order No. 106211.
However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner demanded the reduction of the
purchase price from P4.20 per kilo to P3.65 per kilo to which respondent acceded,
albeit allegedly under duress. Petitioner accordingly issued Purchase Order No.
106373 explicitly superseding Purchase Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again
made by respondent on 5, 8 and 12 November 1994 under Delivery Receipt Nos.
901, 719 and 735, respectively. Petitioner accepted the deliveries but refused to pay
for them even at the reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding instead that the unit
price be further reduced to P3.10 per kilo.
Respondent then filed a Complaint for specific performance and damages
against petitioner seeking payment for the deliveries made under Delivery Receipt
Nos. 901, 719 and 735, amounting to 46,390 kilos at the renegotiated price of P3.65
per kilo. Respondent further demanded that petitioner be directed to accept and pay
for the remaining deliveries to complete the one (1) lot of flint cullets originally
contracted for.
On 26 November 1994, three (3) days after the complaint against it was filed,
petitioner paid for the flint cullets under Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and 735 at
the unit price of P3.65 per kilo.
RTC:
The trial court rules in favor of the respondent and ordered petitioner to
accept deliveries of the flint cullets contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211
and to pay for the said deliveries within ten (10) days from each delivery at the unit
price of P4.20 per kilo. It further directed petitioner to pay P2,540,300.00 in damages
plus interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint on 23
November 1994 until fully paid.
CA:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted the
award of attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. In its Decision dated
15 September 2005, the appellate court held that Purchase Order No. 106211 is a
contract of adhesion whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the purchase orders in question are contracts of adhesion
whose terms must be strictly construed against petitioner
Held:
The court held that they cannot apply the rule on contracts of adhesion in
construing the provisions of the purchase orders in this case. A contract of adhesion
is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract,
and the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. Through
the years, the courts have held that in this type of contract, the parties do not bargain
on equal footing, the weaker party's participation being reduced to the alternative to
take it or leave it. Thus, adhesion contracts are viewed as traps for the weaker party
whom the courts of justice must protect. However, we have also been steadfast in
reminding courts to be careful in their evaluation of allegations of blind adherence to
contracts. There is every indication in this case that respondent, a presumably astute
businesswoman who has dealings with big corporations such as La Tondea as the
latter's sole buyer of cullets and has the financial savvy to obtain a loan from a bank,
gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211 with full knowledge. She was, in fact,
the one who sought a contract with petitioner upon learning of the latter's need for a
supply of flint cullets. Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse
side of the purchase orders, do not reveal any hint of one-sidedness in favor of
petitioner.
If anything, in fact, Condition 4 above seems to have worked to petitioner's
disadvantage as it underpins the refusal of the trial court to accept evidence aliunde
to show that time was of the essence in the transaction. The said condition
specifically mentions that the "delivery date shown on (the purchase order) shall be
of the essence of any contract arising" and that "delivery must be made in strict
accordance with the order or delivery schedule. . ." Purchase Order No. 106211,
however, is unusually silent as to the date the flint cullets are needed.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance,
that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter
of both principle and policy that when the written contract is established as the
repository of the parties' stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the same
cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them.

This rule, however, is not without exception. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an
exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue in the answer,
the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard
petitioner's evidence.
Sifting through the testimony of respondent, we find that although she was
not given definite days during which she should deliver the flint cullets, she was
indeed apprised of petitioner's urgent need for large quantities thereof. Furthermore,
petitioner presented the unrebutted testimony of Ermilinda Batalon, its materials
control manager, to prove that it agreed to the P4.20 per kilo purchase price only
because respondent assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for petitioner's
production requirements. These testimonies give us a more complete picture of the
transaction between the parties and allow for a more reasoned resolution of the
issues, without over-reliance on the tenuous application of the rule on contracts of
adhesion.
Coming now to the second purchase order, we find that Purchase Order No.
106211 had indeed been superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 as the latter
plainly states. Respondent testified that the deliveries of flint cullets on 28 October
1994 and on subsequent dates were already covered by the new purchase order
which did indicate the reduced unit price but did not mention the quantity to be
delivered.
Clearly, respondent knew, at the time she made the deliveries on 28 October 1994
and thereafter, that Purchase Order No. 106373 would already govern the
transaction. Significantly, payments on these deliveries were made by petitioner on
26 November and 8 December 1994, after the complaint for specific performance
was filed and without respondent making as much as a whimper of protest against
the terms of the new purchase order or the reduced purchase price indicated therein.
By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no longer indicated a specific
quantity of flint cullets to be delivered, respondent knew or should be presumed to
have known that deliveries made thereafter were no longer meant to complete the
original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211.

SeaoilPetroleumCorporationvs.AutocorpGroupGR No. 164326 ||

Parole Evidence; Rule 130 Sec. 9
FACTS:
Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased an Excavator from Autocorp Group to be
paid in 12 monthly installments.The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle

Sales Invoice signed by Francis Yu, president of Seaoil, on behalf of said corporation.
Furthermore, it was agreed that despite delivery of the excavator, ownership thereof
was to remain with Autocorp until the obligation is fully settled. After the second
installment, Seaoil requested that payment be stopped. Despite repeated demands,
Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance. Hence, Autocorp filed a complaint for
recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig. Seaoil, on the other hand, alleges that the transaction is not as simple as
described above. It claims that Seaoil and Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to
settle the obligation of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia in favor of another
foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated. Paul Rodriguez is a
stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the owner of Uniline. On the other
hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same time owner of
Focus. Allegedly, Uniline chartered MV Asia Property from its owner Focus. Uniline
was not able to settle the said amount. Hence, Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed
to settle the obligation through conveyance of vehicles and heavy equipment. The
excavator in controversy was allegedly one part of the vehicles conveyed to Focus.
Seaoil claims that Rodriguez initially issued 12 postdated checks in favor of Autocorp
as payment for the excavator. However, due to the fact that it was company policy for
Autocorp not to honor postdated checks issued by its own directors, Rodriguez
requested Yu to issue 12 PBCOM postdated checks in favor of Autocorp. In turn, said
checks would be funded by the corresponding 12 Monte de Piedad postdated checks
issued by Rodriguez. These Monte de Piedad checks were postdated three days
prior to the maturity of the PBCOM checks.
RTC Decision: judgment is rendered in favor of Autocorp Group and Seaoil
Petroleum Corporation is directed to pay Autocorp.
CA Decision: the transaction between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. This
cannot alter the sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run counter
to the parol evidence rule which prohibits the introduction of oral and parol evidence
to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under the exceptions to the
parol evidence rule has not been sufficiently proven.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly applied the parole evidence in the case.
HELD:
Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary
the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. The
parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written

agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that different terms

were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. The
Vehicle Sales Invoice 12 is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a
commercial document. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of
probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are
written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts. The terms of the
subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit
Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not, however,
change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the
customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or
she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal
obligations that may arise from their breach. Oral testimony on the alleged conditions,
coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the document falls within the exception to the
parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where "the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case,
extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties
to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they
entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
interpretation of the instrument." Even assuming there is a shred of truth to
petitioner's contention, the same cannot be made a basis for holding respondents
liable therefor

INTERPRETATIONOFDOCUMENTS
TESTIMONIALEVIDENCE
QualificationofWitness
People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Obogne
GR No. 199740
24 March 2014
Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
On or about the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in
barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga, province of Catanduanes, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA, 1 a

12year old mentally retarded person.
When AAA was presented on November 14, 2006, defense
counsel manifested his objection and called the Courts attention to
Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, which lists down persons
who cannot be witnesses; i.e. those whose mental condition, at the
time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others x x x.
During the continuation of AAAs testimony x x x she was able to
recall what [appellant] did to her x x x.
AAA recalled that while she was playing, [appellant] saw her
and asked her to go with him because he would give her a sugar
cane. [Appellant] brought AAA to his house and while inside, he
removed her panty, and then inserted his penis into her vagina and he
got the knife and then he took a sugar cane and then he gave it to her
and then she went home.
The trial court found AAA a very credible witness, even in her
mental condition. Contrary to defense counsels objection that AAA
was not capable of intelligently making known her perception to others,
AAA managed to recount the ordeal she had gone through in the
hands of the accused, though in a soft voice and halting manner x x x.
AAAs simple account of her ordeal clearly reflects sincerity
and truthfulness.
While it is true that, on crossexamination, AAA faltered in the
sequence of events x x x this is understandable because even one
with normal mental condition would not be able to recall, with a
hundred percent accuracy, events that transpired in the past. But
AAA was certain that it was a long time x x x after the incident when
it was reported to the police. Likewise, she was very certain that the
accused inserted his penis into her vagina x x x.
Ruling of the Trial Court:

The trial court rendered finding Jerry Obogne guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against AAA
and, hereby, sentences him to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.
The trial court did not consider AAAs mental retardation as a
qualifying circumstance considering that the Information failed to allege
that appellant knew of AAAs mental disability.

Yes. AAA is qualified to take the witness stand.

Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130
provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

of

the

Rules

of

Court

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the

next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxxx

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts ruling with modifications.
The appellate court found AAA qualified to take the witness
stand, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our own evaluation of the records reveals that AAA was
shown to be able to perceive, to make known her perception to others
and to remember traumatic incidents. Her narration of the incident of
rape
given
in
the
following
manner
is
worthy
of
note:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Private complainant AAA provided a clear, convincing and
competent testimonial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
appellant of the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. As found by
the trial court, the testimony of AAA was replete with consistent
details, negating the probability of fabrication.
We stress that, contrary to accusedappellants assertions,
mental retardation per se does not affect a witness credibility. A
mental retardate may be a credible witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AAA is qualified to take the witness stand.
HELD:

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.

The
following
persons
cannot
be
witnesses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully.
In this case, AAA is totally qualified to take the witness stand
notwithstanding her mental condition.
The trial court correctly ruled that AAAs mental disability could not be
considered as a qualifying circumstance because the Information failed
to allege that appellant knew of such mental condition at the time of the
commission of the crime.
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental
retardate does not call for the imposition of the death penalty, unless

knowledge by the offender of such mental disability is specifically

alleged and adequately proved by the prosecution.
For the AntiRape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266B of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) expressly provides that the death penalty
shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with the
qualifying circumstance of (10) when the offender knew of the mental
disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime. Said knowledge x x x
qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which
must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the
conviction of appellant for qualified rape under Art. 266B (10), RPC,
could not be sustained, although the offender may be held liable for
simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
[T]he mere fact that the rape victim is a mental retardate does not
automatically merit the imposition of the death penalty. Under Article
266B (10) of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender of
the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the
time of the commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that
sanctions the imposition of the death penalty.
As such this
circumstance must be formally alleged in the information and duly
proved by the prosecution.
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both
qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity
in the information. x x x But in the absence of a specific or particular
allegation in the information that the appellant knew of her mental
disability or retardation, as well as lack of adequate proof that appellant
knew of this fact, Article 266B (10), RPC, could not be properly
applied x x x

Hence, the appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, as defined

under Article 266A of the [Revised] Penal Code, for which the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
DisqualificationbyReasonofMentalIncapacity/Immaturity
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM
Ponente: Carpio Morales
Facts: Private complainant Evelyn Canchela is a mental retardate. Her mother left for
Singapore to work as domestic helper. Evelyn was then entrusted to the care and custody of
her mothers sister Jovita and the husband Golimlim. In August 1996, Jovita left the residence
to meet a certain Rosing. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant instructed private
complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her
clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to rape
her. When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita, however, did
not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
In December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns half-sister, received a letter from their
mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in
Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Lorna suspected that her sister was
pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor for check-up
and ultrasound examination. Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed
that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to
which Evelyn replied that appellant Golimlim had sexual intercourse with her while holding a
knife. Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against appellant. Golimlim
said that the accusation was not true because Evelyns mind is not normal and many other
men had sexual intercourse with her.
RTC: The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Evelyn. Despite her weak and dull
mental state, the victim was consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong (accused Golimlim)
raped her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Evelyn is disqualified as a witness for being a mental retardate
HELD: No. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being
a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility
RULE 130, Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.
The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is
such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;

over the objection of the administratrix who invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court otherwise known as the Dead Mans Statute.

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving
the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.

Sanson, in support of the claim of his sister Celedonia, testified that she had a transaction with
the deceased which is evidenced by six checks issued by him before his death; before the
deceased died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from his (the deceaseds)
son Jerry who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did; and
after the death of the deceased, Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but
were dishonored5 due to the closure of his account. Celedonia, in support of the claim of her
brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased issued five checks to Sanson in
settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the
bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.8

By the account of a medical specialist at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol Medical
Center, who examined Evelyn, although she was suffering from moderate mental retardation
with an IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her. Thus
the doctor testified that she noticed the spontaneity of the answers of Evelyn during the time of
testing. They presented the questions in different ways, and they expect the same answer. If
the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by somebody, the answers will no longer
be consistent.In this case, Evelyn was consistent in identifying that the appellant raped her.
Appellants bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who
convincingly identified him as her rapist.
It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is
not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to. It cannot then be gainsaid that a
mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she
knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court. Modern rules on
evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness.

DisqualificationbyReasonofDeath
FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA,
EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, As Administratrix of the Intestate
Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing Sy, respondents-appellees.
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: Felicito G. Sanson (Sanson), in his capacity as creditor, filed before the RTC a petition
for the settlement of the estate of Juan Bon Fing Sy (the deceased). Sanson claimed that the
deceased was indebted to him in the amount of P603,000.00 and to his sister Celedonia
Sanson-Saquin (Celedonia) in the amount of P360,000.00. Petitioners-appellants Eduardo
Montinola, Jr. and his mother Angeles Montinola (Angeles) later filed separate claims against
the estate, alleging that the deceased owed them P50,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively.
RTC appointed Melecia T. Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, as administratrix of his
estate, following which she was issued letters of administration.
During the hearing of the claims against the estate, Sanson, Celedonia, and Jade Montinola,
wife of claimant Eduardo Montinola, Jr., testified on the transactions that gave rise thereto,

Jade, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo and mother-in-law Angeles, testified
that on separate occasions, the deceased borrowed P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband
and mother-in-law, respectively, as shown by three checks issued by the deceased, two to
Angeles and the other to Eduardo; before the deceased died or sometime in August 1989, they
advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay
them cash, but he never did; and after the deceased died, they deposited the checks but were
dishonored as the account against which they were drawn was closed, hence, their legal
counsel sent a demand letter addressed to the deceaseds heirs Melicia, James, Mini and
Jerry Sy, and Symmels I & II but the checks have remained unsettled.
The administratrix, denying having any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the claims, nevertheless alleged that if they ever existed, they had been paid and
extinguished, are usurious and illegal and are, in any event, barred by prescription. And she
objected to the admission of the checks and check return slips-exhibits offered in evidence by
the claimants upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under
the Dead Mans Statute.
Specifically with respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted
that they are inadmissible because Jade is the daughter-in-law of claimant Angeles and wife of
claimant Eduardo, hence, she is covered by the above-said rule on disqualification. At all
events, the administratrix denied that the checks-exhibits were issued by the deceased and
that the return slips were issued by the depository/clearing bank. After the claimants rested
their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing the trial court that she
was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.
RTC: issued an Order requiring the administratrix to pay, in due course of administration,
creditors-claimants Felicito G. Sanson, in the amount of P603,500.00; Celedonia S. Saquin, in
the amount of P315,000.00; Angeles A. Montinola, in the amount of P150,000.00 and Eduardo
Montinola, Jr., in the amount of P50,000.00, from the assets and/or properties of the aboveentitled intestate estate.

CA: the Court of Appeals set aside the Order of the trial court and dismissed the claims of
Sanson et al.
SC: Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor in determining
either the credibility of the witness orsubject only to well recognized exceptions none of
which is here presentthe admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to
a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness
testimony but is not necessarily a negative element which should be taken as diminishing the
credit otherwise accorded to it.
As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie.
The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted.
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as
to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in
the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or
transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part
therein.
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the
case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar
to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives
of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of
their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions.
In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of
the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate
transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third
party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others
transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to
the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by
checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
While the foregoing testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the
quantum of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person

may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to controvert the same; from a comparison with the naked
eye of the deceaseds signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas
with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all of which checks were drawn from the
same account, they appear to have been affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims
against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix
who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same when she manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.

GovernmentPrivilege
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and
testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and
Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner
disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated
that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions
on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,(b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three
questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On

November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees
and requested them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.7 The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently stated that the context in which
executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees
upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the
respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should
not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to respondent
Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that
he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive
privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters
to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs
to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without
responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they
issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and
privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing
petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. 8 He
insisted that he had not shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He
emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, but respondent Committees did not
respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition for
certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should
restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which
declared him in contempt and directed his arrest and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February
4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated
January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first,
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege;
and second, respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the subject communications as falling
under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close

advisor of the President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second ground, we
found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their invitations
to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt
as to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they
violated Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance
with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily
and precipitately.
The respondents filed a MR.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in
our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions;

HELD: The MR is denied.

(1)
Yes. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential
communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Respondent Committees observation that this Courts Decision reversed the "presumption that
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal
interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the
true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and
resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in
Senate v. Ermita, which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464,
Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in
the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive

privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive
privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent
is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary
character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the
"exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No.
464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an
executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims
to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke
executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the
presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege
granted by the President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in
this case.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked
executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the
Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to
petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation. Thus, the factual setting
of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.

(2)
Yes. The elements of the presidential communications privilege are present.
(A) The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate
to a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not
vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.

The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such
power less executive. "Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of
something, the concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, "non-delegable"
means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated,
the
responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an
executive agreement
is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to
enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence
of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.
(B) The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the
scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is
not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine
of operational proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to communications between those who are
operationally proximate to the President but who may have "no direct communications with
her."
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive
branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved
here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in
fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which
the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned in the Decision the
organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice. This goes to
show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in
every case. In determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of
executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of
their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executives organizational structure.
(C) The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a
generalized interest; and in balancing respondent Committees and the
Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents
invocation, through the Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between
respondent Committees specific and demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized
interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former; and (b) in

the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on
her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic
and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in
Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons
for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal
department.
The President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. No
Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and
unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the Presidents decision-making process, which
inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege
can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information
covered by executive privilege. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees,
since they seek to intrude into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather
information which, according to said respondents, would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of
the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not
clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information
sought by the three (3) questions. For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not
critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the
adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this
Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still
come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other
words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all.

With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the

right of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds
nothing in these arguments to support respondent Committees case. This Court did not rule
that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the
NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify
again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely
excludes from the scope of respondents investigation the three (3) questions that elicit
answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to
appear before respondents to answer the said questions.

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the
Office of the President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government
transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to
make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not
bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither
can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right, as provided in Art. III, Sec. 7 of
the Constitution.

IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE

ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES
UNDER THE SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS
LETTERS FOR THE IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL

In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no
specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions
to such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking
transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. National security
matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well as information
on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It
was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they
must be "examined in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
(3)
No. Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the Communications elicited by the
Three Questions are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions. The jurisprudential test laid

JudicialPrivilege

FACTS:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution
Panel manifested in COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses and
almost a thousand documents to be secured from both private and public offices. The
list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court
officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are internal to the
court. The letters asked for the examination of records and the issuance of certified
true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations for
purposes of the Impeachment Complaint. These letters specifically focused
on the following:

a. with respect to the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. case (presently pending on the merits), the
examination of the rollo of the case and the issuance of certified true
copies of the Agenda and the Minutes of the case;
b.with respect to Navarro v. Ermita or the Dinagat case (still pending on the merits),
the examination of the rollo of the case;
c.with respect to Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives
Committee on Justice, et al. (a closed and terminated
case), the examination ofthe rollo of the case; and
d.with respect to League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC, (a closed
and terminated case) the examination of the rollo of the case.
Per its MANIFESTAITON in open court in the impeachment trial of February 7 and 8,
2012, the House Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Court for the
issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the production of
records of cases, and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees of the
Supreme Court to testify on these records and on the various cases. Hon. Presiding
Sen. Judge Enrile denied the request of Prosecution Panel.
Instead of issuing subpoenas as requested, the Hon. Presiding Senator-Judge Juan
Ponce Enrile.
Another subpoena ad testificandum dated February 10, 2012 directs
Clerk of Court Vidal, in the case of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
former First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo to bring with her, for submission
to the Impeachment Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the Prosecution Panel is entitled to the access to court
records
HELD:
Access to Court Records
Generally, Rule 136 Sec 11 grants the access to court records to any persons,
subject to payment of fees and compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the
request be made by a party to the case. However, certain information contained in

the records of cases before the Supreme Court are considered confidential and are
exempt from disclosure.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of the
following:
1. The result of the raffle of cases
Rule 7, Sec.3 of IRSC
2. The actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Courts session
Rule 10 Sec.2 of IRSC
3. The deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending it
The
privilege
against
disclosure
of
these
kinds
of
information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision.
The rules of confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to
freely discuss the issues without fear of humiliation for ones
comments.

To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the

agency must show that the document is both predecisional and
deliberative.

Predicisional when the document precedes the decision to which

it relates or it is made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion
Deliberative it reflects the consultative process; whether
disclosure of information would discourage candid discussion with
the agency

4. Confidential information secured by justices, court officials and

employees in the course of their official functions
5. Records of cases that are still pending for decision
The Court did not grant the request of Prosecution Panel on the examination of
FASAP vs PAL rollo as it is still a pending case and the rollo contains privileged and
confidential materials and the others are still a pending case. Therefore, all the
requested documents cannot be produced. With regard to the rollos of Dinagat case
and Gutierrez vs HR Committee, although closed and terminated, the Court cannot
grant the request as both contains privileged and confidential information. The case

of League of Cities vs. COMELEC is still a pending case and the examination thereof
cannot also be allowed.
The documents directed to be produced by the subpoena duces tecum in the GMA
and Arroyo cases are resolved in accordance with this listing. The witness can only
testify on the documents and records allowed.
Testimony of Justices
Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled to
testify on matters that are part of the internal deliberations and
actions of the Court in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties, while
testimony on matters external to their adjudicatory functions and duties may be
compelled by compulsory processes.

PrivilegeCommunications(Rule130,Section24)
ROSA F. MERCADO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, respondent
A.C. No. 5108, May 26, 2005
Puno, J.
Facts:
Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa C.
Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and became final and executory. In
August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. Two years thereafter,
respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating counsel for
complainant. Respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel, informing the RTC of
Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in substitution of Atty.
de Leon.
On April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public
document) of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married
to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979,
when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on
April 11, 1978.
Rosa F. Mercado(complainant) filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that
respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against
her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client
relationship.
Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between

attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth
which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to
him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said
about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The
birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone
IBP: Respondent was held guilty for violating the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. He recommended for suspension for the practice of law for 1 year.
However, after the IBP ruling. Mercado wrote a letter of desistance to Chief Jutice Davide due
to her forgiveness to Vitriolo but the same was inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent - Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public document
against his former client.
Held:
The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of merit.
Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege,
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship,
and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.
On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose
other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. We then
held that a violation of the confidence would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a
breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in
confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing
party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel

not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of
confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of
seeking legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.
Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the
alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in
general terms and lacked specificity.

MaritalCommunicationPrivilege
LUTWAK ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 66. Argued December 8-9, 1952.
Decided February 9, 1953.
PONENTE:
Justice Minton
FACTS: Petitioner Regina Treitler is the sister of Munio Knoll and Leopold Knoll, and the
petitioner Lutwak is their nephew. Munio Knoll had been married in Poland in 1932 to one
Maria Knoll. There is some evidence that Munio and Maria were divorced in 1942, but the
existence and validity of this divorce are not determinable from the record. At the time of the
inception of the conspiracy, Munio, Maria and Leopold were refugees from Poland, living in
Paris, France, while Regina Treitler and Lutwak lived in Chicago, Illinois. Petitioner Treitler
desired to get her brothers into the United States.
Alien spouses of honorably discharged veterans of World War II were permitted to enter this
country under the provisions of the so-called War Brides Act which provides in pertinent part:
". . . notwithstanding any of the several clauses of section 3 of the Act of February 5, 1917,
excluding physically and mentally defective aliens, and notwithstanding the documentary
requirements of any of the immigration laws or regulations, Executive orders, or Presidential
proclamations issued thereunder, alien spouses or alien children of United States citizens
serving in, or having an honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United
States during the Second World War shall, if otherwise admissible under the immigration laws
and if application for admission is made within three years of the effective date of this Act, be
admitted to the United States".
The first count of the indictment charged that the petitioners conspired to have three honorably
discharged veterans journey to Paris and go through marriage ceremonies with Munio,
Leopold and Maria. The brothers and Maria would then accompany their new spouses to the

United States and secure entry into this country by representing themselves as alien spouses
of World War II veterans. It was further a part of the plan that the marriages were to be in form
only, solely for the purpose of enabling Munio, Leopold and Maria to enter the United States.
The parties to the marriages were not to live together as husband and wife, and thereafter
would take whatever legal steps were necessary to sever the legal ties. It was finally alleged
that the petitioners conspired to conceal these acts in order to prevent disclosure of the
conspiracy to the immigration authorities.
The conspiracy to commit substantive offenses consisted in that part of the plan by which each
of the aliens was to make a false statement to the immigration authorities by representing in
his application for admission that he was married to his purported spouse, and to conceal from
the immigration authorities that he had gone through a marriage ceremony solely for the
purpose of gaining entry into this country with the understanding that he and his purported
spouse would not live together as man and wife, but would sever the formal bonds of the
ostensible marriage when the marriage had served its fraudulent purpose.
Lutwak, a World War II veteran, was selected to marry Maria Knoll, his aunt by marriage. He
went to Paris where he went through a marriage ceremony with Maria. They traveled to the
United States. They represented to the immigration authorities that Maria was the wife of
Lutwak, and upon that representation Maria was admitted. They never lived together as man
and wife, and within a few months Munio and Maria commenced living together in this country
as man and wife, holding themselves out as such. Lutwak, in the meantime, represented
himself to friends as an unmarried man. Lutwak and Maria were divorced.
Lutwak and Mrs. Treitler also found two women - Bessie Benjamin Osborne and Grace
Klemtner - who were honorably discharged veterans of World War II, and who were willing to
marry Munio and Leopold so that the brothers could come to the United States. Bessie
Osborne was introduced to Treitler by Lutwak, and went to Paris accompanied by Treitler.
There she went through a pretended marriage ceremony with Munio Knoll, and on their arrival
at New York City, Munio was admitted on the representation that he was married to Bessie
Osborne. The marriage was never consummated and was never intended to be. The parties
separated after entering the United States, and they never lived together as husband and wife
at any time. Bessie Osborne's suit for divorce from Munio was pending at the time of the trial.
Still later, Grace Klemtner, who was also a World War II veteran and an acquaintance of
Regina Treitler, went to Paris and went through a pretended marriage ceremony with Leopold.
They then traveled to the United States, where Leopold was admitted on December 5, 1947,
upon the representation that he was the husband of Grace Klemtner. They immediately
separated after their entry into this country, and they never lived together as husband and wife
at any time until about the time Grace Klemtner appeared before the grand jury which returned
the indictment. This was approximately April 1, 1950, more than two years after the marriage
ceremony in Paris. Bessie Osborne and Grace Klemtner received a substantial fee for
participating in these marriage ceremonies.

There is an abundance of evidence in this record of a conspiracy to contract spurious, phony

marriages for the purposes of deceiving the immigration authorities and thereby perpetrating a
fraud upon the United States, and of a conspiracy to commit other offenses against the United
States.
Petitioners present three principal contentions: (1) Their conspiracy was not unlawful because
the marriages involved were valid marriages; (2) the trial court erred in permitting the
ostensible wives of these marriages to testify against their so-called husbands; and (3) the trial
court erred in admitting testimony of various acts and declarations of different petitioners, done
and said after the conspiracy had ended, without limiting the evidence to the particular
defendant who performed the act or made the statement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ostensible wives of these marriages may testify against
their so-called husbands.
HELD:
Much of the evidence of the conspiracy comes from the lips of the so-called
wives of these spurious marriages. The next question with which we are confronted is whether
these so-called wives are competent to testify against their purported husbands in this criminal
prosecution and thus incriminate the so-called husbands.
Civil marriage ceremonies were entered into by the parties in Paris as above indicated. Must
these ostensible marriages be recognized as creating spouses in order that the marital
relationship may be claimed to prevent the wives from testifying against the husbands? At
common law the wife could testify neither for nor against her husband in a criminal case, but
since Funk v. United States, the wife may testify in favor of the husband.
A review in the Funk case of the cases in this Court revealed the inconsistencies of the rule
which made a wife incompetent to testify on behalf of her husband, and this Court resolved the
question in favor of competency. The Funk case left the rules of evidence as to the
competency of witnesses to be formulated by the federal courts or Congress in accordance
with reason and experience. There followed the promulgation by this Court of Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads as follows:
"RULE 26. EVIDENCE.
". . . The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be
governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience."
This rule was a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Stone's statement.
Under this rule, the competency of witnesses is to be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts in the light of reason and experience.
The governing principles are not necessarily as they had existed at common law. Congress
has not acted, and has specifically authorized this Court to prescribe rules of criminal
procedure, but the rules do not specifically answer the problem here. Therefore, it is open to us

to say whether we shall go further and abrogate this common-law rule disqualifying one
spouse from testifying in criminal cases against the other spouse.
When the good faith of the marital relation is pertinent and it is made to appear to the trial
court, as it was here, that the relationship was entered into with no intention of the parties to
live together as husband and wife but only for the purpose of using the marriage ceremony in a
scheme to defraud, the ostensible spouses are competent to testify against each other. Here
again, we are not concerned with the validity or invalidity of these so-called marriages. We are
concerned only with the application of a common-law principle of evidence to the
circumstances of this case. In interpreting the common law in this instance, we are to
determine whether "in the light of reason and experience" we should interpret the common
law so as to make these ostensible wives competent to testify against their ostensible
husbands. The reason for the rule at common law disqualifying the wife is to protect the
sanctity and tranquility of the marital relationship. It is hollow mockery for the petitioners in
arguing for the policy of the rule to invoke the reason for the rule and to say to us "the husband
and wife have grown closer together as an emotional, social, and cultural unit" and to speak of
"the close emotional ties between husband and wife" and of "the special protection society
affords to the marriage relationship." In a sham, phony, empty ceremony such as the parties
went through in this case, the reason for the rule disqualifying a spouse from giving testimony
disappears, and with it the rule.
"It has been said so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable
but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions." Funk v. United States.
The light of reason and experience do not compel us to so interpret the common law as
to disqualify these ostensible spouses from testifying in this case. We therefore hold
that in the circumstances of this case, the common-law rule prohibiting antispousal
testimony has no application. These ostensible wives were competent to testify.

AdverseSpousalTestimonyPrivilege
Trammel vs. US
CJ Burger
FACTS:
On March 10, 1976, petitioner Otis Trammel was indicted with two others, Edwin Lee
Roberts and Joseph Freeman, for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and
the Philippine Islands and for conspiracy to import heroin.The indictment also named six
unindicted co-conspirators, including petitioner's wife Elizabeth Ann Trammel.
According to the indictment, petitioner and his wife flew from the Philippines to
California in August 1975, carrying with them a quantity of heroin. Freeman and Roberts
assisted them in its distribution. Elizabeth Trammel then traveled to Thailand where she
purchased another supply of the drug. On November 3, 1975, with four ounces of heroin on
her person, she boarded a plane for the United States. During a routine customs search in
Hawaii, she was searched, the heroin was discovered, and she was arrested. After discussions
with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, she agreed to cooperate with the Government.

Prior to trial on this indictment, petitioner moved to sever his case from that of
Roberts and Freeman. He advised the court that the Government intended to call his wife as
an adverse witness and asserted his claim to a privilege to prevent her from testifying against
him. At a hearing on the motion, Mrs. Trammel was called as a Government witness under a
grant of use immunity. She testified that she and petitioner were married in May 1975 and that
they remained married. She explained that her cooperation with the Government was based
on assurances that she would be given lenient treatment. She then described, in considerable
detail, her role and that of her husband in the heroin distribution conspiracy.
After hearing this testimony, the District Court ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify in
support of the Government's case to any act she observed during the marriage and to any
communication "made in the presence of a third person"; however, confidential
communications between petitioner and his wife were held to be privileged and inadmissible.
The motion to sever was denied.
At trial, Elizabeth Trammel testified within the limits of the court's pretrial ruling; her
testimony, as the Government concedes, constituted virtually its entire case against petitioner.
He was found guilty on both the substantive and conspiracy charges and sentenced to an
indeterminate term of years pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
In the Court of Appeals petitioner's only claim of error was that the admission of the
adverse testimony of his wife, over his objection, contravened this Court's teaching in Hawkins
v. United States, supra, and therefore constituted reversible error.
CA: The Court of Appeals rejected the contention. It concluded that Hawkins did not prohibit
"the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted co-conspirator under grant
of immunity from the Government in return for her testimony."
ISSUE:
May an accused invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as to
exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife.
HELD:
The existing rule in Hawkins case should be modified so that the witness-spouse
alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to
testify nor foreclosed from testifying.
The privilege claimed by petitioner has ancient roots. It sprang from two canons of
medieval jurisprudence: the rule that an accused was not permitted to testify in his own behalf
because of his interest in the proceeding; second, the concept that husband wife were one,
and that since the woman had no recognized separate legal existence, the husband was that
one. The rule evolved into one of privilege, rather than one of absolute disqualification.
The modern justification for the privilege is its perceived role in fostering the harmony
and sanctity of the marriage relationship. The rule has been criticized, and it has been
suggested that it should be modified to protect only private marital communications, modeled
on the privilege between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient.
The American Law Institute in response advocated a privilege for marital confidences, but
rejected a rule vesting in the defendant the right to exclude all adverse testimony of his
spouse. Several state court enacted similar provisions.
The long history of the rule suggests it should not be casually cast aside. This Court
must decide whether the privilege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal

justice. The complete privilege provided by prior precedent is unnecessary to protect

information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital
relationship. Those are privileged under the independent rule protecting confidential marital
communications. The privilege addressed is intended to exclude evidence of criminal acts and
of communications made in the presence of third persons.
The privileges between priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and
patient limit protection to private communications. The ancient foundations for so sweeping a
privilege have long since disappeared. The contemporary justification for allowing such a
privilege is also unpersuasive. If one spouse is willing to testify, their relationship is almost
certainly in disrepair, with little in the way of marital harmony to preserve. It seems far more
likely to frustrate justice than to foster family peace.

FilialPrivilege(Rule130,Section25)
People vs. Invencion
GR No. 131636
5 March 2003
FACTS:
Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil of Sapang
Tagalog Elementary School in Tarlac, Tarlac, testified that he is a halfbrother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law
wife. Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996, while he
was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and two
other younger brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries.
Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a
pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short
pants.
Gloria Pagala, the mother of Cynthia and former common-law
wife of Artemio, testified that she and Artemio started living together in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, in February 1969. Out of their common-law
relationship, they had six children, one of whom was Cynthia. In March
1982, she and Artemio parted ways permanently. Later, Gloria and her
children lived in Pura, Tarlac. When Artemios mother died sometime in
1996, Cynthia lived with Artemio in a small one-room dwelling owned
by Celestino and located in Barangay Sapang Tagalog, Tarlac, Tarlac.7
On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was
pregnant. Gloria then went to the house of Artemio and asked Cynthia

about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually
abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had
done to their daughter Cynthia.
Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she
examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996. She found Cynthia to be
five to six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal
lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock positions, which could have been caused
by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part.
The defense did not present Artemio as a witness. Instead, his
counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the witness stand and
testified for the defense. He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same
day when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00 a.m.,
he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang
Tagalog. The hut was made of sawali. Its door was padlocked, and its
windows were shut. When he went around the house and tried to peep
through the old sawali walls on the front and left and right sides of the
hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his
children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was
dark inside
Gloria Pagala testified that the house where Artemio used to live
was a small hut with some destroyed portions in its sawali walls. When
she went there to visit her children sometime in December 1995, there
was a hole in front and at the sidewall of the hut facing a vacant lot
where people passed by to fish in a nearby brook. 13 When she went to
the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was informed
of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the
huts sawali walls were not yet repaired.
Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a
witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been
disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.16 Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his
but what the prosecution wanted him to say, as the questions asked

were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in

testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Elven is competent?
HELD:
The rule on filial privilege refersto a privilege not to testify,
which can be invoked or waived likeother privileges.As to the
competency of Elven to testify, we rulethat such is not affected by
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt, otherwise known as the rule
on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify
against an ascendant.
The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked
or waived like other privileges. As correctlyobserved by the lower court,
Elven was not compelled to testifyagainst his father; he chose to waive
that filial privilege when hevoluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven
declared that he wastestifying as a witness against his father of his
own accord and only to tell the truth.
HEARSAYEVIDENCE(Rule130,Sections36to47)
DyingDeclaration
G.R. No. 168169
February 24, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY
TABARNERO
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of Gary and Alberto were issued
by the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay
Tanod Alarma. When he was arraigned, he pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime
charged. During this time, Alberto remained at large. Gary admitted having killed

Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense during the pre-trial conference.
An inverted reverse trial ensued.
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the time of his testimony in June 2001,
testified that he stayed in Ernestos house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Jane
were living together. Mary Jane is the daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife of Ernesto.
However, Gary left the house shortly before the incident because of a
misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter allegedly stopped the planned
marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time. Gary was still
allegedly in his house at around 11:40 p.m. with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father,
co-appellant Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his brother, Jeffrey. Overcome with
emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary went to Ernestos house, but
was not able to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead
shouted his pleas from the outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that
caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane up, and voicing out several times that he
loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When he Gary was about to leave, the
gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto was
aiming at Garys head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left
index finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At
that point, Gary felt that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernestos back. Losing
control of himself, Gary took the bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he
cannot recall how many times he did so.
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, "saklolo, tulungan niyo po
ako" three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, co-appellant
Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary, "anak, ano ang nangyari?" To which Gary
responded "nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning," referring to Ernesto. Gary and Alberto
fled, ran, since they were afraid allegedly out of fear. Gary denied that he and Alberto
conspired to kill Ernesto. He claims that it was he and Ernesto who had a fight, and
that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.
Garys sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that she was a childhood friend of Mary
Jane. Gemarie attested that Mary Jane was Garys girlfriend from 1995 to 1999.
Sometime in 1999, Gary and Mary Jane were prevented from talking to each other.
On the night of the incident, Gemarie observed that Gary was crying and seemed
perplexed. Gary told Gemarie that he was going to Ernestos house to talk to Ernesto
about Mary Jane. Gary allegedly did not bring anything with him when he went to
Ernestos house.
In the meantime, Alberto was apprehended. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charge.
However, while Albertos defense is denial and not self-defense like Garys, the court
decided to proceed with the reverse inverted trial, as it had already started that way.
Edilberto Alarma (Alarma), a barangay tanod, testified that while he was in a meeting
at around 4:00 p.m. on April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention to

surrender to him. Gary told him that he was responsible for the "incident happened at
Daang Riles." Together with his co- fellow barangay tanod Zaldy Garcia, Alarma
brought Gary to the Malolos Police Station, where the surrender was entered in the
blotter report.
Appellant Alberto, a construction worker employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia
Builders, was 45 years old at the time of his testimony. He testified that at the time
when of the incident, he was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. However, he went to visit
his children, Gary and Gemarie. Before going to sleep, he realized that Gary was not
in the place where he would usually sleep. When Gary did not show up, he
proceeded to Daang Bakal, where Gary had many friends. He saw Gary and asked
him what happened and why he was in a hurry, to which Gary replied: "Wag na
kayong magtanong, umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya Erning." Alberto and
Gary ran in different directions. Alberto passed through the railways and exited in
front of the capitol compound to wait for a jeepney going to Sta. Maria, his route
toward his home in Norzagaray. He claims that he had no knowledge of the
accusation that he conspired with Gary in killing Ernesto. It was three months after
the incident that he came to know that he was being charged for a crime. At this time,
he was already residing in Pampanga, where he was assigned when his engineer,
Efren Cruz, got secured a project in said place. Later, Alberto learned from his sibling,
whom he talked to by phone, that Gary had already surrendered. He did not consider
surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name, nobody would work to
support his family. He said that he had no previous misunderstanding with Ernesto.
The first to testify for the prosecution was its eyewitness, Emerito Acibar, the brother
of Mary Jane, was inside their house in Daang Bakal with his brother and his
stepfather, Ernesto, at around eleven oclock on the night of the incident. He heard
somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a "kalabog," followed by
Ernestos plea asking for help. Emerito was about to go outside, but, while he was
already at the door of their one-room house, he saw Ernesto being held by a certain
Toning "Kulit" and another person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing Ernesto with
a fan knivesfe. Emerito lost count of the number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto,
but each inflicted more than one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito
shouted for help. The four assailants left when somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to
approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital.
On cross-examination, Emerito confirmed that Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in
Ernestos house. On the date of the incident, however, Gary had already left the
house, while Mary Jane had moved to Abra with Teresita. According to Emerito, his
family did not know that Mary Jane and Gary had a relationship because they treated
Gary like a member of the family. Ernesto got mad when they found out about Gary
and Mary Janes relationship. On the night of the incident, Emerito was fixing his
things inside their house when he heard someone calling from for the outside, but

was not sure if it was Gary. Emerito neither saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor the
fight between Ernesto and Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which happened seven
to eight meters away from the doorway where he was standing him. He was sure that
there were four assailants, two of whom went to a bridge 8 to 10 meters from the
incident, where they boarded a yellow XLT-type car.
SPO2 Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty at the police station on the night
of October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito reported at the police station that
Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito proceeded to the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating room, very
weak due to multiple injuries. While in the presence of the two doctors on duty, SPO2
Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were
the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan.
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified Emerito did not inform them that he
witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him
who the suspects were when Emerito reported the incident, because they
immediately proceeded to the hospital, considering that the victim, Ernesto, was still
alive. Ernesto was not able to affix his signature on the Sinumpaang
Salaysay because he could no longer talk after the fourth question. SPO2 Morales
further stated that he could not remember talking to Emerito on their way to the
hospital, since they were in a hurry. The government physician at the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital who prepared Ernestos death certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad,
clarified that Ernesto died on October 25, 1999. However, considering the admission
by the defense of the fact of death, the cause thereof, and the execution of the death
certificate, the prosecution did not proceed to solicit these facts from no longer
questioned Dr. Trinidad on these matters.
RTC: convicted Gary and Alberto of the crime of murder.
CA: affirmed the conviction with modification as regards exemplary damages
ISSUE: Whether or not Dying declaration of the victim is admissible in court?
SC: While Ernesto was not able to testify in court, his statement is considered
admissible under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule, we held as follows:
"It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by
the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence -- not so much the rapid
eventuation of death -- is at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the
deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents
wounds, or other relevant circumstances."

In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab wounds which caused his death within the
next 48 hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing Gary and Alberto of
stabbing him, his body was already very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his
inability to speak and write towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for
no person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false
accusation. When a person is at the point of death, every motive of falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth. It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak as he was and with his body
already manifesting an impending demise, would summon every remaining strength
he had just to lie about his true assailants, whom he obviously would want to bring to
justice

ResGestae
MARTURILLAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILS.
G.R. No. 163217 Apr. 18, 2006
J. Panganiban
FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Lito Santos, Ernita Pantinople, PO2 Mariano Operario,
Alicia Pantinople and Dr. Danilo Ledesma as its witnesses from whose testimonies,
the following facts were established.
Lito Santos saw his neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople arrive on board a
jeepney from Bunawan, Davao City. Artemio was carrying a truck battery, some corn
bran and rice. They talked for a while concerning their livelihood afterwhich, Artemio
proceeded to connect the battery to the fluorescent lamps in his store. Artemios store
was located about five (5) meters away from Litos house. After installing the battery
to the fluorescent lamps, Artemio sat for a while on a bench located in front of his
store. Then, Cecilia Santos, Litos wife, called him and Artemio for supper. Artemio
obliged. Lito, opting to eat later, served Artemio and Cecilia the food. After eating,
Artemio returned to the bench and sat on it again together with his three (3) children.
Lito was eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a gunshot. From a distance of
about ten (10) meters, he also noticed smoke and fire coming from the muzzle of a
big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping his chest and staggering backwards
to the direction of his (Litos) kitchen. Artemio shouted to him, Help me, Pre, I was
shot by the captain. However, Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting

incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot.Lito did not see the
person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on Artemio.

of the CFO and CAFGU came to help them. Also, no barangay tanod came to offer
them to help.

Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her house
towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground. Ernita was
hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and aking asawa. She
also repeatedly cried for help.Lito then went out of their house and approached
Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk more than five (5) meters from his
house. Some of their neighbors answered Ernitas call for help and approached them.

While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be touched by
anybody. After more than two (2) hours, the police arrived, together with a
photographer who took pictures of the crime scene.

When the shooting incident happened, Litos house was illumined by a lamp. Their
kitchen has no walls. It is an open-type kitchen giving him an unobstructed view of
Artemio who was about five (5) meters away from where he was positioned at that
time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the space in between his house
and the store of Artemio, the same did not block his view of Artemio. Likewise, the
coconut trees and young banana plants growing at the scene of the crime did not
affect his view.
At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her baby.
She suddenly heard the sound of a gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was
shot by the captain. She immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and
saw appellant wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the
direction of the back portion of Litos house. From there, appellant crossed the street
and disappeared.
Ernita saw appellant carrying with him a long firearm which looked like an M-14 rifle.
Ernita also sensed that appellant had some companions with him because she heard
the crackling sound of the dried leaves around the place. Ernita had a clear view of
appellant at that time because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that
night and by the two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store which were switched on at
the time of the incident.
Ernita immediately went out of their house and ran towards Artemio. Artemio tried to
speak to her but he could not do so because his mouth was full of blood. Upon
seeing the pitiful sight of her husband, Ernita shouted several times, Kapitan, ngano
nimo gipatay and akong bana. She also repeatedly called her neighbors for help but
only Lito Santos, Eufemio Antenero, Norman Libre and some residents of Poblacion
Gatungan responded to her calls and approached them. She noted that no member

PO2 Operario, Investigation Officer of the Bunawan Police Station testified that, he
received a report of an alleged shooting incident. Together with SPO1 Estrellan and a
member of the mobile police patrol on board their mobile car, PO2 Operario
proceeded immediately to the crime scene. They found the lifeless body of Artemio
sprawled on the ground. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and informed
him that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting.
Armed with the information that appellant was the one responsible for the shooting of
Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of appellant and informed him that he
was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited appellant to go with him to the
police station and also to bring along with him his M-14 rifle. Appellant did not say
anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and went with the police to the police station
where he was detained the whole night. Appellant did not also give any statement to
anybody about the incident. The following day, appellant was transferred by the
police to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
Alicia Pantinople, sister of Artemio, testified that on the night of November 4, 1998,
she was at home watching television. She heard a gunshot but did not mind it
because she was already used to hearing the sound of guns fired indiscriminately in
their place. Upon hearing the report, Alicia looked for some money thinking that it
might be needed for Artemios hospitalization because she expected Artemio to be
still alive. Artemios two (2) children, namely: Jonel and Genesis who were staying
with her hurriedly left. She then ran to the place where her brother was shot and
found Artemios dead body on the ground surrounded by his four (4) children.
At the Bunawan Police Station, Alicia was informed by the police that appellant was
at Tibungco Police Station. She sent her male cousin to proceed to Tibungco Police
Station to find out if appellant was indeed in the said place. However, her cousin
immediately returned and informed her that appellant was not in Tibungco Police
Station. She then went around the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked
door. When she peeped through the hole of the said door, she saw appellant reclining
on a bench about two and a half (2 ) meters away from the door. Appellants left leg

was on top of the bench while his right leg was on the ground. Appellant was wearing
a brown shirt, black jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing
brown shoes but he had no socks on his feet.
At the police station, Alicia confronted appellant: Nong Listing I know that you can
recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he done wrong
to you?
"Appellant did not answer her. Nevertheless, she was sure that appellant was awake
because he was tapping the floor with his right foot.
"During the trial, Dr. Ledesma, medico-legal officer, explained that Artemio died of a
gunshot wound. The trajectory of the bullet passing through Artemios body indicates
that his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired. Dr.
Ledesma also found the wound of Artemio negative of powder burns indicating that
the assailant was at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his
gun at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio
indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and lungs were
lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food particles indicating that
he had just eaten his meal when he was shot.
Version of the Defense
Marturillas was on his way home in the evening of November 4, 1998. On that same
evening at around 8:30 p.m., he was roused from his sleep at his house by his wife
since the rwo Kagawad wanted to see him. He was informed that a resident of his
barangay, Artemio Pantinople, had just been shot. Petitioner at once ordered his
Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed [Auxiliary])
so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as
the SCAAs were contacted, they proceeded to the crime scene to determine what
assistance they could render.
While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from where
the deceased lay sprawled, Ernita immediately accused Petitioner of having shot her
husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy. Not being able to talk sense with
Ernita Pantinople, Petitioner and his companions backed off to avoid a heated
confrontation. Petitioner instead decided to go back to his house along with his
companions. Upon reaching his house, Petitioner instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo
to contact the Bunawan Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing

the radio frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of
nearby Barangay San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for police
assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later, PO2 Operario
and another police officer arrived at the house of Petitioner and when confronted by
the latter, he was informed that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio.
Upon their invitation, Petitioner immediately went with the said police officers for
questioning at the Bunawan Police Station. He also took with him his governmentissued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition which Petitioner turned
over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. The police blotter showed that
Petitioner surrendered his M-14 rifle with live ammunition to SPO1 Estrellan and PO3
Sendrijas of the Bunawan PNP at around 10:45 p.m. of November 4, 1998.
When the shooting incident was first recorded in the Daily Record of Events of the
Bunawan PNP it was indicated therein that deceased may have been shot by
unidentified armed men.
After the fatal shooting of deceased, Celestino Marturillas was subjected to paraffin
testing by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Davao. The next day, the PNP Crime
Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report regarding the paraffin test results
which found Petitioner NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates based on the following
findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
After preparing all the affidavits of Ernita Pantinople and her witnesses PO2 Mariano
R. Operario Jr., the police officer as[s]igned to investigate the shooting of the
deceased, prepared and transmitted, on November 5, 1998, a Complaint to the City
Prosecution Office recommending that Petitioner be indicted for Murder, attaching
therewith the Sworn Affidavits of Ernita O. Pantinople (Complainant), Lito D. Santos
(witness) and the Sworn Joint Affidavit of SPO1 Rodel Estrellan and PO2 Mariano R.
Operario Jr. of the PNP.
Based on the Affidavits executed by Ernita Pantinople and Lito Santos, then 2nd
Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution on November 5, 1998
finding sufficient evidence to indict Appellant for the crime of Homicide and not
Murder as alleged in Private Complainants Affidavit Complaint.
CA:
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. According to the appellate court, he
was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene immediately

after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he
had been shot by the captain, clearly established the latters complicity in the crime.
No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their
positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, the CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that
they were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or relatives,
and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his alibi and denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be
more credible.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner should be adjudged guilty of the crime when in fact the
paraffin test resulted negative and the type of gun used was not identified.
RULING: Yes, the petitioner is guilty of the crime.
Having established the evidence for the prosecution, we now address the argument
of petitioner that the appellate court had effectively shifted the burden of proof to him.
He asserts that the prosecution should never rely on the weakness of the defense,
but on the strength of its evidence, implying that there was no sufficient evidence to
convict him.
We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to
sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim
immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the
cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence,
coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical
conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.
The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt:
(a) The dying declaration of the victim.

(b) Ernitas testimony that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands
utterance, "Help me pre, I was shot by the captain," then saw petitioner in a
black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while
carrying a firearm.
(c) Ernitas statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?" was
established as part of the res gestae.
(d) The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the
incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go
immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. Instead, he
avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was
already shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just left. This
reaction was very unlikely of an innocent barangay captain, who would
simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first impulse
of innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express their
innocence at the first opportune time.
(e) The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The
victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was
trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This
showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim.
The pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who
shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an eyewitness
saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the
reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. Further establishing
petitioners guilt was the definitive statement of the victim that he had been shot by
the barangay captain.
Clearly, petitioners guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. To be sure,
conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof that, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or
that degree of proof that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
That some pieces of evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they
are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of
reasoning, toward the conviction of petitioner.Circumstantial, vis--vis direct,

evidence is not necessarily weaker. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence described

above satisfies the requirements of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
Paraffin Test
Petitioner takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test done on him. While
they were negative, that fact alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent.
Time and time again, this Court has held that a negative paraffin test result is not a
conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun. In other words, it is possible to fire
a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when culprits wear gloves, wash their
hands afterwards, or are bathed in perspiration. Besides, the prosecution was able to
establish the events during the shooting, including the presence of petitioner at the
scene of the crime. Hence, all other matters, such as the negative paraffin test result,
are of lesser probative value.
Corpus Delicti
Petitioner then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of
gun used in the shooting. Suffice it to say that this contention hardly dents the latters
case. As correctly found by the appellate court, the prosecution was able to give
sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been
committed. Ruled this Court in another case:
"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by the
testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer
to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with the
use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes."

To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner depends heavily on
its failure to present the gun used in the shooting and on the negative paraffin test
result. These pieces of evidence alone, according to him, should exculpate him from
the crime. His reliance on them is definitely misplaced, however. In a similar case,
this Court has ruled as follows:
Finally, as regards petitioners alibi, we need not belabor the point. It was easily, and
correctly, dismissed by the CA thus:
"[Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it
was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. Here, the locus criminis was only several meters away
from [petitioners] home. In any event, this defense cannot be given credence in the
face of the credible and positive identification made by Ernita."

EntriesintheRegularCourseofBusiness
SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ERIC GAN
G.R. No. 150464
June 27, 2006
CORONA, J.:
FACTS: Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner at its Soler Branch in
Santa Cruz, Manila. Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with respondent
wherein the latter would deposit an initial amount in his current account and he could
draw checks on said account provided there were sufficient funds to cover them.
Furthermore, under a special arrangement with petitioners branch manager then, Mr.
Qui, respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another persons
account also within the same branch. Respondent availed of such arrangement
several times by depositing checks in his account and even before they cleared, he
withdrew the proceeds thereof and transferred them to the other account. These
transactions were covered by what were known as "debit memos" since respondent
had no sufficient funds to cover the amounts he transferred.
Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his
account. The overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78. According to petitioner,
respondent refused to heed petitioners repeated demands for payment. For almost 8
years the total obligation of respondent reached P297,060.01, inclusive of interest.7
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover
the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum until fully paid, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs of suit.

Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the
alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and
consent.
RTC: dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioner was not able to prove that
respondent owed it the amount claimed considering that the ledger cards it presented
were merely hearsay evidence.
CA: affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CA erred in not ruling that the ledger cards and the
testimony of Mr. Patricio Mercado constituted the best evidence of the transactions
made by the respondent relative to his account.
HELD:
The entries in the ledger, as testified to by Mercado, were not competent evidence to
prove that respondent consented to the transfers of funds. These entries merely
showed that the transfers were indeed made and that Qui approved them.
Petitioners claim that respondent availed of a special arrangement to transfer funds
from his account to another persons account was a bare allegation that was never
substantiated. Admittedly, Mercado had no personal knowledge of this
arrangement. In fact, when asked about the details of the alleged consent given by
respondent to the transfers, he stated that he could not remember because
respondent talked to Qui and not to him. Petitioner could have presented Qui whom
they alleged allowed the special arrangement with respondent. But it did not.
Neither can we accept petitioners argument that the entries made by Mercado in the
ledger were competent evidence to prove how and when the negative balance was
incurred. Petitioner invokes Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was
in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of
a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly hearsay. Entries in
business records which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate
facts occurring in the ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty
to communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when
they purport to record what were independent agreements arrived at by some bank
officials and a client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary
reports of the official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its
own instance, to substitute the contract as proof of the agreements with third parties,
is to set a dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as an exception to the
hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being used as a source of undue
advantage for the party preparing them.

DeclarationAgainstInterest
Gravadorv.Mamigo
G.R.No.L24989July21,1967
FACTS:
Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary
SchoolinSta.Catalina,NegrosOrientalonAugust15,1964whenhewas
advisedbytheSuperintendentofSchoolsAngelSalazar,Jr.,throughTeodulfo
Dayao,ofhisseparationfromtheserviceonthegroundthathehadreached
thewarrecordswhichincludedthatstatedthathewasbornonNovember26,
1897(Hewasthus66years,8monthsand22daysoldonrecord).
OnAugust31,1964,petitioner,throughaletter,protestedthatthedate
ofhisbirthisnotNovember26,1897,rather,itwasDecember11,1901.
AttachedwastheaffidavitofLazaroBandoquilloandPedroSieneswhowere
theirneighborsasfarbackasduringthelifetimeoftheparentsofpetitioner.

TheCourtofFirstInstanceofNegrosOrientalruledthatGravadorwas
bornonDecember11,1901andorderedhisreinstatement,backwagesand
damagesamountingtoP52,400.RespondentEutiquioMamigo,theDistrict
Supervisor,appealeddirectlytotheSupremeCourt.Mamigoallegedthatit
waserroronthepartofthetrialcourttorelysolelyonpostdateofbirth
these records, respondent contends, were only manufactured since it was
believedthattheoriginalprewarrecordshadbeenlostordestroyed.
ISSUE:
Whetherthetrialcourtcorrectlyreliedonpostwarrecords?
HELD:
Yes.Whileapersoncanhavenopersonalknowledgeofthedateofhis
birth,hemayneverthelesstestifyastohisagewhichhelearnedfromhis
parentsandrelativesandhistestimonyinsuchcaseisanassertionofafamily
tradition.InhisapplicationforbackpayfiledwiththeDepartmentofFinance
andwhenheaskedtheGSISandtheCivilServiceCommissiontocorrectthe
dateofhisbirth,herepeatedlyassertedthathisbirthdaywasonDecember11,
1901.
Acadastralsurveyasfarbackas1924,totheeffectthatthepetitioner
was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a
deceasedrelative,thisstatementisatonceadeclarationregardingpedigree
withintheintendmentandmeaningofsection39ofRule130oftheRulesof
Court.December11,1901isestablishedasthedateofbirthofthepetitioner
notonlybyevidenceoffamilytraditionbutalsobythedeclarationantelitem
motamofadeceasedrelative.
DeclarationAgainstPedigree
FamilyReputationorTraditionRegardingPedigree
CommonReputation
EntriesinOfficialRecords
CommercialList
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.

Hon. SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING and MERALCO

EMPLOYEES and WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondent.
PONENTE:Martinez
FACTS: MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees of MERALCO. On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its
intention to re-negotiate the terms and conditions of their existing 1992-1997
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the remaining period of two years
starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997. MERALCO signified its
willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated October 17, 1995 and formed a
CBA negotiating panel for the purpose. On November 10, 1995, MEWA submitted its
proposal to MERALCO, which, in turn, presented a counter-proposal. Thereafter,
collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However, despite the series of
meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties failed
to arrive at terms and conditions acceptable to both of them.
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region
Branch of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair
labor practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of conciliation meetings but the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Faced with the imminence of a strike,
MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent Petition with the Department of Labor
and Employment praying that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and to enjoin the striking employees to go back to work.
The Labor Secretary granted the petition.
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective memoranda and on August 19,
1996, the Secretary resolved the labor dispute through an Order,containing the
following awards (among others):
ECONOMIC DEMANDS
Wage increase - P2,300.00 for the first year covering the
period from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1996
- P2,200.00 for the second year covering
the period December 1, 1996 to November 30, 1997.
On August 30, 1996, MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction in ordering the grant of a P4,500.00 wage increase, as well as a new

and improved fringe benefits, under the remaining two (2) years of the CBA for the
rank-and-file employees.

HELD: We find, based on our consideration of the parties positions and the evidence
on record, that the Secretary of Labor disregarded and misappreciated evidence,
particularly with respect to the wage award.

MERALCO filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration on September 18,

1995, alleging that the Secretary of Labor did not properly appreciate the effect of the
awarded wages and benefits on MERALCOs financial viability.

We begin with a discussion on the wages issue. The focal point in the consideration
of the wage award is the projected net income for 1996 which became the basis for
the 1996 wage award, which in turn - by extrapolation - became the basis for the (2nd
Year) 1997 award. MERALCO projected that the net operating income for 1996 was
14.7% above the 1999 level or a total net operating income of 4.171 Billion, while the
union placed the 1996 net operating income at 5.795 Billion.

MEWA likewise filed a motion asking the Secretary of Labor to reconsider its Order
on the wage increase, leaves, decentralized filing of paternity and maternity leaves,
bonuses, retirement benefits, optional retirement, medical, dental and hospitalization
benefits, short swing and payroll treatment. On its political demands, MEWA asked
the Secretary to rule its proposal to institute a Code of Discipline for its members and
the unions representation in the administration of the Pension Fund.
On December 28, 1996, the Secretary issued an Order resolving the parties
separate motions, the modifications of the August 19, 1996 Order being highlighted
hereunder:
Economic Demands
2) Wage Increase:
First year - P2,200.00 per month;
Second year - P2,200.00 per month.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed this petition contending that the Secretary of Labor
gravely abused his discretion in awarding wage increases of P2,200.00 for 1996 and
P2,200.00 for 1997 (among others).
The union disputes the allegation of MERALCO that the Secretary abused his
discretion in issuing the assailed orders arguing that he acted within the scope of the
powers granted him by law and by the Constitution. No reversible abuse of discretion
attended the Secretarys decision because the Secretary took all the relevant
evidence into account, judiciously weighed them, and rendered a decision based on
the facts and law. Also, the arbitral award should not be reversed given the
Secretarys expertise in his field and the general rule that findings of fact based on
such expertise is generally binding on this Court.
ISSUE: Did the Secretary properly consider and appreciate the evidence presented
before him?

MERALCO based its projection on the increase of the income for the first 6 months of
1996 over the same period in 1995. The union, on the other hand, projected that the
1996 income would increase by 29% to 35% because the consumption of electric
power is at its highest during the last two quarters with the advent of the Yuletide
season. The union likewise relied heavily on a newspaper report citing an estimate
by an all Asia capital financial analyst that the net operating income would amount to
5.795 Billion.
We find after considering the records that the Secretary gravely abused his discretion
in making this wage award because he disregarded evidence on record. Where he
considered MERALCOs evidence at all, he apparently misappreciated this evidence
in favor of claims that do not have evidentiary support. To our mind, the MERALCO
projection had every reason to be reliable because it was based on actual and
undisputed figures for the first six months of 1996.On the other hand, the union
projection was based on a speculation of Yuletide consumption that the union failed
to substantiate. In fact, as against the unions unsubstantiated Yuletide consumption
claim, MERALCO adduced evidence in the form of historical consumption data
showing that a lengthy consumption does not tend to rise during the Christmas
period. Additionally, the All-Asia Capital Report was nothing more than a
newspaper report that did not show any specific breakdown or computations.
While the union claimed that its cited figure is based on MERALCO s 10-year
income stream, no data or computation of this 10-year stream appear in the
record.
While the Secretary is not expected to accept the company-offered figures wholesale
in determining a wage award, we find it a grave abuse of discretion to completely
disregard data that is based on actual and undisputed record of financial
performance in favor of the third-hand and unfounded claims the Secretary eventually
relied upon. At the very least, the Secretary should have properly justified his

disregard of the company figures. The Secretary should have also reasonably
insured that the figure that served as the starting point for his computation had some
substantial basis.
The All Asia Capital report upon which the Union relies to support its position
regarding the wage issue cannot be an accurate basis and conclusive
determinant of the rate of wage increase. Section 45 of Rule 130 Rules of
Evidence provides:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest
to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or
other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any
relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein.
Under the afore-quoted rule, statement of matters contained in a periodical,
may be admitted only "if that compilation is published for use by persons
engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them
therein." As correctly held in our Decision dated January 27, 1999, the cited
report is a mere newspaper account and not even a commercial list. At most, it
is but an analysis or opinion which carries no persuasive weight for purposes
of this case as no sufficient figures to support it were presented. Neither did
anybody testify to its accuracy. It cannot be said that businessmen generally
rely on news items such as this in their occupation. Besides, no evidence was
presented that the publication was regularly prepared by a person in touch
with the market and that it is generally regarded as trustworthy and reliable.
Absent extrinsic proof of their accuracy, these reports are not admissible.6 In
the same manner, newspapers containing stock quotations are not admissible
in evidence when the source of the reports is available.7 With more reason,
mere analyses or projections of such reports cannot be admitted. In particular,
the source of the report in this case can be easily made available considering
that the same is necessary for compliance with certain governmental
requirements.

LearnedTreaties
TestimonyorDepositionataFormerProceeding
OPINIONRULE(Rule130,Section48and49)
TURADIO DOMINGO VS. DOMINGO

QUISIMBING, J.
FACTS: Bruno B. Domingo, a widower and retired military man, was the registered
owner, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 128297, issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, of a house and lot with an area of 269.50 square
meters, located at 34 H. Honrubia St., Project 4, Quezon City.
In December 1970, Bruno needed money for his medical expenses, so he
sold said properties. On December 28, 1970, he signed a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the abovementioned properties to his children Leonora, Nuncia, Abella,
and Jose for a consideration of P10,000. The deed was witnessed by Concesa
Ibaez and Linda Noroa and notarized by Atty. Rosauro V. Noroa.
Jose then brought the deed to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, as a
result of which TCT No. 128297 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. 247069 was
issued in the names of the vendees. Bruno Domingo died on April 6, 1975.
Sometime in 1981 petitioner, Turadio Domingo, who by then was residing on
the disputed property, received a notice from the Quezon City Hall declaring him a
squatter and directing him to demolish his shanty on the lot. Petitioner found out that
the planned demolition was at the instance of his brother, Jose and sister, Leonora.
Sometime in 1986, petitioner learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of
Absolute Sale when an ejectment suit was filed against him. Upon advice of his
counsel, he had the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP,
now Philippine National Police or PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon
City compare the signature of Bruno on the said deed against specimen signatures of
his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned Document Report No. 19286 to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard signatures were
written by two different persons. Another Questioned Document Report, No. 007-89,
subsequently issued by the police came up with the same conclusion.
Petitioner filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and
falsification by private individuals against his siblings and Atty. Noroa before the
public prosecutor of Quezon City. But after it conducted an examination of the
questioned documents, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) came up with the
conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen signatures were written
by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. The public prosecutor dismissed
the criminal complaint on June 22, 1989. Petitioner appealed the order of dismissal
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) but the latter affirmed the prosecutors action. A
similar criminal complaint filed by petitioner before the public prosecutor of Manila
was likewise dismissed. On October 23, 1989, petitioner instituted Civil Case before
the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale,
reconveyance of the disputed property, and cancellation of TCT. Petitioner alleged
that Bruno B. Domingos signature on the deed in question was forged. He likewise

averred that the sale was done in violation of the restriction annotated at the back of
Brunos title, to the effect that prior approval of the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) was needed to effect any sale.
In their answer, private respondents relied heavily on the findings of the NBI
that Bruno B. Domingos signature on the deed was genuine, and hence, the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not a forgery.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint. It disregarded the conflicting reports of the the police
crime laboratory and the NBI for failure of the offering party or parties to show that
the standard or specimen signatures were indeed those of Bruno Domingo.
(Petitioner filed a motion for new trial in the CA on the ground of newly discovered
evidence consisting of a letter of Bruno requesting PHHC permission to mortgage the
house and lot and such letter of PHHC approving the said request.)
CA: Denied the motion for new trial the court noted that there was no showing
whatsoever that the letter-request could not have been discovered and produced
prior to the trial below by the exercise of reasonable diligence andis of such a
character as would probably change the result.It likewise pointed out that both the
motion for new trial and the supplemental motion for new trial were not accompanied
by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly
discovered evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo err when it held that the trial court correctly
applied the rules on evidence in disregarding the the conflicting PC-INP and NBI
questioned document reports.
HELD:
The SC sustained the decision of the lower court. In finding that the trial court
correctly disregarded the PC-INP crime laboratory questioned report the appellate
court observed that the signature of Bruno Domingo in the letter to the Bureau of
Treasury (April 1, 1958) and Republic Bank check (Nov. 2, 1962) precede more than
8 years from the questioned deed which was executed in December 30,1970.
The passage of time and a persons increase in age may have decisive
influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in order to bring about an accurate
comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible
in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the appellate court,
the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to the
foregoing standard. Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police
experts were on documents executed several years apart. A signature affixed in
1958 or in 1962 may involve characteristics different from those borne by a signature
affixed in 1970.
The SC also sustained the rulings of the lower court on the testimonies of
Clerma Domingo, Leonora, and Jose to the effect that they saw Bruno affixing his
signature to the questioned deed. They were unrebutted. Genuineness of a

handwriting may be proven, under Rule 132, Section 22, by anyone who actually saw
the person write or affix his signature on a document.
Finally the SC ruled that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present
case is a notarized document. Being a public document, it is prima facie evidence of
the facts therein expressed. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to
contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant. Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in
this case.
***Under the Rules of Court (Rule 132, Sec.22), the genuineness of a
handwriting may be proved by the following:
(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument;
(2)
A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion
thereon, such opinion being an exception to the opinion rule;
(3)
A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted
genuine specimen thereof; and
(4) Expert evidence.

CHARACTEREVIDENCE(Rule130,Section51)
PEOPLE VS. NOEL LEE
PUNO, J.
FACTS: At 9 in the evening of September 29, 1996, Herminia Marquez (46 years old) and her
son Joseph (26 years old) were in the living room of their house in Caloocan City, watching a
basketball game on television. Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was
on her left. Across her, Joseph sat on a sofa against the wall and window of their house.
Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her complete
surprise, she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She
looked up and saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the
gun aimed at Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window,
and simultaneously appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as Lee fired a second shot and 3 shots more. Herminia
turned to her son, dragged his body to the door and shouted for help. With the aid of her
neighbor and kumpare, Herminia brought Joseph to the MCU Hospital where he later died.
Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident. Herminia
told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. She proceeded to the Caloocan City Police
Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting.
Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant however it was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. Herminia appealed the order of dismissal to the Secretary of
Justice. In a letter dated March 16, 1998, Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III reversed and

set aside the appealed Resolution and ordered the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City to file an
information for murder against the accused-appellant. Accordingly, the Information was filed
and a warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant on June 8, 1998. On October 16,
1998, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Appellant is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending
against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted
murder in 1989
DEFENSE OF NOEL LEE: He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00
to 10:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996, he was in his house. He was having some
drinks with his neighbor, Orlando Bermudez, and his driver, Nelson Columba. They were
enjoying themselves, drinking and singing with the videoke. Also in the house were his wife,
children and household help. At 10:00 P.M., Orlando and Nelson went home and accusedappellant went to sleep. He woke up at 5:30 in the morning of the following day and learned
that Joseph Marquez, a neighbor, was shot to death. To appellants surprise, he was tagged as
Josephs killer.
He said that he had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks
apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, Lee caught Joseph inside his car trying to steal his car stereo. Joseph
scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, appellant presented a letter
handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to the mayor, and sent through PO3 Willy
Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter, Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor
for rehabilitation because he was hooked on shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief.
RTC: It was found that accused-appellant was guilty of murder.
On automatic review to the SC: The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the
credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims
that the trial court should not have accepted Herminias testimony because it is biased,
incredible and inconsistent.
The lone eyewitness account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr. Rosalie
Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot woundsone to the right of the
forehead, and the other, to the left side of the back of the victims head.
Noel Lee makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges that the
victims drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of the
persons from whom he had stolen. As proof of Josephs bad character, he presented
Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from
drugs. On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied
anything about her sons thievery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the character evidence which alleges the bad reputation of the victim is
admissible
RULING: No, it is not admissible as evidence in this case.
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:-(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent
to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability or improbability of the offense charged.
As a general rule, the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. If the issues in
the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the
parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual
inquiry into the merits of the case.
Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in this rule in both criminal and civil cases.
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
the accused. And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged, meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of
the act charged.
Sub-paragraph (3) refers to the character of the offended party. Character evidence, whether
good or bad, of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable
degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. Such evidence is most
commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or homicide case or a claim
of consent in a rape case
In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations:
(1) as evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the
accused. The aggressive, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining
whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. When the evidence tends to prove
self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it

produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable
conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary.
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to
determine the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that
the victim was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the
hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that
because of the victims bad character he could have been killed by any one of those from
whom he had stolen is pure and simple speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman, a murder case, the defense
tried to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon
objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:
While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense, such is not necessary in the crime of murder
where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character
may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary (Moran)
In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through
treachery and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph
was sitting in his living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the
window and, without any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all
for the victim to defend himself or retaliate against his attacker. The presence of this
aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victims bad character to
establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time, qualifies
the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.

CharacterofAccusedandVictim
Michelsonvs.UnitedStates
335US469 (1948)
FACTS:
In1947Michelsonwasconvictedofbribingafederalrevenueagent.
Thedefendant,asawitnessonhisownbehalf,admittedpassingthemoney

but claimed it was done in response to the agent's demands, threats,

solicitations, and inducements that amounted to entrapment. On direct
examinationofdefendant,hisowncounselbroughtoutthat,in1927,hehad
beenconvictedofamisdemeanorhavingtodowithtradingincounterfeit
watchdials.
On crossexamination it appeared that in 1930, in executing an
applicationforalicensetodealinsecondhandjewelry,heanswered'No'to
thequestionwhetherhehadtheretoforebeenarrestedorsummonedforany
offense.
Defendantcalledfivewitnessestoprovethatheenjoyedagoodreputation.
Twoofthemtestifiedthattheiracquaintancewithhimextendedoveraperiod
ofaboutthirtyyearsandtheotherssaidtheyhadknownhimatleasthalfthat
long.
WitnessesclaimthattheyneverhadheardanythingagainstMichelson.
Oncrossexamination,fourofthewitnesseswereasked,insubstance,this
question: 'Did you ever hear that Mr. Michelson on March 4, 1927, was
convictedofaviolationofthetrademarklawinNewYorkCityinregardto
watches?' This referred to the twentyyearold conviction about which
defendanthimselfhadtestifiedondirectexamination.Twoofthemhadheard
ofitandtwohadnot.
Tofourofthesewitnessestheprosecutionalsoaddressedthequestion
iftheyheardthatMichelsonwasarrestedforstolengoodswhichthewitnesses
did not know of. Defendant objected to the question which the court
thereafterruledthattheallowanceofwhichisclaimedtobereversibleerror.
ISSUE:
WONtheprosecutionhastherighttocrossexaminethecharacterwitnesses
ofthedefendantMichelson.
HELD:
Yes.Judgmentisaffirmed.
The prosecution may crossexamine the defendants character
witnessesastothecontentsandetentofthehearsaywheretheybasetheir
conclusionsWHENthedefendantputshisreputationtoissue.Therightto

inquireintothereputationorcharacterofthedefendantisdeniedtotheState
butisavailabletothedefendantbecausecharacterisrelevantinresolving
probabilitiesofguilt.Hemayintroduceaffirmativetestimonythatthegeneral
estimateofhischaracterissofavorablethatthejurymayinferthathewould
not be likely to commit the offense charged. This privilege is sometimes
valuabletoadefendantforthisCourthasheldthatsuchtestimonyalone,in
somecircumstances,maybeenoughtoraiseareasonabledoubtofguiltand
that in the federal courts a jury in a proper case should be so instructed.
(Edgingtonv.UnitedStates,164U.S.361,17S.Ct.72,41L.Ed.467.)
Whenthedefendantelectstoinitiateacharacterinquiry,notonlyishe
permittedtocallwitnessestotestifyfromhearsay,butindeedsuchawitness
isnotallowedtobasehistestimonyonanythingbuthearsay.
Inthiscase,thecrimeinquiredaboutwasreceivingstolengoods;the
trial was for bribery. The Court of Appeals thought this dissimilarity of
offensestoogreattosustaintheinquiryinlogic,thoughconcedingthatitis
authorizedbypreponderanceofauthority.ItasksustosubstitutetheIllinois
rulewhichallowsinquiryaboutarrest,butonlyforverycloselysimilarifnot
identicalcharges.
Thegoodcharacterwhichthedefendanthadsoughttoestablishwas
broader than the crime charged and included the traits of 'honesty and
truthfulness' and 'being a lawabiding citizen.' Possession of these
characteristicswouldseemasincompatiblewithofferingabribetoarevenue
agentaswithreceivingstolengoods.Thecrimesmaybeunlike,butbothalike
proceed from the same defects of character which the witnesses said this
defendantwasreputednottoexhibit.Itisnotonlybycomparisonwiththe
crimeontrialbutbycomparisonwiththereputationassertedthatacourtmay
judgewhetherthepriorarrestshouldbemadesubjectofinquiry.Bythistest
theinquirywaspermissible.
UnitedStatesvs.Nixon,SnoddyandGilbreth
777F.2d958 2December1985
FACTS:

David Paige, a DEA agent posing as a drug dealer, used three

confidentialinformants;JamesMcMillan,DonaldSmith,andJamesMarshall,
to garner information about illicit drug dealing activity by the three
defendants; Donald Gilbreth, David Snoddy, and Arthur Tommy Nixon.
DefendantsGilbrethandSnoddywereintroducedtoDonaldSmithandJames
McMillan, two of the CIs, in the late summer of 1983. The CIs led the
defendants to DEA agents posing as bigtime drug smugglers. Several
meetingsbetweenthedefendantsandtheundercoveragentsoccurred.Paige
and another agent, met with defendants Snoddy, Gilbreth, and Nixon on
November 21, 1983, in Hammond, Louisiana, to further discuss the
transaction.Severalarrangementsweremadethatday.Thedownpaymentfor
the42,000poundsofmarijuanawassetat$200,000butthecondominiumsin
Destin,Floridawouldbepartofthedeal.DefendantsSnoddy,Gilbreth,and
Nixonhadalsoindicatedthattheywantedtoseethemarijuanabeforebuying
it. After inspecting the weed, defendants Snoddy and Gilbreth signed a
documenttransferringownershipofthecondominiumsinDestin,Floridato
AgentPaige.DefendantNixonwasresponsibleforsendinganeighteenwheel
tractortrailertopickupthemarijuanaandtransportittoafarminCorinth,
Mississippiforsafekeeping.ThepartiesagreedthatoneofPaige'sassociates
wouldstayatthefarminCorinthtoprotectPaige'sinvestment.OnNovember
27,1983,uponhisarrivalatHammond,Louisiana,NixontoldAgentsPaige
andRuggeriothattwotruckdriversandatruckwerewaitingnearbyatthe
HammondHolidayInntoloadthemarijuana.Thenumberoftheroomthe
driverswereinwouldbeetchedinthedirtonthetruckdoor.Whenhewas
arrested,Nixonwascarrying$50,000cashandthedeeds totwofarmshe
ownedinAlabamaandTennessee.AgentRuggerioproceededtotheHoliday
InnwherehefoundthetruckdescribedbyNixon.Thetruckdrivers were
arrestedastheylefttheirhotelroomtogotothefarm.DefendantsSnoddyand
Gilbreth,whowerenotpresentinHammond,Louisiana,atthetime,were
arrested later. The defendants were charged with conspiring to commit an
offenseagainsttheUnitedStates,travelingininterstatecommerceinaidofan
unlawful enterprise, aiding a principal in the commission of an offense,

attemptedpossessionofacontrolledsubstance,Andusingacommunication
facilityinthecommissionofafelony.
OntheninthdayoftrialdefendantsGilbrethandSnoddyputonthree
character witnesses who had business dealings with these two defendants.
Twoofthewitnesses,ScottRayandWilliamPhipps,bankofficers atthe
BankofLexingtonandtheSouthernBankofLauderdaleCountyrespectively,
knewdefendantsSnoddyandGilbrethbecauseofcertainloanstakenoutby
themthrougheachofthebanks.Thethirdwitness,RogerPettus,wasinthe
automobile business but also had overlapping business interests with
defendantsSnoddyandGilbreth.OneofdefendantGilbreth'sbusinesseswas
theleasingofacustomizedbustotravelingmusicstars.Thepurchaseofone
particular bus was financed by a purchase money loan from the Bank of
Lexington.ScottRay,anofficerofthebank,knewthatthebusservedas
collateral for the loan but he did not know any specifics about the bus.
WilliamPhippsandRogerPettusknewthatoneofGilbreth'sbusinesseswas
theleasingofthisbustomusicstarsbutknewlittleelseaboutit.
OncrossexaminationofScottRay,theprosecutingattorneyaskedthe
witnesswhetherheknewifthebuswas"usedtotransportlargequantitiesof
cocaine."Defensecounselreactedbyquestioningthegovernment'sgoodfaith
basisforsuggestingthatfacttothejury.Thegovernmentintimatedthatithad
abasisinfactforaskingthequestionandthatitwouldprovideittothecourt.
Atapostverdictbondhearingforthedefendants,thegovernmentproduced
twopicturesthathadbeenseizedbyAlabamalawenforcementofficersatthe
home of defendant Snoddy's brother pursuant to a search warrant for
marijuanaunrelatedtothechargesmadeinthiscase.Thepicturesdepicted
severalpersonsinsidesomekindofvehiclehandlingwhatappearedtobe
cocaine. Defense counsel placed the U.S. Attorney on the stand to elicit
testimonyabouthergoodfaithbasisforhavingaskedquestionsaboutthe
transportation of cocaine on a bus owned by defendant Gilbreth. At this
hearingitdevelopedthatthepicturestheprosecutingattorneyreliedonasa
goodfaithbasishadapparentlybeentakenbeforeGilbrethhadeverownedthe
bus.Itturnedoutthatthepictureshadnotbeentakeninsideabus,ratherthey

apparentlyhadbeentakeninsideaconvertedrailwaycarlocatedoutsidethe
ChattanoogaChooChooHiltoninChattanooga,Tennesseeandrentedoutas
lodgingbythehotel.TheU.S.Attorneyalsotestified,however,thatshehad
reliedonhearsaystatementsbycertainAlabamapoliceofficersfamiliarwith
thedefendantstotheeffectthatdefendantSnoddyhadtransportedcocaineon
bussesthatwereleasedouttomusiccelebrities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis for asking three
defensecharacterwitnesseswhethertheyknewthatdefendantsSnoddyand
Gilbrethtransportedcocaineonabusownedbythem.
HELD:
No,theprosecutordidnotlackgoodfaith.Thegovernmenthadagood
faithbasisforaskingthequestions.

Wewillnotlaunchintoadiscourseonthepracticalandtheoretical
underpinningsofthelawofevidencethatallowsaprosecutingattorneyto
probeadefensecharacterwitness'sfamiliaritywiththedefendantbyasking
questionsaboutpurportedpriorbadactsofthedefendant.Wenoteonlythat
thepotentialforabusehere,bywaftingbeforethejury"didyouknow?"type
questionsthathavenobasisinfactbutwhichcanbefataltothedefendant,
has led to the imposition oftwo safeguards that should be complied with
beforesuchquestionsmaybeaskedinthepresenceofajury.First,thealleged
badactmusthaveabasisinfactandsecond,theincidentsinquiredaboutmust
berelevanttothecharactertraitsatissueinthetrial.Thatdoesnotmeanthat
thebasisinfactmustbeprovedasafactbeforeagoodfaithinquirycanbe
made.Thegovernmentshouldhavelaidafoundationoutofthepresenceof
thejurybeforeaskingthesequestions,togivethejudgeanopportunitytorule

ontheproprietyofaskingthem.Defensecounselattemptstomakemuchof
thefactthattheprosecutingattorneyerredinherevaluationofthepictures.
Nonetheless,afterhearingargumentandevidencefrombothparties
thedistrictcourtfoundthatthegovernmenthadagoodfaithbasisforasking
thequestions.Thecourtfurtherfoundthatevenifthequestionsbasedonthe
photographs should nothave been asked, there was sufficient independent
evidenceofguilttosupportthejuryverdictandtheerror,ifany,didnothave
asubstantialadverseimpactonthejury'sverdict.Weseenoreasontodisturb
thisfinding.

UnitedStatesvs.Jackson
549F.3d963 17November2008
FACTS:
Jackson,aprisoner,arguedwithanotherinmate,Brown,whileathird
inmate,Gulley,watched.Afightbrokeout.Thethreewererunningfromthe
yard,wheretheargumentstarted,toacell,whereJacksonorGulleyallegedly
held Brown as the other attacked him with a shank (a homemade knife).
Jackson and Gulley left the cell walking in opposite directions. Brown,
bleedingprofusely,collapsedandwassoonpronounceddead.
JacksonhadBrownsbloodonhisclothesandaninjurytohispalm
consistentwithrecentuseofashank.Hewasapprehended.Hewasplacedin
a special housing unit.Whileheldbysecurity, hetriedtoflushgambling
paraphernaliadownthetoilet.Whenguardstriedtoplaceanotherinmatein
the special housingunit withhim, hetold officials that hewould kill the
inmateiftheinmatewerenotremoved,sayingifyoudon'tbelieveme,look
atthesecuritytapes,I'llkillagain.JacksonclaimedthatBrownpulledouta
shank.
The government contended that Brown was unarmed and only
attemptedtobeginafistfight.ThedistrictcourtconvictedJacksonformurder
andpossessionofadangerousweaponinprisonandsentencedhimtodeath.

Atsentencing,thegovernmentpresentedevidenceofJacksonother
convictions,includingmultiplecountsofarmedrobberyandvariousfirearms
charges,andtestimonyabouthispoordisciplinaryrecordinprison.Anexpert
witness for the government who had conducted psychiatric evaluations of
Jackson testified that there was a high probability that he would commit
violentcrimesinthefuture.
Jackson presented evidence of a poor home life growing up, low
intelligence,posttraumaticstressdisorder,andinstitutionalization.Healso
notedthatthegovernmenthadnotsoughtthedeathpenaltyagainstGulley,
and he submitted an apology he had written for his most recent armed
robbery.JacksonalsoapologizedtoBrownsfamily,thoughheblamedBrown
forstartingthefight.Jacksonexplained,IjustwantedtostabBrown.Ididn't
wanttokillhim.Todemonstratethatheactedinselfdefense,Jacksontried
tointroduceBrownsprisondisciplinaryrecordsintoevidence.
Thedistrictcourtbarredtheevidence,rulingthatitshouldbeadmitted
only if Jackson could prove that he had knowledge of the specific acts
describedbytherecords.Jacksonnowcontendsthatthatrulingwasimproper
anddeprivedhimoftheabilitytopresentacompletedefense.
ISSUE:
WhetherBROWNSprisondisciplinaryrecordswereadmissibleinevidence
andJacksonwasdeprivedtopresentacompletedefense.
HELD:
No. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), character evidence is
generally not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewithonaparticularoccasionTherulesmakeanexception,however,
andpermittheintroductionofevidenceofapertinenttraitofcharacterofthe
allegedvictimofthecrimeofferedbyanaccused
Such a trait of character may be demonstrated by presenting
evidence of the victim's reputation. On the other hand, testimony about
specificinstancesofconductmaybeusedonlyifthecharacteroratraitof
characterofapersonisanessentialelementofacharge,claim,ordefense

Brown's propensity for violence is a pertinent trait of character,

becauseitsupportsJackson'sargumentthatBrownwasthefirstaggressor.
Accordingly,thecourtallowedextensivetestimonyonBrown'sreputationin
theprisoncommunity.
ThedisciplinaryrecordsthatJacksonattemptedtointroduce,however,
involved specific instances of conduct. Under Rule 405, such evidence is
admissible only if Brown's violent character was an essential element of
[Jackson's]defense.
Brown'spriorspecificactswerenotadmissibletoprovehisalleged
inclinationforviolence.First,theplainlanguageofRule405(b)limitstheuse
of conduct to prove essential elements of a charge or defense. Second,
Brown'scharacterwasnotanessentialelementoftheselfdefenseclaiminthe
strict sense because a selfdefense claim may be proven regardless of
whetherthevictimhasaviolentorpassivecharacter.
Jackson cites Holmes v. South Carolina, which declared
unconstitutionalanevidencerulethatthedefendantmaynotintroduceproof
ofthirdpartyguiltiftheprosecutionhasintroducedforensicevidencethat
strongly supports a guilty verdict. Evidentiary rules are given so much
weightunlesstheyprejudicialtoasubstantialinterestoftheaccusedandare
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they serve. By limiting the
admissibilityofspecificacts,rules404and405servethelegitimateinterestof
ensuring that juries do not acquit or convict on impermissibly prejudicial
grounds, but those rules allow limited exceptions where more context is
necessary in the interest of justice.This careful balance is hardly
disproportionate or arbitrary, and Jackson provides no argument to the
contrarybeyondassertion.
Thedisciplinaryrecordswouldnotbeevenarguablyrelevantunless
theydemonstratedthattheguardshadinfactcaughtBrownwithashank.
Oftherecordsrelatedtoviolence,onedocumentsanincidentinwhichBrown
threwhotcoffeeonaguard,andtheotherreportsthathethreatenedtostaba
guard.Intheremainingrecords,onlytwoinvolvedshanks.Anyrelationship

betweenthesubjectandtheprofferedevidencewasweakorunsubstantiated
atbest,andthecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninexcludingit.

EvidenceofOtherBadActs
Boyd vs. US
142 US 450 Jan. 4, 1892
J. Harlan
FACTS:
Boyd and Standley were indicted for the murder of Dansby as charged in the first
count. In the night of Apr. 6, 1890, Boyd, Standley and Davis called to the ferryman, Martin
Byrd, to come and set them over the creek. Byrd protested that he did not like to do work of
that kind after dark, but finally consented to get the key of the boat and take them across the
creek. He went to his house, avowedly to obtain the key, and after remaining away some time,
returned, accompanied by Dansby, Joseph Byrd, and Richard Butler, each with weapons.
When Martin Byrd reached the ferry boat and was about to unlock the chain by which it was
held fast -- Boyd being at the time in the rear end of the boat, while Davis and Standley were
sitting upon the bank of the creek -- Davis said to him, "Lay down that chain, and throw out
your rusty change." Upon Byrd's saying, "Don't you want to cross?" Davis, holding his pistol
upon Byrd, replied, with an oath, "No, it's your money we're after." Dansby started toward Byrd,
and was shot in the back by Boyd. When Davis presented his pistol at Martin Byrd, the latter,
dropping upon his knees, drew a pistol. The ball from Davis' pistol passed over Byrd's head,
but Davis was shot by Byrd, and died instantly. The firing immediately became general. Butler
shot Boyd in the back, Standley shot at Joseph Byrd, but was himself slightly wounded by a
shot from the latter's pistol. Boyd, although badly wounded, went up the creek some little
distance, but, being followed, was secured and carried to Martin Byrd's house as a prisoner.
He remained there until he was arrested by an officer upon the charge of having murdered
Dansby. Standley escaped, and it was some time before he was arrested. Dansby lived a few
days only, and died at Martin Byrd's house from the wounds inflicted upon him on the above
occasion.
The defendants contended that while Boyd was sitting in the boat, and Standley and
Davis on the bank, the ferryman and his party came around with Winchester rifles and
revolvers, and before they suspected anything, had leveled their guns on him and Davis, and
told them to give up their pistols; that they had the description of some men that had robbed
Judge Taylor; that he handed up his pistol, which they took, and Davis drew his out, but
whether to comply or to resist he does not know; that they fired on Davis and killed him; that he
turned, and as he did so, was shot in the shoulder, and fell, the ball remaining under the point
of the shoulder blade; that they ran after Boyd, and while they were gone, he picked up Davis'
pistol and ran off and hid."

The principal witness for the prosecution at the trial was Martin Byrd. When presented
as a witness, the defendants objected to him as incompetent by reason of the fact that he had
been convicted of the crime of larceny and sentenced to the penitentiary. However, as
requested by the District Attorney, he was given a full and unconditional pardon for serving out
his term of 1 year and for good behavior. This request was for the purpose of restoring his
competency as a witness in a murder trial.
The principal assignments of error relate to the admission, against the objection of the
defendants, of evidence as to several robberies committed prior to the day when Dansby was
shot and which, or some of which at least, had no necessary connection with, and did not in
the slightest degree elucidate, the issue before the jury -- namely, whether the defendants
murdered John Dansby on the occasion of the conflict at the ferry. This evidence tended to
show that in the night of March 15, 1890, Standley, under the name of Henry Eckles, robbed
Richard C. Brinson and Samuel R. Mode; that in the afternoon of March 17, 1890, he and
Boyd robbed Robert Hall; that in the night of March 20, 1890, Standley, under the name of
John Haynes, together with Davis, robbed John Taylor, and that in the evening of April 5, 1890,
Davis, Boyd, and Standley robbed Rigsby's store. In relation to these matters, the witnesses
went into details as fully as if the defendants had been upon trial for the robberies they were,
respectively, charged by the evidence with having committed. The admissibility of this
evidence was attempted to be sustained in part upon the ground that Martin Byrd and his
crowd, having the right to arrest (as citizens) the parties guilty of the robberies, were entitled to
show that the robberies had been in fact committed by the defendants. While the evidence
tended to show that Martin Byrd had information, prior to April 6, 1890, of the Taylor robbery,
and of Taylor having offered a reward for the arrest and conviction of the guilty parties, there is
nothing to show that he or his associates had ever heard, before the meeting at the ferry, of
the robberies of Brinson, Mode, Hall, and Rigsby. It aimed to prove that the defendants and
Davis were all engaged in it and were together only the night before Dansby was shot, tended
not only to identify Standley and Boyd, but to show that they came to the ferry for the same
purpose with which they went to Rigsby's house -- namely, to rob and plunder for their joint
benefit, and consequently that each defendant was responsible for Dansby's death if it resulted
from the prosecution of their felonious purpose to rob.
The evidence shows that goods were found upon the person of one of these parties
who was present at this ferry when the killing of Dansby took place that were sworn to by
Rigsby as having been taken by the three parties -- the man Davis or Myers and these two
defendants -- from his store.
A motion for new trial was denied. They were condemned to suffer the punishment of
death.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence as to the several robberies committed prior to the
murder should be admitted in the case of murder against Dansby.

HELD:
No, the evidence should not be admitted. The charge made no reference to the
robberies committed upon Brinson, Mode, and Hall, except as they may have been in the mind
of the court when it referred to "these other crimes." The only other crimes referred to in the
charge (other than the alleged murder of Dansby) were the Rigsby and Taylor robberies. The
jurors were particularly informed as to the purposes for which the court admitted testimony in
respect to those two robberies, but they were left uninstructed in direct terms as to the use to
which the proof of the Brinson, Mode, and Hall robberies could be put in passing upon the guilt
or innocence of the particular crime for which the defendants were indicted. It is true, as
suggested by counsel for the government, that no exception was taken to the charge. But
objection was made by the defendants to the evidence as to the Brinson, Mode, and Hall
robberies, and exception was duly taken to the action of the court in admitting it. That
exception was not waived by a failure to except to the charge.
We are constrained to hold that the evidence as to the Brinson, Mode, and Hall
robberies was inadmissible for the identification of the defendants or for any other purpose
whatever, and that the injury done the defendants in that regard was not cured by anything
contained in the charge. Whether Standley robbed Brinson and Mode, and whether he and
Boyd robbed Hall, were matters wholly apart from the inquiry as to the murder of Dansby. They
were collateral to the issue to be tried. No notice was given by the indictment of the purpose of
the government to introduce proof of them. They afforded no legal presumption or inference as
to the particular crime charged. Those robberies may have been committed by the defendants
in March, and yet they may have been innocent of the murder of Dansby in April. Proof of them
only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from the real
issue, and to produce the impression that they were wretches whose lives were of no value to
the community and who were not entitled to the full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for
the trial of human beings charged with crime involving the punishment of death. However
depraved in character, and however full of crime their past lives may have been, the
defendants were entitled to be tried upon competent evidence, and only for the offense
charged.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial.

UnitedStatesvs.Cunningham
103F.3d553 26December2008
FACTS:
ConstanceCunninghamwassentencedto84monthsinprisonafter
being convicted by a jury of tampering with a consumer product "with
recklessdisregardfortheriskthatanotherpersonwillbeplacedindangerof

death or bodily injury and under circumstances manifesting extreme

indifferencetosuchrisk."
ShewasaregisterednurseatanIndianahospital.Thehospitalstaff
discoveredthatsyringescontainingthepowerfulpainkillerDemerol(abrand
name for meperidine hydrochloride, had been tampered with; in some
instancestheDemerolhadbeenreplacedwithasalinesolution.
Shewasoneoffivenurseswho,duringaperiodwhensomeofthe
syringeswereknowntohavebeentamperedwith,hadaccesstothelocked
cabinet in which they were kept. Allfive nurses wereinterviewed by the
police and denied having tampered with the syringes. But Cunningham
acknowledgedhavingoncebeenaDemeroladdict.Shesaidtheproblemwas
inthepastandtoprovethissheofferedtohaveherbloodandurinetestedfor
Demerol.
The bloodtest was negative butthe urinetest positive, whichwas
consistentwithrecentuse,sinceDemerolremainsintheurinarytractlonger
than in the bloodstream. The government believes that Cunningham was
stealingDemerolfromthesyringesinordertofeedaDemeroladdiction.
Cunninghamarguesthatmerelywithholdingpainmedicationdoesnot
"place"anyone"indangerof...bodilyinjury."Thestatutedefines"bodily
injury"toinclude"physicalpain,"butshearguesthatfailingtorelievepainis
notthesameascausingpain.Sincewiththepainmedicationthereisno(or
less)pain,thewithholdingofthemedicationisanecessaryconditionofpain;
butnotallnecessaryconditions arecauses.Havinganervoussystemisa
necessaryconditionofexperiencingpain,butwewouldnotordinarilysaythat
havinganervoussystemcausespain.Causalascriptionispurposive.Inlawit
isbasedonsocialideasaboutresponsibility;itispolicydriven.Inlightofthe
goalsreasonablytobeimputedtoastatutethatpunishesproducttampering
with injurious consequences expressly including pain, conduct that
perpetuatesaninjurybypreventingitfrombeingalleviatedbytheproduct
designedforthatendisonthesamefootingastamperingthatcreatesafresh
injury,aswhenthetampererintroducesapoisonintoadrug.

Ineithercasethereisaninjurythatwouldnothaveoccurredhadthe
tamperingnotoccurred.Wecannotthinkofanyreasontodistinguishbetween
thetwocases.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotthebadactsofCunninghammaybeadmittedinevidence.
HELD:
Yes.Rule404(b)forbidstheintroductionofevidenceofaperson's
priorconductforthepurposeofshowingapropensitytoactinaccordance
withthecharacterindicatedbythatconduct.SothefactthatCunninghamhad
stolenDemerolinthepastcouldnotbeintroducedtoshowthatsheislikelyto
havestolenDemerolinthepresent.However,evidenceofpriorconductmay
beintroduced(subjecttothejudge'spowertoexcludeitunderRule403as
undulyprejudicial,confusing,ormerelycumulative)forotherpurposes,for
exampletoshowthedefendant'smotiveforcommittingthecrimewithwhich
heischarged.
Wedonothaveacompleteoverlapbetweenevidenceofpropensity
andevidenceofmotiveinthiscase.Mostpeopledon'twantDemerol;beinga
DemeroladdictgaveCunninghamamotivetotamperwiththeDemerolfilled
syringesthat,sofarasappears,noneoftheothernurseswhohadaccesstothe
cabinetinwhichthesyringeswerelockedhad.Noonesuggeststhatanyof
thefivenursesmighthavewantedtostealDemerolinordertoresellitrather
thantoconsumeitpersonally.
Theevidenceofheraddictionwasthusadmissible,unlessthejudge
decidedthatitsprejudicialeffecttheeffectthatisinherentinanyevidence
thatajury,howeverinstructed,mightusetodrawtheforbiddeninferencethat
onceathiefalwaysathiefclearlyoutweigheditsprobativevalue.
TheevidenceofCunningham'ssuspensionmightseemtohavebeen
similarlysuperfluousandequivocal,asbeingmerelythecivilequivalentof
thecriminalconvictionthatthejudgeproperlyexcluded.Butthesuspension,
unliketheconviction,didnotmerelyduplicatetheevidenceofCunningham's
addiction or insinuate a propensity to steal; it also provided essential

backgroundtotheevidenceofherhavingfalsifiedtheresultsoftestsrequired
asaconditionofregainingherlicense.
That evidence furnished the basis for an inference that she had
falsifiedthetestresultsinordertoenablehertocontinuetofeedheraddiction
withoutdetectionandwithoutlosingaccesstoa"free"supplyoftheaddictive
substance,andso,liketheaddictionitself,establishedmotivetotamperwith
theDemerolsyringes.
UnitedStatesvs.Gonzales
110F.3d936 (1997)
FACTS:
Police officer Crowe left his apartment to buy dinner, and noticed
three men in a Chevrolet parked across the street (two of them were the
defendants).Whenhedroveback,Colon,whomCrowerecognizedasoneof
themenhehadseenearlier,waswalkingalonedownthestreetinthevicinity
ofCrowe'sapartment.Seatedinhiscar,CroweobservedColonapproachthe
doorofCrowe'sapartmentbuildingandthenshrughisshoulders,asthough
lostormistakenabouttheaddress.Then,asCrowewalkedtowardhisown
apartment,hesawColonwalkdownonesideofthestreettotheendofthe
block,crossthestreet,andwalkuptheotherside.
Suspicions aroused, Crowe monitored Colon's activities from just
insidethedoorwaytohisbuilding.CrowenextsawthesamewhiteCorsicahe
hadseenearlierslowlymovinguphisstreet,followedbyaredChevrolet
Baretta.Thelightswereoffonbothcars.ThecarspulleduptowhereColon
wasstandingunderastreetlight.Thethreemenhadananimatedconversation
that appeared to Crowe as though they were discussing directions. After
severalminutesofthisdiscussion,EstebanandEmilioGonzalezdrovethe
twocarsaway,onceagainwiththeirheadlightsoff.
Believingthatthethreewereplanningtostealacar,Croweretrieved
hisoffdutyrevolverandacordlesstelephonefromhisapartment.Colonwas
stillpacingupanddownthestreet.

Crowedialed911.Unabletogetthrough,hehandedthephonetohis
girlfriendandaskedhertoplacethecall.Helefttheapartmentbuildingto
confrontColonandGonzalez.Bynowthetwomenhadretreatedfromthe
fence,andwerecrouchingbehindacar.AsCroweapproachedthesidewalkin
frontofhishouse,hesawbothGonzalezandColondrawgunsandbeginto
runinCrowe'sdirectionthewholetimelookingovertheirshouldersinthe
directiontheyhadbeenfacingwhileearliercrouchingbythefence.Asthe
twomenrantowardshim,Croweidentifiedhimselfasapoliceofficerand
directedthemtostop.Theydidnotstop.Instead,Gonzalezfiredashotat
Crowe. Crowe returned fire, and then sought cover behind a parked car.
Crowethensawthetwotosstheirweaponsoveranearbyhedgeandrundown
thestreet,awayfromCrowe.Crowegavechaseandmanagedtoapprehend
Colonafterabriefstruggle.PoliceofficersSapienzaandParksarrivedatthe
sceneinamarkedpatrolcar.SapienzatookcustodyofColonwhileCrowe
retrievedoneoftheweaponsdiscardedbythedefendants.Crowealsogave
theofficersadescriptionofEstebanandEmilioGonzalez.
OfficerCoakley,afterhearingadescriptionofthewhiteCorsicaover
the police radio, spotted a car fitting that description, pulled it over, and
arresteditsdriver,EmilioGonzalez.Somethirtyminuteslater,policeofficer
RalphArgientolocatedtheredBaretta,pulleditoveranddetaineditsdriver,
EstebanGonzalez,untilCrowearrivedandidentifiedhimasthemanwhohad
firedashotathim.
Later that evening, after securing the crime scene, a police officer
foundasecondguninthebushesnearthespotwhereCrowereportedseeing
ColonandGonzalezdiscardingtheirweapons.Noevidenceofspentshell
casingsorballisticdamagewasfound.
Prior to trial, the government sought an in limine ruling from the
districtcourtpermittingthegovernmenttointroducethetestimonyofGeorge
Masciadescribingabreakinandburglaryattemptathishome,locatedaround
thecornerfromCrowe'sresidence,ataboutthetimeofCrowe'sconfrontation
withthedefendants.
ColonandGonzaleswereindicted,andarenowappealing.

ISSUE:
Whetherornottheevidencewassufficienttosustainaguiltyverdict.
HELD:
Yes. Defendants' contention that the evidence against them was
insufficientisbasedontheabsenceofanyphysicalevidencetocorroborate
Crowe'stestimony.TheyarguethatalthoughCrowetestifiedthatheandthe
defendantsexchangedgunfire,nobulletcasingswereeverfound,norwasany
damagetopropertyeverdetected.Inaddition,neitherdefendant'sfingerprints
were found on the guns recovered. These and other defects in proof are
particularlysignificant,defendantsargue,giventheunreliabilityofCrowe's
testimonyattrial.
Where the governments case is based primarily on eyewitness
testimoneydescribingcriminalactivity,anylackofcorroborationgoesonlyto
theweightoftheevidence,nottoitssufficiency.Theweightisamatterfor
argumenttothejury,notagroundforreversalonappeal.
The jury was fully apprised by defense counsel of the absence of
corroboratingphysicalevidenceinsupportofthedefensetheoryofthecase
namely,thatCroweplantedweaponsandotherwisefabricatedmuchofthe
incidentinordertojustifytheimproperdischargeofhisownweapon.The
juryplainlyrejectedthistheory,andthuswasentitled,ifitsochose,torestits
verdictsolelyonCrowe'stestimony.
Besides,therewastestimonytoshowthatsnow,extremecold,andthe
presence of pedestrian traffic impeded the search for evidence and, in
addition,thatsearchesforspentshellcasingsatcrimescenesareonlyrarely
successful.Therewasalsotestimonythatthechancesoffindingfingerprints
onthefoundweaponswereremote.Thejuryquitereasonablycouldhave
favored these explanations over defendants' more sinister theory that, for
example,hadCroweplantinggunsinthebushesnearhishouseinfullviewof
otherofficerswhohadarrivedatthecrimescene.

Jonesvs.States
376,S.W.,2d842
(1964)
FACTS:
Theindictmentallegedthattheappellanttookmoneyfromtheperson
and possession of D. M. Hause without his knowledge and without his
consent,andwiththeintenttodeprivehimofitsvalueandtoappropriateitto
heruseandbenefit.Theindictmentfurtherallegedapriorconvictioninthe
StateofCaliforniaforGrandTheft,andaconvictionpriortothecommission
of that offense in the State of Oklahoma for Grand Larceny. The prior
convictions were proved as alleged. The state relied upon circumstantial
evidence to show appellant's guilt of theft of money from the person and
possessionofD.M.Hause.
HausetestifiedthatonDecember13,1962,theappellantcametohis
auto parts place of business around 3 P.M., while he was working on a
generator; she grabbed C. V. Wells, who later became a partner in the
business,andpropositionedhimforsexualintercourse.Shehadherhandsall
overhim.Hepushedheraway.Shethensaidshehadtourinateandwas
shownanoutsiderestroom.Onthewayof,shefell,orclaimedtohavefallen,
andHause,thinkingshewasdrunk,triedtogetherup.Sheraisedupherdress
andgrabbedhim.
Beforehecoulddragheroutsheturnedaroundandrubbed"herrear
end"onhim.Shethensaidshehadtousethetelephone.Hedidnotseeher
againuntilshewasarrestedonMarch6,1963.Somefiveminutesafterthe
appellant left, Hause reached for his handkerchief and discovered that the
$150ormorehehadinhisbillfoldwasgone,butthebillfoldwasinhis
pocketandthecheckswerestillinit.C.V.Wellsgavesimilartestimonyto
thatofHause.Hetestifiedthathehadnomoneyinhisbillfoldandlostnone.
ThetheftofHause'smoneywaspromptlyreportedtothepolice.
Thestatewaspermittedtoprovethattheappellant,onMarch6,1963,
wenttoanautomobileserviceshoporTransmissionShopinAustinduringthe
noonhourand,afterannouncingthatshewantedtousethebathroom,grabbed
Mr.Grady,theproprietor,andpropositionedhimandhe"pushedherback

becauseshewasdrunk."Shegrabbedhimagainandthenwalkedout.Allof
thistimeMr.Gradywastalkingonthetelephone.Hediscoveredsome15
minuteslaterthatthe$125hehadinhisbillfoldwasgone.
AtruckdriverforTravisMaterialstestifiedthattheappellantwent
intotheTransmissionShopandsome5or10minuteslatershecamerunning
byhistruck,jumpedinablackFordcarparkedaboutablockandahalffrom
theshopand"tookoff.Shewasthrowinggravelandthecarwasspinningand
diggingoutwhensheleft."
LaterthesamedaytheappellantwasapprehendednearTaylor,Texas.
Thestatewasalsopermittedtointroduceevidencetotheeffectthatthe
appellant,onoraboutDecember31,1962,wenttotheplaceofbusinessofan
OrthopedicBraceCompany,whereMr.Hess,wasatworkathisbench,put
herhandonhimlikeshewastryingtokeepfromfallingandacting"asifshe
wastryingtosolicitastreetjob,"andasthoughshewasdruggedordoped.
Shethenleftsuddenlyandthebracemakersoonfoundthathisbillfold,in
whichhehad$20ormore,wasgone.
Appellantwasidentifiedbythewitnessesasthepersonwhocameto
eachoftheshops,propositionedtheowner(eachofwhomwasmarriedand
livingwithhiswife),putherhanduponthem,andleftsuddenly,herdeparture
being soon followed by the discovery that the men's money had likewise
departed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was correct for the Court to admit and consider the
evidence.
HELD:
Yes.Theevidenceregardingtheconductoftheappellantandtheloss
ofmoneyfromthebillfoldofMr.Hess,thebracemaker,andfromtheowner
of the Transmission Shop was admitted over the objection that it was
"irrelevant and immaterial, highly prejudicial. It is at a time different and
subsequenttothedateallegedintheindictmentofDecemberthe13th."The
evidence was offered and was admitted only for the purpose of showing
identity,intent,motive,maliceorcommonplanorscheme.Itwassolimited

inthecourt'schargeandthejurywasinstructedthatsuchevidencecouldnot
beconsideredforanypurposeunlesstheybelievedbeyondareasonabledoubt
thatthedefendantcommittedsuchotheroffenses.
TheintentoftheappellantinmakingphysicalcontactwithMr.Hause
wasmaterialandwasuncertain.Proofthatthemoneywastakenaswellasthe
intentoftheappellantresteduponthecircumstances.
The two collateral offenses show more than a similarity in results.
Theyshowacommonplanandsystematiccourseofaction.Thepeculiarway
inwhichtheotherbusinessmenlosttheirmoneyuponthesamecourseof
conductbytheappellantwasacircumstancethatwasavailabletothestateto
provetheappellant'sguiltoftheftfromthepersonofHause.Theevidence
showedsystem, not merely systematic crime, and the court did not err in
admittingitforthelimitedpurposesstated."Wheretheexistenceofaplanor
systemofcriminalactionisinissue,evidenceofotherorsimilaroffenses
committed by the accused, both before and after the commission of the
offense with which he is charged, is admissible to show that the offense
chargedwaspartofacommonplan,scheme,orsystem.Buttorendersuch
evidenceadmissible,theremustbemorethanacertaindegreeofsimilarityin
results between the crime with which he is charged and the other crimes
committed by him. There must indeed be such a concurrence of common
featuresbetweentheseveralcrimesaswillshowlogicallythatallofthem
mightwellhaveresultedfromacommonplanorsystematiccourseofaction."
Theevidenceissufficienttosustaintheconvictionandnoerrorappears.

UnitedStatesvs.Jones
455F.3d800 1August2006

FACTS:
Severalpoliceofficerswereperformingsurveillanceofthatresidence
at940NorthMainStreetinDecatur,Illinois.Jonesandhisnephew,Montae,
leftthehome,gotintoacaranddroveaway.DetectiveSturdivantfollowed
andobservedthecar,drivenbyJones,makealeftturnwithoutsignaling.He
thenorderedJonestopullthecartothecurb.Joneswasarrestedfordriving
withasuspendedlicenseandtakentothepolicestation.Meanwhile,other
police officers began the search of 940 North Main Street. They found a
plasticbagcontainingcrack,Jones'identificationcard,andpagesfromhis
addressbook.
After the search, Jones was advised of his Miranda rights, and
afterwardshesignedaformindicatingthatheunderstoodhisrights.Detective
Rameytestifiedthat,aftersigning,Jonesadmittedthathehadmovedto940
NorthMainStreetaboutamonthearlierandthattheduffelbagbelongedto
him;thathehadbeensellingcrackfromthehouseduringtheprevioustwoor
three weeks and that the crack in the dresser belonged to him. Detective
RameythenaskedJonestodraftawrittenconfession.Jonesindicatedtothe
policethathewantedtocooperatewiththeinvestigation.Thus,hesigneda
"confidentialsource"form,andtoldthedetectivesthathehadreceivedon
consignmentthecrackthathadbeenseized,andadmittedthathehadintended
tosellit.
Joneswasindictedbyagrandjuryandchargedwithknowinglyand
intentionallypossessingwithintenttodistributefiveormoregramsofcrack
cocaine.TrialoriginallywasscheduledforJune10,2002.OnMay30,2002,
thedistrictcourtgrantedhismotionforacontinuance;thetrialdatewasreset
forJuly15,2002.OnJuly3,2002,asecondmotionforacontinuancewas
filed, requesting additional time to obtain a handwriting analysis of the
statementallegedlypennedbyJones.Jones'counseladmittedthathehadbeen
providedthewrittenconfessionbytheprosecution,andhadbeenunderthe
mistakenimpressionthatapoliceofficerhadwrittenthestatementandthat
Joneshadonlysignedit.Giventhisnewinformation,counselcontendedthat
heneededadditionaltimetoobtainahandwritingexperttodeterminewhether

ornotthedocumenthadbeenwrittenbyJones.Thedistrictcourtdeniedthe
motion.
Atthe closeofthe prosecution's caseduring trial,the Government
asked the court to take judicial notice of Jones' prior conviction for the
unlawfuldeliveryofacontrolledsubstanceinMaconCounty,Illinois.The
districtcourtalsogavethejuryalimitinginstruction,whichinstructedthe
jury to consider the prior conviction only for the purpose of establishing
intent.Thejuryreturnedaverdictofguilty.
Jonesfiledamotionrequestingthathispriorconvictionnotbeentered
intoevidencebecausetheconvictionwas"notrelevanttoprovinganyfactin
issueotherthan[his]propensitytocommitthecrimecharged,"thatitwastoo
remote in time to be admissible and that any probative value would be
outweighed by the prejudice that it would cause him. In response, the
Government argued that the prior conviction was admissible to that show
Jones possessed the intent to distribute the crack because possession with
intenttodistributeisaspecificintentcrime.
ISSUE:
Whether the district court erred in admitting his previous conviction into
evidence.
HELD:
NO.Inreviewingadistrictcourt'sdecisiontoadmitevidenceforanabuseof
discretion,thefourfoldtestbelowmustbeconsidered:
1.Theevidenceisdirectedtowardestablishingamatterinissueotherthanthe
defendant'spropensitytocommitthecrimecharged;
2.Theevidenceshowsthattheotheractissimilarenoughandcloseenoughin
timetoberelevanttothematterinissue;
3. The evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant
committedthesimilaract;and
4.Theprobativevalueoftheevidenceisnotsubstantiallyoutweighedbythe
dangerofunfairprejudice.
First:Itispropertoadmittheevidenceontheissueofintent

The most obvious justifiable situation in which prior convictions are

admissibleindrugprosecutionsontheissueofintentareinthosesituationsin
whichdefendant,whileadmittingpossessionofthesubstance,deniesintentto
distributeit.TheissueofintentmustbeestablishedbytheGovernmentand
evidence of prior convictions for drug trafficking may be helpful. It is
incumbentontheGovernmentto"affirmativelyshowwhyaparticularprior
convictiontendstoshowvolitiontocommitthenewcrime."
An examination of the record reveals that, at trial, counsel for the
defendantarguedtothejurythatonlyasmallamountofcocainewasnearthe
defendant'sidentificationcardandthattheremainderofthecocaine,alarger
amount,wassituatedinanotherplaceinthehouse.Counselalsoemphasized
thepresenceofothersatthesceneatthetimethatthesearchwarrantwas
executed.Afairreadingofcounsel'sargumentisthatJonesdidnotcontrolthe
largeramountandthatthelesseramountwasheldforpersonaluseratherthan
resale.Inthiscontext,anearlierconvictionfordrugtraffickingwascertainly
relevantandprobativeon,amongotherthings,theissueofJones'intent.It
evidencedhisknowledgeofthedrugtradeandthepracticesofdrugdealersin
sellingtheirdeadlywares.Italsowasrelevantandprobativewithrespectto
thedefendant'sknowledgeofthecommercialvalueofevensmallamountsof
thedrugandthereforeofhisintenttosellthelesseramount.Accordingly,it
certainlywasinthesounddiscretionofthedistrictcourttodetermine,given
the facts and circumstances presented bythis case, that this evidencewas
relevantandprobativeontheissuesplacedintocontentionbyJones.
Second:An8yearoldconvictionisnottoooldtobeadmissible
The district court acted within its discretion in deciding that the prior
convictionwascloseenoughintimeandsufficientlysimilarincircumstances
toberelevanttotheissueofintent.Jones'priorconvictionoccurredsixyears
before the charged offense. In previous cases, it was held that a prior
convictionfordistributionofcrackisadmissibleinacasewherethecharged
actinvolvesdistributionofcocaine,asthedistinctionbetweenthetwodrugs
isa"distinctionwithoutsubstance"asbothcrimesinvolvethepossessionwith
intenttodistributeachemicalcompositionofcocaine.

Third: A conviction is sufficient to support a jury finding that a

defendantcommittedasimilaractnotanissueinthisappeal
Fourth:Theconvictionwasnotmoreprejudicialthanprobative
Anyprobativeevidenceofpriorconvictionswillbeprejudicial;however,we
mustdetermineifitwasunfairlyprejudicial.Here,thetrialcourtoffereda
limitinginstruction,anditwasheldthatsuchinstructions"areeffectivein
reducingoreliminatinganypossibleunfairprejudicefromtheintroductionof
Rule404(b)evidence."
UnitedStatesvs,Wales
977F.2d
1323
FACTS:
Robert Smyth Wales entered the United States at Honolulu
InternationalAirportonaflightwhichheboardedinSingapore.Hechecked
the"no"boxonacustomsdeclarationformtodenythathewascarryingmore
than $10,000. Customs agents found he was carrying $48,000. He was
arrestedandchargedwithknowinglyandwillfullymakingafalsestatement
on a customs declaration form he gave to an officer of the United States
CustomsService.Thejuryfoundhimguilty.Thedistrictcourtsentencedhim
to14monthsimprisonment,followedbysupervisedreleasefor21/2years,a
fineof$15,000andaspecialassessmentof$50.Onappeal,Walescontends
theevidencewasinsufficienttosupporthisconvictionandthedistrictcourt
erredinseveralevidentiaryrulings.
ISSUE:
WhetherornottherewassufficientevidencetoconvictWalesofknowingly
andwillfullymakingafalsestatementonacustomsdeclarationform.
HELD:
Yes.Thegovernmentpresentedevidencethatbetweenfiveandseven
daysafterhisarrest,Walesfalselytoldabankofficerthatthekeytohissafety
depositboxhadbeenstolenand,forthisreason,hewantedthebox(whichit
turnedoutcontained$150,000ingoldcoins)drilledopenandthecontents

returnedtohiswife.Walescontendsthegovernmentshouldnothavebeen
allowedtointroducethispostarrestattempttoretrievethecontentsofthe
safetydepositboxandthefactthattheboxcontained$150,000ingoldcoins.
Hearguesthisconductborenosimilaritytothechargedoffense.Wedisagree.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts may be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation,plan,knowledge,identity,orabsenceofmistakeoraccident.
Inthiscircuit"Rule404(b)appliestootheractevidenceregardlessof
whetheritoccurredbeforeoraftertheallegedoffense
Wales'sdeceitfulattempttocleanouthissafedepositboxbeforethe
governmentcouldexamineitscontentswasclearlyanattempttoconcealthe
$150,000ingoldcoins.Thisevidencewasconsistentwiththegovernment's
theoryofthecasethatWaleshadamotiveforsubmittingafalsecustoms
declaration:toconcealhisassetsandtoavoidanexplanationoftheirsource.
Theuseofthisevidencetoprovemotivewasproper.
EvidenceofOtherBadActsinSexualAssaultCases
UnitedStatesvs.LeCompte
131F.3d767 22December1997
FACTS:
LeComptewaschargedwithchildsexoffenses,specificallytheabuse
ofhissecondwifes11yearoldnieceCD,allegedlycommittedinJanuary
1995.AccordingtoCD,LeComptehadplayedgameswithheratheraunt's
trailerandhadexposedhimselftoheronatleastoneoccasion.Theactual
incidentsofmolestationallegedlyoccurredwhileshewaslyingonacouchat
her aunt's, with her siblings sleeping on the floor next to her. LeCompte
allegedlyjoinedheronthecouch,forcedhertotouchhispenis,andtouched
herbreasts.
For alleged sex offenses committed by LeCompte during his first
marriagebetween1985and1987,thegovernmentofferedevidencetosupport
thecaseofCD.Thealleged(first)victim,TT,testifiedthatLeComptehad
playedgameswithheratheraunt'shouse,hadexposedhimselftoher,had
forcedhertotouchhispenis,andhadtouchedherprivateparts.

ISSUE:
WhetherTTstestimonyisadmissibleinLeComptesretrialorwhetherthe
firsttrialforeclosedconsiderationofadmissibilityunderadifferentruleof
evidenceonretrial
HELD:
Rule414providesinrelevantpart:(a)Inacriminalcaseinwhichthe
defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant'scommissionofanotheroffenseoroffensesofchildmolestationis
admissible,andmaybeconsideredforitsbearingonanymattertowhichitis
relevant.Rule414anditscompanionrulesRule413(EvidenceofSimilar
CrimesinSexualAssaultCases),andRule415(EvidenceofSimilarActsin
CivilCasesConcerningSexualAssaultorMolestation)are,accordingtothe
statementofCongress,generalrulesofadmissibilityinsexualassaultand
child molestation cases for evidence that the defendant has committed
offensesofthesametypeonotheroccasionsThenewruleswillsupersedein
sexoffensecasestherestrictiveaspectsofFederalRuleofEvidence404(b).
ThesexualoffensescommittedagainstT.T.weresubstantiallysimilar
to those allegedly committed against C.D. By comparison, the differences
weresmall.Inparticular,theDistrictCourtitselfacknowledgedthatthetime
lapsebetweenincidentsmaynotbeassignificantasitappearsatfirstglance,
becausedefendantwasimprisonedforaportionofthetimebetween1987and
1995,whichdepriveddefendantoftheopportunitytoabuseanychildren.
Moreover,thedangerofunfairprejudicenotedbytheDistrictCourt
wasthatpresentedbytheuniquestigmaofchildsexualabuse,onaccountof
whichLeComptemightbeconvictednotforthechargedoffense,butforhis
sexualabuseofT.T.Thisdangerisonethatallpropensityevidenceinsuch
trialspresents.Itisforthisreasonthattheevidencewaspreviouslyexcluded,
anditispreciselysuchholdingsthatCongressintendedtooverrule.Orderof
theDistrictcourtreversed.
UnitedStatesvs.LeCompte
131F.3d767 22December1997
FACTS:

LeComptewaschargedwithchildsexoffenses,specificallytheabuse
ofhissecondwifes11yearoldnieceCD,allegedlycommittedinJanuary
1995.AccordingtoCD,LeComptehadplayedgameswithheratheraunt's
trailerandhadexposedhimselftoheronatleastoneoccasion.Theactual
incidentsofmolestationallegedlyoccurredwhileshewaslyingonacouchat
her aunt's, with her siblings sleeping on the floor next to her. LeCompte
allegedlyjoinedheronthecouch,forcedhertotouchhispenis,andtouched
herbreasts.
For alleged sex offenses committed by LeCompte during his first
marriagebetween1985and1987,thegovernmentofferedevidencetosupport
thecaseofCD.Thealleged(first)victim,TT,testifiedthatLeComptehad
playedgameswithheratheraunt'shouse,hadexposedhimselftoher,had
forcedhertotouchhispenis,andhadtouchedherprivateparts.
ISSUE:
WhetherTTstestimonyisadmissibleinLeComptesretrialorwhetherthe
firsttrialforeclosedconsiderationofadmissibilityunderadifferentruleof
evidenceonretrial
HELD:
Rule414providesinrelevantpart:(a)Inacriminalcaseinwhichthe
defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the
defendant'scommissionofanotheroffenseoroffensesofchildmolestationis
admissible,andmaybeconsideredforitsbearingonanymattertowhichitis
relevant.Rule414anditscompanionrulesRule413(EvidenceofSimilar
CrimesinSexualAssaultCases),andRule415(EvidenceofSimilarActsin
CivilCasesConcerningSexualAssaultorMolestation)are,accordingtothe
statementofCongress,generalrulesofadmissibilityinsexualassaultand
child molestation cases for evidence that the defendant has committed
offensesofthesametypeonotheroccasionsThenewruleswillsupersedein
sexoffensecasestherestrictiveaspectsofFederalRuleofEvidence404(b).

ThesexualoffensescommittedagainstT.T.weresubstantiallysimilar
to those allegedly committed against C.D. By comparison, the differences
weresmall.Inparticular,theDistrictCourtitselfacknowledgedthatthetime
lapsebetweenincidentsmaynotbeassignificantasitappearsatfirstglance,
becausedefendantwasimprisonedforaportionofthetimebetween1987and
1995,whichdepriveddefendantoftheopportunitytoabuseanychildren.
Moreover,thedangerofunfairprejudicenotedbytheDistrictCourt
wasthatpresentedbytheuniquestigmaofchildsexualabuse,onaccountof
whichLeComptemightbeconvictednotforthechargedoffense,butforhis
sexualabuseofT.T.Thisdangerisonethatallpropensityevidenceinsuch
trialspresents.Itisforthisreasonthattheevidencewaspreviouslyexcluded,
anditispreciselysuchholdingsthatCongressintendedtooverrule.Orderof
theDistrictcourtreversed.
Habit
BURDENOFPROOF(Rule131)
ConclusivePresumption(Rule131,Section2)
EXAMINATIONOFWITNESS(Rule132)
AdversePartyWitness(Rule132,Section11)
PublicDocuments(Rule132,Section23)
FORMALOFFEROFEVIDENCE(Rule132,Section23)
TenderofExcludingEvidence
PREPONDERANCEOFEVIDENCE(Rule133)
CIRCUMSTANTIALEVIDENCE