! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !

! !
Block B2015 Review Operations!
! TORTS & DAMAGES! !
Prof. Rommel J. Casis!
1st Semester, AY 2012-2013!
! !

! ! ! !
Notes!
Unless otherwise indicated, all provisions of law mentioned or cited are from th
e New Civil Code of the Philippines.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Only the relevant conceptual discussions in the cases assigned in the Conceptual
Framework section of the course outline were directly quoted in this reviewer.
This is so since the efforts to make a reviewer only commenced when the class st
arted discussing the Negligence section of the course outline. In any case, most
of the cases assigned were discussed in subsequent sections of the course. As s
uch, for review of those cases, you may refer to said sections.! As for the ital
icized cases in the course outline, direct quotations were made. Most of them we
re also discussed in other parts of the outline anyway, so proceed accordingly.!
Under res ipsa loquitur, the pertinent discussions in the cases were copied und
er the corresponding headings. The reviewer entries made for the cases are place
d after the quotations from the cases.! The Prosser & Keeton citations are abbre
viated and only appears in the conceptual framework section of the reviewer. An
attempt to ll in the citations in the syllabus. It failed. Besides, the applicati
on of the principles enunciated therein in this jurisdiction is questionable, as
they were developed from and for common law jurisdiction.! The "Spouses" in all
case titles were deleted. This has nothing to do with the Committee's view of m
arriage, except, of course, Robert's. He plays with girls. You know that. Beware
!! There are a lot of entries without the Notes eld. This means that a lot of peo
ple did not ll them up online.! The provisions always come rst in each section. Re
member, code is king. Next are conceptual discussions in italicized cases. Final
ly, the cases, also known as your reviewer entries, are laid out.! This reviewer
was formatted in an iPad 2. And yes, it was not easy.! Good luck!!
B2015 Academics Committee! October 2012

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Conceptual Framework!
! ! ! ! ! !
CONCEPT OF TORT! In Common Law! Etymology! The word is derived from the Latin "t
ortus" or "twisted." [Prosser & Keeton]! "Tort" is found in the French language,
and was at one time in common use in English as a general synonym for "wrong."
[Ibid.]! Definition! Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than breac
h of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of an actio
n for damages. [Ibid.]! In Philippine Law! Existence! Article 1902, OCC. Any per
son who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligenc
e shall be liable for the damage so done.! Article 2176. Whoever by act or omiss
ion causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cont
ractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict xxx.!
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by law, requiring the person to conform to
a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.! 2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required:
a breach of duty.! 3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct a
nd the resulting injury.! 4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of
another. [Prosser & Keeton]! Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1
) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. [Garcia v. Salvador, 2
007]! To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must
be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. [Ocean
Builders v. Cubacub, 2011]! The Purpose of Tort Law! There remains a body of la
w which is directed toward the compensation of individuals, rather than the publ
ic, for losses which they have suffered within the scope of the legally recogniz
ed interest generally, rather than one interest only, where the law considers th
at compensation is required. This is the law of torts.! The law of torts, then,
is concerned with the allocation of losses arising out of human activities; and
since these cover a wide scope, so does this branch of the law. xxx The purpose
of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for in
juries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another. [Prosser
& Keeton]! CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT!
!
!
Scope! Definition! Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right give
n or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a
legal duty. [Naguiat v. NLRC, 1997]! A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which ha
s been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, wh
ereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property,
or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability
in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfea
sor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has bee
n rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise
, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would de
termine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the ab
sence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an inv
asion of another's legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by t
he fact that defendant acted without evil intent. [Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, 200

7]! Elements! The traditional formula for the elements necessary to such a cause
of action may be stated briefly as follows:! " of "50 1
!
!
!
Historical Background! The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contract
ual looms clears and unmistakable." This legal institution is of ancient lineage
, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law." In fact, i
n Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa a
quiliana." The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault o
r negligence under the Civil Code xxx.! The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos
survives in the Civil Code. According to Article 1089, one of the five sources o
f obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractu
al xxx. Then Article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governe
d by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning Articles 1902-1910. This portio
n of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aqu
iliana. [Barredo v. Garcia, 1942]! Nature! Article 1089, OCC. Obligations arise
from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which
are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.! Article 11
57. Obligations arise from:! (1) Law;!
!
!

B2015 Review Operations (2) Contracts;! (3) Quasi-contracts;! (4) Acts or omissi
ons punished by law; and! (5) Quasi-delicts.!
TORT & QUASI-DELICT
Torts & Damages
!
Governing Provisions! Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by spe
cial laws.! Definition! Article 1902, OCC. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the dama
ge so done.! Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fau
lt or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the p
arties, is called quasi-delict xxx.!
!
!
Scope! Intentional acts! Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage do
ne. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation b
etween the parties, is called quasi-delict xxx.! As Manresa says the liability a
rising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omis
sion which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has c
aused damage to another. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]! Contrary to an immed
iate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia - that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code th
erein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional volunt
ary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culp
a." This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Suprem
e Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or
estafa, not a negligent act." Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, i
n force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which a
re derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable b
y law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (whic
h refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underlined qualification, "
not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesira
ble construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rathe
r than the spirit that giveth life" xxx. And so, because Justice Bocobo was Chai
rman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code
, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted " of "50 2
!
after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, "not punishable by law," the
reby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or ne
gligent. [Elcano v. Hill, 1977]! Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negl
igence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. [Ibid.; Andamo v. IAC
, 1990]! Article 2176 xxx is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treat
ises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American
or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it in
cludes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assaul

t and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Phili
ppine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New
Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be c
overed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. [Baksh v. CA, 1993]! Damage to propert
y! The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to pr
operty. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and
"damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two conc
epts:" the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "
harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "h
arm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries."In fact, examples
of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. [Cinco v. Canonoy
, 1979]!
!
!
!
Elements! Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, the
re being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the part
ies, is called quasi-delict xxx.! All the elements of a quasi-delict are present
, to wit:" (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the con
nection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff. [Andamo v. IAC, 1990]!
!
!
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT AND QUASI-DELICT! Quasi-delict, as defined in Article
2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aqui
liana, culpa extra-contractual or cuasi delitos) is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also inte
ntional criminal acts, such as

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assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit. [CocaCola Bottlers v. CA, 1
993]!
! !
TORT, QUASI-DELICT, AND DELICT! Distinctions! A tort is not the same thing as a
crime, although the two sometimes have many features in common. The distinction
between them lies in the interests affected and the remedy afforded by law. A cr
ime is an offense against the public at large, for which the state, as the repre
sentative of the public, will bring proceedings in the form of a criminal prosec
ution. [Prosser & Keeton]! The civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is co
mmenced and maintained by the injured person, and its primary purpose is to comp
ensate for the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer. [Ibid.]! Author
ities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a sepa
rate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, a
nd individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
[Barredo v. Garcia, 1942]! Some of the differences xxx are:! (1) That crimes aff
ect the public interest, while cuasidelitos are only of private concern.! (2) Th
at, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while th
e Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.! (3) That
delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only
if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes."" However
, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil resp
onsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the gam
e laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. [Ibid.]! [T]o fi
nd the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. [Ibid.]! [T]o hold that there is only one way
to make, defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and ex
haust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the p
laintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, th
ere is "such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way,
which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under A
rticle 1903 of the Civil Code. [Ibid.]!
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. [Ibid.]! [T]he Revised Penal Code in Article 365 punishes not only reckles
s but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that Articles 1902 to 1910 of t
he Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according t
o the literal import of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. De
ath or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of c
ivil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere wou
ld remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? [Ibid.]! [B]ecause of the broad s
weep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject
, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already disc
ussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that ther
e is another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
[Ibid.]! Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aqui
liana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. [And

amo v. IAC, 1990]! Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a
choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa crim
inal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict
(culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, t
he action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable
for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employer's defense of exe
rcise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the
action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsid
iarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee. [LG Foods v.
Philadelfa, 2006]!
! !
CULPA AQUILIANA AND CULPA CONTRACTUAL! Distinctions! Source! Every legal obligat
ion must of necessity be extracontractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obli
gation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civ
ilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, ot
her than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally embrace
d in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitut
e the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, w
hich the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. Th
e breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inatte
ntion, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the inj
ured party. The
!
!
Intersections! Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and resp
onsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising f
rom a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate " of "50 3

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fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which ar
ise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligati
on it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinc
ulum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently o
f the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]! Burden of proof! When
the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a
negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove th
e negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a
contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is all
eged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not nec
essary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contr
act is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is suffi
cient prima facie to warrant a recovery. [Ibid.]! "As a general rule, it is logi
cal that in case of extracontractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the b
urden of proof of its existence, xxx while on the contrary, in a case of neglige
nce which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor
shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him t
o prove the negligence." [Ibid.]! In such a situation [a contract exists], a def
ault on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation xxx gives rise to a presu
mption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractua
l obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. [FGU Insurance v. Sarm
iento, 2002]! Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on cu
lpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for d
amages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. [Ibid.]! Appli
cability of doctrine of proximate cause! The doctrine of proximate cause is appl
icable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of cont
ract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is
no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is cr
eated by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation bet
ween the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and th
e function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. [Calalas
v. CA, 2000]!
!
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and conseque
ntly, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome an
d he is relieved from liability." [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]! On the othe
r hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissio
ns of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which
amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the
master s negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the
utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liab
ility for the breach of his contract. [Ibid.]! Intersections! Article 2176. Whoe
ver by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is n
o pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict
xxx.! [W]hether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performanc
e of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual o
bligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act o

r omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part o

f the defendant. xxx [T]he practical result is identical xxx. [Cangco v. Manila
Railroad, 1918]! The field of non-contractual obligation is much more broader th
an that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of j
uridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; t
hat is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a con
tractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such condition
s that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have consti
tuted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed betw
een the parties. [Ibid.]! The definition of quasi-delict in Article 2176 express
ly excludes cases where there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the
parties." [Fores v. Miranda, 1959]! And this, because, although the relation of
passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "
the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort." [Air France v. Carrascoso,
1966]! The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-de
lict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the app
lication of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing con
tract between the plaintiff and the defendant. xxx The test (whether a quasi-del
ict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Wh
ere, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by " of "50 4
! !
!
!
Defense of employer for negligence of employee! "From this article [Article 1903
] two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence o
f a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there w
as negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of t
he servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both;
and

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itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the appli
cation of quasi-delict provisions to the case. [Far East Bank v. CA, 1995]! A pe
rusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort,
also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not oth
erwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression h
as not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when t
here obtains a contract. xxx Air France is authority for the view that liability
from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the co
ntract may be also a tort. [PSBA v. CA, 1992]! [A] pre-existing contractual rela
tion between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana xx
x. [Syquia v. CA, 1993]! [L]iability for tort may arise even under a contract, w
here tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act w
hich constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source o
f a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the c
ontract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on
tort to apply. [LRT v. Navidad, 2003]! The law on quasi-delict xxx is generally
applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the p
arties. [Consolidated Bank v. CA, 2003]!
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a l
ack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an u
nreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a thi
rd person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actor s position, in the same or similar circums
tances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him
not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. [Corinthian Gardens v.
Tanjangco, 2008]! PNR v. Brunty, 2006 A collision occurred between a car and a P
NR train at 12 AM causing the death of Brunty, a passenger of the car. The car w
as overtaking another car, with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. PNR
was found negligent.! Doctrine: Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent an
d reasonable man would not do. The test is, did the defendant, in doing the alle
ged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prud
ent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty o
f negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.! Notes:
The negligence of PNR consists in the inadequate safety precautions placed in th
e site. The extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is not applicabl
e in this case since Brunty was not a passenger.! PNR v. CA, 2007 Amores was dri
ving when he came to a railroad crossing. He stopped before crossing then procee
ded. But just as he was at the intersection, a PNR train turned up and collided
with his car, killing him. There was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the
intersection to warn motorists and aside from the railroad track, the only visib
le warning sign was a dilapidated "stop, look, and listen" sign. No whistle blow
was heard from the train before the collision. The SC held PNR liable, and that
Amores did everything, with absolute care and caution, to avoid the collission.
! Doctrine: Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protect
ion of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigi
lance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers i
njury.! Determining the diligence required! Article 1173. The fault or negligenc
e of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the pers
ons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisio

ns of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.!

!
! ! ! Negligence! ! !
CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE! In Common Law! Negligence is a matter of risk that is to
say, of recognizable danger of injury. It has been defined as "conduct which inv
olves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage," or, more fully, conduct "wh
ich falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others aga
inst unreasonable risk of harm." "Negligence is conduct and not a state of mind.
" [Prosser & Keeton]!
!
!
In Philippine Law! Definition! Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obli
gor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature o
f the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the t
ime and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Article
s 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.! If the law or contract does not stat
e the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expect
ed of a good father of a family shall be required.! Article 2178. The provisions
of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.!
!
!
!
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If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in t
he performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be req
uired.! The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to
govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is place
d and the importance of the act which he is to perform. [Sicam v. Jorge, 2007]!
Generally, the degree of care required is graduated according to the danger a pe
rson or property attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or the inst
rumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the greater the degree of care
required. What is ordinary under extraordinary of conditions is dictated by tho
se conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the mor
e imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care. [Far Eastern Shipping v. C
A, 1998]!
!
naturally and probably result in injury, or utter disregard of consequences.! No
tes: Mere riding or stealing a ride on a hauling truck is not negligence, ordina
rily, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se.! Ilao-Oreta v. Ro
nquillo, 2007 Dr. Ilao-Oreta failed to attend to a scheduled laparoscopic operat
ion scheduled by the spouses Ronquillo, to determine the cause of the wife s inf
ertility. The wife already underwent pre-operation procedures at that time. Dr.
Ila-Oreta claimed that she was in good faith, only failing to account the time d
ifference between the Philippines and Hawaii, where she had her honeymoon. The S
C ruled that her conduct was not grossly negligent, since the operation was only
exploratory. Her "honeymoon excitement" was also considered.! Doctrine: Gross n
egligence is the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or dilige
nce or the entire absence of care.! Notes: That she failed to consider the time
difference was probably a big lie, since the estimated time of arrival is clearl
y shown in the ticket.!
!
!
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE! A different, and older, approach has recognized distinct
"degrees" of negligence itself, which is to say degrees of legal fault, correspo
nding to required "degrees" of care. xxx It recognizes three "degrees" of neglig
ence: slight negligence, which is failure to use great care; ordinary negligence
, which is failure to use ordinary care; and gross negligence, which is failure
to use even slight care. [Prosser & Keeton]! Amedo v. Rio, 1954 Managuit was a s
eaman. While he was on board the ship doing his job, he jumped into the water to
retrieve his 2-peso bill, which was blown by the wind. He drowned. His mother w
as not allowed to recover because in acting as such, he was grossly negligent.!
Doctrine: Gross negligence is defined to be the want of even slight care and dil
igence. By gross negligence is meant such entire want of care as to raise a pres
umption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of ca
relessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or p
roperty of others. It amounts to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property.! Notes: When the act is dangerous per se, doing it constitutes gross
negligence.! Marinduque Iron Mines v. WCC, 1956 Mamador was laborer. He boarded
a company truck with others to go to work. When it tried to overtake another tru
ck, it turned over and hit a coconut tree. Mamador died. Upon complaint, the def
ense of the company was that Mamador was notoriously negligent, for violating a
company policy prohibiting riding in hauling trucks, and was, thus, barred from

recovery. The SC cited Corpus Juris to the effect that violation of a rule promu
lgated by a commission or board is not negligence per se, much less that of a co
mpany policy. It may, however, evidence negligence. Even granting that there was
negligence, it certainly was not notorious.! Doctrine: Notorious negligence is
the same as gross negligence, which implies a conscious indifference to conseque
nces, pursuing a course of conduct which would " of "50 6
!
! !
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT! Importance of Standard! The Fictitious Person! Picart v. S
mith, 1918 An automobile hit a horseman, who was on the wrong side of the road.
The horseman thought he did not have time to get to the other side. The car pass
ed by too close that the horse turned its body across, with its head toward the
railing. Its limb was broken, and its rider was thrown off and injured. The SC f
ound the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent man should have foreseen t
he risk in his course and that he had the last fair chance to avoid the harm.! D
octrine: The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable car
e and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same sit
uation? The law here in effect adopts the standard suppose to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence
of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal ju
dgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and pru
dence and determines liability by that.! Notes: The Picart test is the most cite
d test of negligence. It introduced the use of the fictitious person. It has the
markings of common law but because it uses the concept of the discreet paterfam
ilias, later enshrined in the Civil Code as the good father of a family, it is n
ow a civil law test.! Sicam v. Jorge, 2007 Jorge pawned jewelry with Agencia de
R. C. Sicam. Armed men entered the pawnshop
!
!
!

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and took away cash and jewelry from the pawnshop vault. Jorge demanded the retur
n of the jewelry. The pawnshop failed. The SC held Sicam liable for failing to e
mploy sufficient safeguards for the pawned goods. It held that robbery, if negli
gence concurred, is not a fortuitous event. Also, Article 2099 requires a credit
or to take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a fa
mily.! Doctrine: The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all
times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he
is placed and the importance of the act which he is to perform. Negligence, the
refore, is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do;
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It i
s want of care required by the circumstances.! Notes: The fictitious person is n
ot the standard. It is his conduct.! Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco, 2008 The C
uasos built their house on a lot adjoining that owned by the Tanjangcos. Their p
lan was approved by Corinthian Gardens. It turned out, however, that the house b
uilt encroached on the lot of the Tanjangcos. The SC found Corinthian Gardens ne
gligent for conducting only "table inspections," when it should have conducted a
ctual site inspections, which could have prevented the encroachment.! Doctrine:
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a l
ack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an u
nreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a thi
rd person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actor s position, in the same or similar circums
tances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him
not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.! Notes: The test cited
in the case was the Picart test.! Special Circumstances! Heirs of Completo v. Al
bayda, 2010 Albayda, Master Sergeant in the Philippine Air Force, was at an inte
rsection riding his bike when he was hit by a taxi driven by Completo. Albayda s
uffered injuries, including breaking his knee. The SC found Completo negligent,
since he was overspeeding when he reached the intersection. Also, the bike alrea
dy had the right of way at the time of the incident.! Doctrine: The bicycle occu
pies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully
on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be requir
ed of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other b
ecause of the physical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle.! Notes: T
he witnesses for the same parties are of the same number. It seems odd, therefor
e, to apply the test of negligence when the facts are not settled by preponderan
ce " of "50 7
of evidence. Thus, it appears that the court sympathized with Albayda, who was s
erving the government and was left by his wife, supposedly because of his injuri
es.! Pacis v. Morales, 2010 Morales owned a gun shop. An employee of the shop al
lowed Pacis to inspect a gun brought in for repair. It turned out that the gun w
as loaded and when Pacis laid it down, it discharged a bullet, hitting his head.
He died. The SC found Morales, as the owner, liable, since he failed to exercis
e the diligence required of a good father of a family, much less that required o
f someone dealing with dangerous weapons.! Doctrine: A higher degree of care is
required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrument
ality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the dut
y to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unli
ke the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a b
usiness dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree
of care.! Notes: Two things may be considered negligent: the keeping of a defect

ive gun loaded and the storing a defective gun in a drawer. It is strange, howev
er, that the negligence of the employee was not discussed, when the presumption
that the employer was negligent only arises after the negligence of the employee
is established. Also, that the wound sustained was in the head appears to be a
factual anomaly.!
!
!
!
!
Children! Taylor v. Manila Railroad, 1910 David Taylor, 15 years old, and Manuel
, 12, obtained fulminating caps from the compound of Manila Railroad. They exper
imented on them. The experiment ended with a bang, literally. The explosion caus
ed injury to the right eye of Taylor. His father sued for damages. The defense o
f Manila Railroad is the entry to their compound was without its invitation. The
SC held that the absence of invitation cannot relieve Manila Railroad from liab
ility. However, it held that the proximate cause of the injury was Taylor s negl
igence.! Doctrine: The personal circumstances of the child may be considered in
determining the existence of negligence on his part.! Notes: The age-bracket reg
ime, where certain age groups are treated as incapable of negligent conduct, was
not applied here. Also, the standard applied differs from that objective standa
rd of conduct generally applied to adults.!
!
Jarco Marketing v. CA, 1999 Zhieneth, 6 years old, was pinned down by a gift-wra
pping counter at a department store, when her mother momentarily let her go to s
ign a credit card slip. She died. The SC found Jarco Marketing negligent, since
it did not employ safety measures even when it knew that the counter was unstabl
e. That Zhieneth was negligent, that she climbed the counter, is incredible.!

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Doctrine: A conclusive presumption runs in favor of children below 9 years old t
hat they are incapable of contributory negligence.! Notes: The 9-year mark was a
dopted from the Sangco s discussion on the matter, citing the same age mark for
determining discernment in criminal law. This analogy, however, is erroneous sin
ce discernment, in criminal law, is used to determine the existence of criminal
intent, which is wildly different from negligence.!
!
Ylarde v. Aquino, 1988 Ylarde, a 10-year old student, and other fellow students
were asked by Aquino, their teacher, to help him in burying large blocks of ston
es. Aquino left them for a while and told them not to touch anything. After Aqui
no left, they played and Ylarde jumped into the hole while one of them jumped on
the stone, causing it to slide into the hole. Ylarde was not able to get out of
the hole in time and died. The SC ruled that Aquino was negligent in leaving hi
s pupils in the dangerous site, and that it was natural for said pupils to play.
It disregarded the claim that Ylarde was imprudent.! Doctrine: The degree of ca
re required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as a
n adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of pe
rsons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must c
onform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by chi
ldren of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the
same or similar circumstances.! Notes: The choice of standard of diligence for c
hildren also depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.!
with oil from a leak from the tubing, which was improperly fitted to the oil tan
k. The SC held Philippine Motor negligent for failing to use the skill that woul
d have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on
boats. Ordinarily, a backfire would not be followed by a disaster.! Doctrine: Wh
en a person hold himself out as being competent to do things requiring professio
nal skill, he will be liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.!
!
Pharmacists! US v. Pineda, 1918 Santos bought medicine in Santiago Pinedas pharma
cy for his sick horses. He was given the wrong medicine. His horses died. The SC
held him criminally liable under The Pharmacy Law.! Doctrine: The profession of
pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to
use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a specially
high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." In other word
s, the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skil
l employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands. Caveat emptor does not apply because the pharmacist and the custom
er are not in equal footing in this kind of transaction.! Notes: Even when the m
istake is not fatal, the pharmacist will still be held liable if the rule laid d
own applied. Also, caveat emptor may apply in cases of well-known medicine.!
!
! !
Experts! In general! Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are

required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess
a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.! Every man who offers his s
ervices to another, and is employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such
skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. In all these employm
ents where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is underst
ood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commo
nly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretensions are unfou
nded he commits a species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on h
is public profession. [Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 1998]! Culion v. Philippine M
otors, 1930 Culion contracted Philippine Motors to convert the engine of his fis
hing vessel to process crude oil instead of gasoline. When they tried to test it
, a backfire broke out. When it reached the carburetor, the fire grew bigger. Ap
parently, the carburetor was soaked " of "50 8
Mercury Drug v. De Leon, 2008 Judge De Leon was given a prescription by his doct
or friend for his eye. He bought them from Mercury Drug but he was given drops f
or the ears. When he applied the drops to his eyes, he felt searing pain. Only t
hen did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine. Mercury Drug invoked t
he principle of caveat emptor. The SC held Mercury Drug and its employee liable
for failing to exercise the highest degree of diligence expected of them.! Doctr
ine: The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exerc
ise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practic
al men." In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree
of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
" with" the" reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not cons
tantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons
for harmless medicines.!
!
!
Medical professionals! Cruz v. CA, 1997 Dr. Cruz performed a hysterectomy on Lyd
ia Umali. The hospital was untidy, and during the operation, the family had to o
btain blood, oxygen supply, and other articles necessary for the operation outsi
de the hospital. Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was t
ransferred to another hospital. Dr. Cruz

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was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The SC absolved Dr.
Cruz. While the facts point to the existence of reckless imprudence, it was not
shown that such imprudence caused the death of Lydia. Moral and exemplary damage
s were, however, awarded.! Doctrine: By accepting a case, a doctor in effect rep
resents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and s
urgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and ski
ll in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the
same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to trea
t a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malp
ractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of
care of the profession but also that the physician s conduct in the treatment a
nd care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuri
es involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scienti
fic knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary
to support the conclusion as to causation.! Professional Services v. Agana, 200
7 After her hysterectomy operation at Medical City, Natividad found out that two
pieces of sponges were left inside her, which has caused her pain for a long ti
me. The SC held Dr. Ampil, the surgeon who closed the incision, liable, ruling t
hat leaving foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed i
n at the very least prima facie negligence. It is inconsistent with due care, ra
ising an inference of negligence. It is even considered as negligence per se. Al
so, when the operation was finished, it was found out that two sponges were miss
ing.! Doctrine: Once a physician undertakes the treatment and care of a patient,
the law imposes on him certain obligations. To escape liability, he must posses
s that reasonable degree of learning, skill and experience required by his profe
ssion."At the same time, he must apply reasonable care and diligence in the exer
cise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best judgm
ent.! Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, 2008 Dr. Cayao-Lasam conducted a dilatation and c
urettage procedure (raspa) on Ramolete. Almost a month after, she went back to t
he hospital. A dead fetus was found in her womb. She underwent operations, which
rendered her incapable of bering a child. The SC absolved Dr. Cayao-Lasam, sinc
e there was no expert testimony presented to the effect that she breached her pr
ofessional duties, and Ramolete herself failed to attend the follow-up check-ups
after the operation, which could have avoided the injury.! Doctrine: There are
four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and pro
ximate causation. A physician is duty-bound to use at least the same level of ca
re that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. Breach of this duty, whereby the patient is " of "50 9
injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this asp
ect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care an
d the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.! Notes: The elements enumer
ated is the same as that for a tort. It, therefore, shares the same problem as t
hat of tort, that is, lack of statutory basis. The requirement of expert testimo
ny is understandable in this case.! Lucas v. Tuao, 2009 Lucas consulted Dr. Tuao r
egarding his "sore eyes." He was prescribed a medicine. Not long after, however,
his sore eyes turned into a viral infection. Maxitrol was then prescribed. The
infection subsided. Upon discovery that Maxitrol increased the chance of contrac
ting glaucoma, he consulted Dr. Tuao, who brushed it aside. His right eye became
blind because of glaucoma. On consultation to another physician, Lucas was infor
med that his condition would require long-term care. The SC absolved Dr. Tuao. It
found that Lucas failed to discharge the burden of proof by failing to present
expert testimony to establish the standard of care required, breach, and proxima
te causation, which requires expert testimony.! Doctrine: Just like any other pr

oceeding for damages, four essential elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) in
jury; and (4) proximate causation, must be established in medical negligence cas
es. In accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents
that he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and s
kill in the treatment of the patient. This standard level of care, skill and dil
igence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the stand
ard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the know
ledge of experts in the field.! Notes: The action was primarily based on Article
2176. However, instead of using the three elements for quasidelict, the element
s of the common-law tort was used.!
!
!
!
Establishing and Defending! Claims of Negligence!
! ! !
! ! ! !
PROVING NEGLIGENCE! In General! Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court. Burden of p
roof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence req
uired by law.! Presumptions! In motor vehicle mishaps! Article 2184. In motor ve
hicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, wh
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the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune.
It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guil
ty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within th
e next preceding two months.! If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the pro
visions of Article 2180 are applicable.! Article 2185. Unless there is proof to
the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negl
igent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.!
!
Possession of dangerous weapons or substance! Article 2188. There is prima facie
presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury r
esults from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms
and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his oc
cupation or business.! Common carriers! Article 1734. Common carriers are respon
sible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:! (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, light
ning, or other natural disaster or calamity;! (2) Act of the public enemy in war
, whether international or civil;! (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner o
f the goods;! (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;! (5) Order or act of competent public authority.! Article 1735. In
all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding
article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are p
resumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove th
at they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.! Res ipsa
loquitur! Definition/statement of the rule. This doctrine is stated thus: Where t
he thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendan
t, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence
, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose fro
m want of care. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]! Res ipsa loquitur
(the thing speaks for itself). Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendan
t was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was
in defendants exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidenc
e whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that ac
cident happened provided the character of accident and circumstances attending i
t lead reasonably to a
!
belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thi
ng which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of all
eged wrongdoer. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the happening of an injury
permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidenc
e that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control
and management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordin
ary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. [Layugan
v. IAC, 1998, citing Black s Law Dictionary]! While negligence is not ordinaril
y inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury wi
ll not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to neg
ligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means,
literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction,
that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances

accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit

an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person w
ho is charged with negligence. [DM Consunji v. CA, 2007, citing American Jurispr
udence]! Justification. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human e
xperience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence ma
y be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa lo
quitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. [Ramos v
. CA, 1999; Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009]! One of the theoretical basis for the doct
rine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
xxx The doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge
of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the acc
ident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general te
rms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to esta
blish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the
fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
! It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by
which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who
knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the de
fendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it pr
oceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine
is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was n
o negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond pla
intiffs power. [DM Consunji v. CA, 2001, citing American Jurisprudence]!
!
!
" of "50 10

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Nature. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof
or a mere procedural convenience. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]!
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate grou
nd of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the natur
e of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience. [Ramos v. CA, 1999; Professional Services v. Agana, 2007]! Effect.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law o
f negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established wit
hout direct proof and furnishes a substitute for speci c proof of negligence. [Lay
ugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1998]! The rule, when applicable to the facts
and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispens
e with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence t
hereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty o
f due care. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]! [I]t furnishes a subst
itute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing speci c proof of n
egligence. [Ramos v. CA, 1999; Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009]! As stated earlier, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes o
ut a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant t
o explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evi
dence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that
of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendan
t to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from a
rising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after t
he circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established. [DM C
onsunji v. CA, 2001]! Requisites. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when
, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily av
ailable. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]! Still, before resort to t
he doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily show
n: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence o
f someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing
conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. [Ramos v. CA,
1999; Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009; Cantre v. Go, 2007; College Assurance v. Belfran
lt Development, 2007]! In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the co
ntrol of instrumentality which caused the damage.
!
Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant
. In order to have the bene t of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving inj
ury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish
that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular inciden
t. [Ramos v. CA, 1999]! From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisite
s for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurr
ence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control a
nd management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or managemen
t used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the
foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of th
e thing which caused the injury." [Professional Services v. Agana, 2007]! Accord
ingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res

ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur do
ctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means
of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged w
ith negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the acci
dent. [DM Consunji v. CA, 2001, citing American Jurisprudence]! Effect of direct
evidence. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference a
rising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff h
as knowledge and testi es or presents evidence as to the speci c act of negligence w
hich is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence
as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances atte
ndant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury
is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant
, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when th
e circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendan
ts liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in t
his case. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988]! In medical negligence cases. Medical malpracti
ce cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur
has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves
of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of tha
t harm. [Ramos v. CA, 1999]! Although generally, expert medical testimony is rel
ied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act
or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical te
stimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of neglig
ence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony a
pplies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical
!
!
!
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science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind whic
h may be testi ed to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physician
s and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a
patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and
care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeon
s, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one
may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquit
ur is applicable, the court is permitted to nd a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the c
ourt from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care
. xxx When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a
nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustai
ned while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to prod
uce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ip
sa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary c
onditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. [
Ibid.]! Layugan v. IAC, 1988 A truck being repaired by Layugan was parked at the
side of the road. It was hit by an oncoming truck. Layugan was pinned underneat
h the truck, his left forearm and left leg injured. His leg had to be amputated
due to gangrene. The SC held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, used as a d
efense here, need not be applied since there was direct evidence to prove the ne
gligence of the driver of the oncoming truck.! Doctrine: It has generally been h
eld that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availe
d of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents ev
idence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury com
plained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the acci
dent and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly app
ear.! Notes: That the rule was invoked as a defense is strange, since it is usua
lly used to establish negligence.! Ramos v. CA, 1999 For her cholecystectomy, th
e surgeon for Ramos was late, and her anesthesiologist was incompetent. Somethin
g went wrong during the intubation, that her nailbeds became bluish. She had to
be placed in a trendelenburg position, so her brain can get enough oxygen. A res
piratory machine was rushed into the operating room. For lack of oxygen in her b
rain, she went into a comatose condition. In the action for damages, the SC held
that the damage sustained presents a case for the application of res ipsa loqui
tur. Brain damage does not normally occur in a gall bladder operation in the abs
ence of negligence. The anesthesia was under the exclusive control of the doctor
s. The patient was unconscious, incapable of
contributory negligence. The presumption of negligence arose, and remained unreb
utted.! Doctrine: The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally ha
ppen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
an endotracheal tube. The instruments used in the administration of anesthesia,
including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of Dr. Gu
tierrez and Dr. Hosaka. Thus the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can be applied in
this case. Res ipsa could apply in medical cases. In cases where it applies, ex
pert testimony can be dispensed with.! Notes: Expert testimony may be dispensed
with when res ipsa loquitur applies. There were proof of negligence in this case
. Nonetheless, the doctrine was still applied.! Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009 Tan was
the owner of a jitney loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs. It was negotiating
a left turn when it collided with a JAM Transit bus. The jitney turned turtle. I
ts driver and passenger were injured. The eggs were destroyed. SC held the bus d
river was negligent for overtaking when there were double yellow center lines on
the road, which means overtaking is prohibited. Res ipsa loquitur was held appl

icable, since the incident could not have happened in the absence of negligence,
the bus was under the control of the driver, and the jitney driver was not cont
ributorily negligent.! Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law and does not constitute an independent or separate ground for liability. Ins
tead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedu
ral convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff o
f, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.! Notes: While the SC
stated that the doctrine was applicable, it still examined the evidence proving
the negligence of the bus driver. This means that the doctrine was not necessary
in resolving the case.! Cantre v. Go, 2007 While unconscious during her treatme
nt by Dr. Cantre for complications due to her pregnancy, Go sustained a gaping w
ound near her armpit, which appeared to be burns caused by contact with the drop
light in the operating room. The SC found Dr. Cantre negligent. The wound was no
t an ordinary occurrence, since it is far removed from the organs treated. The i
nstrument (droplight or blood pressure cuffs) which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the physician. Go was incapable of contributory neglige
nce since she was unconscious.! Doctrine: In cases involving medical negligence,
the doctrine allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the in
jury, provided that the requisites concur [see Requisites above].! Notes: The re
quisites were matched with the facts of the case to establish the proper applica
tion of res ipsa loquitur.!
!
!
!
!
!
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Batiquin v. CA, 1996 Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on Villegas. A
fterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted herself to a
nother surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst and a piece of rubber mate
rial, which looked like a piece of a rubber glove, embedded in her uterus. The e
lements of res ipsa loquitur were held to be present here. The entire operation
was under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. The injury could not have occur
red unless through negligence. The resulting presumption was not rebutted.! Doct
rine: When the doctrine applies, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary c
are.!
Doctrine: When the doctrine applies, it may dispense with the expert testimony t
o sustain an allegation of negligence. The inference of negligence is not dispel
led by mere denial.! Notes: The case illustrates clearly the element of control
in the requisites for the application of the doctrine. Also, only College Assura
nce has the knowledge of, or at least it had the best opportunity to ascertain,
the cause of the fire.!
! !
DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE! Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause!
Article 2179. Article 2179. When the plaintiff s own negligence was the immediat
e and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. xxx! Bernardo v.
Legaspi, 1914 There was a collision between 2 automobiles. One sued for damages
. The other counterclaimed. Th SC held that both were negligent in handling thei
r automobiles, in such a character and extent as to prevent either from recoveri
ng.! Doctrine: Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessne
ss contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of
the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover.! PLDT v. CA, 1989 The jeep dr
iven by Esteban suddenly swerved, hit a mound, and fell into an open trench, whi
ch was an excavation undertaken by PLDT. Esteban frequently drive through said s
treet. The SC found that Esteban was negligent, since he did not exercise reason
able care and prudence, when he already knew of the perils of the road. Also, th
ere was insufficient evidence proving the negligence of PLDT. Esteban cannot rec
over.! Doctrine: Negligence, which is not only contributory to the injury but go
es to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determinin
g factors, precludes the right to recover damages.! Notes: The presence of warni
ng signs could not have prevented the accident. The proximate cause would still
be the sudden swerving of the jeep. If the injury could have been prevented by t
he warning signs, failure place them may be the proximate cause.! Manila Electri
c v. Remoquillo, 1956 Efren Magno was repairing a media agua in his stepbrother
s house. With a galvanized iron sheet, he turned around. The sheet came in conta
ct with an electric wire, causing his death by electrocution. Manila Electric wa
s absolved. The SC found that, while Manila Electric may have been negligent in
leaving the wires uninsulated, the proximate cause of the death was Magno s sudd
en turning around and the close proximity of the house to the electric wires, in
violation of the construction permit given.! Doctrine: A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more tha
n furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was mad
e possible, if there intervened
!
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007 After her hysterectomy operation at Medical

City, Natividad Agana found out that two pieces of sponges were left inside her
, which has caused her pain for a long time. Dr. Ampil, who closed the incision,
invoking res ipsa loquitur, blamed Dr. Fuentes, who conducted the operation its
elf. The SC absolved Dr. Fuentes, since he ceased to have control of the thing w
hich caused the injury, when Dr. Ampil took over. On the contrary, Dr. Ampil was
the lead surgeon, liable under the "captain of the ship" rule.! Doctrine: The m
ost instrumental in the requisites [see Requisites above] for the doctrine to ap
ply is the control and management of the thing which caused the injury.!
!
!
!
DM Consunji v. CA, 2001 Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji, fell 1
4 floors to his death from a building. He was working on top of a plywood floori
ng when the bolts, which were merely inserted, connecting it to a 5-ton chain bl
ock, loosened, causing the whole assembly to fall. The SC found DM Consunji, who
had exclusive management of the construction site, liable. It held that res ips
a loquitur applies, since no worker would fall unless someone was negligent, and
Juego was not contributorily negligent.! Doctrine: As a rule of evidence, the d
octrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recogniz
es that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furni
shes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.! Notes: The case mentioned t
hat res ipsa loquitur is based on common sense and necessity.!
!
!
College Assurance v. Belfranlt, 2007 Fire razed a building owned by Belfranlt De
velopment and leased to College Assurance Plan. damages. It was caused by an ove
rheated coffee percolator in the store room leased to College Assurance. College
Assurance assailed the report of the fireman to this effect. The SC held that e
ven without such report, res ipsa loquitur may be applied. The fire was not an s
pontaneous occurrence. It originated from the store room, in the possession and
control of College Assurance. Belfranlt Development had no hand in the incident,
and it has no means to find out for itself the cause of the fire.!
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between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrela
ted, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have h
appened but for such condition or occasion.! Notes: In relation to the discussio
n on experts, Magno cannot be considered as such since his job was not for pay.!
Contributory negligence of plaintiff! Article 2179. xxx But if his negligence w
as only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.! Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the c
ontributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may rec
over.! NPC v. Heirs of Casionan, 2008 Casionan and Jimenez took bamboo poles, 14
and 18 feet, respectively, for pocket mining and walked on the only trail that
led to their workplace. The trail had high-tension electrical lines sagging and
dangling to the ground. When Noble turned left on a curve, his bamboo hit a wire
which electrocuted him. Noble died. His heirs sued NPC. The latter asked for mi
tigation of its liability since Casionan was contributorily negligent. The SC di
d not think so.! Doctrine: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection
. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the
person injured which, concurring with the defendant s negligence, is the proxim
ate cause of the injury.! Notes: The definition of contributory negligence here
almost equated it to proximate cause.!
!
!
aware of the defects in the rail, his disobedience, which placed him in danger,
contributed to some degree to the injury "as a proximate, although not as its pr
imary cause." He is thus entitled only to half the amount of damages.! Doctrine:
Where the claimant contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its deter
mining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, h
e contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defenda
nt responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a sui
table equivalent for his own imprudence.! Notes: The court surveyed the common l
aw rule of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. The reason for
such rule is because of the difficulty in measuring negligence and the extent t
o which it cause the injury. The court, however, refused to apply it, ruling ins
tead that contributory negligence only reduces the amount recoverable, a rule no
w in the Civil Code. The rule was applied to actual damages in this case. Whethe
r it may be applied to other kinds of damages is not settled.!
!
!
Genobiagon v. CA, 1989 An old woman was crossing the street. She started to do s
o when a rig was approaching, followed by another, driven by Genobiagon, which w
as very fast as it was trying to overtake the first rig. Genobiagon eventually b
umped the old woman to her death. Tried for homicide through reckless imprudence
, he claims that the reckless negligence of the woman was the proximate cause. T
he SC rejected his defense.! Doctrine: The defense of contributory negligence do
es not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one
cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligen

ce! Notes: Contributory negligence, which usually serves as a defense in civil c

ases, is not applicable in criminal cases.!
Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon, 2005 After a bottle of beer, Castillon was drivin
g fast on a motorbike without helmet, when the jeep he was tailgating made a sud
den left turn. He died. The SC held that, while the sudden left turn of the jeep
was the proximate cause, Castillon was guilty of contributory negligence. He is
entitled only to half of the damages (loss of earning capacity, death indemnity
, moral).! Doctrine: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled t
o recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence.
The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by h
is negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability v
aries depending on the circumstances of each case.! Notes: The case cited MH Rak
es v. The Atlantic as regards the mitigation of damages without discussing the r
eason behind the proportionate reduction.!
!
!
MH Rakes v. The Atlantic & Co., 1907 Rakes was transporting iron bars through a
hand car. Rakes walked beside the hand car, which was prohibited by the foreman.
When the iron bars slipped, and because of a depression in the rails caused by
a recent typhoon, his feet was injured and amputated. The SC found that while he
may not be
PNR v. Brunty, 2006 A collision occurred between a car and a PNR train at 12 AM
causing the death of Brunty, a passenger of the car. The car was overtaking anot
her car, with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. The SC found the car d
river contributorily negligent, but did not mitigate the liability of PNR to Bru
nty. Her relationship with the driver was not established.! Doctrine: To hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed
an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an i
mpending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is stil
l necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negl
igence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is c
ontributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a
condition for its occurrence.!
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Notes: Causal link between negligence and injury is included in the definition o
f contributory negligence. Also, the negligence of the driver was external to th
e liability of PNR to Brunty. As such, it does not mitigate such liability.!
! ! ! ! !
Fortuitous event! Definition! Defense and exceptions! Elements! Three-step analy
sis! Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation require
s the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.! Based on the
provision and on the lecture, the three-step test for determining the existence
of fortuitous event, which exempts from liability, is:! First: Is the event a f
ortuitous event? As defined, fortuitous events are those which "could not be for
eseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable."! Second: Is it within the ex
ceptions in Article 1174? If yes, the defense cannot apply. The exceptions are w
hen the liability for fortuitous event is:! (1) specified by law;! (2) when it i
s declared by stipulation; or! (3) required by the nature of the obligation.! Th
ird: Are the elements present? The elements, as laid down in Lasam v. Smith, are
:! (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure
of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human wi
ll;! (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso f
ortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.! (3) The occu
rrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obl
igation in a normal manner;! (4) The debtor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.! Note: The elements,
while lacking in statutory basis, are applied by the court anyway.! Juntilla v.
Fontanar, 1985 The right rear tire of the jeepney, where Juntilla was a passeng
er, exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Juntilla, who was sitting at th
e front seat, was thrown out of the vehicle. He suffered injuries and his Omega
watch was lost. On his complaint for breach of contract of carriage with damages
, the SC ruled that the defense of fortuitous event was not present since the ca
use of the event was not independent of the
human will. The incident was either caused by the negligence of the driver, or m
echanical defects.! Doctrine: The requisites of a caso fortuito are mentioned in
Lasam v. Smith [see Three-step analysis above]. When the cause of the unforesee
n and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will," that is, neg
ligence of the defendant concurred, the defense does not apply.! Notes: In case
mechanical defects caused the injury, the carrier is liable if such defects can
be discovered by exercising the degree of care required. It may, however, recove
r from the manufacturer. Also, while blowing-out of a newly bought tire may cons
titute fortuitous event, it was not so in this case since there were indications
of concurrent negligence on the part of the driver.! Southeastern College v. CA
, 1998 A typhoon blew the roof of Southeastern College away. It landed on the ho
use of the Dimaanos, damaging it. On suit for damages, the SC ruled that typhoon
is a fortuitous event, and that the College was not negligent. If the roofing w
ere not firmly anchored, it could not have withstood previous typhoons.! Doctrin
e: In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is ne
cessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of
which the loss may have been occasioned. When the effect is found to be partly t
he result of the participation of man whether it be from active intervention, or
neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and remove
d from the rules applicable to fortuitous events.! Notes: The case traced the hi

story of fortuitous event from Partidas. It also cited Tolentino, stating the fo
rtuitous events may be produced by by nature or by act of man.! Sicam v. Jorge,
2007 Jorge pawned jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam. Armed men entered the paw
nshop and took away cash and jewelry from the pawnshop vault. Jorge demanded the
return of the jewelry. The pawnshop failed. The SC held Sicam liable for failin
g to employ sufficient safeguards for the pawned goods. It held that robbery, if
negligence concurred, is not a fortuitous event.! Doctrine: An act of God canno
t be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the p
ossible adverse consequences of such a loss. One s negligence may have concurred
with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, show
ing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuito
us event would not exempt one from liability. ! Plaintiffs assumption of risk/vol
enti non fit injuria! Afialda v. Hisole, 1949 A caretaker of carabaos was gored
by a carabao. He later died as a consequence of his injuries. In an action based
on Article 1905 against the owner, the SC held that being injured by the animal
under his care was one of the risks of the occupation which the caretaker volun
tarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. It held that Article
1905 does not apply.!
!
!
!
!
!
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Doctrine: Article 1905 names the possessor or user
iable for "any damages it may cause," since he has
ion to prevent it from causing damage.! Notes: The
wingly assumed the inherent risk when he agreed to

of the animal as the person l

the custody and is in a posit
caretaker voluntarily and kno
be employed as such.!

!
if he is not negligent in doing so. It does not apply in an action based on Arti
cles 19 and 21, since even if the risk of injury is assumed, the obligation to t
reat others fairly under said provisions still exists.! Notes: Compare with Pant
aleon v. American Express as to the applicability of the doctrine when the actio
n is based on Articles 19 and 21.!
Ilocos Norte Electric v. CA, 1989 After a typhoon, early in the morning, Nana Be
len ventured into the waist-deep flood to look after the merchandise that might
have been damaged in her store. While wading through the flood, she suddenly scr
eamed and quickly sank. On that spot, an electric wire was seen dangling from a
post, moving in a snake-like fashion. In the complaint, the electric company rai
sed the defense of volenti non fit injuria. The SC held that it is inapplicable,
since Nana Belen was impelled to brave the subsiding typhoon to see to it that
her goods were not flooded. At that time, she was at a place where she had a rig
ht to be, to protect her source of livelihood.! Doctrine: A person is excused fr
om the force of the rule when (1) an emergency is found to exist or if the life
or property of another is in peril, or (2) when he seeks to rescue his endangere
d property.!
!
!
Calalas v. CA, 2000 Sunga sat in an extension seat in a jeepney. An Isuzu truck
bumped the jeepney, injuring Sunga. The jeepney owner sued the truck driver and
owner, based on quasi-delict. They were held liable. Sunga filed a case for brea
ch of contract against the jeep owner, with the truck owner as third party defen
dant. The SC held Calalas liable. It said that taking an "extension seat" did no
t amount to an implied assumption of risk.! Doctrine: The contention that taking
an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk is akin to arguin
g that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not
be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drownin
g by boarding an overloaded ferry.!
Pantaleon v. American Express, 2010 While on a European tour, Pantaleon and his
family attempted to purchase diamond pieces at Coster Diamond House using their
American Express. This they did 10 minutes before their tour group had to leave
for Amsterdam. The purchases were approved by American Express only after 45 min
utes. The trip to Amsterdam had to be cancelled. The tour group became annoyed a
nd irritated with them. Upon his complaint, the SC ruled that Pantaleon knew tha
t the group will be irritated with him, when he decided to push through with the
purchases. It was a natural and foreseeable consequence of his action. Thus, th
e doctrine of volenti non fit injuria was wholly applicable.! Doctrine: The doct
rine of volenti non fit injuria refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consen
t to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.
! Notes: In Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, the doctrine was held inapplicable. In this ca

se, presumably based on the Human Relations provisions also, it was applied.!
!
Prescription! Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four
years:! (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;! (2) Upon a quasi-de
lict.! Kramer v. CA, 1989 Kramer s fishing boat collided with an inter-island ve
ssel of Trans-Asia Shipping Lines. Upon protests of both parties before the Boar
d of Marine Inquiry, an investigation was conducted. More than 4 years after the
incident, the BMI concluded that the negligence of TranAsia s employees caused
the collision. Almost 4 years passed when Kramer sued for damages based on quasi
delict. The SC held that the action is barred by prescription, to be reckoned fr
om when the cause of action accrued. The aggrieved party need not wait for the d
etermination of an administrative body. ! Doctrine: The prescriptive period begi
ns from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The right of action accrues when
the following concurs: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means a
nd under whatever law it arises or is created, (2) an obligation on the part of
defendant to respect such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.! Notes: In cases where more t
han 2 vessels are involved, the decision of BMI might be needed, since determina
tion of negligence is technical and more difficult.!
!
!
Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, 2005 Amay Bisaya was invited by a friend for several years
to a private party in the hotel. He claimed that he was told by the executive s
ecretary, in a loud voice and with the other guests able to hear, to leave for h
e was not invited. Upon his complaint based on the human relations provision, th
e hotel invoked volenti non fit injuria. The SC held the doctrine does not apply
, since the action was based on Articles 19 and 21. Nonetheless, it found that t
he narration of Amang Bisaya incredible. It believed the testimony of the execut
ive secretary, that he was asked to leave in a discreet manner, and that since i
ntent to injure was not proven. Hence, no liability attaches under Articles 19 a
nd 21.! Doctrine: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person ass
ents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury, which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowi
ngly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
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The Cause!
! !
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES! Proximate Cause! Bataclan v. Medina, 1957 One of the front
tires of a passenger bus bursted. It zigzagged, fell into a canal, and turned t
urtle. While the driver and the passengers were getting out of the bus, people l
iving in the area arrived, with torches, to help. The torches, however, ignited
the gas, which was leaking from the bus, killing the passengers, who were stuck
in the bus. The SC held that the bus company liable for the death of the passeng
ers.! Doctrine: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, it is th
at acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, ea
ch having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final ev
ent in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable resu
lt of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person resp
onsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent perso
n, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.! Mercury Drug v. Baking,
2007 Instead of a medicine for blood sugar, Mercury Drug s saleslady gave Baking
a potent sleeping tablet. He took it for 3 consecutive days, he fell asleep whi
le driving. He figured in a vehicular accident. The SC held that the proximate c
ause of the accident was the negligence of the saleslady, since it would not hav
e happened if the correct medicine was given.! Doctrine: Proximate cause is any
cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred other
wise. It is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideratio
n of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.! Notes: There is a possibility
that there was contributory negligence, since a considerable amount of time has
lapsed since the sale of the medicine. In any case, proximate cause is usually c
onfused with the standard of care. Proximate causation should emphasize the conn
ection between negligence and the injury. The case, however, only focused on the
degree of care required.! Pilipinas Bank v. CA, 1994 To cover the checks he iss
ued, Florencio Reyes asked PCIB to withdraw from his account there and deposit i
t to his account at Pilipinas Bank. In the deposit slip, the account number was
wrong, but the depositor s name was Florencio Reyes. The bookkeeper of Pilipinas
Bank did not notice the surname, so the deposit
was credited to one Florencio Amador, the account corresponding to the wrong acc
ount number. The checks were dishonored. The SC held that the proximate cause wa
s the negligence of Pilipinas Bank s bookkeeper.! Doctrine: Proximate cause is a
ny cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient in
tervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not h
ave occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticip
ated by a person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or some similar
injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable cause.! Notes: The defi
nition of proximate cause is different from that in Bataclan v. Medina in that,
in this case, the element of foreseeability was added.!
!
!

Concurrent Cause! Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and ea
ch is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the i
njury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had agai
nst any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of th
e case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor s negligence ceases to
be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as tho
ugh his acts were the sole cause of the injury. [Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 199
8]! Remote Cause! Gabeto v. Araneta, 1921 Ilano and Gayetano was on board Pagnay
as carromata, Agaton Araneta laid hands on the reins to stop the horse, claiming
that he called the carromata first. Pagnaya pulled the reins from Araneta. In th
e process, the bridle on the horses mouth loosened. Pagnaya had to pull over the
horse near the curb to fix it. The horse became disturbed, moved forward, bumpin
g a telephone box, which crashed. Frightened, the horse ran at full speed. Ilano
was able to get out of the carromata, but Gayetano was was left inside. He sust
ained injuries which led to his death. The SC held that the stopping of the rig
by Araneta was not the proximate cause, since an appreciable amount of time laps
ed until the horse ran. It was too remote from the accident to be considered as
such proximate cause.! Doctrine: The chronology of the events may be considered
to determine the proximate cause. A cause too remote from the accident cannot be
considered a proximate cause.!
!
!
!
Intervening! Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987 From a cocktail party where he ha
d a shot or two of liquor, Dionisio drove his car home. His headlights then sudd
enly failed. When they went back on, a truck, owned by Phoenix Construction was
parked askew, such that it blocked oncoming traffic. Dionisio swerved but it was
too late. He suffered injuries
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and nervous breakdown. The SC held that, while Dionisio was guilty of contributo
ry negligence, one which was not an efficient intervening cause, the immediate a
nd proximate cause was the truck driver s negligence in parking.! Doctrine: If t
he intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience, is reasonably to
be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the p
articular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, be
cause of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason.! Notes: In other words, if the purported intervening cause is a fo
reseeable risk or is closely related to the original risk, then there is no effi
cient intervening cause.!
! ! ! !
TESTS IN DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSE! But for/sine qua non! Substantial factor!
Mixed considerations! There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proxim
ate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the
act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fe
tched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natur
al and probable result of the act or omission. [Dy Teban v. Ching, 2008]!
result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills g
asoline about the premises creates a "condition;" but the act may be culpable be
cause of the danger of fire." When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition h
as done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is th
e very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape respo
nsibility." Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" r
emains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in th
e highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward." "
Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the d
istinction is now almost entirely discredited." So far as it has any validity at
all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new forc
e intervenes." But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and the characte
r of the intervening cause. [Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987, citing Prosser &
Keeton]!
!
Last Clear Chance! Definition! The doctrine of last clear chance states that whe
re both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later
than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or ne
gligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid th
e loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering da
mages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fa
ir chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. [Conso
lidated Bank v. CA, 2003]! This doctrine, in essence, states that where both par
ties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time th
an that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negli
gence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear oppor
tunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the co
nsequences thereof. xxx [T]he rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence

of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negli
gence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, w
ho had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exerci
se of due diligence. [Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA, 1997]! It goes without saying
that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antece
dent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we hav
e already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem
always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. xxx
Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chanc
e to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so
!
!
Sufficient link! Dy Teban v. Ching, 2008 A prime mover suffered a tire blowout a
t around midnight, causing it to be parked askew, occupying a substantial portio
n of the highway. It did not have any early warning device. At dawn, while it wa
s dark, a passenger bus collided with a van in an attempt to swerve to avoid the
parked prime mover. The SC found that the skewed parking of the prime mover was
the proximate cause of the accident. Its driver was negligent in failing to pre
vent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.! Doctrine: Plaintiff must, howe
ver, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or i
njury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act o
r omission.! Cause versus Condition! Cause and Condition. Many courts have sough
t to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "condit
ions" upon which that cause operated." If the defendant has created only a passi
ve static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable." But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of n
ecessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result
, it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situat
ions, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
!
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is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence o
f the other party. [Picart v. Smith, 1918]!
!
Application! Picart v. Smith, 1918 An automobile hit a horseman, who was on the
wrong side of the road. The horseman thought he did not have time to get to the
other side. The car passed by too close that the horse turned its body across, w
ith its head toward the railing. Its limb was broken, and its rider was thrown o
ff and injured. The SC found the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent ma
n should have foreseen the risk in his course and that he had the last fair chan
ce to avoid the harm.! Doctrine: The person who has the last fair chance to avoi
d the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, wit
hout reference to the prior negligence of the other party.! Bustamante v. CA, 19
91 Seven passengers of a bus were thrown out and died when it collided with a gr
avel and sand truck. Before the collision, about 30 meters away, the bus driver
saw the front wheels of the truck wiggling and was heading toward his lane. Beli
eving that the truck driver was merely joking, he sped up to overtake a tractor
in an inclined part of the road. While overtaking, the collision happened. The h
eirs of the victims filed for damages. The SC held that the doctrine of last cle
ar chance does not apply, since the case was not between the owners and drivers
between colliding vehicles.! Doctrine: The doctrine cannot be extended into the
field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held
liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter s peril, a
nd it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against
third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had neg
ligently failed to take action which could have avoided the injury.! Notes: The
case defined the doctrine both in terms of its effect on recovery and as a test
to establish liability, that is, to determine proximate cause. However, part of
the definition provided does not help at all in determining proximate cause sinc
e it even includes cases where it is impossible to determine whose negligence ca
used the occurrence. In other words, it seems to include those cases where proxi
mate cause cannot be determined at all. ! Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987 From
a cocktail party where he had a shot or two of liquor, Dionisio drove his car h
ome. His headlights then suddenly failed. When they went back on, a truck, owned
by Phoenix Construction was parked askew, such that it blocked oncoming traffic
. Dionisio swerved but it was too late. He suffered injuries and nervous breakdo
wn. One of the defense of Phoenix Construction is that Dionisio had the last cle
ar chance to avoid the injury. The SC held that the doctrine does not apply, sin
ce there is no general concept of last clear chance that may be extracted from i
ts common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in a civil law jurisdiction. It held that the determi
nation of proximate cause is not merely an exercise of chronology.! Doctrine: Th
e last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdictio
n by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent,
it has found its way into the Civil Code."The historical function of that doctri
ne in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of the common law doctrine of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery of damages by a plaintif
f who was also negligent, even if relatively minor compared to the wrongful act
or omission of the defendant. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if
any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction whe
re contributory negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery under Article 2179
.!

!
!
Glan People s Lumber v. IAC, 1989 Calibo was driving a jeep, with others riding,
when it collided with a cargo truck near a bridge, leading to Calibo s death. W
hen a complaint for damages was filed, the SC found that the drivers had a full
view of each other at 150 meters, and the truck stopped at 30 meters. Calibo had
the last clear chance to avoid the accident, which he failed to seize. The truc
k driver is thus not liable.! Doctrine: The doctrine of the last clear chance pr
ovides as valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it did whe
n invoked and applied in Picart v. Smith, 1918.! Notes: The case affirmed the ap
plicability of the doctrine of last clear chance in this jurisdiction.! Pantranc
o v. Baesa, 1989 A Pantranco bus encroached on the opposite lane causing its col
lision with a jeepney. Pantranco raised the defense that the jeepney had the las
t clear chance. It then claimed that it must be exonerated from liability. The S
C ruled that the jeepney is not liable, since its driver was not aware of the im
pending peril. As such, the defense of last clear chance does not apply. The jee
pney expected that the bus would return to its lane.! Doctrine: For the doctrine
to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the
last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril
or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it." One cannot be expe
cted to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known
the existence of the peril.!
!
!
!
Engada v. CA, 2003 A pick-up, driven by Engada, encroached upon the lane of a Ta
maraw jeep, headed towards a head-on collision with it. When Tamaraw jeep swerve
d to the left to avoid the pick-up, it also returned to its lane. The vehicles c
ollided. In the criminal complaint against criminal case for simple imprudence r
esulting in physical injuries and damage to property, Engada invoked the doctrin
e of last clear chance. The SC held that there was no clear chance to speak of,
since the pick-up was fast approaching. It applied the emergency rule instead.!
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Doctrine: The doctrine states that a person who has the last clear chance or opp
ortunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his oppo
nent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accide
nt. The chance must be clear, such that there is time and opportunity to ponder
the situation.! Notes: This case applied the doctrine to a criminal case.!
last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due d
iligence.! Notes: The negligence of Romeo constituted in his not checking the ba
nk statements issued to him regularly by the bank, which led to the increase of
his injury.!
!
!
PNR v. Brunty, 2006 A collision occurred between a car and a PNR train at 12 AM
causing the death of Brunty, a passenger of the car. The car was overtaking anot
her car, with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. PNR was found negligen
t. The SC held that the doctrine is inapplicable.! Doctrine: The antecedent negl
igence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The doctrine does not apply wh
en the proximate cause has already been established.!
!
Lapanday Corp. v. Angala, 2007 Lapanday s crewcab bumped a pick-up on its rear,
causing damage to said vehicle. Upon complaint, the SC held that both vehicles w
ere at fault: the crewcab was speeding and the pick-up was on the wrong lane whe
n it tried to make a U-turn. Both being negligent, the doctrine applies. The cre
wcab, which was the rear vehicle, had the last clear chance of avoiding the coll
ision.! Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parti
es are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caus
ed the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but fa
iled to do so is chargeable with the loss.! Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA, 1997 Ro
meo, President of RMC, entrusted funds to his secretary, Irene, to be deposited
in RMCs account in Philippine Bank of Commerce. Irene, however, deposited said fu
nds to her husband s account. It was only after more than a year that Romeo foun
d the scheme out. When he sued the bank for damages, the SC found that, while he
was negligent, the bank had the last clear chance in averting the injury. It or
dered payment of 40% of the actual damages by the bank.! Doctrine: The doctrine,
also called "supervening negligence" or "discovered peril," states that where b
oth parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault o
r negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clea
r opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with
the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an
antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by anot
her, if the latter, who had the
Canlas v. CA, 2000 Supposedly to raise capital for a business, Canlas delivered
to Manosca the titles of lots he owned. Manosca, with the help of impostors pret

ending to be Canlas and his wife, was able to get a long from Asian Savings Bank
, secured by a mortgage over the lots. When the lots were foreclosed, Canlas sue
d to annul the mortgage. The SC ruled that the bank, having the last clear chanc
e to avoid the injury, and failing to verify the identity of the supposed owners
, must suffer the loss.! Doctrine: The doctrine is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in poin
t of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose f
ault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule
is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of dam
ages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair c
hance to prevent the impending harm by exercise of due diligence.!
!
!
Consolidated Bank v. CA, 2003 The passbook of LC Diaz was given to another by th
e teller of Consolidated Bank. Soon after, an unauthorized withdrawal was made.
When LC Diaz sued to recover the amount withdrawn, the lower courts applied the
doctrine of last clear chance and found the bank liable. The SC, after holding t
hat the cause of action arose from culpa contractual, ruled that the doctrine do
es not apply in cases of breach of contract.! Doctrine: In a case of culpa contr
actual, neither the contributory negligence of a plaintiff nor his last clear ch
ance to avoid the loss, would exonerate a defendant from liability. Such contrib
utory negligence or last clear chance merely serves to reduce the recovery of da
mages.! Notes: In culpa contractual, the principle on proximate cause does not a
pply. As such, the doctrine, as a means to establish such proximate cause, also
does not apply.!
! !
!
Persons Vicariously Liable!
!
Article 2180. The obligations imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is resp
onsible.! xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good f
ather of a family to prevent damages.!
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PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY! Article 2180. xxx The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.! Guardians are liable for damag
es caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority a
nd live in their company. xxx! Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or d
elivered in satisfaction of the claim.! Article 216, Family Code. In default of
parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:! (1) The s
urviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;! (2) The oldest brother or sister
, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and! (3) The child
s actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
! Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.! Article 217
, Family Code. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children an
d other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in su
mmary judicial proceedings to heads of children s homes, orphanages and similar
institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.! Article 221, Fami
ly Code. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civill
y liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their u
nemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to appropriate defenses provided by law.! Parents!
Notes: The discussion of the court seems to focus on the negligence of the paren
ts themselves, not on the negligence of their son, for which they are vicariousl
y liable. As such, it is Article 2176, not Article 2180, which should apply.! Ta
margo v. CA, 1992 Adelberto shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which led to
her death. After the incident, Adelberto s adoption was finalized. In any case,
a case for damages was filed against his natural parents, who claimed that, sin
ce adoption retroacts to the filing of the petition, the proper party to be sued
are the adoptive parents. The SC held that the natural parents are still liable
, since they had the actual control and custody at the time of the commission of
the act.! Doctrine: The retroactive effect may be given effect to permit the ac
crual of some benefit in favor of the child, but not to burden the adoptive pare
nts with liability for a tortious act, which they could not have foreseen or pre
vented. It is inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying th
e doctrine of vicarious liability.! Notes: What is important is who has actual c
ustody and control of the minor at the time of the act was committed.!
!
! !
Guardians! Others! Libi v. IAC, 1992 Wendell and Julie Ann were sweethearts. Whe
n they broke up and Wendell wanted to reconcile, Julie Ann refused. Wendell reso
rted to threats. They were found dead, each with a single gunshot from the same
gun. Julie Ann s parents believed that Wendell killed their daughter. When a cas
e based on Article 2180 was filed against Wendell s parents, the SC found that t
hey were gravely remiss in their duties, in the safekeeping of the gun and in be
ing unaware of the affairs of their son, who turned out to be a narcotics agent.
Whether Wendell committed a quasi-delict or crime, the parents are still liable
.! Doctrine: The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a par
ent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and s
upervision of the child. The civil liability imposed on parents for the quasidel

icts of their minor children in Article 2180 is primary. The liability of parent
s for felonies committed by their minor children is also primary.!
TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS! Article 2180. xxx Lastly, teachers or head of establishmen
ts of arts and trades shall be liable for damages cause by their pupils and stud
ents or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. xxx! Article 218,
Family Code. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, ent
ity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority a
nd responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instructio
n or custody.! Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activi
ties whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution
.! Article 219, Family Code. Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages cau
sed by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial g
uardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor
shall be subsidiarily liable.! The respective liabilities of those referred to
in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised t
he proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.! All other case
s not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provis
ions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.! Palisoc v. Brillantes, 1971 Dominador
Palisoc and Virgilio Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. O
ne afternoon during recess, in the laboratory room, Daffon and another classmate
were working on a machine, while Palisoc was looking on at them. Daffon
! !
!
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remarked that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. An exchange of blows ensued, un
til Palisoc stumbled on an engine block, causing him to fall with his face downw
ard. He became pale and fainted. He died. The SC held the school officers solida
rily liable with Daffon.! Doctrine: The rationale for the liability of the schoo
l is that, so long as the student remains in the custody of the school hears and
teachers, they stand, to a certain extent, as to the student, in loco parentis
and are called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of said
child. The requirement is not that the student lived and boarded with his teache
r or school of cials, but that he remains in their custody, that protective and su
pervisory custody which the school and its heads exercise over students, again i
ncluding recess time.! Amadora v. CA, 1988 Amadora, 17, was shot by his classmat
e Daffon, 3 days before graduation day, at the school auditorium. Amadora was at
the school, an academic institution, to submit a physics report. Daffon was con
victed of homicide. On complaint for damages, the SC absolved the school officia
ls and teachers, for failure to prove negligence on their part. On the contrary,
school regulations to maintain discipline were enforced.! Doctrine: Article 218
0 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is
academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the t
ort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such studen
t, following the first part of the provision. This responsibility applies as lon
g as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of
a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, a
nd even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility o
f the school authorities over the student continues.! Notes: Unlike the parent w
ho will be liable only for his minor child, the teacher is answerable for torts
of his students regardless of the students age. Also, the case treats the custody
broadly, but it is settled when it starts or ends.! Salvosa v. IAC, 1988 Abon w
as a student and an employee of the armory of the school s RTC. One night, he sh
ot a commerce student within school premises, using an unlicensed gun from the a
rmory. He was convicted of homicide. In the case for damages, the SC absolved th
e school, since Abon was no longer under its custody when the incident happened.
It held that he was not in recess, since he was no longer in attendance in the
school at that time. He was already dismissed.! Doctrine: The mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody" of the s
chool, as contemplated in Article 2180.! Notes: The case mitigates the sweeping
scope of custody in Amadora v. CA. The case effectively states that the school i
s not liable for tortious acts of the student after dismissal.!
!
St. Mary s Academy v. Carpitanos, 2002 During an enrollment drive, a student, 15
, drove the jeep carrying the students. The steering wheel was detached. The jee
p turned turtle. A student died. In the case for damages based on the Family Cod
e provisions, the SC found that, since there was no proof that the proximate cau
se of the accident was the negligence of the school, it cannot be held liable.!
Doctrine: If the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special paren
tal authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the ac
ts or omissions of the minor while under their custody. However, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate caus
e of the injury caused. It must have a causal connection to the accident.! Notes
: The Family Code provisions on vicarious liability of those with special parent
al authority over a minor child are of the same nature as that in Article 2180.
In this case, however, they were applied as if they were similar to Article 2176

, such that proximate causation needs to be proven, rather than presumed.!

!
OWNERS/MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS/EMPLOYERS! When Applicable! Article 2180. xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsib
le for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.! Employers shall
be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engage
d in any business or industry. xxx! Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage ca
used by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid
or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.! xxx [The] terms ["employers" and "o
wners and managers of an establishment or enterprise"] do not include the manage
r of a corporation." It may be gathered from the context of Article 2180 that th
e term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "em
ployer". [Phil Rabbit v. Phil American, 1975]! No absolutely hard and fast rule
can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether a
t a given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer s business in the opera
tion of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of f
acts.! xxx The foregoing principles and jurisprudence [from American Jurispruden
ce] are applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondea
t superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the
fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in America
n law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of
!
!
!
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the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employers business or within the scope of his assigned task. [Castilex v. Vasque
z, 1999]! Jayme v. Apostol, 2008 Facts: A pick-up, driven by an employee of the
Municipality of Koronadal, was on its way to the airport, with the mayor on boar
d, hit Jayme, sending him 50 meters away from the point of impact. The SC held t
hat the mayor cannot be held liable, since he was not the employer. He was merel
y a passenger and a fellow employee. Likewise, Koronadal is immune from suit.! D
octrine: To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, th
e following requisites must be established: (1) that the employee was chosen by
the employer personally or through another, (2) that the service to be rendered
in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all ti
mes, and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reas
on of the functions entrusted to him.! Notes: The four-fold test in determining
the existence of an employment relationship was applied in this case.! Filamer v
. IAC, 1990 Funtecha was a student and a janitor at Filamer Christian Institute.
One evening, he was allowed by the school s driver to drive a school jeep. He s
truck Kapunan. In the independent civil action, the SC held that there was no em
ployment relationship between Funtecha and the school, since, as a working stude
nt, he was not included in the payroll, and, even assuming that there was such r
elationship, he was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment at th
e time of the incident. He should bear the full brunt of his negligence.! Doctri
ne: The liability of the employer only arises when the negligence of the employe
e occurred while the employee is acting within the scope of his employment.! Not
es: The decision relied heavily on a provision of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code to the effect that there is no employment relationship between a scho
ol and its working student.! Filamer v. IAC, 1992 On reconsideration, the SC hel
d that there was an employment relationship between Funtecha and the school, and
that, since driving the jeep to the house of the school president after driving
students to their homes was for the benefit of the school, it is liable under A
rticle 2180 as an employer.! Doctrine: The clause "within the scope of their ass
igned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer
, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the e
mployer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage.! Notes: The Implementing Rules were not applied this time. It
was held that its provisions are not decisive in a civil suit for damages agains
t a working student and a school. However, the decision did not delve on how to
determine the existence of employment relationship, focusing instead
on resolving whether the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned ta
sks.! NPC v. CA, 1998 A dump truck, owned by NPC and driven by an employee suppl
ied by PHESCO, figured in a collision with a Tamaraw jeep. On suit for damages,
NPC disclaimed liability claiming that the driver was not its employee. PHESCO c
laimed that it was merely a recruiter. The SC found that PHESCO was merely a lab
or-only contractor, and, as such, NPC is the direct employer. It is liable under
Article 2180.! Doctrine: In an action for recovery of damages as a result of qu
asi-delict committed by an employee supplied by a labor-only contractor, the Civ
il Code is the applicable law, not the Labor Code.! Notes: Article 2180 is probl
ematic in that there is no test provided to determine the existence of employmen
t relationship. While the case stated that the liability of the employer is dete
rmined by the Civil Code, it relied on Labor Code provisions on labor-only contr
acting to determine the existence of employment relationship.! Castilex Corp. v.
Vasquez, 1999 At dawn, Vasquez was driving his motorcycle at a rotonda when Aba
d, manager of Castilex Industrial Corporation, with a company pickup, driving ag
ainst the flow of traffic, collided with him. Vasquez died. In the action for da

mages, the SC absolve the company from liability, ruling that Abad was not actin
g within the scope of the functions entrusted to him when the incident happened.
As such, its burden to prove that it was diligent did not arise.! Doctrine: Neg
ligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business o
r industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their as
signed task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on
the occasion of their functions.! Notes: Circumstances surrounding the incident
were considered to determine whether Abad was acting within his assigned tasks
at the time of the incident. These include the fact that the area was a "lively
place," and a woman shouting "daddy, daddy," when Abad was only 29.! Valenzuela
v. CA, 1996 Valenzuela was driving her car so early in the morning when she had
a flat tire. She was pointing at the tools to a man who volunteered to held her,
when she was hit by Li, assistant manager of Alexander Commercial and drunk at
that time. Valenzuela s leg had to be amputated. In the suit to recover damages,
the company was held solidarily liable, since there was no proof that it made t
he necessary steps, evidencing diligence in entrusting the company car to Li, su
ch as determining his driving proficiency and history.! Doctrine: The basis of t
he liability of the employer is not respondeat superior, but that of bonus pater
familias, for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of employees. In providing for a company car for
business use, a company owes a
!
!
!
!
!
!
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responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees
to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to
use the company issue capably and responsibly.! Professional Services v. Agana,
2007 After her hysterectomy operation at Medical City, Natividad Agana found ou
t that two pieces of sponges were left inside her, which has caused her pain for
a long time. The SC held Dr. Ampil, the surgeon who closed the incision, liable
, ruling that leaving foreign substances in the wound after the incision has bee
n closed in at the very least prima facie negligence. It is inconsistent with du
e care, raising an inference of negligence. Some authorities even consider it ne
gligence per se. Professional Services, owner of Medical City, was held solidari
ly liable as an employer of Dr. Ampil. The SC also cited the principle of appare
nt authority or agency by estoppel and doctrine of corporate negligence to susta
in the hospital s liability.! Doctrine: The nature of the relationship between t
he hospital and the physicians, whether consultants only or otherwise, is immate
rial. For the purposes of apportioning responsibility in cases of medical neglig
ence, an employeremployee relationship exists between them.! Notes: The case sur
veyed the US rules, stating that, at first, hospitals were exempt from the appli
cation of respondeat superior, since physicians were considered as independent c
ontractors. However, due to the increase in the role of hospitals in regulating
medical care, the exception was abolished. Ramos v. CA is the basis for ruling t
hat the nature of the relationship is inconsequential in our Philippine jurisdic
tion.! Professional Services v. Agana, 2008 On motion for reconsideration, the S
C upheld its earlier ruling. While the disposition of Ramos v. CA was reconsider
ed, since the hospital did not exercise control over the physician, its earlier
doctrine still stands.! Doctrine: For the purpose of allocating responsibility i
n medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hos
pitals and their consultants.! Professional Services v. Agana, 2010 On second mo
tion for reconsideration, the SC, "after gathering its thoughts," not on the bas
is of the principle of respondeat superior (supposedly referring to Article 2180
) anymore, for lack of evidence showing an employment relationship, but under os
tensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil, and, pro hac vice, under the pr
inciple of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospi
tal.! Doctrine: The control test is still employed to determine the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between hospital and doctor.! Notes: The refe
rence to respondeat superior is absolutely wrong. Under Article 2180, a separate
negligence is presumed on the part of the employer, hence, there is only a pres
umption of negligence, which may be disputed by
proof to the contrary. Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, the
employer is automatically considered negligent upon finding of negligence of th
e employee.!
!
!
Presumption of Negligence! Rebuttal of Presumption! Lampesa v. De Vera, 2008 De
Vera boarded a jeepney to Baguio. It allowed a truck, then driven by Copsiyat an
d owned by Lampesa, to pass. However, when the jeepney moved forward, the truck
moved backwards, hitting the jeep. De Vera lost a finger. The SC held that, upon
determination that the negligence of Copsiyat was the proximate cause of the ac
cident, Lampesa, as the employer, was presumed negligent. It found that the pres
umption was not rebutted. That Copsiyat showed his driver s license when he appl
ied for the job is inadequate. An employer is bound to do more. He must also sho

w that he exercised diligence in supervising his employees.! Doctrine: Once negl

igence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arise
s that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said em
ployee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convin
cing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision
of his employees.!
!
!
!
!
Mercury Drug v. Huang, 2007 Stephen Huang was paralyzed as a result of a collisi
on between his car and a truck, owned by Mercury Drug. Mercury Drug claimed that
it was diligence in its hiring procedure and in the supervision of its employee
. The SC found that the truck driver only took the underwent the procedure when
he applied as a delivery man, not as such driver. Also, the tests conducted were
limited. In any case, diligence in the supervision and discipline of employees
was not proven. The driver s license was confiscated at the time for reckless dr
iving. But no disciplinary action was taken against him.! Doctrine: To be reliev
ed of liability, the employer should show that it exercised the diligence of a g
ood father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervi
sion of the performance of his duties. For selection, the employer is required t
o examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. For
supervision, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monito
r their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To es
tablish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof
, including documentary evidence.! Notes: From the level of proof required, it a
ppears that rebutting the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer
is difficult to dispute.!
!
STATE! Article 2180. xxx The State is responsible in like manner when it acts th
rough a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official t
o whom the task
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done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be
applicable. xxx! It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are su
able because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevert
heless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the dischar
ge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be s
hown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defen
dant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or th
at the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the clai
mant cannot recover. [Jayme v. Apostol, 2008, citing San Fernando, La Union v. F
irme]! Merritt v. Government, 1916 Merritt was riding a motorcycle when he was h
it by an ambulance of Philippine General Hospital. His skull was fractured and h
is leg broken. A legislation was passed waiving immunity from suit of the govern
ment. In the case filed under the Old Civil Code, the SC held that, since the am
bulance driver is not a special agent, the government is not liable.! Doctrine:
The responsibility of the state is limited by Article 1903 to the case wherein i
t acts through a special agent, one who receives a definite and fixed order or c
ommission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a specia
l official, so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not appl
y to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who
on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and natu
rally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law.! Notes: The governme
nt cannot be presumed negligent. In fact, regularity in its performance of dutie
s is presumed.! Rosete v. Auditor General, 1948 The employees of the Emergency C
ontrol Administration stored gasoline in a warehouse, close to Rosete s building
, contrary to city ordinances of Manila. When a person lit his cigarette 5 meter
s from the gas drum, a fire broke out, damaging Rosete s property. The SC held t
hat the government is not responsible, since there was no showing that whatever
negligence may be imputed was done by a special agent.! Doctrine: The responsibi
lity of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent,
duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged
with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the cla
im is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with som
e administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibilit
y.! Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 1989 Pickup owned and operated by National Irrigatio
n Administration bumped
!
Fontanilla. The SC held that held that NIA, an agency with its own juridical per
sonality, and performing proprietary functions, is liable as an ordinary employe
r.! Doctrine: The liability of the state has two aspects: (1) its public or gove
rnmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only
, and (2) its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterpr
ises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.! Notes: Private individua
ls may be agents if they are hired for special governmental task.! Fontanilla v.
Maliaman, 1991 The SC denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that NI
A is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the government." It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions." Therefore, it may be held liable for the dam
ages caused by the negligent act of its driver.! Doctrine: A government agency,
in contracting to provide water supply, acts under its proprietary power and not
under legislative, public or governmental powers.!

!
!
! !! !
Persons Speci cally Liable!
POSSESSORS OR USERS OF ANIMALS! Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoe
ver may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, a
lthough it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case t
he damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered the damage.! Vestil v. IAC, 1989 A 3-year old child was bitten by a do
g, while playing at the house of Vicente Miranda, now deceased, and father of Ve
stil. The child died of bronchopneumonia, a complication of rabies. On suit for
damages, Vestil s defense was that she was not the owner. The SC held her liable
, since he was the possessor of the animal. She also had possession over the hou
se, as she collected rents from its boarders.! Doctrine: For liability under Art
icle 2183, what must be determined is the possession of the animal, regardless o
f the ownership.! OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES! Article 2184. In motor vehicle misha
ps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in th
e vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It
is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.! If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provi
sions of Article 2180 are applicable.!
!
!
!
!
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Chapman v. Underwood, 1914 Chapman was standing beside a car he hailed when a ca
r, with Underwood, as the owner, on board and driven by his chauffeur, coming fr
om the opposite direction, turned a bit to the opposite lane to avoid the oncomi
ng traffic. The car hit Chapman. The SC absolved Underwood since it did not appe
ar that, from the time the car took the wrong side of the road to the commission
of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give Underwood an opportunity to c
orrect the act of his driver.! Doctrine: An owner who sits in his automobile and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of
negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such ac
ts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without
the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance
, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, al
though present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, ei
ther civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in
the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acqu
iescence, makes his driver s act his own.! Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 1968 Caedo, wit
h his family, was driving his car, when, from the opposite direction, Yu Khe Tha
i s cadillac, with his driver, tried to overtake a carretela in front, despite C
aedo s car on the opposite lane noticeable at a short distance. The cadillac cau
ght the rear bumper of the carretela, was not able to recover, and collided with
Caedo s car. The SC held that no negligence can be imputed to Yu Khe Thai, sinc
e his driver has been employed for many years without traffic violations, the ca
r was running at a reasonable speed, and the time element was such that there wa
s no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and war
n the driver.! Doctrine: Under Article 2184, if the causative factor was the dri
ver s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liab
le if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The b
asis for the liability is the relationship of pater familias.! Notes: The test o
f whether there was negligence is subjective, since car owners precisely obtain
the services of drivers because they are not as proficient in the activity. Also
, different standards apply across the board, depending on the circumstances of
the owner and the case.! PROVINCES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES! Article 2189. Provin
ces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision.! Guilatco v. Dagupan City, 1989 Guilatco fell into a manhole on
a sidewalk in a provincial road. Her right leg was fractured. In the case for da
mages, the SC held the city
liable, since the supervision and maintenance of manhole was the duty of the cit
y engineer. It held that the exemption of the city from liability of the city in
its charter is not applicable, since Article 2189 governs liability arising fro
m defective streets, public buildings, and other public works.! Doctrine: Under
Article 2189, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to
the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. It only requires th
at either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
! Notes: Article 2189 was not treated as a quasi-delict in this case, but more l
ike strict liability, such that liability attaches when the requisites provided
concur, and proximate causation is not an issue.! Quezon City v. Dacara, 2005 Da
cara s car rammed into a pile of street diggings. He sustained injuries and his
car damaged. In the suit for damages against the city, the pile of earth., the S
C held that the the city was negligent for failing to install even a single warn
ing device at the area under renovation. They city was held liable under Article

2189.! Doctrine:" Local governments and their employees are responsible not onl
y for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the publi
c. They must therefore secure construction areas with adequate precautionary mea
sures.! Notes:" If the doctrine in this case would be strictly observed, then lo
cal governments would face countless suits concerning every accident cause by im
proper maintenance of roads and streets.!
!
!
! !
PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS! Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structur
e is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, i
f it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.! Article 2191. Proprietors
shall also be responsible for damages caused:! (1) By the explosion of machinery
which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of ex
plosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;! (2) B
y excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property;! (3) By the fall
ing of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not cause by force majeur
e;! (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers, or deposits of infectious matt
er, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.! Article 2192. If the
damages referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any d
efect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering
damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in acco
rdance with said article, within the period therein fixed.!
! !
!
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ENGINEER/ARCHITECT OF COLLAPSED BUILDING! Article 1723. The engineer of architec
t who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages
if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should co
llapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the de
fects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if t
he edifice falls, within the same period, on account of the defects in the const
ruction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to
any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervi
ses the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.! Accept
ance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the caus
es of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.! The
action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building.!
HEAD OF FAMILY FOR THINGS THROWN/FALLING! Article 2193. The head of a family th
at lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by t
hings thrown of falling from the same.! OWNERS OF ENTERPRISES/OTHER EMPLOYERS! A
rticle 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compen
sation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or oth
er employees even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely d
ue to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in th
e course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the
employee contracts any illness or disease cause by such employment or as the res
ult of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee s own
notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not
be liable for compensation. When the employee s lack of due care contributed to
his death, or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.! Article 1712
. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter
and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worke
r s intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the e
mployer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did n
ot exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff s fel
low-worker.! Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine, 1933 One Sunday, Madlangbayan, a c
ollector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, was on his way home from making
collections in his bicycle, when he was ran over, to his death, by a truck. In t
he suit by his heirs under Act 3428, the SC held that the death did not arise ou
t of or in the course of his employment as collector.! Doctrine: "Arising out of
" refers to the origin or cause of the accident, and is descriptive of its chara
cter. "In the course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under
which the accident took place. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are
equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular empl
oyment are excluded.! Alarcon v. Alarcon, 1961 Alarcon hired Urzino and Generoso
to dig a well on his land. On the second day of work, Urzino died while being l
owered into the hole, supposedly to dig deeper. An obnoxious odor and hot air ca
used his asphyxia. In the suit based on Article 1711, the SC absolved Alarcon, s
ince he does not own any enterprise.! Doctrine: Article 1711 applies only to own
ers of enterprises and other employers, which, by virtue of ejusdem generis, ref
ers to persons who belong to a class analogous to "owners of enterprises," such
as those operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or trade, requ
iring its managers to contract the services of laborers, workers, or employees.!
MANUFACTURERS/PRODUCERS! Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuf
fs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injur
ies cause by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual rel
ation exists between them and the consumers.! Article 97, Consumer Act. Liabilit
y for the Defective Products. Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, an

d any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages
caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacturer, constructio
n, assembly and erection formulas and handling and making up, presentation or pa
cking of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate informati
on on the use and hazards thereof.! A product is defective when it does not offe
r the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consi
deration, including but not limited to:! a) presentation of product;! b) use and
hazards reasonably expected of it;! c) the time it was put into circulation.! A
product is not considered defective because another better quality product has
been placed in the market.! The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shal
l not be held liable when its evidences:! a) that it did not place the product o
n the market;! b) that although it did place the product on the market! such pro
duct has no defect;! c) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.! Ar
ticle 99. Liability Defective Services. The service supplier is liable for redre
ss, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating
to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate info
rmation on the fruition and hazards thereof.! The service is defective when it d
oes not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to:! a) man
ner in which it is provided.!
!
! !
!
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b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;! c) the time wh
en it was provided.! A service is not considered defective because of the use or
introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held
liable when it is proven:! a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;!
b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.! Article 106. Prohibitio
n in Contractual Stipulation. The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventi
ng, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as
provided for in this and in preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there
is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be j
ointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Ac
t. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the p
roduct or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who inco
rporated the component or part are jointly liable.! Section 5, RA 9803. Liabilit
y for Damages from Donated Food. A person, whether natural or juridical, shall n
ot be subject to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age, packa
ging, or condition of apparently wholesome food that a person donates in good fa
ith for charitable purposes. This shall not apply, however, to an injury or deat
h of an ultimate beneficiary of the donated food that results from an act or omi
ssion of a person constituting gross negligence or intentional misconduct.! PERS
ONS WHO INTERFERE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS! Article 1314. Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the othe
r contracting party.!
expired but THT still occupied the properties. When THT was dissolved and So Pek
Giok already dead, his grandson, So Ping Bun, continued to occupy them. This ev
en when another company TEC, already leased the properties from DCCSI. So Ping B
un was allowed to continue his occupation for some time. When TEC demanded that
he vacate the properties, he immediately contracted with DCCSI for lease of the
properties. When TEC sued to nullify So Ping Bun s contracts and for damages, th
e SC absolved So Ping Bun since no deliberate wrongful motives of malice were im
puted on him.! Doctrine: The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of
a valid contract, (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existenc
e of contract, and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justifi
cation or excuse. Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, a
nd the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than
in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the allege
d interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct,
it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.! Notes: Th
e case had the wrong interpretation of Gilchrist v. Cuddy. Also, the extent of t
he interest of the interferer is irrelevant in determining whether it was malici
ous or not.!
!
!
!
Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 1915 Gilchrist contracted with Cuddy, to exhibit the latter
s Zigomar film. Gilchrist already paid. Few days before showing, Cuddy returned
the payment to Gilchrist, informing him that he made other arrangements for the
film with Espejo and Zaldarriaga. Espejo knew that the film was already contract
ed when he engaged with Cuddy. In the case for specific performance, an injuncti
on was issued for Espejo and Zaldarriaga to refrain from exhibiting the film. Th

ey counterclaimed for damages for wrongful issuance of the injunction. The SC di

smissed the counterclaim, ruling that the issuance was justified, since Gilchris
t faced an immediate prospect of diminished profits. It added to the justificati
on that motive for profit does not relieve from liability in interference.! Doct
rine: That the only motive for interference with the contract was a desire to ma
ke a profit, without malice beyond that, does not relieve them of the legal liab
ility for interfering with that contract and causing its breach.! Notes: The lia
bility for the interference, however, was not discussed, since the case was abou
t the counterclaim.!
Lagon v. CA, 2005 Lagon purchased 2 parcels of land. A few months after, Lapuz f
iled a complaint alleging that he had been leasing the properties, built a build
ing, and subleased it to others, and that Lagon had been collecting rentals from
his sub-lessees. He claimed that Lagon induced the sellers to sell the property
to him, in violation of his leasehold rights. The SC held that the requisites o
f interference with contractual relations were not all present. The case is one
of damnum absque injuria. Lagon was merely advancing his financial or economic i
nterests.! Doctrine: Article 1314 provides that any third person who induces ano
ther to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contractin
g party. "Induce" refers to situations where a person causes another to choose o
ne course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The tort recognized in the p
rovision is known as interference with contractual relations. The interference i
s penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to
reap the benefits that should result therefrom. The requisites of the tort are t
hose laid out in So Ping Bun v. CA.! Notes: There is inducement when there is de
viation from the original plan due to one s persuasion. The case also misinterpr
eted Gilchrist v. Cuddy.!
!
!
So Ping Bun v. CA, 1999 THT, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, leased D
CCSI s property. The lease
Go v. Cordero, 2010 Cordero was an exclusive distributor of a shipping company i
s Brisbane. After incurring travel expenses and closing his first deal with a Co
rdero, he found out that the latter was directly dealing with the shipping compa
ny for the second transaction, cutting off his commissions. Worse, his lawyers a
lso connived with the client and the shipping company to take
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him out of the picture. He sued them all for conspiring in violating his exclusi
ve distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights. The SC held
that the existence of the contract and knowledge by the alleged interferers was
not disputed. As to the legal justification, it found that while the motive was
to reduce the price of the transaction, the bounds of permissible financial inte
rest was transgressed, since Go already incurred expenses in closing the deal, a
nd the lawyers still demanded their cut from him, despite going behind his back
in procuring another deal.! Doctrine: The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract, (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of
the existence of a contract, and (3) interference of the third person is withou
t legal justification. As to the third element, to sustain a case for tortuous i
nterference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven
by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff.! Notes: Without So Ping Bun v.
CA and Lagon v. CA, this would have been a case for tortious interference. The
SC had to rely in Article 19, to uphold its ruling that there was tortious inter
ference. All of this when Article 1314 does not in itself require malice.!
! ! ! Independent Civil Action! !
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory proces
s to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;! (17) Freedom from being co
mpelled to be a witness against one s self, or from being forced to confess guil
t or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confessi
on, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;! (18) Freedom fro
m excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments, unless the same is imposed
or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and! (19) Freedom of access to the courts.! In any of the cas
es referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant s act or omission c
onstitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an en
tirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Suc
h civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the l
atter be instituted) and may be proved by preponderance of evidence.! The indemn
ity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.! The
responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act o
r omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.! MH
P Garments v. CA, 1994 The Boy Scouts of the Philippines awarded an exclusive fr
anchise to MHP to distribute its official uniforms, as well as the authority to
undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in court of all illegal sour
ces of such uniforms. It instigated the seizing of such items, with the help of
police authorities but without warrant. In the case for damages, the SC held tha
t the seizure was illegal. MHP, as a private individual, can also be held liable
under Article 32.! Doctrine: Under Article 32, the wrong may be civil or crimin
al. Malice or bad faith is not necessary. Otherwise, it would defeat the main pu
rpose of the provision, which is the effective protection of individual rights.
Good faith is not a defense. Also, the provision makes liable an officer or a pe
rson directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the rights.! Notes:
The determination of whether rights have been violated employs tests in constit
utional and criminal law.! Silahis v. Soluta, 2006 The hotel officers and guards
, in barong tagalog, searched the union office without warrant and allegedly fou
nd a plastic bag of marijuana. A case against the union officers and members wer
e filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was dismissed, since the eviden
ce was inadmissible. In the complaint for malicious prosecution and illegal sear

ch against the hotel, the SC held that the search stinks of illegality. The hote
l had ample time to obtain a warrant, but it did not. They
VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS! Article 32. Any public officer or emplo
yee, or any private individual, who directly and indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and lib
erties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:! (1) Freedom
of religion;! (2) Freedom of speech;! (3) Freedom to write for the press or to
maintain a periodical publication;! (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detent
ion;! (5) Freedom of suffrage;! (6) The right against deprivation of property wi
thout due process of law;! (7) The right to a just compensation when private pro
perty is taken for public use; ! (8) The right to the equal protection of the la
ws;! (9) The right to be secured in one s person, house, papers, and effects aga
inst unreasonable searches and seizures;! (10) The liberty of abode and of chang
ing the same;! (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;! (12) The r
ight to become a member of associations or societies for the purposes not contra
ry to law;! (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances; ! (14) The right to be free from involunta
ry servitude in any form;! (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
!
!
!
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orchestrated an illegal search for which they are liable, under Article 32.! Doc
trine: The basis of the action is Article 32 of the Civil Code. It may be invoke
d against a private individual who violated a constitutional right of another. I
t speaks of a public officer or a person directly or indirectly responsible for
such violation. It is not the actor alone who must answer for the damages/injury
caused to the aggrieved party. It is not even necessary that the defendant unde
r this article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would d
efeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.
It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plainti
ff.! As constitutional rights occupy a lofty position in every civilized and dem
ocratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, wh
ether constituting a penal offense or not, by both public officers and private i
ndividuals, must be guarded against. That is why it is not even necessary that t
he defendant should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would def
eat its main purpose. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutiona
l right of the plaintiff."! Notes: While the hotel owned the union office, the u
nion officers and members, who were its legal occupants, are entitled to the rig
hts against illegal search.! Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, 2007 Vinzons-Chato, as Co
mmissioner of Internal Revenue, reclassified Champion, Hope, and More, from loca
lly manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand, increasing its ad valorem tax
. Fortune, the manufacturer, moved for reconsideration of the reclassification b
ut was denied. However, the SC eventually invalidated it. When Fortune sued for
damages, VinzonsChato moved to dismiss on the ground that there was not allegati
on of bad faith. The SC, applying Article 32, instead of Section 38 of the Admin
istrative Code, which required bad faith, held that no allegation of bad faith w
as necessary.! Doctrine: It is not necessary that the defendant, under Article 3
2, should have acted with malice or bad faith. Otherwise, it would defeat its ma
in purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices
that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.! Vinzons
-Chato v. Fortune, 2008 When the case was referred to the SC en banc, the court
distinguished between duty owing to the public collectively and duty owing to pa
rticular individuals. In the former, the remedy is political, except when the in
dividual suffers a particular or special injury. In the latter, the individual m
ay sue when he suffers an injury on account of the officer s improper performanc
e or non-performance of his duty. In this case, the duty involved is one owed to
the public in general. No particular injury was proven.! Doctrine: An individua
l can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the p
ublic only; he must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone do
es not constitute a wrong. A contrary precept will
lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might ha
ve the like.! DEFAMATION, FRAUD, AND PHYSICAL INJURIES! Article 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely s
eparate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured par
ty. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, a
nd shall require only a preponderance of evidence.! The article in question uses
the words defamation , fraud and physical injuries. Defamation and fraud a
re used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so th
at these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to the
m any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sen
se." With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms phys
ical injuries could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined
in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commiss

ion would have used terms in the same article some in their general and another
in its technical sense." In other words, the term physical injuries should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because th
e terms used with the latter are general terms." In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil
action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must ha
ve been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recom
mended." If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery,
as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense
committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted hom
icide, or even death. [Madeja v. Caro, 1983, citing Carandang v. Santiago]! Can
Article 33 above cited be made applicable to an employer in a civil action for s
ubsidiary liability? The answer to this question is undoubtedly in the negative.
! What this Article 33 authorizes is an action against the employee on his prima
ry civil liability. It cannot apply to an action against the employer to enforce
his subsidiary civil liability as stated above, because, such liability arise o
nly after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought ag
ainst him before the conviction of his employee is premature. [Joaquin v. Anicet
o, 1964]! Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be ins
tituted as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which is provided by A
rticle 33. It adopts the elements of criminal libel. [Yuchengco v. Manila Chroni
cle, 2009]! Arafiles v. Phil Journalists, 2004 A complaint based on Article 33,
for damages was filed by Arafiles, Director of the National Institute for Atmosp
heric Science against Morales
! !
!
!
!
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of Peoples Tonight, who wrote an article based on the interview he made with a co
mplainant, who charged Arafiles of forcible abduction with rape and forcible abd
uction with attempted rape, and on the police blotter report. Arafiles claimed t
hat the article was grossly malicious and overly sensationalized. The SC held th
at the article, viewed as a whole, sufficiently informs the reader that the narr
ation is based on the account of the victim.! Doctrine: Article 33 contemplates
a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the pur
ely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under the provision sh
all be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance o
f evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency
or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of th
e Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code.! Notes: There is no malicious se
nsationalization of facts in a published article when the sources come from an o
fficial public document, such as police blotter, and from the interview made wit
h the victim.! MVRS v. Islamic Council, 2003 MVRS published in its tabloid an ar
ticle stating that the Muslims do not eat pigs because they are consider them as
gods. Islamic Da wah Council sued for damages, based on Article 33, representin
g not only Muslims in the Philippines, but the entire Muslim world. The SC held
that the article does not relate to the Council or to any individual in particul
ar. It found that it was not directly referred or alluded to. This element of id
entifiability was lacking, owing to the size of the group.! Doctrine: Declaratio
ns made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an iden
tified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or
alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right
of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech a
nd expression, as well as of the press.! Notes: Defamation has to be a negative
comment. This case makes defamation of larger groups difficult.! Heirs of Simon
v. Chan, 2011 Chan, aside from filing a criminal case for violation of BP 22, su
ed for collection of the amount of the checks, claiming that the action is indep
endent of the criminal case, based on Article 33. The SC held that the Revised R
ules of Criminal Procedure, which applies retroactively, provides that the civil
liability in BP 22 can only be enforced in the criminal case, since a separate
civil action for violations of said law is prohibited. Article 33 may be availed
of in estafa, but not in this case.! Doctrine: The criminal action for violatio
n of BP 22 is deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and
no reservation to file such civil action separately is allowed or recognized.! N
otes: It appears that the rule-making powers of the SC here limited the remedies
that may be availed of under the Civil Code, to enforce civil liability.!
Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola, 1965 A truck, owned by Pepsi, collided with the private ve
hicle, driven by Capuno, who, together with his 2 passengers, died. The truck dr
iver was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. An action for d
amages was also filed, but the SC held that such claim, based on Article 33, has
already prescribed, since more than 4 years had lapsed since the death.! Doctri
ne: The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing
death.! Corpus v. Paje, 1969 An accident between a Victory Liner bus, driven by
Paje, and a jeepney, driven by Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other persons were inju
red. Paje was charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence. The right to institute a separate civil action was reserve
d. After Paje s conviction by the trial court, he appealed to the CA. Meanwhile,
the action for damages was filed. The CA then acquitted Paje, with the finding
that the reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, as collision was
pure accident. He moved to dismiss the action for damages, citing his acquittal
. The SC held that the acquittal barred the action.! Doctrine: Criminal negligen

ce or reckless imprudence is not one of the crimes mentioned in Article 33, whic
h authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, entirely separate a
nd distinct from the criminal case and shall be proved by preponderance of evide
nce.! Bonite v. Zosa, 1988 Bonite was hit by a truck. His heirs filed a criminal
complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence. It was dismissed, on the gr
ound that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The heirs then filed a c
ase for damages. The SC held that the filing of the case was proper, under Artic
le 29 and 2176. Article 33 was not applicable, since criminal negligence is not
among the crimes stated therein.! Doctrine: Article 33 assumes a defamation, fra
ud, or physical injuries intentionally committed, not through criminal negligenc
e.! Jervoso v. People, 1983 Jervoso was convicted of homicide. He was also adjud
ged to indemnify the family of the deceased, despite the fact that there was a r
eservation to file a separate civil action. The SC held that, since there was a
reservation, the award of damages was erroneous.! Doctrine: The term "physical i
njuries" in Article 33 is used in a generic sense." It includes consummated, fru
strated, or attempted homicide.! Dulay v. CA, 1995 Torzuela, a security guard of
Safeguard shot Dulay to death, using his service gun. A case for homicide was f
iled. The separate action for damages by Dulay s wife was dismissed on the groun
d that the liability sought to be enforced arose from a crime. The SC ruled that
the action was based on Articles 2176 and 33. It may proceed independently of t
he criminal proceeding.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Doctrine: The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 includes bodily injuries
causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustra
ted, and attempted homicide. Prior conviction is unnecessary, since the civil ac
tion can proceed independently of the criminal action.!
!
NEGLECT OF DUTY! Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force r
efuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to l
ife or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and t
he city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil ac
tion herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a p
reponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.! CATCH-ALL INDEPE
NDENT CIVIL ACTION! Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a crimi
nal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil actio
n is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds
no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosec
uting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaina
nt may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil
action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant s mo
tion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defend
ant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.! If during the penden
cy of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting at
torney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the crimina
l proceedings.!
for damages against Shell Philippines. The SC awarded damages based on Article 1
9, as implemented by Article 21.! Doctrine: It may be said that Article 19 only
contains declarations of principles. While such statement may be is essentially
correct, it is implemented by Article 21. With this rule, the legislator vouchsa
fed adequate legal remedy for untold numbers of moral wrong, impossible for huma
n foresight to provide for specifically in statutes.! Notes: Based on this case,
an action based solely on Article 19 cannot prosper, since it is not self-execu
tory.! Globe Mackay v. CA, 1989 Tobias was accused of his boss, Globe Mackay Gen
eral Manager Hendry of being privy to various fictitious purchases and fraudulen
t transactions in the company. He was forced to take a leave. The police investi
gators, however, cleared him from liability. Despite this, Globe Mackay lodged 6
criminal complaints against him. Finding himself with no work, Tobias sought em
ployment at another company. Hendry, at his own behest, wrote that company stati
ng that Tobias was dismissed for dishonesty. The SC ruled that imputation of gui
lt without basis, the pattern of harassment during the investigations, the writi
ng of letter to a prospective employer, and the filing of the criminal complaint
s, transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 in relation
to Article 21. The right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be c
onfused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for d
amages.! Doctrine: Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one s rights but also in the performance of one s du
ties. These standards are the following: to act with justice, to give everyone h
is due, and to observe honesty and good faith. However, while it lays down a rul
e of conduct, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an acti
on for damages under either Articles 20 or 21 would be proper.! Notes: There is

no rigid test in determining whether there is an abuse of right. The specific ci

rcumstances of each case is considered.! Albenson v. CA, 1993 Albenson Enterpris
es delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries. Checks were issued as p
ayment. They were dishonored. Albenson traced the origin of the check to one Eug
enio S. Baltao. Thus, Albenson demanded from him, but he denied. A complaint for
violation of BP 22 was filed but was dismissed. It was found out that the perso
n who issued the checks was his son, with the same name. Baltao then filed for d
amages for malicious prosecution, but the SC found that there was no abuse of ri
ght, since Albenson only filed the complaint after it made inquiries. Baltao did
not inform Albenson that the checks were issued by his son. He instead waited i
n ambush to sue for damages.!
!
!
! ! ! Human Relations Torts ! !
!
ABUSE OF RIGHTS! Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights an
d in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.! Velayo v. Shell Company, 1956 Shell Philippine
s was among the creditors of the Commercial Airlines (CALI), who was about to fi
le for insolvency. To avoid such insolvency proceedings, CALI met its creditors
to discuss liquidation. Fitzgerald represented Shell, and was made a member of t
he committee to supervise the liquidation. However, upon knowledge that a plane
of CALI was in the US, Shell assigned its rights to Shell America, allowing it t
o attach said plane. The insolvency proceeding was then instituted. The administ
rator of CALI s assets filed a case
!
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Doctrine: The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are: (1) there is a
legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, (3) for the sole inte
nt of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 19 and 21 requires that the act b
e intentional. There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. Whether or not t
he principle of abuse of rights has been violated depends on the circumstances o
f each case.! Notes: Elements (2) and (3) are quite the same. Also, the requirem
ent of that prejudicing or injuring another be the sole intent is problematic. A
s long as one can point to another motivation, the requisite is no longer presen
t.! Amonoy v. Gutierrez, 2001 A mortgage over lots was executed to secure the pa
yment of Amonoy, as counsel for the heirs of Cantolos. Since the settlement of t
he estate took too long, however, Amonoy filed for the judicial foreclosure of t
he mortgage. The heirs opposed, so they were ordered to pay, or else the lots wi
ll be auctioned. They failed to pay and the the mortgage was foreclosed. Amonoy
caused the demolition of the structures in the lots, despite a TRO issued by the
SC. When the heirs sought to annul the foreclosure, the SC found that Amonoy, b
y proceeding with the demolition despite the TRO, abused his rights. Worse, it w
as an invalid exercise of a suspended right.! Doctrine: The exercise of a right
ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially
to the prejudice of others. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsibl
e.! UE v. Jader, 2000 Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He
took a removal examination for one subject, but the grade was released late. In
the meantime, he was allowed to graduate. He was reviewing for the bar examinati
on when he learned that he failed the removal exam. On suit for damages, the SC
held that UE is under a contractual obligation to promptly inform the student of
his status in the school and the remedies he may avail of. Failure to do so con
stituted bad faith, which makes it liable for damages under Article 19, more so
since Jader was allowed to graduate and after he had prepared to the bar examina
tions.! Doctrine: Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by gran
ting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is imposs
ible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized
society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them, that their fellowmen,
when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary underst
anding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they dea
l in the general course of society will act in good faith.!
Notes: If the elements stated in Albenson v. CA were applied here, the action wo
uld have not prospered.! Barons Marketing v. CA, 1998 Barons had an unpaid accou
nt with Phelps. It requested to settle the amount through payment by installment
s, but instead Phelps filed a collection suit. Barons now contends that Phelps a
bused its right to collect payment, but the SC, holding that good faith is alway
s presumed, held that bad faith was not proven. Also, it found that Phelps was d
riven by legitimate reasons in rejecting the offer. It held that the case is a m
ere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof.! Doctrine: To constitute an abuse
of rights under Article 19, the defendant must have acted with bad faith or inte
nt to prejudice the plaintiff. In practice, courts, in the sound exercise of the
ir discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the e
xercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.! Notes:
This case is different from Velayo v. Shell since there was no prior understandi
ng that no suit will be filed.! Diaz v. Davao Light, 2007 A dispute regarding el
ectrical connection, where Diaz unilaterally installed a meter and Davao Light c

aused its disconnection, was settled by a compromise agreement. In any case, Dav
ao Light still filed a complaint for theft against Diaz, but was dismissed for l
ack of probable cause. When Diaz claimed for damages, the SC held that the case
was of a damnum absque injuria, since it was his acts which resulted to the fili
ng of the complaint, and that the sole intent to prejudice was not proven in evi
dence.! Doctrine: The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the exi
stence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) fo
r the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Good faith refers to the s
tate of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupu
lous advantage of another. It is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the d
uty to prove the same.! Pantaleon v. American Express, 2009 While on a European
tour, Pantaleon and his family attempted to purchase diamond pieces at Coster Di
amond House using their American Express. This they did 10 minutes before their
tour group had to leave for Amsterdam. The purchases were approved by American E
xpress only after 45 minutes. The trip to Amsterdam had to be cancelled. The tou
r group became annoyed and irritated with them. Upon his complaint, the SC ruled
that American Express had not duty to act upon the purchases within a specific
period of time. As such, there was not breach of duty. Also, it had the right to
review and either approve or disapprove of the purchases. While it is bound by
the principle of abuse of rights, no bad faith was shown on its part.! Notes: Wh
ether or not Article 19 can stand alone, without invoking Article 21, is not set
tled.!
!
!
!
!
!
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ILLEGAL ACTS! Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or neglig
ently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage.! Arti
cle 20 does not distinguish. The act may be done either willfully or negligently
. [Albenson v. CA, 1993]! Garcia v. Salvador, 2007 Salvador, who was then a trai
nee, was required by her employer to undergo medical tests as a prerequisite for
regular employment. Garcia, a medical technologist, conducted the test. The res
ult showed that she was positive for hepatitis. She did not qualify for regulari
zation. Subsequent tests, however, revealed that she was negative for the diseas
e. She was rehired. In her complaint for damages, the SC awarded damages based o
n Article 20, for the actionable conduct of Garcia. The testing center was not s
upervised by a licensed physician, the test was administered without supervision
of a pathologist, and the result was released directly to Salvador, without aut
horization from a pathologist, all in violation of law regulating clinical labor
atories.! Doctrine:" Article 20 provides the legal basis for the award of damage
s to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some
legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief
to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provisio
n.! ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES! Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or publi
c policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.! Velayo v. Shell Company, 1
956 Shell Philippines was among the creditors of the Commercial Airlines (CALI),
who was about to file for insolvency. To avoid such insolvency proceedings, CAL
I met its creditors to discuss liquidation. Fitzgerald represented Shell, and wa
s made a member of the committee to supervise the liquidation. However, upon kno
wledge that a plane of CALI was in the US, Shell assigned its rights to Shell Am
erica, allowing it to attach said plane. The insolvency proceeding was then inst
ituted. The administrator of CALI s assets filed a case for damages against Shel
l Philippines. The SC awarded damages based on Article 19, as implemented by Art
icle 21.! Doctrine: The legislators, in providing for Article 21, vouchsafed ade
quate legal remedy for untold numbers of moral wrongs, which is impossible for h
uman foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes, such that a wrong or
injury, contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, should be compensat
ed by damages.! Albenson v. CA, 1993 Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel p
lates to Guaranteed Industries. Checks were issued as payment. They were dishono
red. Albenson traced
! !
! !
the origin of the check to one Eugenio S. Baltao. Thus, Albenson demanded from h
im, but he denied. A complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed but was dismisse
d. It was found out that the person who issued the checks was his son, with the
same name. Baltao then filed for damages for malicious prosecution, but the SC f
ound that there was no abuse of right, since Albenson only filed the complaint a
fter it made inquiries. Baltao did not inform Albenson that the checks were issu
ed by his son. He instead waited in ambush to sue for damages.! Doctrine: Articl
e 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, with the following elements: (1) there
is an act which is legal, (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, publ
ic order, or public policy, (3) and it is done with intent to injure. The act mu
st be intentional. As for malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the pr
osecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and t
hat it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for

prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. The action may b
e based on Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8). Three (3) elements
must be present in such cases: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was fina
lly terminated with an acquittal, (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecuto
r acted without probable cause, (3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by l
egal malice.! Wassmer v. Velez, 1964 Only 2 days before their scheduled wedding,
Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that the wedding had to be postponed due
to the disapproval of his mother. The next day, he sent a telegram stating that
the wedding would push through. After such telegram, however, he neither appeare
d nor was he heard from again. In the suit for damages, the SC held that, while
a breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the case is not of mere breach o
f promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemni
zed, is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which Velez mus
t be held answerable for damages, under Article 21.! Doctrine: A breach of promi
se to marry is not actionable, but the manner in which it is done (if contrary t
o law, morals, good customs, or public policy, under NCC 21) may give rise to da
mages.! Notes: What was probably considered in the case is not the breach itself
, but the manner by which it was done and its effects.!
!
!
!
Tanjanco v. CA, 1966 Claiming that she consented to his pleas for carnal knowled
ge in consideration of his promise to marry, only to be broken, Santos sued Tanj
anco for damages. The SC found that there was no seduction in the case, am essen
tial feature in the illustration of Article 21, by the Code Commission. It is th
e essence of the injury.
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Santos maintained intimate secual relations with Tanjanco for a whole year, with
repeated acts of intercourse. This is incompatible with the idea of seduction.!
Doctrine: The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sex
ual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage. It connotes essentially t
he idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.! Notes: The decision seems to im
ply that the length of time that the relationship has persisted is the factor co
nsidered in determining whether there was seduction or not.!
!
Baksh v. CA, 1993 Baksh, an Iranian exchange medical student, courted and promis
ed to marry Gonzales, a waitress. Baksh went with her to her hometown to ask for
the consent of her parents, who agreed. They then lived together in his apartme
nt. Marilou was a virgin before the relationship. Baksh was able to deflower her
. When Marilou demanded marriage, Baksh claimed that he was already married. She
sued for damages under Article 21. The SC held that, since Gonzales surrendered
her virginity because of moral seduction, Baksh is liable under Article 21.! Do
ctrine: Where a man s promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congr
ess, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the pr
omise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21, not because of such promise to marry but beca
use of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and re
putation which followed thereafter. It is essential that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.!
strollers delivered. He claimed that the goods were defective. Que instituted a
BP 22 case against him. It was only at this time when Que sent back the stroller
s. The case was dismissed by the city fiscal. Nicolas then filed for damages ari
sing from malicious prosecution. The SC ruled that Que acted with probable cause
, considering that the checks were dishonored and were not funded despite demand
, and that the strollers were not returned immediately. As such, Que had reason
to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him from the start.! Doctrine: To co
nstitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was pro
mpted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated d
eliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
" The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. Also, dismissal of the criminal compl
aint by the fiscal s office did not create a cause of action because the proceed
ings therein did not involve an exhaustive examination of the elements of malici
ous prosecution.! Notes: The case illustrates the fact that probable cause in cr
iminal procedure is not the same as probable cause as an element in malicious pr
osecution. Also, its existence is determined not on the level of the prosecutor,
but on the part of the person, who instituted the case alleged to be malicious.
!
!
!
Pe v. Pe, 1962 As an adopted son of Lolita s relative, they grew close together,

learning the rosary. They fell in love. Lolita s parents forbade her from seein
g Alfonso, but the relationship continued. Soon after, Lolita disappeared. Her p
arents and siblings sued Alfonso, who turned out to be already married, based on
Article 21. The SC found that the circumstances cannot but show that he, throug
h ingenious scheme and trickery, seduced Lolita. He has committed injury to the
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy.! Doctrin
e:" The injury under Article 21, aside from that sustained by the seduced person
, also includes that upon the reputation of the family. Also, the circumstances
surrounding the incident may be considered to determine whether there was seduct
ion.! Notes:" The award of damages was made just because Alfonso was married at
the time.!
Drilon v. CA, 1997 Responding to a letter requesting investigation of the failed
coup attempt in December of 1989. The preliminary investigation led to the fili
ng of an information for rebellion with murder and frustrated murder against, am
ong others, Adaza. Upon such filing, Adaza sued Drilon and the prosecutors for d
amages, claiming that they were engaged in a deliberate, willful and malicious e
xperimentation by filing the charges, when they were fully aware that there were
no such crimes. The SC held that the suit stated no cause of action, since the
criminal has not been terminated. Also, there was a finding of probable cause, w
hich also signifies the absence of malice. As to the Hernandez ruling, ruling th
at rebellion cannot be complexed, it was held that such doubtful question of law
may be the basis of good faith.! Doctrine:"The statutory basis for a civil acti
on for damages for malicious prosecution are found in Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 2
9, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8). In order for such suit to prosper, the plaintif
f must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defe
ndant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an
acquittal, (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probabl
e cause, and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, t
hat is by improper or sinister motive.!
!
!
Que v. IAC, 1989 Nicolas ordered a stop payment for the checks he gave to Que in
payment of the canvass
Magbanua v. Junsay, 2007 Magbanua, a househelper, was impleaded as an accused in
a robbery case filed by her employer, Junsay. When she was acquitted, she filed
for
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damages against Junsay for malicious prosecution. The SC held that there was pro
bable cause in filing the criminal complaint against her, as she admitted her pa
rticipation. That her admission was later declared inadmissible does not detract
from that fact. Also, there was no proof that the filing of the complaint was i
mpelled by legal malice.! Doctrine:" Malicious prosecution is an action for dama
ges brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other leg
al proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after
the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the d
efendant. Thus, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the pro
secutor or that he instigated its commencement, (2) the criminal action finally
ended with an acquittal, (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted withou
t probable cause, and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice, an impro
per or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filin
g of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiat
ion of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.!
Notes:" The malicious prosecution includes civil and administrative proceedings
.!
violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a tra
nsgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of
the party aggrieved.!
!
Quisaba v. Sta. Ines, Inc., 1974 When Quisaba was relieved from duty to carry ou
t the instructions of his employer, which he has refused to do previously since
it is beyond his tasks, he filed a complaint for illegal termination. He did not
pray for reinstatement or backwages. A motion to dismiss was filed on the groun
d of lack of jurisdiction. The SC held that the case is intrinsically concerned
with a civil, not labor, dispute. It has to do with an alleged violation of Quis
aba s rights as a member of society, and does not involve an existing employeeem
ployer relation, properly cognizable by regular courts.! Doctrine:" The right of
an employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in wh
ich the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. Dismissal, done a
nti-socially or oppressively, is in violation of Article 1701 and Article 21.!
!
!
Grand Union Supermarket v. Espino, 1979 Espino forgot to pay for a cylindrical r
attail. He offered to pay, but he was instead paraded to the the back of the sup
ermarket to fill up an incident report. He was dubbed a shoplifter by the guards
. When he was about to pay for the rattail, his money was taken, supposedly to b
e given to guards who apprehend those who steal from the supermarket. Many peopl
e witnessed the incident. In his complaint for damages based on Article 21, the
SC found that the manner in which he was detained, interrogated, fined, and thre
atened, in the presence of many people, rendered the supermarket liable for dama
ges under Articles 19 and 21. It was contrary to morals, good customs, and publi
c policy.! Doctrine:" Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy an
d peace of mind of his neighbors and others (Article 26). One must act with just
ice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19).!

VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY! Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The f
ollowing and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, sh
all produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:! (1) Pry
ing into the privacy of another s residence;! (2) Meddling with or disturbing th
e private life or family relations of another;! (3) Intriguing to cause another
to be alienated from his friends;! (4) Vexing or humiliating another in account
of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect
, or other personal condition.!
!
!
Carpio v. Valmonte, 2004 Valmonte was the coordinator in the wedding. Carpio was
an aunt of the bride. She accused Valmonte of stealing her diamond jewelry. She
also caused the searching of her personal belongings. Valmonte, when the police
arrived, was bodily searches, interrogated, and trailed. She filed for damages
against Carpio. The SC held that Carpio s accusation was uncalled for and withou
t proof, and by any standard of law, impermissible and contrary to morals and go
od customs, in violation of Article 19 in relation to Article 21.! Doctrine: Com
plementing Article 19, Articles 20 and 21 provide the legal bedrock for the awar
d of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in
St. Louis Realty v. CA, 1984 St. Louis Realty caused to be published an advertis
ement which displayed the house of Aramil, representing it as belonging to Arcad
io. Aramil noticed the mistake. Accordingly, he wrote to St. Louis telling them
that he did not permit the publication of the advertisement. Claiming that the a
dvertisement not only amounted to transgressions of his private property but als
o damaging to his prestige in the medical profession, he sued for damages based
on Article 21, in relation to Article 2219. The SC found that, because of the ad
vertisement, Aramil s private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed, and
he suffered diminution of income. It held that St. Louis was grossly negligent.
! Doctrine:" Prying into the privacy of another s residence, meddling with or di
sturbing the private life or family relations of another and similar acts, thoug
h they may not constitute a criminal offense, produces a cause of action for dam
ages, prevention and other relief. !
!
Gregorio v. CA, 2009 Sansio Philippines instituted a BP 22 case against Gregorio
. A wrong address was stated in the
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complaint, such that Gregorio was not able to controvert the allegations against
her. She was arrested. It turned out, however, that she did not issue the said
checks. The criminal case was dismissed. She sued for damages. Sansio moved to d
ismiss, claiming that the case was for malicious prosecution, and it does not al
lege bad faith. The SC held that the basis for the action was Article 2176 in re
lation to Article 26, and that no allegation of bad faith was necessary.! Doctri
ne: Article 26 grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relie
f in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of
: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to fa
mily relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) r
ight to peace of mind.!
!
Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, 2011 Spouses Guanio booked at the Shangri-la Hotel
for their wedding reception. However, at the reception, the catering director an
d the sales manager did not show up, the service of dinner was delayed, certain
items in the published menu were unavailable, the waiters were rude, among other
disappointments. When they sued for breach of contract, the SC held that it was
the Guanios who breached the contract since they did not inform Shangri-la of t
he change in expected number of guests. In any case, Shangri-la could have done
better. Nominal damages were thus awarded, under considerations of equity.! Doct
rine: Every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy a
nd peace of mind. !
!
DERELICTION OF DUTY! Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss bec
ause a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to pe
rform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.! UNFAIR COMPETITION! Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intim
idation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed meth
od shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage
.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
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Concept of Damages!
!
IMPORTANCE AND DEFINITION! Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed,
the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or
the violation of some right. [People v. Ballesteros, 1998]! There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a leg
al right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and d
amages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty." These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. [Custodio v. CA, 1996]! In order that a plaintiff
may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish
that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to t
he plaintiff, a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law." Thus, there
must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there s
hould be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suff
ering. [Ibid.]!
Doctrine: The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to
a right to recover damages." To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wr
ong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.! Notes: There has to
be damnum et injuria for recovery.!
!
LAW ON DAMAGES! Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively
applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.! Article 2198. The pri
nciples of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.! TYPES OF DAMAGES! Article 2197. Damages may be: !
(1) Actual or compensatory;! (2) Moral;! (3) Nominal;! (4) Temperate or moderat
e;! (5) Liquidated; or! (6) Exemplary or corrective.!
!
!
! ! ! !
WHEN ALLOWED! Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively a
pplicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157.! Article 2196. The rules
under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formula
ted elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case
of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing damag
es laid down in other laws shall be observe insofar as they are not in conflict
with this Code.! Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are

hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.! Custodio v.
CA, 1996 The Custodios and the Santoses fenced their properties, effectively cl
osing the access of the tenants of the Mabasas to the public highway. The Santos
es reasoned out that their daughter was dragged by a bicycle driven by a son of
one of the tenants and that their footwear were lost. Also, when the tenants wer
e drunk, they bang the doors and windows of the Santoses. In any case, upon the
application of the Mabasas, they were granted easement and damages. The SC, howe
ver, deleted the award of damages, ruling that there was no legal injury since t
he owners had the right to fence their properties, and the Mabasas had no right
to the easement, prior to the grant.!
Actual or Compensatory Damages!
DEFINITION/PURPOSE! Articles 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation,
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffere
d by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or co
mpensatory damages.! [A]ctual or compensatory damages are those damages which th
e injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong done and injuries received
when none were intended." Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that
are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they are intended to put
the injured party in the position in which he was before he was injured. [Oceane
ering v. Barreto, 2011]!
! !
!
! !
PROOF REQUIRED! Pleading and Proof of Actual Damage! Nature of Loss and Proof! O
ceaneering v. Barreto, 2011 Oceaneering Contractors contracted with Barreto to u
se the latter s barge to transport construction materials. The barge capsized, w
hen the cargo shifted to one side, breaking the barriers and creating holes
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through which water entered. When Barreto sued, Oceaneering counterclaimed for t
he value of the cargo. The SC only awarded a part, proven by vouchers and receip
ts.! Doctrine: Under Article 2199, there must be pleading and proof of actual da
mages suffered for the same to be recovered. In addition to the fact that the am
ount of loss must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a re
asonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, impose
d on the party claiming the same. Corollary to the principle that a claim for ac
tual damages cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and insubstant
ial proof, courts are, likewise, required to state the factual bases of the awar
d.!
of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reaso
nably been foreseen by the defendant.! Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to b
e adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggrava
ting or mitigating circumstances.!
!
Earning Capacity and Business Standing! Article 2205. Damages may be recovered:!
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permane
nt personal injury;! (2) For injury to the plaintiff s business standing or comm
ercial credit.! Gatchalian v. Delim, 1991 Gatchalian boarded a bus, when it bump
ed a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle
, and fell into a ditch. Among the passengers injured was Gatchalian, who filed
for damages based on breach of contract. She claimed that the accident left her
with a conspicuous white scar on her forehead, causing her mental suffering and
diminishing her facial beauty, thereby depriving her of employment opportunities
. She was supposed to meet a district schools supervisor at that time. The SC he
ld that the claim for unrealized revenue cannot be sustained, since she was not
assured of the job as substitute teacher at that time. She was, however, awarded
actual damages of P15,000 for plastic surgery.! Doctrine: Damages cannot be awa
rded on the basis of conjecture. To claim for loss of employment, such employmen
t must not be episodic and contingent. Also, person is entitled to the physical
integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actua
l injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assess
able.! Candano Shipping v. Sugata-on, 2007 Sugata-on went missing when the vesse
l in which he worked sank. His wife sought indemnity for his death, based on Art
icle 1171. The SC, instead of using the principles in the Labor Code, ruled that
the remedy under Article 1171 is distinct from those under the Workmen s Compen
sation Act, and that the remedies are damages provided in the Civil Code. It rul
ed that only actual damages (unearned income) are warranted since the death was
due to fortuitous event.! Doctrine: The formula is: Net Earning Capacity = Life
Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income - Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses), w
here Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - Age at the time of death), as adopted from th
e American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience
Table of Mortality. The Net Earnings is that which he would have used to suppor
t his dependents. The Expenses is computed at 50% of the Income, absent proof th
at it constituted a smaller percentage.!
!
!

LOSS COVERED! In General! Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall compre
hend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which
the obligee failed to obtain.! PNOC Shipping v. CA, 1998 A fishing vessel was h
it by a tanker. In the case for damages, for the value of the hull, equipment, a
nd cargo, as well as unrealized profits and lost business opportunities, the own
er of the fishing vessel presented price quotations to prove the claim. The SC h
eld that, since the price quotations were ordinary private writings, the persons
who signed them should have been presented as witnesses. Failing to do so, the
quotations are hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, nominal damages, in the amount of
P2M, should be awarded.! Doctrine: In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, a
ctual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or om
ission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one
is the loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is
the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (luc
ro cesante).!
! !
!
!
In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts! Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts
, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be t
hose that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligat
ion, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at th
e time the obligation was constituted.! In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or w
anton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be re
asonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.!
!
In Crimes and Quasi-Delict! Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defen
dants shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequ
ences of the act or omission complained
!
Death by Crime or Quasi-Delict! Article 2206. The amount of damages for death ca
used by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Three thousand
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pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:! (
1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the dec
eased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnit
y shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased
on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;! (2) If the deceased was obliged to g
ive support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not
an heir called to the decedent s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;! (3) The
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased m
ay demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the decease
d.! People v. Buban, 2007 Buban shot Imperial to death in the latter s hut. He w
as found guilty for murder, qualified by treachery. In view of RA 9346, however,
the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity of P75,000
and moral damages of P50,000, for the violent death, were awarded.! Doctrine: C
ivil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need
of proof other than the commission of the crime.! People v. Apacible, 2010 Arman
killed Arnold, while the latter was sleeping, with his 8-month old child at his
side. He was convicted of murder, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. A civ
il indemnity of P50,000 was awarded. On appeal, it was increased to P75,000. The
SC reduced it to P50,000.! Doctrine: The award of P75,000 as civil indemnity li
es only in cases where the proper imposable penalty is death.! Notes: While recl
usion perpetua was imposed in People v. Buban, the proper imposable penalty is d
eath, had it not been for the prohibition for its imposition. In this case, the
penalty was reclusion perpetua all the way. As such, it may be inferred that eve
n if reclusion perpetua was imposed, when the proper imposable penalty is death,
the indemnity is P75,000. If not, then P50,000.! Crisostomo v. People, 2010 A c
ashier was shot to death by armed men, when they robbed money from a gasoline st
ation. Three armed arrived at a gasoline station in on board a motorcycle in San
Miguel, Bulacan. Two went to the cashier. One of the armed men was convicted of
robbery with homicide, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua, a civil indemnity
of P75,000. The civil indemnity was reduced by the SC to P50,000 but added P50,0
00 as moral damages.! Doctrine: In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and mo
ral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each is granted automatically in the abs
ence of any qualifying aggravating
circumstances. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidenc
e other than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the commission of the
crime.! Philippine Hawk v. Lee, 2010 A motorcycle driven by Tan, with his wife,
when it was hit by a bus, killing Tan. In the complaint based on quasi-delict, t
he wife alleged that her husband made P1M operating a gasoline station, and P36,
000 a year, for their copra business. The SC, based on the Certificate of Credit
able Income Tax, showing that Tan had earned a gross income of P950,988 for 1990
, for the gasoline station, determined that his net earning capacity was P1M. To
determine his net earnings, 80% was deducted from the income, as expenses for o
peration of the business. Then, 50% of the remaining income was deducted as his
reasonable expenses. Civil indemnity of P50,000 was also awarded, based on Artic
le 2206.! Doctrine: The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased i
s provided for by Article 2206. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for l
oss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money. As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of e
arning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may b
e awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is

self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, i
n which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased s li
ne of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed
as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor l
aws.! In Rape Cases! People v. Astrologo, 2007 Astrologo raped her daughter. He
was convicted as such for simple rape, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and orde
red to pay P75,000 (civil indemnity) and P75,000 (moral damages). The SC reduced
both to P50,000, since the crime was simple rape. It awarded P25,000 as exempla
ry damages, to deter fathers from sexually abusing their own daughters.! Doctrin
e: Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory da
mages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. The case law also requ
ires automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without need of proof bec
ause from the nature of the crime, it can be assumed that she has suffered moral
injuries entitling her to such award, separate and distinct from civil indemnit
y.! ATTORNEY S FEES! Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney s fee
s and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, ex
cept:! (1) When exemplary damages may be awarded;! (2) When the defendant s act
or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to inc
ur expenses to protect his interest;!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;! (4) In ca
se of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;! (5)
Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;! (6) In actions for l
egal support;! (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, la
borers and skilled workers;! (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen s compen
sation and employer s liability laws;! (9) In a separate civil action to recover
civil liability arising from crime;! (10) When at least double judicial costs a
re awarded;! (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorney s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.! In all cas
es, the attorney s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.! Quirante
v. IAC, 1989 Quirante, lawyer for the now deceased Casasola, filed a motion for
confirmation of his attorney s fees, claiming that they agreed, as confirmed by
the heirs, that he will receive P30,000 and half of what will be collected. The
heirs opposed. The SC held that the claim is premature, since litigation is sti
ll pending. It also held that the attorney s fees claimed are not the same as th
at in Article 2208.! Doctrine: The claim for attorney s fees may be asserted eit
her in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered, or
in a separate action." Attorney s fees under Article 2208 is an award in favor o
f the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the ju
dgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney s fees by execution.!
Meralco v. Ramoy, 2008 The electrical connection of Ramoy, et al., were disconne
cted, allegedly because they were illegally occupying the property of NPC. It tu
rned out however that they were outside said property. In the case for damages a
nd attorney s fees, the SC held that, while Meralco failed to exercise the requi
red diligence, it cannot be considered as having acted in bad faith. Thus, exemp
lary damages cannot be awarded. As such, attorney s fees cannot also be awarded,
under Article 2208.! Doctrine: In the absence of stipulation, attorney s fees c
annot be recovered except in cases under Article 2208.! Notes: From the way it w
as stated, it seems that an award of exemplary damages is required in every case
for attorney s fees to be awarded.! Briones v. Macabagdal, 2010 The Brioneses,
after obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of Vergon, from w
hich they bought their lot, constructed their house. It turned out that the lot
they built on was that bought by the Macabagdals, who then sued to recover the
property. The Brioneses were ordered to pay, among others, attorney s fees. The
SC held that attorney s fees cannot be awarded, since they were not specifically
prayed for. It held that a general prayer for other reliefs is insufficient.! D
octrine: Attorney s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the
concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs, and must be
specifically prayed for. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a su
it. The power of the court to award attorney s fees under Article 2208 demands f
actual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculat
ion or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of
the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason
for the award.! Bank of America v. Phil. Racing Club, 2009 PRCI s signatories i
n its bank account pre-signed checks, since they were going out of the country.
However, the checks, while irregular, were encashed by a John Doe. PRCI sued for
the amount of the checks. The SC held that the irregularities on the face of th
e checks should have prompted the bank to inquire. It distributed the actual dam
ages. It did not grant attorney s fees either.! Doctrine: Article 2208 requires
factual, legal, and equitable justification for the award. An adverse decision d
oes not automatically justify an award of attorney s fees to the winning party.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect hi

s rights, attorney s fees may not be awarded unless there is sufficient showing
of bad faith.! Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corp., 2011 Instead of pursuing the coun
ter-attachment bond, Pilhino opted for a writ of execution over the trucks of th
e Andradas. It turned out, however, that the cars were already sold to Moises An
drada. Pilhino sued to annul the sale. Moises filed a counterclaim for damages a
nd attorney s fees, arguing that the sale was valid, since it was already releas
ed from the attachment when it was made. The SC held that Pilhino acted in bad f
aith in suing him. The claim for attorney s fees under Article 2208(4), claiming
that the civil case filed was clearly unfounded, is not meritorious, since bad
faith was not shown.! Doctrine: Award of attorney s fees is the exception rather
than the rule. The power of a court to award attorney s fees under Article 2208
demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left t
o speculation and conjecture. The general rule is that attorney s fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be pl
aced on the right to litigate.! Notes: The decision required bad faith for Artic
le 2208(4) to apply. Whether the same bad faith is required in other items in th
e provision is not settled.!
!
!
!
!
!
!
INTEREST! Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of mo
ney, and the debtor incurs in delay, the
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indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the
payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the lega
l interest, which is six per cent per annum. ! Article 2210. Interest may, in th
e discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contrac
t.! Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.! Article
2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially dema
nded, although the obligation may be silent on this point.! Article 2213. Intere
st cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims and damages, except when the dem
and can be established with reasonable certainty.! I. When an obligation, regard
less of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-deli
cts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measu
re of recoverable damages.! II. With regard particularly to an award of interest
in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as wel
l as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:! 1. When the obligation is bre
ached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbear
ance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from th
e time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of int
erest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.! 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of m
oney, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed a
t the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the de
mand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand
is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the dem
and is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of
the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.! 3. When the jud
gment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, abo
ve, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this inter
im period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. [Eastern Shipping
Lines v. CA, 1994]! Frias v. San Diego-Sison, 2007 Frias and SandiegoSison ente
red into a MOA over a house and lot, providing that the latter may decide, withi
n 6 months, whether she would buy the property or not. Should she decide not to
buy, the payment, amounting to P3M, will be considered a loan, which will not be
ar interest for the first 6 months, but a compounded interest will be imposed fo
r the next 6 months. San Diego-Sison decided not to buy. Frias claimed that the
compounded interest should only be for the second six months, and not beyond. Th
e SC ruled otherwise. It said that the stipulation was made with the reasonable
expectation that the amount would be paid within 6 months. Failing to pay within
said period, the interest rate should continue until actual payment. Otherwise,
it would constitute unjust enrichment.! Doctrine: The payment of interest const
itutes the price of the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due is re
turned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor co
ntinues to use such principal amount.!

!
!
!
Soriamont v. Sprint, 2009 Sprint leased 2 chassis units to Soriamont. They were
withdrawn from Sprint, never to be returned. Soriamont also failed to pay the re
ntals. Sprint thus sued for collection. The SC imposed a 6% interest on the rent
als and the interest charges, since it does not constitute a loan or forbearance
of credit, to be increased to 12% after the decision has become final, at which
time the award is equivalent to a forbearance of credit.! Doctrine: Under Artic
le 2209, when an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is b
reached, then an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. The interim period from th
e finality of the judgment awarding a monetary claim until payment thereof is de
emed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.! Notes: Interest is paid in th
e concept of damages when (1) the obligation is payment of a sum of money, (2) t
he debtor is in delay, and (3) there is no contrary stipulation. The interest ra
te that applies in that agreed upon by the parties. Otherwise, the legal rate of
6% applies.! Pan Pacific v. Equitable, 2010 Equitable engaged the services of P
an Pacific for air conditioning works. An escalation clause was stipulated in th
e contract. Eventually, Pan Pacific faced financial difficulties in meeting the
increased prices of labor and inputs for the project. This is in part by the fai
lure of Equitable to pay on time. Equitable extended a loan to Pan Pacific, but
given directly to the laborers ac compensation. When the loan matured, Equitable
asked that it be offset with its contractual obligations. Pan Pacific asked for
rescission of the loan and demanded payment from Equitable. The SC ruled that E
quitable should pay, and the interest rate should be that stipulated in the prom
issory notes, that is, 18%.!
!
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Doctrine: Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for damages in case of del
ay in discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum of money is t
he payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the pa
rties. In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest,
payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary interest
becomes due and payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon b
y the contracting parties, then the damages payable will consist of payment of l
egal interest which is 6%, or in the case of loans or forbearances of money, 12%
per annum. It is only when the parties to a contract have failed to fix the rat
e of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the Court will apply the 1
2% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money. !
!
DUTY TO MINIMIZE! Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting fr
om the act or omission in question.! MITIGATION OF DAMAGES! Article 2214. In qua
si-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damage
s that he may recover.! Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quaside
licts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other th
an the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
! (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;! (2)
That the plaintiff derived some benefit as a result of the contract;! (3) In ca
ses where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the
advice of counsel;! (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;! (5) Th
at since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the
plaintiff s loss or injury.!
!
In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule
. Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and al
leviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirc
hed reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar h
arm unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages can be
aptly justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has s
uffered such damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the c
ases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages
must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. [BF Meta
l v. Lomotan, 2008]! Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed t
o compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, f
right, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, so
cial humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although incap
able of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be prop
ortional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. [Expertravel v. CA,
1999]! Kierulf v. CA, 1997 A Pantranco bus bumped an Isuzu pickup, leaving the
pick-up driver and its passenger, Kierulf, injured. In the suit for damages, the
Kierulf spouses asked for moral damages on the ground of loss of conjugal fello
wship and impairment of sexual life, due to the disfigurement of Kierulf. The SC
, however, found that Kierulf s husband did not testify as to the claimed effect
on their marital consortium. As such, moral damages cannot be awarded. Also, th
e social and financial standing of Kierulf cannot be considered since prior to t
he accident, she was not subjected to any contemptuous conduct, despite knowledg
e of her standing on the part of the offender. For her physical sufferings, ment

al anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings, however, award of mora
l damages, in the amount of P400,000, is proper.! Doctrine: Moral damages are aw
arded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
defendant s culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possi
ble, of the spiritual status quo ante.! Notes: The decision implies that moral d
amages may be recovered for loss of marital consortium, provided that proof is p
resented. As to what sort of proof must be presented is questionable.! Sulpicio
Lines v. Curso, 2010 The siblings of a physician who boarded a vessel, which eve
ntually sank, claimed for compensatory and moral damages. The SC held that, as a
general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in breach of contract, unless t
here is fraud or bad faith, and that Article 2206(3) did not mention brothers an
d sisters as among those who recover moral damages by reason of the death of the
deceased.!
!
! ! ! !
Moral Damages!
PURPOSE! Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate th
e claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdo
er. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defen
dant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements
that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone." It is aimed at
the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. [ABS-CBN v. CA, 1
999]!
!
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Doctrine: The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, to enable the
injured party to obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic event. T
he conditions for such award are: (1) a clearly substantiated injury, whether ph
ysical, mental, or psychological, (2) a factually established culpable act or om
ission, and (3) such wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the inju
ry sustained, and (4) the award is based on Article 2219.!
Doctrine: Proof of mental anguish or emotional distress is required for recovery
of moral damages.! Arcona v. CA, 2002 Arcona was charged for killing Ong, throu
gh stabbing, and slight physical injuries for beating Talanquines with a bamboo.
He was convicted of the first, and was ordered to pay moral damages amounting t
o P10,000. The SC increased it to P50,000.! Doctrine: Violent death invariably a
nd necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death
or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious
life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this
reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and
proof of emotional suffering.!
!
! !
WHEN RECOVERABLE! Moral Suffering as Proximate Result! Article 2217. Moral damag
es include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirch
ed reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar in
jury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant s wrongful act or omission.! S
pecific Cases! Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:! (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;! (2) Q
uasi-delicts causing physical injuries;! (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or othe
r lascivious acts;! (4) Adultery or concubinage;! (5) Illegal or arbitrary deten
tion or arrest;! (6) Illegal search;! (7) Libel, slander or any other form of de
famation;! (8) Malicious prosecution;! (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;! (10)
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
! The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in
No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.! The spouse, descendants,
ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article, in the order named.! Article 2220. Willful injury to property may
be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, unde
r the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breac
hes of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.!
!
! !
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries! In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a
) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant i
s guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. [BF Metal v.
Lomotan]! Rape! People v. Lizano, 2007 The victim, 11, was raped by her uncle o

n 3 occasions. He was convicted for one count. A civil indemnity and moral damag
es, P50,000 each, was awarded.! Doctrine: Civil indemnity is automatically impos
ed, without need of proof other than the fact of commission of the rape. The sam
e is true with moral damages, since it is assumed that a rape victim had suffere
d moral injuries entitling her to such award.!
!
!
Criminal offense resulting in physical injuries! People v. Pirame, 200 Pirame an
d Teodorico were convicted of murder, for striking Torrenueva in the forehead wi
th an iron pipe and piece of wood to his death. There were sentenced to reclusio
n perpetua, with, among others, P50,000 for both moral and exemplary damages. Th
e SC deleted this award, ruling that there was no basis for the moral damages, s
ince the widow did not testify on her suffering meriting the award.!
Malicious prosecution! Expertravel v. CA, 1999 Expertravel sued Lo for payment o
f plane tickets and damages. It turned out, however, that Lo already paid. Moral
damages were awarded to Lo for P30,000. The SC deleted the award, stating that
institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit may justify award of attorney s fe
es, but has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral
damages. This is so as not to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Otherw
ise, moral damages must be awarded every time to a prevailing defendant, who suf
fered the same anguish as anyone who is haled in court.! Doctrine: The requisite
s for an award of moral damages are thus: (1) an clearly sustained injury, wheth
er physical, mental or psychological, (2) a factually established culpable act o
r omission, (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate c
ause of the injury sustained, and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any
of the cases stated in Article 2219.!
!
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Industrial Insurance v. Bondad, 2000 A DM Transit bus bumped the rear of a packe
d passenger jeepney. The passengers were injured. The bus then swerved to the le
ft and collided with a car, driven by Grace Morales, who also sustained injuries
. The vehicles were damaged. Morales and Industrial Insurance filed a complaint
between the bus driver and the jeepney driver. The SC held that the case against
the jeepney driver was filed recklessly and without basis. Industrial Insurance
acted in wanton disregard of obvious facts. It was in bad faith, compelling the
jeepney driver to litigate. Moral damages are in order.! Doctrine: In any case,
to sustain such award, it must be shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury,
and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 222
0. Bad faith or ill motive is necessary. Allegation of mental anguish, serious a
nxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the ac
ts of the other party is not enough. Also, the right to litigate must not be pen
alized, but it must be exercised in good faith.! Notes: The requisite of bad fai
th was added to Article 2219(8), on malicious prosecution.!
work. In her complaint for monetary benefits and damages, the SC awarded moral a
nd exemplary damages of P30,000.! Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable where
the dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressiv
e to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy.! Notes: The decision did not specify which acts were attended with bad f
aith or fraud, so as to merit award of moral damages.! Juridical Persons! ABS-CB
N v. CA, 1999. ABS-CBN, claiming that it had a perfected contract for the airing
rights of certain movies, filed for specific performance, and obtained an injun
ction for their showing by RBS. The SC ruled that there was no perfected contrac
t. The claim of RBS for moral damages, however, cannot be granted, on the ground
that it is a juridical person.! Doctrine: Moral damages cannot be granted to a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in leg
al contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot experien
ce physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one h
aving a nervous system.! Republic v. Tuvera, 2007 The PCGG filed a complaint for
restitution and damages against Marcos and the Tuveras, alleging that Juan Tuve
ra, as the then Presidential Executive Assistant, abused his position to obtain
a logging concession in favor of the company, the shares of which are substantia
lly owned by his son. The SC did not award moral damages.! Doctrine: A juridical
person is generally not entitled to moral damages, as it cannot experience phys
ical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental a
nguish, or moral shock. Thus, under Article 2217, they are not so entitled. They
may, however, avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Articl
e 2219.! Notes: It was stated that juridical persons may claim under Article 221
9(7), since it does not distinguish between juridical and natural persons. Howev
er, all the items in the provision do not make such distinction.!
!
!
Willful injury to property! Regala v. Carin, 2011 Carin sued Regala, claiming to
have suffered from the construction conducted by the latter in his property. Ea
rlier, Regala asked Carin s consent for extending his residence. Regala, however
, intended to build a second floor to his house. Carin claimed that dust and dir
t from the construction fell on his property, and that the laborers entered his
property without his authority. The SC did not award moral damages, since Carin
failed to establish that his injury was the proximate result of Regala s act or

omission, and that Regala was in the lawful exercise of his property rights. He
was in good faith.! Doctrine: Under Article 2220, the damage caused to the prope
rty must have been inflicted maliciously or willfully, for moral damages to be r
ecovered.! Breach of contract in bad faith! Under the provisions of this law, in
culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when th
e defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to b
ad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionall
y, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting i
n physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 220
6, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a p
assenger results from a breach of carriage. [Expertravel v. CA, 1999]! Triple Ei
ght v. NLRC, 1998 Osdana was hired as waiter in Saudi Arabia. When she got sick,
she was not paid. Soon after, she was not allowed to work. Her sickness persist
ed, due to harsh working conditions. Then she was dismissed, supposedly in the g
round of illness, without separation pay and salary for the period when she was
not allowed to
!
!
!
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING AMOUNT! The established guideline in awarding
moral damages takes into consideration several factors, some of which are the so
cial and financial standing of the injured parties and their wounded moral feeli
ngs and personal pride. [Kierulf v. CA, 1997]! The social and financial standing
of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only
if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender s knowl
edge of his or her social and financial standing.[Ibid.]!
! !
!
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Lopez v. Pan American, 1966 Due to the wrongful cancellation of the reservations
by an employee of Pan American, Lopez, then senator, and his family were constr
ained to take tourist accommodations in their flight to San Francisco. The SC, i
n awarding moral damages, considered the position of Lopez as senator and former
vice-president. He was awarded P100,000. His wife and his daughter and son-in-l
aw, were awarded P50,000, P25,000, and P25,000, respectively, on the ground that
they shared in the the prestige, and, therefore, the humiliation, of Lopez.! Do
ctrine: Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In this case, the social humiliation, wounde
d feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish were proximate results of the bre
ach in bad faith. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers, but
it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightf
ully expected from contractual undertaking.! Notes: Whether or not political sho
uld be considered is problematic.! Valenzuela v. CA, 1996 Valenzuela was driving
her car so early in the morning when she had a flat tire. She was pointing at t
he tools to a man who volunteered to held her, when she was hit by Li, assistant
manager of Alexander Commercial and drunk at that time. Valenzuela s leg had to
be amputated. In the suit to recover damages, the SC, considering the nature of
the damage and the consequences, such that she would have to undergo adjustment
of her prosthetics, replacement, rehabilitation and therapy, awarded P1M as mor
al damages.! Doctrine: While moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaint
iff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate
to the suffering inflicted.!
recognition of a right violated and invaded. They are recoverable where some inj
ury has been done but the amount was not proven. Its assessment is left to the d
iscretion of the court according to the circumstances.!
!
!
Gonzales v. People, 2007 Gonzales burned down the building, where he was a tenan
t, with her aunt. He was convicted of arson. The SC found that there was no proo
f provided to show the value of the building or the properties therein. In any c
ase, nominal and temperate damages may be awarded.! Doctrine: The assessment of
nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumst
ances of the case. Generally, they are small sums fixed by the court without reg
ard to the extent of the harm done. However, it is also a substantial claim, if
based on a violation of a legal right. In such cases, the law presumes damage al
though actual damages are not proven. Nominal damages are damages in name only a
nd not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of the wrong inflicted, bu
t simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.! Notes: The disp
ositive portion did not contain an award for nominal damages.! WHEN AWARDED! Art
icle 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from
any source of enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where any property ri
ght has been invaded.! Francisco v. Ferrer, 2001 The cake ordered for the weddin
g did not arrive on time. It turned out that the order slip was lost. A cake fro
m the country club was bought as replacement. In the suit for breach of contract
, the SC held that, since the action was based on contractual breach, fraud or b
ad faith must be present. It then held that there was none in the case. Nonethel
ess, it awarded nominal damages (P10,000), on the ground that making a lame excu
se that the cake was delayed, when there was none shows the insensitivity, inadv
ertence, or inattention to a customer s anxiety and need of the hour.! Doctrine:

Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and
must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss
of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial inj
ury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown.!
! !
! !
!
Nominal Damages!
NATURE AND PURPOSE! Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that
a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, m
ay be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plai
ntiff for any loss suffered by him.! Robes-Francisco Realty v. CFI, 1978 Millan
was able to pay a lot she bought on installment. When she demanded that the same
be registered to her, she found out that it was mortgaged to PNB. The SC, findi
ng that Millan did not present evidence of actual damage to her, awarded nominal
damages in the amount of P10,000, since the delay of RobesFrancisco Realty, amo
unting to non-performance of the obligation, is apparent.! Doctrine: Nominal dam
ages are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindicati
on or
! !
!
Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, 2011 Spouses Guanio booked at the Shangri-la Hotel
for their wedding reception. However, at the reception, the catering director an
d the sales manager did not show up, the service of dinner was delayed, certain
items in the published menu were unavailable, the waiters were rude, among other
disappointments. When they sued for breach of contract, the SC held that it was
the Guanios who breached the contract since they did not inform Shangri-la of t
he change
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in expected number of guests. In any case, Shangri-la could have done better. No
minal damages (P50,000) were thus awarded, under considerations of equity.! Doct
rine: Nominal damages may be awarded for the discomfiture the claimants were sub
jected to. Every person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, priv
acy and peace of mind.! Notes: The case was not clear as to the basis of the awa
rd, whether it was equity, or Article 26. In any case, the amount of nominal dam
ages depends on the circumstances.! People v. Marquez, 2011 Marquez was convicte
d of kidnapping and failure to return a minor. She took Merano s baby only to be
returned 6 months after. The SC awarded nominal damages to the mother, in recog
nition and vindication of her right as a parent, which was violated and invaded.
! Doctrine: The violation of the right as a parent may be the basis of award of
nominal damages.! Notes: It appears the court does not require that a specific r
ight be violated for nominal damages to be awarded. Also, the qualification in P
entosa v. CA, that nominal damages should be commensurate to the injuries sustai
ned, is wrong, precisely because nominal damages are not intended to indemnify f
or the injury caused.! EFFECT OF AWARD! Article 2223. The adjudication of nomina
l damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accesso
ry questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and
assigns.!
!
!
pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would
meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature
of the case, be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and
should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where th
e injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cas
es, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provide
d for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.! As it would
not be equitable - and certainly not in the best interests of the administration
of justice - for the victim in such cases to constantly come before the courts
and invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages previous
ly awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate da
mages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account the cost
of proper care. [Ramos v. CA, 1999]! Temperate or moderate damages avail when t
he court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The textual language mig
ht betray an intent that temperate damages do not avail when the case, by its na
ture, is susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss xxx. Still, jurisprudence applyi
ng Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances
where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty. [Repu
blic v. Tuvera, 2007]! Pleno v. CA, 1988 Pleno s delivery van was hit in the rea
r by a cargo truck, causing it to move faster, hitting a truck parked on the sho
ulder of the highway. His legs were crushed in the wreckage, and his head suffer
ed extensive injuries. He was awarded, among others, temperate damages (P200,000
). The SC upheld the award, in lieu of loss of earning capacity, since the incom
e was not proven.! Doctrine: Temperate damages are included within the context o
f compensatory damages, where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pe
cuniary loss cannot be offered, although the court is convinced that there is lo
ss.! Tan v. OMC Carriers, 2011 A truck with a trailer, owned by OMC Carriers, su
ddenly lost its brakes. The driver jumped out leaving it ramming into the house
and tailoring shop of the Tans. The husband was instantly killed. The trial cour

t, applying res ipsa loquitur, held OMC and the driver liable, awarding, inter a
lia, P355,895 as actual damages and P500,000 as loss of earning capacity. The SC
held that the claim for actual damages, for the damage on the house, tailoring
shop, and equipment inside, cannot be upheld, since there were not receipts subm
itted to proved their monetary value. The same is true with loss of earning capa
city since documentary evidence were not presented. Temperate damages may, howev
er, be awarded. The photographs prove that there was loss, and the earning capac
ity of the husband was never disputed. P200,000 and P300,000, respectively, are
proper.!
!
! ! ! Temperate Damages !
!
WHEN RECOVERABLE! Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more th
an nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court f
inds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be provided with certainty.! Article 2225. Temperate damages
must be reasonable under the circumstances.! Our rules on actual or compensator
y damages generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered a
s a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and that the cost can
be liquidated. However, these provisions neglect to take into account those sit
uations, as in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing and pos
sible future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to oc
cur, are difficult to predict.! In these cases, the amount of damages which shou
ld be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury cau
sed, should be one which compensates for
!
!
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Doctrine: Absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still h
as the option of claiming temperate damages, where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convi
nced that there is pecuniary loss.!
!
FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT! Serrano v. People, 2010 Galang was stabbed by Gio
vanni in a rumble. Giovanni was convicted of frustrated homicide, and ordered to
pay P15,000 (medical expenses). The SC convicted of attempted homicide. As to t
he civil liability, the SC awarded P25,000 as temperate damages.! Doctrine: If t
he actual damages, proven by receipts during the trial, amount to less than P25,
000.00, the victim shall be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,0
00.00, in lieu of actual damages." The award of temperate damages is based on Ar
ticle 2224, which states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered whe
n the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be
proven with certainty.! People v. Murcia, 2010 Murcia burned down the house, wh
ere he occupied one room. In the process, he stabbed two women. One died in the
fire. The other lived to die another day. One of the cases filed was for destruc
tive arson, for which he was convicted and ordered to pay P250,000 for the house
, and P10,000 as actual damages and P10,000 as temperate damages (both presumabl
y for funeral expenses). The SC held that the temperate damages should be increa
sed to P25,000, and the actual damages deleted, in line with People v. Villanuev
a, that when the actual damages proven by receipts are less than P25,000, temper
ate damages of P25,000 should be awarded in its place. Also, since the value of
the house, was not proven, temperate damages (P200,000) may be awarded.! Doctrin
e: Temperate damages, under Article 2224, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the natur
e of the case, be proven with certainty.!
that, while penal clauses are valid, the rate imposed here is unconscionable. It
was reduced to 12% per annum.! Doctrine: Courts are empowered to reduce such st
ipulated damages if the same are iniquitous or unconscionable, pursuant to Artic
le 1229, as echoed in Article 2227.! Notes: Regardless of how stipulated damages
are called, they are still liquidated damages.!
!
DETERMINING AMOUNT! Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an ind
emnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or uncons
cionable.! Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defend
ant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated d
amages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
! Titan Construction v. Uni-Field, 2007 When Titan Construction failed to pay fo
r the construction supplies in bought on credit from Uni-Field, the latter sued
for collection with damages. The receipts of the transactions provided that an i
nterest rate of 24% on overdue accounts will be imposed. Also, in case of suit,
liquidated damages of 25% of the outstanding obligation, and 25% of the total cl
aim, among others, will be paid to Titan. The SC reduced the attorney s fees to
25% of the principal obligation, as it is exorbitant. Besides, it serves the sam
e purpose as liquidated damages, as penalty for breach of contract.! Doctrine: A
rticles 1229 and 2227 empower the courts to reduce the penalty if it is iniquito
us or unconscionable. The determination of whether the penalty is iniquitous or
unconscionable is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and depends on

several factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature
of the obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences.!
!
!
! ! ! Liquidated Damages ! !
! ! ! Exemplary or Corrective Damages !
!
!
DEFINITION! Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the partie
s to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.! Pentacapital Investment
v. Mahinay, 2010 A suit for a sum of money (P1.9M) was filed by Pentacapital Inv
estment against Mahinay. In the promissory notes, an interest rate of 25% on the
principal obligation was imposed. Also, a penalty charge of 3% per month (36% p
er annum) was stipulated. The SC held that the 25% interest was excessive and, t
hus, void. It was reduced to 12%. The SC also held
PURPOSE! Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of ex
ample or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, li
quidated or compensatory damages.! The imposition of exemplary damages is a mean
s by which the State, through its judicial arm, can send the clear and unequivoc
al signal best expressed in the pithy but immutable phrase, never again. [Republ
ic v. Tuvera, 2007]!
! ! !
WHEN IMPOSED! In General! Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are impo
sed, by way of example or correction for the public
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good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.!
Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the co
urt will decide whether or not they should b e adjudicated.! Article 2234. While
the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the cour
t may consider the question whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is n
ecessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, b
efore the court may consider the question of granting exemplary damages in addit
ion to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for
liquidated damages.! Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are
renounced in advance shall be null and void.! Under Article 2234 of the Civil Co
de, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows for the
award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they should b
e adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages
by way of example or correction for the public good should be awarded. [Republi
c v. Tuvera, 2007]!
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separ
ate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.!
!
!
People v. Dalisay, 2009 The victim, 16 years old, was raped by the live-in partn
er of her mother. The offender was convicted of qualified rape, with reclusion p
erpetua, P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as ex
emplary damages. The SC convicted of simple rape, since minority and relationshi
p were not alleged in the information. While Article 2230, in relation to the Re
vised Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not allow exemplary damages without the
qualifying circumstance alleged in the information, Article 2229 may be the basi
s of the award in this case, so as not to defeat the policy of exemplary damages
. P30,000 is proper.! Doctrine: Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, c
an be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous
conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an ins
tance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, lays down the very ba
sis of the award.! People v. Diunsay-Jalandoni, 2007 Jalandoni raped a 21-year o
ld, with a mental age of a 4-year old. He was convicted of qualified rape, with
P50,000 as civil indemnity, and P50,000 as moral damages. The SC convicted of si
mple rape only, since knowledge of the mental disability of the victim was not s
ufficiently alleged in the information, which only indicated that the victim was
a retardate. The civil liability is still P50,000. While the crime was committe
d before the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the SC exemplary damages of P2
5,000 anyway.! Doctrine: However, the retroactive application of the Revised Rul
es of Criminal Procedure cannot adversely affect the rights of a private offende
d party that have become vested where the offense was committed prior to the eff
ectivity of said rules." Thus, aggravating circumstances not alleged in the info
rmation but proved during the trial may be appreciated for the limited purpose o
f determining appellant s liability for exemplary damages.! People v. Dadulla, 2
011 A father raped his daughter once, and tried to do so again. He was convicted

of qualified rape, with death penalty, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P20,000 a
s moral damages, and attempted rape, with P20,000 as moral damages. The informat
ion did not allege the qualifying circumstance, and crimes were committed before
the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, but it was applied
retroactively, since it was favorable to the accused, by the SC, thereby convict
ing of simple rape. Also, the attempted rape was reduced to acts of lasciviousne
ss. Failure to allege does not affect the civil liability. Pursuant to Article 2
230, exemplary damages of P30,000 for rape and P10,000 for acts of lasciviousnes
s must be imposed.!
!
!
PNB v. CA, 1996 The payment for Tan s land, in an expropriation proceeding, was
paid by PNB to another person. He demanded payment, but was refused. PNB was ord
ered to pay the amount and P5,000 as exemplary damages. The SC deleted the award
for exemplary damages, since there is no evidence that PNB acted in bad faith,
and there was no award of compensatory damages.! Doctrine: The requirements for
exemplary damages to be awarded are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example i
n addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them ha
s been established, (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their det
ermination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded
to the claimant, (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a want
on, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.! Notes: Article 2229 mentions t
hat exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated
, or compensatory damages. The case only mentions compensatory. Also, the requis
ite that the act must have been in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolen
t manner is one for contracts and quasi-contracts, under Article 2232.! In Crime
s! Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil
liability may be imposed when the crime
!
!
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Doctrine: Although an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the i
nformation cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accus
ed, the established presence" of" one" or" two" aggravating" circumstances" of"
any kind or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Articl
e 2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the informati
on affected only the criminal liability of the accused, not his civil liability.
! In Quasi-Delicts! Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be gra
nted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.!
!
!
In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts! Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts
, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, frau
dulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
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