Comparing Political Regimes across Indian States: A Preliminary Essay

Author(s): John Harriss

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 48 (Nov. 27 - Dec. 3, 1999), pp. 3367-3377
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Comparing Political
This article makes a strong case for differentiating the political systems of different states in India on
the basis of the balance of caste/class power and the nature of party organisation within those states. Such
differences can then be shown to influence the policy formulation and performances of these states, especially
with regard to decentralisation of power to lower caste/class groups and alleviation of poverty.
IT has been suggested- for example,by
AtulKohli(1987) - thatIndiaconstitutes
a 'laboratory'for comparativepolitical
analysis.The fact thatthe countryhas a
numberof stateswithquitediversepolitics,
but within the framework of Indian
federalism,createsconditionsfor 'con-
trolledexperiments'.But these apparent
opportunities havenotbeentakenup very
much.Thereareimportantbodiesof work
by individualscholarson the politics of
particularstates - one thinks of the
sustainedresearchby Zoya Hasan and
PaulBrasson UttarPradesh,thatof James
Manoron Karnataka, of JayantLele and
latterly, of Thomas Blom Hansen on
Maharashtra, andof GhanshyamShahon
Gujarat.It is also strikingthatsome states
have not been the subjectsof such con-
sistent research.And exercises in com-
parativepoliticshave beenratherthinon
theground.Effortsweremadein collabo-
rativeexerciseson the politicsof various
states orchestratedby Myron Weiner
(1968), by IqbalNarain(1967 and 1976)
andthenby JohnWood(1984).Thelatter
includesaninterestingcomparativeessay
by RoderickChurchwhich is referredto
laterin thisarticle.ThenKohlipublished
the resultsof his researchon the effec-
tiveness of different party regimes in
Karnataka(that of the Congress under
DevarajUrs),in UP (theJanatacoalition)
and in West Bengal (the Left Front),in
relationto povertyreduction,in his book
TheState and Poverty in India (1987). But
themostambitiouscomparative projectso
farhas beenthatof FrancineFrankeland
M S A Rao, who broughttogetherwork
bya groupof scholarswithina framework
whichfocusedon the problematicof 'the
declineof dominance'(1989, 1990).The
exercisewhich I have undertakendraws
heavilyupon,andaimsto extendthework
of Frankeland Rao.
Kohliconcludedfromhis comparative
studythatdifferencesbetweenthepolitical
regimes of differentstates do make a
significantdifference,specificallyto the
adoptionof pro-poorpoliciesin theIndian
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
SPECIAL ARTICLES
Regimes across Indian States
A Preliminary Essay
John Harriss
context.Othershavedisagreed.V S Vyas Approaching the ideal of democracy,
and P Bhargava,for example,summing therefore,dependsuponthedifferentiation
up the findingsof comparativestudiesof of therealmof politicsfromoverallsystems
public intervention and rural poverty of inequalityina society- so thatcollective
alleviationin ninestates,sayemphatically decisions are not made by particular
that"successin povertyalleviationefforts individualsor groupsof people because
was not significantly affected ... [at least] of thepowerderivedfromtheireconomic
by the professedpoliticalideologyof the or social status[Rueschmayeret al 1992:
rulingpartiesinthedifferentstates"(1995: 41ff]. In practice democraticforms of
2572). The debate which is inherentin government,involvingthe accountability
these differentstatementsis more signi- of the executiveto an assemblyof repre-
ficant than it once was because of the sentatives elected through free, open
increasedsalienceof state-levelpoliticsin elections, in the context of freedom of
the contextof India'seconomicreforms. expression and association, can never
Thegreaterfinancialautonomyof thestates eliminatealtogetherthe significanceof
which these entail "is likely to combine differencesof wealth,powerandstatusin
with increasedregulatoryautonomy... society.Hence,theMarxistshavegenerally
makingthe state level a more important rejectedsuchrepresentative democracyas
politicalarena,andtherefore,moreinneed a sham,concealingthe exerciseof power
of study"[Jenkins1996: 198].The effort bythedominantclass.Theviewexpressed
of developinga comparativeanalysisof by Rueschmayerandhis co-authorsis that
statepoliticsseemsworthwhile,therefore. theidealof democracyis approached more
or less closely accordingto thebalanceof
DEFINING REGIME DIFFERENCES
class power in a society, and the nature
The term 'regime' is used widely but of the state system. The developmentof
quitelooselyinpoliticalscience.Itis quite capitalismis, in some ways,actuallycon-
often appliedto a particulargovernment, ducivetoapproaching thedemocraticideal
as in 'theTeluguDesamregimein Andhra becauseit weakensthepowerof landlords
Pradesh';but as frequentlyit is applied and strengthens subordinate classes,
to suchbroaddistinctionsas thatbetween shifting them from the relatively un-
democraticandauthoritarian formsof rule. favourableenvironmentof peasantagri-
Clearly,in a discussionof Indianstates, culturein which, as Marxarguedin The
operatingwithintheframeworkof federal Eighteenth Brumaire, they are 'like
democracylaid downin the Constitution potatoesin a sack' - dividedfrom each
of India, the latterdistinctiondoes not other, lacking a sense of a collective
apply. We may be concerned,however, interest,and given their identityby the
with differences in the democratic more self-consciousclasses which make
functioningof differentstates,anddescribe uptherestof society.Thedemocraticideal
these in termsof 'regimetypes'. is approachedmore closely, too, if the
'Democracy'is takento mean:'govern- state-system(theorganisationof thestate)
mentbythepeople;theformof government is relatively autonomousin relationto
in which sovereignpowerresidesin the society. But thereis narrowgap between
peopleandis exercisedeitherdirectlyby theScylla,of a state-systemdominatedby
them [participatorydemocracy] or by particularinterestswithinsociety,suchas
officers elected by them [representative thoseof landlords,or of industrialcapital,
democracy]'.Clearly,this is a statement or of financecapital,and the Charybdis,
of anideal,forit evadestherealproblems of a state-system which is absolutely
of collectiveaction,whicharisefromthe autonomousand able to exercise dic-
factthatthegoalsheldby individuals('the tatorshipover society, over-ridingthe
people') rarely coincide absolutely. interestsand aspirationsof 'thepeople'.
3367
This is where 'civil society' enters the
equation:the more developed is the sphere
of private, voluntary association, of civil
society, the wider is the-gap between the
Scylla and the Charybdis, and the greater
the space for democracy, for it implies that
different interests are organised within
society, and able (at least to a significant
degree) to hold the organisations in the
state-system accountable [derived from
Rueschmayer et al 1992].
In the light of this discussion it would
seem perfectly sensible to compare Indian
states as democratic regimes. Although
the majorityof the labour force across the
country remains agricultural, there are
important regional differences and
differences between states in terms of the
organisation of agriculture, the level of
development of capitalism, andof agrarian
class structures. There are differences
between states in terms of the extent of
industrial development, and hence in the
development of both the industrial
bourgeoisie and the working class. These
differences may then be reflected, in turn,
in variations in the nature and the extent
of political mobilisation, and of
organisationin civil society, both of which
are likely to be very significantly
influenced, in the Indian context, by caste
and other ethnic identities. These political
differences may exercise a significant
influence on the functioning of the various
(state-level) 'state systems'. This is one
level of comparison, therefore, which we
might describe as 'structural'.Another is
that of 'regime' in the sense, rather, of
'government'. This is the sense employed
by Atul Kohli when he writes:
Variations in regional distributive
outcomes ... are a function of the regime
controllingpolitical power. Regime type,
in turn - at least in the case of India -
closely reflects the nature of the ruling
politicalparty.The ideology, organisation
and class alliances underlying a party-
dominatedregimearethenof considerable
consequence for the redistributive
performanceof that regime (1987: 10)
In his book, of course, he goes on to
compare the performance of different
party-dominated regimes in three Indian
states.
For the purposes of this paper, we may
seek to distinguish regime differences
across states at both the structural level
and thatof 'party-dominatedgovernment',
searching in the first place for evidence
on the nature and extent of political
mobilisation and of organisation in both
civil and political society. In the light of
the preceding short discussion of demo-
cratic political systems critical questions
3368
arethese: arethereappreciabledifferences
between states in terms of the balance of
class power, and the extent of political
participationof historically subordinated,
lower classes? What is the nature of this
'participation',ideologically and organis-
ationally, and what are the relationships
of the lower classes with other classes?
Note that it has often been argued that
Indian politics are characterised by
'political accommodationism', referring
to the way in which dominant elites build
coalitions of political support amongst
sections of dependent groups by means of
a strategy of selective inclusion.1
Tackling these questions in the Indian
case requires study of evidence on class
structuresandtheirrelationshipswithcaste/
ethnicity and historical structures of
dominance (defined, following Frankel
and Rao as: 'the exercise of authority in
society by groups who achieved socio-
economic superiority and claimed
legitimacy for their commands in terms of
superiorritualstatus').2 'Class formation'
is always and everywhere a problematic
concept. The relationships between
'objective' differences between groups of
people, in terms of theirroles and relations
within productive systems, and the
subjective categories in terms of which
people experience and understand these
roles and relations - between 'class-in-
itself' and 'class-for-itself - have always
to be treatedcontextually and historically.
In the Indian case this means studying the
relationships between class and caste. We
know thatthereis no neatmappingbetween
'class' and 'caste', but there are strong
broad correspondences, for example
between landownershipandcaste position.
We also know that in many instances class
relationships are experienced as relations
between castes [see Harriss 1994]. Some-
times potential or actual class political
mobilisation is cross-cut by caste relations,
and vice-versa - and sometimes not. In
practice we have to study the class/caste
bases of different regimes in order to
addressthe criticalquestion of 'the balance
of class power'.
Further analysis entails examining
political organisation, including the
formation of different types of association
and the ideology, organisation and class
alliances underlying different party-
dominatedregimes/governments.Whatare
the stated objectives of different regimes?
How do they seek to win support,
ideologically and organisationally? What
are the alliances on which they depend?
What are the relationships between 'local
power' and state-level politics? Questions
concerning leadership and organisational
Economic and Political Weekly
and ideological coherence - which Kohli
also highlighted - enter in here.
'Measuring' regime differences is
obviously difficult, both conceptually and
practically(given whatis in some instances,
in regardto India, the paucity of data, and
in others data inconsistencies). We can
obtain some qualitative information on
the characteristicsof differentstateregimes
from the political science literature and
from political commentaries (for example,
Manor's commentary on the new support
base built by Devaraj Urs between 1972
and 1980 in Karnataka).3It is also of value
to trace changes in the composition of
state legislatures and of state governments
(and the backgrounds of chief ministers,
too) in terms of caste and occupation (not
of course that these translateat all directly
into policy and policy practice, but still,
shifts like that which took place in the
1970s when agriculturalists started to be
represented much more strongly, are
significant). It is possible to take quite
systematic account of the frequency of
changes of government and to derive from
this indicators of regime stability, which
can be supplemented from the descriptive
literature.Generally my approachhas been
to try to develop a framework worked out
by Roderick Church in a comparative
discussion of state politics (in UP, Bihar,
West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka,
Maharashtraand Gujarat)written in 1984.
At this time, Church argued, there was
a 'crisis of participation' amongst lower
castes/classes. This was in the context of
a fourfold distinction between caste
categories:
The 'upper'castes,the 'highcastes' or the
'twice-born'arethe brahmans,kshatriyas
and banias. They have long dominated
society and politics as landlords in the
countryside and as businessmen and
professionals in the city. [Note the
connection that is made throughoutthe
discussion between caste statusand class
positions.]
The 'middle' castes are the principal
farmingcastes (jats,yadavsandkurmisin
the north, for example; Marathas in
Maharashtra,and so on). According to
caste traditionthey are Sudras, the term
for all those below the twice-born and
above the untouchables,but they have a
special status and importancebecause of
theirnumbersandland.Typicallythey are
kisans (farmersor [rich]/middlepeasants.
[It is usually the case that the locally
'dominantcastes' - dominantby virtueof
their control over land and labour,which
are still commonly the basis of local
political power - are from these 'middle'
castes].
At the bottom of the traditional status
November 27, 1999
 hierarchyare the 'scheduled' castes, the
ex-untouchables,who now have special
constitutionalprotection and privileges.
They areprimarilyagriculturallabourers.
The 'lower' castes form an economic and
social stratum which is sandwiched
betweenthe middlecastes above themand
theScheduledCastesbelow. Itis composed
of marginal farmers, sharecroppersand
landless labourers from low status
agriculturalcastestogetherwithtraditional
service and artisan castes - barbers,
boatmen,blacksmiths,carpenters,grain-
parchers, oil-pressers, and so on. The
proportionof people in this stratumvaries
from region to region, but it is usually
abouta thirdof the population.4Because
individual castes are usually small and
widely dispersed, as well as poor, the
lower castes find it difficult to develop a
common sense of identity or to assert
muchpoliticalpoweron theirown. (These)
lower castes are the last stratum to be
brought into politics ... [Church 1984:
230-31;emphasis mine].
Church went on to argue that by the
1960s ''the only people systematically
excluded from a share of political
representation and policy benefits were
the castes below the middle castes and
above the Scheduled Castes" and that as
people from these groups sought a larger
share in state power, they encountered
resistance or attempts at co-optation on
the part of dominant groups (from the
upperand middle castes): "This is evident
in new levels of violence and corruption,
in populist appeals to the 'poor', in calls
for law and order, in the emergence of
regionalism, in struggles over reservations
for the 'backward classes', and in the
efforts of political parties to recruit
representatives from lower castes" [this
and the previous quotation, Church 1984:
231]. This powerful statement has proven
remarkably accurate, and it applies to
Indian politics in the 1990s, as well as to
the 1980s.
The lower castes have mobilised, or
have been mobilised politically in several
different ways: (i) as 'poor people', held
to have interestsin common with scheduled
castesandtribes;(ii) throughstatusappeals,
when a hard-pressed upper caste group
seeks to recruittheir support (as happened
in thekshatriyamovement in Gujarat,when
rajputkshatriyawere preparedto concede
'kshatriya' status to hitherto low-ranking
kolis in order to increase their political
clout), or when it is sought to establish
links between middle and lower castes as
fellow membersof the 'backwardclasses' ;5
(iii) by emphasising the regional
community(throughappeals, forexample,
to 'We Telugus' or 'We Bengalis'). Such
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
TABLE1: TYPOLOGY
OFPOLITICAL IN DIFFERENT
REGIMES STATES,EARLY1980S
Category Characteristics States
A Upper caste/class-dominated Bihar, Uttar Pradesh
Congress regimes + [Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan]
B Lower castes/classes recruitedinto Gujarat,Karnataka,Maharashtra[?:JH]
+ [AndhraPradesh?]
Congress regimes
C Lower castes/classes strongly represented Kerala, West Bengal
in non-Congressregimes + [Tamil Nadu]
D Competition between Congress and a Punjab
'middle' caste regional party (excluding
lower castes/classes?)
Notes:
1 The evidence supportingChurch's classification is found in the papers in Wood (ed) (1984).
2 I have added other states (+ [...]), which Churchdid not consider, in the light mainly of evidence
found in the relevant chaptersin Frankeland Rao's two-volume work on state politics:
Orissa, describedin detail by Mohanty(1990) as still dominatedby brahmansand karans(scribes,
comparablewith kayasthas in northernIndia).
Rajasthan,dominatedby rajputs,as indeed it remainsto the present(see the articleby Jenkins 1998
which shows how even the jats in the state, an important'middle' caste, in Church's terms, have
been kept out of power).
Madhya Pradesh is not included in Frankel and Rao's volumes, perhaps because, as Christophe
Jaffrelot has noted recently, traditionaldominance by princes and upper castes was still not in
decline in thatstate at the time at which Frankel-Raoand theirco-authorswere writing, in the mid-
1980s - indeed it hardly is today [Jaffrelot 1998: 40].
Andhra Pradesh is perhapsmore clearly placed in category B than Maharashtra.Andhrapolitics
were still dominatedmainly by reddys, and in some of the coastal districts by kammas, in a way
which was comparable with Marathadominance in Maharashtra.But, Ram Reddy notes, "The
Congress Party [in Andhra]underthe direction of IndiraGandhi [and her satrap,P V Narasimha
Rao, as chief minister]succeeded to a substantialextent in weakeningthe hold of the rich peasantry
over the 'vote banks' providedby the poor peasants and landless [this is analysed in detail in the
ethnographicaccount of MargueriteRobinson (1988)]", so thatwhen IndiraGandhiwas defeated
nationwide in 1977 after the period of emergency rule, "in AndhraPradeshthe JanataPartycould
not make a dent in.her hold over the poorer sections. The backward castes and the harijans
continued to identify Mrs Gandhi with the poor, while the dominant agriculturalcastes aligned
themselves with the Janata. The Congress victory, with the support of the weaker sections,
indicatedan increasingsocial polarisationboth along caste and class lines" [Reddy in Frankeland
Rao 1989:284].
Tamil Nadu: Here the Congress lost control in 1967, ceding power to the Dravida Munnetra
Karzagham, a regional party which propagated Tamil cultural nationalism, and which was
successful in mobilising lower castes againstTamil Nadu's relatively fragmenteddominantcastes.
Punjab: While each of these major states presents a distinctive political history, Punjabarguably
constitutes a case apartwhich cannot be incorporatedinto the three main categories which have
been distinguished.The structureof dominancearoundbrahmans/kshstriyaswhich prevailedover
most of India was not strongly developed here, because of the importanceof Sikhism. Punjabwas
also strongly affected by social reform movements with anti-brahmanicalovertones, in the later
19th/early20th centuries.So it has not been a state with an 'uppercaste/class dominatedCongress
regime'. Moder Punjabpolitics are fundamentallyinfluenced by the relations of Sikhs, who are
predominantin ruralpartsof the state, and Hindus who, although they only make up a little more
than a thirdof the whole population,are numericallydominantin urbanareas. Politics have been
dominated since independence by competition between a strong Sikh-based regional party, the
Akali Dal, and Congress, both of them subject to intense factionalism,with the communist parties
and Hindu nationalistJan Sangh/BJPalso playing significant roles. It is said that "Elite (Sikh) Jat
dominanceunderthe hegemony of successful landownersis one importantdimension of the Akali
Dal" [P Wallace in FrankelandRao 1990: 456]. In termsof Church'sdefinitions it can be described
as a 'middle' caste dominatedparty.Some poorerSikhs, including Sikh artisans,and certainlythe
Sikh Scheduled Castes (who make up close to 30 per cent of the population),have generally been
inclined to support the Congress, which has also been supported by some of the town-based
Hindus, others of whom have supportedthe Jan Sangh/BJP. The communist parties have won
supportfrom "marginal(Sikh) farmersratherthan landless labourers"[P Wallace in Frankeland
Rao 1990: 446]. The Akali Dal has usually had to pursuea strategyof accommodationwith Hindus
in orderto secure and hbld office, and has commonly enteredinto alliance with the JanSangh/BJP
(as indeed it has done at the nationallevel within the loose coalitions which have kept the BJP in
office in central governmentafter the 1998 general election). The effect has been to exclude those
who would be referredto in terms of the schema proposed here as 'lower castes/classes' from
significantpolitical participation;and it is thoughtthatthe movement led by Bhindranwale,which
brought civil war to the state in the 1980s, appealed to poor Sikhs as well as to educated
unemployed youth.
3 Haryana,Himachal Pradesh,Jammuand Kashmirand Assam, amongst the majorstates, are not
considered here.
Source: Church (1984).
3369
attempts,however, to unite the lower castes
with those above them are inherently
problematical because of real differences
in economic interests. The lower castes
may be won by populist appeals (as Indira
Gandhi sought to) "but they can also be
drawnto more radical alternatives, as well
as to the regional parties. The net effect
is to make political coalitions more fluid
and to add a new element of uncertainty
to party politics" [Church 1984: 233].
Aroundthe early-middle 1980s, Church
argued,the patternsof politics in different
states could be understood in terms the
extent and mode of political participation
of the lower castes: "First, there are those
states in which lower castes have achieved
positions of power in the legislature and
government and where governmentpolicy
to some extent addresses the concerns of
thepoor(my emphasis; JH). These include
West Bengal, Gujarat,Karnataka,Kerala
and (perhaps to a lesser extent) Maha-
rashtra. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar remain
states where the lower castes have made
little progress. Second, among states in
which the lower castes have made the
most progress, there are those in which the
Congress has taken the initiative in
recruiting the lower castes and bringing
change" (1984: 236-37). Thus Church
proposed a typology of political regimes
in different states, in the early 1980s (see
Table 1).
Before proceeding to extend this frame-
work to take account of political develop-
ments in the last 15 years, it is important
to take account of other factors which
make for differences between political
regimes:ideology, leadership,organisation
and stability (all aspects of the institu-
tionalisation of politics). In the Indian
case, all of these are affected by certain
general (national) tendencies of politics
and governance. Firstly, although much
policy analysis seems to operate with the
implicitassumptionsthatthe Indianstate(s)
corresponds with the model of rational-
legal authority, and that it is engaged in
rational problem-solving in the common
interest, the reality is of course very
different.It is a notoriousfact thatpolitical
life in India has become increasingly
criminalised andis in thrallto those whom
Chatterjeedescribes as "self-seeking and
unprincipled political speculators", for
whom "politics is ... a business, like
speculating in share markets ... a risky
business where you can go bust all of a
sudden, but where you can also make a
fortuneif things go all right"(1997[ 1991 ]:
213-14). Though the extent of outright
criminality has steadily increased, Indian
politics has always had the characteristics
3370
of a 'risky business' with potentially very
high returns. Though many of the early
legislators were extraordinarilyprincipled
and personally austere, not all were, and
the prospect thatthe Congress would form
ministries in 1937, under the Government
of India Act, had already brought in many
new members,attractedby the possibilities
of government patronage. The Congress
party machine which exercised largely
unchallenged authority, both at the centre
and in the states, for the first 30 years of
independent India, was always oiled by
patronage - the exchange of offices, jobs
and access to public resources for the
mobilisation of electoral support, or 'the
loaves and the fishes of offices andjobs',
as Ashok Mehta memorably put it - rather
thananorganisationdependentupon active
cadres. It is by these means that 'political
accommodationism', referred to earlier -
selective inclusion, designed to build
coalitions of support - has been made to
work. But increasingly,throughthe history
of independent India, political office has
been sought in order to derive rents in
various forms.
One of the concomitants of these general
features of the Indian political system is
that there is competition for 'the spoils of
office'. Large majorities are often not a
guarantee of a stable and secure govern-
ment, because it is then more difficult for
those in power to satisfy the aspirations
of all their supporters. There is a built-in
tendency towards factionalism - com-
petition between groups led by particular
individuals who are in pursuit of personal
gain and personal differences, ratherthan
being divided from each other ideo-
logically. Ideology, indeed, counts for
rather little in this political system. And
there is no major state which has not
experiencedperiodsof instabilityas a result
of factional in-fighting in ruling parties.
Changes of government, in this context,
most emphatically, often mean nothing
more than a reshuffling of personnel, and
have absolutely no ideological or policy
implications.
Another aspect of the spoils is that
political parties are but weakly institu-
tionalised (they are not dependent upon
active cadres but rather on the prospect
or the actualityof thedistributionof spoils).
This is a problem which has grown pro-
gressively worse, as many commentators
have remarked, since Indira Gandhi, in
pursuing her struggle for ascendancy over
the old leadership of the Congress Party
in the late 1960s and 1970s, rather sys-
tematically broke up the old Congress
machine. Atul Kohli (1996), revisiting in
the 1980s places in which the late Myron
Economic and Political Weekly
Weiner studied local Congress organis-
ation in the 1960s, reported that he could
find little active 'organisation' to speak
of, at all. The same is true of other political
parties, as well [see for example, Manor's
comments on the JanataDal in Karataka;
Manor 1998]. Interventions by central
government in state-level politics, which
have increased in frequency as part of
these developments, have also contributed
significantly to political instability.
The outstandingly successful political
parties of the last quarter-century have
been the CPI(M) in West Bengal and
Kerala, the Jan Sangh/BJP in parts of
north India, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra,
and the DMK/ADMK in Tamil Nadu.
These parties, while they have certainly
not always been above the games of patro-
nage andcorruption,6do have organisation
and (less so, latterly, in the case of the
DMK/ADMK) coherent ideology (crude
though this may seem to outsiders to be,
in the case of Shiv Sena especially). An
important influence, therefore, upon
regime differences at state level is the
extent to which states have been governed
by these parties. The DMK/ADMK in
Tamil Nadu, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra,
and the Telugu Desam in AndhraPradesh,
are - in the Indian context - relatively
'strong' parties, with frankly regional
agendas and organisations. But in practice
the CPI(M) in West Bengal and Kerala,
and the BJP in the north Indian states in
which it is most strong, where it has
established distinctive regional versions
of the overall ideology of hindutva [see
for the BJP in Maharashtra,Hansan 1996,
1998; Rajasthan, Jenkins 1998], function
like regional parties, as has the JanataDal
in Karnatakaand Orissa. It is significant
- and refers back to the initial discussion
above, distinguishing between regimes in
terms of the extent and mode of parti-
cipation by lower castes/classes - that as
Partha Chatterjee has put it: "The more
the processes of democracy have deepened
in India, the more has its centre of gravity
moved downwards ... (and that) ... Today,
there are numerous groups that are able
to make their demands heard in the demo-
cratic arena ...". But there are differences,
still, in these respects, between states.
A few words more on idea of the
'accommodationism'in Indianpolitics [the
following has been stimulated by Jenkins
1996]. This can be viewed eitherpositively
or negatively, or - perhaps more sensibly
- as having positive as well as negative
aspects.Froma radicalperspective 'accom-
modation' means at best fudge and
tokenism, if not deliberate manipulation
to head-off pressureforthe thorough-going
November 27, 1999
 structuralchanges which are necessary for
the empowerment of poor, exploited and
oppressedpeople. But accommodationcan
also be considered positively, as part of
a gradual process of change which may
lead to greaterequity and inhibit violence,
in a context in which radical change is
politically infeasible (this is more or less
what the authors of Redistribution With
Growth argued in the 1970s, of course).
The standard works on the political
economy of India,those of PranabBardhan
(1984) and of Francine Frankel (1978),
converge around the view that political
accommodationhas frustratedthe projects
both of rapid economic growth and of
human development in India, and Paul
Brass, in his survey of Indian politics,
arguesthat"'accommodativepolitics' have
failed and cannot succeed in the face of
growing class antagonisms in the
countryside andthe increasing dominance
of India's 'proprietary classes"' (1990:
246). This last assessment seems to have
been falsified by events in the decade
since it was written, but it will be argued
here that there are significant differences
between states in the extent to which ac-
commodative politics still work, and in
their modalities.7
We are now in a position to attempt to
extend and develop the framework first
worked out by Church (see Table 2).
A (ii): States where upper caste/class
dominance has persisted - (1) MP and
Rajasthan: These are both constituted
largely by former princely states and in
both some of the former rulers have
remained politically powerful. They are
states, too, in which right wing parties -
Swatantrain the 1960s, and the Jan Sangh,
later BJP - have traditional base. The Jan
Sangh shared office in Madhya Pradesh,
briefly, as early as 1967, establishing a
pattern of two-party competition at an
early stage; and the party led the Janata
government in Rajasthan after 1977. The
BJP took office in both states in 1990, and
retained it in 1993 (after a period of
president's rule, following the demolition
of the Babri masjid at Ayodhya in 1992)
in Rajasthan (until 1998, when the party
lost) thoughnot in MadhyaPradesh(where
the party lost again to Congress in 1998).
Neitherstate has offered much opportunity
for left-wing political parties or their
ideologies. Political leadership in
Rajasthanwas divided between brahmans,
rajputs,and jats, and the state assemblies
dominated by these three groups, and the
scheduled castes, Jenkins has shown how
the BJP has been a vehicle for extending
rajput dominance (1998). Narain and
Mathurremarkedthat "The day when the
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
placidity and civility of Rajasthanpolitics Mohanty argues that "a brahman-karan
will be rocked by the 'power-drive' of the middle class dominates society andpolitics
agriculturalcastes, while bound to arrive, in contemporaryOrissa" (1990: 321); and
is difficult to predict" (1990: 53). It has that "The failure of caste associations or
still not come. Jaffrelot's work on politics opposition parties to pave the way for the
in Madhya Pradesh (1998), similarly, autonomous politicisation of the lower
shows the continuing pre-eminence of castes ... facilitated the continuation of
brahmans, rajputs and banias in both the upper caste control over major political
BJP and the Congress in that state, though parties" [Mohanty in Frankel and Rao
it seems that part of the reason for the 1990]. The numericalstrengthof scheduled
success of Congress in retaining office in castes and tribes in the population of the
the state is that the party, under Digvijay state "could not be exploited by the left
Singh's leadership, has been successful in parties ... conservative elements could
incorporatingsome from the lower castes, manage to receive their [the SCs'/STs']
and members of the scheduled tribes (who political support ... (and) despite their
makeup one-fifthof the state's population). visible presence in the state and the
This is thecontext, too, of some progressive legislature they have not emerged as an
measures in education and local self- independent political force" [Misra 1989:
government in the recent past. Previously 254]. Left-wing parties have never won
the Congress in MP had a long history of much support outside small pockets. The
factionalism, and the longest single period most outstanding political leader from
in office of any CM, before Digvijay Singh, Orissa has been the late Biju Patnaik, who
was that of Arjun Singh (between 1980 maintained a political following in oppo-
and 1985). The most significant changes sition to Congress for over two decades,
of party regime in these two states are widening the social base of electoral
those which have taken place in the 1990s. politics and mobilising the rising 'agrarian
(2) Orissa: Orissa has features in middle class', as Mohanty describes it,
common with these two states. It too was including notably khandayats,numerically
partially constituted by former princely the largest single caste group, and who
states, and like MP it has a high proportion should probablybe considered as 'middle'
of scheduled tribes within its population. caste [in terms of Church's definitions;
The princes of Orissa seem to have been and see Mitra 1982]. Biju Patnaik led the
less successful in retainingpolitical power, Janata Dal government of Orissa after
but the right wing parties, initially 1990, before losing office again to
Swatantra- to which some of the princes Congress in 1995. The politics of Orissa
gravitatedandwhich took partin a coalition have had an unusually strong personal
government after 1967 - and later the Jan element, and party contests have been
Sangh/BJP, have long been influential. governed by intra-elite competition.
TABLE2: TYPOLOGY
OFINDIANSTATEREGIMES
Category Characteristics States
A(i) States in which upper caste/class dominance-as persisted and Madhya Pradesh
Congress has remainedstrong in the context of a stable two-party Orissa, Rajasthana
system [ 'traditionaldominance' ratherthan politics of
accommodationvis-a-vis lower classes]
A(ii) States in which upper caste/class dominance has been effectively Bihar,
challenged by middle castes/classes, and Congress supporthas Uttar Pradesha
collapsed in the context of fracturedand unstable party
competition [both 'dominance' and the politics of accommodation
have broken down]
B States with middlecaste/classdominatedregimes,where the Congress Andhra Pradesh,
has been effectively challenged but has not collapsed, and there is Gujarat,
fairly stable and mainly two-partycompetition [the politics of Karnataka,
accommodationvis-a-vis lower class interests have continued to Maharashtra,
work effectively, most effectively in Maharashtraand Karnataka, Punjab?b
least effectively in Gujarat]
C States in which lower castes/classes are more strongly represented Kerala,
in political regimes where the Congress lost its dominance at an e Tamil Nadu,
arly stage West Bengalc
Notes: a: These five states are classified as 'low income states'.
b: AP and Karnatakaare 'middle income states', and Punjab,Gujaratand Maharashtraare
'high income states'.
c: These three states are 'middle income states'.
3371
Latterly the Congress and Patnaik's
following(whichhaspassedsubstantially
to his son Navin, now leaderof the Biju
JanataDal, which is in alliancewith the
BJP)havecompetedfor power,operating
fromthe same social base, and, "Mono-
polisingthecompetitivearenathey(have)
pre-empted alternative popularforcesfrom
acquiring politicalsignificance"[Mohanty
in Frankeland Rao 1990]. It is unlikely,
here,thatchangesof party-regimeareof
any great significancefor policy or its
implementation.
A (ii): States where upper caste/class
dominancehas been effectively challenged
- (1) BiharandUttarPradesharethe core
statesof the 'Hindiheartland',wherethe
uppercastes are much more numerous.
The CongressParty in both states was
dominatedby membersof these upper
castes. About UP, Zoya Hasan writes,
"fromtheoutsettherulingpartyrestricted
the access of lowercastes to positionsin
government,and successive Congress
regimesweredominatedby uppercastes-
classes.Uppercastedominationprovided
the frameworkof politicalbondingin a
fragmented society" (1998: 19). But
'middle'caste,in ourterms,'OtherBack-
ward Classes' (OBCs) have become
politically powerfulin both states; the
Congress party has very substantially
destroyeditself,afterrulingeachstatefor
most of the time from independenceup
to 1989/1990,andno longerhas muchof
anelectoralbase;andpoliticsin eachstate
is fragmented,and bitterly contested
betweenformationswhichderivefromthe
Lok Dal, in which OBCs are strong,the
BJP, to which the upper castes have
gravitatedbutwhichseeks, as elsewhere,
to win supportfromlowercastes as well,
and dalit-based parties (notably the
Bahujan SamajParty,oneof whoseleaders,
Mayawati, becamethefirstscheduledcaste
womanto hold the chief ministershipof
a majorstate,in a brief tenurein UP in
1995).The ruleof law has brokendown
to a greaterextentin Biharthanelsewhere
in India,but the home ministerof India
wenton recordin theLokSabhain March
1997 to statethatUP is movingtowards
'anarchy,chaos and destruction'.
B: States with 'middle' caste/class
dominated regimes: There are of course
many differencesbetween these states.
But they are alike in having powerful
'middle' castes/classes - numerically
significant,locally dominantcastes, but
whosedominanceextendsoverwideareas,
and which have generally exercised
pervasivepolitical influence:the reddys
andkammasof AndhraPradesh(whomake
up, together, about 20 per cent of the
3372
population);thepatidarsof Gujarat(about especially,successfulindustrialists,who
12 percent);thelingayatsandvokkaligas have pursuedeffective strategiesof ac-
of Karnataka (who togetherconstitute30 commodationof the lower caste/classe
per cent or so of the population);andthe interests,assistedin this by the fact that
marathasin Maharashtra (30 per cent or though those described as 'backward
so of the populationof the state).Thejat castes' makeup about50 per cent of the
Sikhs, similarly,constitutemorethan20 population in the districts of Andhra
percentof thepopulationof Punjab.Upper Pradesh,theyarealsounevenlydistributed
castes (brahmins,baniasand kshatriyas) anddividedinto a largenumberof small
havebeensignificantin thepoliticsof all groups. "In its actual functioning, the
fourstates,butmoreso in Gujarat,where practiceof politicalaccommodationtook
brahminsandbaniasgenerallydominated on an ad hoc and expedientcharacterin
therulingCongressPartyuptoandthrough responseto the variousclaims raisedby
the 1960s[Wood1984].Inallthesestates, competingsocialgroups.Radicalpolitics
thedominant'middle'castes(andtheupper [in a state in which communistswere
castes) have been challengedby lower initiallypowerful- it was thoughtlikely
castes,or theyhaveaccommodated lower thatthe CPIwouldformthe firstgovern-
caste aspirations,butthe politicalgripof ment of the state after its formationin
the 'middle'castes has remainedstrong, 1956] were therebyavoidedand amelio-
thoughperhapsin varyingdegrees.They rative measurespursued"[this and the
arealso statesin whichthe BJPnow has following quotations from Reddy in
a significantpresence,whichis important FrankelandRao 1989:265]. The politics
in relationto theconcernsof thisanalysis of patronage(in which "Theunderlying
especiallybecauseof thewayin whichthe assumptionwas that every aspirantto
partyhas mobilisedsupportwhichcross- power had his price ...", p 265) gave way,
cuts middleclasses and some groupsof as a resultof the policies adoptedin the
low caste/classpeople, thoughnot in a 1970s under the inspirationof Indira
way whichpromisesto deliververymuch Gandhi to a populist strategy, which
to the latter.The strengthof the BJP is continuedto winherandherpartysupport
evidentin Gujarat,whereit cameto power in the state even in the aftermathof the
in 1995andhasbeenin office, thoughnot emergency(as noted above). But by the
withoutinternalconvulsions,for muchof end of the 1970s resentmentsbuilt up
the time since then, and in Maharashtra, amongsthighercaste groupsbecauseof
whereit also held office, in alliancewith what was perceived as the tilt towards
Shiv Sena,from1995untilOctober1999. scheduled castes and "the rural poor
TheBJP'selectoralstrengthinbothAndhra themselvesbecame divided along caste
Pradesh,whereit won 18 per cent of the lines. Finally, the break-downin client-
vote and 4/42 seats in the 1998 general patronrelationsat the local level resulted
election,but has virtuallyno presencein in the failureof politicalcommunication
thestateassembly,andinKamataka, where andcreateda void whichwentunfilledin
it won 27 percentof the vote in 1998and the absenceof any new grassrootsparty
became the second largestparty in the organisation"(p 285). Youth, educated
stateassemblyin 1994,albeitwitha much middleclasses,membersof 'lower'castes
smallershareof thevotethantheCongress, and Kammaindustrialistsalike went in
is muchless secure.Manorarguesthatthe searchof analternativeto Congress.Then
prospectsof the BJP in Kamatakastill intheearly1980sIndiraGandhi'sfrequent
dependratheron the self-destructionof interventionsin Andhrapolitics, and a
the Congressand the JanataDal thanon rapid succession of ineffectual chief
its ownefforts,andthattheBJP'sorganis- ministers,builtupresentments whichwere
ation"hasalwaysbeenfarless strongand successfully exploited by the film star
extensiveinKarnataka thanitscounterparts N T Rama Rao, who establisheda new
innorthern andwesternIndia"(1998:194). political party,the Telugu Desam Party
Thesejudgmentswere confirmedduring (TDP), and - steppinginto the political
the 1999 Lok Sabhaand VidhanSabha vacuum created by the decline of the
electionsinthestate.TheBJPis alsolikely Congress,and the 'void' at local level -
to remaina minorforce,in Manor'sview, won office in the statein 1983 [see also
inAndhraPradesh,thoughtheperformance Kohli 1988,andVakil 1990,whoconfirm
of the partyin the 1998 generalelection the analysisgiven by Ram Reddy].One
showed that it has finally arrivedin the charismatic leader (NTR) effectively
state. replacedanother(IndiraGandhi),butlater
(1) AndhraPradesh:Thepoliticsof this was a nationalleader while the former
state has continuedto be dominatedby regional:"It was (NTR's) charismathat
'forwardcaste'reddysandkammas,major dominatedthe electoralscene, rendering
landholdersandin thecaseof thekammas most of the organisedpolitical parties
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
irrelevant"(p 286). The TDP offered 'to
restorethe dignityof the Telugupeople'.
The policies it proposed were frankly
populist(notablypromisingrice at Rs 2
perkilo), andattemptedto accommodate
youth, women and the 'lower' castes/
classes - indicating"the continuity in
politicalstyle".Indeedthe interimbudget
passed by the TDP immediatelyafter it
cameto powershiftedfromirrigationand
power development,which received an
increasedoutlay of only 6 per cent, to
socialandcommunityservices,on which
trfeoutlaywas increasedby 30 per cent
[see Pai 1996]. The continuitiesin the
leadership of thedominant'middle'castes/
classes is shown in studies of the com-
positionof the stateassemblyand of the
statecabinet(thoughit is truethatkammas
weremorestronglyrepresentedunderthe
TDP - NTR was himselfa kamma),and
the representationof members of the
'lower'castes/classesinlocalgovernment
has beenonly gradual.RamReddysums
up:"Whilethe partiesin powerchanged,
the stabilityof the polity continued.The
successof apartyseemedto lie in building
a strongandcharismatic personalityonthe
onehandandcarryingoutpopulistpolicies
on the other,capableof appealingto a
broadspectrumof disadvantaged groups.
[No newpartyorganisationcouldbe built
to substitutehorizontalmobilisationof
thepoorforverticalpatronclientnetworks
...(which)... contributed to excessive
dependenceon a singlecharismaticleader
and increasingcentralisationof power;
p287].As the politicsof accommodation
appeared tobreakdownbecauseof itsown
social contradictions[not all groups or
aspirantstopowercanpossiblybesatisfied]
another party emerged with a new
charismaticleader and more expansive
populistpolicies"(p 291). Sure enough
NTR's TDP, thoughit retainedoffice in
1985aftera badlybungledattemptby the
Congress governmentat the centre to
removehim, lost in the state in 1989 to
the Congress,even thoughby this stage
RajivGandhi'scharismahadwornrather
thin.TheCongressgovernmentinthestate
was thendefeatedin turnin 1994 by the
TDP,whichwasableto highlighttheissue
of the distributionaleffects of the fiscal
reformswhichwereby thenbeingimple-
mentedin the country.The issue of sub-
sidisedrice was centrallyimportant.The
cheaprice scheme had been effectively
run by the TDP before 1989, and the
recordof the Congressin runningit was
perceivedas poor, not least becausethe
price had been increasedfrom Rs 2 to
Rs 3.50 per kilo. Now the futureof the
TDP, under a new and somewhat
charismaticleader,Chandrababu Naidu,
is underthreatas the schemehasbeencut
down in response to the World Bank
conditionality.In sum, continuityin the
dominance of 'middle' caste/class
interests,butthe populistprogrammesof
the TDP mayrepresenta significantshift
within the regime.
(2) Gujarat:The more complex caste-
class structureof this statehas madefor
politics which are even more Byzantine
thanis usual in India.GhanshyamShah
comments,"thesocialsituationin Gujarat
is not quite clear. Caste as a social
organisation ... is crumbling, though not
disappearing.At the same time caste
sentimentsprevailin the intra-classcon-
flictsamongthepoorfarmers,agricultural
labourersand industrialworkers[in this
relativelyhighlyindustrialised statewith
particularlyextensive commercialagri-
culture]as well as the rich peasantsand
business class. While differentclasses
cuttingacrosscasteboundariesarebeing
formed,classconsciousnessas suchis yet
to develop.Thissituationworksin favour
of theupperclassesof thedominantcastes
in perpetuatingtheir hold over society"
(1990: 111). The state does not fit so
clearlyintothecategoryof 'a middlecaste
dominated regime' as do Andhra,
Karnatakaand Maharashtra,because
membersof the uppercastes- brahmans
andespeciallybanias,as well as patidars
- a classic 'middle' caste in Church's
terms,exercisinglocaldominancein parts
of thestate,and'kshatriyas'- whoinclude
both rajputsand some kolis, the most
numerous caste group of the state
(accountingfor arounda quarterof the
population),who includelarge numbers
of small and marginal farmers, and
agricultural labourers,andcanbe defined
as 'lower'caste,have all vied for power.
As Wood argued(1984) the Congress-I
wassuccessfulinthe 1980sinestablishing
a powerbase by deployingthe so-called
'KHAM'strategywhichwaspresentedby
its own advocatesin the partyas a way
of 'uplifting'disadvantagedmembersof
society. 'KHAM' refers to 'kshatriya'
including lower caste kolis, harijan
(scheduledcastes- around7 per cent of
the population), 'Adivasis' (scheduled
tribes- around18 percent),andMuslims
(another8 percent or more).Thusit was
thatChurchdefinedGujaratas a statein
which lower castes/classes had been
recruitedinto Congressregimes,though
it was alreadyclear that the 'KHAM'
strategyhadexacerbateddivisionswithin
each of its constituentgroups,with the
worse-offamongstthembeing excluded
from benefits.But it did mean, as both
ShahandWoodhavenoted,thattherewas
alsoadiscrepancybetweenpoliticalpower
and social dominancein the state. The
economy was dominatedby brahmans,
baniasand patidars,but political power
was held mainly by rajput and koli
kshatriyas, and Wood remarked, in-
sightfully, that "The haves, possessing
social andeconomicpowerbutexcluded
from access to political power in the
Congress-I,appearto have nowhereto
turnexcepttohopelesslyweakanddivided
oppositionparties,ortolawlessbehaviour"
(1984: 221). He anticipatedthe violence
and turbulent conflict which have
characterisedGujarat'spolitics in the
1980s.But the 'haves'did find a partyto
turnto by the end of the decade, in the
BJP. Accordingto Shah's accountof it
(1998), first the Jan Sanghand then the
BJP have pursueda long-runstrategyof
building supportin Gujarat,seeking to
incorporatedalits(scheduledcastes)and
OBCs (lower castes in our terminology)
underuppercaste leadership."Theparty
hasputthedalit,tribalandOBCmembers
in the forefrontin various campaigns"
(1998:257), fieldingsignificantnumbers
of OBC candidates in state assembly
elections,whilstatthesametimecontriving
neveractivelyto supportjob reservations
for them.And in 1991 as manyas 63 per
cent, still, of the state and districtlevel
leaderswerefromuppercastes(brahmans,
banias)and the patidars.After the BJP
took power in the state in 1995 it was
rapidlysplitby a conflictbetweenleaders
whichseemedto reflecttraditional rivalry
between patidarsand rajputs-cum-kolis.
Shankarsinh Vaghela,himselfa rajputbut
witha base amongstkolis, brokeawayto
formthe RashtriyaJanataParty,ruledfor
a time with Congresssupportand "tried
with some success to emergeas a leader
of the OBCsin Gujarat"[Shah:in Franke
land Rao 1998: 265]. But in the state
electionsin 1998thepolarisationon caste
lines which Vaghelaanticipateddid not
occurandtheBJPwonwidespreadsupport
in a comprehensive victory (Vaghela
subsequentlymergedthe RJPwith Con-
gress, arguing - curiously for one so
recentlya leaderof theBJP- thathisparty
had no ideological differences with
Congress). The currentchief minister,
KeshubhaiPatel,is now perceived,how-
ever, as favouringpatidarsat the cost of
'lower' castes, and there are reportsof
troublein the rulingpartyfor this reason
(Frontline, June 18, 1999).
Insum,thereis littleevidenceto suggest
thatlowercastes/classeshave won much
politicalgroundin Gujarat,andthecurrent
ascendancyof the BJPis foundedon 'the

Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999 3373

upperclassesof thedominantcastes'.But
regimeshiftsoccurredin the later 1970s
and 1980s in the periodof the 'KHAM'
strategyandagainin the mid-1990swith
the assumptionof powerby the BJP,and
therealignmentof economicandpolitical
power.
(3) Karataka:Thepoliticsof Karataka
has been describedby Manoras a state
witha conservativesocialorder,in which
"thedisparitiesinwealth,statusandpower
havenot been so severe as to undermine
thecomparativecohesivenessof society"
(1989: 323). Later, he argues that this
'cohesion'"rootedin small peasantpro-
prietorship"(p 331), has been dominated
by lingayatsand vokkaligas.Congress
administrationsled by vokkaligas and
lingayatsin the 1950s and 1960s aresaid
to have carried out 'modest reforms',
offering modest concessions to poorer
groups[thoughit is possible thatManor
has latterlyover-emphasisedthe effec-
tivenessof the land reformsof 1961, as
well as those carriedout in the times of
the Urs administration in the 1970s: see
Damle 1989]. But by the late 1960s the
solidarity of 'lingayat raj' was being
undermined by frustrations overaccessto
patronage. ThisassistedDevarajUrs' rise
to power,whichinvolvedmobilisationof
lowercaste/classgroupsin the 1970s.But
Urs'regime,describedas 'progressive'by
Manor(1980) and after him by Kohli,
lackedorganisational foundationsanddid
not endure.Neitherdoes it seem - in the
lightof subsequentevents -that Urssowed
the seedsof radicalchangein Karnataka
societyin theway in whichM N Srinivas
and M N Panninisuggestedwhen they
wrote,"Hesucceededinmakingthepoorer
sectionsrealise that in a democracynot
only shouldthe governmentworkfor the
welfareof thepoorbutalso thatit should
berunbythem"(1984:73). TheCongress-
I wasrestoredto powerin 1980,underthe
leadershipof GunduRao,who proceeded
to governwith such bunglingineptitude
(Manorsaves his most cuttinglanguage
forGunduRao)as to alienate"avastarray
of importantsocial groups"who then, in
January1983"astonished Indiabyrejecting
a Congressgovernment forthefirsttime".
Accordingto Manor"Becauseso many
alienated groups had turned to the
opposition,the Janatagovernmentwhich
took power in 1983 contained repre-
sentativesof nearlyeveryimportant social
forcein thestate.Despiteill-informedand
quite unsubstantiated cliches in sections
of the Indian press, lingayats and
vokkaligashave not succeededin domi-
nating that government"[this and the
precedingquotationsManor1989:356].
3374
His view was that as a result of these organisational setting ... it has an
eventsin theearly1980s,it was no longer incompatible leadership structure
possible for any single social force to emanatingmainlyfromdiscreteandpre-
dominate Karnatakapolitics, and he existing political backgrounds [The
(correctly,as it has turnedout) foresaw recurrent conflictsbetweenthetopleaders
thatpolitics in Karnatakamightbecome of the JanataParty,later JanataDal in
increasinglyunstable. Karataka - Hegde, Bommai and Deve
The local dominanceof lingayatsand Gowda, a brahman,a lingayat and a
vokkaligasmay have persisted- this is vokkaliga,respectively,- bear out this
quiteclearlyshownbyRayandKumpatla's point].TheJanataPartyhasnoideological
analysisof thesocialbackgrounds of zilla commitmentto the poor;its ideologycan
parishad presidents inthemid-1980s,under be spelled out only in terms of some
the Janatagovernmentof the state(1987) generalities like democracy and de-
- buttheywerenolongerdominant,Manor centralisation.The hold of the dominant
maintained,as they had been at supra- landowningcastesinthepartyis enormous.
local levels. He considered that "The Its policies and programmes are not
problemof the Hegdegovernment[after thereforeintendedto imperilthe entren-
1983] was not thatthey favouredlocally ched interestsof thepropertiedclassesas
dominant groups but that they risked a whole ..." [Ray and Kumpatla 1987:
spreadingtheir resourcestoo thinly by 1830]. Manor,and Kohli, in the light of
distributing largesse to nearly every their commentarieson the Urs' govern-
sizeablegroupin the state"(1989: 357). ment,mightwellarguethatthisis precisely
SrinivasandPanninihadbeeneven more thepoint:thesewereregimeswhichwere
positiveaboutthe characterof the Hegde able to pursue modestly progressive
government, suggesting that it had agendasbecause- pursuingthe politics
"restoredthe bias thatUrs gave to rural of accommodationthey took a pragmatic
upliftandpovertyeradication" (1984:73). attitudetowardspropertiedclasses.But it
Ray and Kumpatla,however,foundthat has yet to be demonstratedthat they
in local governmentthe representation of achievedlastingbenefitsforpoorerpeople
lingayatsandvokkaligaswasgreaterunder in Karnataka(and, it would seem, from
Hegde thanit had been in Urs' time and the studies of Minhas-Jain-Tendulkar
held thatbecausethe Janatagovernment (1987) and Datt-Ravallion(1998), that
had neitherthe will nor the capacityto they did not). The 1994 elections to the
challengelocalpowerholders"thenewly state assembly in which lingayats and
createdpowerful[panchayatiraj]system vokkaligaswon, respectively,29 and 24
of democraticdecentralisation is unlikely percentof the seats,showthepersistence
to create substantialgains for the rural of theirinfluence(see alsoHaroldGould's
poor"(1987: 1825), a finding which is analysis( 1997)of theJanataDalelectoral
broadlysubstantiated byManor'sownlater strategyin thegeneralelectionsin thestate
workon panchayatirajin Karnataka, with in 1996, which confirmsthe point.
RichardCrook.Crookand Manorargue Insum,it is notclearthat'middle'caste/
that decentralisationin Karnatakahas class dominance has been shaken in
improved political participation and Karnataka, orthatlowercastes/classeshave
governmentperformance,but, they say exercisedsomevoice in the way thatthey
"Even(this) the most successfulof our haveinAndhraandinGujarat. Itis possible
cases showed little evidence of having that both the Urs and the JanataParty/
beenparticularly responsiveto 'vulnerable JanataDal regimeshavebeen more'pro-
groups', the poor or the marginalised" poor' than others, but it has yet to be
(1998: 301). In Karnatakathere was no shown that - if this was so - they have
mechanism or political process for had much effect.
checkingtheexerciseof localpower,such (4) Maharashtra: JayantLele, who has
as might be supplied,they imply - a la written extensively on Maharashtra
Kohli - by dominancein the political politics,says of the marathasthat"Inno
system of a leftist party.We shouldnot other state do we find an ideologically
then "expectdemocraticdecentralisation guided and economicallydifferentiated
in India to assist in povertyalleviation casteclusterof thissize"(1990: 180);and
overthe shortto mediumterm,unlessthe RobertJenkinssums up Lele's views on
centralisedsystemis dominatedby aleftist the politics of the state as follows: "the
party"[CrookandManor1998:77]. The Marathacaste clusterhas constructeda
Urs regime,andsubsequentlytheJanata/ systemof elite-pluralist hegemony,which
Janata Dal failed (pace Srinivas and subsumesmanyunprivilegedmembersof
Pannini)to bringaboutradicalchangein that caste cluster as well as other dis-
Karnataka politics:"Hegde,likeUrs,heads advantagedcastes, and has cut short a
a partywhichhas a loose ideologicaland 'coalitionof the disadvantaged'... this
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
system is flexible enough to respondto
most challengesof change"(1996: 210,
note 12). Dalits have been more con-
tinuouslyorganisedin Maharashtra than
has beenthe case elsewherein India,and
in consequenceperhapsthere has been
more'generous'accommodation of elites
fromthescheduledcastes,scheduledtribes
andMuslimsthanelsewhere,so that"They
have developeda vested interestin the
maintenanceof the system. Lele says
elsewhere,"Ambedkar'sproject'of low
caste-emancipation'is on the buffers'...
(while) ... Those from the OtherBackward
Classes .. have also realised that without
controloverlandor trade,withouta caste
clusterideologyequivalentto thatof the
Marathasor Mahars[the most numerous
Scheduled Caste] and without spatial
concentrations, mobilisingagainstMaratha
hegemonyor theCongresssystemcannot
yieldalastingalternate systemof rewards"
[Lele1990:188].TheMaharashtra govern-
ment was unableto providesatisfactory
informationto the MandalCommission
aboutthestatusof the 'OBCs'in thestate,
buttherewas also unlikeGujarat,littlein
the way of 'anti-reservation' outburstsin
Maharashtrain the 1980s. The state's
widelycelebratedemploymentguarantee
scheme(EGS)- thestate'smostimportant
anti-povertyprogramme,has played a
significantpartin 'thesystem',too:"Large
partof the fundsfor the EGS is provided
bytheprosperous urbansectorof thestate...
(the)politicallypowerfulruralelite in the
statesucceededin extractingfinancefrom
theurbansectorfor the GS in orderto get
benefitsfromtheassetscreatedin therural
areas [whilst also managing potential
resistance:JH]" [MahendraDev 1995:
2674].
Anotheroutcomeof thesystemwasthat
Congress rule proved most durable,
amongstall the majorstates, in Maha-
rashtra,anduntil1995thepartywas only
outof powertherefortwoyears(andeven
then,thegovernmentwhichruledbetween
1978 and 1980, in the aftermathof the
emergency,includedthose who hadbeen
and who were to be again leadersof the
Congress-I).The 1995 state assembly
electionssaw the first serious challenge
to bothCongressandthe Marathadomi-
nance.The BJP-ShivSena alliance won
29.1 per cent of the vote and 64 and 73
seats respectivelyagainst the Congress
'80(and30.9percentof thevote),bringing
aboutthefirstchangeof partyregime.For
the firsttime in its history,the state had
a realnon-Congress government,andone
not dominatedby marathascomingfrom
ruralareas.The castecompositionof the
VidhanSabhadid not changevery much
Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999
in 1995, thoughits social characterwas
changedin otherways. Marathastrength
wasmaintained - butthekindsofmarathas
who won were differentfromthose who
hadheldseatsin previousassemblies.The
MarathaMahaSangh(acasteassociation)
allied with the Shiv Sena, but successful
marathacandidateswho won on the Shiv
Sena ticketwere young and had little or
no support from Maharashtra's co-
operativesorotherinstitutions:"Theyare
those disgruntledelementswho are not
absorbedin the local powerstructureby
the clannishmarathasof the Congress"
[Vora 1996: 173; points confirmedin
Banerjee'sanalysis(1997) of the success
of the BJP-ShivSenain the 1996general
election].The BJP's64 MLAs"reflected
the party'ssystematicstrategyof trans-
formingits upper-casteimage"[Hansen
1998: 147]. Only 10 were brahminsand
24 came from the maratha-kunbi caste
cluster.
A commentatorarguesthat in India's
most urbanisedand industrialisedstate
"the rural-basedCongress is becoming
irrelevant"[Vora1996:172],butthesame
on
writergoes tosuggestthatcrucialfactors
in the elections were first, the Congress
in-fighting,whichmeantthattherewere
large numbersof rebel Congress can-
didates, and second, the party's loss of
supportamongstMuslims(followingthe
violenceagainstMuslimsin the Bombay
riots of 1992-1993).Here,as elsewhere,
the self-destructionof the Congresshas
played a significant,if not vital, partin
theBJP'srise.It is certainlystill too early
to write off the Congressas a political
force in Maharashtra (thoughit has been
furtherdamagedbytherecentsplitbetween
SharadPawar and Sonia Gandhi).But
meanwhilethere has been a change of
party-regimefor the first time in Maha-
rashtra.The significanceof this has yet
to becomeapparent. OnoneleveltheBJP-
ShivSenaseemstoaccommodate different
class interestsveryeffectively,thoughin
a differentway from thatwhich worked
under the old Maharashtrian Congress
systemin Maharashtra. The implications
in the longer run of local challenge to
Marathadominancemaybeprofound.But
in termsof policy,at leastin theshortrun,
therehas not been greatdeal of change.
C: States in which lower castes/classes
have been more strongly represented:
Kerala,TamilNaduandWestBengalare
stateswhichstandoutbecausetheircaste/
classstructures
havehistorically
beenquite
fragmented.In none of them was upper
castedominanceas stronglyentrenchedas
in the north (though brahmans had
positionsof importancein all of them);
noneof themhas'middle'castesextending
localdominanceoverwideareas,as is the
case with the marathas,the reddysor the
lingayatsand vokkaligas.In all the three
statestherearestrongindicationsof higher
levels of political mobilisation and
participation by 'lower'castes/classesthan
is trueelsewhere.Papersin Wood(1984)
substantiate thiscase for KeralaandWest
Bengal, where it is due to the activities
of aleft-of-centreparty,theCPI(M)which
has combined coherent leadership,
pragmatism towardsthepropertied classes,
and ideological and organisational
commitment which has successfully
challengedlocallandedpower-holders. In
bothstatestherehasbeenmoresignificant
effortmadeatassetredistribution through
agrarianreformthan elsewhere.Kerala,
however,hasamoredevelopedcivilsociety
and more politicalcompetition,whereas
the CPI(M)in West Bengal has become
rathera monolithicmachine.Echeverri-
Gentacknowledges"Theparty'srelative
success in dislodgingtraditionallanded
elites ...". But he argues that "democratic
competitionis essential in maintaining
partycommitmentanddisciplineoverthe
longerrun" andhefearsthat"Thedeclining
competitiveness of politicsinWestBengal
suggests thatthere may be a reductionin
responsiveness to the rural poor"
[Echeverri-Grant 1993: 168-169].None-
thelessthe workof RichardCrookshows
that amongst all the instances of de-
centralisationwhich he has been able to
identifyandto studyfromacrosstheworld,
West Bengal'shas been most successful.
He concludeshis comparativestudy by
arguingthat"Itis highly significantthat
the most successful cases [like West
Bengal] were the ones where central
governmentnot only had an ideological
commitmentto pro-poorpolicies,butwas
preparedto engage actively with local
politics ... to challenge local elite resistance
if necessaryandto ensureimplementation
of policies".(Wherecentralgovernments
hadnotconfrontedlocal elites,theresults
of decentralisation in relationto the poor
were universallypoor.)
InTamilNadutheparticipation of lower
castes/classeshas ratherbeen articulated
by a local,regionalpartywhichatonetime
propagated culturalnationalism,andwhich
has had charismaticleaders who have
successfully appealed to lower castes/
classes through populist programmes.
Cross-classpoliticalallianceshave been
establishedby fairlywell-institutionalised
politicalparties.Politics is quiteclearly
notuppercaste/class-dominated asin(say)
MP, or middle caste/class-dominated as
in (e g) Maharashtra,but the DMK/
3375
AIADMK regime does have a petit institutionalisedpartysystem than does institutions,and requiresthat they should be
Karnataka,where the party system is identified by a commission appointedby the
bourgeois rather than working class
character.Kohli's observationsonMadurai - thoughit is still president. When the V P Singh government
increasinglyfragmented decidedin 1990, to adoptthe recommendations
suggest that the ADMK became dominatedby thelocallypowerfulmiddle of the second such Backward Classes
deradicalised,failedto buildinstitutional castes/classes.
UnsurprisinglyCrookfound Commission there was violent protest from
roots (beyondthe MGR fan clubs), and thatdecentralisationin Karnataka wasless members of upper castes, especially across
failed to deliver on its anti-centre,anti- effectivein relationto povertyalleviation northernIndia. The extraordinarysensitivity
brahman and pro-poor goals, which thanin WestBengalgiventhatthecentral surrounding 'Mandal' (the name of the
chairman of the second commission, which
"slowlybroughtto theforea rulerelected (state) governmentmade no attemptto came to be applied generally to the recom-
primarilybyvirtueof his personalappeal" challenge local power. There has been mendationsof the report)is in parta reflection
(1990:182).Similarly,Washbrooks views morepartycompetitionin Gujaratthanin of the increasingpolitical strengthof some of
"theAIADMKregimewas one of bread Maharashtra which may have made for the 'OBCs' ('other backward classes'), and
(or rice) andcircuses(or movies) and in rathergreaterresponsivenessto the poor may also have contributedto its development.
One reason for favouringthe use of Church's
broadpoliticalterms,mightbe conceived (eg through the PDS). Where stable, distinctionbetween'middle'and'lower'castes,
as a form of Bonapartistor Caesarian relatively well-institutionalisedparties ratherthan - as if often the case in political
democracy.Classically,the bourgeoisie, competefortheirvotes,thepoliticalsystem commentaryin and on India - using only the
or the elite of wealth, withdrewfrom a is likelytobe moreresponsiveto theneeds category of 'OBCs', is precisely thatthe latter
formalpositionof controlover the state and interestsof poorerpeople,andmore are quite clearly differentiatedin the way that
apparatusandthe constitutionalpolitical effective in bringing about poverty Church suggests.
6 A fortioriduringtheperiodin whichJayalalitha,
process.Not only was theirdirectcontrol reduction.
leader of the ADMK, was chief minister of
no longernecessaryfor the purposesof
Notes Tamil Nadu after 1991.
capitalaccumulationbut theirattemptto 7 Jenkins'argument,developed in the context of
exercise it ... provoked resistance and [This paper was written in connection with a a discussion about 'the politics of protecting
instability.Formalcontrolwastransferred collaborative project on 'Political Systems and the poor', in the process of economic reform
to [Iwouldratherputit, 'wasassumedby'] Poverty',directedby MickMoore(of theInstitute in Maharashtra,is an interesting one. He
a cadreof professionalpoliticalmanagers of Development Studies,Sussex)andJamesPutzel suggests "that both the rich and politicians
(of the LSE) for the governance departmentof alike, though clearly diverting to themselves
who on the basis of a populistideology, theUK departmentfor internationaldevelopment. a good deal of the resourcesmeantfor the poor,
mollifiedresistanceby turing whatwas I am grateful to Mick and James for their havesomethingtogainfrompreservinga system
left of the stateinto a welfareagencyand encouragementof my work.] of social welfare which has allowed them to
by stirringup feelings of patriotismand 1 Frankel's control the flow of resources and thereby to
atavism"[Washbrookin FrankelandRao masterlyanalysisof India's political shore up their waning traditionalauthority..
economy 1947-77 shows how accommodation there may be life left yet in the corpse of
1989: 258]. worked and what its effects were [Frankel
Inconclusion,therefore,theredoesseem politicalaccommodationism"(1996:200).And
1978]. no badthing,either,forthepoorof Maharashtra,
to be a strong case for differentiating 2 In the two-volume work Dominanceand State he seems to suggest, stand their best chance
betweenthe politicalsystemsof different Power in Modern India (1989, 1990) edited of gaining some protectionfrom the effects of
statesin termsof thebalanceof caste/class by Frankel and Rao, various authors analyse economic liberalisation. There are political
the relationsof dominance,in this sense, and
power,andthenatureof theirparty systems, 'statepower' ('the exertionof secularauthority pressures in India,in his view, which will tend
and it may be expected that these dif- to createthe conditionsfor the type of coalition
by individuals appointed or elected to offices
ferencescan be shown to influencethe of the state, who claim legitimacy under the envisaged by Joan Nelson between 'some;
of the amongthe poor' and those in middlingincome
policyprocessandtheperformance law'). A centraltheme of the work as a whole deciles.
states.Forexample,in the groupof states concernsthedeclineof 'dominance',associated
where middle castes/classeshave been with brahmanism. References
3 There is a lot of variation in terms of the
dominant, amiddleincomestate(according
quantity,content and quality of the literature Bardhan, P (1984): The Political Economy of
toDattandRavallion)likeAndhraPradesh relating to different states, which presents a Development in India, Blackwell, Oxford.
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Kamataka,and a high income state like one. Very little is available on the politics of Agriculture, Land and Asset Distribution',
than
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lead to what has been described as Article 340 of the Indian Constitutionrefers Some IndianStates Done BetterThan Others
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bidding down of wages by the locally for preferentialtreatmentin access to public Echeverri-Gent,J (1995): TheStateand the Poor:
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3376 Economic and Political Weekly November 27, 1999

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OUP, Delhi. or Continuity? Westview, Boulder.
QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER
Essays in honour of K Raman Pillai
Edited by: B. Mohanan & P. S. Nair
The 22 articlesin this book touch upon the world economic order,the
world political order,the global security arrangements,the prospectsof
universalHumanRights,the worldenvironmentorderandthe challenges
before world governancethroughthe UN system. In all these articlesthe
perspectiveis thatof thedevelopingworldandmoreparticularlycountries
in the Asian region. The picture of the world that emerges on reading
the articles is neither satisfactorynor just. It is not alarmingeither. It
reflects the QUEST, a quest that is partly inchoate, mostly inarticulate
and some times contentious.To-be able to know the dimensions to the
quest, one has to readthe entirebook and reflect on issues it raises. Well
there is no limit to the quest and the more you get to know aboutit, the
more you realise how little you know. But even to know whatyou know,
you need to read this book.
- N. R. Madhava Menon
Member Law Commission of India
CONTRIBUTORS
Francoise Houtart B. Mohanan
K. RamachandranNair K. V. Kesavan
C. NarayanaRao
Rajen Harshe
V. K. SukumaranNayar Y. Rafeek Ahmed
B. Vivekanandan G. Haragopal
G. Gopakumar A. Suneetha
P. S. Jayaramu J. Prabhash
P. SukumaranNair Pravin N. Sheth
N. Nyathi Shaji Varkey
ManoranjanMohanthy Ninan Koshy
M. J. Vinod D. Jeevan Kumar
K. C. Sreekumar
363 + XIII 1999 ISBN 81-87503-00-9 Rs. 695
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3377