PEOPLE v OPTANA

[G.R. No. 133922 (February 12, 2001)]

Ponente: Kapunan
-four (4) Informations for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, or known
as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse and four (4) Informations
for Rape were filed against herein accused-appellant Deolito Optana
Facts:
-Maria Rizalina Onciano is the daughter of Nida A. Onciano who was born on
December 13, 1981 at Tondo General Hospital.
-She was raped by her stepfather, Deolito Optana, in September 1993 and on other
several occasions.
-On February 23, 1996, Maria Rizalina delivered a baby boy
-Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 and Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code for rape
RTC:
Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the
same date against the said victim is erroneous as it is illegal, except where the law
itself so allows. Section 5 (b) Republic Act 7610, however, does not so allow. The
said law in fact provides that if the child is below 12 years old, the accused must be
prosecuted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Conversely, if the child is
above 12 years old but below 18 years old, then the accused must be prosecuted
under Republic Act 7610 for the so called "child abuse
SC:
-The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the
RPC in Criminal Case No. 485-95 since it was proved that he raped her in
September, 1993. She was below 12 years old at that time.
-While Maria Rizalina also testified that she was raped several times after
September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed to establish the material details
as to the time, place, and manner by which these offenses were committed. Thus,
the trial court acquitted the accused under Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 48495, 486-95, 488-95, 489-95 for want of sufficient evidence.
-Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she
was molested by the accused for the last time on October 28, 1995. (She was 14
then) Whether there was force and intimidation to qualify this incident as rape was,
unfortunately, not proven. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that Maria Rizalina was
sexually abused by the accused on this occasion. Hence, the trial court convicted
the accused under Criminal Case No. 487-95 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. 7610
or the Child Abuse Law.

PEOPLE VS. ABELLO

Facts: On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 oclock in the early morning, while sleeping
in their house with her sister-in-law and nephew. AAA was suddenly
awakened when his stepfather Abello mashed her breast. The same
situation happened again come July 2, 1998. In these two occasions AAA
was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming from outside which
illuminated the house. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m., Abello this time
placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The latter got awaken when Abello
accidentally kneeled on her right hand. AAA exclaimed Aray forcing the
accused to hurriedly enter his room. He was nevertheless seen by AAA. The
victim on the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother. The
RTC found Abello guilty under the three Information. The CA affirmed Abellos
conviction on appeal but modified the penalties imposed.
Issue: Whether or not, the court a quo erred in not absolving the accused-appellant
of the crime.
Held: We note that both the RTC and CA found AAAs testimony to be positive,
direct, and categorical, while the RTC found the defenses version too
strained to be believed for being contrary to human experience. A material
point we noted is that Abello could not say why AAA would falsely accuse him. The
substance and tenor of the testimony and the element of motivation are critical
points for us since a straightforward, categorical and candid narration by the victim
deserves credence if no ill motive can be shown driving her to falsely testify against
the accused. Our consideration of Abellos defense of denial and his other
arguments lead us to reject them for the following reasons: First, the issue of his
credibility is reduced to a choice between the offended partys positive
testimony and the denial of the accused. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the
mere denial of ones involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the
positive testimony of the offended party. Second, we flatly reject Abellos argument
that his relationship with AAA insulates him from the crimes charged. Our judicial
experience tells us that in handling these types of cases, the
relationship between the offender and the offended party has never been
an obstacle to the commission of the crime against chastity. Third, we find the
claim that AAA could have just dreamed of the incidents complained of, to be
preposterous. In the normal course, a woman will not expose herself to these risks
unless she is certain of what happened and she seeks to obtain justice against the
perpetrator. Based on these considerations and in the absence of clear indications
of errors in giving credence to AAAs testimony, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the RTC and the CA.

Malto vs People
FACTS
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student,
AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the
incident, petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and became
sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship,
AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the
petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During
the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a
professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage
and exert influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce
his student at Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to
indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in
fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain
petitioners conviction and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as
amended and sentenced him to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his
acts were not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III
of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds
that there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by
reason of their sweetheart relationship
HELD
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.

Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element
of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the
accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party.
The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party. Since all
three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art.
III of RA 7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and
consented to have sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of
mutual love and affection. The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness
and rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires proof that the
accused and the victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases
under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens
patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because
of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual
behavior. For this reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to
adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy
under a law which seeks to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination. In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination. [A]s well as to intervene on behalf of the child
when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having care or custody of the child
fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination
or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.

The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies,
consistent with the principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to
promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and
happy life.

Atty. Susan M. Aquino vs. Hon. Ernesto D. AcostaA.M. No. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002
Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the U.S.,
bringing giftsfor the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon
of the same day, heentered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand.
Suddenly, he pulled her towards him andkissed her on her cheek.On December 28,
2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by
phone,saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her
room, shook her hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced
her and kissed her. She wasable to free herself by slightly pushing him away.On the
first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she
couldsee him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant
arrived there,respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his
sexual attempt.Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding
the jurisdiction of the CTA,while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other, respondentsuddenly placed his arms around
her shoulders and kissed her.In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called
complainant, requesting her to go to
hisoffice. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany
her.Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.The last
incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called
complainant andasked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the
CTA. She again requestedRuby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested
that they should act as if they met byaccident in respondents office. Ruby
then approached the secretarys table which was
separatedfrom respondents office by a transparent glass.
For her part, complainant sat in front of respondent's table and asked him what he
wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondentseemed to be at a loss for words
and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something atthe secretary's desk.
Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for and

stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was
looking for and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto
akong gawin sa iyo kahapon pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant
instinctively raised her hands to protect herself but respondent held her arms
tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed himaway, then slumped
on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered hisface
with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a
comfortroom. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note
stating, sorry, it wonthappen again.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment.
Held: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the
charges against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment.
Rationale: A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and
does not fall within the purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section
3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:'Sec. 3.
Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined
Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an
employer, employee, manager, supervisor,agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who,having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or
educationenvironment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual
favor from the other, regardlessof whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of saidAct.a)In a work-related or employment
environment, sexual harassment is committed when:1)The sexual favor is made as
a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individualfavorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the refusal togrant
sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
inanyway would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or
otherwiseadversely affect said employees;2) The above acts would impair the
employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws;or 3) The above acts would
result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for
theemployee.'"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual
harassment are as follows:1)The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent
of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or
moralascendancy over another;2)The authority, influence or moral ascendancy
exists in a working environment;
3)

The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,

instructor, professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or
moral ascendancymakes a demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor.Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent
judge demanded,requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in excha
nge for favorablecompensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges specified
under Section 3 of R.A. 7877. Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of
Judicial Ethics or the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
US vs ANCHETA
Facts: On or about 26 August 1908, four Igorots looking for work passed by Rufino
Anchetas house. He told them they may have a carabao and money in exchange of
killing his uncle Tiburcio Ancheta. Rufino planned the robbing ang killing of Tiburcio.
He instructed them to kill and rob his uncle at night as well as to get the carabao
and php40 from the house and leave the pigs and chicken as well as the black shirt
and bolo. The four agreed to it and Rufino went to Ululing to avoid suspicion of the
killing about to happen. The Igororts having confessed and tried for their crime was
found guilty and Rufino was charged and convicted separately of robbery with
homicide by induction.
Issue: Whether or not Ancheta may be tried and convicted as a principal of the
crime?
Decision: Judgment reveres and Ancheta found guilty of robbery with homicide
and sentenced of death penalty. The fact that he induced the commission of the
crime makes him a principal. The moment the crime is complete as to them, the
one who induced the act becomes a principal and no further participation on his
part is necessary to produce this result.