EVIDENCE: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION

G.R. No. 127240

March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is
when it is "practicable and convenient."
FACTS:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In
1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila
on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in
the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he
had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to
be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended.
Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in 2,
and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the law,
stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for
citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization,
Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing
to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February,
1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for
naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
RTC granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship.
The State, however, through the OSG, appealed all the names
by which he is or had been known (2) failed to state all his
former place of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3)
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of
2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also
in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence.
The following documents were annexed to the States appellate
brief:
1. A copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization
in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner stated that
in addition to his name Ong Chia, he had likewise been

known since childhood as Loreto Chia Ong. As

petitioner, however, failed to state his other name in his
1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that
his petition must fail.
2. Income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973
to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support
himself and his family.
3. A copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a
Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These
documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had
been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil
Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been
living together as husband and wife since 1953 without
the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State,
belies his claim that when he started living with his wife
in 1953, they had already been married.
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this Petition for
Review.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court
erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis
of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not
having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," so
it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered.
SC affirmed the decision of the CA and denied the instant
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion in ruling that in
naturalization cases, the CA can deny an application for Philippine
citizenship on the basis of documents not presented before the trial
court and not forming part of the records of the case.
HELD: NO
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of
the Rules of Court which provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence
(Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization.
The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are

not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final

favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of
the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial
court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity,
effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally
offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the
right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals.
thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN
Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia
under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767
while the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable
and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal.
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial,
and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the
part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet of the Special Committee on
Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767."
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the
authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the
petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the
joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been
executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed
to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may
cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our
conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.

G.R. No. 107383

February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent
Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr.
Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
RTC
declared
private
respondent
Dr.
Martin
the
capital/exclusive owner of the subject documents and papers
and ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken
by her from private respondents clinic without the latters
knowledge and consent.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this
petition.
Petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso
Felix, Jr., this Court ruled that the documents and papers
(marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use
by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
respondent's complaint.
SC denied the petition for review for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the subject documents and papers were admissible
in evidence.
HELD: NO

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix,

Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private respondent, Dr.
Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using
the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice
or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case
amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's
admission as to their genuineness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of
the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of
the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the
documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court
was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this
Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and,
therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents
and papers became effective again.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

G.R. No. 150224

May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
Per Curiam
*This case was decided 3 years before to the Rules on DNA Evidence
took effect.
FACTS:
June 30, 1998 Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers
(Isabel Dawang) house. At 10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel
Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn
stayed. At 12:30 PM, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin, saw
Yatar, who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and
black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing
back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawangs house. Judilyn
didnt find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live
therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the
latter that he would not be getting lumber he had been
gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar was now
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants; and
noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp. Yatar
asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the
former purports to talk with the latter but he immediately left
when Judilyns husband arrived.
In the evening, when Isabel arrived home, she found the lights
were turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and the
containers which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still
empty. Upon ascending to the second floor, she found the door
tied with a rope. When Isabel succeeded opening it with a
knife, she groped in the darkness and felt Kathylyns lifeless
and naked body, with some intestines protruding out from it.
Soon after, the police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and
undergarments beside her body. Amongst others, a white
collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters
away from the house.
Meanwhile, semen was also has been found upon examination
of Kathylyns cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing,
results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen
is identical to Yatars genotype.
RTC sentenced the appellant Yatar to death for the special
complex crime of Rape with Homicide. Hence, this automatic
review.
1st ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred when it gave weight to the
evidence of DNA testing.
HELD: NO
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples
were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in
analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and

procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the

qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically,
the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow, it was ruled that pertinent evidence
based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it
was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed
greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques.
DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the
DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR
analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant
and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
2nd ISSUE: Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
HELD: YES
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found
in the victims vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were
living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim,
Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellants wife left the house
because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the
victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early
morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia
Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing
a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a
dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black

shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pasa was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty
white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the
day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9)
The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the
house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear
and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory
examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and
"J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene
was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J"
and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was
detained but was subsequently apprehended, such flight being
indicative of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a
conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts
on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 155208
March 27, 2007
*
NENA LAZALITA TATING, Petitioner,
vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR
MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
DOCTRINE:
The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary
weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence.
FACTS:
Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating owned a parcel of land located
at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.
October 14, 1969 Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Tating. The contract of
sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over
the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.
However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
December 28, 1977 Daniela executed a sworn statement
claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was

simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the

latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject
property for the purpose of helping her defray her business
expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any
loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the
name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed
to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her
heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who
predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that
when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she
executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they
are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
over the subject property as heirs of Daniela, Nena did not
reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Private respondents filed a complaint with the RTC against
Nena praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT
issued in the name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and
tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.
RTC rendered the document of sale as NULL and VOID.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence,
this Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both
the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was
simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated
December 28, 1977. However, petitioner argues that said
Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the
lower courts considering that Daniela has long been dead
when the document was offered in evidence, thereby denying
petitioner the right to cross-examine her.
SC granted the petition and reversed the decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether both the RTC and CA erred when it gave probative
value to the Sworn Statement of Daniela.
HELD: YES
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn
statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of
evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the
affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.
For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,
unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to

testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA
committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given
probative value on Danielas sworn statement for purposes of
proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was
simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to
sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no
intention of disposing of her property when she executed the
subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant. Aside from
Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to present
any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a
different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner.
G.R. No. 173476
February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
Past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the
Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after
stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was
still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in
order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on their way to the hospital
Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had stabbed
him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at
2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the
stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the
complex at the time.
Salafranca was charged with and tried for murder for the fatal
stabbing of Bolanon.
RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of Murder.
On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC citing the
dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as
his assailant, and Salafrancas positive identification as the
culprit by Mendoza. Hence, this appeal.
SC affirmed the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the utterance of Bolanon is qualified as a dying
declaration or part of the res gestae?
HELD: Both a dying declaration and part of the res gestae

It appears from Estaos testimony that Bolanon had gone to the

residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek help right after being
stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly dressed up to
bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that
on the way to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had
stabbed him, and the latter had told Estao that his assailant had
been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had
seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to
advise him not to talk anymore; and that about ten minutes after
his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had
expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances
qualified the utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration
and as part of the res gestae, considering that the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his
death and right after the hacking incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae
either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence
due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when
the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration
is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his antemortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person
who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound
in the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great
difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the hospital
emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred
under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for
the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death
can be shown by the declarants own statements or from
circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds,
statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician.
Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon
was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae
and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act,
the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res
gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the

assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence,

i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the
taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time
to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His
utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The
statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general
way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations
that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact
as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on
res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime
when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose
to manufacture testimony.
G.R. No. 128538
February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE
INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO
HALILI, respondent.
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative
value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party
failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.
FACTS:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC)
through its chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and
vice president, Pablo Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House Inc., (SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48.
To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private
respondent Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety
Agreement binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the
obligation on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan
when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC,
Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no
payment was made.

 SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and
Halili with the RTC.
In its Answer, SCC asserted that SIHIs lack of cause of action,
contending that the promissory note was null, void and of no
binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a
preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against
it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to
prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the
witness was not established and there was no showing that he
had personal knowledge of the transaction.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Petitioner contends, among others, that SIHI introduced
documentary evidence through the testimony of a witness
whose competence was not established and whose personal
knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified to was not
demonstrated. It argues that the same was in violation of
Sections 36 and 48,Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and it was
manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have ruled
otherwise.
SC affirmed the decision of CA with modification as to the
award of attorneys fees.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed an error of law when it failed to
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to
the hearsay rule contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
HELD: NO
Petitioner's arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed to appear
several times on scheduled hearing dates despite due notice to it
and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing dates, petitioner was
supposed to cross-examine the lone witness offered by SIHI to prove
its case. Petitioner now charges the appellate court with committing
an error of law when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence
of said testimony pursuant to the "hearsay rule" contained in
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided
in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries
no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an
exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence,
then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to

be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that

it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that
the matters testified to by a witness are hearsay. However, the right
to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to
cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to
cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed
to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial
court's finding that petitioner had waived its right to cross-examine
the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to be
raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals
correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness as
he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.