Taiwan Af

1AC

War
China-Taiwan relations will collapse DPP will win
elections and refuse to acknowledge One China
The Economist 15, where the hell is the author,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21646571-chinese-leaders-send-warnings-taiwans-opposition-partyahead-elections-next-year-chinas-bottom

between China and Taiwan, leaders in

Beijing are beginning to warn that tensions will rise again if the
winner of Taiwans next presidential election, in January, fails to
make a clear commitment to the notion that there is only one China.
On March 4th President Xi Jinping said "pro-independence forces" in
Taiwan were the biggest threat to peace in the Taiwan Strait. His remarks
were clearly intended as a warning to Taiwan's independence-leaning Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), which has a good chance of returning to power. Its
AFTER more than seven years of calm relations

leader, Tsai Ing-wen (pictured above), faces a tough choice: anger China, or try to placate it and risk

Taiwan's ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), ousted the DPP in the
island's presidential polls in 2008, it has agreed with China's line that relations between the
two sides should be based on what is often called the "1992 consensus"; namely that both sides
accept there is but one China, while defining that term in their own different ways. Mr Xi said this
accord was a precondition for conducting exchanges with Taiwan." Ms Tsai, however, has not
accepted that there is such a consensus, and has set out her own conditions: ties
appearing weak. Since

with China must benefit Taiwans democratic development, promote regional security and stability, and be
reciprocal and mutually beneficial. A senior DPP official, Joseph Wu, says China's threats are not conducive

KMTs acceptance of the 1992 consensus has played a

critical role in lowering tensions with China and boosting cross-strait
economic ties. Trade volume last year exceeded $198 billion, according to mainland statistics. In
to peace. Much is at stake. The

recent days, Chinese officials have drawn attention to the tenth anniversary on March 14th of the adoption
of an anti-secession law by Chinas parliament. Their message is that China reserves the right to invoke
the bill, which authorises the use of force against Taiwan should China consider that there is no chance of
peaceful unification. Few believe that China would use a DPP victory as a pretext to attack Taiwan, but
many of the islands businesspeople worry that a renewed chill in cross-strait relations could impede trade
and investment flows between the two sides and make it more difficult for Taiwan to sign free-trade
agreements with other countries. China's prime minister, Li Keqiang, in his annual press conference on
March 15th, reasserted the importance of both the "one-China principle" and the 1992 consensus. But he
also promised that "closer attention" would be paid to the interests of Taiwanese investors, and that China
would "continue to pursue preferential policies" towards them. In the last elections, in 2012, the KMT
candidate, President Ma Ying-jeou, appeared to gain an advantage because of voters worries about Ms
Tsais unwillingness to accept the 1992 consensus and the damage that might do to Taiwans relations with
China. Since then, however, fears have grown that some industries might be overwhelmed by competition
from China and jobs might be threatened. A year ago students occupied Taiwans legislative chamber in an
unprecedented protest against a trade deal with China; hundreds of thousands took to the streets in

In municipal elections in November the KMT sufered one of its

worst electoral losses since the party took refuge on the island at the end of the Chinese civil
support.

war in 1949. Voters anxieties about the potential impact of cross-strait economic ties on their livelihoods
may have been a factor. "Accepting

the 1992 consensus before the [next]

election would be political suicide for the DPP ," says George Tsai of the Taiwan
Foundation for Democracy. The KMT is now struggling to remould its image. The hugely unpopular Mr Ma
has resigned as KMT chairman; a charismatic city mayor, Eric Chu, has replaced him. But the party is still
plagued by infighting and has yet to find a presidential candidate. Mr Chu, its best hope, says he does not
want to run. America is probably anxious. It does not want to be seen in Taiwan as interfering in the politics

of a fellow democracy. But America wants the DPP to show it can maintain good ties with China; it does not
want to be sucked into a conflict that might erupt should China lose patience. Mr Xi has shown a little
impatience already. In 2013 he called for a final resolution of political disputes between the two sides.
"These issues cannot be passed on from generation to generation," he said. Taiwanese voters appear
increasingly less convinced.

That makes China-Taiwan war inevitable

Huang 16, Quartz reporter covering China, Hong Kong U with masters degree in Journalism,
http://qz.com/602804/war-with-china-is-inevitable-if-taiwan-keeps-pushing-for-independence-a-chinesegeneral-says/

China is not happy about Taiwans recent election results. With new
president Tsai Ing-Wen winning by a landslide and her Democratic
Progressive Party in control of the legislature, Beijing now faces a
ruling party with a more pro-independence stance although it has long viewed
the self-ruled island as part of Chinese territory. One day after the election, Beijing
stressed its opposition to any form of secessionist activities
seeking Taiwan independence. Last week, an army of Chinese internet users jumped
their countrys Great Firewall to flood Tsais Facebook page with anti-independence messages. But the

a retired Chinese major general, who warns a

war between China and Taiwan is inevitable if Taiwan continues to
seek independence. We have promised that Chinese people will
never fight Chinese people, but if Taiwans separatist forces
continue to press us into a corner, we will be left with no choice but
to seek reunification by force,' wrote Luo Yuan, a retired Peoples Liberation Army
toughest statement yet came from

general in a commentary (link in Chinese) published Monday (Jan. 25) in the nationalistic state tabloid
Global Times. The high-ranking ex-generals prominent essay in a state newspaper is an apparent warning

Luo, 66, now serves as the vice head of China Strategic Culture
Promotion Association, a self-proclaimed civil research group on international and Taiwan
signal to Tsai.

affairs that is government-funded. A rear admiral in Chinas navy, he is best known for his harsh stance on
Chinas territorial disputes with its neighbors. We will respect public opinions, but there are majority and
minority public opinions, Luo says. Taiwans option for unification or independence can only be decided

Luo warned Taiwans

economy will be hurt by independence, citing its trade and tourism
flows from China. Taiwan would have no chance of winning in a war against China, he said,
by the 1.3 billion Chinese people, including Taiwanese people.

comparing the military personnel and weapons of the two sides. Unification means peace and
independence means war, Luo says. This week, Taiwan held military drills on an island it controls just off
the Chinese coast. Back in 1992, Chinas Communist Party reached an agreement with Taiwans Nationalist
(Kuomintang) Party which states that both Taiwan and mainland China acknowledge there is only One
China, but neither side recognizes the others legitimacy. Tsai Ing-Wen said she understands and
respects the agreement after winning the election.

China strike inevitable

Asia Times 15, http://atimes.com/2015/10/taiwan-military-says-china-preparing-for-possibleattack/

China is actively building up its armed forces and they would be

strong enough by 2020 to launch an attack on Taiwan, a military report said
on Tuesday (Oct 27). Despite closer political ties China is "continuing to accumulate
large-scale war capabilities, with the threat of a cross-strait military
TAIPEI:

conflict continuing to exist", according to the island's 2015 National

Defence Report. The mainland's annual military spending has grown
on average by double-digit rates over the past decade, second only
to the United States, it said. The biennial report published by the defence ministry said China
was strengthening its naval and air forces in the region to deter foreign forces from intervening in any
invasion. "China believes foreign interference would be its biggest concern if it attacks Taiwan," it said.
China and Taiwan split at the end of a civil war in 1949. Relations have warmed since current Taiwanese

China still
sees Taiwan as a breakaway territory and refuses to renounce the
use of force should it declare formal independence. The defence ministry said
President Ma Ying-jeou of the China-friendly Kuomintang party came to power in 2008. But

there was a risk of Taiwan letting its guard down because of increased economic and cultural exchanges in
recent years. "Overall (China) is diversifying its Taiwan strategy, forging positive developments in the
cross-strait situation, giving them an advantage for any future attacks on Taiwan," its report said.

Taiwan will elect a new president in January, with the candidate of

the pro-independence opposition Democratic Progressive Party, Tsai
Ing-wen, tipped to win. She has pledged to maintain the status quo if she wins but some
analysts have questioned whether cross-strait peace could be
maintained. The defence ministry report also questioned China's reported military
spending, which it said was significantly understated. The actual budget is estimated
to be two to three times the reported figure, putting it on par with the US and
Russia, it said. The US is Taiwan's main ally and sells weapons to the island, a source of discontent for
China.

China has missiles pointed at Taiwan

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 06 ,
CHINAS MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS iv.

China has over 700 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) stationed

opposite Taiwan; the numbers have been increasing by roughly 100
missiles a year. According to Mark Stokes, these SRBMs are used to deter or
coerce neighbors such as Taiwan. They could also reach U.S. bases in the
region and interrupt U.S. naval operations. China continues to
upgrade its intercontinental ballistic missiles. According to Assistant Secretary
Rodman, these longer-range [missile] systems will reach many areas of
the world beyond the Pacific, including virtually the entire
continental United States.

War escalates due to US miscalc, goes nuclear

Lowther 15, The Diplomat, Director at School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force
Global Strike Command, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-chinaand-america/

the Second Artillery Corps

possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the
United States if fired from Chinas eastern seaboard and an
additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is
In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that

reaching the East Coast home to the nations capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge

China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class

also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will

carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an
American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not
submarines. China may

the quality, of Chinas nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the
question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is
straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike.
As China argues, it has a no-nuclear-first policy which makes its arsenal purely defensive while its other capabilities
such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware
that Chinas investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon,
Washington within reach of the East Wind. While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is
rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find
such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to
blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. Chinas fears are not
unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As
declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use
overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its
positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position
and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict

analysts believe that a conflict over

Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S.
would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its
political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from
intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to
discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted
in its initial eforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the
United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and
attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very
between the United States and China is possible, some

likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regimes relative weakness and the probability that
American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes,
which mingle conventional and nuclear C2,

the Chinese may escalate to the use of a

nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in Chinas self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing deescalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would
occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic
matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This,
in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember
that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of
executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly
have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States far more is at stake for China than it is for the
United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese
soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan.

mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of Chinas

strategic thinking in fact it is explicitly rejected the PRC will see the situation
Given that

very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does

China does have specific goals that are

a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan .
not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However,

Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan
maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to Chinas power projection beyond
the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. Chinas maritime land
reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan.
With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is
greatly diminished. Chinas relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change
dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to
supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view
toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience
that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to Chinas ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of
Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many

Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to

China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to
guarantee them even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it

pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S.
involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and
obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control,

China will likely use the election or statement of

a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action.
and conclude in the Taiwan Straits.

This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui,
ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six

China continues to
expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war
games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced
additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou,

in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery
Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed,
and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact than
many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs
when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their

Unless we give serious thought to possible

scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may
be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to
prevent a catastrophe.
counterparts in the United States.

Arms Sales Plan

Taiwan is pushing for more weapons from the US
Minnick 15,
China's steady acquisition of advanced weaponry has driven
ambitious Taiwanese requirements, including plans to procure
stealth fighters, advanced jet trainers, long-range unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft and main battle tanks. Some requirements are awaiting
sale notification to the US Congress or are still working through the Ministry of National Defense's internal
programming process. Those include: MH-60R naval helicopters. Aircraft-deployed mines, such as the
Quickstrike series. Shipboard electronic warfare system upgrades, such as the SLQ-32. Phalanx close-in
weapon systems. Tactical datalink systems as part of a follow-on to the Po Sheng C4ISR upgrade
program, now more commonly referred to as "Shyun An" or "Xun An." Among the Chinese programs
spurring Taiwan's response are Su-35 fighter aircraft and long-range S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.

Chinese eforts in the South China Sea have also driven

requirements for more ships and submarines, though these will be largely
indigenous build programs.

Thus the plan: The USFG will negotiate with China to

cease all arms transfers to Taiwan in exchange for the
removal of Chinas short-range ballistic and cruise
missiles from within a radius of 1,000 kilometers from
Taiwan.

The plan solves and reduces China-Taiwan tensions

Hickey 09, Dennis V. Hickey is a professor of political science at Missouri State University. China,
The U.S. and Taiwan, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/11/opinion/oe-hickey11

American arms sales to Taiwan hold the potential to jeopardize SinoAmerican relations. But there is a way for Washington to use military arms
to turn this situation into a win-win-win scenario for the U.S., China
and Taiwan. Relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan have improved enormously in the
last year. The two sides have hammered out agreements easing travel and trade restrictions, promoting
tourism and providing for improved postal services and food safety. Beijing has agreed to Taipei's
participation as an observer in the World Health Assembly -- the steering body of the World Health
Organization -- as "Chinese Taipei," while Taipei has junked the quixotic campaign to rejoin the United
Nations. A free-trade pact is on the horizon, and both sides are talking about a peace agreement. Despite

U.S. military support for Taiwan remains the most

sensitive and volatile issue in Sino-American relations. During the 2008 U.S.
these positive trends,

presidential campaign, Obama endorsed the Bush administration's decision to sell $6.5 billion in arms to

Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain called for a more

robust weapons package -- a position embraced by arms merchants
and many of Taipei's friends in Washington. And they are now calling
on the U.S. to sell 66 upgraded F-16 warplanes to Taiwan for up to
$4.9 billion. The Obama administration has yet to decide whether it
Taiwan. But

will approve the contentious sale. The problem is that Beijing would
consider any sale of advanced fighters to Taipei as extremely
provocative, and it is probable that such a deal would lead to an
escalation in tensions with Taiwan. And U.S. military officials have
warned that the sale could also severely strain Sino-American
relations at a time when Washington requires Beijing's support to cope with a host of international
challenges. Obama should not bow to Chinese pressure and scuttle the
idea of F-16 sales. Rather, the warplanes should be used as
bargaining chips. The administration ought to explore the possibility of agreeing to a deal similar
to that proposed by then-President Jiang Zemin to President Bush in 2002. Namely, the U.S. should
agree not to sell advanced fighters to Taiwan in exchange for the
removal of the 1,500 ballistic missiles that China has deployed
directly opposite Taiwan. Such an initiative could yield numerous dividends. For starters, it
is likely that Beijing would seriously consider this proposal, because
removal of the missiles would generate a lot of goodwill among the
Taiwanese people and the weapons could no longer be cited by local
politicians as evidence of Beijing's hostility. In fact, Taiwan has stated
repeatedly that the mainland must either "remove or dismantle" the
missiles as a precondition for any negotiations toward a peace
agreement. In Taiwan, removal of the missiles would provide officials
with tangible evidence that the policy of cooperation and
conciliation with the Chinese mainland is working. The current leaders would
be able to more easily move forward with other measures aimed at rapprochement and enhance their

the move would enable Taiwan to reduce the

level of arms purchases from the United States. Officials in Taipei
acknowledge (and sometimes complain) that they are pressured by
Washington to "do more" to provide for their own defense. But they
note that arms purchases are linked directly to the threat posed by
the mainland. Taiwan's Defense Ministry has conceded that the removal of the
missiles would prompt the island to "make adjustments on military
procurements and research and development." U.S. officials have long
prospects for reelection. Moreover,

emphasized that arms sales to Taiwan can serve as a stabilizing factor in East Asian affairs. In this
instance, approval of the high-profile F-16 sale would jeopardize relations with Beijing, undermine core

the
prospect of dropping such sales as a bargaining chip to persuade
China to remove the missiles, it would help reduce cross-strait
tensions, pave the way for closer Sino-American relations and
promote peace and stability in the western Pacific. The choice should be
American interests and help spark an arms race across the Taiwan Strait. But if Washington uses

obvious.

F-35
Taiwan wants F-35s, China also reacts strongly against
arms sales
Taipei Times 11, Sep 20, Taiwan plans to request F-35s from US,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/09/20/2003513701/2

Taiwan would be pleased if the US has indeed agreed to help upgrade its fleet
of F-16A/B aircraft and plans to move toward selling it the even more
sophisticated F-35 model at some point, Deputy Minister of National
Defense Andrew Yang () said in Richmond, Virginia, on Sunday. The retrofit of
the F-16A/B fleet is part of Taiwans national defense policy. It would
be great if the US approves the deal, Yang said on the sidelines of
this years US-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, to which he led a
Taiwanese delegation. The administration of US President Barack Obama has
reportedly decided to sell Taiwan a US$4.2 billion arms package that
would include an upgrade to Taiwans F-16A/B fleet, but not the more
advanced F-16C/Ds Taipei is eager to acquire. Two US congressional aides told reporters that the US
Department of State gave a briefing on Capitol Hill on its decision on Friday, but has yet to issue a formal
notification of the intended sale. An announcement on the sale is expected by the end of this month. Yang
said Taiwan and the US have consistently addressed security issues in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act. Arms procurements should follow the prescribed procedures, Yang said, adding that the US
decision to offer Taiwan the F-16A/B upgrade package might not necessarily imply it had rejected the F16C/D deal. Noting that the F-16A/B upgrade and the F-16C/D procurement are two separate matters, Yang
said Taiwan had not received any -formal notification that the US had decided against the F-16C/D deal. In
Taipei, Minister of National Defense Kao Hua-chu () yesterday also denied the US would not offer the
F-16C/Ds as part of a new arms package, adding that he had not received any official information to that
effect. Kao said the deal had not yet been finalized and that Taiwan had not been notified. The F-16A/B is a
high-performance aircraft with all sorts of combat equipment and functions and the fleet would be able to
perform even better after a mid-life upgrade, Yang said. There were no immediate details on the package
of upgrades the US is providing for the F-16A/Bs. However, even if it includes sophisticated radar, avionics
and missile systems, Taiwans air force will still lag far behind its Chinese counterpart, defense analysts
say. A Pentagon report issued last year painted a grim picture of Taiwans air defense capabilities, saying
many of its 400 combat aircraft would not be available to help withstand an attack from China. Wang Kaocheng (), a military expert at Tamkang University, said Taiwans air defenses would get a lift from the
upgrade, but that the country is still at a profound disadvantage compared with Beijing in the number of
third-generation warplanes it has at its disposal. Taiwan has fallen behind in air superiority as of now, not
to mention the fact that China is developing fourth-generation stealth fighters, which could be very
powerful, Wang said. The upgrade program will not fill the vacuum left over by the absence of the F16C/Ds. Asked whether a possible setback in the attempt to buy F-16C/Ds reflected a US change in its
policy toward Taiwan following its increasing reliance on Beijing in recent years, Yang said he did not think
the US would take sides. The Taiwanese government remains confident of US neutrality in dealing with

As to whether Taiwan would procure a nextgeneration aircraft such as the F-35, Yang said Taiwan would
definitely move in that direction. Any arms deal will be based on
Taiwans defense needs and ultimate goals as well as Washingtons
assessment of the overall situation, Yang said. For our part, we would not pass up any
cross-strait issues, he said.

available options, he said. Yang is scheduled to meet US officials in Washington after the defense industry
conference ends. The China Daily yesterday warned on its front page that an arms sale would spark

a senior researcher at
Tsinghua University in Beijing, as saying the [arms sale] hurts
Chinas core interests. And to keep on doing the wrong thing for 30 years just doesnt make it
right. In an editorial on Saturday, the Global Times warned that
Beijing should not limit its focus on the US when threatening
strong reaction. The article quoted Tao Wenzhao (),

retaliation over arms sales to Taiwan, but Taipei as well. The

mainland [China] should not sit idly by concerning this protection
money paid by Taiwan. Instead, it should remind Taipei that such an
investment will bring only disaster, it said. Beijing used to seek
revenge on Washington after arms sales to Taiwan. This time, it should also
include Taipei as Beijing has more leverage on the island. Beijing should notify Washington and Taipei in
advance of the fateful consequences of a new arms sale, it said, adding that pressuring Taipei would
produce better results than directly confronting Washington. In 1994, Turkey threatened Greek Cypriots
that it would destroy any missiles imported from Greece and installed in areas controlled by Greek
Cypriots. This worked well, the editorial said. The mainland has never taken such a stance against Taiwan
for fear that it might be going too far. However, Beijing should no longer rule out such measures any more
if it wants to prevent the island from overstepping the line.

Kills Taiwanese econ, also F-35 wouldnt give Taiwan a

military advantage
Butts and McKinney 16, April 4, The National Interest, What Would China Do if America
Sold Taiwan F-35s?, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-would-china-do-if-america-sold-taiwan-f-35s15667

if the United States decides to sell its new F-35

Lightning II fighter to Taiwan? The fictionalized scenario below, based on a careful analysis
What would happen

of the Chinese leadership, attempts to answer that question. March 2, 2017: A Taiwanese fighter jet on a

In
response, the Republic of China Air Force, which for some time has
been asking for upgraded planes, presses for a new arms package
from America. Despite promising to maintain peace and stability in
cross-Strait relations a little over a year ago in her victory speech,
Tsai Ing-Wen, Taiwans president, is faced with growing pressure to
respond strongly. A concerned Legislative Yuan authorizes major
defense budget increases (overcoming budget difficulties) aimed at
acquiring the F-35. Eager to signal that the rebalance she spearheaded in the Obama
routine patrol collides with a Chinese drone and crashes into the South China Sea; the pilot is killed.

administration is returning in full force, newly elected president Hillary Clinton (following the advice of

The sale is
made, despite severe protestations from Beijing. How is a humiliated
China likely to respond? President Xi assembles his National Security
Commission (NSC) and asks for options. Exasperated with the United
States for so publically rejecting his ofer of a new type of great
power relations, he says he wants to impose costs on Taiwan and
America for their destabilizing actions. Liu He, Xis principal economic advisor and
hawkish media commentators) directs the Defense Department to sell Taipei fifty F-35s.

vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, replies that the Sino-American
economic relationship is too important to risk over arms sales to Taiwan, which have occurred before.
Moreover, even unofficial aggression, such as the incident with the young singer during the election in

Liu
outlines a series of policies. First, he says, drastically cut mainland
tourism to Taiwan. Currently, he explains, around four million (or 40
percent) of all tourists visiting Taiwan come from mainland China.
Second, go after Taiwanese business elitesa powerful electoral
constituencyby hinting in meetings that Taiwanese exports will be
curtailed. (Currently, such exports to mainland China make up more
than a quarter of all Taiwanese exports.) We can restrain market
access to China for DPP-friendly companies in Taiwan, particularly
Taiwan, can strengthen the voices for independence. Our response, therefore, should be subtle.

those with ties to Japan and America, by instructing the Ministry of

Commerce to use the new anti-monopoly law to the fullest extent.
Wang Qishan, the Partys anti-corruption czar, chimes in: We should
also pay special attention to the estimated one million Taiwanese
living on the mainland and initiate disciplinary investigations against
any two-faced entrepreneurs who benefit from Chinese trade while
supporting independence. Xis chief of staff and director of the General Office, Li Zhanshu,
sums up the objective of these economic actions: halt both official and unofficial cross-Strait dialogue to
punish Tsai Ing-wen, and incentivize Taiwans business elites and even ordinary entrepreneurs to work to
restore positive and peaceful cross-Strait relations. Nodding in consent, Xi agrees to this plan of action.

Air Force General and vice chairman

of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Qiliang speaks up. These
fighters do not fundamentally change the military balance. We
already cover Taiwan with S-400 ground to air missiles and as long as the
Americans remain uninvolved in any dispute, we will retain total air dominance
despite the new fighters. Exactly, breaks in Wang Huning, Xis chief ideologue and a
But what about military options? he inquires.

confidant of the last three Chinese presidents. Furthermore, if we respond too aggressively to the sale of
the fighters, we could strengthen pro-independence rebels in Taiwan and undermine the peaceful nature of
the China dream. Looking directly at the two CMC vice chairmen, Wang declaims: There should be no
missiles fired into the ocean like in previous crises, and no independent military response. Instead, as in
the economic sphere, Chinas response should be shrewder.

Cybersecurity and arming Iran

Butts and McKinney 16
We should begin by approaching the twenty-one states that currently recognize Taiwanespecially in
Oceania and Latin Americaand initiate negotiations to switch their recognition to mainland China, Wang
says. As you know, we have shelved these issues for some time, but we now need to further isolate and
pressure Taiwan on the global stage. The first step is to start a charm offensive incentivizing these states
to recognize that there is only one China. We should also instruct the United Work Front Department to

Cai Qi, Li Zhanshus

deputy in the NSC, has been waiting patiently as one of the most
junior advisors present. But Xi now calls on him for advice. A
whitewashed crow soon shows itself black again, he answers, citing an old Chinese saying. The sale
of F-35s blatantly violates the 1982 Joint Communiqu in which the
U.S. promised to gradually reduce its weapons sales to Taiwan. We
should respond by ceasing to cooperate with the Americans on
cybersecurity, and accelerate our covert eforts to infiltrate
American critical infrastructure and acquire American trade secrets.
reach out to our KMT contacts and make clear that F-35s cross a line.

If they dont live by their word, why should we live by ours? Fan Changlong, the other vice chairman of the
CMC, shakes his head angrily. Not satisfied with the subtle response, he says: Why dont you recognize
that we are now in a direct rivalry with the United States? This is just the latest of their tricks, alongside
the Belgrade embassy bombing, their support of Tibetan revolutionaries and militarization of South China

They are slowly encircling us, just as they are Russia through
NATO expansion. We should have a firmer response: for example,
selling ballistic missiles to Iran. That would send a strong signal to
the Americans. Li Zhanshu, well-versed in managing both
diplomatic and military afairs, quickly responds that UN Security
Resolutions prohibit such a sale, at least until the final sanctions
directed against Iran are lifted. If this happens as scheduled in 2023,
Sea.

China could sell DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles to Iran. This

weapon system would allow the Iranians to deter U.S. aircraft
carriers aggressively stationed in Bahrain, significantly upgrading
Irans anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The agreement,
which would be made in secret, could be in exchange for Iranian oil
looking to enter Chinas increasingly energy-dependent market. In
the meantime, he suggests, China should finalize its deal to sell 150
J-10 fighters to Iran. Sensing consensus among his advisors, Xi breaks up the meeting but asks
Wang and Li to stay back. He instructs Li to implement the economic and political sanctions against Taiwan
and to impose costs on the U.S. through the specified cyber and arms-sales options. However, he

Chinas longerterm plans to resist Americas containment of China, specifically

diversifying Chinas economic base by increasing trade with Eurasian
countries, modernizing the PLA to challenge U.S. primacy in East
Asia, and seeking closer relationships with other great powers
mistreated by America. So, we will respond to Americas aggressive
actions by hurting Taiwan economically and politically. We will
impose costs on the U.S. by ending cyber cooperation, increasing
our infiltration of U.S. critical infrastructure, and by signing an arms
deal with Iran. How is America likely to respond to these actions? Xi
asks his two closest advisors. Li Zhanshu responds first: We are
already excluded from the TPP, and the U.S. has recently announced
increased cooperation with the Philippines in building up its A2/AD
capabilities. The Americans are likely to continue to interfere in regional affairs and Chinas
emphasizes that these responses are really just tactical, and must be reinforced by

domestic policies even if we do not react to the sale of F-35s. Furthermore, they continue to violate their
free-market rhetoric by disadvantaging Chinese investment in America. Wang Huning agrees, but
cautions the younger Li: That may be, but if we do not tread carefully we might further American
containment. Remember, there is growing dissatisfaction in Washington with U.S. engagement policy. Right
now we still enjoy a window of strategic opportunity. Following our agreement to UN sanctions against
North Korea, South Korea and the United States shelved THAAD deployment. This might be brought up
again, as would potential tariffs or technology controlsor the United States could leak its success in the
recent cyber infiltration of the PLAs Strategic Rocket force, which would be a national embarrassment.

Relations Adv.
US arms sales to Taiwan harm China relations which are
on the brink
Associated Press 10, Foster Klug and Robert Burns in Washington, Charles Hutzler and
Gillian Wong in Beijing, and Annie Huang in Taipei contributed to this report. China: Taiwan arms sales harm
national interest, http://www.dailyrepublic.com/archives/china-taiwan-arms-sales-harm-national-interest/

Chinas foreign minister warned that U.S. plans to sell $6.4 billion
of arms to Taiwan will harm Chinese eforts to unify peacefully with the
island, the ministry said today, after China suspended U.S. military exchanges and threatened
unprecedented sanctions against American defense companies. Foreign Minister
BEIJING

Yang Jiechi said the planned weapons sales to self-governing Taiwan, which Beijing claims as its territory,
were a crude interference in Chinas internal affairs and would hurt its national security.

Beijings strong response to Fridays U.S. announcement of the weapons sales, while not
entirely unexpected, was swift and indicated that it plans to put up a greater
challenge than usual as it deals with the most sensitive topic in U.S.-China relations.
This is the strongest reaction weve seen so far in recent years ,
said Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, northeast Asia project director for the International Crisis Group.
China is really looking to see what kind of reaction its going to receive from President Barack

Chinas Defense Ministry said the arms sales would cause

severe harm to overall U.S.-China cooperation. Vice ministerial-level talks on
Obama, she said.

arms control and strategic security were postponed. Defense Ministry spokesman Huang Xueping said the
Chinese military would fight any move to hurt the countrys sovereignty. We will never give in or
compromise in this issue, Huang said in a statement. In comments made during a visit to Cyprus on
Saturday, Foreign Minister Yang urged Washington to respect Chinas interests and revoke the arms sale
decision immediately to avoid undermining bilateral relations, the Foreign Ministry said. He said the U.S.
sales jeopardized Chinas national security and Chinas peaceful reunification efforts. The warning
came as the U.S. seeks Beijings help on issues including the global financial crisis and nuclear standoffs in

Tensions were already high after recent U.S.

comments on Internet freedom and a dispute between Google and
China, as well as Obamas plan to meet with Tibetan spiritual leader
the Dalai Lama this year. Chinas Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei told U.S. Ambassador Jon
North Korea and Iran.

Huntsman that the sales of Black Hawk helicopters, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missiles and other
weapons to Taiwan would cause consequences that both sides are unwilling to see, the ministry

The ministry also threatened sanctions against U.S. companies

involved in the arms sales, which hasnt happened in past sales to
Taiwan. Our action regarding Taiwan reinforces our commitment to stability in the region, U.S.
said.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said in Washington on Saturday. We know China has a
different view. Given our broad relationship with China, we will manage this issue as we have in the
past. The United States is Taiwans most important ally and largest arms supplier, and its bound by law

China responds angrily to any

proposed arms sales, however, and it also cut of military ties with
the U.S. in 2008 after the former Bush administration announced a multibillion-dollar arms sale to
to ensure the island is able to respond to Chinese threats.

Taiwan. A similar cutoff of military ties was expected this time, but it comes as Washington and Beijing
wanted to improve normally frosty relations between their armed forces. The U.S. has tried to use military
visits to build trust with Beijing and learn more about the aims of its massive military buildup. In the
past, these kinds of suspensions have lasted for three to six months, with some parts of the military-tomilitary relationship suspended beyond that, said Phillip Saunders, a distinguished research fellow at
the National Defense University in Washington. I expect something similar this time. Its not known
whether the arms sale will affect President Hu Jintaos expected visit to the U.S. this year or a summit on
nuclear safety in the U.S. this spring. Experts on China warned Beijing could take further steps to punish

The latest
suspension of military ties should afect planned visits to China by
the United States to show its newfound power and confidence in world affairs.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Michael Mullen,

the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staf. A visit to the U.S. by
the Chinese militarys chief of the general staf, Gen. Chen Bingde,
could also be called of. The U.S. Congress has 30 days to comment on the newest arms sales
before the plan goes forward. Lawmakers traditionally have supported such sales. Though Taiwans ties
with China have warmed considerably since Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou took office 20 months ago,
Beijing has threatened to invade if the island ever formalizes its de facto independence. China has more
than 1,000 ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Ma told reporters Saturday that the deal should not anger the
mainland because the weapons are defensive, not offensive.

US-China cooperation solves global threats

Fingar & Garrett 13, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, China-US
Cooperation: Key to the Global Future, http://cusef.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/05_eng.pdf

The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain.

The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of
technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth
of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond
the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all
countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and

Global
challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and
resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and
certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune.

require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of
national leaders to control their countrys destiny .

What China and the United States

do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the
global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future
plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the
future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the
world. Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to
resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn
inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an
unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The
international communitys lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international
crises and instability. Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum
competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and
internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major
powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an each nation for itself mentality
that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges.

To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum

competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and
take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve winwin outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased
demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to
harness new technologies to improve living conditions through
sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to
prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United
States become more prosperous as we work together.
Global Revitalization and Cooperation:

US-China Relations solve laundry list of impacts: Asian

stability, NoKo War, India War, and Japan
Brzezinski 13 [Zbigniew Brzezinski, an American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman
who served as a counselor to Lyndon B. Johnson from 19661968 . The US-China relationship is vital to
global stability. Good thing it isn't doomed, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/GlobalViewpoint/2013/0218/The-US-China-relationship-is-vital-to-global-stability.-Good-thing-it-isn-t-doomed,
February 13th, 2013//Rahul]

agitation regarding the potential Chinese military threat to

America ignores the benefits that the US also derives from its very
favorable geostrategic location on the open shores of two great oceans as well as from its
trans-oceanic allies on all sides. In contrast, China is geographically encircled by not
always friendly states and has very few if any allies . On occasion, some of
Simplistic

Chinas neighbors are tempted by this circumstance to draw America into support of their specific claims

Fortunately, there are some signs that a

consensus is emerging that such threats should not be resolved
unilaterally or militarily, but through negotiation. Matters have been not helped
or conflicts of interest against China.

by the American medias characterization of the Obama administrations relative rebalancing of focus
toward Asia as a pivot a word never used by the president with military connotations. In fact, the new
effort was only meant to be a constructive reaffirmation of the unchanged reality that the US is both a

the real threat to a stable

US-China relationship does not currently arise from any hostile
intentions on the part of either country, but from the disturbing
possibility that a revitalized Asia may slide into the kind of
nationalistic fervor that precipitated conflicts in 20th-century Europe
over resources, territory, or power. There are plenty of potential flash points: North
Korea vs. South Korea, China vs. Japan, China vs. India, or India vs.
Pakistan. The danger is that if governments incite or allow nationalistic fervor as a kind of safety valve
it can spin out of control. In such a potentially explosive context, US political and economic
involvement in Asia can be a crucially needed stabilizing factor. Indeed,
Pacific and Atlantic power. Taking all these factors into account,

Americas current role in Asia should be analogous to Great Britains role in 19th-century Europe as a
constructive off-shore balancing influence with no entanglements in the regions rivalries and no attempt
to attain domination over the region. To be effective, constructive and strategically sensitive engagement
in Asia by the US must not be based solely on its existing alliances with democratic Japan and South Korea
which is in Chinas interests because of its stabilizing impact. Engagement must also
mean institutionalizing American and Chinese cooperation. Accordingly, America and China should very

Mutual engagement
bilaterally and multilaterally and not reciprocal exclusion is what
is needed. For example, the US ought not seek a trans-Pacific
partnership without China, and China should not seek a Regional Comprehensive
deliberatively not let their economic competition turn into political hostility.

Economic Pact without the US. History can avoid repeating the calamitous conflicts of the 20th century if
America is present in Asia as stabilizer not a would-be policeman and if China becomes the preeminent,
but not domineering, power in the region. In January 2011, President Obama and now-departing Chinese
President Hu Jintao met and issued a communiqu boldly detailing joint undertakings and proposing to

build a historically unprecedented partnership between America and

China. With Mr. Obama now re-elected and Communist Party chief Xi Jinping preparing to take over
Chinas presidency in March, the two leaders should meet to revalidate and re-energize
the US-China relationship. Whether this relationship is vital and
robust, or weak and full of suspicion, will afect the whole world.

Economic engagement
Economic engagement refers to eforts to change the
behavior of the target state
Celik 11, Prof., International Studies, Uppsala U. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT
POLICIES, 2011, 11.

Economic engagement policies are strategic integration behavior which

involves with the target state. Engagement policies differ from other tools in
Economic Diplomacy. They target to deepen the economic relations to
create economic intersection, interconnectedness, and mutual
dependence and finally seeks economic interdependence. This
interdependence serves the sender state to change the political
behavior of the target state.

Economic engagement includes many things

Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
WHAT IS TOTAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT?, Jan. 17, 2009. Retrieved Jan. 9, 2013 from http://20012009.state.gov/e/eeb/92986.htm.

Total Economic Engagement seeks to integrate and coordinate all U.S.

economic instruments and programs into our regional and country strategies.
The Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) broad
crosssection of economic disciplines, interagency contacts, and expertise in
such areas as trade, finance, energy, development, transportation, and
telecommunications help ensure this coordination.

Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State, WHAT IS TOTAL ECONOMIC
ENGAGEMENT?, Jan. 17, 2009. Retrieved Jan. 9, 2013 from http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/92986.htm.

An accurate accounting of a nations total engagement must include

economic policies as well as, trade, remittances, and foreign direct
investment. In these areas, the U.S. leads the world in total economic
engagement with the developing world. The private donations of American
citizens, military emergency aid and peacekeeping and government
assistance provide the primary sources for development financing.

China Taiwan
Taiwan is a part of China, One-China Principle and multiple
treaties prove
Taiwan Afairs Office 00, and the Information Office of the State Council,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/sums/timeline_docs/CSI_20000221.htm

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. All the facts and laws about
Taiwan prove that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory .
In April 1895, through a war of aggression against China, Japan forced the
Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and forcibly
occupied Taiwan. In July 1937, Japan launched an all-out war of aggression
against China. In December 1941, the Chinese government issued the
Proclamation of China's Declaration of War Against Japan ,
announcing to the world that all treaties, agreements and contracts
concerning Sino-Japanese relations, including the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, had been abrogated, and that China would recover
Taiwan. In December 1943, the Cairo Declaration was issued by the
Chinese, U.S. and British governments, stipulating that Japan should
return to China all the territories it had stolen from the Chinese,
including Northeast China, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago. The
Potsdam Proclamation signed by China, the United States and
Britain in 1945 (later adhered to by the Soviet Union) stipulated that
"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In August
of that year, Japan declared surrender and promised in its
instrument of surrender that it would faithfully fulfill the obligations
laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. On October 25, 1945, the
Chinese government recovered Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago,
resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. On October 1, 1949,
the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the
government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of
the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena,
thereby bringing the historical status of the Republic of China to an end. This
is a replacement of the old regime by a new one in a situation where the
main bodies of the same international laws have not changed and China's
sovereignty and inherent territory have not changed therefrom, and so the
government of the PRC naturally should fully enjoy and exercise China's
sovereignty, including its sovereignty over Taiwan. Since the KMT ruling
clique retreated to Taiwan, although its regime has continued to use
the designations "Republic of China" and "government of the
Republic of China," it has long since completely forfeited its right to
exercise state sovereignty on behalf of China and, in reality, has
always remained only a local authority in Chinese territory. The
formulation of the One-China Principle and its basic meaning. On the day of
its founding, the Central People's Government of the PRC declared to
governments of all countries in the world, "This government is the sole

legitimate government representing the entire people of the People's

Republic of China.

Taiwan is politically China

Mattlin
In this vein, Jacobs clearly dislikes references to the Chinese origins of various
Taiwanese political structures and practices. Instead, he argues that Taiwan
today has undergone cultural change and that people on the island today feel
that they have a Taiwanese identity. I do not dispute this assertion. However,
this statement misses the point. Nowhere do I claim that people on the island
today still feel Chinese in terms of political identity. When I refer to Taiwans
enduring Chinese legacy, it is in three senses: (1) the KMT political
and party systems originated on the mainland, (2) the modes of
political competition bear the legacy of earlier political struggles on
the mainland, and (3) Taiwans political culture is still afected by
features associated with Chinese culture.

Taiwan is its own sovereign state, I law proves

Jacobs 09, Professor of Asian Languages and Studies, received his AB., MA and PhD degrees from
Columbia University in the United States, A Longitudinal Examination toward Understanding What
Constitutes a Healthy Approach to Balance in the Taiwan Strait p.22-23

According to international law

Convention on Rights and Duties of States, signed at
Montevideo on December 26, 1933, Taiwan clearly meets the four criteria of
sovereignty: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter
into relations with other states. In addition, Article 3 of the Convention makes
clear that the political existence of the state is independent of
recognition by other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its
Underlying this concern is the issue of Taiwans sovereignty.
established as a result of the

integrity and independence.24 Unfortunately, over the years and during his presidency Ma seems to have

presidential campaign,
Ma stated clearly that Taiwan, which he sometimes called the ROC, is a sovereign
country. In his inauguration speech, however, he stated, the keystone for a final solution to the crossshifted ground several times on the issue of Taiwans sovereignty. During his

strait problem is not in a conflict over sovereignty, but in ways of life and core values.25 A year later, in a
press conference on May 19, 2009, President Ma stated that the sovereignty of the ROC belongs to the
people. Ma further said, Taiwan is the ROCWe should clear this up from a historical and constitutional
viewpoint. The public must not be confused into thinking Taiwans sovereignty is undefined.26
Unfortunately, his presidential spokesman then modified this statement by adding a Chinese character
that changed the meaning to Taiwan is part of the Republic of China.27

Misc.

Export Control Plan

The USFG will ban the export of defense-related systems
integration software, high-resolution commercial imagery
technologies, commercial sensor and laser technologies,
and commercially applicable guidance and navigation
technologies to China.
Export control solves China military aggression against
Taiwan
Segal 04, CFR, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies and Director of the Digital and
Cyberspace Policy Program, http://www.cfr.org/china/practical-engagement-drawing-fine-line-us-chinatrade/p7063

A successful export control policy will focus on how the Chinese

military may use any dual-use technology acquired from the United
States as well as whether the use of this technology would have any significant impact on the military outcome of a
possible conflict. For example, does the import of microprocessors from U.S. companies enable the PLA to develop military

United
States is most concerned with military technologies that could
significantly improve Chinas ability to coerce Taiwan into
negotiating with the main-land on Beijings terms and, more generally, improve the
capabilities that would otherwise be beyond its reach within a limited time period?19 Currently, the

PLAs limited power-projection capabilities in maritime East Asia, which might allow Beijing to seize and hold disputed

As a
result, beyond the embargo on sales of all military items, lethal and nonlethal, on the U.S. Munitions List imposed
after the Tiananmen Square massacre, U.S. policy should try to prevent the export to
China of dual-use technologies that would aid the PLA in four
categories: battle-space awareness, precision-strike munitions,
command and control of joint military operations, and information
warfare.20 All four of these categories are tightly tied to Chinas
possible desire to launch a rapid, coordinated air-and-missile attack
on Taiwanese command-and-control facilities, military air bases, and
naval facilities as well as key leadership targets on the island a
coercive use of force that some believe to be the most likely conflict
scenario across the Taiwan Strait.21 Greater battle-space awareness
could increase the PLAs certainty of the location of its own and enemy
troops, as well as those troops current and upcoming activities.
With precision-guided munitions, Beijing could hope to destroy
leadership or high-value military targets accurately, quickly, and
with a minimum of civilian casualties. Efective joint operations
could en-sure that the PLA Navy, Air Force, and missile forces
(Second Artillery) would all work together seamlessly, creating a
more deadly attack. Finally, information-warfare capabilities might
allow the PLA to degrade Taiwans (and possibly the United States)
own battle-space awareness and perhaps even create civil chaos in
Taiwan. To limit these four capabilities, only a small number of
territories against regional forces as well as deter or complicate a U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan.

specific technologies should be controlled, including defense-related

systems integration techniques and software, the high-resolution
commercial imagery technologies needed for reconnaissance
satellites, commercial sensor and laser technologies, and
commercially applicable guidance and navigation technologies. U.S.
export control policy is likely to be relatively efective in each of
these areas because the technology is militarily significant and the
United States has unique technological capabilities in each of these
systems or is able to build multilateral support for control. As a key
component in battlefield awareness, systems integration techniques
could substantially increase Chinas ability to launch an attack on
Taiwan. In commercial sectors, systems integration might create a new product or process by integrating software
and hardware. On the battlefield, these techniques allow commanders to integrate hundreds of various communication,

The PLAs
capabilities in systems integration are currently weak, with only
minor successes in linking various components into a single
product.22 Because the field is dominated by established defense
contractors such as Lockheed Martin and a few defense-oriented
start-up companies, not commercial IT producers, keeping network
and core systems integration software out of the hands of the
Chinese military is a realistic goal.23 The ability to buy high-resolution satellite imagery from
computer, and personnel management systems to produce new and more deadly combat capabilities.

private companies has essentially leveled the playing field in certain aspects of image-based intelligence. China or any
other state or nonstate actor can currently purchase 1-meter resolution images from vendors in a few countries, including
Russia and India. In any war-fighting scenario, however, timeliness remains an issue, as the PLA would want access to
images as quickly as possible.24 Being denied advanced imagery technology will perpetuate Chinas dependence on
foreign suppliers and leave Beijing vulnerable to the type of counterintelligence used by the United States in Operation
Enduring Freedom. During that campaign, the United States paid millions of dollars to a commercial firm Space Imaging
for exclusive rights to photographs taken above the war zone, primarily to deny Al Qaeda the ability to monitor U.S.
troop move-ments.25 Without dedicated high-resolution imaging systems of its own, China faces the risk of either
battlefield blindness during any operation or reliance on its own lower-resolution imaging satellites. Sensors are an
integral part of network-centric warfare, because they can detect individual vehicles, ships, or aircraft well beyond visual
range and also provide targeting information on a near real-time basis. Many of these sensors are commercial, off-theshelf items that have a small likelihood of being controlled effectively, but the United States maintains a technological

Export control policy should be

concentrated on precisely these areas.26 Lasers, which the PLA could use to improve its
lead in sensor input as well as in the creation of network nodes.

own targeting and to confuse the targeting of U.S. precision-guided munitions, should also be controlled, but the United
States will have limited impact on most of these technologies. China is developing its own indigenous laser capabilities
that it can use for targeting or target interference.27 More sophisticated lasers used for directed-energy weapons and
space-object tracking will not be widely avail-able outside of the United States in the next 10 years and thus are more
susceptible to control.

Unauthorized US exports contribute to Chinas military

modernization
Brauner 15, Western Arms Exports to China p.7-8, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 43, independent
international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 199596 Taiwan Strait crisis, the maintenance of US
restrictions on exports to China has been driven by a broader set of considerations related to the potential
threat posed by Chinas military modernization and its implications for the USAs power-projection
capabilities, particularly in the western Pacific Ocean.32 These concerns are shared by all security-related
branches of the US Government and remain prominent in US thinking. A recent report by the US
Department of Defense (DOD) and the US Department of State argued that Chinas military could be put
to use in ways that increase Chinas ability to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favour,
and possibly against US national security interests.33

According to the US DOD, Chinas

sustained process of military modernization is supported by ongoing

eforts to gain access to military-relevant technologies from the
USA, including through civilian front companies and economic
espionage.34 Seeking to limit Chinas access to these technologies is a key rationale for the USAs
continued application of export control restrictions on China. Key concerns for the USA
include Chinas improving capabilities in access denial including
short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles , land-attack
and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military
cyberspace capabilitiesas well as long-range strike and power
projection.35 In recent years, Chinas development of weapons
capable of targeting space-based assets has been a particular
concern for the USA. A 2012 US intelligence assessment mapped the
vulnerability of the US militarys space-based assets to disruption by
Chinese military satellites, missiles and ground-based jamming
techniques.36 While exports of dual-use items on the CCL are not
covered by the US arms embargo, additional controls apply to certain exports of CCL
items. For example, since the late 1990s the USA has maintained strict controls on exports of

a US Congressional Committee report

on Chinas attempts to acquire military technology from the USA (the
so-called Cox Report) concluded that unauthorized transfers of satelliterelated technologies had allegedly helped Chinese missile
programmes (although many of the reports findings, including on the extent to which the Chinese
satelliterelated technologies to China. In 1998

military benefitted from any transfers of technology, have since been challenged).37 In response, the USA
banned both the export of satellite technologies to China and the launch of US satellites in China.38 In
2007 the USA also introduced a set of stricter controls on exports of CCL items to China under the so-called
China Rule.39 In particular, exports of 20 categories of CCL items became subject to additional licensing
requirements if they are, or may be intended for, military end-use in China.40 Requirements for end-user
certificates (EUCs) were also expanded.41 In particular, exporters of most CCL items to China must obtain
an EUC issued by Chinas Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), regardless of the end-user.42