Frondarina v.

Malazarte
Facts:
The property in question in this
case is Lot 5 which was acquired
by Flordelina
Santos
from
Iluminado Amar and was thereafter
acquired by Cirila Gongora. Cirila G
ongora, sister of Frondarina, filed a
Miscellaneous Sales Application
with the Bureau of Lands.
Said disputed land was declared in
Gongora's name for purposes of
tax declaration and she also paid
the real estate taxes on said
property for years.
Frondarina obtained the disputed
lot from her sister thereafter as
evidenced by a Waiver of Rights to
the parcel of land.
Frondarina declared the lot in her
name for taxation purposes and
paid the real estate taxes on such
property for years. She also had
the lot surveyed and fenced it with
4 strands of barbed wire and tended
2 mango and 1 coconut tree on the lot.
Malazartes here came into the
picture and out of no where alleged
thatthey
bought the said lot from Romeo
Valencia and that they have been
residing on the lot since 1988.
On the sad date, they immediately
started construction of their house
on the lot without a building permit

because their application to build

was notgranted
due
to
the
complaint filed by Frondarina.
o
To
support
their
claim,
they presented
their
caretaker,
Lorenza Andrada to testify in their
favor.
The MTCC ruled in favor of the
Frondarinas
who
have
sufficiently established their cause
of action against the Malazartes.
But this was overturned by the RTC
who
stated
that
the
Malazartes were in actual and physi
cal possession of the lot through th
eirpredecessor in interest Romeo
Valencia.
The RTC anchored their decision
on the fact that the Frondarinas
were not in actual and physical
possession of the land as such was
only possesses by their caretaker
Allegedly, this caretaker was
threatened by the Malazartes but
the trial court deemed this as mere
hearsay
evidence
since
the
caretaker was not really presented
to testify as witness.
The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Who are the owners of the lot?
If the aforestated question rules
that the Frondarinas are the
owners, do the Malazartes have the

right to indemnity as builders in

good faith?
Ratio:
The court gives credence to the
claim of the Frondarinas that they
and their predecessors in interest
had been in peaceful, physical
possession of the said lot since
1971.
Although the fact is that none of
the parties have actually been in
possession of the land(since it was
possesses by their caretakers), the
actuations of the Frondarinas are
more in accordance with the usual
course of human conduct and
common experience. The claim of
the Malazartes that they occupied
said lot for 15 years deserves scant
consideration since his job took up
most of his time.
Romeo Valencia also testified that
he checked with the BoL and was
told that the lot has not been
declared in the name of any
person.
However, this statement of his is
not true as there was a tax
declaration in Cirila's name. The
latter
also
applied
for
a
Miscellaneous Sales Application
before.
Seeing as there is already a falsity
and misrepresentation in the
testimony of Valencia, the court
rules that his testimony does not
constitute evidence of the truth of
the said allegations.
The testimonies of
Frondarina
were
more
consistent
with

one who has been deprived of poss

ession
by force. They sought help from
officials and reported incidents.
Such is more in accordance with a
person who has been illegally and
unfairly deprived of possession.
The lack of testimony of the
caretaker (who was not presented
as witness) was not fatal to the cau
se of the Frondarinas as ample and
circumstantial
evidence
was presented.
The tax declarations also, as well
as the payments for taxes for the
disputed lots are much earlier than
those allegedly made by the
Malazartes.
Although tax declarations are not
conclusive evidence, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner.
The Malazartes are not builders in
good faith.
Considering
that
they
were
informed by the petitioners that
the
disputed
lot
was
owned by them and had the right o
f possession over said lot, still, they
persisted on building their house
on it. Respondents therefore are
not builders
in good faith
and shall lose
their house
without any right to reimbursement
SALAZAR
vs
DUPLICATORS INC.

PHILIPPINE

Petitioner Estrellita Salazar became

Sales Representative of respondent
company, Philippine Duplicators,

Inc. on May 1, 1987. She was

assigned at the Southern Section of
Metro Manila under the direct
supervision of respondent Leonora
Fontanilla. Petitioner received her
last compensation in the amount of
PhP 14,095.73 which covered her
basic
salary
and
monthly
commission.
Petitioner
alleged
that
on
December 7, 1998, respondent
Fontanilla called her to the latters
office
and
handed
her
a
memorandum with a ball pen
requesting her to receive it.
Petitioner refused to receive it
because it stated her termination
from
employment
and
asked
Fontanilla why she should be
terminated as she had done
nothing wrong.
On December 9, 1998, respondent
Fontanilla directed Salazar, through
a memorandum to explain, within
72 hours from receipt of said
document, why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her
in violation of Section 8, Category V
of the companys Handbook on
Constructive
Discipline
for
falsifying company records.
On December 8, 1999, Labor
Arbiter Manuel R. Caday rendered
his
Decision
finding
that
petitioners dismissal was for a just
cause, but respondent Duplicators
breached
the
twin-notice
requirement for dismissal under
Section 2 (c), Rule XXIII, Book V of
the
Implementing
Rules
and
Regulations of the Labor Code.
Thus, Duplicators was ordered to

pay an indemnity of PhP 10,000.00

to petitioner Salazar.
On January 26, 2000, Salazar filed
a Memorandum of Appeal from the
adverse Decision. On August 28,
2000, the NLRC decided the appeal
finding that there was actually no
termination
of
Salazars
employment but considering that
reinstatement was not advisable
due to the strained relationship
between the parties, separation
pay was ordered paid to petitioner
in lieu of reinstatement.
The CA AFFIRMED the decision of
the NLRC with modification. The
dismissal of the petitioner is
perforce declared lawful and valid.
Nonetheless, as a measure of
compassion and social justice, she
is hereby pronounced entitled to
separation pay equivalent to one
months salary for every year of
service rendered.
Simply stated, the CA ruled that
the
termination
of
Salazars
employment was legal and valid.
While the dismissed employee was
not entitled to separation pay, the
CA nonetheless awarded severance
pay
pursuant
to
settled
jurisprudence and in the interest of
social justice. Lastly, it ruled that
there was no breach of the due
process requirements prescribed
for dismissal from employment.
Under Petition for Review on
Certiorari is before SC, Salazar
contends that NLRC should not
have
deleted
the
award
of
indemnity of PhP 10,000.00 in her
favor since both Duplicators and

Fontanilla did not interpose any

appeal from the Decision of Labor
Arbiter Manuel Caday and hence,
no affirmative relief could be
granted to said respondents.

affirmative relief to the appellees

since they did not comply with the
requirements of appeal. In this
case, Rule VI, Section 3 of the NLRC
Rules
of
Procedure
[2000]
prescribes the following:

ISSUE
Whether or not the NLRC could
validly delete the award of
indemnity in Salazars favor since
respondents did not appeal.
HELD
As a general rule, a party who has
not appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than the ones granted
in the appealed decision.
The reason for this rule is that
since parties did not appeal from
the decision or resolution, they are
presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication. Furthermore, Rule
141 on Legal Fees provides that if
the fee is not paid, then the court
may refuse to proceed with the
action until they are paid and may
dismiss the appeal or the action or
proceeding. The case or appeal is
deemed filed only upon payment of
the
docket
or
appeal
fee
considering that jurisdiction is
acquired by the court over the case
or the appeal only upon full
payment of the prescribed fee.
Thus, the court has no jurisdiction
or authority to grant affirmative
relief to the party who did not
appeal as there is no obligation to
pay any fee. Furthermore, in the
interest of fairness, it would not be
proper
and
just
to
award

Section
3.
REQUISITES
FOR
PERFECTION OF APPEAL. a) The
Appeal shall be filed within the
reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
under oath with proof of payment
of the required appeal fee and the
posting of a cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
shall
be
accompanied
by
memorandum of appeal which shall
state the grounds relied upon and
the arguments in support thereof;
the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed
decision, order or award and proof
of service on the other party of
such appeal.
Complying
with
these
specifications is a difficult and
tedious process, specifically the
posting of cash or surety bond. It
would
be
discriminatory
and
inequitable if a party who has not
complied with these requirements
will be granted affirmative relief.
In the instant case, did the NLRC
violate the rule in labor cases that
an appellee cannot be awarded any
affirmative relief?
We find no deviation from the
doctrine.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that

petitioner Salazars dismissal was
for a just cause but discovered an
infraction
of
the
two-notice
requirement on the dismissal of an
employee for which he ordered
Duplicators to pay the indemnity of
PhP 10,000.00 to Salazar. However,
on petitioners appeal, the NLRC
believed that there was after all no
dismissal of petitioner Salazar but
due to strained relationship, the
company was made to pay
separation pay of PhP 14,095.73
instead of paying the indemnity of
PhP 10,000.00 imposed by the
Labor Arbiter. It is the deletion of
the PhP 10,000.00 indemnity that
is being assailed by the petitioner
as a grant of affirmative relief to
respondent Duplicators.
We are not persuaded.
Petitioners first ground in her
Memorandum of Appeal before the
NLRC stated that Labor Arbiter
Cadays rulingthat she was not
illegally
dismissed
was
erroneous. In resolving this issue,
the NLRC overturned Cadays
finding
of
petitioners
valid
dismissal, and instead concluded
that there was no termination of
petitioners employment. As a

consequence, the NLRC had to

recall the award of PhP 10,000.00
indemnity imposed by Arbiter
Caday although not prayed for by
respondent Duplicators since the
said award was inconsistent with
the
finding
that
petitioners
employment subsisted. Without
petitioners dismissal, there can be
no legal basis for the indemnity;
hence, Duplicators is not obliged to
comply with the two (2)notice
requirement. In annulling the
award, the NLRC merely exercised
its authority under Article 218 (d)
of the Labor Code to correct or
amend any error committed by a
labor arbiter in aid of its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Petitioner
has no reason to complain that she
was deprived of monetary benefits
since the NLRCs Decision did not
actually benefit Duplicators as the
PhP 14,095.76 separation pay
granted to petitioner is certainly
greater than the PhP 10,000.00
indemnity deleted by the NLRC.
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
DENIED and the March 15, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals
and the August 7, 2002 Resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 62556 are
AFFIRMED.