Freedom of Expression

General Considerations
Near vs Minnesota
Facts: Mr. Near published a newspaper in Minnesota
called the Saturday Press, which reported certain
questionable conduct by the local police and officials,
and hinted at a perceived favoritism. An article
claimed that the police were turning their heads to the
criminal actions of a Jewish gangster. Minnesota
enacted a statute that made the publication of
malicious, scandalous and defamatory matters in the
print media a public nuisance.
Issue(s): Whether a state law authorizing proceedings
to restrain the publication of print media operates
within the bounds of the liberty of press protected by
the 1st and 14th
Holding: No. The law infringes upon the liberty of the
press,
guaranteed
through
the
14 th and
unconstitutionally restrains publication.
Procedure: Cnty Atty sought injunction.
Ct
permanently enjoined any further publications
containing M, S, and D material and from further
conducting nuisance under the title of The Saturday
Press or any other title. MN S Ct Affirmed. USSCt
Reversed.
Rule(s): 1st and 14th
Rationale: Liberty of Speech and Press are w/i the
liberties protected by 1st and 14th from state invasion.

MNs law is not aimed at curing individual or private

wrongs, it is aimed at the distribution of scandalous
material harmful to the public. But, it is not directed
just at the distribution of the statements, but also the
continued publication of charges against public
officials.
Its object and effect is not punishment, but
suppression of the offending newspaper or periodical.
Suppression under this law is accomplished by
enjoining publication. This law not only suppresses
publication of the media, but it also effectively censors
the publisher personally.
Restraint against publication is limited to exceptional
cases such as when at war Govt may prevent
disclosure of military information; or decency may be
enforced against obscene publications; or where
security of the community life requires protection
against incitement to violent action. None of the
exceptions are present here.
Liberty of the press has meant historically that
publication has immunity from previous restraints or
censorship.
DISSENT: MN law does not operate as a prior restraint
on publication w/i the meaning of that phrase. It does
not authorize administrative control in advance. There
is no question that states have the power to denounce
actions deemed a nuisance which threaten morals,
peace, and good order.
New York Times vs United States

Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United

States (Supreme Court) held that the Government
failed to meet the requisite burden of proof needed to
justify a prior restraint of expression when attempting
to enjoin the New York Times and Washington Post
from publishing contents of a classified study.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any system of prior restraints
on expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its invalidity. The
Government thus creates a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such a restraint.
Facts. The United States sought to enjoin the New York
Times and Washington Post from publishing contents
of a confidential study about the Governments
decision making with regards to Vietnam policy. The
District Court in the New York Times case and the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in the
Washington Post case held that the Government had
not met the requisite burden justifying such a prior
restraint.
Issue. Whether the United States met the heavy
burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such a restraint on the New York Times and
Washington Post to enjoin them from publishing
contents of a classified study?
Held. No. Judgments of the lower courts affirmed. The
order of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is
reversed and remanded with directions to enter a
judgment affirming the District Court. The stays
entered June 25, 1971, by the Court are vacated. The
mandates shall issue forthwith.
Dissent. The scope of the judicial function in passing
upon activities of the Executive Branch in the field of

foreign affairs is very narrowly restricted. This view is

dictated by the doctrine of Separation of Powers. The
doctrine prohibiting prior restraints does not prevent
the courts from maintaining status quo long enough to
act responsibly. The First Amendment is only part of
the Constitution. The cases should be remanded to be
developed expeditiously.
Concurrence. To find that the President has inherent
power to halt the publication of news by resort to the
courts would wipe out the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution [Constitution]. The First
Amendment of the Constitution leaves no room for
governmental restraint on the press. There is,
moreover, no statute barring the publication by the
press of the material that the Times and Post seek to
publish. The First Amendment of the Constitution
tolerates no prior judicial restraints of the press
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that untoward
consequences may result. Thus, only governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably,
directly and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support the issuance of an interim
restraining order. Unless and until the Government has
clearly made its case, the First Amendment of the
Constitution commands that no injunction be issued.
The responsibility must be where the power is. The
Executive must have the large duty to determine and
preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise its power effectively. The Executive is correct
with respect to some of the documents here, but
disclosure of any of them will not result in irreparable
danger to the public. The United States has not met
the very heavy burden, which it must meet to warrant
an injunction against publication in these cases. The
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ultimate issue in this case is whether this Court or the

Congress has the power to make this law. It is plain
that Congress has refused to grant the authority the
Government seeks from this Court.
Discussion. This very divided opinion shows how heavy
the Governments burden is to justify a prior restraint
of expression
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R.
No. 168338 | February 15, 2008
Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies
of the Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving
a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between
then-President
Gloria
Arroyo
and
Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ
Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who
had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the
Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a
continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody.
Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go
after media organizations found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of
a tape. Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and
radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a
just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to
the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed
a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary
Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
Issues:

(1) Will a purported violation of law such as the AntiWiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press?
(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of contentbased prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the
Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech
or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the
clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these
acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the
press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger
test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free
speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ
Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of contentbased prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution. It is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in
or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
sufficient that the press statements were made by
respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for
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and on behalf of the government in an official capacity

is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept
of an act does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an
official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp (DYRE) v. Dans Jr.
137 SCRA 628
L-59329
July 19, 1985
Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station
DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of
national security. The radio station was allegedly used
to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends
that they were denied due process. There was no
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure.
Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates
freedom of expression. Before the court could even
promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised,
Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed
a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the
station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana;
who is no longer interested in pursuing the case.
Despite the case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested parties, thus
the dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds
that there is need to pass a RESOLUTION for the
guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals
in matters as this case.
Issue:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case

of DYRE.
Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the
Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.
Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio
Station in 1980 as null and void. The absence of a
hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The
primary requirements in administrative proceedings
are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay
Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast
station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine
provides the following requirements:
(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present
ones case and submit evidence presented.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) The decision must have something to support
itself.
(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence
that is adequate to support conclusion)
(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented
at hearing
(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent
consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinates views

(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that

the proceeding can know the various issued involved
and reasons for decisions rendered.
The court stresses that while there is no controlling
and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an
unavoidable standard that government actions must
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and
property is valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation
of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has
the right to be protected against broadcasts which
incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test
for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear
and present danger rule. If in the circumstances that
the media is used in such nature as to create this
danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has
the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television
may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a
start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. The people continues to
have the right to be informed on public affairs and
broadcast media continues to have the pervasive
influence to the people being the most accessible form
of media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the
the special protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.
Soriano vs. Laguardia

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner,
as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two
days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly
alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister
of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Are Sorianos statements during the televised Ang
Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and within
the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental
rights as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty
as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended
him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months.
The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated
as obscene, at least with respect to the average child,
and thus his utterances cannot be considered as
protected speech. Citing decisions from the US
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Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis

should be context based and found the utterances to
be obscene after considering the use of television
broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and
the G rating of the show, which are all factors that
made the utterances susceptible to children viewers.
The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could
be easily understood by a child literally rather than in
the context that they were used.
The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior
restraint, but rather a form of permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In
affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of
suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that
the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter
without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit
fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the
suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of
petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating
Daan as a permit was already issued to him by
MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent
contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program.
(Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)
Chaplinsky vs New Hampshire
Brief Fact Summary. Chaplinsky was convicted under a
State statute for calling a City Marshal a God damned
racketeer and a damned fascist in a public place.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Fighting words are not
entitled to protection under the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution)
Facts. A New Hampshire statute prohibited any person
from addressing any offensive, derisive or annoying

word to any other person who is on any street or public

place or calling him by any derisive name. Chaplinsky,
a Jehovahs Witness, called a City Marshal a God
damned racketeer and a damned fascist in a public
place and was therefore arrested and convicted under
the statute.
Issue. Did the statute or the application of the statute
to Chaplinskys comments violate his free speech
rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. No. The lower court is affirmed.
Considering the purpose of the First Amendment of the
Constitution, it is obvious that the right to free speech
is not absolute under all circumstances. There are
some narrowly defined classes of speech that have
never been protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution. These include fighting words, words
that inflict injury or tend to excite an immediate
breach of the peace. Such words are of such little
expositional or social value that any benefit they might
produce is far outweighed by their costs on social
interests in order and morality.
The statute at issue is narrowly drawn to define and
punish specific conduct lying within the domain of
government power. Moreover, the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire, which is the ultimate arbiter of the
meanings of New Hampshire law, has defined the
Statute as applying only to fighting words. Therefore,
the Statute does not unconstitutionally impinge upon
the right of free speech.
Discussion. By holding that fighting words are not
protected forms of speech the Supreme Court of the
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United States (Supreme Court) announced a rare form

of content based restriction on speech that is
permissible. The student should consider what
characteristics distinguish a fight word from a bona
fide criticism. One difference may lie in the speakers
intent. Fighting words are intended to inflict harm,
bona-fide criticisms are intended to communicate
ideas. Another difference may lie in the differing likely
effects of each: fighting words are likely to provoke
the average person to violence while bona fide
criticisms are not.
MVRS vs Islamic DaWah Council of the Phils.
(2003)
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
a. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local
federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious
organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla,
de Guzman, da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a
class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide
against MVRS Publications, Inc., arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily
tabloid. The article reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay.
Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay
kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila
ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo
na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

b. Islamic DaWah: the libelous statement was insulting

and damaging to the Muslims; not only published out
of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings,
cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that
on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not
only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire
Muslim world
c. MVRS Publications, Inc.,: the article did not mention
respondents as the object of the article and therefore
were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was
merely an expression of belief or opinion and was
published without malice nor intention to cause
damage
d. RTC: dismissed the complaint; persons allegedly
defamed by the article were not specifically identified
e. CA: reversed RTC decision. The defamation was
directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. The suit
for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC
DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious
status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the
requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of
all Muslims.
ISSUES:
1. WON Islamic DaWah has a cause of action for libel.
NO.
HELD:
1. NO, there is no cause of action for libel.
DOCTRINES:
Defamation - which includes libel and slander,
means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation
or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or
confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory
7

feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. 6 It is the

publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him
into disrepute.7 Defamation is an invasion of a
relational interest since it involves the opinion which
others in the community may have, or tend to have, of
the plaintiff.
Words which are merely insulting are not actionable
as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken,
do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation
in the absence of an allegation for special damages.
The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff
does not make it actionable by itself.10
Declarations made about a large class of people
cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable
individual.
Absent
circumstances
specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member
of a class, no member of such class has a right of
action without at all impairing the equally demanding
right of free speech and expression, as well as of the
press.
APPLICATION: there was no fairly identifiable person
who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since
the persons allegedly defamed could not be
identifiable, private respondents have no individual
causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class
allegedly disparaged.
i.)
An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal,
separate and distinct in the community. A Muslim may
find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous;
others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their
faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels."
There is no injury to the reputation of the individual
Muslims who constitute this community that can give

rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is

personal in character to every person. Together, the
Muslims do not have a single common reputation that
will give them a common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy.
DOCTRINE: If the group is a very large one, then the
alleged libelous statement is considered to have no
application to anyone in particular, since one might as
well defame all mankind. As the size of these groups
increases, the chances for members of such groups to
recover damages on tortious libel become elusive.
This principle is said to embrace two (2) important
public policies:
first, where the group referred to is large, the courts
presume that no reasonable reader would take the
statements as so literally applying to each individual
member.
second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily
safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well
as of the press, effecting a sound compromise between
the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel
cases.
APPLICATION: The Muslim community is too vast as
to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were
particularly defamed.
CASES/AUTHORITY CITED:
Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
associations of sugarcane planters in Negros
Occidental filed against Newsweek over an article
"Island of Fear" allegedly depicting Negros Province as
a place dominated by exploitative wealthy landowners
and sugar planters who also brutalized and killed
underpaid planters. SC dismissed complaint on the
ground that no allegation in the complaint that the
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ii.)

article complained of specifically referred to any of

them. Where the defamation is alleged to have been
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class
or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the
action separately, if need be.
Arcand v. The Evening Call Publishing Company: US CA
held that the one guiding principle of group libel is that
defamation of a large group does not give rise to a
cause of action on the part of an individual unless it
can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory
matter.
US Vs Alvarez
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Alvarez
(Defendant), was convicted of conspiring to transport
marijuana to the United States from Columbia based
on his participation in unloading the drugs from a pickup truck prior to their being put on a United States
bound
airplane.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Evidence of agreement in a
conspiracy may be inferred from indirect evidence
such as participation in overt acts that further the
conspiracy.

Facts. The Defendant, prior to unloading drugs

concealed in large household appliances from a pickup
truck to be put on a United States bound airplane,
responded affirmatively to an undercover agents

inquiry as to whether he would be at the unloading site

in the United States. He was convicted of conspiring to
transport marijuana on this evidence.
Issue. Is circumstantial evidence alone sufficient to
prove the agreement element of a conspiracy
charge?
Held. Yes. Affirmed. A jury may properly have
concluded that the Defendants intended presence at
the unloading site in the United States was evidence of
a prior agreement by the Defendant to assist in the
criminal conspiracy. The Defendant cannot escape
criminal liability solely on the basis that he did not join
a criminal conspiracy until well after its inception or
played
only
a
minor
role
therein.
Dissent. There was no evidence that the Defendant
had knowledge that criminal activity was afoot. The
evidence only showed that he unloaded a washing
machine from a truck and indicated that he would be
present at the unloading site in the United States. The
majority does not explain how a jury could not accept
this scenario over the contention that the defendant
was aware of the criminal activity underway.

Discussion. The majority in this case broadens the

net of a conspiracy charge to include those for whom
the only evidence of agreement in the conspiracy is an
overt act in furtherance of it, even where that act may
permit of an inference of innocent conduct unrelated
to the conspiracy.
Davao City Water District vs Aranjuez no digest

Obscenity
Miller vs California
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Millers
(Defendant) conviction for mailing advertisements for
adult books to unwilling recipients was vacated and
remanded in an effort to shift the burden of obscenity
determinations to the state and local courts.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. In determining whether
speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of
fact must be: (a) whether the average person,
applying contemporary community standards would
find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the

California Penal Code for mailing advertisements for
adult material to non-soliciting recipients.
Issue. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene
material without limits?
Held. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and
remanded for further proceedings. In determining
whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for
the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards
would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work

depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,

sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific
value. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional
standard the utterly without redeeming social value
test. If a state law that regulates obscene material is
thus limited, as written or construed, First Amendment
constitutional values are adequately protected by the
ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when
necessary.
Dissent. To send men to jail for violating standards
that they cannot understand due to vagueness, denies
them
of
due
process.
The statute in question is overbroad and thus,
unconstitutional.

Discussion. This case attempts a new definition and

clarification of obscenity while also trying to shift the
burden of obscenity determinations to the state and
local courts.
Stanley vs Georgia
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Stanleys
(Petitioner) home was being searched for evidence of
bookmaking when officers found obscene films.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Mere possession of obscenity
is not punishable under the United States Constitution
(Constitution).

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Facts. The Petitioner was being investigated for

bookmaking. Officers were searching his home when
they found 8mm films that they determined to be
obscene. They confiscated the materials and charged
the Petitioner with knowingly having possession of
obscene matter.
Issue. Does this law prohibiting possession of
obscenity violate the First Amendment of the
Constitution?
Held. Yes. The Constitution prohibits making mere
possession a crime.
Discussion. The government is not allowed to dictate
to people what they will and will not read, watch or
enjoy. The Constitution strictly protects an individual
from such unwarranted intrusion and control.
Osborne vs Ohio
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), is a Supreme
Court of the United States case in which the Court held
that the First Amendment allows states to outlaw the
mere possession, as distinct from the distribution, of
child pornography. In so doing, the Court extended the
holding of New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982),
which had upheld laws banning the distribution of child
pornography] against a similar First Amendment
challenge, and distinguished Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969), which had struck down a Georgia law
forbidding the possession of pornography by adults in
their own homes. The Court also determined that the
Ohio law at issue was not overbroad, relying on a
narrowing interpretation of the law the Ohio Supreme
Court had adopted in prior proceedings in the case.
However, because it was unclear whether the State

had proved all the elements of the crime, the Court

ordered a new trial.
With respect to child pornography, however, the
government does not act out of a "paternalistic
interest" in regulating a citizen's mind. By outlawing
the possession of child pornography, the government
seeks to eradicate legitimate harms by diminishing the
market for child pornography. These harms include the
psychological damage to children -- both the children
depicted in the pornography, for whom the images
produced serve as a permanent record of the abuse,
and the children whom potential abusers might lure
with such images. "Given the importance of the State's
interest in protecting the victims of child pornography,
we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this
vice at all levels in the distribution chain."
Even if the First Amendment did not categorically
forbid the government to ban the possession of child
pornography, Osborne argued that the Ohio statute
under which he was convicted was overbroad. A ban
on speech is "overbroad" if it outlaws both prohibited
speech as well as a substantial amount of legitimate
speech. The statute, as written, banned depictions of
nudity, and the Court had previously held that nudity
was protected expression. But the Ohio Supreme Court
had held that the statute only applied to nudity that
"constitutes a lewd exhibition or involves a graphic
focus on the genitals, and where the person depicted
is neither the child nor the ward of the person
charged" with violating it. Furthermore, the Ohio
Supreme Court had required that the defendant had to
know that the images depicted children before being
convicted of possession of child pornography. By
narrowing the scope of the statute in these ways, the

11

Ohio Supreme Court had sufficiently tailored the law

only to those images most harmful to children.

temporary restraining order against indiscriminate

seizure.

However, the Court reversed Osborne's conviction

because, after reviewing the record of the trial, it
observed that the State did not present evidence that
the images were "lewd" within the meaning of the
statute. Because lewdness was an essential element of
the crime, the State had not satisfied its obligation to
prove all the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation

and burning of obscence reading materials but
admitted that these were surrendered by the stall
owners and the establishments were not raided.The
other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco
Cabrera, filed no answer.

The dissenting opinion, written by Brennan and joined

by Marshall and Stevens, argued, "When speech is
eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to
find restrictions on them invalid. But were the First
Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom
would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne's pictures may be
distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his
right to possess them privately and his right to avoid
punishment under an overbroad law."[1]
Pita V CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
J.
Sarmiento
Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group,
and the Manila Police, seized and confiscated from
dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to
be obscene. These were later burned. One of the
publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila
to enjoin him from confiscating more copies of his
magazine and claimed that this was a violation of
freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show
cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a

On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order

setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for
the parties to adduce evidence on the question of
whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine
alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the
defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the
Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack
of merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument
that freedom of the press is not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could
without any court warrant or order seize and
confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply
of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial
court could dismiss the case on its merits without any
hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for
resolution was merely the application of petitioner for
the writ of preliminary injunction.

12

Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?

Held: No. Petition granted
Ratio:
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other
article charged as being obscene may fall. Also,
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it." (Kottinger) When does a publication
have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to
be offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines
have neither been drawn nor divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from
Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in
terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather
than isolated passages, which were central to
Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that
"contemporary community standards" are the final
arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak
undertook moreover to make the determination of
obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a
consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger
had given unto law enforcers.

The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v.

California,
which
expressly
abandoned
Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to
wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to
what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to
the reluctance of the courts to recognize the
constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparently,
the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not
included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption
that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions
among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague
theories of what is acceptable to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of
the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to
suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious
reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it
is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes
develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in
step with the rapid advance of civilization. What
shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not
necessarily repulsive to the present generation. But
neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no
pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it
is the divergent perceptions of men and women that
have probably compounded the problem rather than
resolved it. Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature
13

comes within the ambit of free expression, although

not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court
has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the
right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would
warrant State interference and action. But the burden
to show this lies with the authorities. "There must be
objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural,
proof of the existence of such clear and present
danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case
involving the delivery of a political speech, the
presumption is that the speech may validly be said.
The burden is on the State to demonstrate the
existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be:
(1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to
stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private
respondents have shown the required proof to justify a
ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court
order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure, by way of a search warrant. Has petitioner
been found guilty for publishing obscene works under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not
answered, one can conclude that the fact that the
former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by
"police power" is no license to seize property in
disregard of due process. The PDs dont give the
authorities the permission to execute high-handed
acts. It is basic that searches and seizures may be
done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they
become unreasonable and subject to challenge.

There is of course provision for warrantless searches

under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself
suggests, the search must have been an incident to a
lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime
committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no
constitutional nor legal provision which would free the
accused of all criminal responsibility because there
had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here
to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have
validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut
campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in
his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been
committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge,
jury, and executioner rolled into one.
PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared
in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain Francis
Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots
wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It
also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter
through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the
deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of
such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the
article destroyed the respect and admiration he
enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item,
ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to inform the
public on matters of general interest, promote the
14

public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the

people, and that the story was published in good faith
and without malice.
Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under
privileged communication and therefore protected by
the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.
Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is
not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we
assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character when
the matter was published in the newspaper and
circulated among the general population, especially
since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither a
public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two
levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask for the
deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of
the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is
also untrue because the events she reported never
happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty.
Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is
not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error
materially advances societys interest in uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated falsehood
falls into that class of utterances which are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly

outweighed by the social interest in order and

morality The knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth,
do not enjoy constitutional protection
New York Times vs Sullivan
Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff)
sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co.
(Defendant), for printing an advertisement about the
civil rights movement in the south that defamed the
Plaintiff.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees
require a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
Facts. The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of
Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was
defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York
Times. The advertisement was entitled, Heed Their
Rising Voices and it charged in part that an
unprecedented wave of terror had been directed
against those who participated in the civil rights
movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement
did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that
it referred to him indirectly because he had oversight
responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed
that it authorized publication of the advertisement
because it did not have any reason to believe that its
contents were false. There was no independent effort
to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the
15

Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant

was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the
advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury
found the ad libelous per se and actionable without
proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff
$500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed. The Defendant appealed.
Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for
printing an advertisement, which criticized a public
officials official conduct?
Held. No. Reversed and remanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press
are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a
libel action brought by a public official against critics of
his official conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if
the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to
bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that
the words were published of and concerning the
plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the
defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he
can persuade the jury that they were true in all their
particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are
to have the breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that

it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was

false or not.
*The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a States
power to award damages for libel in actions brought by
public officials against critics of their official conduct.
In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is
applicable.
* The Defendants failure to retract the advertisement
upon the Plaintiffs demand is not adequate evidence
of malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not
adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant failed
to check the advertisements accuracy against the
news stories in the Defendants own files. Also, the
evidence was constitutionally defective in another
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jurys
finding that the allegedly libelous statements were
made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that
the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution do not merely delimit a States power to
award damages, but completely prohibit a State from
exercising such a power. The Defendant had an
absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of
the Montgomery agencies and officials.
Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a
defamation action involving his official conduct, malice
must be proved. Without the showing of malice, the
Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this
case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom
speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First
Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the
States via the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.
16

Rosenbloom v Metro Media, Inc.

403 U.S. 20
June 7 1971
In 1963, petitioner was a distributor of nudist
magazines in the Philadelphia metropolitan area.
Respondent Metromediaradio station, which broadcast
news reports every half hour, broadcast news stories
of petitioner Rosenblooms arrest for possession of
obscene literature and the police seizure of "obscene
books," and stories concerning petitioner's lawsuit
against certain officials alleging that the magazines he
distributed were not obscene and seeking injunctive
relief from police interference with his business. These
latter stories did not mention petitioner Rosenblooms
name, but used the terms "smut literature racket" and
"girlie-book peddlers." Following petitioner's acquittal
of criminal obscenity charges, he filed this action
seeking damages under Pennsylvania's libel law.
Issue:
Whether the New York Times' knowing-or-recklessfalsity standard applies in a state civil libel action
brought not by a "public official" or a "public figure"
but by a private individual for a defamatory falsehood
uttered in a news broadcast by a radio station about
the individual's involvement in an event of public or
general interest
Held:
The actual malice standard applies.

If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it

cannot suddenly become less so merely because a
private individual is involved, or because in some
sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to
become involved.
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. The
present case illustrates the point.
The community has a vital interest in the proper
enforcement of its criminal laws, particularly in an area
such as obscenity where a number of highly important
values are potentially in conflict: the public has an
interest both in seeing that the criminal law is
adequately enforced and in assuring that the law is not
used unconstitutionally to suppress free expression.
Whether the person involved is a famous large-scale
magazine distributor or a "private" businessman
running a corner newsstand has no relevance in
ascertaining whether the public has an interest in the
issue. We honor the commitment to robust debate on
public issues, which is embodied in the First
Amendment, by extending constitutional protection to
all discussion and communication involving matters of
public or general concern, without regard to whether
the persons involved are famous or anonymous.
G.R. No. 141994. January 17, 2005
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC., petitioner,
vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTERBICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE,
17

(AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F.

AGO, respondents.
Facts:

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts

judgment with modification. The appellate court made
Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre.
Issues:

Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by

Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun Alegre
(Alegre). Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-AM
which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc.
(FBNI). Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay
municipalities and other Bicol areas.
In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima
and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical
and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that
the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita
Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed
a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and
Alegre on 27 February 1990.
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a
reputable learning institution. With the supposed
expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious
imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC
and Ago) reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as
defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a
Decision] finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except
Rima. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court
found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

1. Whether or not the broadcasts are libelous.

2. Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral
damages.
3. Whether or not the award of attorneys fees is
proper.
Ruling:
1. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural
or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed
malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately
their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the
supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a
documentary or public affairs program, Rima and
Alegre should have presented the public issues free
from inaccurate and misleading information. Hearing
the students alleged complaints a month before the
expos, they had sufficient time to verify their sources
and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly
made a thorough investigation of the students alleged
gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the
purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department
18

of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that

he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an
alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any
information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the
students because they were many and not because
there is proof that what they are saying is true. This
plainly shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of
whether their report was true or not.
Had the comments been an expression of opinion
based on established facts, it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts. However, the
comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed up by
facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and
remain libelous per se.
The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code of
the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas,
Ink. (Radio Code). Item I(B) of the Radio Code provides:
B.
PUBLIC
AFFAIRS,
COMMENTARIES

PUBLIC

ISSUES

AND

1. x x x
4. Public affairs program shall present public
issues free from personal bias, prejudice
and inaccurate and misleading information.
x x x Furthermore, the station shall strive to
present balanced discussion of issues. x x
x.
xxx

7. The station shall be responsible at all times in

the supervision of public affairs, public
issues and commentary programs so that
they conform to the provisions and
standards of this code.
8.

It shall be the responsibility of the

newscaster,
commentator,
host
and
announcer to protect public interest,
general welfare and good order in the
presentation of public affairs and public
issues.[36]

The broadcasts fail to meet the standards

prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays down the
code of ethical conduct governing practitioners in the
radio broadcast industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary
code of conduct imposed by the radio broadcast
industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a
public warranty by the radio broadcast industry that
radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by
which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability
and sanctions.
The public has a right to expect and demand that
radio broadcast practitioners live up to the code of
conduct of their profession, just like other
professionals. A professional code of conduct provides
the standards for determining whether a person has
acted justly, honestly and with good faith in the
exercise of his rights and performance of his duties as
required by Article 19 of the Civil Code. A professional
code of conduct also provides the standards for
determining whether a person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another has acted in a manner contrary to

19

morals or good customs under Article 21 of the Civil

Code.

damages. In this case, the broadcasts are libelousper

se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award of P300,000 moral
damages unreasonable. The record shows that even
though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has
not suffered any substantial or material damage to its
reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of moral
damages from P300,000 to P150,000.

2. FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral

damages because it is a corporation.
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao
Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the award of moral
damages.
However,
the
Courts
statement
in Mambulao that a corporation may have a good
reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground
for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls
under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This
provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral
damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether
the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of defamation and
claim for moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se,
the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of
an honest mistake or the want of character or
reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation
of damages.[46] Neither in such a case is the plaintiff
required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a
condition precedent to the recovery of some

3.

The award of attorneys fees is not proper.

AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily its claim for
attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to
warrant the award of attorneys fees. Moreover, both
the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state
in their respective decisions the rationale for the award
of attorneys fees.
In Inter-Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, we held that:
[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as
an item of damages is the exception rather than the
rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every
time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code
demands
factual,
legal
and
equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court
must explicitly state in the text of the decision, and not
only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason
for the award of attorneys fees.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
Petition denied.
GMA NETWORK vs BUSTOS Case Digest
20

GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs.

BUSTOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

JESUS

G.

impact on their audience making it appear that other

doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the
complaining unsuccessful examinees.

FACTS: A libel complaint was filed against GMA

NETWORK, INC and newscaster, Rey Vidal. The issue
started from the Petition for Mandamus filed by the
unsuccessful examinees of the physicians licensure
examinations before the RTC of Manila to compel the
PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check
and reevaluate the test papers. As alleged, mistakes in
the counting of the total scores and erroneous
checking of answers to test questions vitiated the
results of the examinations.

In defense of the alleged libel, GMA Network argued

that the same was but a privileged communication.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the said news report was within the ambit
of privileged communication
2. Whether the said narration of the news reporter and
the used of video footage were libelous
HELD:

As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA

Network, Inc. assigned to gather news from courts,
among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered
the filing of the mandamus petition. After securing a
copy of the petition, Vidal composed and narrated the
news coverage for the ten o'clock evening news
edition of GMA's Channel 7 Headline News, quoting
thereof the allegations of the unsuccessful examiners
that the gross, massive, haphazard, whimsical and
capricious checking that must have been going on for
years should now be stopped once and for all.
Simultaneous with the news, was an old video footage
showing physicians wearing black armbands.
Along these lines, respondents claimed that the said
report was false, malicious and one-sided. Vidal and
GMA Network, Inc., in reckless disregard for the truth,
defamed them by word of mouth and simultaneous
visual presentation on GMA Network, Inc.'s Channel 7.
They added that, the showing of the unrelated old
footage was done purposely so as to make a forceful

1. Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a

summary of the allegations in the said Petition for
Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the
same fall within the protected ambit of privileged
communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable
for damages claimed by respondents for simply
bringing to fore information on subjects of public
concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified.
Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable
regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In
absolutely privileged communications, the mala or
bona fides of the author is of no moment as the
occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. On the
other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged
communications, the freedom from liability for an
otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the
absence of express malice or malice in fact. The
second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or
21

author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided

the prosecution established the presence of bad faith
or malice in fact. To this genre belongs "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks" falling under and described as
exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.

complained of is concerned. In view of the state of

things, the video footage was not libel in disguise;
standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it
was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing
derogatory in nature.

However, the enumeration under the aforecited Article

354 is not an exclusive list of conditional privilege
communications as the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the speech and of the press has expanded
the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters
of public interest.The news telecast in question clearly
falls under the second kind of privileged matter.

Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and

Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)

2. No, the statement in the news report falls within the

ambit of privileged communication. For, although
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters
considered privileged.
Furthermore, neither the insertion of the file video
constitute malice on the part of the petitioners.
Contrary to the CA's findings, the identifying charactergenerated words "file video" appeared to have been
superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the
minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular
footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the
phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely
to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the
viewing public." The trial court added the observation
that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a
standard practice." the absence of the accompanying
character-generated words "file video" would not
nevertheless, change the legal situation insofar as the
privileged nature of the audio-video publication

Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:
o January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila
Chronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector assigned to
the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US
Airforce planes which forwarded such message to
Manila
o
An American Army plane dropped emergency
sustenance kits on the beach of the island which
contained, among other things, a two way radio set.
Using the radio set Cruz reported to the authorities in
Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a
series of killings committed on the island since
Christmas of 1955.
o
Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were
immediately deployed to the babuyan claro. They were
led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that
Cruz only fabricated the story about the killings to get
attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to
Manila.
o
Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax
the same word to be used by the newspapers who
covered the same
22

o January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila

Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted a pictorial
article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz
being a hoax it brought to light the misery of the
people living in that place, with almost everybody sick,
only 2 individuals able to read and write and food and
clothing being scarce
o January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the
"January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz as a
health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his
isolated post, cooked up a story about a murderer
running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could
be ferried back to civilization. Called it Hoax of the
year
o In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published
but both photos were of a different person of the same
name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man,
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan
o
January 27, 1957 published statements
correcting their misprint and explained that confusion
and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan
13th issues deadline
o Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila.
Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in damages (5k
actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)
o CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:
o WON petitioners should be held liable for their error
in printing the wrong Fidel Cruzs photo in relation to
the hoax of the year?

o
WON such error is sufficient ground for an action
for libel to prosper?

Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is
reduced to P1,000.00

Ratio:
1.
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers
because libel is harmful on its face by the fact that it
exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule,
whether it is fact or opinion is irrelevant.
o
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is
"malicious defamation, expressed either in writing,
printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending
to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish
the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule,"
o Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and
Libel "Publication of a person's photograph in
connection with an article libelous of a third person, is
a libel on the person whose picture is published, where
the acts set out in the article are imputed to such
person."
o
In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture
being published beside the article imputes him as the
purveyor of the hoax of the year

23

2.
Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom
however it also can not claim any talismanic immunity
form constitutional limitations
o State interest in press freedom citing Justice
Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is necessary
for the maintenance of good governance Public
officials must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comments on official actsof course criticism does
not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an
individual is less than the state, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good.
o So long as it was done in good faith, the press
should have the legal right to have and express their
opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right
would be to infringe upon freedom of the press.
o Last word on the subject Citing Quisumbing v.
Lopez: Press should be given leeway and tolerance as
to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy
o Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of
legal values
o TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual
malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note: but this
was not done in this case)
4.
Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correction of error in
publishing does not wipe out the responsibility arising
from the publication of the original article
o Correction = Mitigating circumstance not a justifying
circumstance!

GR No. 170141

April 22, 2008

Third Division

Reyes

FACTS:
Respondent needed to go to the US to donate
his kidney to his ailing cousin. Having obtained an
emergency US Visa, respondent purchased a round trip
ticket from petitioner JAL. He was scheduled to a flight
bound for LA via Japan. On the date of his flight,
respondent passed through rigid immigration and
security routines before being allowed to board a JAL
plane.
While inside the plane, respondent was asked to
show his travel documents. After which he was ordered
by the crew to leave the plane, imputing that
respondent is carrying falsified travel documents.
Respondent pleaded but was ignored and under
constraint he gets off the plane. The plane took off and
respondent was left behind.
Respondent was refunded with the cost of his
ticket minus 500 USD, when JAL found out eventually
that his travel documents were not falsified and in
order. Respondent filed an action for damages against
JAL.

JAPAN AIRLINES vs. SIMANGAN

24

RTC RULING:

decision was affirmed with modification. 500K ED,

100K ED, 200K AF.

JAL is liable for beach of contract of carriage,

and should pay 1M as MD, 500K as ED, 250K as AF +
cost of suit. JAL appealed contending it is not guilty of
breach of contract of carriage and not liable for
damages.

RATIO:
Breach of contract of carriage

CA RULING:
Affirmed RTC decision with modification as to
amount of damages for being scandalously excessive.
500K MD, 250K ED and NO AT.

In an action for breach of contract of carriage,

all that is required of plaintiff is to prove the existence
of such contract and its non-performance by the
carrier through the failure to carry the passenger
safely to his destination. Simangan complied with
these requisites. Damage was accrued by JAL when
Simangan was bumped off despite his protestations
and valid travel documents and notwithstanding his
contract of carriage with JAL.

ISSUE:
WON JAL is guilty of breach of contract of
carriage.
WON Simangan
exemplary damages.

is

entitled

to

moral

Award of moral damages in breach of contract of

carriage.

and

HELD:
JAL is guilty of breach of contract of carriage and
is liable for damages. Petition of JAL was denied. CA

As a general rule, moral damages are not

recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not enumerated under Art
2219 NCC. As an exception, such damages are
recoverable in:
1. Mishaps resulting to a death of a passenger (Art.
1764 NCC)

25

2. When carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith (Art.

2220)
JAL breached its contract of carriage with
respondent in bad faith, when its crew ordered
respondent to disembark while the latter is already
settled in his assigned seat under the guise of verifying
the genuineness of his travel documents. Inattention
to and lack of care for the interest of its passengers
who are entitled ot its utmost consideration,
particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad
faith which entitles the passenger to award of moral
damages.

Award of exemplary damages in breach of contract of

carriage.
Exemplary damages maybe recovered in
contractual obligations as a way of example or
correction for the public good.JAL is liable for
exemplary damages as its acts constitute wanton,
oppressive and malevolent acts against respondent.
Passengers have the right to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration and are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities
and abuses from such employees.

Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Noel [GR 76565,

November 1988] En Banc, Feliciano (J): 13 concur, 1
took no part
Facts: On 3 July 1986, 21 persons (Atty. Dimatimpos
Mindalano, Atty. Mangorsi A. Mindalano, Shiek Edres
Mindalano, Sultan Guinar Mindalano, Farouk Calipa
Mindalano, Sultan Mahadi Mindalano, Sultan Khalid
Mindalano, Sultan Ma-Amor Mindalano, Dr. Taher
Mindalano, Datu Maguidala Mindalano, Sobaida
Magumpara Vda. De Mindalano, Raisha Mindalano
Mandangan, Atty. Kimal M. Salacop, Datu Kamar M.
Mindalano, Mayor Raslani Mindalano, Vice-Mayor
Alidadi A. Mindalano, Eng. Rashdi A. Mindalano, Mrs.
Paisha Mindalano Aguam, Datu Azis Mindalano Aguam,
Mrs. Moomina Mindalano Omar, Datu Aminola
Mindalano Omar), claiming to be the nearest relatives
of the late Amir Mindalano, suing on their own behalf
and on behalf of the entire Mindalano clan of
Mindanao, filed a Complaint for damages (Civil Case
81-86) before Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of
Marawi City charging the Bulletin Publishing Corp.
represented by its President, Martin Isidro and its
Publisher, Apolonio batalla, Ben F. Rodriguez, Fred J.
Reyes, Jamil Maidan Flores, et. al. with libel. The
Mindalanos' action was anchored on a feature article
written by Flores entitled "A Changing of the Guard,"
which appeared in the 22 June 1986 issue of Philippine
Panorama, a publication of Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. In particular, exception was taken to the
following excerpt: "The division of Lanao into Sur and
Norte in 1959 only emphasized the feudal nature of
26

Maranaw politics. Talk of Lanao politics and you find

yourself confined to a small circle of the Alonto,
Dimaporo, Dimakuta, Dianalan, Lucman families and a
few more. These are big, royal families. If you are a
Maranaw with aspirations for political leadership, you
better be a certified bona fide member of one or
several of these clans. xxx About the only time that
one who was not of any royal house became a leader
of consequence in the province was during the
American era when the late Amir Mindalano held some
sway.
That was because Mindalano had the advantage of
having lived with an American family and was
therefore fluent and literate in English. But as soon as
the datus woke up to the blessings of the transplanted
American public school system, as soon as they could
speak and read and write in English, political
leadership again became virtually their exclusive
domain. There must be some irony in that." They
alleged that, contrary to the article, the Mindalanos
"belong to no less than 4 of the 16 Royal Houses of
Lanao del Sur," that the statement that the late Amir
Mindalano, grand patriarch of the Mindalano clan, had
lived with an American family, a statement which, they
alleged, apart from being absolutely false, "has a
distinct repugnant connotation in Maranao society."
Contending finally that Bulletin, et. al. had with malice
inflicted "so much damage upon the social standing of
the plaintiffs" as to "irreparably injure" the Mindalano
name and reputation, and thus interposed a claim for
the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses, all in the
aggregate amount of P2,350,000.00. Reacting to the

complaint, Bulletin, et. al. filed on 6 August 1986 a

Motion to Dismiss urging that (a) venue had been
improperly laid, (b) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, and (c) the complainants lacked the
capacity to bring the suit. In an Order dated 30
October 1986, however, Judge Edilberto Noel
(Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of the Regional Trial
Court, 12th Judicial Region with station in Marawi City)
denied the Motion to Dismiss and directed Bulletin, et.
al. to file their answer to the complaint. Bulletin, et. al.
filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the Bulletins article, which did not
include the late Amir Mindalano as a member of a
royal clan, be considered defamatory.
Held: It is axiomatic in actions for damages for libel
that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole. In
its entirety, the subject article "A Changing of the
Guard" is in essence a popular essay on the general
nature and character of Mindanao politics and the
recent emergence of a new political leader in the
province of Lanao del Sur. The essay is not focused on
the late Amir Mindalano nor his family. Save in the
excerpts complained about, the name of the Mindalano
family or clan is not mentioned or alluded to in the
essay. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus
merely illustrative or incidental in the course of the
development of the theme of the article. The language
utilized by the article in general and the above
excerpts in particular appears simply declaratory or
expository
in
character,
matter-of-fact
and
27

unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or

derisive implications or nuances appear detectable at
all, however closely one may scrutinize the above
excerpts. There is no evidence of malevolent intent
either on the part of the author or the publisher of the
article in the quoted excerpts. Further, although the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that titles of
royalty or nobility have been maintained and appear to
be accorded some value among some members of
certain cultural groups in our society, such titles of
royalty or nobility are not generally recognized or
acknowledged socially in the national community. No
legal rights or privileges are contingent upon grant or
possession of a title of nobility or royalty and the
Constitution expressly forbids the enactment of any
law conferring such a title. Thus, the status of a
commoner carries with it no legal disability. Assuming
for present purposes only the falsity (in the sense of
being inaccurate or non-factual) of the description in
the Panorama article of Amir Mindalano as not
belonging to a royal house, the Court believes that
such a description cannot in this day and age be
regarded as defamatory, as an imputation of "a vice or
defect," or as tending to cause "dishonor, discredit or
contempt," or to "blacken the memory of one who is
dead" in the eyes of an average person in our
community. The above excerpts complained of do not
disparage ar deprecate Maranao titles of royalty or
nobility, neither do they hold up to scorn and
disrespect those who, Maranao or not, are commoners.
There is no visible effort on the part of Bulletin, et. al.
to cast contempt and ridicule upon an institution or
tradition of members of a cultural or ethnic minority

group, an "indigenous cultural community" in the

language of the Constitution, whose traditions and
institutions the State is required to respect and
protect. What the Mindalanos assert is defamatory is
the simple failure to ascribe to the late Amir
membership in a Maranao royal house, the ascription,
in other words, to him of a factual condition shared by
the overwhelming majority of the population of this
country, both Maranao and non-Maranao, Muslim and
non-Muslim. In a community like ours which is by
constitutional principle both republican in character
and egalitarian in inspiration, such an ascription,
whether correct or not, cannot be defamatory.
Furthermore, personal hurt or embarassment or
offense, even if real, is not, however, automatically
equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation
protects one's interest in acquiring, retaining and
enjoying a reputation "as good as one's character and
conduct warrant" in the community and it is to
community standards not personal or family
standards that a court must refer in evaluating a
publication claimed to be defamatory. Hence, the
article "A Changing of the Guard" is clearly one of
legitimate public interest. The neewspaper in the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press have
kept well within the generally accepted moral and civil
standards of the community as to what may be
characterized as defamatory. The complaint in the
court below failed to state a cause of action and should
have been dismissed by the Judge.

28

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor

daughter, JOANNA* MARIE BIANCA S. BINAY,
petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENIVI
V. FACTAO and VICENTE G. TIROL, respondents.
G.R. No. 170643

September 8, 2006

Facts:

In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special

Edition, an article entitled "ALYAS ERAP JR." was
published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle
of the Binays and the assets that they acquired while
in public office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:
Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong
anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng panty na
nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer
ni Binay. Magarbo ang pamumuhay ng batang ito dahil
naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.
Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the
minor Joanna Marie Bianca,5 filed a complaint6 for libel
against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol as
publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the article,
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati.

Petitioner claims that the article is defamatory as it

tends to, if not actually, injure Joannas reputation and
diminish the esteem, respect, and goodwill that others

have of her. Petitioner alleges that there is no good

intention or justifiable motive in publishing Joannas
status as an adopted child which is essentially a
private concern and the purchase of an expensive
intimate apparel, but to ridicule and to induce readers
to lower their perception of Joanna.
On the other hand, private respondents allege that
they did not harp on Joannas status as an adopted
child as the same was mentioned only once in the
article; that they did not intend to injure her reputation
or diminish her self-esteem; that they referred to the
price of the underwear not for the purpose of
maligning her or to make her look frivolous in the
publics eyes, but to show that petitioner and his
family lead lavish and extravagant lives; and that this
matter is within the realm of public interest given that
petitioner is an aspirant to a public office while his wife
is an incumbent public official.

Issue:

The issue to be resolved is whether there is prima

facie evidence showing that the subject article was
libelous.

Ruling:

Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is

defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
29

act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance

tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead." Its elements are as
follows: (a) an imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation;
(c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) the
existence of malice.19 Thus, for an imputation to be
libelous, it must be defamatory, malicious, published,
and the victim is identifiable.20
The elements of publication and identity of the person
defamed are present in this case. Thus, in resolving
the issue at hand, we limit our discussion on whether
paragraph 25 of the subject article contains the two
other elements of libel, to wit: (a) imputation of a
discreditable act or condition to another, i.e., whether
the paragraph is defamatory; and (b) existence of
malice.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the

words used are construed in their entirety and taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.22
Tested against the foregoing, we find that there is
prima facie showing that paragraph 25 of the subject
article is defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and
vexatious as it has absolutely nothing to do with
petitioner's qualification as a mayoralty candidate or
as a public figure. It appears that private respondents
only purpose in focusing on Joannas status as an
adopted child and her alleged extravagant purchases

was to malign her before the public and to bring her

into disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of
her privacy.

The Court also disagrees that the same constitutes

privileged communication because it was a fair
comment on the fitness of petitioner to run for public
office, particularly on his lifestyle and that of his family
as accused argues. He claims that as such, malice
cannot be presumed. It is now petitioners burden to
prove malice in fact.
According to the court, paragraph 25 does not qualify
as
a
conditionally
or
qualifiedly
privileged
communication, which Article 354 of the Revised Penal
Code limits to the following instances: (1) A private
communication made by a person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2)
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
To qualify under the first category of a conditionally or
qualifiedly privileged communication, paragraph 25
must fulfill the following elements: (1) the person who
made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an
interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board,
or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter,
and who has the power to furnish the protection
30

sought; and (3) the statements in the communication

are made in good faith and without malice. 24
Whichever way we view it, we cannot discern a legal,
moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's status as
an adopted daughter. Neither is there any public
interest respecting her purchases of panties worth
P1,000.00. Whether she indeed bought those panties
is not something that the public can afford any
protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious
that private respondents' only motive in inserting
paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass
Joanna before the reading public.
In addition, the claim that paragraph 25 constitutes
privileged communication is a matter of defense, 25
which is can only be proved in a full-blown trial. It is
elementary that "a preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof."26
Moreover, under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. It is thus
incumbent upon private respondents to prove that
"good intention and justifiable motive" attended the
publication of the subject article.
Ayer Productions Pty Ltd vs Capulong
Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and
his movie production company, Ayer Productions,

envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing

and for Philippine and international release, the
historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day
Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other
government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified
his approval of the intended film production.
It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series
television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style,
creating four fictional characters interwoven with real
events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New
South Wales) is an American historian have developed
a script.
Enrile declared that he will not approve the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family
in any cinema or television production, film or other
medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.
petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of
Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and
petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion
picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile
invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistance of the movie production and making of any
reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating
any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or
marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was
violated.

31

Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression

includes the freedom to film and produce motion
pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or
to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the
circumstance that the production of motion picture
films is a commercial activity expected to yield
monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted
and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither
private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge
knew what the completed film would precisely look
like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present
danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject
matter is one of public interest and concern. The
subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the
history of the country.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous
events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners
propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public
figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to
some extent at least, their right to privacy.
The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the
instant case between the constitutional freedom of
speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may
be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and
historical in its presentation of events.

Bartnicki vs Vopper

Brief Fact Summary. Bartnicki (P) and Kane (P) were

union representatives whose cell phone conversation
was illegally intercepted and recorded at a time when
collective-bargaining negotiations were going on, in
which they were involved. Vopper (D) was a radio
commentator who played a tape of the conversation
between the two unionists on his radio show in
connection with his news story featuring the
negotiated settlement. Bartnicki (P) and Kane (P) filed
for damages, one ground being that Vopper (D) with
others used the tape on public media despite knowing
or having reasonable grounds to know that the tape
was of an illegally tapped conversation. Vopper (D)
claimed that his disclosure was protected under the
freedom of speech guaranteed under the First
Amendment.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The anti-wiretapping laws
make it illegal to disclose the content of a conversation
which was itself illegally intercepted. However, if these
provisions are made to apply to the disclosure of
information which has been obtained in a legal way
from the party which intercepted the conversation, and
if the information relates to some matter of public
concern, the said provisions violate the First
Amendment.
Facts. Some unknown person tapped and recorded a
cell phone conversation between Bartnicki (P ) who
was chief negotiator for a teachers union, and Kane
(P) who was president of the same union. The
conversation included a threat of violent action
(perhaps metaphorically) by Bartnicki in the event the
unions demands were not met. The negotiations
32

eventually wound up with a settlement in favor of the

teachers. After the settlement, Vopper (D), a radio
commentator, aired a recording of the intercepted
conversation on his show along with his report on the
settlement. He was not party to the interception, and
did not know who was responsible for it, and had
obtained the recording by legal means. The two union
leaders filed for damages under federal wiretapping
laws, which under S. 2511(1)(a) prohibits intercepting
cell phone calls, and under S. 2511(1)(c) prohibits
disclosure of material obtained by illegal interception.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted review of the case.
Issue. Do the wiretapping laws which proscribe
disclosure of material obtained by unlawfully tapping
communications violate the First Amendment, if used
to conceal information which has been obtained by
legal means from the intercepting party, and when
such information is related to public concern?
Held. (Stevens, J.) Yes. The provisions of federal
wiretapping laws are in violation of the First
Amendment if used to suppress the disclosure of
information obtained legally from a party which
illegally intercepted a conversation, and if the
information is such as concerns the public. Since the
Court has no doubt of Voppers statement that he was
not involved in nor had knowledge of the illegal
interception of the conversation, that he came into
possession of the intercepted communication lawfully,
and that the disclosed information was of public
concern. In such a case, it would be a violation of the
constitution if a state were to make a citizen liable for
the publication of true information. The issue to be

determined here is whether a person who has obtained

access to some material in a legal manner from one
who has procured it through illegal means should be
punished for publishing the material. The wiretapping
legislation has as its first intent the removing of
incentive
for
any
interception
of
private
communication. This is not served if an innocent
disclosure of public information obtained legally is
punished under that law. The person who performed
the illegal act is the one who merits punishment, and
only in such a case will the punishment have the
desired deterrent action.
The second intent the
government intends to serve through this law is to
prevent harm from ensuing to the persons whose
private
communications
were
thus
illegally
intercepted. This is a much stronger motive, as it is an
important essential of government to ensure privacy of
comversation. In this suit, however, the maintenance
of privacy is of less concern than the disclosure of
matters which concern the public. When a person
involves himself in public affairs, he invites some loss
of privacy as a matter of course. This material of public
concern cannot be removed from the protection
afforded by the First Amendment because some
unknown person acted illegally in obtaining the tapped
conversation. The decision is affirmed.
Dissent. (Rehnquist, C. J.) The federal and state
government anti- wiretapping laws were enacted in
order to prevent the privacy of citizens from violation.
Under these laws, it is illegal to intentionally tap into a
private conversation and also to disclose material from
electronic communications. The majority view of the
court is that these laws are in violation of the First
33

Amendment, since the illegally obtained information

relates to a matter of public concern, even though the
concept of what constitutes valid public concern is not
a matter the majority even touch upon. However, it is
undoubtedly true that this view as held by the majority
actually reduces the freedoms protected by the First
Amendment, since millions of citizens who use
electronic communication have reason to fear
disclosure of their private conversation under this
nebulous view. The anti-wiretapping statutes are
neutral as to the content of the tappedconversations,
and only apply to the fact of illegally obtaining private
information. This definition is extremely precise to fit
the demands of the statutes object, and therefore it is
against all precedent to review these laws as
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, the standards of
which they already meet. These laws should be upheld
under intermediate scrutiny as they do further the
important governmental interest of protecting citizen
privacy. The constitution should not be a means of
protecting
unwilling
publication
of
private
conversations.
Concurrence. (Breyer, J.) The Court decision in this
case is intended to be applicable only to the facts of
this specific case, and not to extrapolate beyond this
situation. The facts here considered are that,first, the
broadcasters were within the law up to the time of
their publishing the information, and that secondly, the
information disclosed involved a threat of possible
physical harm to others, which is a matter of public
concern.

Discussion. The issue in this case led to a decision

which expanded the legal precedent in this area. Until
this time the Courts holding was that under the First
Amendment, a person could not be held liable for
publishing private facts provided the information was
legally obtained from public records. The only
justification for liability would be a governmental
interest of highest magnitude. This present case
involved communication of a matter which could be
regarded as public in some aspects so that it could not
be treated as a purely private matter, which might
have rendered the publisher liable.
Reno vs American Civil Liberties Union
Brief Fact Summary. Two provisions of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) that
criminalized providing obscene materials to minors by
on the internet were held unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a content-based
blanket restriction on speech is overly broad by
prohibiting protected speech as well as unprotected
speech, such restriction is unconstitutional.
Facts. At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory
provisions enacted to protect minors from indecent
and patently offensive communications on the
Internet. The District Court made extensive findings of
fact about the Internet and the CDA. It held that the
statute abridges the freedom of speech protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).

34

Issue. Whether the two CDA statutory provisions at

issue are constitutional?
Held. No. Judgment of the District Court affirmed.
Under the CDA, neither parents consent nor their
participation would avoid application of the statute.
The CDA fails to provide any definition of indecent
and omits any requirement that the patently offensive
material lack serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. Further, the CDAs broad categorical
prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are
not dependent on any evaluation by an agency
familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.
CDA applies to the entire universe of the cyberspace.
Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on
speech, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a
form of time, place and manner restriction. The CDA
lacks the precision that the First Amendment of the
Constitution requires when a statute regulates the
content of speech. In order to deny minors access to
potentially harmful speech, the statute suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive. The CDA places an
unacceptable burden on protected speech, thus, the
statute is invalid as unconstitutional.
Concurrence. The constitutionality of the CDA as a
zoning law hinges on the extent to which it
substantially interferes with the First Amendment
rights of adults. Because the rights of adults are
infringed only by the display provision and by the
indecency transmission provision, the judge would
invalidate the CDA only to that extent.

Discussion. This case brings the First Amendment of

the Constitution into the Internet age while prohibiting
speech regulations that are overbroad despite their
seemingly benevolent goals.
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

v.

THE

Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial

communications, also known as spam is entitled to
protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit
the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded
the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot
rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of
the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private
individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation
to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it.
In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that
online defamation constitutes similar means for
committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes
35

only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author

of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings
with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal
Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of
print.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
that punishes aiding or abetting libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity. The terms aiding or abetting
constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect
on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or
abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners
point out, formal crimes such as libel are not
punishable unless consummated. In the absence of
legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their
level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel,
Section
4(c)(3)
on
Unsolicited
Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S.
Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto
Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1)
nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175,

otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of

2012 for violating the fundamental rights protected
under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the
Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing
the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government, the Executive Director of the Information
Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the
Philippine National Police, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The
Cybercrime
Act
violate
the
petitioners
constitutionally protected rights to freedom
of expression, due process, equal protection,
privacy of communications, as well as the
Constitutional
sanctions
against
double
jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative
authority and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizure;
o Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime
Act more than doubles the liability for
imprisonment for any violation of existing
penal laws are in violation of the
petitioners right against Double Jeopardy;
o Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act,
which permits the NBI and the PNP with
due cause to engage in real time
collection of traffic data without the
benefit of the intervention of a judge,
36

violates the Petitioners Constitutionallyprotected

right
to
be
free
from
unreasonable searches and seizure as
well as the right to the privacy of
communications;
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which
authorizes the Respondent Secretary of
DOJ to block or restrict access to any
content upon a prima facie finding that
the same violates the law, contains an
undue delegation of legislative authority,
infringes upon the judicial power of the
judiciary, and violates the Petitioners
Constitutionally-protected right to due
process and freedom of expression; and
Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a
cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of
the law increased the penalty from 6
months to 4 years and 2 months to the
greater period of 6 years to 10 years,
infringes upon the right to freedom of
expression and also restricts the freedom
of the press. Under Section 12, a prima
facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can
trigger an order directed at service
providers to block access to the said
material without the benefit of a trial or a
conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon
the right to freedom of expression and
also restricts the freedom of the press.
The increased penalties, plus the ease by

which allegedly libelous materials can be

removed from access, work together as a
chilling effect upon protected speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in
the court of law, and that this Petition is
therefore cognizable by the SCs judicial power
under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the
Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o imposes heavier penalties for online
libel than paper-based libel; single act of
online libel will result in two convictions
penalized separately under the RP and
the Cybercrime Act;
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will
ensure the imprisonment of the accused
and for a much longer period. Such
changes will result in a chilling effect
upon the freedom of speech;
o with the passage of the Cybercrime Act,
Senator Vicente Sotto IIIs earlier threat to
criminally
prosecute
all
bloggers
and internet users who were critical of
his alleged plagiarism of online materials
for use in his speech against the
Reproductive Health Bill became real;
threat of criminal prosecution under RA
10175 will work to preclude people such
as Petitioners from posting social
37

commentaries online, thus creating a

chilling effect upon the freedom of
expression;
o gives the DOJ Secretary blanket
authority to restrain and block access to
content whether authored by private
citizens or the organized press sans any
hearing of any kind but merely upon a
mere prima
facie showing
that
a
particular Internet article constitutes
online libel;
o respondents must demonstrate how the
Cybercrime Act will fare under strict
scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate
the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution:
o Persons who commit crimes using
information
and
communication
technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of
being imprisoned more than double the
imprisonment laid down in the RPC or
special law, simply by the passage of the
Cybercrime Act;
o the cybercrimes defined and punished
under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely
identical to the crimes defined in the RPC
and special laws which raises the
possibility that an accused will be
punished twice for the same offense in
violation of the Constitution;

Congress created a class of offenders

who commit crimes by, through or with
the use of ICTs in violation of the equal
protection clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate
the Right to Privacy and the Right Against
Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
o No compelling state interest that
justifies real time collection of data; the
authority vested on the Philippine
National Police and the National Bureau of
Investigation to collect data is not
bounded by any reasonable standard
except due cause which presumably,
the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
o While the privacy of suspected
terrorists, through the Human Security
Act, are protected by the intervention of
the
Court
of
Appeals
before surveillance operations
are
conducted, the privacy of all citizens may
be infringed without judicial participation
in the Cybercrime Act;
o Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required
to justify the incursion into the right to
privacy;
o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the
NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic
data at all times without interruption;
o

38

 No stated justification for this warrantfree unlimited incursion into the privacy
of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretarys Take Down
Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime
Act violates Due Process and is an Undue
Delegation of Legislative Authority
o The DOJ Secretarys overwhelming
powers to order the restriction or blocking
of access to certain content upon a mere
prima facie finding without any need for a
judicial determination is in clear violation
of petitioners Constitutionally protected
right to due process;
o The Cybercrime Act contemplates that
the respondent DOJ Secretary will be
judge, jury and executioner of all
cybercrime-related complaints;
o To consider that all penal provisions in all
specials laws are cybercrimes under
Section 6, it follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual
property rights owners may be
acted upon the Respondent DOJ
Secretary to block access to
websites and content upon a
mere prima facie showing of an
infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com)
offering
goods
on
retail
to
o

Philippine citizens may be blocked

for violating the Retail Trade Law;
3. Foreign service providers such
as Skype may be blocked from
offering voice services without
securing a license from the
National
Telecommunications
Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for
presumably violating the IP Code.
o The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests
laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro
Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to
determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power: (1) the completeness
test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Acts
declaration of policy does it lay
down the legislative policy with
respect to the blocking of content.
No limits upon the takedown power
of the respondent DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough
to prevent the DOJ Secretary from
exercising infinite discretion and
becoming the supreme authority in
the Philippine Internet landscape.
Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically
unconstitutional:
Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited
commercial communications
39

Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection

of traffic data
Section 19 which pertains to restricting or
blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 granting power to
the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer
data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed
evidence was not in keeping with the Constitution.
The said automatic take-down clause is found in
Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA
10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19 is
"constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a
form of final restraint on speech without prior judicial
determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement
authorities with due cause to collect or record by
technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real
time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that
"the transmission of
commercial
electronic
communication with the use of computer system which
seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and
services are prohibited" unless certain conditions
such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient
are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter
VIII of the law allows the rest of the law to "remain in
full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held
invalid.

Three other provisions were not struck down

and remain in the law, but they will not apply in certain
cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is
online libel, which is constitutional as far as the
original author is concerned.
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting
the commission of a cybercrime and to the attempt to
commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional
only in the following cases: child pornography,
unsolicited commercial communications (or spam),
and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other
cybercrimes outlined in the law.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime
Division Chief Ronald Aguto explained to Rappler that
it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the
prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a
cybercrime."
Aiding a
nd abetting the commission of a
cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover certain
players in the online industry.
Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber
criminal
under
other
laws,
was
declared
unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel
and child pornography.
The SC cited the guarantee against double
jeopardy or being punished more than once for the
same offense a guarantee outlined in the
Constitution in deciding on Section 7.
Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, while child pornography is punishable by
RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.

Nuances in other provisions

40

A person convicted of libel or child pornography can

only be punished once, under the coverage of
a single law.
Times Film Corp vs City of Chicago
I. ISSUES:
A. Issues Discussed: 1st Amendment (speech,
press, assembly)
B.
Legal
Question
Presented:
Did a Chicago city ordinance that required
submission of motion pictures to city officials for
approval prior to their public exhibition, and forbid
their exhibition unless they met certain standards,
violate the First Amendment?
II.
A.

CASE

SUMMARY:
Background:

Petitioner Times Film Corporation owned the

exclusive right to exhibit the film Don Juan in
Chicago. A Chicago city ordinance required that
anybody who wished to publicly exhibit a film
within city limits submit the film to the office of the
commissioner of police and pay a license fee. The
office of the commissioner of police was allowed to
refuse to issue a permit to show the film if it
determined that the film did not meet certain
standards. A denial of a permit to show a film
could be appealed to the mayor and the mayor's

decision

would

then

be

final.

Petitioner paid the license fee, but refused to

submit the film Don Juan to the office of the
commissioner of police for examination. After
Petitioner was refused a permit to show the film,
the corporation brought suit in federal court
seeking to prevent the city from interfering with
the exhibition of the film. Petitioner argued that
the
provision
of
the
ordinance
requiring
submission of the film constitutes a violation of the
First
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
The court dismissed Times Film Corporation's suit
on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction
over the matter. Petitioner appealed that ruling to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which
also denied that the corporation had jurisdiction.
Subsequently, Petitioner sought review in the
United States Supreme Court and the high court
granted certiorari.
B. Counsel of Record:
ACLU Side
(Petitioner/Appellant)
Felix J. Bilgrey and
Abner J. Mikva argued
the cause and filed a
brief for petitioner.

Opposing Side
(Respondent/Appellee)
Robert J. Collins and
Sydney R. Drebin
argued the cause for
respondents. With them
on the brief was John C.
Melaniphy.

41

C. The Arguments:
ACLU Side
(Petitioner/Appellant)
Unavailable

requirements as to the submission of the film.

Opposing Side
(Respondent/Appellee)
Unavailable

III. AMICI CURIAE:

ACLU Side
(Petitioner/Appellant)
Emanuel Redfield filed
a brief for the American
Civil Liberties Union, as
amicus curiae, urging
reversal.

Opposing Side
(Respondent/Appellee)
Unavailable

IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION:

"[T]here is not a word in the record as to the
nature and content of 'Don Juan.' We are left
entirely in the dark in this regard, as were the city
officials and the other reviewing courts. Petitioner
claims that the nature of the film is irrelevant, and
that even if this film contains the basest type of
pornography, or incitement to riot, or forceful
overthrow of orderly government, it may
nonetheless be shown without prior submission for
examination. The challenge here is to the censor's
basic authority; it does not go to any statutory
standards employed by the censor or procedural

In this perspective we consider the prior decisions

of this Court touching on the problem. Beginning
over a third of a century ago in Gitlow v. New York,
they have consistently reserved for future decision
possible situations in which the claimed First
Amendment privilege might have to give way to
the necessities of the public welfare. It has never
been held that liberty of speech is absolute. Nor
has it been suggested that all previous restraints
on speech are invalid...
Chicago emphasizes here its duty to protect its
people against the dangers of obscenity in the
public exhibition of motion pictures. To this
argument petitioner's only answer is that
regardless of the capacity for, or extent of, such an
evil, previous restraint cannot be justified. With
this we cannot agree. It is not for this Court to limit
the State in its selection of the remedy it deems
most effective to cope with such a problem,
absent, of course, a showing of unreasonable
strictures on individual liberty resulting from its
application in particular circumstances. We, of
course, are not holding that city officials may be
granted the power to prevent the showing of any
motion picture they deem unworthy of a license.
As to what may be decided when a concrete case
involving a specific standard provided by this
ordinance is presented, we intimate no opinion.
The petitioner has not challenged all - or for that
matter any - of the ordinance's standards.

42

Naturally we could not say that every one of the

standards, including those which Illinois' highest
court has found sufficient, is so vague on its face
that the entire ordinance is void. At this time we
say no more than this - that we are dealing only
with motion pictures and, even as to them, only in
the context of the broadside attack presented on
this record."
Held: the judgment is affirmed.

Freedman vs Maryland
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), is
a United States Supreme Court case that ended
government-operated rating boards with a decision
that a rating board could only approve a film and had
no power to ban a film. The ruling also concluded that
a rating board must either approve a film within a
reasonable time, or go to court to stop a film from
being shown in theatres. Other court cases determined
that television stations are federally licensed, so local
rating boards have no jurisdiction over films shown on
television. When the movie industry set up its own
rating systemthe Motion Picture Association of
Americamost state and local boards ceased
operating.
Ronald Freedman challenged the law of Maryland that
films must be submitted to the Maryland State Board
of Censors before being shown in theaters, claiming it

unconstitutional; violating freedom

granted by the First Amendment.

of

expression

In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court

held that a rating board could only approve a film and
had no power to ban a film.
The Maryland law is unconstitutional, since it provides
the danger of unduly suppressing protected
expression.

Gonzales v Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22,

1985
CJ Fernando
Facts:
Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed
that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults only
by a subcommittee of the movie review board together
with the required cuts and scene deletions. He justified
that these requirements were without basis and were
restrains on artistic expression. He adduced that the
film is an integral whole and all its portions, including
those to which the Board now offers belated objection,
are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a
whole, there is no basis even for the vague
speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its
classification.
He appealed to the movie review board but the same
affirmed the decion of the sub committee.

43

When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the

board claimed that the deletions were removed and
the requirement to submit the master negative was
taken out but the film was still rated for adults only.
The petition was amended to contest the rating only.
Issue: Was the rating made with grave avuse of
discretion (Note I put in those regarding obscenity for
future purposes)
Held: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse
of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES
Ratio:
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for
the communication of Ideas and the expression of the
artistic impulse. Burstyn-importance of motion pictures
as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. (No
clear dividing line between what affords knowledge
and that of pleasure or else there will be a diminution
to a right to self-expression). Bagatsing- Press freedom
may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly
and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such
freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can
be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that [the State] has a right to
prevent.
Censorship doesnt full cover free speech or there
might bean emasculation of basic rights. However,
there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua
non for the meaningful exercise of such right without
denying the freedom from liability.Freedom from
censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction.

Mutuc- board of review is limited to classification of

films to safeguard other constitutional objections,
hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.That is to abide by
the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and
restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of
expression may be limited is the clear and present
danger of an evil of a substantive character that the
State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not
only be clear but also present. There should be no
doubt that what is feared may be traced to the
expression complained of. The causal connection must
be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time element
cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger
be only probable.
Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so
if an entire production is banned, is allowable only
under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil to public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest.
Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance unorthodox Ideas, controversial
Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of
opinion have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of the First Amendment is the rejection of
obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.

44

Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is

difficulty in determining what is obscene.
Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed
material to be judged merely by the effect of an
isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons
The test was whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest. Some material can legitimately deal
with sex and its effects on susceptible persons. Such a
censorship can be considered violative of the
constitution. On the other hand, the substituted
standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand
the charge of constitutional infirmity.
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene
material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a
great and mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to
mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital
problems of human interest and public concern.
In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied
contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.
Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity
are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the
arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the
State.
Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than
true to its function if any government office or agency
would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist

enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for

beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine
what for him is a true representation. It is not to be
forgotten that art and belles-lettres deal primarily with
imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense.
What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to
respect, unless there is a showing that the product of
his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.
On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard
set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed
in such a fashion to avoid any taint of
unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a
recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a
fundamental, and a universal role of construction,
applied when considering constitutional questions, that
when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of
which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts
will always adopt the former.
There can be no valid objection to the controlling
standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion
when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is
very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH
VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the
fact that some scenes were not for young people. They
might misunderstand the scenes. The respondents
offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove
the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned: a less
liberal approach calls for observance. This is so
because unlike motion pictures where the patrons

45

have to pay their way, television reaches every home

where there is a set.
It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the
sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be
denied though that the State as parens patriae is
called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young.
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN and Loren Legarda (2005)
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of The

Inside Story produced and hosted by Loren Legarda. It
depicted of female students moonlighting as
prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees
and interviewed student prostitutes, pimps, customers
and some faculty members. Philippine Womens
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of
the students involved and the faade of PWU served as
the background of the episode. It caused uproar in the
PWU community. Dr. Leticia de Guzman (Chancellor
and Trustee of PWU) and PWU Parents and Teachers
Association file letter complaints with petitioner
MTRCB, alleging that the episode besmirched the
name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of
some of its female students.
MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint
with the MTRCB Investigating Committee alleging that
respondents:
-did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review

-exhibited the same without its permission, violating

Sec. 7 of PD 1986 and Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7,
Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations
Respondents: The Inside Story is a public affairs
program, news documentary and socio-political
editorial, the airing of which is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and
of the press. MTRCB has no power, authority and
jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon
respondents.

MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondents

to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program and
declared that all subsequent programs of the The
Inside Story and all other programs of the ABSCBN Ch
2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board
of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, the
Chairman of MTRCB issued a Decision affirming the
ruling of the Investigating Committee.

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari

with the RTC and sought to:
declare unconstitutional certain provisions of PD
1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations
- (alternative) exclude the The Inside Story from
the coverage of such provisions
- annul and set aside MTRCB Decision and
Resolution
because they constitute prior restraint on
respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of
-

46

the press, and those provisions do not apply to the The

Inside Story because it falls under the category of
public affairs program, news documentary or sociopolitical editorials governed by standards similar to
those governing newspapers.

RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN:

-

annulled Decision and Resolution of the MTRCB

declared that assailed provisions do not cover
The Inside Story and other similar programs for
being public affairs programs which can be
equated to newspapers

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by MTRCB.

Issue: WON the MTRCB has the power/authority to

review the The Inside Story prior to its exhibition or
broadcast by television. YES

MTRCB/SG: (1) all tv programs including public affairs

programs, news documentaries or socio-political
editorials are subject to MTRCBs power of review, (2)
tv programs are more accessible to the public than
newspapers, thus liberal regulation cannot apply, (3)
power to review tv programs does not amount to prior
restraint, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does not violate
respondents constitutional freedom of expression and
of the press.

SC: Rule in statutory construction: Ubi lex non

distinguit nec distinguere debemos (where the law
does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling
reason apparent in the law to justify it). When the law
says all television programs, the word all covers all
tv programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. Since The Inside Story is a tv
program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review.
There also has been no declaration by the framers
of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of
the press has a preferred status. If the SC did not
exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and
review power of MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story. The
only exceptions are tv programs imprinted or exhibited
by the Philippine Government and/or its departments
and agencies, and newsreels.

WON The Inside Story

Newsreels.

falls under the category of

Respondents: Yes.
SC: NO. It is not defined in PD 1986 but Websters
dictionary defines it as short motion picture films
portraying or dealing with current events; mostly
reenactments of events that had already happened.
The MTRCB Rules and Regulations define it as straight
news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses,
commentaries and opinions. The Inside Story is more
of a public affairs program, a variety of news
47

treatment; a cross between pure tv news and newsrelated commentaries, etc. within MTRCBs review
power.

MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the

program nor did it cancel respondents permit. The
latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit
the program to MTRCB for its review and approval.
Therefore, there is no need to resolve whether certain
provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and
Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry:
-

proper party
actual case or controversy
question raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
the decision on the constitutional or legal
question
must
be
necessary
to
the
determination of the case itself

Petition of MTRCB Granted. RTC Decision Reversed.

MTRCB Decision Affirmed.
United States vs. Bustos [GR L-12592, 8 March 1918]
First Division, Malcolm (J): 5 concur
Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of
the Province of Pampanga assembled, the prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary

through the law office of Crossfield & O'Brien, and 5

individuals
signed
affidavits,
charging
Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and
asking for his removal. Crossfield & O'Brien submitted
this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to
the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by
these attorneys was signed by 34 citizens. The
Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of
first instance for the Seventh Judicial District
requesting investigation, proper action and report. The
Honorable Percy M. Moir, recommended to the
Governor-General that Punzalan be removed from his
position as justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and ordered that the
proceedings had in the case be transmitted to the
Executive Secretary. Later the justice of the peace filed
a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance
granted the motion and reopened the hearing;
documents were introduced, including a letter sent by
the municipal president and is councilors of Masantol,
Pampanga, asserting that the justice of the peace was
the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime,
the auxiliary justice of the peace, had instituted the
charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first
instance ordered a suppression of the charges against
Punsalan and acquitted him of the same. Attorneys for
complainants thereupon appealed to the GovernorGeneral. On 12 October 1916, Felipe Bustos, et. al.
(the petitioners against Punzalan) were charged for
libel. The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the
defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez, Juan
S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty
48

and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P10 and

1/32 of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense,
coming into the case, after the handing down of the
decision, filed on 16 December 1916, a motion for a
new trial, the principal purpose of which was to retire
the objection interposed by then counsel for the
defendants to the admission of the document
consisting of the entire administrative proceedings.
The trial court denied the motion. All the defendants,
except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato Macalino
appealed.
Issue: Whether the intemperate allegations set forth in
the information against the public official may be the
basis of a libel case against the petitioning citizens.
Held: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." These paragraphs found in the
Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage.
The language carries with it all the applicable
jurisprudence of great English and American
Constitutional cases. The interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in
the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thinskinned with reference to comment upon his official

acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the

individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not
authorized defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual
is less than the State, so must expected criticism be
born for the common good. Rising superior to any
official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the
Legislature, to the Judiciary to any or all the
agencies of Government public opinion should be
the constant source of liberty and democracy. The
guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the
right
to
criticize
judicial
conduct.
The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced
is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge
the same as any other public officer, public opinion will
be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of
public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be
tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in
the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over
the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a
citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On
the contrary, it is a duty which everyone owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all
know of any official dereliction on the part of a
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to
bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is
to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr.
Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of
libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the
conduct of their officials in whispers or with bated
breath in a free government, but only in a despotism."
49

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary

consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the right of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petition means that any person or group of persons
can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate
branch or office of the government for a redress of
grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning
must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges
made. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the
orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege. Privilege is
classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first,
we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as
the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may
be lost by proof of malice. A pertinent illustration of
the application of qualified privilege is a complaint
made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable
cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still
cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements
must be made under an honest sense of duty; a selfseeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not
necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and
efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient

if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in

good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not
defeated by the mere fact that the communication is
made in intemperate terms. A further element of the
law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party
applies to the wrong person through some natural and
honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will not take
the case out of the privilege. Hence, the Court find the
defendants entitled to the protection of the rules
concerning qualified privilege, growing out of
constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights.

#9 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC. VS. JUDGE

MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 104, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1049
FACTS:
Published under the by-line of one
Marichu Villanueva and titled Judiciary worse than
PNP, an item in the June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila
Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the
results of the latest opinion polls conducted by the
Ateneo Social Weather Station, as Social Weather
Stations, Inc. (or SWS) is also known, showed the
Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that
the Philippine National Police. The item went on to
state that the President and his Cabinet had been
briefed on the results of the survey by Professors
Mahar Mangahas and Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and
that Malacanang had expressed concern over the
Judiciarys law standing. Press Secretary Jesus Sison
50

was also quoted as saying that this was most

puzzling, although he could not, recall the exact
rating, noting only that the PNP had a better image
that the judiciary.

against Honorable Maximiano C. Asuncion for grave

abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, in
connection with his issuance of an Order dated 17 June
1993.

Said report appears to have prompted Judge

Maximiano C. Asuncion, presiding judge of Branch 104
of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, motu
proprio to initiate on the same date of June 17, 1993
proceedings ordering the President of the SWS to:
explain why you should not be held in contempt for
distributing to the general public without prior
permission from any court your findings that the
people have more confidence with the police than with
judges thereby tending directly or indirectly to degrade
the administration of justice.

ISSUE: Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is

violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and freedom from prior restraint.

On June 21, 1993, Prof. Mahar Mangahas

through Atty. Antonio M. Abad, Jr. submitted his
comment and explanation that it was not true that the
Social Weather Stations, Inc. distributed to the general
public the alleged survey. Said survey was privately
given to Pres. Ramos and the cabinet and was not
intended for publication nor for public consumption
and that if ever it reaches the media, he had not
authorized anyone to do so.
The hearing was had a scheduled on June 23,
1993, after which Judge Asuncion promulgated an
Order dated July 2, 1993, finding Professor Mangahas
explanation satisfactory and dismissing the contempt
charge against him.
After three weeks or so, or more precisely on
July 26, 1993, Professor Mangahas addressed a letter
to the Chief Justice intended as a formal complaint

HELD:

No.

What was clearly implicit in the newspaper

report about the results of the SWS poll - in the words
of Judge Asuncion, that the people have more
confidence with the police than with the judges in
light of the fact, of which judicial notice is taken, that
said report came out at a time when there already was
widespread publicity adverse to the judiciary, there
can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the
administration of justice.
Thus, Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for
what, at a minimum, he must have felt duty-bound to
do in the circumstances. No question of prior
restraint or violation of the guarantee of free
speech arises here, what he did being, in
essence, merely to initiate an inquiry into the
source and basis of the derogatory news report.
And he forthwith abated the proceedings upon
receiving
an
explanation
he
deemed
satisfactory.
Upon the facts, and under applicable law and
principle, the complaint fails to make a prima facie
showing of the charges made therein, and must
perforce be as it is hereby, DISMISSED.
51

In Re Emil P. Jurado | 243 SCRA 299 (1995)

FACTS:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who
writes in a newspaper of general circulation (Manila
Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and
irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from
about October 1992 to March 1993). Other journalists
had also been making reports or comments on the
same subject. At the same time, anonymous
communications were being extensively circulated, by
hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and
corruption in the courts.
What was particularly given attention by the
Supreme Court was his column entitled Who will
judge the Justices? referring to a report that six
justices, their spouses and children and grandchildren
(a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong,
and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their
other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and
that the trip was arranged by the travel agency
patronized by this public utility firm.
This column was made amidst rumors that a
Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility
firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the
public utility firm. The seed of the proceeding at bar
was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court
on August 27, 1992, in the so-called controversial
case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No,
94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided;

the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr.

Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the
majority.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit
was also received from the public utility, denying the
allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court
then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt
with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility
company be docketed and acted upon as an official
Court proceeding for the determination of whether or
not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

ISSUE #1:
WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom
to justify the published writings.

HELD:
NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate,
may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement
and the false statement made with reckless disregard
of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm
for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or
otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the
52

exercise of his rights and in the performance of his

duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The provision is
reflective of the universally accepted precept of
abuse of rights, one of the most dominant principles
which must be deemed always implied in any system
of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in
ascertaining the truth of the statements when
publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to
identifiable judges or other public officials.Judges, by
becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily
subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which
embody more stringent standards of honesty,
integrity, and competence than are commonly required
from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who
seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having
forfeited any right to private honor and
reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all
save those who feel no need to maintain their selfrespect from becoming judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of
speech and the individual interest of judges (and for
that matter, all other public officials) in the
maintenance of private honor and reputation need to
be accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these
two legitimate interests is precisely found in the
norm, which requires those, who, invoking
freedom of speech, publish statements which
are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or

other public officials to exercise bona fide care

in ascertaining the truth of the statements they
publish. The norm does not require that a journalist
guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But
the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of
private reputation by publishing or circulating
defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to
ascertain the truth thereof.
Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed
that raw intelligence or reports he received
surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover,
some of his reports were completely untrue because
he did not bother to make any further verification.

ISSUE #2:
WON the court has the power to cite him for contempt.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to
punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in
any manner with a case before the Court. The power to
punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against improper interference with the due
administration of justice." Contempt is punishable,
even if committed without relation to a pending
case.

53

Jurado would also claim that the Court has no

administrative supervision over him as a member of
the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why
he is being singled out, and, by being required to
submit to a separate administrative proceeding,
treated differently than his other colleagues in media
who were only asked to explain their reports and
comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad
Hoc Committee.
The answer is that upon all that has so far been
said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for
utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation
which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the
administration of justice, or interfere with the
disposition of its business or the performance of its
functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been
singled out. What has happened is that there
have been brought before the Court, formally
and in due course, sworn statements branding
his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him
the alternatives of substantiating those reports
or assuming responsibility for their publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what
capacity whether a journalist, or as a member of the
bar he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby
he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar
earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account
as a lawyer for his statements as ajournalist.
This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and
principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to
sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused
press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present

to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and

opprobrium,
detriment
and
prejudice
of
the
administration of justice. That he is at the same
time a member of the bar has nothing to do with
the setting in of those sanctions, although it
may aggravate liability.
Jurados actuations, in the context in which they
were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of
whom he wrote.
They constitute contempt of court, directly tending
as they do to degrade or abase the administration of
justice and the judges engaged in that function. By
doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of
reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live
by their Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at
all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their
calling.
Fortun v. Quinsayas, et.al.
G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013
(Confidentiality Rule in Disbarment Proceedings;
Exception)
Facts: Petitioner Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun, the lead
defense counsel of Ampatuan, Jr. in the prominent
"Maguindanao Massacre Case," filed this present
petition for contempt against Atty. Prima Jesusa
Quinsayas,
et.al.,
including
media
men
and
broadcasting companies.
Quinsayas, et.al. filed a disbarment case against
Fortun for dishonest and deceitful conduct violative of
54

the Code of Professional Responsibility. They alleged

that Fortun is "engaging in activities misleading the
prosecution and the trial court." Pending the
disbarment case, Quinsayas was invited to a show
"ANC Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao
Massacre," where he discussed the disbarment case
against Fortun, including its principal points. This
tempted Fortun to file this present petition against him
and various media men and companies.
Fortun alleged that Quinsayas, et al. actively
disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint
against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court on the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings.
Petitioner
further
alleged
that
respondent media groups and personalities conspired
with Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential
materials on their respective media platforms. He said
that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint
against him exposed this Court and its investigators to
outside influence and public interference.
In their comments, respondents, among others,
contended that the filing of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner was already the subject of
widespread news and already of public knowledge, and
that petitioner is a public figure and the public has a
legitimate interest in his doings, affairs, and character.
Issue: Whether or not respondents violated the
confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings,
warranting a finding of guilt for indirect contempt of
court.

Held: Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule, but

the media men and companies are not liable thereto.
The Court recognizes that publications which are
privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential
in nature until their final resolution and the final
decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing
of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a
matter of public concern considering that it arose
from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of
the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on
his involvement and participation as defense counsel
in the case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment
complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions
involving the Maguindanao Massacre case. Since
petitioner is a public figure or has become a
public figure because he is representing a
matter of public concern, and because the event
itself that led to the filing of the disbarment
case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the
filing of the disbarment case as legitimate news.
It would have been different if the disbarment case
against petitioner was about a private matter as the
media would then be bound to respect the
confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings
under Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Said provision of the Rules of Court is not a
restriction on the freedom of the press. If there is a
55

legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from

making a fair, true, and accurate news report of a
disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate
public interest in a disbarment complaint, members of
the media must preserve the confidentiality of
disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
As to Quinsayas, he is bound by Section 18, Rule
139-B both as a complainant in the disbarment case
against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an
officer of the Court, Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, he
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint
against petitioner to members of the media which act
constitutes contempt of court. The premature
disclosure by publication of the filing and
pendency of disbarment proceedings is a
violation of the confidentiality rule.
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this
Court to make its investigations free from any
extraneous influence or interference, but also to
protect the personal and professional reputation of
attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and
litigants. It is also to deter the press from publishing
administrative cases or portions thereto without
authority.
In view thereof, the court found Quinsayas liable
for indirect contempt of court, with a fine of P20,000.

Gonzales v. COMELEC
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 4880 on
the grounds that it violates their rights such as
freedom of speech, of assembly, to form associations
or societies. More so, they question the forms of
election campaigns enumerated in the act.
Facts:
1. Congress passed a statute (RA 4880) which was
designed to maintain the purity and integrity of
the electoral process and calling a halt to the
undesirable practice of prolonged political
campaigns, bringing in their wake serious evils
not the least of which is the ever-increasing cost
of seeking public office.
2. Cabigao was an incumbent council in the 4 th
district of Manila and the official candidate of
the Nacionalista Party for the position of Vice
Mayor. He was subsequently elected to that
position.
Meanwhile, Gonzales is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City, and a
political leader.
3. They claim that the enforcement of RA 4880
would prejudice their basic rights such as
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and
right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law. Specifically, they
challenge the validity of two new sections
included in the Revised Election Code under RA
4880 which was approved and took effect on
June 17, 1967. The said sections prohibit the
too early nomination of candidates and limit the
period of election campaign and political
activity.
More so, after defining the terms
56

candidates and election campaign/partisan

political activity, the acts which constitute
election campaign were specified, and that
simple expression of opinion and thoughts
concerning the election was not to be
considered as part of an election campaign.
This prohibition was furthered by a proviso
which provided that nothing stated in the Act
shall be understood to prevent any person from
expressing his views on current political
problems or issues, or from mentioning the
names of the candidates for public office whom
he supports.
4. The acts deemed included in the terms election
campaign of partisan political activity are: (a)
forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees or other groups of persons for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign or propaganda for or against a
party or candidate; (b) holding political
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for
the purpose
of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or
against a candidate; (c) making speeches,
announcements or commentaries or holding
interviews for or against the election of any
party or candidate for public office; (d)
publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or
party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving
contribution for election campaign purposes,
either directly or indirectly.

Ruling:
1. The Court held that the challenged statute
cannot be declared unconstitutional on several
grounds. First, it is premature to challenge the
statutes validity. Second, the required number
of votes was not met when the Court
deliberated on the scope of election campaigns
or partisan political activities. Precisely, the
Court declared that RA 4880 could have been
narrowly drawn and practices prohibited be
more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid
limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine.
2. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom
of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system. No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.
What does it embrace? At the very least, free
speech and free press may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then to previous
restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages
or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear
and present danger of substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
3. The vital need in a constitutional democracy for
freedom of expression is undeniable whether as
a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of
attaining the truth, of securing participation by
the people in social including political decisionmaking, and of maintaining the balance
57

between stability and change. The trend as

reflected in Philippine and American decisions is
to recognize the broadest scope and assure the
widest latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It
represents a profound commitment to the
principle that debate of public issue should be
uninhibited, robust and wide-open. It is not
going too far, according to another American
decision, to view the function of free speech as
inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as
they are, or even stirs people to anger.
4. Freedom of speech and of the press thus means
something more than the right to approve
existing
political
beliefs
or
economic
arrangements, to lend support to official
measures, to take refuge in the existing climate
of opinion on any matter of public consequence.
5. From the language of the specific constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be
passed abridging the freedom of speech and of
the press. The realities of life in a complex
society preclude however a literal interpretation.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. It
would be too much to insist that, at all times
and under all circumstances, it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition.
6. As for freedom of assembly, the Bill of Rights as
thus noted prohibits abridgment by law of
freedom of speech or of the press. The Bill of
Rights likewise extends the same protection to
the rights of people peaceably to assemble. As
pointed in US v. Bustos, this right is a necessary

consequence of our republican institution and

complements the right of free speech.
7. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs.
8. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the majority in Thomas v. Collins, it
was not accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of
grievances. All these rights, while not identical,
are inseparable. They are cognate rights and
assurance afforded by the clause of this section
of the Bill of Rights, wherein they are contained,
applies to all. As in the case of freedom of
expression, this right (right of people peaceably
to assemble) is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent.
9. Our Constitution likewise recognizes the
freedom to form association for purposes not
contrary to law. With or without a constitutional
provision of this character, it may be assumed
that the freedom to organize or to be a member
of any group or society exists. With the explicit
provision, whatever doubts there may be on the
matter are dispelled. Unlike the cases of other
guarantees, which are mostly American in
origin, this particular freedom has an indigenous
cast and could be traced to the Malolos
Constitution.
10.In a sense, however, the stress on this freedom
of association should be on its political
58

significance. If such a right were non-existent,

then the likelihood of a one-party government is
more than a possibility. Authoritarianism may
become unavoidable. Political opposition will
simply cease to exist; minority groups may be
outlawed, constitutional democracy as intended
by the Constitution may well become a thing of
the past.
11.Nonetheless, the Constitution limits this
particular freedom in the sense that there could
be an abridgment of the right to form
associations or societies when their purposes
are contrary to law. It is submitted that the
phrase for purposes not contrary to law is
another way of expressing the clear and present
danger rule for unless an association or society
could be shown to create an imminent danger to
public safety, there is no justification for
abridging the right to form associations or
societies.
12.In considering whether Republic 4880 is
violative of the rights of free speech, free press,
freedom
of
assembly
and
freedom
of
association, the Court cannot ignore the
legislative declaration that its enactment was
in response to a serious substantive evil
affecting the electoral process, not merely in
danger of happening, but actually in existence,
and likely to continue unless curbed or
remedied. To asset otherwise would be to close
ones eyes to the realities of the situation. Nor
can we ignore the express legislative purpose
apparent in the proviso that simple expressions
of opinion and thoughts concerning the elections
shall not be considered as part of an election
campaign, and in the other proviso that

nothing herein stated shall be understood to

prevent any person from expressing his views
on current political problems or issues, or from
mentioning the names of the candidates for
public office whom he supports.
Such
limitations qualify the entire provision restricting
the period of an election campaign or partisan
political activity.
13.According to the act, [i]t shall be unlawful for
any political party, political committee or
political group to nominate candidates for any
elective public office voted for at large earlier
than 150 days immediately preceding an
election, and for any other elective public office
earlier than 90 days immediately preceding an
election. This provision affects the right of
association. Political parties have less freedom
as to the time during which they nominate
candidates; the curtailment is not such,
however, as to render meaningless such a basic
right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save
the above cited, is not unduly narrowed.
Neither is there such an infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not
for such purpose. Thus, the Court sustained its
validity unanimously.
14.On the one hand, it cannot be denied that the
limitations thus imposed on the constitutional
rights of free speech and press, of assembly,
and of associations cut deeply into their
substance. On the other, it cannot be denied
either that evils, substantial in character, taint
the purity of the electoral process.
The
justification alleged by the proponents of the
measures weighs heavily with the members of
the Court, though in varying degrees, in the
59

appraisal of the aforesaid restrictions to which

such precious freedoms are subjected. They are
not unaware of the clear and present danger
that calls for measures that may bear heavily on
the exercise of the cherished rights of
expression, of assembly and of association.
15.The Court, with five justices unable to agree, is
of
the
view
that
no
unconstitutional
infringement exists insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees,
or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda or both for or against a candidate or
party is restricted and that the prohibition
against
giving,
soliciting
or
receiving
contribution for election purposes, either
directly or indirectly, is equally free from
constitutional infirmity.
16.The restriction on freedom of assembly as
confined to holding political conventions,
caucuses,
conferences,
meetings,
rallies,
parades or other similar assemblies for the
purpose of soliciting votes or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda or both for or against a
candidate or party, leaving untouched all other
legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult
question. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the
contention that this should be annulled.
17.The other acts, likewise deemed included in
election campaign or partisan political
activity tax, to the utmost, the judicial
predisposition to view with sympathy legislative
efforts to regulate election practices deemed
inimical because of their collision with the
preferred right of freedom of expression. From
the outset, such provisions did occasional

divergence of views among the members of the

Court. Originally, only a minority was for their
being adjudged as invalid. It is not so any more.
This is merely to emphasize that the scope of
the curtailment to which freedom of expression
may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, the
debasement of the electoral process.
18.The majority of the Court is of the belief that the
ban on the solicitation or undertaking of any
campaign or propaganda, whether directly or
indirectly, by an individual, the making of
speeches, announcements or commentaries or
holding interview for or against the election for
any party or candidate for public office, or the
publication or distribution of campaign literature
or materials, suffers from the corrosion of
invalidity. However, to call for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, it lacks one more affirmative
vote to that effect.
19.It is understandable for Congress to believe that
without the limitations set forth in the
challenged legislation, the laudable purpose of
RA 4880 would be frustrated and nullified.
Whatever persuasive force such approach may
command failed to elicit the assert of a majority
of the Court.
This is not to say that the
conclusion reached by the minority that the
above portions of the statute now assailed has
passed the constitutional test is devoid of merit.
It only indicates that for the majority, the
prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for
or against the election of any party or candidate
for public office and the prohibition of the
60

publication or distribution of campaign literature

or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether
directly
or
indirectly,
or
that
undertaking of any campaign or propaganda for
or against any candidate or party, is repugnant
to a constitutional command. To that extent, the
challenged statute prohibits what under the
Constitution cannot by any law be abridged.
20.In terms of the permissible scope of legislation
that otherwise could be justified under the clear
and present danger doctrine, it is considered
opinion of the majority, though lacking the
necessary vote for an adjudication of invalidity,
that the challenged statute could have been
more narrowly drawn and the practices
prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy
the constitutional requirements as to a valid
limitation under the clear and present danger
doctrine.
21.
It is undeniable, therefore, that even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, they cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. For precision of regulation is the
touchstone in an area so closely related to
our most precious freedoms.
22.It is of the opinion that it would be premature, to
say at least, for a judgment of nullity of any
provision found in RA 4880.
The need for
adjudication arises only if in the implementation
of the Act, there is in fact an unconstitutional
application of its provisions.
ADIONG v. COMELEC

March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its
powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and
other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution
provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following
are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of
Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly
exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboard
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in
the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELECs
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals
and stickers in mobile places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the
posting of decals and stickers on mobile places,

G.R. No. 103956

61

public or private, and limit their location or publication

to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of
Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that decals and stickers may be posted only
in any of the authorized posting areas provided in
paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public
or private except in designated areas provided for by
the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in
the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the
freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned
prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of
an individual to express his preference and, by
displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree
with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the
statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is
void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the
decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizens private property,
which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The
provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded
that they include the posting of decals or stickers in
the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated.
Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law. (The right to property may be
subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this

right is joined by a liberty interest, the burden of

justification on the part of the Government must be
exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is
not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich
candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to
inform the electorate as regards their candidacies,
mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and
stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be
reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on
cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving
vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in
this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the
COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.
PABLITO V. SANIDAD - petitioner; newspaper columnist
of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER,
a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio
and the Cordilleras
COMELEC - respondent; through its Solicitor- General
Type of petition filed: PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ISSUE:
Whether Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167
is constitutional or not.
62

HELD:
FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 was promulgated due to
the enacted RA No. 6766 (An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) last
October 23, 1989, which paved for a call of a
plebescite fo its ratification (original schedule was
reset from December 27, 1989 to January 30, 1990.
Allegations of Sanidad:
1.Unconsitutional as it it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
press
2.Constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionallyguaranteed freedom of the press bause of its penal
provsions in case of violation
Responses of COMELEC
-Not violative of the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press but only a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to
supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section
4 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of RA 6646
-Does Not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing his
views and/or from campaigning for or against the
Organic Act. He may still express his views or
campaign for or against the act through the Comelec
space and airtime (magazine/periodical in the
province)

Petiton is GRANTED- Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution

No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional
. TRO made permanent due to the following reasons:
1. It has no statutory basis
2. Form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable
reason
3. affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the
forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
ABS- CBN vs. COMELEC, GR 133486, Jan 28, 2000
This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC
Resolution No. 98-1419 . Petitioner asserts that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining
the petitioner or any other group from conducting exit
polls during the May 11 elections.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot
and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has
already been held and done with.
ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case?
RULING:
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed
Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental
freedom of expression transcend the past election. The
63

holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our

democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling
is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of
the issue now will only postpone a task that could well
crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had
occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the
extent
of
protection
given
by
constitutional
guarantees."7 Since the fundamental freedoms of
speech and of the press are being invoked here, we
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,
whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls
and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this
procedural requirement may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice,8 when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection
of labor,9 when the decision or resolution sought to be
set aside is a nullity,10 or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the
Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20)
days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner
got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under
the circumstances, there was hardly enough
opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to
obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998
elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence;

the Petition involves transcendental constitutional

issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Social Weather Stations Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections [GR 147571, 5 May 2001] Second Division,
Mendoza (J): 3 concur
Facts: The Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a
private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including
economics,
politics,
demography,
and
social
development, and thereafter processing, analyzing,
and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other
hand, Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation,
which features news-worthy items of information
including election surveys. SWS and Kamahalan
Publishing brought the action for prohibition with the
Supreme Court to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from enforcing 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act),
which provides that "Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election." SWS states that it wishes to conduct
an election survey throughout the period of the
elections both at the national and local levels and
release to the media the results of such survey as well
as publish them directly. Kamahalan Publishing, on the
other hand, states that it intends to publish election
survey results up to the last day of the elections on 14
May 2001. They argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
64

conducted and published the results of surveys prior to

the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as
two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither
empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable
danger to tile voting process posed by election
surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is
imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or
on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and
publishing articles concerning political issues up to the
day of the election. Consequently, they contend that
there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied
access to the results of election surveys, which are
relatively objective.
Issue: Whether 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.
Held: 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press. 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech,
expression, and the press prohibiting the publication of
election survey results affecting candidates within the
prescribed periods of 15 days immediately preceding a
national election and 7 days before a local election.
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional
rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to the Supreme Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.
The Government thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for in enforcement of such
restraint. There, thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every

legislation. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O

'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest
makes such interest "not related to the suppression of
free expression." By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the
election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4
shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not
viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical
results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression means that "the government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content." The prohibition
imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that
it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The
prohibition may be for a limited time, but the
curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total
suppression of a category of speech and is not made
less so because it is only for a period of 15 days
immediately before a national election and 7 days
immediately before a local election. In fine, 5.4 is
invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can
be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
US vs O Brien
65

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, OBrien

(Defendant), was convicted for symbolically burning
his draft card under a federal statute forbidding the
altering of a draft card. His conviction was upheld after
the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme
Court) found the law constitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. First, a government regulation
is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government. Second, if it furthers a
substantial or important governmental interest. Third,
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. Fourth, if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment constitutional
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Facts.
The
Defendant
was
convicted
under
Section:462(b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act (UMTSA) of 1948, amended in 1965 to
include the applicable provision that made it an
offense to alter, knowingly destroy, knowingly
mutilate a Selective Service registration certification.
Defendant knowingly burned his draft card on the front
steps of the local courthouse. The Court of Appeals
held the 1965 amendment unconstitutional as a law
abridging the freedom of speech.
Issue.
Whether
the
1965
Amendment
is
unconstitutional as applied to Defendant because his
act of burning the draft card was protected symbolic
speech within the First Amendment?
Whether the draft cards are merely pieces of paper
designed only to notify registrants of their registration
or classification, to be retained or tossed into the
waste basket according to the convenience of the
registrant?

Whether the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as

enacted because it was intended to suppress freedom
of speech?
Held. No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. It
cannot be accepted that there is an endless and
limitless variety of conduct that constitutes speech
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
to express an idea. However, even if the alleged
communicative element of Defendants conduct is
sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution), it does not
necessarily follow that the destruction of a draft card is
constitutionally protected activity. First, a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government. Second, if it
furthers a substantial or important governmental
interest. Third, if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
Fourth, if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment constitutional freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The
1965 Amendment meets all these requirement
s. Therefore, the 1965 Amendment is constitutional as
applied to Defendant.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.
Although the initial purpose of the draft card is to
notify, it serves many other purposes as well. These
purposes would be defeated if the card were to be
mutilated or destroyed.
No. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. The
purpose of Congress is not a basis for declaring this
legislation unconstitutional. Therefore, the 1965
Amendment is constitutional as enacted.
66

Discussion. This case creates a symbolic speech test

that was used here to uphold the 1965 Amendment to
the UMTSA.

Clark vs Community for Creative

Brief Fact Summary. A National Park Service regulation
banning camping in certain parks was held by the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
not to violate the First Amendment when applied to
prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park
and the Mall.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A message may be delivered
by conduct that is intended to be communicative and
that, in context, would reasonably be understood by
the viewer as communicative. Symbolic expression of
this kind may be forbidden or regulated if the conduct
itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the
regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial
governmental interest and if the interest is unrelated
to the suppression of speech.
Facts. In 1982, the Park Service issued a renewable
permit to the Respondent, Community for Creative
Non-Violence (Respondent), to conduct a wintertime
demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall for the
purpose of demonstrating about the plight of the
homeless. The permit authorized the erection of
symbolic tent cities. The Park Service, however, denied
Respondents request that the demonstrators be
permitted to sleep in the tents. Respondent filed this

action to prevent the application of the anti-camping

regulations to the proposed demonstration.
Issue. Whether a National Park Service regulation
banning camping in certain parks violates the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) when applied to prohibit demonstrators
from sleeping in Lafayette Park and the Mall?
Held. No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The
regulation forbidding sleeping is defensible as both a
time, place or manner restriction and as a regulation of
symbolic conduct. The requirement that the regulation
be content neutral is clearly met. The Park Services
decision to permit non-sleeping demonstrations does
not impugn the camping prohibition as a valuable, but
perhaps imperfect protection to the parks. The Park
Service regulation is necessary. Further the Park
Service has the authority to judge how to protect the
park lands. Therefore, the National Park Service
regulation banning camping in certain parks does not
violate the First Amendment of the Constitution when
applied to prohibit demonstrators from sleeping in
Lafayette Park and the Mall.
Dissent. The proper starting point for analysis in this
case is the recognition that the Respondents speech is
symbolic speech and therefore protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution. The regulations as
applied to Respondent, fails to satisfy the time, place
or manner standards. The Supreme Court should have
subjected the Governments restrictive policy to
something more than minimal scrutiny.

67

Discussion. This case illustrates that symbolic speech

can be regulated by the government as long as the
regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial
governmental interest and if the interest is unrelated
to the suppression of speech.
Virginia State Board vs Virginia Citizens Consumer
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, the Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Respondent), argues
that the state code prohibiting the advertising of
prescription prices is unconstitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Commercial speech is a form
of protected speech that can be regulated to protect
the public from deceptive or misleading information.
Facts. Virginia will charge a licensed pharmacist of
being unprofessional if he advertises the amount he
charges for prescription drugs. Drug prices vary
greatly (up to 650%) by location. Therefore, the
Respondent advocates for disclosure of the prices of
drugs.

advertised, then the government has a legitimate

interest in protecting the economic well-being and
health of the public.
Summary of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977)
Facts: Two Arizona attorneys opened a legal clinic for
low income people. Seeking to increase their volume
of business they ran a newspaper ad. The State Bar
tried to discipline them and they claimed the
prohibition violated the Sherman Act and the
1st Amendments free speech clause, as it applied to
the state through the 14th Amendment.

Issue: Whether the State Bars ban on attorney

advertising violated the attorneys right to free,
commercial speech, where the advertisement only lists
specific prices for routine services?

Issue. Is commercial speech protected by the First

Amendment?
Held. Yes. But, the First Amendment does not prevent
the state from regulating advertisements.
Dissent. Restrictions on commercial speech should be
left to the discretion of state legislatures.
Discussion. There is a substantial public interest in the
content of advertisements. The wording and
suggestions will lead consumers to buy or use
products. If the product does not function as

Holding: Yes, the flow of such information may not be

restrained, and the present application of the
disciplinary rule against attorney advertising violates
the 1st Amendment.

Procedure: Judgement of S. Ct. of AZ is affirmed in

part and reversed in part by S.Ct.
68

restraint, and there may be reasonable restrictions on

the time, manner, and place of advertising.
Rule : 1st Amendment and 14th Amendment.
Central Hudson Gas vs Public Service Commission
Rationale: The Sherman Act does not apply to
restraint of trade that is conceived and supervised by a
state government. If the Commercial basis of the attyclient relationship is to be promptly disclosed on
ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it
seems inconsistent to condemn the candid revelation
of the same information before he arrives. Habit and
tradition are not in themselves an adequate answer to
a constitutional challenge, and therefore the HX
foundation has crumbled. The belief that legal
services are so unique that fixed rates cannot be
established is refuted by the record, the State Bar
sponsors a program where attorneys perform services
like those advertised at standardized rates. The
prohibition of advertising serves only to restrict
information that flows to consumers. Advertising is the
traditional means for a supplier to inform a potential
purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange.
The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served to
burden access to legal services. Restraints on
advertising are an ineffective way of determining
shoddy work. An atty who is inclined to cut quality will
do so regardless of the rule on advertising. Most
lawyers will behave as they always have: They will
abide by their oaths. Advertising by attys may not be
subjected to blanket suppression. Advertising that is
false, misleading, illegal, or deceptive is subject to

Brief Fact Summary. In the winter of 1973-74 there

existed an electricity shortage in the State of New
York. Accordingly, the Appellee, the Public Service
Commission (Appellee), imposed a ban on all
advertising that promotes the use of electricity. By
1976 the electricity shortage subsided, causing the
Appellee to determine whether or not to continue the
ban. Upon further inquiry, the Appellee decided to
continue the ban, causing the Appellant, Central
Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. (Appellant), to file suit
claiming that the regulation of the Appellee was
infringing on their First and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional rights involving commercial speech.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case established a fourpart analysis for commercial speech cases. (1)
Whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution). To be protected, it must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. (2) Whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
part one and part two are satisfied, then (3) A court
must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted. (4)
Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Facts. In December 1973, the Appellee ordered electric
utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that
promotes the use of electricity. The Appellee based
69

this regulation on a finding that the interconnected

utility system in New York State does not have
sufficient fuel stocks to continue furnishing all
customer demands for the 1973-74 winter. In 1976,
the fuel shortage ended, causing the Appellee to
request public comment on its proposal to continue the
ban on advertising. The Appellant opposes the ban on
First Amendment constitutional grounds and filed this
suit after the Appellee decided to continue the ban.
The 1976 order from the Appellee was that information
advertising, used to encourage shifts of consumption
of electricity from peak use times to periods of low
electricity demand would be allowed because it does
not increase aggregate consumption, but would
promote the leveling of demand throughout the day.
The Appellee also offered to review specific proposals
by companies to determine if their advertisement
meets this criterion. The Appellant challenged this
order in state court, arguing that the Appellee
restrained commercial speech in violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The
Appellees order was upheld in the trial court, by the
appellate level and by the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue. Whether a regulation of the Appellee of the
State of New York violates the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution because it completely
bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility?
Held. Yes. The Appellees ban is unconstitutional even
though the United States Constitution (Constitution)
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. The
protection
available
for
particular
commercial
expression turns on the nature both of the expression
and of the governmental interests served by the
regulation. There is a four-part analysis for commercial

speech cases. (1) Whether the expression is protected

by the First Amendment of the Constitution. To
determine if it is protected, the speech must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. (2) Whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
parts one and part two are satisfied, then (3) A court
must determine whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted. (4)
Whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
Under this four-part analysis the Supreme Court of the
United States (Supreme Court) found that the
advertising is commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
found that the state interest in suppressing the use of
energy is substantial. The Supreme Court also found a
direct link between the state interest in conservation
and the Appellees order as there is a connection
between advertising and demand for electricity. This
lead the Supreme Court to consider whether the
complete suppression is more extensive than what is
necessary. The Supreme Court in this case determined
that the Appellee has not shown that it could not
protect its interest in energy conservation through a
less restrictive means. For example, providing
information in its advertisement about the relative
efficiency and expense of its offered service.
Therefore, since there is a less restrictive means
available, the restriction by the Appellant is an
unconstitutional restriction of free speech.
Dissent. The Supreme Courts decision fails to give due
deference to the subordinate position of commercial
speech. The dissenting judge feels the court has gone
back to the days of Lochner, feeling that it can strike

70

down regulations of a State through its own notions of

what is the most appropriate means of regulation.
Concurrence.
Doubts whether suppression of information concerning
the availability and price of a legally offered product is
ever a permissible way for the State to dampen
demand for or use of the product. But, agrees with the
majority that even though commercial speech is
involved, it is protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution. In fact, the Appellees ban is a covert
attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its
citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by
depriving the public of the information needed to make
a free choice.
Another concurring judge argued that this is not a
commercial speech case. Therefore, they see no need
to decide whether the four-part analysis, adequately
protects commercial speech as properly defined in
the face of a blanket ban of speech of the sort involved
in this case.
Discussion. This case is most significant because it
clearly provides a four-part test to be used in cases
involving commercial speech. The Supreme Court in
this case also provides a clear use of this test through
its analysis. This case builds on the definition of
commercial speech provided in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy. That case defined commercial speech as
expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience, which is to be used to
determine whether or not part one of the test in this
case is satisfied. Part two of the test, looks at whether
the States interest is substantial and is similar to all
other First Amendment analysis, except as stated in
this case and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the

state possesses an elevated standard of interest in

regulating commercial speech, as does part three
determining whether the regulation furthers the
interest. This leads to part four of the test, where it
seems most commercial speech cases will be decided.
In part four once again, as is with most First
Amendment expression cases, e.g. obscenity cases,
the Supreme Court will on a case-by-case basis
determine if there was a less restrictive means of
regulation. If a less restrictive means is available to
achieve the same goal, the answer will always
necessarily
strike
down
the
regulation
as
unconstitutional.
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINESvs. HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T.
DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51
(Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to
2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported,
promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured
that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish
infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children,
are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. the
71

DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,

2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing
that the RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the
Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the
Constitution in promulgating the RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition.
Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health
and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing
said provisions. The international instruments pointed
out by the respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are
deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the
DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
Customary international law is deemed incorporated
into our domestic system. Custom or customary
international law means a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987
Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires
that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of
international law refers to norms of general or

customary international law which are binding on all

states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the
(ICMBS), but it did not prohibit advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products.
Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides that
advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized
and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC). In
this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS
are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
This may constitute soft law or non-binding norms,
principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of the member states
and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA
Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of
the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature. On the other hand, the petitioners also
failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just
exactly how such protective regulation would result in
the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both
manufacturers and distributors, the Court sees no
harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the
rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance
with the objective, purpose and intent of the Milk
Code.
Pleasant Grove vs Summum
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460 (2009), is a United States legal case relating to the
intersection
of
government
speech
and
the
Constitution's
prohibition
on
a
government
72

"establishment" of a religion for the country,

specifically with respect to monuments (e.g., statues)
on public land.
Issue
In
this
case,
the United
States
Supreme
Court considered whether the municipality of Pleasant
Grove, Utah, which allows privately donated
monuments, including one of the Ten Commandments,
to be displayed on public property, must also let
the Summumchurch put up its own statue, similar in
size to the one of the Ten Commandments.
According to the New York Times: "In 2003, the
president of the Summum church wrote to the mayor
here with a proposal: the church wanted to erect a
monument inscribed with the Seven Aphorisms in the
city park, similar in size and nature to the one
devoted to the Ten Commandments. The city declined,
a lawsuit followed and a federal appeals court ruled
that the First Amendment required the city to display
the Summum monument."[1]
The Supreme Court's decision was expected to be the
most important establishment clause decision of the
term. Some court-watchers believed the Court would
rule that the United States Constitution does not allow
government to favor one religion over another. [2]
Arguing for the petitioner (the City of Pleasant Grove)
was Jay Alan Sekulow, chief counsel for the American
Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), and for the
Summum,
attorney
Pamela
Harris
of
the

firm OMelveny & Myers. The ACLJ argued that there

should be a distinction between government speech
and private speech and though the government should
have the right to display the 10 Commandments, it
should not have to endorse all private speech.
Holding
On February 25, 2009, the Supreme Court ruled
unanimously against Summum in the Pleasant Grove
case. Justice Samuel Alito, in his opinion for the court,
explained that a municipality's acceptance and
acquisition of a privately funded permanent monument
erected in a public park while refusing to accept other
privately funded permanent memorials is a valid
expression
of governmental
speech,
which
is
permissible and not an unconstitutional interference
with the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
According to Alito, "the display of a permanent
monument in a public park" is perceived by an
ordinary and reasonable observer to be an expression
of values and ideas of the government, the owner of
the park and the monument, even though the
particular idea expressed by the monument is left to
the interpretation of the individual observer. Alito
made a clear distinction between forms of private
speech in public parks, such as rallies and temporary
holiday displays (Christmas trees and menorahs), and
the government speech represented by permanent
monuments. He opined that even long winded
speakers eventually go home with their leaflets and
holiday displays are taken down; but, permanent
monuments endure and are obviously associated with
their owners. Alito wrote, "cities and other jurisdictions
take some care in accepting donated monuments."
While Summum attempted to persuade the Court that
73

preventing governments from selecting monuments on

the basis of content would be tenable, Justice Alito
noted that such a situation could put government in
the position of accepting permanent monuments with
conflicting messages, that do not represent the values
and ideals of the community, or removing all
monuments from public space. Alito also questioned
whether, if the law followed the view expressed by
Summum, New York City would have been required to
accept a Statue of Autocracy from the German
Empire or Imperial Russia when it accepted the Statue
of Liberty from France
A municipality's acceptance and acquisition of a
privately funded permanent monument erected in a
public park while refusing to accept other privately
funded permanent memorials is a valid expression of
governmental speech
Walker vs Texas
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), was a United States
Supreme Court case in which the Court held
that license plates are government speech and are
consequently more easily regulated/subjected to
content restrictions than private speech under the First
Amendment.
The Texas Division of the Sons of Confederate
Veterans sought to have a specialty license plate
issued in the state of Texas. The request was denied
prompting the group to sue, claiming that denying a
specialty plate was a First Amendment violation

The
majority
opinion,
written
by
Associate
Justice Stephen Breyer, relied heavily on the Courts
2009 decision in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,
which stated that a city in Utah was not obliged to
place a monument from a minor religion in a public
park, even though it had one devoted to the Ten
Commandments. The court ruled that refusing the
minor monument was a valid expression of
government which did not infringe on the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech.[1]
Justice Samuel Alito wrote the dissent, arguing that
specialty license plates are more commonly regarded
as a limited public forum for private expression,
consisting of "little mobile billboards on which
motorists can display their own messages". Therefore,
rejecting the design basically amounts to viewpoint
discrimination
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they
are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that
their right as organizations and individuals were
violated when the rally they participated in on October
6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is
74

a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a

permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause
as the time and place of a public assembly form part of
the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government.
The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to
assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and
two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy
resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of
their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those
raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is
void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October
4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response
and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections
4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect
on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably
assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine
Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of

grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and

petition for redress of grievances, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a
right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the
very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus
readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to lawful cause does not make it content-based
because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion,
protesting, and influencing in of grievances come
from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent
of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order,
75

public safety, public convenience, public morals or

public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and
respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take
all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable
freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of
the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of
this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices,
no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right
to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks
or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet
complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore,
Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it
would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are
ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, the
petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED
G.R. No. 175241

February 24, 2010

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

represented by its National President, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL
RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO"
ATIENZA, Respondent.

Facts:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thru its president
Jose Anselmo Cadiz filed a letter application for a
permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June
22, 2006 from 2:30 to 5:30 PM, before the Office of the
City Mayor of Manila, Mayor Jose Atienza. The latter
granted a permit but changed the venue to Plaza
Miranda, which permit the IBP received on June 19,
2006. The IBP, Attys. Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, and
Anselmo Cadiz then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Action. Having been unacted within 24
hours from its filing, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court, which it denied
because of the pendency of the CA petition. The rally
pushed thru on June 22, 2006 at the foot of the
Mendiola Bridge, despite the Manila Police District
barring them from doing so. After the rally, they
voluntarily dispersed. On June 22, 2006, the MPD filed
a criminal case against Atty. Cadiz for violation of the
Public Assembly Act for staging a rally not indicated in
the permit, which he answered.
In the meantime, the Court of Appeals denied the
petition for certiorari initially filed by the petitioners for
being moot and academic and lacking merit. It ruled
that the city mayor did not abuse his discretion when
76

he modified the venue of the rally. The Public Assembly

Act does not require that the reason for the
modification be put in writing. It merely requires that
the action taken shall be in writing and applicants be
furnished within 24 hours. Hence the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Did the Mayor act with grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the permit?
Held:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on
ground of mootness. However, even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
In the present case, the question of the legality of a
modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the
terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned
official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time
in processing the application where the shortest
allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The
susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to
definitively resolve the issue at hand.

xxx
Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall
act on the application within two (2) working days from
the date the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason
the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to
accept the application for a permit, said application
shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the
office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard
on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and
served on the application [sic] within twenty-four
hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf
denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in

77

his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in

an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate
Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after
receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on
appeal shall be required. A decision granting such
permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the
applicant shall, be immediately executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be
decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of
filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in
his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the
Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal
appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied)

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at

modifying the terms of the permit against the standard
of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to
an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
which blank denial or modification would, when
granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have
it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining
whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what
may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the
assumption especially so where the assembly is
scheduled for a specific public place is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there. The
exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is
not to be abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

xxx
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately
inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the
matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of
the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly
go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment

any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of
whim and caprice for respondent to just impose a
change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a
specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the
appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of
discretion and, under specific statutory provision, not
to have modified the permit in terms satisfactory to
the applicant.

78

Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

[GR 127930, 15 December 2000] First Division,
Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: Following the publication of the SeptemberOctober 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam
College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang
Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho), the members of
the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog,
all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed
by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College
Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November
1994 informed them that letters of complaint were
"filed against you by members of the Miriam
Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five
student have been forwarded to the Discipline
Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find
enclosed complaints. As expressed in their complaints
you have violated regulations in the student handbook
specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32,
Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n,
and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a,
page 37. You are required to submit a written
statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the
initial date of hearing to be held on November 15,
1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA
Conference Room." None of the students submitted
their respective answers. They instead requested Dr.
Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order 94, Series
of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case. In a
Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again
required the students to file their written answers. In
response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the
students, submitted a letter to the Discipline

Committee reiterating his clients' position that said

Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to
Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose
discipline on his clients on account of their having
written articles and poems in their capacity as campus
journalists." Hence, he argued that "what applies is
Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and
its implementing rules and regulations." He also
questioned the partiality of the members of said
Committee who allegedly "had already articulated
their position" against his clients. The Discipline
Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte.
Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the
Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, to wit: (1) Jasper Briones
[Editor-in-Chief of ChiRho, 4th year student]: Expulsion;
(2) Daphne Cowper: Suspension up to (summer) March
1995; (3) Imelda Hilario: suspension for 2 weeks to
expire on 2 February 1995; (4) Deborah Ligon [4th
year student and could graduate as summa cum
laude]: suspension up to May 1995; (5) Elizabeth
Valdezco: suspension up to (summer) March 1995; (6)
Camille Portuga [Octoberian]: graduation privileges
withheld, including diploma; (7) Joel Tan: suspension
for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (8) Gerald
Gary Renacido [2nd year student]: Expelled and given
transfer credentials; (9) Relly Carpio [3rd year
student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials;
(10) Jerome Gomez [3rd year student]: Dismissed and
given transfer credentials; and (11) Jose Mari Ramos
[Art editor of Chi-Rho, 2nd year student]: Expelled and
given transfer papers. Said students thus filed a
petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the
Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. On 17
79

January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII,

presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order
denying the students' prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order. The students thereafter filed a
"Supplemental
Petition
and
Motion
for
Reconsideration." Subsequently, the RTC issued an
Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of
preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a
reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated
22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition. The
students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and
Daphne Cowper, sought relief in the Supreme Court
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of
preliminary injunction/restraining order11 questioning
the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995.
On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) for disposition. In its
Decision dated 26 September 1996, the appellate
court granted the students' petition. The CA declared
the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the
students' suspension and dismissal, void. Miriam
College filed the present petition.
Issue: Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act
precludes the schools right to discipline its students.
Held: In several cases, the Supreme Court has upheld
the right of the students to free speech in school
premises. The right of the students to free speech in
school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to
free speech must always be applied in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment.
Thus, while the Court upheld the right of the students
to free expression in the cases of Malabanan vs.
Ramento, Villar vs. Technological Institute of the
Philippines, Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, and Non vs. Dames II, the Court did not

rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct

by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others." Provisions of law (such as Section 7 of the
Campus Journalism Act) should be construed in
harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the
legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in
a manner that would avoid their conflicting with the
fundamental law. A statute should not be given a
broad construction if its validity can be saved by a
narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a
manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to
discipline its students. At the same time, however, said
provision should not be construed as to unduly restrict
the right of the students to free speech. Consistent
with jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act is read to mean that the school cannot suspend or
expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or
she has written, except when such article materially
disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others. Further, the power of
the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the
maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
environment conducive to learning. That power, like
the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of
the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. the Court
TITLE: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO
DE TORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

80

FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the

UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without
pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989.
During this period, he served as the Philippine
Government official representative to the Centre on
Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific
(CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was
about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an
extension of said leave, but was denied. He was
advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report
within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of
personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work.
After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr.
De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was
reporting back to duty. However De Torres was
informed that in the absence of any approved
application for leave of absence, he was considered to
be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with
UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration
with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal
reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that
since records at UPLB did not show that he had been
officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty.
Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCIUPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission
regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres.
The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045
stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning
September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of
leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres'
absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB.
Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him
that he should report for duty on or before September
5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to

assume duty as ordered

separation from the service.

caused

his

automatic

The CA upheld the decision of the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo
de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged
absence without official leave is valid.
HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33,
Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was
in effect at the time. The provision states:
"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay
be granted for more than one year. If an
employee who is on leave without pay for any
reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of
one year from the effective date of such leave,
he shall be considered automatically separated
from the service; Provided, that he shall, within
a reasonable time before the expiration of his
one year leave of absence without pay, be
notified in writing of the expiration thereof with
a warning that if he fails to report for duty on
said date, he will be dropped from the service."
UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the
possibility of being dropped from the service, if he
failed to return and report for duty. This action
constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein,
however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped
from the service by the University. In the case at bar,
however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually
dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the
UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had
been warned of the possibility of being dropped from
the service if he failed to return to work within a stated
81

period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of

dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued
by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records
show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll
of personnel; his salary was even increased three
times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the
explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest
governing body of UP. All these circumstances
indubitably demonstrate that the University has
chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing
petitioner from its employ.
Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private
petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence
without leave, the University was exercising its
freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely,
who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the
light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law,
the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP
the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former
could not have done so without trampling upon the
latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom.
Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the
Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or
surrogate administrator of government offices and
agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to
approving or reviewing appointments to determine
their concordance with the requirements of the Civil
Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not
have the power to terminate employment or to drop
workers from the rolls.
Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a
new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service
in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at
CIRDAP.

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED

RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 08 March 2011, EN BANC,
(Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Sanction awaits a subordinate who misbehaves.
The right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the
Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only
citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has
repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.
Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme
Court decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the
Vinuya decision), the case involving the Filipino
comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the
counsel for the petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion
for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental
responsibility of states in protecting its citizens human
rights specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and,
second, a supplement thereto asserting that the
Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources
and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources
were twisted by the ponente, Justice Mariano del

82

Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid

down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Courts formation of an ethics
committee tasked to investigate the veracity of the
alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly
plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme
Court, noting the misreading and/or misrepresentation
of their articles. Hence, in their articles, they argue
that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can
be classified as crimes against humanity, thus
attaining the jus cogens status; consequently, it shall
be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya
decision cited them to support the contrary stand.
In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP
College of Law came up with a statement entitled
Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court (Restoring Integrity Statement), which
statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del
Castillo, treating the same not only as an established
fact, but as a truth. Said statement was posted online
and at the Colleges bulletin board and was submitted
to the Supreme Court. The manner in presenting the
arguments and the language used therein, the Court
believed,
were
inappropriate
considering
its
signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court
issued a Show Cause Resolution directing respondents
to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Conversely, compliance to
such resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one
respondent.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution
denies respondents their freedom of
expression
2.) Whether or not the Show Cause Resolution
violates respondents academic freedom as
law professors
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny
respondents their freedom of expression
A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will
plainly show that it was neither the fact that
respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor
that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was
the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are not parties
nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their
opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
case for the proper disposition and consideration of
the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show
Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and
uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to this
Court of the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity
Statement.

83

The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the

freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
Thus, proscribed are the use of unnecessary language
which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration, or tends
necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in
the integrity of the members of the Court. In other
words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
In a long line of cases, the Court has held that
the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers
must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be
protected from due influence or interference. In cases
where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the
authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the
limits of fair comment and common decency.
The Show Cause Resolution does not violate
respondents
academic
freedom
as
law
professors

There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution

that dictates upon respondents the subject matter
they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject
lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with
undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending
case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
Academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case.
The
constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their
ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. The Court believes
that the reason that freedom of expression may be so
delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.
The Court reiterates that lawyers when they
teach law are considered engaged in the practice of
law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more
than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of
the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons
of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law
professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
they are lawyers.

84

85