People vs Coricor

G.R. No. L-48768

December 4, 1971
Facts:
Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pedro
Lego in the sum of P2, 000, and to pay the costs, having been found by the lower court guilty of
murder committed on September 15, 1941. The evidence for the prosecution was presented on
October 20 and 21, 1941, and the evidence for the defense on October 21 and 22, 1941. Six
witnesses testified for the prosecution.
Issue:
W/O accused-appellant committed the crime of murder under Art 248 or death or physical
injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances under Art. 247 of the RPC?
Held:
A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to the
conclusion that appellant's version as to the circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed is
the more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis to invite
Pedro Lego and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a
paramour, one Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis, appears not to tally with the
fact that, according to the testimony of the accused, not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis,
he went twice to her to complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the
extent that appellant manifested to Catalina that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation
with Isabel, he will kill them and would forget that Lego is his uncle.
The court applied in the case at bar Art 247, the death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour
is punished, as adultery, by article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from 4 months to 6 years
of imprisonment, and the one committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by
article 334, with imprisonment from 6 months and 4 years and 2 months for the erring husband
and banishment for the mistress. Under article 334, not all cases of conjugal infidelity committed
by a husband is punishable. The great majority of them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will think
of prosecuting the husband who should indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or
with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal infidelity, some punishable with short terms of
imprisonment, others with simple banishment, and still others not punishable at all, article 247,
in effect, confers to the offended spouse the power to inflict the supreme penalty of death. The
banishment provided for the killer is intended more for his protection than as a penalty. Such a
twisted logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high time to relegate article 247 to
where it properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity promised to herself never to
commit again. The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise.

For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the offense
of having killed Pedro Lego as punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and,
accordingly, is sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to indemnify the
heirs of Pedro Lego in the sum of P2, 000.

People vs Mallari

Facts:
While Joseph and Liza (wife) were watching a basketball game at the barangay basketball court,
Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and attempted to stab

Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up with him, Rufino
boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued chasing Joseph until
the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death.
Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the use of a motor vehicle is a qualifying circumstance for the crime of murder?

Held:
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching
up with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is
therefore clear that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said
case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and
in carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot
the victim, which caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the
victim by running over him.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another by means of a motor
vehicle is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder. The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance, reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.

PEOPLE VS WHISENHUNT
368 SCRA 586

Facts:
On or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior

strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa Elsie Santos
Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head and
different parts of her body.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of abuse of strength is present.
2.) Whether or not scoffing of the victim's body is to be appreciated in court to qualify the crime
to murder.

Held:

1.) The answer is in the negative. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that
accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be
enough proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.

Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. In this case,
nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in
any of the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his
superior strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the
photograph of accused-appellant that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be
appreciated against accused-appellant.

2.) Yes, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly
appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder. In this case, accusedappellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he
strewed the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to
rot on the ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the

photographs offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer
cannot help but feel utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.

PEOPLE VS CONTINENTE
339 SCRA 1

Facts:
It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged
with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Information dated June 20,
1989 in connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe
while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the arrest of another suspect, Juanito
Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2)
separate amended information for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas,
among the other accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the element of treachery is present qualifying the crime to murder.

Held:
Yes, the shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by
the perpetrators to ensure the commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves
arising from the possible resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who
were all armed with powerful firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven
by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City.
Without any warning, appellant Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon
reaching the said place. Hence, the crime committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during
the said ambush is murder.

PEOPLE VS ANTONIO
335 SCRA 646

Facts:
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards
between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of
one by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo Arnie Tuadles, a former professional basketball
player, succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted
with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto Ambet S. Antonio, a one-time
chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and
Tuadles became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted
when they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson
Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and
gameroom. Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the
gameroom at the second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or pusoy dos,
ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.

Issue:
Whether or not Treachery is attendant in the case to convict the accused of murder.

Held:
No, Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no
preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and specially
to insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the
victim may take.

A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was arrived at
on the spur of the moment.
There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated
argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants
and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen. Even if it could be said that the attack was
sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v. Chua, we reiterated our consistent view
that: While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts
of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should
have put the deceased on guard.

Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have
anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by
a heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both
prosecution and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with
treachery.

PEOPLE VS TEEHANKEE
249 SCRA 54

Facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the
village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk
the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late.
Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven
by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the
road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you? (Show me
your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without
bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: Why are you
bothering us? Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him.
Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: Why did you shoot me?
Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused
ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said no and took a step
backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical
and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna
kill us. Will somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino
to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk.
Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accuseds
car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accuseds car, trying to put
some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused
caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen
finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino.
Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness.
Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and
shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND

CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI
LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of
confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated
Murder was amended to MURDER.

Issue:
Whether or not there is evident premeditation and treachery in the commission of the crime.

Held:
No, it has been consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by
itself, constitute treachery. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left
him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that
appellant consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment
of his criminal design without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of
the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between
the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was
thus the result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate
act of will.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman
in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around
his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to
Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and
begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed
his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them. There was an
appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and
Hultman a period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the
trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are
concerned.

PEOPLE VS. MANERO

218 SCRA 85

Facts:
On 11 April 1985, the Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo
Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of
one Reynaldo Diocades. They were conferring with three others of a plan to liquidate a number
of suspected communist sympathizers. Among their targets are: Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez,
Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an
Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino
Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo
Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion,
the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter
Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead. They later on nailed a placard near
the carinderia bearing the names of their intended victims. Later, at 4:00 pm, the Manero
brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with assorted firearms, proceeded to
the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the vicinity of Deocades'
carinderia. After a heated confrontation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of
Bantil who was able to parry and was hit at the lower portion of his ear. Bantil tried to run but he
was again fired upon by Edilberto. Though Bantil was able to seek refuge in the house of a
certain Domingo Gomez, Norberto Jr. ordered his men to surround the house so that Bantil
would die of hemorrhage. Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto
strewed him with a burst of gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he
knelt with both hands clenched at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and
ridicule from the dreaded desperados. At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km.125 on
board his motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his coaccused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened
the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was
ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted
Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At
this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)?
Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to break your head)?"
Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr. Favali dropped to the
ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only
way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body
three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head
of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the
terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their
comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and
Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero

brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson
case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellants can be exculpated from criminal liability on the basis of defense of
alibi which would establish that there is no conspiracy to kill.

Held:
The court did not appreciate the defense of alibi of the Lines brother, who according to them,
were in a farm some one kilometer away from the crime scene. The court held that It is
axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place
but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission. There is no physical impossibility where the accused can be at the crime
scene in a matter of 15-20 minutes by jeep or tricycle. More important, it is well-settled that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the
prosecution witnesses. In this case, there were two eyewitnesses who positively identified the
accused. Contrary to the claim of the Lines brothers, there is a community of design to commit
the crime. Based on the findings of the lower court, they are not merely innocent bystanders but
in fact were vital cogs in the murder of Fr. Fuvali. They performed overt acts to ensure the
success of the commission of the crimes and the furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. While
accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action
showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it.
It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the
offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of
purpose, and unity in its execution is present. While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not
originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias whom the group targeted for the kill,
nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest.
The accused agreed that in case they fail to kill the intended victims, it will be suffice to kill
another priest as long as the person is also Italian priest

PEOPLE V. UNLAGADA
389 SCRA 224

Facts:
On January 27, 1989 at around 9:00 in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with
Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Negros Occidental. After
two hours, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal
necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought beer.

Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself.
According to Edwin, he was only about three meters from Danilo who was relieving himself
when a short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the
side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with half- filled bottle of beer. Almost
simultaneously, a group of men numbering of seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with
assorted weapons. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was being
mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be
given medical attention.

Edwin Selda confirmed the identity of the suspect who was then in the custody of the police.
Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities, that the man under
detention, Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo. The accused
assails his conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding Unlagada guilty of murder instead of tumultuous
affray under Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code?

Held:
Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the accused has
been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification.

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a
confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the

author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group
of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing, as
against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a tumultuous affray
within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free- for- all,
where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a
confused and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware
of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda,
approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accusedappellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and
given no chance to put up any defense.
Wherefore, the decision of conviction appealed from is affirmed.

PEOPLE VS MARAMARA
317 SCRA 222

Facts:
The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School PTA of
which accused- appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused- appellants house in
Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight,
while Ricardo Donato was dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend
of the accused- appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened,
Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito
Donato was about two meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long,
accused- appellant took his hand- gun tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito
Donato, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother
Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about
3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of
what happened.

Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital
where the latter died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito expired, Regarder
Donato, the father, asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant.

The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore lacerated
wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons.

The trial court ruled against the accused- appellant and was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder.

Issue:
Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray instead of murder?

Held:
There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be held liable only for death
caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such
situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists

when Miguelito attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body- two on
the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused- appellant with his
hand- gun shot Miguelito.

Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos killer.

While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend
verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these
wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the
defenses version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to
the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death.

Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresenciano
Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

SISON VS. PEOPLE

250 SCRA 58

Facts:

Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into violence. On July
27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known Coryista.

The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta
by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it was denied. Despite this
setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse.
Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory
infiltrators. The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.

At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. Annie Ferrer was
there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily ordered them gulpihin ninyo ang
mga Cory hecklers! A few minutes later, she was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted
kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor,
saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his
pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he
could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was able to tow
Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head.
De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision
repeatedly boxed him.

Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at the Rizal monument and
continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collap[sed and lost consciousness. Sumilang
with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was refused
admission. So they took him to PGH where he died upon arrival.

The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De Los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer but increasing
the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court convicts Tamayo of
homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the crime committed is murder and not
death caused in a tumultuous affray?

Held:
For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1) there be
several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled and
assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the course
of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be
identified.

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage
in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded
and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.

The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and
one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a
while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and
blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.

As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number
and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior
strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself.

Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of
murder.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.

DADO V. PEOPLE
392 SCRA 46

Facts:

On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat,
the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams, which composed of petitioner
SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga.
Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while petitioner was
armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying an M16 armalite rifle.
The team saw somebody approaching who was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away
from the team, Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso
fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a single shot
from his .45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun burst, he did not
turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him purposely to
demoralize their enemy.

The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not
the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas
and told him that it was not intentionally done and it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas
died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.

Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Silvestre
Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on
the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where
she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim
at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the
bullets was upwards.

Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments
recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed
bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other
metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper
jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.

The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other hand petitioner,
filed this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner guilty of
homicide.

Held:
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards
the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner had intent to kill
the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.
Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is
dangerous to life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in
the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.

Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for
the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person;
and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of
homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm.

PEOPLE V. SALUFRANIA
389 SCRA 224

Facts:
Filomeno Salufrania by boxing and strangling MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, his
lawfully wedded wife and who was at the time 8 months on the family way, caused upon her
injuries resulting in her instantaneous death and the death of the child who was still in its
maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was charged with the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion committed. The lower court found Filomeno guilty as charged and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Hence, the automatic review of the case by the Supreme
Court. Filomeno alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to
cause an abortion.

Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused for the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion is proper?

Held:
No. Filomeno Salufrania should not be held guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion but of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.
It has been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
Filomeno; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus
in her womb. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of the wife,
Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by Filomeno upon her. However, the
intent to cause the abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach,
taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to

show intent to cause an abortion. In fact, Filomeno must have merely intended to kill his wife but
not necessarily to cause an abortion.

PEOPLE V. GENOVES
61 PHIL. 382

Facts:
Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she claims she owned.
Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing her to fall to the ground
several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy with child. Soledad by such fall suffered
pains in the abdomen. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in the painful
and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the other
baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies died. Genoves was then charged and
convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion.

Issue:
Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is proper?

Held:
No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised
Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and the
evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to Soledads death. Genoves must
be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.

AGUIRRE VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. NO. 170723

FACTS:
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a criminal complaint for the violation of
Revised Penal Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation to Republic Act No.7610
against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several John/Jane Doe
alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the apparent instructions of respondents Michelina AguirreOlondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the
medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. Agatep on the intended mutilation via
bilateral vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted,
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement mutilated or abused his common law
brother, Laureano Aguirre. She further contends that his common law brother went through a
vasectomy procedure but that does not amount to mutilation. Dr. Agatep contends that the
complainant has no legal personality to file a case since she is only a common law sister of Larry
who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Vasectomy
does not in any way equate to castration and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an
organ in the context of law and medicine.The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged
did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation did not deprived Larry of his reproductive
organ. Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor
dismissed the petition stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio dismiss outright the
petition if there is no showing of any reversible error in the questioned resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation

Held:
No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or
partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements of mutilation under the
first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and

deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., the vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic)
Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self.

LI V. PEOPLE AND CA
427 SCRA 217

Facts:
Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the death of
Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television at home with
his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan.
They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li and a certain
Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house of the
Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner Li
shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by petitioner carrying a
baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his
house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to
his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once. Immediately
thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.
Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat Christopher
Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. The
deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his
hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is
highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal.
His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review,
seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury instead of
homicide?

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It ruled that the only injury attributable to Li is the
contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In
view of the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond
reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely

in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party
for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any
methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an
appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and
impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of
the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence
reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains
at large.

PEOPLE V. OGA
431 SCRA 354

Facts:
At around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998, Ignacio and his wife were awakened by the loud
banging of corrugated GI sheet coming from the barracks of his co-construction worker which
was about 3 meters away. Ignacio and his wife proceeded in haste to investigate but they were
surprised and disarrayed to see his co-worker, herein appellant, naked on top of their daughter,
Irene, who was also naked.

Irene testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of August 9, 1999, the appellant summoned her to his
barracks. Thinking he had the usual errand for her she approached him. However, appellant
suddenly pulled her and laid her on a wooden bed (papag). The appellant then took off her pants
and panty, as well as his clothes. He inserted his penis into her vagina. It was only at around
2:00 a.m. that she was able to finally kick the galvanized iron sheet that enclosed the appellants
barracks.
Appellant did not deny that he had several intercourse with Irene but interposed sweetheart
story.

Issue:
Whether or not force and intimidation are attendant in this case?

Held:
Neither was intimidation employed against her. Even if she was pulled down to the bed, she was
not threatened with bodily or physical harm by a knife, bolo or any object or instrument that the
appellant could have employed so as to create a real apprehension of dangerous consequences
or serious bodily harm. Irenes overall deportment during her ordeal defies comprehension and
the reasonable standard of human conduct when faced with a similar situation. It is unnatural for
an intended rape victim, as in the case at bar, not to make even a feeble attempt to free herself
despite a myriad of opportunities to do so. This constrained us to entertain a reasonable doubt on
the guilt of the appellant.

PEOPLE VS AGSAOAY
430 SCRA 450

Facts:
on or about July 15, 1997, at Barangay Malokiat, municipality of Pozorrubio, province of
Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a bolo with intent to have sexual intercourse with his own daughter, Josephine Ferrer
Agsaoay, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with JOSEPHINE AGSAOAY, a 17 years old minor and
accuseds own daughter, against her will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of
said Josephine F. Agsaoay. Furthermore, the victim was again raped by the accused 2 days after
using a bolo to scare and threaten the said victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.

Held:
Yes.The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent.35 Consequently, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must
prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) he accomplished such act
through force or intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she is under 12 years of age or is demented.

The sole important issue in a rape case is the credibility of the victims testimony, in view of its
nature in which only two persons are normally involved. Hence, in adjudicating such issue,
jurisprudence has established the following guidelines: (1) the victims testimony must be
scrutinized with extreme caution since an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but
difficult for the accused to disprove it; and (2) when her testimony meets the test of credibility,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.

In the case at bar, we find Josephines account of her ordeal in the hands of appellant forthright
and credible.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 46, Urdaneta Pangasinan, in Criminal Cases Nos. U-9332 and U-9333, finding appellant
Santiago Agsaoay, Jr. guilty of the crimes of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH in each case, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that
he is ordered to pay the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral
damages in each case. Additionally, appellant is ordered to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in Criminal Case No. U-9332.

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
369 SCRA 179

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accusedappellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of
the mandate of the sovereign will.

Held:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws. this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the
people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation
of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.

PEOPLE VS CAMPUHAN
329 SCRA 270

Facts:
On April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel Pamintuan,
went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her 2 children.
There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon, who was then
busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second
floor. Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants"
and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees and his hands
holding his penis with his right hand. Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and
boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside
who she tried to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting
Vicente, her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel s hymen was intact.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused committed a consummated statutory rape

Held:
The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primos penis was able to penetrate
Chrystels vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered
consummated rape, however, only attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. Also, there were
no physical signs of injuries on the witness body to conclude a medical perspective that a
penetration has taken place. In rape cases, it is important that a valid testimony and medical
certificate complements each other, for relying alone on testimonial evidence may create
unwarranted or mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully establish a proof that the penis, in
reality, entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that the rape was
consummated.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court on convicting Campuhan guilty of statutory rape is
modified. Hence, convicted of attempted instead.

PEOPLE VS ECHAGARAY
257 SCRA 581

Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been
committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister
motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of
rape against the accused. This was dismissed.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and
retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of
the Philippines.

A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accusedappellant.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed
factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence
of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 7659.

Issues:
1.) Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority.
2.) Whether or not the crime is punishable by death penalty.

Held:
1.) Yes. In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of
denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies
given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance, which the victim herself intended to

disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the
accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.

2.) Yes, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed, among others, if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.

4.

when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )

PEOPLE VS TAN
G.R.NO. 177566

Facts:
On 17 September 1997, appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for ransom in an
Information the accusatory portion of which reads: That on or about September 8, 1997 in the
evening of Barangay Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one another and
grouping themselves together, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and use of high
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously take, carry away, and deprive Ruiz Saez-Co
y Lim of his liberty against his will for purposes of extorting money as in fact a demand for
money was made as a condition for his release but before any ransom can be paid, the victim was
rescued after eight (8) days in captivity.
Based on the victims account, the ordeal he had gone through can be divided into three distinct
segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3) the protracted detention.
The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode where he was held by armed
men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second segment covered the entire forced
journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention house in Taytay, Rizal. And the third
segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full length of the victims involuntary
confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring rescue. There is no doubt that the victim
was deprived of his liberty throughout all the episodes.

On arraignment, appellants entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal liability of the appellants in each and every episode established
beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty for kidnapping or illegal detention.

Held:
We agree with the OSG that the participation of the appellants in the forcible taking and journey
of the victim was not clearly established. There were no eyewitnesses who testified on the
abduction. While the victim testified on the three episodes, he failed to see and identify any of
his captors until he was rescued as he was blindfolded most of the time during his captivity. He
did not see the face of the persons who abducted him in Mamatid and those who formed the
entourage which brought him to Taytay. To conclude that those who were captured during the

rescue operation were also participants in the forcible taking and asportation is to lower the level
of evidence required for conviction.
The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants therein was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that they should be held
liable therefor.
The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held captive leads to
no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a single appellant
could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGO
G.R. NO. 173022

Facts:
On 10 September 1996, Oliver Caparas, then 13 years of age, was waiting for a ride to school
when four men forcibly seized and boarded him into a car wherein he was blindfolded and taken
to Baguio. The next day, Eleazar Caparas received a call from the kidnappers asking for Php 10
Million ransom in exchange for the release of his son, Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers
went to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan. After three days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to
lower the ransom money to Php 1.7 Million. Through Olivers uncle, the kidnapper were able to
receive the money. Then, they brought Oliver to a Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway,
gave him money and told him his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station would fetch him. After
the kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2 Epafrodito Aliling and
SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects was a member of an NPA rebel
returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend,
dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the group, was invited for questioning. On that
occasion, she admitted her participation in the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated
appellants.

Issue:
Whether or not elements constituting the crime of kidnapping are present to convict appellants of
the said crime.

Held:
Yes. Under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Kidnapping is committed with the
concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2)

that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; and (3) that
the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) that in the commission of the offense,
any of the following circumstances are present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than five days; or (b) that it is committed simulating public authority; or (c) that any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer. It is
evident from the testimonies of the witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were
present. First, appellants are private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four armed
men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will. Fourth, the detention
lasted for seven days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the time of the kidnapping incident.

MADSALI, ET AL. V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 179570

FACTS:
After a confrontation between the victim and her aunt Inon Dama while fetching water, the
appellant (Maron) and his father (Sajiron) appeared suddenly in the victims house with a gun
and told the victim to come with them. When she refused, Sajiron and Maron tied her hands
behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There,
Sajiron had carnal knowledge with the victim against her will while Maron stood guard and
watched them. They left the forest and brought the victim to the house of Egap, where she was
detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap to guard the victim and to shoot her if she would
attempt to escape. A day after, the victims mother came to get her; unfortunately Egap refused
and threatened to kill her daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of
losing her daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. Egap
asked the victim if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. She was then forced to sign an
unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after she and Sajioron were
married by Imam Musli Muhammad. After the marriage, she and Sajiron lived in the house of
Egap. While detained, she did not try to escape because her house was very far from the place
where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if she would
attempt to escape. Months after the marriage, Sajiron and Egap were arrested by the police.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed was kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

HELD:
Yes. Further perusal of the allegations in the information appears that the crime charged was
actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and rape, defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of serious illegal
detention consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining him or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In this
case, although the victim was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece
of cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

People v. Silongan
G.R. No. 137182

FACTS:
For automatic review is the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103, convicting
appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon,
Jumbrah Manap and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious
Illegal Detention and sentencing them to suffer death penalty. Appellants, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap Alexander Saldana, America Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco for
the purpose of demanding ransom in the amount of Php 12 Million, detaining and depriving
Alexander Saldana of his personal liberty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.

HELD:

Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation of the victims
liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the accused to effect the
same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the prosecution: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense, any of the four circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be
present. But if the kidnapping was done for the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element
is no longer necessary. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from Alexander, as to warrant
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. It is not necessary that there be actual payment of
ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the purpose of demanding
ransom.
PEOPLE V. SURIAGA
381 SCRA 159

FACTS:
On February 22, 1995, an information was filed with the RTC charging Ruben Suriaga, Rosita
Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention committed
as follows: That on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz, conspiring
together, kidnapped and took away Nicole Ramos, a two-year old female child, without the
consent of her parents, for the purpose of extorting ransom from the latter, and thereafter,
detained her and deprived her of her freedom and liberty up to and until 4:30 in the afternoon of
the following day. Joel Isidera, having learned of the kidnapping and without having participated
therein as principal or accomplice, took part by assisting the principal accused to profit by the
effects of the crime by accompanying and driving for accused Ruben Suriaga to the place where
the pay-offs was made and receiving the ransom money in the amount of Php 100,00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.

HELD:
Yes. The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the person detained is a child,
the question that needs to be addressed is whether there is evidence to show that in taking the
child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and that it was the intention of the accused to
deprive the mother of the childs custody. Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom
have been sufficiently established by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1)
appellant, a private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission
from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived,
without informing her parents of their whereabouts; 2) he detained the child and deprived her of
her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4) he
demanded a ransom of Php 100,000 through telephone calls and gave instructions where and
how it should be delivered.

PEOPLE V. LLAGUNO
285 SCRA 124

FACTS:
Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in an Information with the
following: that said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intend, did then and there kidnap and detain
one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido
Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital part of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries as a consequence of which he died a few days later. Although appellant, was
charged with kidnapping with murder, the trial court convicted him only of murder defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court did not, however, find
him liable for serious illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the
victim was detained only for one day.

ISSUE:
Whether or the trial court is erred in not finding accused liable for illegal detention.

HELD:
Yes. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention under Article 268
of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was sustained by
the trial court, clearly established that appellant had in fact detained the victim without authority
to do so. Banzon testified that he witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellants
room. Banzons testimony significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim

sustained multiple abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several
employees called her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home
because there was a man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International. Dr.
Cenizas testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant.

It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. In a complex crime,
although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes
of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court
is not confined to the conviction for murder; rather, the scope of its review encompasses the
offense charged in the information, which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled
doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even
obligates) the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment
even if they have not been assigned. When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the
whole case. Since the information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the
acts constituting slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the information, and may
thus be validly taken into account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly, appellant
was fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and granted a fair
opportunity to defend himself. At this juncture, we deem it significant to reiterate that the trial
court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted of serious illegal detention for
the sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed five days. The court a
quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for at least one day, which act by
itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial court appreciated the act constituting
slight illegal detention as a qualifying circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the
defense. While we find no proof beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the
records indisputably prove culpability for slight illegal detention

PEOPLE V. DADLES
278 SCRA 708

FACTS:
Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in two separate informations, to wit: That on
or about 24th of May 1989, in the Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of Negros Occidential,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the first above-named accused,
in company of his five other co-accused, whose true names are still unknown and herein
designated only as Ka Morito, Ka Willy, Ka Dindo, Ka Mike and Ka Juanito, who are still at
large, aremed with assorted firearms of unknown calibers, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain, and keep Alipio Tehidor and Dioniso
Tehidor and bring them somewhere in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and

against their will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their civil
liberties since then up to the present. The trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant
of two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.

HELD:
Yes. Based from the evidence presented during the trial, the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of kidnapping the victims. However, since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only
the fact of kidnapping was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. ROLUNA
231 SCRA 448

Facts:
Eight person, including accused Roluna were charged with kidnapping with murder. Witnesses
claimed that they saw victim Anatalio Moronia stopped by accused and several others. The
victim was alleged to have been threatened with firearms and hand bound behind his back. The
accused claimed that he was taking care of an ill relative at the time of the kidnapping. The RTC
found Roluna guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping with murder.
The accused raised that the body of the victim has not surfaced and that the unexplained
disappearance cannot be blamed on him as there is all possibility that the victim may still be
alive.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the victim is sufficiently proved and the accused be held liable for it.

Held:
The Rules of Court provides that the death shall be presumed if a person who has been in danger
of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.
However, the Supreme Court decided that there were insufficient circumstances to hold the
accused responsible for the death of the victim. The testimony of the witnesses stating that the
victims hands were bound by a companion of the accused is not enough to prove that the
accused killed him. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts established by the
prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the
events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-

appellant for the death of Moronia. The SC thus decided that Since none of the circumstances
mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with serious illegal detention)
was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that
the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE VS PASTRANA
387 SCRA 342

Facts:
Erma Postejo, a domestic helper in Canada, is the mother of Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola and 9-year
old Willy Garpen, Jr. her son by a common-law relationship. She was introduced to accusedappellant Rubi-Rose who offered to work on the processing of Willys travel documents to
Canada. Rubi-Rose asked for P 18,300.00 as processing fee. Later on, accused-appellant
informed Erma that Willy was suffering from bronchitis. Erma sent P 5,610.00, P 3,000.00 to be
given to Doroteo and the remaining balance should pay for Willys medical treatment. Then on
March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from their home in Caloocan and
brought them in Tondo. Aresola went home and Willy was left in Tondo. Accused-appellant was
asking Erma for sums of money which Erma refused to transmit.

March 27, 1997, accused-appellant informed Doroteo that Willy was missing and that he was last
seen playing inside her apartment. Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Erma
found out that Willy was never treated for any illness. Accused-appellant vehemently denied the
charges against her but the trial court found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused the crime of kidnapping and failure
to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.

Decision:

No, the Court ruled that Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely: (1) the offender is entrusted with the
custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his
parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but
rather the deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. The word deliberate as used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere
negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and
maliciously wrong.

In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses. As consistently ruled by
the Court, we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility
of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. Factual
findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight
and respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses
through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. In the instant case, there is no
reason for us to disregard the trial courts finding that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.