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COURT
OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133000, October 02, 2001, SECOND
DIVISION, (BUENA, J.)
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana
Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951,
Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property. Graciano received
8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14 share of the said property. Further, said heirs
executed and forged an "Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among
themselves the parcel of land into several lots.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's
name. other lots were subdivided. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but
retained ownership over the second lot.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein
petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No.
107443 to his wife. When Graciano died, he left
his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.
Private respondents filed a complaint and alleged
that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through
the
employment
of
fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the lot by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed
of Sale in favor of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such
fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
already
barred
by
Ruling
No, actions for reconveyance of property
predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim
of prescription of action would be unavailing.
"The action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."
Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are
basically courts of law and not courts of equity.
Equity, which has been aptly described as "justice
outside legality," should be applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law.
Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTCMakati, Branch 61 issued an order granting the
petition and allowing the will. Shortly after the
probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on
February 26, 1996.
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioner argues that the proceedings
must continue until the estate is fully distributed
to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the
testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that
Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondents petition for issuance of letters
testamentary. The contention has no merit. In
cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that
the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are
instituted only after the death of the testator, so
much so that, after approving and allowing the
will, the court proceeds to issue letters
testamentary and settle the estate of the testator.
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In
fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain
a petition for probate of the will of a living
testator under the principle of ambulatory nature
of wills. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code
authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of
the will filed by the testator himself. Rule 76
likewise provides that the testator himself may,
during his lifetime, petition in the court for the
allowance of his will. After a will has been
RULING:
ISSUE:
May a will executed by a foreigner abroad
be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed?
RULING:
1. YES. ATCI, as a private recruitment
agency, cannot evade responsibility for
the money claims of Overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad
by the mere expediency of claiming that
its foreign principal is a government
agency clothed with immunity from suit,
or that such foreign principals liability
must first be established before it, as
agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.
2. NO. It is hornbook principle, however,
that the party invoking the application of
a foreign law has the burden of proving
the law, under the doctrine of processual
presumptionwhich, in this case, petitioners
failed to discharge.
The Philippines does not take judicial
notice of foreign laws, hence, they must
not only be alleged; they must be
proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
invoking it must present a copy thereof
and comply with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The documents presented, whether taken
singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently
prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee
under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead
of submitting a copy of the pertinent
Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and
translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what ATCI, et
al. submitted were mere certifications
attesting only to the correctness of the
translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at
all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ
from Philippine laws and that under such
Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated.
Held:
Appointment of an estate administrator
1. The rule is that if no executor is named in the
will, or the named executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond,
or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint
an administrator of the estate of the deceased who
shall act as representative not only of the court
appointing him but also of the heirs and the
creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its
discretion, the probate court may appoint one,
two or more co-administrators to have the benefit
of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented.
In the appointment of the administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.
This is the same consideration which Section 6 of
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the
order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate. The underlying
assumption behind this rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence
or mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.
Removal of an administrator requires just
cause
3. Administrators have such an interest in the
execution of their trust as entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause.
Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court
provides the legal and specific causes authorizing
the court to remove an administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with
ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact
legally before it in order to justify a removal.
There must be evidence of an act or omission on
ANTONIETTA
GARCIA
VDA.
DE
CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(Special Eight Division), HON. JAPAL M.
GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial
Region, Cotabato City, and FLORITA A.
VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of
the late Roberto L. Chua, respondents
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998, J. Kapunan
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out
of wedlock with private respondent Florita A.
Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. The couple begot
two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson
Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
ascendants or descendants, hence the abovenamed minors shall succeed to the entire estate.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua
representing to be the surviving spouse of
Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that
at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was
his residence, hence, RTC of Davao City is the
proper forum. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss for lack of merit ruling that Garcia had
no personality to file the motion not having
proven her status as wife of decedent. The court
did not admit the Xerox copy of the allege
marriage contract between Chua and petitioner
because the best evidence is the original or
authenticated copy which Garcia cannot produce.
Further, Florita presented a certification from the
local civil registrar concerned that no such
marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized
the wedding, that he has not solemnized such
alleged marriage.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a Motion praying that the
letters of administration issued to Vallejo be
recalled and that new letters of administration be
issued to her. She, likewise, filed a Motion to
declare the proceedings a mistrial. Both motions
were denied by the trial court.
Issues:
1. Is there a need to publish the amended
petition for administration where the
amendment is due to failure to indicate
residence of decedent?
2. Does petitioner have legal standing to file
a motion to dismiss?
Held:
1. No. The original petition contains the
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
ISSUE.
1. Is the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs valid? NO.
2. Was the assumption by the heirs of the
indebtedness of the deceased valid? NO.
3. Can the petitioner hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased? NO. (Sec.
5, Rule 86).
HELD.
Ruling
No, it could already be concluded that
notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention
as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of "intervention"
under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims.
Had the claims of petitioners against
Benedicto been based on contract, whether
express or implied, then they should have filed
their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of
the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration
and published by the administrator immediately
after the issuance of such notice. However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were
based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders
Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed
under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive
the death of the decedent and may be commenced
against the administrator pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the
intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil
Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case was
already pending review before this Court at the
time of Benedicto's death.
However, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in
accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily
mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had
sought before the RTC since the right to intervene
is not one of those reliefs. While there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain
prayers4 or reliefs from the intestate court not
4
RULING:
1. No. The Order of the RTC denying Sarsabas
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is not appealable
even on pure questions of law. It is worth
mentioning that the proper procedure in this
case, as enunciated by this Court, is to cite
such interlocutory order as an error in the
appeal of the case -- in the event that the RTC
rules in favor of Vda. De Te -- and not to
appeal such interlocutory order. On the other
hand, if the petition is to be treated as a
petition for review under Rule 45, it would
likewise fail because the proper subject would
only be judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case.
2. No. In the case before the Court, Sarsaba
raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of Sereno, not in his Motion to
Dismiss or in his Answer but only in his
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss. Having failed to
invoke this ground at the proper time, that is,
in a motion to dismiss, Sarsaba cannot raise it
now for the first time on appeal.
The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over
one's person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it. Failure to serve
summons on Sereno's person will not be a
cause for the dismissal of the complaint
against the other defendants, considering that
they have been served with copies of the
summons and complaints and have long
submitted their respective responsive
pleadings.
The failure to effect service of summons unto
Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein does
not render the action DISMISSIBLE, considering
that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty.
Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio Lavares and the
NLRC, were validly served with summons and the
FACTS.
The RTC of Roxas City convicted
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova with Rape. Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February
4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to
cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hepato-carcinoma
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme
Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal,
and required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability
arising from his commission of the offense
charged.
ISSUE.
Is the civil liability
extinguished by his death?
of
Bayotas
RULING.
Yes, if the civil liability is based solely on
his criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the death of the convict:
(1) criminal liability is TOTALLY extinguished as
to his PERSONAL liabilities; (2) as to his
PECUNIARY penalties, his liability is
extinguished ONLY when the death of the
offended occurs before final judgment. In the
instant case, Bayotas died before final judgment.
Ordinary money claims under Section 21,
Rule III must be viewed in the light of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate. The
latter
provides
an
EXCLUSIVE
ENUMERATION of what claims can be filed
against the estate, to wit: (1) funeral expenses; (2)
expenses for the last illness; (3) judgments for
money; and (4) claims arising from contracts,
express or implied. If the obligation arose from
other sourceslaw, quasi-contract and quasidelictit is Section, Rule 87 that applies where
the
action
is
brought
against
the
Executor/Administrator.
of
the
supplied.)
co-ownership.
(Emphasis
Issue:
Did RTC have jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in favor of Pasay City government and
did the 5-year statute of limitations within which
to file claims as set forth in Rule 91 set in.
Held:
Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of
succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the
real or personal property of a person who dies
intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful
owner, a property is claimed by the state to
forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the
first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents
of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within
which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may
be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and
a time limit is imposed within which such action
must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated
property must file his claim "within five (5) years
from the date of such judgment, such person shall
have possession of and title to the same, or if sold,
the municipality or city shall be accountable to
him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate;
but a claim not made shall be barred forever." The
5-year period is not a device capriciously
conjured by the state to defraud any claimant;
on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to
encourage would-be claimants to be
punctilious in asserting their claims,
otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was
handed down by the lower court as early as 27