People of the Philippines Vs. Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista & Edgar Pimentel.

G.R. No. 196005. October 1, 2014

Carpio, Acting C.J
Facts:
On March 9, 1999 Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Juan Bacolor for the
possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the
latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboas gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Cornista
opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the
main gate. After seeing the inmates run out, inmate Dionisio Badua, who was earlier given keys
to the cell for the routine head count padlocked the main gate and returned to his cell. Once
outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with
plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latters knowledge and
consent. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep
and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda
pick-up truck turned turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police
authorities surrounded the cane field and arrested appellants and their companions.
The trial court convicted Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel with Murder appreciating
conspiracy and treachery, and Carnapping . However, the trial court failed to consider Cornistas
minority at the time of the commission of the crime. On appeal, The Court of Appeals modified
the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista taking
into account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The appellate court held that "it
is manifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between right and
wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts."
Issues:
1. Whether or not treachery attended the commission of the crime.
2. Whether or not there was conspiracy in the commission the crime
3. Whether or not Fieldad, Cornista & Pimentel should be convicted of the crime of
Carnapping.
4. Whether or not the defense of Impulse of uncontrollable fear under Art 12 of the RPC
will exonerate the appellants of the crime of Carnapping.
5. Whether or not Fieldad is entitled to Parole
Ruling:
1.
Yes. Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued
with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the
compound." This argument is untenable. There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and speciallyto insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take. In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail
officers were not afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning, Fieldad
and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers.

2.
Yes. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy can be inferred from and established
by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators. Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after
the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose
and design in the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is
corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion than
that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
3.
Yes. Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things. The elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the
vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to
a person other than the offender himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner
thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things. All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants
admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the
vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by
appellants.
4.
No. Appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his
flight from jail. For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal
combat. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep,
they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus,
there could not have been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had
every opportunity to escape individually.
5.
No. Since treachery qualified the killings to murder and there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it
must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty, Person convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
Note: The Supreme Court did not touch on the Appellate Courts ruling on the plea of minority
of Ryan Cornista.
People of the Philippines Vs. Garry Dela Cruz y De Guzman

G.R. No. 205821. October 1, 2014

Leonen, J
Facts:
dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust operation was allegedly
conducted after a civilian informant tipped the Zamboanga City Police Office that a certain
"Gary" was selling illegal drugs at the parking area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor Lim
Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City. The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Wilfredo
Bobon (PO1 Bobon), as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roberto Roca (SPO1 Roca), as back-up
arresting officer. The buy-bust team prepared a 100.00 bill as marked money. The buy-bust
operation team, accompanied by the informant, went to the target area. The informant initially
brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1 Bobon who handed the marked money to dela Cruz in
exchange for one sachet of suspected shabu. SPO1 Roca then arrested dela Cruz. Upon frisking
dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed
the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his left
pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked 100.00 bill. Dela Cruz and the seven (7) sachets seized
from him were then brought to the Zamboanga City Police Station.8 There, PO1 Bobon taped
taped the sachets. On the same day, the seven sachets were turned over to SPO1 Federico Lindo,
Jr., the investigating officer, who prepared the request for laboratory examination. Subsequently,
the tests yielded positive results for shabu.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a compliance with the chain of the corpus delicti under Section 21
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Ruling:
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential
element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to
establish an element of these offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an
accused. In People v. Nandi, this court explained that four (4) links "should be established in the
chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the
illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the
illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic
chemist to the court. There is no evidence on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and
recorded. PO1 Collado could not even provide the court with the name of the investigator. It was
Forensic Chemist Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified the person who delivered the
specimen to the crime laboratory. He disclosed that he received the specimen from one PO1
Cuadra, who was not even a member of the buy-bust team. Per their record, PO1 Cuadra
delivered the letter-request with the attached seized item to the CPD Crime Laboratory Office
where a certain PO2 Semacio recorded it and turned it over to the Chemistry Section.
Federico Sabay Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 192150. October 1, 2014

Brion, J
Facts:
While the Federico Sabay (petitioner) and his daughter Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were
busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo), the latter
confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioners) alleged intrusion into Godofredos property.
A verbal altercation ensued between them. In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit
Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The petitioner joined in by throwing a stone at
Godofredos face, breaking the latters eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as a result, he felt
dizzy. The petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.
Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course his
efforts, he was hit in the hand with a bolo. The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified
the parties. The Medico Legal Certificates showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on the
left parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jervie sustained a wound in
his right palm. The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light
Threats for allegedly uttering threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.
The MTC convicted the petitioner with 2 counts of slight physical injuries and absolved
him of the crime of light threats as they are deemed absorbed by the crime of slight physical
injuries. It further absolved Erlinda of the crime light threats as there were no allegation of the
same. It also rejected the allegation of self-defense as there were no clear and convincing
evidence of unlawful aggression on the part of Godofredo. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MTC The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a valid claim of self-defense.
Ruling:
No. Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that
he satisfied the elements required by law; he who alleges must prove. As the RTC and the CA
pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he did not even
present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he
consulted a doctor. Nor did he everpresent the doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too,
that he was attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by
the prosecution eyewitnesses, Rodolfo and Dina, who both testified that it was the petitioner who
had attacked Godofredo.
Norberto Cruz y Bartolome Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 166441. October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J
Facts:
Norberto Bartolome and his wife, Belinda Cruz, were engaged in the selling of plastic
wares and glass wares. Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them in selling

their wares. One night, AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her.
Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was
divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or
shell be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas
fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue
his lustful desires. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed
to wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto
touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands wereshaking.
When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside. Later that day, AAA and BBB
narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. The RTC rendered its judgment
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in and acts of
lasciviousness. The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the RTC deleting the conviction of
acts of lasciviousness for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of the crime of Attepted Rape.
Ruling:
No. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required
in acts of lasciviousness. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is
not required in acts of lasciviousness. The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her
panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and
breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His
embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with
her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her
when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most,
his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
Felina Rosaldes Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988. October 8, 2014
Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School, was
hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, Felina
Rosaldes (petitioner), who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner
asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his
seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his
armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk. As a result, he
lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. As a result, Michael Ryan suffered several
injuries. The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse under Section 3 Republic Act
7610. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner should be convicted of the crime of child abuse.
Ruling:
Yes. Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as
her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive.
She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical
maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has
expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an
act by deedsor by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. It was also shown that Michael Ryans
physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of a child.
Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced
the petitioners cruelty.
People of the Philippines Vs. Edward Adriano y Sales
G.R. No. 208169. October 8, 2014
Perez, J
Facts:
Police Officer 1 Teodoro Morales (PO1 Morales), who testified that acting on a report
received from a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North
Daang Hari, Taguig City, Police Chief Inspector Porfirio Calagan formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation to entrap Adriano, designating PO1 Morales as the poseur-buyer, and marking
the buy-bust money consisting of ten P100.00 bills with the initials "PC". After briefing, PO1
Morales, together with the informant and his team, proceeded to North Daang Hari where PO1
Morales bought P200.00 worth of shabu from Adriano. Upon giving Adriano the marked money
and after receiving a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, PO1 Morales signaled
his team to arrest Adriano. PO2 Ronnie Fabroa immediately arrested Adriano. The marked
money confiscated from Adriano was brought to the police station for investigation, while the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which was mraked at the crime scene was
brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory by PO2 Vergelio Del Rosario,
who also prepared the letter-request. In the PNP Crime Laboratory, the result of the laboratory
examination confirmed the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The RTC convicted Adriano of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Adriano should be convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.

2. Whether or not there is a compliance with the chain of the corpus delicti under
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Ruling:
1.
Yes. In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following two (2) elements
must be duly established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place; and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In the case at bar, the
prosecution duly established the two (2) elements: (1) to account that the transaction or sale
indeed took place, PO1 Morales narrated the transaction in a clear and direct manner; and (2) the
seized illegal drugs and marked money were presented before the trial court as proof of the
identity of the object of the crime and of the corpus delicti.
2.
Yes. it has been repeatedly noted by the Court, the Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 9165
offer some measure of flexibility through the proviso. Non-compliance does not invalidate the
seizure or render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved. Despite the arresting
officersfailure to strictly observe the requirements of Section 21 on the custody and disposition
of the seized items, the violation of the CDDA of 2002 was duly proven. The arresting officers
duly recorded the movements and custody of the seized items from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt by the forensic laboratory to safekeeping up to presentation in
court.
Leonora Rimando Vs. Spouses Winston and Elenita Aldaba, and People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 203583. October 13, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
Rimando enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable
and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced by Rimandos proposal and
taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the amount
of P500,000.00 as investment in her business. In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3)
postdated checks, one for P500,000.00 and the other two (2) for P40,000.00 each, and made
them sign an investment contract with Multitel International Holding Corporation (Multitel).
Upon maturity of the checks, Sps. Aldaba attempted to encash the same but were dishonored for
being drawn against insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to demand Rimando to make
good the said checks, but to no avail. Hence, they were constrained to file a criminal complaint
for estafa against her. In her defense, Rimando denied her friendship with Sps. Aldaba and that
she enticed them to invest in her own business, as she had none. According to her, she only
referred them to Multitel Investment Manager Jaimelyn Cayaban who handled their investment.
She also maintained that she only issued the three (3) post dated checks to accommodate them
while waiting for the check from Multitel, but when the latter issued the check, Sps. Aldaba
refused to accept it so she can be held liable in case their investment fails. Meanwhile, Sps.
Aldaba also filed a criminal case against Rimando for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Rimando was acquitted.

The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba in
the amount of P500,000.00. It found the absence of the element of deceit as Sps. Aldaba were
fully aware that they would be investing their money in Multitel and not in Rimandos purported
business. The CA affirmed the RTC Ruling. It held that a prosecution for violation of BP 22 is
distinct, separate, and independent from a prosecution for estafa, albeit they may both involve
the same parties and transaction. As such, Rimandos acquittal and subsequent exoneration from
civil liability in the BP 22 cases does not automatically absolve her from civil liability in the
estafa case.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimandos civil liability in the estafa case despite
her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases.
Ruling:
Yes. Rimandos acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any
civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the
accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the
accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Rimandos civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as
the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce them
to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an
accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In
lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter