Syst Pract Action Res (2015) 28:613627

DOI 10.1007/s11213-015-9350-7
ORIGINAL PAPER

A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of Social

Systems
Leonardo Augusto Amaral Terra1 Joao Luiz Passador2

Published online: 2 July 2015

 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Abstract Systems thinking comprises one of the greatest revolutions of the 20th century.
The core of such approach embodies crucial epistemological questions, which refer to the
need to formulate methods suitable to their premises. As the theoretical reflexive space
cannot be neglected within the scientific process, not only the construction of empirical
methods, but also the methodologies for building theoretical hypotheses to describe and
explain complex phenomena must be appropriate to the perspectives of the ideals of such
complexity. Thus, the present research effort aims at proposing a structured methodological approach, based on the philosophical principles of the general systems theory and
Husserls phenomenology, which can be used as an alternative to describe and explain
complex systems phenomena. As a solution to the problem at stake, we present a research
framework based on a hybrid procedure, which applies analogue processes and also eidetic
reduction in order to build theoretical descriptions capable of synthesising complex
dynamics in a structured manner. Despite some challenges inherent to its nature, the
proposed method shows robustness in philosophical terms, to organise the formulation of
theoretical hypotheses in an action research environment.
Keywords

Systems theory  Methodology  Phenomenology  Analogy  Complexity

& Leonardo Augusto Amaral Terra

prof@leoterra.com.br
Joao Luiz Passador
jlpassador@usp.br
1

Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos, Ribeirao Preto, SP, Brazil

Universidade de Sao Paulo, Ribeirao Preto, SP, Brazil

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Introduction
By analysing the development of organisational studies over the last decades of the 20th
century, Drucker (1994, 2003) recognised that the transformations from which society had
been suffering were not mere surface phenomena, and that they would also be accelerated.
Such phenomena indicated that the science of organisations needed to change to cope with
the increasingly frequent contingencies. According to Peters (1991), such problems
occurred due to the increasing complexity of the scenarios. New variables, arising from
globalisation, the new model of speculative financial markets, technology and the vision of
society by itself, might have created an extremely complex and dynamic environment to be
foreseen.
Recent events, such as global warming, the scarcity of elementary resources, the
financial crisis in 2008 and the social revolutions that originated from the so-called Arab
Spring, demonstrate that, even two decades after these diagnoses, organisations are still
unprepared to cope with such changes.
According to Hurtado (2006), such challenges have led to a relevance crisis in the field.
It is the authors belief that, despite the abundant discussions contemplating complexity,
such facts continue to be poorly structured with regard to the perspectives over this same
intricacy. Relevant concepts, such as strategy, remain fragmented, which, according to
Jaspers (1976), makes them incompatible with the understanding of both the holistic
overview and the complexity of scenarios that embed organisations. This is because
fragmented modelsproduced by the neo-Taylorist organization of academic inquiry that
is anti-systems in essenceare incapable of mapping the relations required for the thorough essential description of the complex phenomena (Capra 1983; Faria 2005; Hurtado
2006).
Thus, the dominance of such epistemological approaches persists limiting the complete
understanding of the constitutional relationships of transient processes, which leads
organisations to build the foundations of their decisions on karst landscapes. Authors such
as Prahalad and Hamel (1994), Casanova (2004) and Hurtado (2006) propose a break with
Cartesian paradigms, with the subsequent construction of new paradigms for the science of
organisations, which, in a sense, refers to the ideas of counter inductive methods, as
proposed by authors such as Feyerabend (1993).
One of the major steps in this direction was taken by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy.
While proposing the basis of process thinking in the 1930s, he noted that entities constituted through interaction among agents had produced different dynamics from those
obtained through the study of their separate components. Bertalanffy then adopted the term
system to describe entities comprising interconnected units whose organisation would
be the key element of its dynamics. Henceforth, this concept became the foundation of
what would later be known as the Systems Theory (Bunge 1997; Capra 1983, 1996).
The central idea behind this theoretical construct is that systems can only be understood
as integrated wholes; their parts or components interact and conjoin in such a way that they
cannot be reduced to smaller units without losing their properties (Bunge 1997; Capra
1983, 1996). In other words, [] systems thinking concentrates not on basic building
blocks, but on basic principles of organization (Capra 1996, p. 30).
In view of that, Bertalanffy proposed that science should be concerned with the
transforming and equally self-organising movement of complex relations, to which the
systems constituents would find themselves submitted (Bertalanffy 1972; Capra 1996;
Casanova 2004). The incitements of this new science making brought [] a new life to

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both the experimental methods and the construction of theories of articulated sets and
subsets (Casanova 2004, p. 51), with a major impact on the social sciences, which are
traditionally based on dialectical and positivist approaches, being the last one predominant
in the contemporary scenario.
Among the methodologies arising from this perspective, the foremost to map the
properties of social systems is the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) proposed by
Checkland (1989, 2000). However, Checkland (2000) highlights that SSM does not
comprise a method or technique in itself, given that it indicates only principles and
assumptions for research guidance in an action-oriented context, which can inhibit
researchers in its use, due to the lack of a structured procedure to describe and explain
phenomena therethrough.
In order to assist researchers in formulating theoretical hypotheses about descriptions
and explanations of complex phenomena, especially those related to richly interconnected
systems, such as the social and economic systems, the present work aims at proposing a
structured methodological approach, based on the philosophical principles of the general
systems theory and Husserls phenomenology, which can be used as alternative to describe
and explain the dynamics of complex systems.

Systems Thinking and Its Main Epistemological Implications

Initially, the concepts of systems theory derived their essentials from a Cartesian-structured
discipline termed Cybernetics (Bauer 1999; Bertalanffy 1972; Morin 2005; Pierce 1980).
In addition, this subject has its basis in the pioneering efforts of such greats as John Von
Neumann and Norbert Wiener, whose ideas spread during World War II from their use as
building tools for self-governing war apparatuses (Bauer 1999; Bertalanffy 1972; Morin
2005; Pierce 1980).
Thus, a significant contribution of cybernetics to systemic knowledge refers to feedback
loops. This idea is the foundation of the self-regulation mechanisms that are responsible for
maintaining dynamic stability in systems far from equilibrium, as well as living organisms.
Feedback loops provide crucial implications for the study of systems; such recursion is a
key component to maintain the order amid richly interconnected dynamic systems (Bertalanffy 1972).
When this circularity of action exists between the parts of a dynamic system, feedback
may be said to be present (Ashby 1957, p. 53). In a system made up of feedback loops,
[] an initial cause propagates around the links of the loop, so that each element has an
effect on the next, until the last feeds back the effect into the first element of the cycle
(Capra 1996, p. 56). Thus, such system presents a recursive causality, in which responses
also act as a stimulus for new interactionssee Fig. 1.

STIMULUS

MESSAGE

RECEPTOR

MESSAGE

CONTROL
APPARATUS

RESPONSE

EFFECTOR

FEEDBACK

Fig. 1 Basic feedback loop. Source Bertalanffy (1972 p. 162)

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The main implication of feedback loops, in epistemological terms, consists in the fact
that web-connected systems require a non-linear mathematical model that, ultimately, can
lead to uncertainty and indeterminacy (Capra 1996). Bateson (1967, 1979) illustrates the
implications of this phenomenon by contrasting the reactions of a stone and a kicked dog.
As the author elaborates, the stones response will be linear, in accordance with Newtons
third law of motion; the behaviour of the dog will be proportional to the energy the animal
might spend for such. Therefore, the dog will demonstrate a nonlinear response, deriving
not only from external stimulus, but from a set of system responses: in essence, a selfgoverned response.
This issue produces a particularity of Cybernetics which affects systemic thinking as a
whole. Within the cybernetic context, explanations always occur in a negative way, in
contrast to causal explanations amid positivist thinking, which are usually embraced in
traditional science. From a causal perspective, the explanation takes place in the course of
events. Thus, it is necessary to establish a direct relationship between cause and effect.
From a cybernetic perspective, we observe the probabilities of occurrence among several
possibilities. Among the possible alternatives, the cybernetic researcher analyses the reasons why an alternative has been followed by the system, rather than another, and thereby
settles the constraints that led the phenomenon to such development scenario (Bateson
1967, 1979).
When the phenomena of the universe are perceived as linked together by cause-andeffect and energy transfer, the resulting picture is of complexly branching and interconnecting chains of causation (Bateson 1967, p. 30; 1979). In complex systems, relationships gain such a dimension that a system becomes permeated with an excessively large
number of interactions and interferences that define the behaviour of the system as a whole
(Morin 2005). Although complex systems can be governed by relatively simple patterns,
when combined, these systems can generate an endless variety (Pascale 1999). Therefore, a
major implication of feedback loops towards systems study lies in the fact that the
understanding of complex systems only makes sense in its totality: the patterns that emerge
from their relationship. Once the elements within systems are disconnected, this recursive
chain, responsible for their behaviour, is lost (Ashby 1957).
Therefore, thinking from complexity requires a rupture with the ideal of disciplines.
Having complexity as a reference requires that the barriers between the sciences, imposed
by the fragmentation of Cartesian thought, be broken by means of a reform in scientific
thinking (Capra 1996; Casanova 2004). In view of this conception, reductionist approaches
and disciplines adopted by classical science become restricted, whereas:
[] Different levels correspond to different fields of knowledge. Their techniques
and discourses are separated, and they do not touch one another at their limits where
they are articulated from one another. We have only very limited means to talk about
these articulations, because they appear in between the different fields of scientific
knowledge; and, therefore, we cannot have a direct access to them (Atlan 1987,
p. 125).
Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasise that the core idea within this view does not
consist of denying what the disciplines have produced. If all things are both caused and
causative, supported and supportive, mediate and immediate, are sustained by a linkage
that is both material and intangible, it is impossible to conceive the parts apart from the
whole; likewise it is not possible to conceive the whole disregarding its parts (Morin
2007, p. 22). Therefore, the main difference between the Cartesian methods and systemic

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approaches is the idea that the properties of the parts are not intrinsic, but can be understood only within the context of the larger whole (Capra 1996).
In this sense, Bertalanffy (1972) also reinforces that, in the same sense that the whole
and the emerging patterns that arise from its relationships should not be neglected, the
study of the parts also cannot be neglected. In the authors view, systemic knowledge must
be grasped in a cycle from the part to the whole, and from the whole to the part, based on
the study of the dynamic interactions of the phenomenasee Fig. 2. By virtue of such a
characteristic, related to knowledge acquisition within systemic perspectives, the focus of
any method of this kind must occur both in the description of the properties of the very
objects, and in the description of the patterns that originated from those relations among
the problems units.
In humans, pattern mapping is controlled by the right hemisphere of the brain, having
intuition as a mechanism for reality apprehension. On the other hand, the senses, which are
used by the empiricism of Cartesian approaches, relate to the detailing of both substance
and formalism, and they are linked to the left hemisphere of the brain (Crema 1989; Jung
1971). While the properties of the parts are apprehended through the activities of the left
brain hemisphere, which, by means of perception and cognition, apprehends the existence
of the object, as well as describes and classifies it, the synthesis of the totality is given by
intuition, which unconsciously perceives the whole picture of the possibilities that are
available. Such perception is in line with the view of Capra (1996), for whom intuition is a
key component to build an integrative paradigm, as proposed by systemic thinkers.
In this sense, systems thinking (ST) cannot be treated either as holism or as reductionism, as it does not look either totally upwards or downwards. In fact, an approach that
is exclusively sensorial and logicalsuch as reductionism, may lead to alack of knowledge
of the whole. Similarly, a purely intuitive and sentimental approachsuch as holism, may
lead to mystics; it is impossible to organise and define what is real in the constructions of
the right hemisphere, if such results are never submitted to the scrutiny of the left hemisphere of the human brain (Crema 1989).
Inbeing both integrative and disintegrative, ST requires, simultaneously, an intuitive
and a rational stance. ST demands the totalising intuition, the symbolism and the ability to
recognise patterns, pertaining to the right hemisphere of the brain, as much as the logical
activity and ability to compare and classify, pertaining to the left hemisphere. Therefore,
we can say that ST is concilliatory, not favouring any of the aspects comprising the
cognitive abilities of human beings; on the contrary, ST requires methods that are able to
articulate and benefit from all of these skills.
In view of this, the systemic ideals point to a methodological conception capable of
handling interconnection issues due to a hypertrophy in the importance of aspects as
follows: Cartesianism regarding the aspects of the left hemisphere, in contrast with holism,

Fig. 2 Knowledge apprehension

cycle according to systems
thinking. Adapted from Morin
(1990)

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in regard to the aspects of the right hemisphere. Therefore, to construct a theory grounded
in systemic ideals, there must be a real integration between the activities of both cerebral
hemispheres (Crema 1989). Thus, for an understanding from a systemic perspective, it is
necessary to compose methods that are based both on the intuition syntheses and logical
deduction, with the latter being needed to classify and debug the contents of such intuitive
apprehensions.
As previously shown, the synthesis of the entire phenomenon, obtained through integration, comprises a relevant aspect for constructing complex knowledge that, according to
Devlin (1996), requires abandoning the ideal of Cartesian science. Therefore, it is necessary to have an approach focused on descriptive nature studies, having epistemological
and ontological foundations that differ significantly from the traditional paradigm adopted
by classical sciencesee Table 1.
At this point, it is worth noting that the integrative conception of ST implies an epistemological problem. Any attempt to understand the dynamics of a system attached to the
rest of the universe requires, at the same time, the knowledge of this system and the
universe as a whole, so that no relationship may escape from the observer. Under such
conditions, certainty requires, at least, the knowledge and the unlimited calculation powers
of the superior intellect proposed by de Laplace (1829). However, the limits for data
processing and transmission imposed by the information theory show that, even before a
deterministic approach, the existence possibility of such being is, at least, unrealistic
(Pierce 1980; Shannon 1948).
Consequently, under the concepts of ST, the construction of knowledge shall employ
elements of theoretical, experimental and empirical reflection in stages ranging from the
standpoints of fragments to the standpoint of totality, in order to distinguish scale and
generalisation levels linked to the phenomenon (Bertalanffy 1972; Casanova 2004). In
view of such perspective, the limitations imposed on the limit of the knowledge of the
totality lead ST to a position other than the one proposed by the Cartesian paradigm, which
is supported by the determinist and reductionist ideal. In such conception, the relationships
and constraints imposed on knowledge of the future of a system are brought back to the
agenda of scientific knowledge, which requires new methods to be able to deal with the

Table 1 Differences between the reductionist and systemic paradigms

Approach
Reductionist

Systemic

Study focus

Objects

Relationships

Subject/object

Dissociable

Indissociable

Precept

Disintegration

Integration , disintegration

Dominant brain hemisphere

Left

Right , left

Knowledge

Sensorial

Intuitive

Predominant inference

Inductive

Deductive

Causality

Linear

Recursive

Models

Linear

Non-linear

Language

Formal/mathematical

Symbolic

Source Designed by the authors

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description of richly interconnected systems, endowing a chain of causality that is difficult

to expound adequately.

A Phenomenological Proposal to Develop Synthetic Pictures

As previously presented, systemic thinking requires an approach ranging from substance to
patterns, moving back and forth into a closed cycle of knowledge apprehension. According
to Checkland (2000), pictures allows the mediation of a holistic understanding of the
complex systems relationships and also constitutes a good starting point to explore
problem situations and to understand how relationships affect all players in the process.
Despite being an essentially bottom-up approach, the notion of rich picture adopted
by Checkland (1989, 2000) is bound to philosophical concepts seen in authors of the
phenomenological schools, especially Heidegger (1993). However, Edmund Husserls
phenomenological approach allows a top-down approach that proves to be more appropriate to describe figures that summarise the problem as a whole, while allowing no
exhaust with respect to the observer.
The studies concerning modern phenomenology had their origin in the search by
mathematician Edmund Husserl for a method to achieve [] a science to be actually
based on ultimate and absolute basis (Zitkoski 1994, p. 17). To this end, Husserl started
from the premise that the phenomena are [] the ways of being aware of something and
all of its constituents [] (Husserl 1982; Moreira 2002, p. 64). In this design, the
phenomena do not address the objects themselves, but the way in which they are perceived
by the observers consciousness. This form does not consist in a mere appearance, as it has
its own nature (Husserl 1982; Moreira 2002). Therefore, we understand that the phenomenology of Husserl seeks [] the direct investigation and description of phenomena
such as consciousness experiments (Moreira 2002, p. 67).
The adoption of this approach led Husserl (1982) to the conclusion that access to
phenomena descriptions is only possible through direct access to the contents of the
observers consciousness. Thereby, phenomena descriptions would not be possible without
prior expounding [] the intentional flow operation that encompasses all conscious life
of the Ego and Cogito (Husserl 1982; Zitkoski 1994, p. 55).
Husserl (1982), then, proposed that the phenomenological judgement should be preceded by a disconnection process between the researcher and their previous perspectives
towards the existence of an external universe, until the ultimate source of the senses and
possible values to be attributed to an object are revealed. Consequently, the researcher shall
ignore their conceptions regarding the object, even those believed to be self-evident truths.
Husserl (1982) termed this process as Epoche, and to him, this is the only path to the
rigorous foundation in which apodicticnesstaken by the author not as the evidence, but
as the self-evidenceprovides the maximum degree of certainty. Therefore, the Epoche, as
reduced subjectivity, is an essential criterion for the study of the phenomenological sphere
(Zitkoski 1994).
Merleau-Ponty (2005) highlights that the disconnection process search proposed by the
Epoche find serious practical difficulties, as the consciousness of the researcher acts as a
noise in the search for an ultimate evidence. To handle such problem, the author proposes
that phenomenological evidence requires the recognition of the intentionality of the being,
for only then is it possible to recognise the evidence amid the noise caused by the contents
of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2005; Moreira 2002). This view is consistent with

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Devlins conceptions, according to whom the viewer cannot handle a practical situation,
disconnected from their experiences, as [] prior experiences are a necessary condition
for us to interpret the world at all (Devlin 1996, p. 347).
Within this context, the only way to achieve Husserls phenomenology goals would be
through the acknowledgment of the limits and intentionality of the beings consciousness,
which ultimately would spring from the observers social reality. Then, phenomenology
carries, in its core, the recognition of the intentionality of consciousness, and therefore,
the recognition of the difficulties inherent in the pursuit of scientific neutrality and absolute
truth, because humans happen to be included as reflective agents in the process (Husserl
1982; Moreira 2002, p. 71).
Hence, within the phenomenological perspective, Science has not and never will have,
by its nature, the same significance as the world which we perceive, for the simple reason
that it is a rationale or an explanation of that world, given by the perspective of the
observer (Merleau-Ponty 2005, p. III). Phenomenology recognises, in the transience of the
being, the very transience of reality itself, because the limits in the reducibility of intentionality arise as boundaries to achieve the proper facts behind the perceived reality.
Therefore, Husserls phenomenology carries, in its core, a revolutionary epistemological character, as the transient aspects of consciousness lead to the transience of the
recognised object, and the impossibility of attaining true knowledge. Such perspective
differs radically from Cartesian thinking, which advocates consciousness devoid of purpose, which is capable of explaining the phenomena in a clear and transparent manner and
reinforces the possibility of a neutral and impartial science. The phenomenological
method, in contrast, starts from the premise that there is a strong intentional character in
science.
Once sensorial perception is permeated with biased awareness, phenomenology
recognises that whatever stimulates the senses cannot be treated as an expression of facts as
proposed by Cartesian approaches. For Husserls phenomenology, the direct and immediate representation of the object lies solely on intuition. Thus, the gaps in an intentional
act of judgement must be filled through intuition, not with sensorial perceptions (Husserl
1982). In other words, phenomenological evidence emerges from the intuitive gap that fills
in the contents of consciousness. Within the dynamism of intentionality [], evidence
emerges as a distinctive type of judgement (Zitkoski 1994, p. 22).
Therefore, under the phenomenological conception, the evidence is manifested through
the judgement of the researcher. It frees the researcher from the burden of finding meaning
and structuring both their sources and their experiments, because the contents of their own
consciousness, filled through intuition, constitutes the most important information source,
and therefore, is an object to be structured to become intelligible. Given the phenomenological sphere, the researcher must undergo the experience, actually taking place as
an observer or participant in the action per se, not as an explorer of others perceptions.
To this end, Husserl (1982) highlights that the intuition of essences, termed as eidetic
intuition, consists of the path to a strictly reasoned description of the phenomena. The
eidetic intuition refers to a synthesis of the phenomena that reaches all of the possible
evidentiary senses; having this feature secures for phenomenology the rigorous foundation
for its status as a science (Zitkoski 1994).
From this perspective, Husserl (1982) proposed a reduction method to distinguish,
through intuition, the invariant aspects of a given object. This process, termed as eidetic
reduction, occurs through the elimination of any feature that is not essential for the phenomenons recognition as it is (Husserl 1982; Zitkoski 1994). In essence, this method
proposed by Husserl (1982) presents a considerable formulation potential for pictures

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capable of synthesising the problem, similar to the rich figures of Checkland (1989,
2000).This is because both point to the same goal, which is to establish the relationships
that make the object recognisable as such.
To illustrate this procedure, we shall take a mug as an application example. Its colours
or patterned designs do not modify the mug object in its essence. Even devoid of such
attributes, the mug still exhibits itself to the observer as a mug. Nevertheless, having the
image of its wing removed, the mug then assumes the essence of a mere container, such as
an ordinary cup. Therefore, the process of eidetic reduction reveals that characteristics such
as colour or prints are not the components of the mugs primary essence, contrarily to the
wing, which is an important descriptive aspect for the mug to be recognised as such.
Consequently, it is possible to state that, in eidetic evidence, the description of the phenomenon is obtained through the internal and external relations belonging to the essences
of phenomena (Giles 1989; Merleau-Ponty 2005; Moreira 2002; Zitkoski 1994).
Thus, the phenomenological method proposed by the author is a descriptive method of a
qualitative nature, which uses non-experimental means for constructing knowledge (Giles
1989; Moreira 2002). Husserl (1982) highlights the importance of non-experimental
approaches in the scientific knowledge apprehension process. In the authors view, the very
delineations performed by traditional science are, in fact, originally eidetic reductions that
are subsequently converted into empirical activities, and therefore, require a formulation
structured within pure possibilities, to give rise to adequate processes of empirical analyses. So, [] the science of pure possibilities precedes the science of actualities and
alone makes it possible, as a science (Husserl 1982, p. 72).
At this point, it is crucial to highlight that intuition does not deny the researchers
rational aspect. Intuition is the polar opposite of the senses; it is capable of producing
totalisations that the senses are not able to convey (Jung 1971). Once intuition cannot be
taken as an antagonist to reason, but to the senses, neither can the phenomenological
judgement be considered opposite to it. Therefore, assuming phenomenology as an
investigative approach does not mean that the effort to organise and sort the contents of
consciousness may dispense reflections concerning the problem. Still, the very need for the
recognition of common elements within the contents of consciousness makes the presence
of a reflective space imperative to organise and classify these contents of consciousness in
order to make them intelligible.

The Analogical Method of Knowledge Classification and Organisation

As previously stated, Husserls eidetic reduction is a promising method to collect and
analyse evidence within studies concerning complex systems, whereas the eidetic reduction process can be used as a construction tool for synthetic pictures. Nevertheless, to meet
the needs of ST, whose perspective is the basis of the present consideration, it is necessary
to unify the results of an intuitive effort to a careful reflection, to organise and classify
knowledge from its parts and the relationships established among them.
To this end, we propose an analysis method that can come to existence through a
concurring link between the phenomenological evidence and the aspects required by
deductive inference. This common bond aims to enable the classification and description of
the organisation, so that it can be understood and analysed in virtue of features that are
already familiar to the researcher. In this scenario, the analogical method stands out,
because it allows the transportation of similarities between different systemic levels and

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enables the simplified understanding of complex phenomena, inherent in the whole, from
acknowledged phenomena. Moreover, this approach was effectively consolidated by the
so-called Hard Sciences.
According to Husserl (1982, p. 111), [] each everyday experience involves an
analogising transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its
anticipative apprehension of the object as having asimilar sense. When there is the
revelation that the meaning perceived through the analogue refers to a new meaning, this
leads to the formulation of the idea of primary creation. Therefore, in the phenomenological concept, analogies occur through an assimilative perception that ultimately makes it
possible to directly relate the unknown object to a previously known group of objects
(Husserl 1982).
According to Gentner et al. (2001), metaphors constitute a process originating from the
same relationship between the communalities among objects occurring in an analogy, in
which these eventually assume the characteristics of analogies when sharing primary
relational information. Consequently, analogies can be considered as a more stringent class
of metaphors. In this regard, Bateson (1967) offers an important contribution by stating
that stringent metaphors show themselves as techniques imported from deductive and
formal processes of mathematical logic, suitable for cybernetics-originated process analysissuch as the complex systems.
Because analogies are a more rigorous class of metaphors, they can be used as bonds
between the intuitive and the rational; they comprise the phenomenological evidence and
the raw materials for the logical-deductive process. In addition, the analogical process can
organise and classify the self-evidence, from a communal iconic set. This set can assist in
the distinction between the judgements concerning a synthesis of the whole, from the ones
meaning nothing but mere mystification. Thus, the adoption of such hybrid method,
capable of accommodating the evidence of intuition, as well as knowledge classification
and organisation, meets most of the needs imposed by the systemic perspective.

Building a Method for the Description of Soft Systems

Henceforth, the collection of evidence for a research effort to describe complex systems
must be undertaken upon the eidetic reduction principles of the phenomenological method
to develop, from intuition, a synthetic scheme of the primary essence of the studied
phenomena. Thus, the first step of such procedure must be developed through a process of
eidetic reduction as proposed by Husserl (1982), to construct a rich picture of the issued
problem.
As previously shown, eidetic reduction is a process in which the relationships between
the phenomenon and the external environment are removed until the moment when the
removal of any of the remaining relationships prevents the phenomenon from being
recognised as such. Under the concept of Husserls phenomenology, this is the moment
when the phenomenon reveals itself as a pure potentiality that, ultimately, is the essential
generality that allows it be recognised as such (Husserl 1982).
To this end, the researcher must stand as a direct participant or observer of the phenomenon under study, to reduce the external interference to a minimum degree. Aware of
the phenomenon, the researcher must remove as many relationships and units as possible
until the investigated system is not perceived as what it intends to describe. The result,
obtained as the first evidence, shall contemplate nothing but the relationship and the units

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needed, so that the problem may be perceived as it is. This process refers to the practical
application of eidetic reduction proposed by Husserl (1982). The final outline, obtained
from this procedure, may only be treated as the problems primary evidence if the removal
of whichever indicated relationship makes the illustrated system incompatible with the
essential aspects that allow it to be recognised as such.
In essence, this procedure is a similar application to the proposed construction of rich
pictures suggested by Checkland (1989, 2000). However, the dossier addresses the
problem from all, until the summary of it allows the researcher to access the essence of the
phenomenon. So, in contrast to the bottom-up perspective of Checkland, it consists of a
formal procedure aimed at exploring the synthetic character of intuition through the
philosophical basis which gives the phenomenological reduction of its character its degree
of science. Despite the differences in the adopted perspective, it is a tool that can also be
used as a means of effective phenomenal description inside Checklands approach,
replacing the rich pictures traditionally adopted by such a perspective, giving greater
summarising power for descriptions of richly interconnected complex systems.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, when the researcher is the source of the actual
description that embodies the phenomenons primary essence, the quality of their
descriptions can be favoured by a reversal of the writing procedures that are traditionally
adopted in scientific papers. To reduce the noises emitted by the information storages of
consciousness, according to the difficulties raised by Merleau-Ponty (2005), the literature
on the study theme can be developed after the description of the study objects primary
essence is made. In doing so, the researcher may minimise the impact of preconceptions
regarding the contents of consciousness, in which such construction would be based. This
approach would also help to minimise the impact that old concepts would have on new
discoveries that Feyerabend (1993) points out as a problem of traditional methods.
In sequence to the formulation of the proposed procedure, we suggest the application of
an inference procedure, based on deductive logic using transpositions by analogies.
Analogy is an argument that concludes from certain similarities observed, other similarities not yet observed (Parra Filho and Santos 2002, p. 82). In other words, the analogybased methods seek to [] investigate things or facts and explain them according to their
similarities and their differences. (Fachin 2001, p. 37). According to Parra Filho and
Santos (2002), analogies lead to hypotheses or probable conclusions; therefore, they cannot
be treated as conclusions with a high degree of certainty. The transformation of an analogy
into a theory with a higher degree of certainty depends, ultimately, on demonstrations, in
which the similarity between the analogues is strong.
Nagel (1979) divides analogies into two 2 sorts: substantive and formal. The substantive
start from the assumption that a given system holds certain known properties and that these
serve as an iconic model for a new system, not necessarily incurring a conceptual transposition from the known system to the new system. This was the type of analogy used by
physicist James Clerk Maxwell when drafting the laws for magnetism. In formal analogies,
though, the researcher must rely on an abstract and a correlated set of mathematical
concepts that nourish similarities among themselves. These concepts can comprise a
description of a second phenomenon from an originating and correlated abstract structure.
In summary, one can say that a substantive analogy contains an iconic similarity, while a
formal analogy contains a conceptual similarity among the studied elements (Nagel 1979).
As complexity [] does not engage in discovering phenomenical analogies, but
finding common organisational principles, the principles of evolution of these principles,
the characters of its diversification (Morin 2005, pp. 3940), then, substantive analogies
show promise to support the analysis procedures in problems involving such a system.

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In this context, the synthesis of the problems primary essence must be broken down
into its subsystems, and these should be analysed by means of analogies between these
subsystems dynamics and the dynamics already identified in other subsystems of their
own.
In this context, the synthesis of the problems primary essence must be broken down
into its subsystems, and these should be analysed by means of analogies between these
subsystems dynamics and the dynamics already identified in other subsystems of their
own. Subsequently, the systemic totality should be restored by coupling its subsystems, so
that none of the relationships found are lost or subtracted from the phenomenons
descriptionsee Fig. 3. Thus, it is possible to ensure that no relationship, appointed in the
primary essence, may be destroyed for convenience at the time of the construction of any
of the analogical stages.
The reintegration process, which occurs at the analogical stage, contributes significantly
to the organisation of the results, especially the construction of a simplified conception of
the problem. However, this is an appropriation of concepts from a set of subsystems in
networking, where one dynamic leads to another, the interweaving and multidisciplinarity
lead to the construction of disordered skeletons of the concepts to be related.
For coherent contents, it is suggested that the researcher use an integrative method, in
which the skeleton formed from this set of analogous dynamics is successively treated

B
?
?

Subsystems whose dynamics are known and are similar to

the behavior of the envisioned system's parts and couplings,
through the collection of evidence.

C
Description of the primary essence of the
"A" system that emerges as the
phenomenon's evidence..
"A" may be understood through 3B + 2C, coupled according to the
following description, with the form of coupling having as much
importance as the dynamics of the components.

B
B

Fig. 3 The process of primary essence reconstruction through analog components. Source Designed by the
authors

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625

and organised through sequential analyses and reorganisations, in a process referring to the
hermeneutic circles of Heidegger (1993), until the description is consistent with reality.
The dynamics of this process are shown in Fig. 4.
Subsequent to the organising effort, what emerges from this process is a detailed picture
of the problem, which transcends the descriptive aspect and allows, by analogy, an
explanation of much of the reported problem.

Final Considerations
This research sought to equip important aspects proposed by the General Systems Theory
of Bertalanffy (1972). Through a phenomenological perspective, a set of procedures is
proposed that, when combined, allow you to build descriptions and synthetic explanations
of complex phenomena, supported by a philosophical basis which gives them their degree
of science. As a result, the proposed process delivers a theoretical proposition about the
problem studied, based on a qualitative analysis that is based on formal processes of
deductive logic.
Figure 5 summarises the stages of this method. As seen, both immersionthrough an
action and/or participant survey, and the construction of the synthetic pictureby means of
an eidetic reduction process, constitute the descriptive step of the process. Afterwards
comes an explanatory stepstructured through an analogical process, supervened by a
recursive organisation step, which eventually culminates in the formulation of a theory
concerning the dynamics of the studied problem.
While this approach has focused on the individual, its application may also make an
important contribution in a collaborative research environment. Each participant may be
asked to develop their own synthesis to figure the problem, involving specific parties of the
phenomenon or even a whole. These can also be called to assist in the selection of
appropriate analogies to explain the phenomenon, according to their experience. The
adoption of techniques such as brainstorming, in a context of discussions from the

Stage N

Stage N+1

Stage N+2

Result
Fig. 4 Dynamics of interactions to organise content expression. Source Designed by the authors

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Problem
Immersion

Rich Picture
Construction

Identi cation
of Analogies

Results

Recursive
Structuration

Fig. 5 Stages of the proposed method. Source Designed by the authors

perspective of a hermeneutic spiral (Heidegger 1993) and an eidetic reduction (Husserl

1982), can also lead to the construction of a more robust synthesis about the problem,
which is able to synthesise it from multiple viewpoints.
It is noteworthy that, when studying an environment determined by the context, the
distinction between the deductive and inductive steps of the explanation process becomes
crucial (Bateson 1967). This is because the results of an essentially deductive proposition
neither exclude nor deny inductive approaches. Therefore, it is strongly encouraged that
the study results obtained from this method are tested by means of specific experimental
designs for such.
Eventually, based on the presented epistemological support, we expect to have taken a
significant step to enable theoretical approaches about systems dynamics in the fields of the
social and organisational sciences, specifically in descriptions and explanations of complex
phenomena, which are historically difficult to elucidate through Cartesian approaches or
even by traditional action-oriented methodologies. Further efforts towards instrumentalising the construction of adequate experimental designs, aimed at testing the results from
this sort of procedure, must be employed to provide studies of such nature with the
deserved attention and due soundness: procedures like architectures for artificial ethology
experiments in order to confirm the hypotheses formulated from this methodology or even
experiments based on organisational interventions in order to measure the results of certain
dynamics mapped through this approach.

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