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Impartiality:
Impartiality according to (Lawrence, 1991), is sometimes treated by philosophers as if it were
equivalent to moral impartiality. Or, at the very least, the former word is often used, without the
qualifying adjective moral, even when it is the particularly moral concept that is intended. This
is misleading, since impartiality in its broadest sense is best understood as a formal notion, while
moral impartiality in particular is a substantive concept and one concerning which there is
considerable dispute.
According to (Troy, 2002), It is all too easy to assume that the word impartiality must denote a
positive, unitary concept presumably a concept closely linked with, if not identical to, morality.
This, however, is simply not the case. Rather, there are various sorts of behaviour that may be
described as impartial, and some of these obviously have little or nothing to do with morality. A
person who chooses an accountant on the basis of her friends' recommendations may be entirely
impartial between the various candidates (members of the pool of local accountants) with respect
to their gender, their age, or where they went to school. Yet if her choice is motivated solely by
rational self-interested considerations then it is clear that the impartiality she manifests is in no
way a form of moral impartiality. To take a more extreme case, consider an insane serial killer
who chooses his victims on the basis of their resemblance to that some celebrity. The killer may
be impartial with respect to his victims' occupations, religious beliefs, and so forth, but it would
be absurd to regard this as a form of moral impartiality (despite the fact that, in certain contexts,
morality does require impartiality with respect to such considerations.)
(Troy, 2002) stated that , It is also worth noting that some types of impartiality may in
themselves be immoral or morally questionable. Suppose that I decide to pass along a treasured

family heirloom to one of my two sons, Bill and Phil. Flipping a coin would constitute one type
of impartial procedure for choosing between the two. But suppose that I have already promised
the heirloom to Phil, on several occasions. In this case it would be quite wrong to allow a coin
toss to determine whether he gets it. Deciding by means of a coin toss would be an impartial
procedure, but it would be the wrong sort of impartiality here, for it would ignore the moral
obligation created by my previous promises.
The word impartiality, then, picks out a broad concept that need not have anything to do with
morality. (Indeed the final species of impartiality discussed below, epistemic impartiality, is not
essentially a moral concept at all.) In this broad sense, impartiality is probably best characterized
in a negative rather than positive manner: an impartial choice is simply one in which a certain
sort of consideration (i.e. some property of the individuals being chosen between) has no
influence. An analysis along these lines has been proposed by Bernard Gert. Gert's analysis holds
that A is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and only if A's actions in respect R are
not influenced at all by which member(s) of G benefit or are harmed by these actions (Gert
1995, p.104). Thus, for Gert, impartiality is a property of a set of decisions made by a particular
agent, directed toward a particular group.
According to (Troy, 2002), Gert's analysis captures the important fact that one cannot simply ask
of a given agent whether or not she is impartial. Rather, we must also specify with regard to
whom she is impartial, and in what respect. Gert's analysis, then, permits and indeed requires that
we make fairly fine-grained distinctions between various sorts of impartiality. This is necessary,
since one and the same agent might manifest various sorts of partiality and impartiality towards
various groups of persons. Consider, for instance, a university professor who is also a mother of

five children, and who is currently acting as a member of a hiring committee. Such an agent
might be impartial between her children with respect to the care they receive (while preferring
her own children over others in this respect), and also impartial between the various job
candidates; but it is clear that these two uses of the word impartial denote very different
practices. In particular, the idea of merit applies in one case but not the other: to be impartial
between job candidates is presumably to select between them on the basis of merit, whereas to be
impartial between one's children is not to think of merit at all, but rather to provide equal
protection and care to all.
Many attempts to characterize impartiality fail to respect the distinction between the broadest,
most formalistic sense of the notion, and a more specifically moral impartiality. To say, for
instance, that an impartial choice is one that is free of bias or prejudice is to presuppose that we
are dealing with a certain sort of impartiality, that which is required or recommended by
morality, or at least worthy of moral approbation. Bias and prejudice are loaded terms,
suggesting not only that some consideration is being excluded, but also that the exclusion is
appropriate and warranted. Similarly, the idea that impartiality requires that we give equal and/or
adequate consideration to the interests of all concerned parties goes well beyond the
requirements of the merely formal notion. In the coin toss case, it is quite clear that Phil's claims
to the heirloom are not being given equal or adequate consideration. As a characterization of
moral impartiality, however, this suggestion is considerably more promising.

References
Lawrence, B. (1991). Impartiality and Ethical Theory. Retrieved 11 February, 2016, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381660?seq=1
Troy, J. (2002). Impartiality. Retrieved 11 February, 2016, from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/impartiality/