Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Publisher's Foreword
th
January 2009
Kim, Yongdeok
President
Northeast Asian History Foundation
Publisher's Foreword 5
Contents
Introduction
Sungho KangJohn W. McDonaldChinsoo Bae / 9
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh:
Farakka Barrage Case
M. M. Mahbub Hasan / 117
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving and Securing
Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute
Justice M. Mbuh / 135
Contents 7
Introduction
Sungho Kang John W. McDonald Chinsoo Bae
The First Annual International NGO Conference on History and Peace took
place from 12 to 16 September, 2007 in Seoul, Korea. The Second Annual
International NGO Conference on History and Peace on The Role of Global
Civil Society towards Historical Reconciliation in East Asia was held in
Seoul on 8-12 October, 2008, with participants from 23 countries. During
the conference, an NGO Forum devoted several sessions especially to territorial issues and conflict resolution. Experts and NGO leaders from different
parts of the world discussed the root causes and background of international
conflicts. The aim was to explore territorial issues; clarify the role of NGOs
in finding peaceful solutions to these problems within the context of historical reconciliation; and promote international cooperation and NGO (civil
society) networking for preventive diplomacy and peace building.
There have been many NGO gatherings in the world covering a range
of issues, but this meeting was unique in addressing this theme. The main
events of the 2008 NGO Conference on History and Peace included plenary
sessions, workshops, exhibitions, a film festival and several cultural
performances. The special workshop on territorial issues and conflict resolution was co-organized by The International Network for Peace and Conflict
Resolution
(INCORE)
in Seoul.
introduction 11
(within oneself)
or external
(between
introduction 13
reduce conflict.
There are currently thousands of individuals and organizations outside
governments and intergovernmental organizations that are working for peace
around the world. These people are achieving significant results which are
not recognized enough. It seems that governments are reluctant to admit
non-state actors into the business of peace and security.2
This publication focuses on the work of NGOs and, in particular, their
transnational networking mechanisms which serve as an effective means of
preventive diplomacy and conflict management. Because historical conflicts
and territorial issues are usually associated with national legitimacy, it is
not easy to solve such matters at the governmental level alone. Countries
in East Asia, in particular, Northeast Asia, face numerous challenges to achieve
historical reconciliation because of historical wounds and territorial disputes
which are barriers to the progress of regional cooperation and peaceful
coexistence.
The International NGO Forum on Territorial Issues and Conflict Resolution
is a means of the implementation of Second Track or Citizen Diplomacy.
Citizen Diplomacy is facing the profound challenge of complex conflicts
by bringing together all those working to build a sustainable and just peace.
Under the principle of Second track or Citizen Diplomacy, they work together
to understand better the dynamics underlying the conflict and conflict transformation from violence to a collaborative process of peace building and official
diplomacy, opening up opportunities for communication, and cross-cultural
understanding. It can introduce new insights and ideas to the official process,
reduce tensions and misunderstanding, build capacity in civil society, and
promote public support and political will.3
2
Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette Verhoeven, eds.
People Building Peace II (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 47.
Ibid., p. 5.
introduction 15
(governments)
by itself. This book became the foundation for the Institute for Multi-Track
Diplomacy in 1992 in Washington, D.C.5
The fundamental belief of this approach is that the only way to solve
a conflict is to sit down face to face and talk about it. It is worth noting
that a dozen universities in the United States offer a Masters or Ph.D degree
in conflict resolution, beginning in 1982. Unfortunately no university in
South Korea offers a full course on conflict resolution. One university in
China and two universities in Japan have developed curricula in conflict
resolution. It is hoped that the two conferences in Seoul and this book will
stimulate the establishment of courses and degrees in conflict resolution,
beginning to establish this discipline as a field in East Asia.6
To manage conflicts, it is logical to involve not only the international
organizations, but also regional and sub-regional organizations and networks
with strong links to local and community-based organizations. Such regional
players can have a significant role not only in early warning and early response but also in crisis management on the ground. It is therefore, important
to build partnerships than bring NGOs together with governmental, intergovernmental, sub-regional, and regional organizations. This is all the more
important in view of the fact that NGOs often have a better knowledge
and understanding of the regional political and cultural dynamics, greater
capacity to analyze local developments, and well-established links with con5
For more details, see the following work of John W. McDonald and Dr. Louise
Diamond, Multi-Track diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (US. Institute
for Peace, 1991; West Hartford, Connecticut, Kumarian Press, Inc., Third Edition,
1996; also translated into Chinese and published by Beijing University, 2007).
See John W. McDonald and Noa Zanolli, The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and
Peacebuilding : Stories and Lessons (Lanham: Lexington Books, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2008).
(Taiwan)
and Japan,
between Japan and Russia, between Korea and China, between Korea and
Japan. This region does not have any multilateral security institutions, intergovernmental bodies, economic initiatives or other multilateral institutions.
The Northeast Asian region is economically the most rapidly developed area,
but there are many unfavorable factors which hinder regional cooperation
and peacebuilding at present. They can be listed such as existing border
disputes, island disputes, lingering historical animosities and a difference
in economic systems with weak inter-regional trade linkages.8
As a preliminary step toward regional cooperation, forming NGO networking and their operation will contribute to making a breakthrough. For
this purpose, the NGO Forum on Historical Reconciliation and Territorial
Issues has been conducted since 2007 with the participation of numerous
7 op. cit., p. 52.
8 Tobi P. Dress, Designing a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: Taking a Systems Approach
introduction 17
scholars and practitioners, NGO leaders and experts from different parts of
the world. They discussed different cases of conflict resolution and territorial
issues and shared their experiences and their wisdom. This book is a collection of their presentations at the International NGO Forum on Territorial
Issues and Conflict Resolution.
This publication titled Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding : The Role
of NGOs in Historical Reconciliation and Territorial Issues contains nine
papers.
Ekaterina Stepanova, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), presented New Trends and Challenges in Modern Armed
Conflicts by which she is indicating that armed conflicts have undergone
significant changes in the last couple of decades. She analyzes the trends
of conflicts with statistics by comparing the Cold War era and the Post-Cold
War era. She shows the increase of bothnumber of conflicts and locations
since the beginning of the Post-Cold War era. Internal
(intra-state)
conflicts
outnumbered interstate conflicts by four times since the 1950s. In the past
decade, 95 percent of conflicts have not been fought between states, but
within states. Therefore, there is a tendency of increase of internally displaced persons since 1990. It means the necessity of our understanding of
security from national security centered on the security of the state to
a broader notion of human security centered on the security of people,
both individually and collectively. She emphasizes that the more our understanding of security integrates elements of human security, the greater is
the role it assigns to civil society, including at the global level, and in shaping
and promoting security through conflict resolution.
John W. McDonald, the co-founder and president of the Institute for
Multi-Track Diplomacy in 1992 in Washington, D.C., explains the necessity
of citizen diplomacy or Track Two diplomacy, considering the contemporary
international system based on the concept of national sovereignty and the
nation-state system. He also indicates the weak point of the United Nations
which cannot interfere with intra-state conflicts because of national
sovereignty. This vacuum can be filled by non-governmental organizations
with the participation of private citizens who can change the thinking of
governments through peaceful, focused and dedicated action. He introduced
his concept of citizen diplomacy, i.e., multi-track diplomacy as a systems
approach to peace. He and one of his colleagues came up with the idea
of the systemic nature of the nine tracks in the multi-track systems approach
to peace
(SCS-IWG)
introduction 19
(Philippines)
is a good example
(dam)
on the Ganges between India and Bangladesh. India carried out the plan
of the establishment of Farakka Barrage on the Ganges in 1974 which causes
serious damage to more than 20 million farmers in Bangladesh. When the
water conflict could not be resolved between the two governments, NGOs/
civil society organizations in this region rose to be engaged in advocacy
activities through NGO networking. Mr. Hasan focused on voluntary commitment of citizen diplomacy with the participation of NGOs/CSOs from
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal toward the resolution of the Farakka Barrage
disputes.
Justice Mbuh, Professor, University of Yaound, Cameroon, in Africa,
presented his paper on sustainable peace and security over the Bakassi
Peninsula Dispute. The Bakassi Peninsula dispute has been understood by
many scholars as only a boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria,
ignited mostly over the resources of oil and gas, but Prof. Mbuh revealed
the complex historical background of the Bakassi Peninsula area which is
called Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons).
introduction 21
We believe this publication will serve as useful information and inspiration to promote and support citizen diplomacy and NGO networking so that
the efforts and goals of the NGO Forum on Territorial Issues and Conflict
Resolution will spread and be fulfilled in the near future.
Finally, we appreciate the encouragement of the Northeast Asian
Foundation of Korea for making this publication possible.
st
This is also part of the broader process it is not only our understanding
of armed conflict, but also our basic understanding of security that is changing: from the more traditional militarized interpretation of national security
centred on the security of the state to a broader notion of human security
centred on the security of people, both individually and collectively.
Needless to say that the more our understanding of security integrates elements of human security, the greater is the role it assigns to the civil society,
including at the global level, in shaping and promoting security, including
through conflict resolution.
There are two broad approaches to the contemporary analysis of armed
conflict in the global context, as distinct from the study of individual or
region-specific conflicts. One approach is focused on collection and quantitative analysis of data
Uppsala University
Center
(Canada)
(Sweden),
Maryland University
(USA),
Human Security
state-based conflicts were collected, ignoring conflicts where state is not a party).
Still, for any analysis of armed conflicts that goes beyond any narrow
local or regional perspective or is not limited to any single theoretical angle,
i.e. for any analysis of conflicts on a global scale, some common ground
must be established. This common ground is most naturally provided by
data on armed conflicts that measures their main parameters across the globe.
The parameters must be basic enough to be applicable to most armed conflicts
around the world. In particular, if different global conflict datasets based
in different parts of the world and using different methodologies show similar
trends in armed conflicts, this is a good scientific indication of the genuine
nature of these trends.
1 See, for instance, Kaldor, M. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global
Era, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) and Global Civil Society: An
Answer to War (Polity Press, 2003).
(124)
tive during the 17 years since the end of the Cold War: more armed conflicts have taken place since the end of the Cold War than over the previous post-WWII decades
conflicts
and the
(see Fig.
4 and 5).
The second trend was the shift in the direction away from major wars.
There were only four armed conflicts in 2007 that reached the intensity of
war (the threshold of 1000 battle-related deaths): Afghanistan, Iraq, Sri-Lanka, and
(2006)
or South Ossetia/Georgia
did not qualify as wars, as they resulted in less than 1000 bat-
involves the state as at least one of the parties; b) has at least once reached
the level of war
such death in the following years. Normally, major armed conflicts comprise
about half of all state-based conflicts and about one fourth of all conflicts
(see Fig. 6).
2007 there were 14 major armed conflicts, including all four major wars.
The third trend is the absence or a very limited number of inter-state
conflicts. In the post-World War II period more conflicts were always
fought within states, not between states
insula or between Iran and Iraqwere also some of the deadliest, each with over million
deaths).
But in the decade since 1998, only three conflicts were fought be-
(1998-2000),
(2008)
(1999)
(2003).
India-Pakistan
Even conflicts
conflicts in the strict senserather, they were internal conflicts with foreign intervention, or internationalized intra-state conflicts. Until 2008, for
the four years no inter-state conflict was recorded.
The related, fourth trend is rather a continuation of a longer-term developments, than a radically new one. In the past decade, 95 percent of conflicts have not been fought between states, but this is part of a much longer-term trend of a sharp, 12-fold increase in number of civil wars between
1946 and 1991. Much of this rise in the numbers of internal conflicts was
due to proliferation of anti- and post-colonial conflicts polarized by Cold
War ideological confrontation, but kept relatively low-scale. Todays
intra-state conflicts are hardly confined within certain states territory and
may
be heavily internationalized
and other support from a foreign government, including military intervention i. e. by NATO
forces in Yugoslavia over Kosovo or by Russia in support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia),
spill over the border, may involve a government of one state and non-state
groups from another state
fought between organized armed forces of two or more states and the original incompatibility is internal.
In sum, the vast majority of modern conflicts are low- to mid-intensity
intra-state conflicts that not always involve the state and maybe heavily
internationalized. Much less frequent are asymmetrical state-based conflicts
(between high-tech forces and conventionally incomparably weaker state and non-state actorsUS-led coalition vs. the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 or vs. Saddam Husseins regime
in Iraq in 2003).
one another.
The fifth trend is the growing shift of the central focus from the state
as the main actor in armed conflicts towards armed actors other than state.
According to UCDP, non-state conflicts
take place in Africa. Also, such conflicts occur or even tend to be con-
centrated in the same countries or locations that are also areas of statebased conflicts
(such as Darfur/Sudan).
non-state groups involve fewer battles and are usually less deadly in terms
of battle-related deaths. Also, they tend to last shorter than conflicts with
the participation of the state, especially some protracted insurgencies against
the state. The bad news is that violence by non-state actors seems to target
civilians more than armed actors and more civilians are killed one-sidedly
these days by non-state actors than by governments.
The sixth trend reveals that the change in armed conflict patterns
from major battle-oriented wars to civil wars and asymmetrical conflicts)
(away
is also paired
with and reflected in the changing casualty patterns. Today, the overall
proportion of civilian fatalities from collective armed violence, including
both civilians killed as a result of fighting between the combatants and civilians targeted directly by armed actors is higher than military fatalities.
The fifth trend is that much of contemporary armed political violence
goes beyond armed conflict as such
armed parties).
(reminiscent
On
conflict also shows that armed conflicts are no longer tied to a particular
location
or territory
(the
more were fought over government in the past decade. However, more
state-based conflicts are fought over territory.
This brief list of the main trends in todays armed conflicts is hardly
complete or exhaustive. It could, for instance, be supplemented by the rise
of some forms of violence that used to be relatively marginal on a global
scale
(such as terrorism).2
Old challenges
It is also useful to break-up the broad trends listed above. Such trends
and developments are commonly viewed as either positive, or negative,
or unchanged. However, it may be more accurate to view them as old and
2 For more detail, see Stepanova, E. Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological
and Structural Aspects, SIPRI Research Report no. 23 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008).
3 For more detail on fragmentation of violence, see Stepanova, E., Trends in Armed
which data is available for several decades. Overall, there had been
a 40 percent decrease in the numbers of such conflicts since the early
1990s. A particularly sharp decrease can be traced in the number of
major wars which is lower than ever in the post - WWII period, except
for a few years in 1950s. A sustained decline in the number of intra-state conflicts since the early 1990s, including armed self-determination conflicts, is also notable, particularly as compared to the sharp
rise of such conflicts in 1946-1991.
s
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declining annual totals for battle deaths since the end of World War II)
see Fig.
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, both
New challenges
If, however, one turns to the qualitative research
grasping change)
less rosy. Both have begun to trace the rise of new forms of warfare and
violence and the diversification and proliferation of armed actors
(large-scale
predatory gangs, government-affiliated and autonomous clan militias, transnational violent religious networks).
now involved than in any other time in the past 6 decades. It also point
at growing internationalization of conflicts
Furthermore, new
armed conflicts have been erupting at roughly the same pace for the past
60 year. Most recently, there has been an unusually large number of new
or revived conflicts since the mid-2000s, especially from the failure of past
peace processes
Among other things, this means that the downward trend in conflict is
not the result of effective prevention of new conflicts (despite the six-fold
increase in the UN preventive diplomacy missions
(1990-2002).
Rather, the
(1989),
(51)
over 145
of the 124
of mass killings
Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda when over 500,000 people were killed),
a much
Fifth, forms of violence that are not in decline or those that are even
on the rise
(IDPs)
remained relatively
stable over the last years, but increased over the last couple of years.
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, by 2007 there
were 24.5 mln IDPs around the world, mostly in conflict-affected countries
Sudan, Colombia, Iraq, Uganda and DRC, with 15.6 mln exposed to se-
rious threat to their physical safety. The new development is that refugee/IDP flows are no longer side-effects, but central goals of violence. In
many cases, violent deaths may be avoided by displacement, but in the longer term, if not addressed, todays displacement will breed tomorrows violence as it has been the case with the 4.8 mln Palestinian refugees today
(see Fig. 16).
Finally, as noted above, the recent data show that non-state conflicts
(that are not initiated by the state and not involving the state)
The fact that most conflicts today are internal, but often cross-border;
that the state is not necessarily the central actor and non-state conflicts outnumber state-based ones; the phenomenon of failed, absent or persistently
failing states; the combination of localization/fragmentation and transnationalization of violence; and, above all, the fact that most victims from
all forms of armed violence today are not combatants, but civilians all
these elements come together to form a reality in which the urgent need
for a qualitative upgrade and expansion of the role of civil society is
self-evident. It is not the state or the military, but civilians that are the
greatest and most direct victims of todays armed conflicts and other forms
of armed violence. The civil society groups which are the most direct representatives of the civilian population can no longer be seen as an
auxiliary, additional extra in dealing with armed violence they should
and will increasingly assume the role among the key stakeholders in
Fig. 3_State-based conflicts and conflict locations during and after the Cold War, 1946-2003
(PRIO data)
Fig. 6_State-based conflicts (incl. major conflicts) and non-state conflicts, 2002-2006 (SIPRI/
UCDP data)
Fig. 11_Battle deaths in conflicts short of major wars, 1946-2005 (CIDCM data)
Fig. 16_Terrorist incidents worldwide and in Iraq, 2001-2006 (based on MIPT data)
Fig. 17_Terrorism fatalities worldwide and in Iraq, 2001-2006 (based on MIPT data)
members of the United Nations. Today, there are 193 members in the UN.
Where do all these new nations come from? They came from the collapsed
empires. This means that more two thirds of the nations in the world today
are less than 45 years old. Many are still trying to find their path to this
day, and many are having trouble doing so.
My second theory has to do with ethnic conflict and its definition.
In 1989, two of my colleagues and I were invited to Moscow by the
Soviet Academy of Sciences to talk about conflict resolution. During our
visit we met with five members of the recently elected Soviet Parliament,
who had been democratically elected for the first time in 70 years. They
were curious about the concept of conflict resolution, unknown to them.
For decades, the Soviet Empire used firing squads, deportation to Siberia,
and labor camps, to resolve their problems.
Within in the first few minutes of our meeting, I was asked how to
solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I
said that I had no quick fix that would help them and suggested that they
call on the OSCE
of which
(1618-1648)
when the leadership of that country denies access to those nations and the
United Nations who want to be of assistance in reducing conflict within
national boundaries.
The most dramatic example in the world today is Sudan. The Sudanese
government has encouraged genocide in the province of Darfur for the last
four years, with hundreds of thousands of people killed. The head of state
of Sudan has prevented the United Nations from sending in a peacekeeping
force, quoting the right of national sovereignty.
This leaves a vacuum with regard to dealing with the 40 ethnic conflicts that are taking place today across the world. Thanks to the rise of
non-governmental organizations in many countries, this vacuum is being
partially filled. Small non-governmental organizations like my Institute for
Multi-Track Diplomacy are trying to assist the peoples in these internal
conflicts, to find a path towards peace.
I spent 40 years of my career as a U.S. diplomat and the last 20 years
I managed two small non-governmental organizations interested in conflict
resolution and peacebuilding.
While still a U.S. diplomat I became intrigued by the role that private
citizens can play in the field of foreign affairs with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As a result of this interest I wrote the first book
on that subject in 1985, Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, and
demonstrated that private citizens can change the thinking of governments
through peaceful, focused and dedicated action.
We call the work of Governments Track One diplomacy, and refer
to citizen action as Track Two diplomacy. Track One is always guided
by written instructions when it negotiates with other countries and is always cautious, formal, not flexible or risk-taking.
Track Two, on the other hand, allows much more freedom of thought
and action, is informal, flexible, risk-taking and innovative. Track Two does
including the Media. This is the heart of the multi-track system, because
to build peace that lasts, all tracks have to work together.
Track Two:
NGOs and Professionals
Track Seven:
Religinon & Culture
Track Three:
Business & Trade
Track Four:
Private Citizens
Track Five: Research,
Training and Education
I know from my experience that no single track, including Track One, can
build a peace process by itself. Unfortunately most governments today do
not realize that yet.
The basic concept I am talking about is a system of nine tracks that
must work together over time to resolve individual conflicts around the
world.
Since 1992, we have operated in Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, BosniaHerzegovina, the following African countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe,
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea. In the Indian subcontinent we have worked with the
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in Exile, with divided Kashmir
on both sides, in the divided Provinces of Punjab, in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and
Georgia in the Caucasus. We also worked in Taiwan and in Cuba. In every
case we have applied the principles of multi-track diplomacy and helped
to bring about a conflict transformation.
How do we work? We only go where we are invited to come by the
people in the conflict. We are not invited by governments, but we are invited by people who are hurting, often traumatized, and who want help.
When we decide to take on a project, we raise the money and go and
listen. Unfortunately Track One is not a good listener. It is essential for
Track Two to listen. We ask people what their needs are and how we can
help them. We tell them we do not have any money but we do have some
useful skills and we want to help.
Whenever we take on a project, we make a minimum of a five year
commitment to that project. We do not fly in for a weekend or a month.
We worked eight years in Cyprus and 11 years in Kashmir, because people
wanted our help.
We usually contact Track One to let them know that we are in their
country and to invite them to participate in our conflict resolution training
sessions. They rarely take advantage of this opportunity to learn about multi-track diplomacy and conflict resolution. But they have never prevented
us from doing our work.
We are totally transparent and neutral. Our goal is to bring people together from both sides of the conflict, and build understanding. We provide
skills that are only truly successful when we touch the heart. When the
participants realize that the enemy, across the room, has the same hopes
and fears and aspirations, we can go on to the process of healing, forgiveness and reconciliation. We begin to design together a more peaceful future.
Where ever we go, trauma and fear of the other side is present. And we
have to recognize that and work with skill and lots of patience together
on forgiveness and reconciliation. That is never easy but can be achieved.
Let me give you a few examples of our work. In 1985, the governments
of Great Britain and Ireland signed an international treaty which among
other things stated that the two governments would develop a Bill of
Rights for Northern Ireland. I was fascinated by this Track One idea and
in 1989, after my retirement from the U.S. Government, and now being
President of an NGO in Iowa, I called on the British Foreign Office to
find out what they had done about this great idea of a Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland. I learned that they had done nothing and did not plan
to do anything. They only put the idea forward as a public relations ploy.
I decided to take on this project and do the staff work for Track One
on this subject, with the hope they would accept our work.
We convened a small group of experts from Northern Ireland and the
United States and agreed that two Irish men, one Catholic and one
Protestant, would draft a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Then the Iowa
Peace Institute would take that draft and convene political leaders from
Northern Ireland and other international experts to review the document to
give it greater credibility.
We held a conference in Des Moines, Iowa, in December 1991, funded
by the Iowa business community, Track Three. Eight Irish men, including
five political leaders, and seven international experts approved, after one
week of discussions, this draft document. A year later, in London, Track
One, Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland, held a conference on Northern
Ireland. Track One created an ad hoc committee on the Bill of Rights for
Northern Ireland and the only document on the table was the one developed in Des Moines, Iowa. Three of the five political leaders who were
present in Iowa, were members of the ad hoc committee. At the end of
the conference, both governments, Britain and Ireland, announced to the
world that they approved the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, and it
is mentioned four times in the April 1998 Final Agreement.
This is a key example of how a small NGO can take one piece of a
larger conflict and focus Track Ones attention on it and get it adopted by
Track One.
My second example has to do with the problems the world is facing
today with regard to drinking water and sanitation issues. I want to focus
particularly on the current water situation in Israel and Palestine and show
how an NGO can take a piece of this larger conflict and again try to do
the staff work for Track One.
In November of 2007, President Bush convened forty Track One governments in Annapolis, Maryland, to focus on the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. One of the key issues that not resolved at the Annapolis meeting
was the question of the fair and equitable distribution of water between
Israel and Palestine.
A Quaker Group
in Annapolis, Maryland,
decided that it would offer its help to Israeli and Palestinian water experts
to focus on their precarious and difficult water situation. The Group spent
a great deal of time and effort on raising money and organizing a Dialogue
between Track Two water experts from both sides. They asked me to be
the Mediator to facilitate the interaction between the participants of the two
groups. In august 2008, this Quaker Group organized, under the leadership
of a Quaker member, who is a Judge in the Maryland Court system, a
meeting which took place in a safe, neutral conference center in Maryland.
They brought together five Israeli water experts and five Palestinian water
experts. In addition, there were four U.S. water experts, all private citizens.
One had been the Water Commissioner for seven years on the US-Mexican
border, the other was a practicing lawyer on water related issues, the third
was a professor of International Water Law, and the fourth a professor of
and they
were enthusiastic about the idea. My most recent information from Georgia
and the State Department is that support for this idea is increasing.
My hope is that in the months ahead funding is being made available
by the U.S. Government so that we might be able to start a Dialogue with
various Track One entities to make this idea a reality and transform the
conflict zone into a peace zone.
Before closing, let me say a few words about the importance of Dialogue.
At my Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy we are bringing for example
together, in regular intervals, graduate students from several universities in
the Washington, D.C. area, to share information about their home countries.
It is amazing how quickly these young people in a Taiwan-China dialogue,
in a Korea-Japan dialogue, in a Japan-China dialogue, or Korea-China dialogue, change their prejudices and views about each other and how they
deal with their history, when they talk to each other about it. They always
wait eagerly for the dialogues to continue.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, based on my experience,
NGOs everywhere can bring about a positive change for a more peaceful
environment by applying the concept of multi-track diplomacy to any conflict, including the issues that beg for a solution in North East Asia to create
a more peaceful world. Multi-Track Diplomacy can make the Impossible
Possible.
I strongly believe that the only way to solve a conflict, at any level
of society, is to sit down face to face to talk about it.
Maritime Council)
Background
The long road towards peace and cooperation in the South China Sea
(SCS)
started back in the late 1980s. This was after several decades of
disputes and confrontation that began soon after the end of the Second
World War when countries around the SCS first started making claims to
sovereignty over features within the sea. In the late 1980s and before the
conclusion of the Cambodian war through the Peace Agreement in Paris
in 1991, I recognized that prospects for peace and cooperation may finally
have come to Southeast Asia, although there were still potential for worrying developments and conflicts in the SCS.
The countries around the SCS have a long history of confrontation and
very little experience of cooperation. Armed clashes between China and
Vietnam have occurred primarily in 1974 with the latest in 1988. Multiple
territorial claims to islands existed, as well as claims to national maritime
zones of jurisdiction, particularly in and around the Spratly islands group.
The island disputes were bilateral, trilateral or even in some instances,
multilateral. The rapid economic development of the countries around the
SCS, particularly China, led to a scramble for the natural resources of the
SCS, both living and non-living.
Strategic issues were also at stake. The strategic significance of the SCS
to non-littoral countries could not be ignored. The sea-lines of communications through the area are significant both for the region and for world
trade and the global economy. Consideration needed also to be given to
increasing problems of pollution and the safety of navigation as well as
to the protection of the marine environment and fragile marine ecosystems.
Then there were the political factors that inhibited the process of
cooperation. The SCS is surrounded by countries that are vastly different
from one another, in land size, population, per capita income, employment
in fisheries, fish catch and consumption of fish per capita. Political systems
also markedly varied from the communist/ socialist countries of the northern littoral, namely China and Vietnam, to the non-communist southern and
eastern insular countries
Darussalam).
Seas.
For Japan, the SCS and its approaches, especially the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, are extremely important since more than 80 percent of its
oil imports are transported through these waterways. These waterways are
also extremely important to Japanese trade with Southeast Asia, South
Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Japanese interest in the preservation of peace and cooperation in the SCS may increase as the result of
its new orientation and increasingly intensive economic, trade and investment relations with ASEAN, South Asian and Middle-eastern counties.
The United States has always been interested in the area because it offers the shortest route from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and because
it is essential for the movement of United States fleets, both for its own
global strategy or for defending its allies in the region. The U.S. also has
large trade, economic and investment relations with the countries around
the SCS. In May 1995, the U.S. Department of State announced the U.S.
policies on the South China Sea which basically were as follows:
a. The U.S. urges peaceful settlement of the issue by the states involved
in a manner that enhances regional peace, prosperity and security;
b. The U.S. strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert
any nations claim in the South China Sea, and would view any such
use as a serious matter;
c. The U.S. takes no position on the legal merits of competing sovereignty claim and is willing to help in the peaceful resolution of the
competing claim if requested by the parties;
d. The U.S. has a strategic interest in maintaining maritime line of communication in the region and considers it essential to resist any maritime claim beyond those permitted by UNCLOS;
e. The U.S. strongly supports multilateral security dialogue and, in particular, Indonesias on-going effort to develop a peaceful solution to
the South China Sea disputes, and urges all involved to work diligently within the framework provided by Indonesia.1
of the 104 Congress, First Session, submitted by Congressman Gilman of the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and in the Statement of the U.S. Department of State on the
Spratlys and the South China Sea on May 10, 1995.
Sea, dated September 4, 1958. This point was repeated in Article 6 of the Chinese
Law No. 55/1992 on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of China, passed by
the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 7th Congress of the PRC on
February 25, 1992
ordinates are not measured from base points on land, but from fixed positions at sea. The Philippines has also occupied a number of islands and
rocks.
The Malaysian claim is primarily based on the continental shelf principle and is clearly defined by coordinates. It occupies islands that it considers to be situated on its continental shelf. Equally, Bruneis claim seems
to have been based also on the principle of EEZ and continental shelf, although the boundary lines are drawn almost parallel from, and are the continuation of, two points at sea at the 100 fathoms depth contour that were
announced in 1958 by the British as the continental shelf boundaries between Brunei and Sarawak and North Borneo
(Sabah).
All or most of these claims overlap with one another and some of them
with several other claims. All the claimants, with the exception of Brunei,
have occupied several rocks and reefs. There is no clear pattern of
occupation. Some Chinese occupations have been quite far to the south.
The significance of the various conflicting claims is very clear. It is basically a scramble for space and resources, either living or oil and gas, which
are believed to be abundant in the area. Exploration efforts are continuing
for oil and gas and fishery resources are being exploited. Conflicts have
arisen in the past and may arise again in the future.
Indonesian Initiative
Indonesia is not a claimant to any islands or rocks in the Spratly group.
But if the Chinese/Taiwanese dashed lines of 1947 are taken into consideration and continuously connected, then the Chinese/Taiwanese claims
could also intrude upon Indonesias EEZ and continental shelf as defined
in the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention
(UNCLOS),
and as demarcated
(Articles 61-67)
Enclosed Seas concepts as stipulated in Article 122 and 123. That Article
123 stated that;
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate
with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance
of their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour,
directly or through an appropriate regional organization:
a. to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea;
b. to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
c. to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area;
d. to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international or-
(CIDA)
(SCS-IWG)
was
established in Vancouver and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, which
I had established and directed in Jakarta, would collaborate and help develop the agenda for the meeting, prepare background papers, and arrange for
the participation of resource persons.
In view of this, at the end of 1989 I traveled around the ASEAN capitals
to find out whether and what we could do together about the SCS within
the context of preventive diplomacy. For that purpose, 1 prepared a basic
working paper. Out of this trip, I found out that:
practically everybody thought that we should do something;
there was apprehension that territorial disputes could pose major difficulties in developing cooperative efforts;
in view of difficult and sensitive territorial issues, it would be better
a platform for policy oriented discussions, not only for an academic exchange of views.
Each ASEAN country was asked to prepare a specific paper and to take
a leading role in discussions. Malaysia was to lead the discussion on territorial and sovereignty issues; Singapore on political and security issues;
Indonesia on marine scientific research and environmental protection; the
Philippines on safety of navigation; Thailand on resources management;
and Brunei Darussalam on institutional mechanisms for cooperation. Since
this was the first exploratory meeting, there was no statement issued at the
end of the meeting, although informal records were prepared by the
organizer.
The First Workshop laid the groundwork and it was apparent that there
were quite a few areas where participants were prepared to cooperate. In
preparing the Second Workshop, I thought that China and Taiwan
Taipei)
(Chinese
should be included as they have claims in the SCS and also occupied
some features in the area. But it was not easy at that time to bring China
into the discussion, primarily because China considered that the SCS issues
should not be regionalized or internationalized, and that China would
discuss whatever problems it had directly and bilaterally with the countries
concerned. In Chinas view, its claims to sovereignty over the SCS islands
were undisputable. In addition, it would be difficult for China to sit down
with Taiwan in international meetings like the South China Sea Workshop,
if these were formal meetings. But by the Second Workshop in Bandung
in 1991, it had become an all inclusive group; not only Vietnam and
China were invited and participated but also Taiwan
(Chinese Taipei).
Even
land-locked Laos was invited. Cambodia was invited later after the political
situation there became clearer.
Thus, by the Second Workshop in Bandung in February 1991, we were
able to bring China, Vietnam, Laos, and Chinese Taipei into the Workshop
Process. The Bandung meeting went into more detail with the topics mentioned above, including the problems of sovereignty over the Spratlys and
the Paracels, the roles of major non-SCS powers in the region, as well as
confidence building measures. More technical discussions took place on
marine scientific research, marine environmental protection, safety of navigation, and on resources management. Some ideas to establish a secretariat
as well as to formalize the meeting were mentioned. More significantly,
the participants attending the Bandung meeting agreed to issue a statement
saying that the SCS disputes should be settled peacefully, that force shall
not be used to settle the disputes, and that the parties to the disputes shall
exercise restraint in order not to exacerbate the potential conflicts. This
statement was a precursor to a much more formal ASEAN Declaration
on the South China Sea in Manila in July 1992, which provided guiding
principles for efforts to manage potential conflicts in the SCS through
cooperation.
By the Third Workshop in Yogyakarta in 1992, more specific dis-
cussions took place on the various topics. By this time, I felt that devising
cooperative projects would have to be worked out in more detail by specific technical working groups
(TWGs)
(GEMs).
Resources Assessment
(TWG-RA)
(TWG-LM)
(TWG-MEP),
(TWG-SNSC).
Finally,
the participarits also indicated that the workshop series had reached a stage
where it would have to concretize programs or projects to realize cooperative efforts through a step-by-step approach.
The Fifth Workshop in Bukittinggi in 1994 approved some specific
projects, which had been formulated by the Technical Working Groups, particularly a program for cooperation on the study and conservation of biodiversity in the SCS. The Bukittinggi Workshop also agreed, among others,
to authorize me to seek support and funding for the project proposal on
biodiversity; to convene another meeting of the TWG on Marine Scientific
Research to finalize proposals on sea-level and tide monitoring, and on a
database, information exchange and networking; and to convene the first
meeting of the TWG on Legal Matters in Thailand. The Workshop also
further discussed confidence-building measures, including discussion in detail on the need for non-expansion of existing military presence in the
South China Sea.
The Sixth Workshop in Balikpapan in 1995 approved the two project
proposals drawn-up by the TWG on Marine Scientific Research, namely
study on tides and sea level change and regional cooperation in the field
of marine science data and information network in the SCS. The participants also agreed to forward these project proposals to their respective authorities for their consideration and support in their implementation. I was
asked to solicit support from various sources for these projects.
The Seventh Workshop in Batam in 1996 further discussed the problems of implementing the agreed project proposals. Since 1995 there were
some difficulties in implementation, not only because of the financial prob-
lems but also because of political issues. Practically all countries in the
SCS have indicated willingness to participate in the implementation of the
agreed programs either in providing expertise, facilities or some even
financial. But China believed that the implementation of the agreed programs should be left to national institutions alone, particularly due to the
sensitive nature of the issues dealing with territorial and sovereignty claims.
It was only at the Eighth Workshop meeting in Pacet, Puncak, in December
1997 that the participants agreed to jointly implement the agreed programs
for cooperation. I was asked to continue to approach various international,
regional and national agencies, governmental or non-governmental, to support the implementation of the agreed programs.
The Ninth Workshop in Ancol, Jakarta, in 1998, continued discussion
on implementing the agreed projects. A representative of the UNEP indicated to the meeting that UNEP could help with the implementation of
some components of the Biodiversity Project. The Meeting also continued
discussion on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. On the Safety
of Navigation, the participants agreed to recommend to their respective authorities to consider ratification of the Rome Convention on the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988, of the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992,
of the International Convention on the Establishment of International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, and of the International
Convention on Oil Spill Pollution and Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990.
The Tenth Workshop in Bogor in 1999 noted that the atmosphere of
co-operation had improved, despite some difficulties. The Workshop also
discussed and endorsed the recommendations of the various meetings of the
TWGs and GEMs. The issues of the formulation of the Code of Conduct
for the South China Sea and the issues of implementation, as well as link-
ages with other activities, continued to be the subject of discussion. In order to avoid difficulties with regard to implementation of bio-diversity expedition in the South China Sea, it was agreed to conduct the expedition
in and around the undisputed Indonesian islands of Anambas in the South
China Sea.
The Eleventh Workshop was held in Cengkareng in March 2001. This
Meeting, while discussing and endorsing the reports and recommendations
of the various TWGs and GEMs, was also confronted with the decision
of Canada, for reasons unknown to us, not to extend its financial support
to the Workshop Process beyond the current support
(early 2001).
In view
th
in Jakarta.
(coordinated by China),
(coordinated by Indonesia),
It was agreed to
dorse the revised proposal and requested China to continue with the preparation to implement the project. With regard to the Palawan Biodiversity
expedition, the Philippines informed the workshop that it has changed the
implementation of the expedition from a Track Two activity to a Track One
activity and had widened the area of the expedition to also include Luzon.
This announcement created problems, and the workshop decided not to
continue discussion on this matter since Track One activity was outside the
purview of the workshop. As it turned out, some participants later withdrew
their participation in the Luzon-Palawan expedition. The workshop also
asked Indonesia to continue with the preparation for the study of Sea Level
Rise and asked Malaysia to initiate works on cooperation with regard to
Search and Rescue. At this occasion, Chinese Taipei proposed the establishment of South East Asian Ocean Network for Education
(SEAONE)
for train-
ing purposes to promote ocean science research. China has difficulties with
this proposal, and due to lack of consensus, the proposal was not discussed
further, noting that Chinese Taipei could initiate the program as its own
by inviting all other participants to make use of it.
The Fifteenth workshop was held in Anyer, Banten, in November 2005.
The workshop discussed and endorsed the result of the TWG meeting on
the Database Information Exchange and Networking project, held in
Tianjin, China, on 11-12 October, 2005. The workshop also discussed and
endorsed the result of the TWG meeting on the Study of Tides and Sea
Level Change and their impact on coastal environment in the SCS, held
in Anyer, Banten, Indonesia, on 22-23 November, 2005, and agreed to begin its implementation. All participants acknowledged the importance of the
workshop process as a confidence building measure and a preventive diplomacy mechanism which was still relevant to the current situation. In addition, after the implementation of the biodiversity project in Anambas
later in Palawan),
(and
climate change. The participation of certain authorities, as in the 15 Workshop, was already covered by the Special Fund which was established in
2004.
The Seventeenth Workshop was held in Yogjakarta in November 2007.
It discussed the various programs, particularly regarding the impact of global climate change on the South China Sea. It was agreed that the Workshop
Process is still relevant to maintained peace, stability, and cooperation in
the region, and it shall remain informal, participants attending the workshop
in their personal capacities, and that the workshop will continue to work
on the basis of consensus.
The Eighteenth Workshop is now being planed for November 2008 in
Menado, Noth Sulawesi, Indonesia.
(JD)
or Joint Cooperation
(JC).
I personally
(TWG-RA)
twice in Jakarta in July, 1993 and in 1999. The TWG-RA also established
a Study Group
(SG)
(TWG-RA)
excellent potential, and that we should study the various concepts or models of joint development around the world and to learn from them what
could be applied to the SCS area. I believed the concept should be formulated with agreement on at least four points:
1) The zone where the joint development will take place;
2) The nature, the subject or the topics of the cooperation
(fisheries,
minerals, gas, oil, environment, marine scientific research, marine parks, etc.);
Conclusions
A. Preventive Diplomacy
In view of our experience with developing cooperation to promote preventive diplomacy in the SCS, some conditions for successful efforts would
seem to be:
1) Realization by the parties to the disputes that conflict, especially
armed conflict, will not settle the disputes and will not bring benefits to any/either party; in fact they only bring mutual damage or
loss to the parties. I feel that the parties to the disputes in the SCS
are now aware of this.
2) Political will is required to settle the disputes peacefully and to prevent the disputes escalating into armed conflicts. The parties must
realize that their interests lie in finding a solution of the disputes
rather than in prolonging them. I feel that we still have to do a lot
to strengthen political will, although some progresses has been
made.
3) The parties should not legislate any territorial claims especially in
areas where claims are clearly disputed. Legislating territorial claims
and seeking support through public opinion tend to harden the position of all sides and make it more difficult to seek solutions or compromises, or even temporary solutions such as joint development. I
feel that this point still needs to be appreciated.
4) There is a need to increase transparency in national policy, legislation and documentation with more frequent meetings among the
legal officers of the various regional countries in order to exchange
documentation and information, including with legislative planning.
5) Successful efforts often begin with informal activities, either through
the Track Two or informal Track One processes. After such efforts
have had some success, a more formal track-one approach could be
(which started
China Sea Workshops. Preventive diplomacy requires patience, tenacity and consistent efforts.
6) Preventive diplomacy should be undertaken by all parties who
have an interest in the solution of problems, both regionally and
internationally. Solutions that take into account only national and regional interests, but ignore the interests of states outside the region
are not necessarily an effective solution for the long run. I feel that
this point is slowly being appreciated.
B. Basic Principles
In managing potential conflicts, it is important to take into account several
basic principles, such as:
1) To use an all inclusive approach and not exclude any directly interested countries or parties.
2) To start with less sensitive issues with which participants feel comfortable discussing without incurring the animosity of their respective governments or authorities.
3) The participants should be senior enough or eminent persons in their
government although they are participating in the process in their
private capacity.
4) The structure of the process should not be institutionalized by creating a permanent or well-organized mechanism. The process should
be kept as flexible as possible.
5) Differences should not be magnified and cooperation should be
emphasized.
6) In view of the delicacy and sensitivity of some issues, it is wise to
start with what is possible and follow a step by step approach and
the six points basis for settlement of disputes agreed upon by the
Second Workshop in Bandung in July 1991 and the five points
ASEAN Declaration on the SCS in Manila in July 1992 have became elements for the formal ASEAN-China Dialogue resulting in
the Declaration on the conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
adopted in Phnom Penh in 2002.
3) Discussion on Confidence Building with regard to military activities
has also slowed down, although there is still agreement to continue
discussion on this matter.
4) Discussion on formulating cooperation in technical matters has made
a lot of progress in the various Technical Working Groups. In fact,
three projects of cooperation have been agreed, namely on biodiversity, climatic change and sea level monitoring, as well as on
preparing a data base and net-working. A bio-diversity expedition
took place in 2002 in Anambas area, followed by the Philippines
bio-diversity expedition near the Palawan Island.
5) The efforts to develop cooperation through Joint Development have
also produced concrete results, such as the Agreement between
China and Vietnam on the Common Fishery Area in the Gulf of
Tonkin in 2002. An agreement between China and Philippines to
conduct a joint exploration survey for oil between the oil companies
of the two countries, was signed in Beijing in 2004, and a similar
agreement for three years on marine seismic undertakings between
the oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam, was signed
on 14 March, 2005.
Throughout the discussion of South China Sea issues, China has played a
key role. I am happy to note that China has moved away from being reluctant and skeptical to become an ardent supporter of the workshop
process. Chinas neighbors in the SCS area have responded positively, and
the policy of the Southeast Asian countries of constructive engagement
with China seems to be working. China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia
may see closer relations and cooperation in the future.
One of the successes of the efforts to manage the potential conflicts
in the SCS would be the absence or continued absence of armed conflict
in the area. Yet, precisely the absence or the prolonged absence of conflicts
in the area would also be one of the reasons for the argument that the
Workshop Process would no longer be needed. This argument could also
be used as an excuse not to implement agreed projects of cooperation,
which have been so painstakingly discussed and formulated. I personally
believe that this reasoning or argument is dangerous, because I do not share
the view that we have to wait until disputes erupt into actual armed conflict
before we do something about it. If disputes erupt into armed conflict, then
the efforts to manage potential conflicts in the SCS would have failed.
D. Concluding Remarks
There are good opportunities for promoting cooperation in various areas
and developing confidence-building measures and processes for the SCS.
The more discussion takes place on relevant issues, the better are the prospects for managing potential conflict in the area. The prognosis for the future would be much worse if South China Sea countries were not prepared
to talk about the issues, and to transform them into actual cooperation.
It has indeed been a long road towards peace and cooperation in the
South China Sea but it has all been worthwhile. In this context, I hope
that Indonesia, together with all its partners in the South China Sea
Workshop, will continue to exercise wisdom and leadership, albeit informally, in taking the initiative to promote peace, stability and cooperation
in the SCS and South East Asia in general, for their own respective good
and common interests. There are also good prospects for the model of the
South China Sea workshops to be used to deal with similar problems, including in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan or East Sea.
Introduction
The Mindanao conflict in Southern Philippines is an example of a protracted conflict that has persisted for many years. There are many analyses and different interpretations about the causes and nature of this conflict
determination, etc. However, one thing that is consistent in all these analyses
is the geographical nature of this conflict. It involves the areas in Southern
Philippines inhabited by the roughly 8 million Bangsamoro people, together
with their Christian and Lumad neighbours. The areas include parts of the
Mindanao island as well as other islands in this Southern Philippines archipelago Palawan, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, among the bigger and better
known islands. These islands constitute the areas in contention in this conflict
and have been designated the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro. These
are the areas that will be covered by this short paper.
Territorial issues and territorial conflicts are not the concerns of states
alone. It is well noted that since the end of the cold war, the nature of
most conflicts around the world and especially in the developing countries have involved the state being in collision with non-state actors.
Some of these conflicts have been of the type called self-determination
or separatist, meaning they involve groups asking for the independence
or separation of their areas from the present state boundary. These areas
constitute their domain justified by current occupation or history of previous ownerships, either as personal properties or part of the territory of
their rulers or ancestors, or both. These areas then constitute part of the
core problem or issue when addressing conflicts of this nature. Negotiations
between parties to the conflict have always include the need to address the
boundaries, limits, and scope of the areas in question, the occupants, both
current and former, and the nature of the takeover or creation of the land
areas. If the nature of the takeover can be proven to be illegal, then the
matter of returning it back to its rightful owner will have to be addressed.
In cases where this is not possible or practical, the issue of compensation
has to be raised. This is when the process can become rather tricky. Of
importance also is the issue of politics and governance. Who have the right
to govern and administer these areas, and how can they achieve this mandate? Is it through a presidential or congressional order, or through provisions provided or created in the constitution, or through the signing of an
agreement or treaty between the parties and confirmed through a plebiscite
or referendum, conducted and monitored by independent third parties?
The Mindanao conflict situation has gone through many rounds of negotiations involving a number of actors. On one side, the state, represented
by the president and the appointed negotiating panel is always a constant.
On the other side, the Bangsamoro has been represented by two main
groups the Moro National Liberation Front
Liberation Front
(MILF).
(MNLF)
processes with the government side. The MNLF started out demanding independence but subsequent negotiations, with the OIC as the third party,
have convinced them to accept autonomy over specific Bangsamoro occupied areas. The Philippines government or the GRP and the MNLF signed
the Tripoli Agreement in 23 December, 1976. This agreement, unfortunately,
(ARMM).
(SPCPD)
of the region. Both ARMM and SPCPD were headed by the MNLF but
with much subservience from the GRP as leaders were subject to political
appointments and fiscal management remained with the central government.
Presently, the ARMM remains as an institution, but is riddled with poor
governance, inadequate resources, ineffective regional framework, bureaucratic isolation from national governance, and shows a lack of democratization in its processes.2 On the other hand, the SPCPD was abolished by
President Arroyo in 2002 due to management failures.3 With these, the
GRP-MNLF 1996 Final Peace Agreement is largely viewed as a failure in
delivering peace and development to the Moros.
On another front, soon after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, and
1 For more information about the history and development of the Mindanao conflict,
please see Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar (eds.), The Mindanao
Conflict (Penang: SEACSN, 2005).
2 For a discussion of the ARMM governance please see the ARMM Roundtable Series
were not handled by MNLF personalities, instead by appointed officers from the
national government.
(MILF).
(BDA),
cestral domain.
Ceasefire between the two sides was achieved in 2003 when first the
MILF declared a unilateral ceasefire effective on 2 June, 2003, with the
government following with its own ceasefire declaration on 19 July, 2003.
The GRP and MILF kept its ceasefire but have proceeded with an on and
4 This progress is manifested when the MILF has divulged the location of its 23 camps
off peace talks. Taking into account the crucial atmosphere of the ceasefire, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels have proactively instituted some
mechanisms to ensure its success. The peace panels created the Joint
GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities
and Local Monitoring Teams
(LMTs)
(CCCH)
ceasefire between the AFP and the MILF forces. Moreover, taking heed
of the calls of the civil society groups5, they have also established the
International Monitoring Team
(IMT)
domain was on and off in 2007 and finally resumed again in early 2008.
The resumption of the peace talks was again followed by a break-down
and withdrawal of some members of the Malaysian International Monitoring
Team
(IMT);
(MOA-AD).
continued with the peace panels signing their initials on the agreement on
April 27, 2008 with a promise to come back on 5 August, 2008 to formally
sign it in front of and with the endorsement of as many groups as possible
including the Malaysian government, a representative from the Organization
of Islamic Countries
(OIC),
(TRO)
of the public domain but encompasses ancestral, communal, and customary lands, maritime, fluvial and alluvial domains as well as all natural resources therein that have inured or vested ancestral rights on the
6 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
basis of native title. Ancestral domain and ancestral land refer to those
held under claim of ownership, occupied or possessed, by themselves
or through the ancestors of the Bangsamoro people, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present, except
when prevented by war, civil disturbance, force majeure, or other forms
of possible usurpation or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as
a consequence of government and private individuals, corporate entities
or institutions.
4. Both Parties acknowledge that the right to self-governance of the
Bangsamoro people is rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a
Pangampong ku Ranaw. The Moro sultanates were states or karajaan/kadatuan resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements
of nation-state in the modern sense. As a domestic community distinct
from the rest of the national communities, they have a definite historic
homeland. They are the First Nation with defined territory and with
a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations. The Parties concede that the ultimate objective of entrenching the Bangsamoro homeland as a territorial space
is to secure their identity and posterity, to protect their property rights
and resources as well as to establish a system of governance suitable
and acceptable to them as a distinct people.
These points clearly highlight the importance of territory and it effective
governance in the Mindanao conflict situation. The areas being covered by
the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE)
which re-
fers to conflict affected areas outside the BJE, special socio-economic and
cultural affirmative action implemented by the Central Government will be
carried out. This area will also be subjected to a plebiscite not earlier than
25 years from the signing of the Comprehensive Compact to determine the
question of the accession to the BJE.
(TRO)
Philippines
(GRP)
(MILF)
official signing
very difficult. The stand-off between government and MILF forces ended
but incidences of confrontations could not be prevented and have started
to spillover in other areas in the succeeding days.
On 18 August, 2008 several towns in Lanao del Norte, Saranggani and
Sultan Kudarat were attacked by MILF groups. This ensued a major military operation by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).
Apart from
this, Christian vigilante groups have also emerged to protect their communities and, at the same time, threatened the Bangsamoro communities. By
23 August, the Department of Interior Local Government
(DILG)
issued
in response to calls
of local leaders and politicians. The whole security situation have created
panic among the people and forced more mass evacuations even in places
where no actual armed conflict or attacks have occurred, like in Iligan and
Ozamiz cities. This was further escalated with the continuous fanning of
the conflict by local and national leaders who are giving pro-war public
statements and even to the point of polarizing communities. It was very
fortunate that various civil society groups and peace advocates in these
communities have helped ease the tension by verifying reports of incidences, engaging the communities in dialogue, and tirelessly responding
to the needs of the Internally Displaced Peoples
(IDPs).
In as much peace
groups tried their very best to maintain a level of calmness among the con7 Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) are civilian volunteers recruited
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Army Division to serve as its auxiliary group
on the ground, while the Civilian Volunteer Organization (CVO) are civilian
volunteers recruited by the local governments as its added security enforcements for
local executives and politicians. CVOs are deputized by the Philippine National Police
but under the financial support and jurisdiction of these local governments.
(BDA),
funds for war material and preparations. And contrary to the move of
President Arroyos government to attract more foreign intervenors and help
support the peace process, public opinion is being swayed to resist more
foreign interventions on the issue.
The heightened interest on the Mindanao peace process created a national impact. It surprisingly became a national issue at a time when the
Philippines is equally occupied with many challenges with regards to its
national leadership and politics and its difficulties in coping with the global
economy and poverty issues. Yet, as the issue grabbed the limelight, the
increasing humanitarian crisis in Mindanao has not moved the country to
put a stop to the ongoing armed conflict. Mindanews reports that there are
currently over 500,000 IDPs staying in evacuation centers, while at least
62 people have died since August. While military operations continue in
pursuit of the lawless MILF group as declared by the government, the
general public in Mindanao is in constant fear of another full-blown
all-out-war. In spite of President Arroyos assurances of her commitment
to the search for peace in Mindanao, there is a wide public opinion that
she has already, in fact, given up on the peace process with the MILF. She
has dissolved her peace panel and the Office of the Solicitor General has
defended the executive branch at the Supreme Court
saying
that it will not sign the MOA-AD on its present form. Thus, President
Arroyos recent actions have given more doubts on her political will for
this peace process after turning its back despite the many years of hard
work and investment put in by her peace panel and advisers.
On 11 September, 2008, Secretary Hermogenes Esperon, Jr, from the
Office of the Presidential Adviser of the Peace Process
(OPAPP),
was sent
peace process continues; (2) that the MILF must take control of Commanders
Kato and Bravo and turn them over to the government; (3) that the
MOA-AD will become a major reference, if and when peace talks resume;
and (4) that the issue of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR)
must be put as the first agenda in future talks. At present, the peace
talks are suspended and the ceasefire mechanisms are not in full operations
and have no clear control over the security situation. The strength of the
International Monitoring Team
(IMT)
was recently put under the oversight of the OPAPP instead of hold-
ing its usual hierarchy of authority.9 During normal situations, all ceasefire
8 The complete IMT manpower is at 60 members operating in 5 strategic areas all over
Mindanao as stated in its Terms of Reference. The IMT has been deployed since
2004. However, due to the long impasse on the peace negotiations on the Ancestral
Domain that lasted for more than a year, the Malaysian government had decided to
withdraw a big number of its IMT contingent in May 2008. The Malaysian
government maintains that the peacekeeping mission in Mindanao as part of
confidence building on the ongoing peace talks. However, if the peace talks are not
progressing, then there is no reason to maintain the peacekeeping mission since the
peace process cannot be hinged on peacekeeping alone, but on a final settlement of
the peace talks. With the suspension of the peace process soon after August 5 and
the volatile environment on the ground, the Philippine government unilaterally
requested for the extension of the IMT on August 28 for another three months. This
mission is being led by then IMT Deputy Head, Gen. Maj. Datuk Mat Yasin Mat
Daud from Malaysia.
9 A Mindanews article on September 5 quoted Brig. Gen. Rey Sealana, chair of the
governments CCCH that OPAPP Sec. Esperon told him that temporarily, the
governments CCCH are directly under the Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process. Besides the IMT, other ceasefire mechanisms include the Joint
Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and the Ad Hoc
Joint Action Group of the AFP and the MILF.
mechanisms work collaboratively and submit their reports to the GRPMILF Peace Panels for actions. Due to the non-existence of the GRP Peace
Panel, these mechanisms, therefore, can only fulfill their responsibilities in
a very limited manner. Also, in the meantime, National Security Adviser
Secretary Norberto Gonzalez has initiated a series of dialogues on the
Mindanao peace process among the civil society groups led by Church
leaders. Whether this is now what constitutes the new peace process, without the involvement of the MILF, is very unsettling and proves to be a
complete round-about.
While the Philippine government has announced its new directions in
the peace process, should it decide to resume, MILF Chair Ebrahim Murad
maintains that the MILF will not re-negotiate the MOA-AD as this had
been agreed upon in the last peace talks. Thus, the peace talks, when it
resumes, can only start from where it left off. As of September 15, the
MILF Chair had given instructions to its soldiers to defend themselves
against the AFP operations. He also insists that Commanders Kato and
Bravo will not be surrendered to the government. The MILF attributes the
failure of the peace process to the governments lacking commitment and
support by allowing the Supreme Court TRO and national politics play its
part in deciding the fate of the MOA-AD and the peace process itself. At
an official level, the GRP and MILF have disengaged themselves in any
direct communication channels except for their official statements being
coursed through the Malaysian third party facilitator.
begun. In spite of appeals from civil society groups and the international
community for the two parties to resume the peace talks, there appears to
be no clear path out of this crisis. This break down of the peace process
has not only divided the Filipino society, generated deep prejudices and
biases, but has also greatly eroded any sense of confidence on President
Arroyos management on Mindanao. It is during these times of crisis, and
upon their shoulders, that peace advocates in Mindanao, Manila, and from
the international community, have to unravel possibilities for a bilateral
ceasefire, fully re-start the peace process between the GRP and the MILF,
and sustain this momentum until a final peace agreement is achieved. This
is the challenge facing the NGOs and the civil society and they have to
build upon all the work and experiences that they have done in the past.
According to an earlier work by Ayesah Abubakar10, peacebuilding initiatives in Mindanao can be grouped into at least nine categories. (1) peace
movement and alliances; (2) peace education and research; (3) relief, rehabilitation reconstruction, and development; (4) truth commissions and
investigative missions; (5) grassroots ceasefire monitoring; (6) peace journalism; (7) dialogue and consultations; (8) interfaith dialogue, and (9) arts
and culture for peace advocacy. They all need to be continued and enhanced in this time of uncertainty to revive the ailing peace process. Of
these, several types of initiatives will be of utmost importance now. These
include strengthening the peace movement and alliances, providing relief
and humanitarian support, organizing ceasefire monitoring missions, and
engaging the parties and stakeholders in dialogue and consultations, including inter-faith dialogue.
Peace movement and alliances: Over the years, various organizations,
10 Paper presented at the Seminar in The Roles of Civil Society in Peacebuilding in
institutions, and groups have come together and formed alliances and networks aimed towards strengthening the peace advocacy and promoting the
non-violence agenda in Mindanao. These involves Track Two and Track
Three stakeholders that include church-based organizations, academic institutions, political groups, sectoral groups, non-government organizations
and the grassroots community associations or groupings. Unique to
Mindanao is its multi-diverse constituency from various ethno-linguistic
tribes. This consolidation of a peace movement is proudly defined as
tri-people referring to the Christians, the IPs or lumads, and the Moros.
The Mindanao peace movement is exemplified with the existence of the
Mindanao Peaceweavers that is known as the convergence of all networks
and alliances. Another smaller but significant network is the Consortium
of Bangsamoro Civil Society
(CBCS)
Mindanao Peaceweavers.
The organization of Mindanao Peaceweavers
(MPW)
certed response from Mindanao civil society groups to take the challenge
of claims from President Arroyos administration that there is a weak
peace constituency. This explains the February 2003 escalation of violence
wherein the AFP was unstoppable in conducting its military offensives
on the MILF since according to a high ranking official, there are more
hawks than doves in Malacanang meaning that there was more support
for taking the military solution in resolving Mindanao once and for all.11
The work of these NGOs and other civil society actors will need to be
increased to counter the work of those opposed to the peace process.
Relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development: The occasional
armed conflicts over the years have created much havoc to the communities
in Mindanao. Thousands of people often had to flee their homes and seek
11 Public forum with Sec. Bert Gonzales of Office of the President, organized by the
temporary shelters from nearby places, and often upon their return, they are
faced with the reality of having to rebuild their homes and their livelihood.
During the relief operations stage, normally half of the Internally Displace
Peoples
(IDPs)
ities since the combined support from the government, NGOs and other
agencies is able to handle only half of the population. Apart from the government help, many of the NGOs contribute to this effort by providing food
and shelter relief services to the IDPs. At a later stage, rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the conflict affected communities, and the general economic upliftment and development of these areas are also slowly addressed.
Among the local NGOs doing this type of activities are a couple of Moro-led
organizations, such as the United Youth for Peace and Development
(UNYPAD)
(BDA).
Shortly after
program, and the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society with its Task
Force Kalilintad
of more than half the members of the IMT, the task of monitoring for violations and keeping the peace will have to be taken up by the CSOs again.
The task however might be daunting and difficult for them now, given that
both sides are determined not to back down from their positions. The GRP
is keen on arresting what they call rogue commanders of the MILF whom
they blamed for attacks on Christian groups and villagers, to the extent of
arming local Christian militias and villagers. The MILF on the other hand,
has steadfastly refused to hand in these commanders and has given orders
to their followers to protect themselves. In this volatile period, it is unsure
really how much unarmed civilian monitors can effectively do their monitoring and peacekeeping duties. The best strategy really would be to increase foreign monitors, be they the one being led by Malaysia or to even
get the UN peacekeepers to come in.
Dialogue and consultations: Conflict resolution is not limited to track
1 in Mindanao. This also occurs across the Tracks two and Three levels
where the civil society is involved through the conduct of dialogues and
consultations. The tri-people of Mindanao proactively engage each other
and define their own differing and common interests, and generate ideas
and solutions to the conflict issues which may be of help to the peace
panels. Groups like the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society
(CBCS),
and the Mindanao Peoples Caucus continue to engage each other in constructive discussions vis--vis their position to the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations. This is also being supplemented by those involved in the interfaith dialogue. With religion and identity seen by some as factors of the
conflict, there is clearly a need to be more educated of each others religion, belief, and culture. Interfaith dialogues are particularly crucial because
it opens more avenues for understanding, tolerance, and acceptance
amongst peoples. Groups like Silsilah Foundation and the Bishops-Ulama
Forum have helped bridge the divide and polarization on religion brought
about by the conflict.12 This more than ever now is needed. Pro-peace
12 Reina Neufeldt, Sarah McCann, and Jaco Cilliers, Case Study: Explicit and Implicit
Peace Building: Catholic Relief Services in Mindanao, Philippines and BosniaHerzogovina, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (Cambridge, MA: Collaborative
groups from different orientations and leanings have to come together and
show that they are all for peace.
As a response to the overwhelming negativity on the MOA-AD and the
GRP-MILF peace process, civil society groups and peace advocates
launched various fora and public discussions explaining the MOA-AD in
Mindanao, Manila and overseas. Big universities like University of the
Philippines, Ateneo de Manila, Miriam College, De La Salle, Ateneo de
Davao, and many others hosted public seminars. The usual conferences and
meetings of peace and development workers in Mindanao were also utilized
th
(MPC)
affected communities to Manila for them to articulate the situation to university students, religious leaders, senators, media, other government officials, and President Arroyo herself. They appealed to President Arroyo to
halt the ongoing military operations that have destroyed more homes and
lives in Mindanao. Almost all of them have come with statements condemning the breakdown of the peace process and the ensuing war.14
for Development Action, September 2000)
13 MUSLAF and Mindanao Multi-Sectoral Network submitted their appeals since
August. However, their cases have yet to be heard. Thus far, the petitioners against
the MOA-AD have already done their hearings at the Supreme Court.
14 The support has not only come from within the Philippines but also from
Conclusions
As mentioned in this paper, the Mindanao conflict does involves territorial issues in the form of areas in contention by the parties. Currently,
there is an entity called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)
governed by the MNLF. This area will be enlarged under the pro-
(BJE)
tral domain claim by the MILF in their deliberations with the Philippine
government
(GRP).
started in 1997 went through several rounds with ancestral domain being
discussed in the third round. The MOA-AD which was supposed to be
signed in August 2008, and which was to be a prelude to political discussion in the next round, was finally rejected by the GRP after protests
from some quarters. This, and the dissolution of the GRP peace panel, effectively killed off the peace process for the time being and regressed the
situation to one of war again. To date more than 60 people have been killed
and more than 500,000 people have had to flee the confrontations and becoming IDPs.
The Mindanao Peace Process between the GRP and the MILF is now
dead. This is the conclusion that can be made from the recent events that
have unfolded since the ill-fated non-signing of the MOA-AD on 5 August,
2008. These events actually started with the issuance of the Temporary
Restraining Order
(TRO)
August, 2008 and culminated with the same body making the temporary
permanent through the majority 8-7 vote on 14 October, 2008, declaring
society organizations from all over Southeast Asia called upon the conflict actors to
observe the ceasefire and go back to the peace process. They called upon the
Supreme Court to lift the TRO and sign the MOA-AD as soon as possible to achieve
peace in Mindanao. They also call upon the Malaysian government to continue its
role in facilitating the peace talks and leading the IMT. For further detail, please
see www.mindanews.com.
the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution, and which effectively
killed off the peace process.
What then of peace in Mindanao? The situation now is uncertain, in
the sense that there is no clear direction for peace in Mindanao on the part
of the major actors. But for many concerned observers and affected populace there, the picture is clear. There can be no peace while this current
government is in power the last exercise has effectively killed off any
trust-building created over the years. The MILF can make the conclusion
that it is futile to enter in any new negotiation with the current government.
In fact they have already said that there will not be any renegotiation on
the points already agreed to. It is also clear that the message given by the
Supreme Court in its decision says that future activities, including any
peace negotiation, would have to be within the jurisdiction of the constitution.
It makes it difficult then to think out of the box when the boundaries
have been clearly marked out, and doing things out of this box will be
deemed illegal and unconstitutional.
This brings us to a difficult predicament what to do now, given the
current political climate and an environment which is unresponsive and
even hostile to peace initiatives. Peacebuilders need to take stock of the
realities of current events and try to figure the next moves. For example,
hostilities have and will probably increase; there have been numerous
armed clashes and the ceasefire is hanging by a thread, despite some quarters arguing for the validity and continuation of the earlier ceasefire agreement; the numbers of IDPs and those affected by the war will increase,
creating a difficult humanitarian crisis that all of us are not ready or well
equipped for; the dilemma facing concerned third parties including the facilitator, Malaysia, as well as those involved in the IMT Brunei, Libya,
and Japan; the dilemma facing donors such as JICA, World Bank and others as to whether they need to continue their programs, revise them given
the current climate, or to even stop them; the problem of those involved
in rehabilitation and development programs, both international and local,
and decisions that they have to make regarding the continuation and extent
of their investments. These are the questions that those involved in peacebuilding in Mindanao at all levels have to address. Everybody will have
to grapple with the various options in front of them and pray that they,
and others, will when the time comes, choose the most practical, suitable,
and viable one. Whatever decision that will be made, however, might not
prove to be the most acceptable one for everybody. But it will have to be
made.
So, what are some of the scenarios for Mindanao and options on the
table for the stakeholders and peacebuilders to choose from? The first scenario is of course the continuation of the current status quo situation largely
envisioned in the previous part. Not only for Mindanao but also for the
Philippines. Nothing will change for the moment and things will stay that
way until the next presidential election in 2010. The next scenario is an
increase in the intensity of the conflict situation. There have already been
many reports of armed clashes involving both sides, and if things are not
controlled
of both sides taking the military option in pursuing their goals is very real.
There is also very little prospect of further negotiations between the sides.
The option, and the challenge for all including the facilitator and the IMT
is to somehow find creative ways to improve and maintain the ceasefire.
This will have to be coupled with enhancing humanitarian efforts on the
ground, and limiting the impact of the armed clashes on the people. Several
things, many of those have already started, will need to be continued and
enhanced. These include continuing rehabilitation and development work,
both by the local civil society groups as well as international bodies. These
activities are also necessary to instill a sense of hope to the people of
Mindanao, apart from the obvious target of cushioning and repairing the
impact of war on the affected areas as well as the general Mindanao area.
Other important activities that need to be continued are those that can contribute to the improvement of the mindsets of the parties and the affected
people. These include doing consultation and dialogue between the various
groups at all levels, including communities, civil society organizations, as
well international actors. Hopefully this can contribute to the dissemination
of information and education on the situation in Mindanao and the various
scenarios and options that are on the table for the people. And lastly, this
hopefully can contribute to the creation of a stronger constituent for peace
on all sides that will be supportive of the goals, objectives, and processes
of future peace initiatives.
Background
Bangladesh is located in Southern Asia, in the Northeast of the Indian
sub-continent, and covers a total area of 147,570 km2. Bangladesh is a
small part of the hydrodynamic system that includes the countries of Bhutan,
China, India, and Nepal. She is possessing unique natural characteristics
and being located at the mouth of the largest delta in the world. This delta
of loose soil is formed by alluvial deposit brought down by the numerous
distributaries of the Ganges. But the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta has been
created by deposition of river-borne sediments. Ganges water and sediment
have been diverted through a barrage
(dam)
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
119
utilization of its resources for improving the living standard of the people.
Impelled these suffering the people of this region have launched numerous
social movements demanding mitigation of the problems.
of Ganges river flows since 1951. On 29 October, 1951, Pakistan officially objected Indias plan to construct Farakka Barrage. In order to divert
water from the Ganges to the Hooghly river
(in India)
by a 42 km long feed-
lean season flow of Ganges to meet the full requirements of both countries
and expressed their determination that before the Farakka project would be
commissioned they would arrive at a mutually acceptable allocation of the
water available during the periods of minimum flow in the Ganges. The
declaration authorized Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC)1 to
study schemes relating to the augmentation of the dry season Ganges flow
and make recommendations to meet the requirements of the both countries.
Farakka barrage started operation on 21 of April 1975. On June 1975,
Indo-Bangladesh JRC submitted its report in pursuance on the 1974 joint
declaration. Bangladesh side suggested augmentation of dry season flow
through building storage reservoirs in Nepal and whereas Indian side
stressed augmentation through diversion of water from the Brahmaputra
river to the Ganges River
proposal.
After a 1975 coup installed
an anti-India government in
Bangladesh, India began diverting as much as 60 percent of
the Ganges dry season flows. In
1976, India continued unilateral
diversion of the Ganges flow
beyond the stipulated period in
the 1975 ministerial declaration
throughout the 1976 dry season
and withdrew 1133 m3/sec of
water
th
1 On 24
November, 1972, India and Bangladesh signed statutes of the Indo- Bangladesh
Joint River Commission (JRC).
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
121
nal)
th
Bangladeshs appeal to the UN, the UN General Assembly adopted a consensus statement, which directed both countries to urgently negotiate a fair
and expeditious settlement of the Farakka problem to promote the wellbeing of the region
(UN, 1976).
(MOU)
(1986-1988),
which expired
rd
on 31 May, 1988. On 23 October, 1995, Bangladesh again raised the issue to 50th UN General Assembly about the misery of Bangladeshi people
due to the unilateral water diversion at Farakka Barrage. An agreement between Bangladesh and India on sharing the Ganges water at Farakka was
signed on 12th December, 1996 for the duration of 30 years.
On 19-20 September 2006 a Indo-Bangladesh Ministerial meeting held
in Dhaka for resolving river erosion problem in the boarder side, but ending no fruitful result. On January 2008 a letter has been sent to the Indian
Government for ensuring water ratio between Bangladesh and India according to the water treaty1996 by JRC. Hence, the 2246 m long Farakka
barrage is still a lingering source of conflict and tension between Bangladesh
and India.
(ADB),
tional financial institutions have got the involvement and are the direct beneficiaries of this catastrophing situation. As far as the adverse
affect of the globalization on ecology and environment is concerned,
the Bengal is the worst victim.
g) Bengals major economy is based on the agriculture and about 80 percent people are involved with agriculture. Without water for irrigation
and with the overflooded situation, it made Bengal one of the poorest
countries in the world.
h) Whole social, economic and political systems are directly co-related
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
123
with this Farakka Barrage. The abject poverty has provoked the women
and child smuggling. Five million women and girls have been already
smuggled and kidnapped and sold to the prostitute markets of the
India
(Mainly Mumbai)
are being stolen and kidnapped and their organs are smuggled to the
foreign countries. Some of these children are also sold to the oil-rich
middle-east countries for the use of the camel race.
(Novak 1993:
not come true. This will perhaps go down in the history of International
Treaties in regard to sharing a life-sustaining commodity as a vagueness
of Himalayan-proportion. While vagueness pervades the entire body of the
Treaty, contradiction is another characteristic of the much-vaunted document.
We may discuss it here.
In case flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusec in any 10-day period,
the two governments will enter into immediate consultations to make adjustment on an emergency basis, in accordance with equity, fair play, and
no harm to either party. Therefore while the formula does guarantee
35,000 cusec under all flow regimes to each country for 3 ten-day periods,
it may be conveniently interpreted as inapplicable if the flow comes down
below 50,000 cusec. This is a serious flaw in the Treaty and will be a constant source of misunderstanding between the two countries, as it has been
this year. And therefore a Treaty flagged as a historic one just tread on
a muddy ground. More so because low flow will occur naturally during
the period when water-needs will be higher
(March-April).
sets 10 day periods from March to May in which India and Bangladesh will
alternately take most of the water reaching Farakka, set at a minimum of
34,500 cubic feet per second. But on 27 March, during a period when the
flows were supposed to favor Bangladesh, the monitoring team at Hardinge
Bridge recorded only 6,500 cubic feet per second, the lowest figure ever.
Many Bangladeshi accused India of surreptitiously diverting water at
Farakka at night when no monitoring team was present. Its very difficult
to deal with such mistrust, after even the process is running by the NGOs
and CSOs.
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
125
(beyond na-
so that all players can see a common picture as to what the effects of the
water withdrawal at Farakka truly are. Within that context of a common
understanding, then possible solutions can be formulated
doning withdrawal for Calcutta, because the Ganges will ultimately bypass Farakka in its slow
drift to the east).
(i.e.
suring social justice. At the same time some NGOs are inactive against
2 Swain, A., Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and
Ethnic Conflict in India, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1996, pp. 189204.
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
127
these issues and overlooking this great human aspects as well as they are
thinking about the interest on their investment. The NGOs which are still
alive against this unjust discrimination are trying to play their role from
a common platform. Though they are creating different issue based on networks but their inner aspect of the movement and vision is almost same
that is to save Bangladesh from any kinds of intrigue and unjustness. From
this spirit there are many NGO networks created in Bangladesh. They are
helping each other to run social movement like in the case of Farakka
Barrage. For example, in the south-west region of Bangladesh some network
has been created on water rights issue which is continuously pressuring government for resolving Indo-Bangladesh water problems in connection with
the Farrakka Barrage.
In the efforts of coordinating the remaining local conflicting interests
and meeting the local security needs prevalent in rainy season, key roles
may be expected played by Water Management Groups or Cooperative
Associations along with local government staffs of BWDB and LGED,
and by local NGOs including Area Water Partnerships (AWPs) in particular, which have been organized under Global and Bangladesh Water
Partnership (GWP, BWP) as policy forum for implementing IWRM on
a grass-root level (Miwa OKURA).
They are jointly organizing various meetings, workshops, seminars, and
conferences for ensuring peoples livelihood by resolving water problems.
(PRC)
(CDP)
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
129
It was the second attempt to attack by India for destroying Bangladesh after
the first attack of Farrakka Barrage. But the continuous movement of NGOs
at the local, national and international level discouraged the Indian government to stop her inhumanity plan against Bangladesh but they are still
thinking about their river linking mechanism.
Engr Quamrul Islam Siddiqui said all water experts along with social scientists, experts on geography and other experts should come forward to build
a forum to ensure the smooth flow of water in the international rivers. We
should take steps on how to increase the conservation of water, he said.
He also said, The Padma and Brahmaputra are the main rivers of the
country which provide with huge quantity of surface water. If India builds
a water grid line to shift water from the northern region to southern region,
it would be disastrous for Bangladesh and the country will be deprived of
surface water drastically.
Dr. Ainun Nishat said, India, China, Turkey and Brazil are conserving
water without considering the demands of water of downstream countries.
But, under the international laws, conservation of water from the upper-riparian is not legal without taking the demands of down stream counties
into consideration.
Recommendation:
An immediate long-term solution to the environmental and economic problems caused by Indias diversion of the Ganges flow is imperative. From
my above discussions, therefore, to ptotect the people of the border regions
from the ravages of various problems and to prevent massive loss of lives
and property, the following steps are recommended;
1. The Indian Government has to change their mentality, although they
could never change it before even they could never able to set the
Indo-Bangla water conflicts mitigation meeting agenda in the last over
hundred of meetings.
2. Ganges water sharing issue has to be considered as the regional issue,
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
131
(SAARC)
(e.g. Agriculture,
Conclusion:
Water is invaluable and useful environment resource of nature. Preservation
of natural water resources and river channel is important for the sustainable development of nature. Ecology and environment as well as bio-diversity depend on natural river flow. Due to withdrawal of water from the
rivers by India will reduce the water availability in Bangladesh. Water on
the Ganges flows from upstream to downstream and falls into the Bay of
Bengal, so its course depends on upstream river which is the sources of water flow of Bangladesh. I heartily request all CBOs, CSOs, and NGOs, policy makers, the UN, the SAARC, the other local, national, and international
communities, to support the protection of the adverse impact of Farakka
barrage that is highly affecting Bangladesh, ensure over 30-million peoples
livelihoods, save us from the highest climate change vulnarability by a
peaceful and meaningful solution to the Indo-Bangla water conflict that remains to be solved for last 60 years.
Leading Role of NGOs in Solving Water Disputes between India and Bangladesh: Farakka Barrage Case
133
Introduction
The fraudsters and violators of international law have had their say with
political manipulations that satisfy their individual rationale, as opposed
to that of the badly abused, re-colonized and collective nationals of
Ambazonia and Cameroun as a contemporary torn state. It is time to lay
bare their track record and call for order and respect of the rule of law
and the rights of Man so provided by Nature, God and The Law of
Nations. This paper is based upon the proposition that the propensity of
the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, in its post-hand-over phase1 of becoming a
protracted armed conflict beyond Bakassi to include the entire British
Cameroons
1 We should note that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the dispute over
Bakassi on 10/10/2002; and the Annan-Bakassi Peace Accord (ABPA) signed by both
Cameroun and Nigerian authorities from 29 January-02 February 2005 to return to
their boundaries at independence as ordered by the Court, 1913 and 1919 for Nigeria
and Cameroun, respectively; and the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) 12/06/2006
replaced the ABPA and carried out the hand-over of the peninsula from one illegal
occupant (Nigeria) to another (Cameroun)! This is grounds enough to expect and
project future escalation between Ambazonia and Cameroun using expected utility
theory of understanding international conflicts (Beuno de Mesquita, B., 1991; Jervis,
1976, 1981, 1983).
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 137
gree to which the President of Cameroun Mr. Paul Biya stops fidgeting
with the Law of Nations. The core of arguments is that by invoking a treaty, which Cameroun knowingly, consistently, glaringly and deliberately violated to claim Bakassi from Nigerias own 419 attempts at doing same,
Cameroun also knowingly and deliberately lied to the Court, thus invariably
committing acts of perjury against the law of nations and setting up the
entire Gulf of Guinea sub-region for future conflicts. This paper dismisses
the Green Tree Agreement
Biya to answer seven questions; ask the United Nations officials to answer
ten questions against eleven evidence of the history of Ambazonia, attempts
providing a compromise solution, appeals to UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon and shows that Cameroun rule of Ambazonia and claims over
Bakassi Peninsula because of the United Nations Plebiscite of 11 February,
1961 are absolutely bogus, fraudulent and illegal.
This author, in configuring and conceptualizing this particular dispute
in 2000 two years ahead of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ)
ruling,
held that the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute was first a case of the sovereignty of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)2
made as to which nation sovereignty of the peninsula lies. Since 1916, international law protected both Cameroun and Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)
2 Coined from Ambas Bay Colony, founded by Reverend Alfred Saker at about
1843-1858, with Victoria as Capital (Mbuh, J. 2000, 2005). Upon illegally annexing
Southern Cameroons in violation of the Trusteeship, UN Resolution 1608 of 21 April
1961 and because of the appellation Cameroun, elite of the erstwhile Southern
Cameroons or given the false pretense of implementing the unity Agreement
stipulated by the said UN Resolution 1608, confronted Cameroun in 1985 with three
landmark documents, renamed the territory or Southern Cameroons as Republic of
Ambazonia and since then Cameroun Republic, which had independence on 1 January,
1960 has been in denial of any violation of international law, let alone the inalienable
rights of Ambazonians, to the extent they issue death ordinances as that in the
appendix herein.
Cameroun was to become East Cameroon and Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) was
to be known as West Cameroon, provided there was a unitary constitution on or before
1 October, 1961. This is never been honored by Cameroun!
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 139
(Kenya, Zimbabwe,
(Cameroun)
the propensity for future escalation of the sovereignty dispute into a war
of liberation of Ambazonia
against
since
when Ambazonia first had a parliament and government when they separated from Nigeria
(1954),
reveals that even though it would appear that Nigeria has handed over the
peninsula to Cameroun, the question as to the legitimacy of Cameroun
claims over the peninsula and the entire Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)
na-
tional territory still remains unanswered. This is because Cameroun is supposed to be one of two states in a union with Ambazonia
Studies by Mbuh
(2000)
(Southern Cameroons).
dactions of the ICJ Ruling, that Cameroun has not only illegally occupied
Ambazonia, but did also file doctored statements to the international court
in staking her claims over Bakassi, which acts confirm state-succession and
illegal annexation of Ambazonia.
In utilizing and defending the projected and expected role of international law that it has enough provisions that can defuse any tensions and
conflicts between nations, Expected Utility Theory
Bruno de Mesquita, 1991; 1993)
might have, in claiming the peninsula, ordered their preferences and undertook the dangerous mission of defending the peninsula even militarily
(because of its oil and other resources wealth and for that Ambazonians thank them enormously!),
their acts were illegal and therefore at contrast with the expected
(GTA)
(Jervis, 1976).5
This explanation is
not too different from that of conception and misconception, which are a
measure of intensity of ones beliefs and conceptualization of what is, rightly or wrongly, consequences of peoples causal effects of phenomena.
In this regard, Willingness would denote, and grants opportunity for
5 For details, see Jervis, R. (1976) Perception and Misperception in International
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. See also, Jervis (1969) Hypothesis
on Misperception. International Politics and Foreign Policy.
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 141
(Waltz, 1959).
In the case of the Bakassi Peninsula and her aftermath, handing over
to Cameroun is a necessary but insufficient condition for peace and security.
The sufficient condition for prolonged, sustainable peace, therefore, lies in
the ability of Cameroun authorities to set aside all other considerations and
engage dissident voices in meaningful dialogue be they for power-sharing, for reformation of a sorry system, or for self-determination dissident
voices must not be seen as destructive, but rather, for the sense it makes
utilizing all or aspects of their claims to strengthen unity, be it in diversity
(Mbuh, 2007).
many authors and researchers in international conflict studies to provide explanations of political decisions such as voting, study of international conflict, notably deterrence, war termination,
and Fiorina, 1972; Beuno de Mesquita, 1981; Gilpin, 1981; Mitchell and Nicholas, 1983),
(FOTs)
(2007)
utilizes EUT to
defend truths of the history and the proper interpretation of the law in relation to Ambazonia and reveal that regardless of the ICJ ruling, there still
exist a serious threat to global peace and security over the Gulf of Guinea
Sub-region because Ambazonias sovereignty and not that of Bakassi is
what is at stake.
When parameters of the Bakassi and Ambazonia sovereignty disputes
are examined, they expose the fact that triggers and escalators are a function, primarily of FOTs and their individual, greedy choices and discrimination, especially abuse of the law, which fuel exclusion into national economic and political discuss
No example in
the law does always catch up with them from Halle Salesie, Colonel
Mengistu Haile Mariam, Field Marshal Dada Idi Amin, Ahmadou Ahidjo,
Houphouet Boigny, Mathieu Kereku, Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor, Mubutu
Sese Seko, Ian Smith, and of course Piet Botha and the now old racist bastion in South Africa to current FOTs such as Paul Biya, Omar Bongo,
Yoweri Museveni, and Robert Mugabe. This is because in ordering their
preferences, African leaders are prone to putting individual rationality
ahead of collective rationality, which is by far more sustainable and successful in preventing dissent by securing for one and all opportunity, great6 Bastiat, Frederic (1964) The Law. Fifth Ed. New York: Foundation for Economic
er peace and security. To this effect, such leaders are classified as FOTs.
Just as Robespierre knew no better, so too has leadership in Cameroun displayed blunders and plundering against the law and the rights of their
masses, especially those of Ambazonia. And just like the fate of
Robespierre, so too should the law triumph over the abuses of FOTs by
Cameroun authorities over Ambazonian sovereign rights. The degree of
collective rationality is so limited, and better measured in terms of the adversity or despondency of the masses as a consequence of escalating conflicts
Again, nothing
would give us clarity into conflict triggers and escalators than the core
study of the Bakassi Peninsula border dispute and her aftermath, if at all
by Nigeria handing over the peninsula to Cameroun matters have been put
to rest.
Concerning the Bakassi Peninsula dispute, the misperceptions by FOTs,
guided primarily by individual rationality led belligerent states to take the
matter to the ICJ in 1994. By August 2008, Nigerian authorities finally
submitted to the 2002 ICJ ruling, however ambiguous, to hand over the
Peninsula to Cameroun. In addition to the ICJ Ruling, Nigerias High Court
had two victories of dissenting voices from Ambazonians
Bakassians)
(including
citing misinterpretation of the rule of law and the history of the territory
under dispute.7 Dissenting voices also held
that the handover should not take place without associated disputes given
7 For details see case of Southern Cameroons versus Nigeria in Abuja High Court, 2002;
Bakassians -V- Nigeria in the same court, 2008. The primary contentions being that
Bakassi was part of the Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) during the UN Plebiscite
in February 1961; and that the results of the said UN Plebiscite having never been
implemented, it is a breach of international law to handover Bakassi to Cameroun,
which had separate independence from Southern Cameroons and has illegally occupied
and ruled the said territory with impunity.
their due treatment such as the case of Ambazonia -v- Cameroun and the
compensation and assimilation of Bakassians and Nigerians who have lived
there all their lives into Cameroun polity. In other words, the factors that
triggered and led to escalatory skirmishes over the peninsula have not been
properly addressed. Gross misperceptions and misconceptions, and even
misinterpretation of the ICJ Judgment still abound. Since provisions of international law to this effect have already been discussed
2007),
(Southern Cameroonians)
have been addressing the UN, domestic Cameroun, Nigerian and African
Union Courts and winning their cases in support of demands for independence from Cameroun, are such legal victories not enough justification that they have lived under tyranny and insecurity under Cameroun
rule?
4. Do such legal victories not mean that the root causes of the Bakassi
Peninsula dispute have not been properly addressed by international and
domestic jurists and that whatever decision they arrived at was due to
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 145
duress, if they neglect the glaring fact that Cameroun has breached her
boundary at independence?
5. If Cameroun authorities have already given out contracts for exploitation
of oil in the peninsula, and given that Ambazonian oil since 1972 has
not been accounted for and very little or nothing has been done to this
territory in the name of development
why should
any observer not see Cameroun President Paul Biya as a FOT and their
greedy ambitions of embezzling state funds, using Ambazonian resources to develop Cameroun as being guilty of crimes against humanity?
6. In addition, if Camerouns President is not being truthful to Nigerians
at Bakassi, even though they were never part of the Ambazonian population that voted in the Bakassi District in the UN Plebiscite in 1961
Cameroun unity with Ambazonia and the failure thereof; given the underdevelopment, over-exploitation, gross and continuous abuses of basic
and fundamental inalienable human rights of Ambazonian masses, how
then can Nigerians in Bakassi trust the utterances of Cameroun President
Paul Biya, when there is surmounting evidence that he and his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo, never honored the terms of union with then
Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
(Southern Cameroons):
(1946)
(1922)
and UN Trusteeship
laws?
(Concurrent Jurisdiction)
(which was
a historic characteristic peculiar to, and when Ambazonians demanded and re-instated it
in 1990, at the expense of many of their citizens being killed, maimed, tortured and illegally detained)
(Ambazonia)
(FRC, 1961),
(RC, 1984),
were
these developments consistent with the letter of the law protecting 1922
Mandatory Territories and 1946 Trust Territories, let alone the terms of
the Two Alternatives of 1960?8
6. That when Cameroun attained separate independence on 1 January, 1960
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 147
and secured her boundary by the 1916, 1919, 1931 and 1933 AngloFrench boundary treaties, was this consistent with the evidence they
(Cameroun)
if so, can they tender any agreements with Ambazonians to this effect?
7. That when the UN Human Rights Committee ruled in Fongum GorjiDinka -v- Cameroun9 that they did not have the authority to deal with
matters of self determination, citing ratione material and ratione temporis, neglecting the primary causes which set the Ambazonia leadership against Cameroun
which Fon Fongum Gorji-Dinka was arrested, detained, tortured and paraded before the
Yaound, Cameroun Military Tribunal, House arrested and pushed into exile, as has millions of Ambazonians)
the letter of the law of treaties and of Trust Territories and benefits that
accrue to a people thereof ?
8 Cameroun Republic tendered all these documents of the Mandated Territory, 1931/
which the United Nations ought to utilize in correcting all anomalies over the
erstwhile Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia, removing all ambiguities that create
gross human rights abuses by Cameroun of Ambazonians. Sadly enough, the UN
Tribunal ruled that it does not have powers to decide matters on self-determination.
Sadly again, the Tribunal and all her Judges erred for Article 1, of the United
Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNICCPR) disproves
them! However, the ruling did uphold all previous rulings in Cameroun Tribunals
and Courts, citing these were enough to have remedied the situation and stop the
abuse of individual and collective rights. This is the core argument in this work.
(see appendix),
shoots dead
(Ambazonia),
implicitly calling into question Cameroun claims that they have sovereignty over Bakassi because Southern Cameroons united with them in
1961?
Unless these questions are given befitting answers, and the United Nations
fully brings her weight to bear on Cameroun and her colonial master
France who sponsors the Cameroun illegalities and atrocities with cash and
supplies, the United Nations should brace herself for the worse in a pending feud between Ambazonia and Cameroun. That Cameroun attained separate independence is but incriminating and self-explanatory evidence that
they are illegally occupying Ambazonia and must be stopped. Therefore, it
is time the United Nations challenges itself and Cameroun to prove that
indeed the Plebiscite of 11 February, 196110 was the letter of the law
(Two
10 11 February, 1961 UN Plebiscite. This is the date during which the vote for the Two
has
a separate nation and in this new age, lead the world in defence of human
Instrument. We must note here that the Federal Cameroon Republic was distinct from
the Cameroun Republic, which attained separate independence from Ambazonia on
1 January, 1960. This is also the heart of the dispute between Ambazonia and
Cameroun that Ambazonia did not vote to be absorbed into an alien system which
hardly protect human rights but abuses them endlessly.
11 UN Resolution 1608 of April 21, 1961. This UN Resolution currently haunts the
Bakassi Accords, especially the Green Tree Agreement (GTA). The Resolution
demanded that the results of the Plebiscite should be implemented in accordance with
the terms of the Two Alternatives of 1960, on or before 1 October, 1961. Till this
date, that has not been the case and is reason why Ambazonians currently rebel
against Cameroun rule and want total independence.
12 Cyrus The Great. He built a Great Temple for God in Jerusalem in obeying God
even as Jews were in captivity. Set Jews free to return to Israel. Was Leader of
Persia and under him Persia became the Worlds First Super Power. For details, see
Ezra 1:1-2; 2 Chronicles 36:22-23.
rights and peace missions based on the rule of Gods Laws, International
Law and eleven historic stages of Ambazonia Statehood as follows:
1. Carthaginian Navigator Hanno at about 500 B.C. while on a mission to
attempt sailing to India met Mount Mongo-Ma-Loba erupting. Incidentally,
the traditional name ties with the name Chariot of Gods provided by
Hanno the Navigator. It is not known which name preceded which.13
This means that Ambazonia was discovered 1980 years before the
Portuguese named river Wouri as Rio dos Cameroes or River of Prawns
in 1472 and from which Cameroun got her name!
2. Ambas Bay Colony, founded by Reverend Alfred Saker between 1831
and 1843-1884 when this territory became part of the larger German
Kamerun
(1884-1916)
Protectorate.
3. Upon the defeat of Germany by the joint Anglo-French army in the area
of Douala in 1914, and sharing the booty by the Anglo-French Treaty
of 1916, the territory of British Cameroons was carved out of Kamerun,
with Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
of British Cameroons.
4. The boundaries of British
Cameroons
(Republic of Cameroun)
and French
in 1919.
(1946)
administered the territory with Nigeria, a British Colony until decolonization was re-stated and misinterpreted in 1960.
13 For more details, see Mbuh, J. (2005) Inside Contemporary Cameroun Politics.
Authorhouse Inc., Bloomington, Indiana, USA, 678 pages. For ordering details see,
http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore/ItemDetail~bookid~26923.aspx
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 151
(Southern Cameroons).
(Ambazonia)
masses and elite protested to no avail for the independence option and
voted for the better of the two options to join Cameroun. Such a union
would be the formation of a confederacy of two equal states. The
United Nations passed a resolution approving the results of the plebiscite
and as demanded by UN Resolution 1608 of 21 April, 1961. This conference has not been held.
10. Cameroun has since then ruled Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
with a
(English-Speaking)
(1972-1984)
and
(1984 present).
(ARC)
(Ambazonia)
a peoples discovery, history and polity in relation to practitioners of international law, international organizations, political activists, writers and leaders of nations and international organizations
Thus
in the face of surmounting evidence from which the Cameroun governments have displayed intransigence and lack of foresight, it is but clear that
nothing can be said in their favour once escalation takes place. As to
whether Ambazonia will be free, it is only a matter of when, not how
for surely, in such disputes where brute force is confronted with the discipline of law and preponderance of evidence, it is not hard to foretell who
the victors and the vanquished would be. Perhaps Ambazonians have to
prove that they are not gun-shy, after all.
No one echoed these fears more than the Americans and the British.
The evidence is abundant in the report presented to the U.S. Government
by their Lagos, Nigeria Console John K. Emmerson in 1959.15 The Report,
far from condemning Ambazonia or Southern Cameroons, did in fact raise
alarm and signalled that humanity was only attempting to dodge a problem
and postpone it for a future date for, in Emmersons predictions, the
Southern Cameroons was far more important than its population of 800,000
14 Ibid.
15 For more details, see document by U.S. Nigeria Console John K. Emmersons report
people, back in 1959. Emmerson noted that far from its small population
and small territory, it was a frontier of French and British influence in
Africa, why not the world. What Emmerson did not foresee was that
Ambazonia was to become the seat and centre of a global revolution for
respect of human rights and the Law of Nation, of God and of Mother
Nature a development which no nation in the world can boast of! The
lead powers of the world feared communism and deprived Ambazonians
of their inalienable rights, what are they going to do now when confronted
with an Ambazonian global revolution? They cannot now stand in the way,
can they? If they do, they would face the wrath of God, for it has been
written that this day and time will come; that prophesy is now fulfilled!
The violation of Ambazonian sovereign rights apart, the fact that the
West Cameroon
(1961)
(1972)
Daniel, Revelations),
How then
can we doubt the false pretences of the courts and tribunals over the issue
of Ambazonia sovereignty? In defence of Ambazonia sovereignty, we again
invoke the following documents, cases/judgments that reveal that the hypocrisy of the international system is not limited in documents but also in
her tribunals and implementation processes:
1. The UN Trusteeship Agreement: It was badly terminated in such a way
that the letter of the law did not apply.
2. UN General Assembly Declaration Granting Independence to All Colonial
and Other Peoples of 12 December, 1960 was made barring any conditions
on peoples in-
(ARC)
(March 1985)
(July 1985)
(May 1985)
(c) The
e. In addition, in Ambazonia Head of State in-exile Fongum GorjiDinka -v- Cameroun at the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) (following Mukong -v- Cameroun)
(Ambazonia).
(Ambazonia)
if union with Cameroun has been imposed, not enforced without violation of basic and fundamental human rights and terms of the agreement?
5. The Judgment of the Abuja, Nigeria High Court in Southern Cameroons
-v- Nigeria
(Ambazonia)
dependence;
ensure diligent prosecution to conclusion the claims of the peoples of the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
to self-determination and
(Ambazonia)
17 For more details, see case and decision of the UN Tribunal in Fongum Gorji-Dinka
(Republic of Cameroon),
c. This would show that the Peninsular was recognised by the United
Nations as being part of the Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)20
d. For the entire period of 1922 till 1961 when trusteeship was terminated Bakassi was comprised within British Cameroons.21
e. Moreover, as the Court has shown in para 213 in 1961 / 62 Nigeria
clearly and publicly recognized Cameroon
(Ambazonia)
title to Bakassi.22
is
19 For details, see ICJ Ruling on Bakassi Peninsular, 10/10/2002, para. 210, line 8-10.
20 Ibid, para. 210, line 24-27.
21 Ibid, para 212, line 36-39.
22 Ibid, para 223, line 15-16.
Agreement
(GTA).
while claiming to not be tempering with the ruling of the ICJ, in setting
aside its Article 7, clearly violated the rule of law. This is not only
shameful, illegal but also morally very wrong!
8. The case of the Southern Cameroons National Council
Cameroons Peoples Organization
Cameroun
(Republic of Cameroun)
(SCAPO)
(SCNC) /
Southern
against La Republique du
(Southern Cameroons)
Constitution.
gone through are also documented in his three works and are continuous
testimonies against Cameroun.25
10. Fongum Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroun.26 This case, more than even that
over Bakassi and the Green Tree Agreement
(GTA)
(UNPO)
With that, the UNPO then moved on to call on the people of the Southern
Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
Stewardship in the Southern Cameroons Struggle; (b) Prisoner without a Crime and
(c) The Case for the Southern Cameroons Independence.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
Southern Cameroons,28 but should continue to use peaceful methods commensurate with SCNC principles in stating and pursuing their cause for
independence. In a symposium titled, The Right to Self- Determination in
International Law,29 academics, human rights activists and practitioners
defend the right to self-determination. Most participants based their arguments on cases presented to the UN Committee on Human Rights, invoked
The Charter Declaration on the Right to Self-Determination, The Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People, The International Covenant on Civil
and Political rights
(ICCPR),
Social and Cultural Rights. Much of what was discussed borders on what
has been expressed in many paragraphs of this work. Certain excerpts
caught this authors eyes. Self-Determination beyond an individual was defended in a paper presented by Anna Batalla,30 as well as by Marco
Perduca.31 To Perduca, it seems the question over Ambazonia was a little
confusing when he notes, Cameroons
became in-
northern territory joined Nigeria and the Southern territory joined Cameroun
(1961). 32
28 Ibid.
29 International Symposium, The Right to Self-Determination in International Law,
Rights (UNHCHR). At the symposium above, she presented a paper in which she
invoked The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to defend the right
to self-determination of all peoples and also challenging the Human Rights
Committee rulings as being inconsistent.
31 Marco Perduca is a Member of the General Council of the Transnational Radical
Party (TRP) and of the UNPO Foundation. He presented a paper at the symposium
(above) titled, Can We Get Out of the Self-Determination Trap?
32 Ibid, p. 2.
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 161
We now know from preceding discussions in this work that decolonization of the British Cameroons was not as simple as stated. Furthermore,
we can observe from the little excerpt above a flaw that has rocked this
dispute in Ambazonia -v- Cameroun. The name issue marred the union
for
(Ambazonia)
joined Cameroun!
This confusion is why at onset of the legal pursuits in 1985 the name
Ambazonia was invoked for Southern Cameroons. Invoking article 1 of
the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights, Batalla noted,
Article 1 of both Covenants clearly establishes the right of all peoples to self- determination, including their right to freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and the corresponding obligation of state parties to respect and promote the realization of that right. This recognition is all the more remarkable considering the legally binding nature and wide
acceptance of the two international covenants. Yet, we notice that the main body
charged with this task of surveying the implementation of the ICCPR, the Human
Rights Committee (the Committee), has been cautious when interpreting and applying Article 1, especially in the context of the individual complaints procedure
established by the Optional Protocol to the OP-ICCPR.33
The trouble with the praise which accepts the two international covenants
is that it is just that acceptance and nothing more, especially when law
defenders and implementers are confronted with the pressures of power
politics, fuelled for the most part by the corruption influences of nations
guilty of violations of the law. Is it not such political pressures and why,
most likely, even bribery and corruption of Committee Members that cause
such circumvention of the rule of law? Otherwise, it beats the mind of this
author why case after case, the Committee waters down the article, which
33 Ibid, p. 1; see also Batalla, A., p. 1.
34 Ibid.
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 163
General Comment No. 12, article 1 (3) imposes specific obligations on States parties
to respect and to promote the realization of the right to self-determination, not only
in relation to their own peoples but also vis--vis all peoples which have not been
able to exercise or have been deprived of exercising that right.35
(GTA)
that it is only but a matter of time for the skies to broke lose over
Ambazonia-Cameroun relations. When this happens, Cameroun authorities
shall face the wrath of God in the anger of the masses of Ambazonia and
the fight to be put up by Gods Angels
(Graham, 1986)
system, which now ruin the world under United Nations nose and possible
cover. Alternatively, the UN should immediately follow with deployment
of UN Peace Keeping Troops to facilitate Cameroun withdrawal and the
re-instatement of a transitional Government to run the affairs of Ambazonia
(and possibly including Northern Cameroons)
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, see section 4.4, p. 5/9.
And what did the very Committee rule in the case of Azerbaijan? Is this
not blatant abuse of the law, or at best even racism against African situations? Could it have been possible for the UN Committee to be truly
effective and in so doing seal all doors and avenues through which
Cameroun authorities were passing to violate the rights of Ambazonians?
Could the Committee Members have done something, and without necessarily appearing to be instigating a revolt against Cameroun or even favouring State party by simply making a recommendation to the UN General
Assembly and or the UN Security Council about the facts of the matter?
A recommendation such as, a case was presented to us and we do not
have jurisdiction over the matter or all other aspects of it, but it is clear that
if nothing is done,
the situation
(UN),
The Committee said they do not have the competence Yes, clearly and from the foregone analyses, they were most definitely incompetent
to even have dared handling the matter: they were accomplices and complimenting crimes against humanity and should be held accountable. UNSG
Ban Kimoon should do right by Ambazonia, fire the Committee Members,
call them to order and then set the ball rolling for the total and final liberation of Ambazonia without the necessity of her peoples and those of
Cameroun shading unnecessary innocent blood.
Law does not deal in and with isolation and isolated matters but takes
into consideration all relevant evidence where and when applicable. Here
was a case where the relevance and the necessity of expanding the verification process so as not to appear circumventing the truth and rule of
law was completely missed
and
the Committee wants us to think they did not have the powers and or mandate to deal effectively with the matter? Here are some of the arguments,
which make UN current position on the Ambazonia question to look extremely questionable, lawless and even preposterous, while at the same time
fanning a dangerous dyadic and genocidal war:
1. Once the United Nations Committee on Civil and Political Rights
(UNCCPR)
(URC)
by present-
ing the map of the defunct URC as the map of Republic of Cameroon
(RC)
(GTA).
(GTA)
end to this deception, distortion and fraud. The JIC Judgment, in numerous instances, and without any ambiguity at all clearly states to whom
the Bakassi Peninsular belongs
by Cameroun President Paul Biya, which action infuriated the French government;
the French in turn threaten to shoot down the UNSGs Plane, and indeed had him
and the UN Entourage searched so as to retrieve the signed ABPA and which with
threat and harassment they succeeded to force Kofi Annan to yield to the dictates
of the French by suppressing and replacing the ABPA with the Green Tree
Agreement (GTA) of 12 June, 2006.
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 167
(GTA)
Republic of Cameroon
terms of union; since it was only through it that Cameroon had any connection with Ambazonias oil rich Bakassi Peninsular. One would wonder if Kofi Annan did this knowingly or under duress of his plane being
shut down on the return trip from having Cameroun President Paul Biya
sign the ABPA on 31 January, 2005. Did the UNSG knowingly violate
the rule of law by modifying the ICJ ruling with conditionalities while
claiming it was not doing such a thing?
4. Fortunately, all errors as well as such false pretences have been set aside
by the law against alteration of ICJ judgments restated in Article 7 of
the GTA which reads thus, This agreement shall in no way be construed as an interpretation or modification of the judgment of the
International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 from which the
agreement only sets out the modalities of implementation, ICJ Ruling
on Bakassi Peninsular, 2002.38 It seems the drafters of the GTA shot
their own feet and by so doing, clearly revealed that the intent of the
GTA was not executing the ICJ Judgment but giving illegal oil-bunkering rights to certain parties, hoping that Ambazonia would not go to
war, either to recover Bakassi or drive Cameroun out of their national
territory. How far is that true? And would those who hatched the fraud
over Bakassi go free of such illegal manipulations of the rule of law?
Thus, by operation of law, this author wrote to the UN Secretary
General on 15 July, 2006 insisting that the GTA should stands automatically corrected, so that the map of Ambazonia replaces that of the false
pretence URC; and the appellation Ambazonia replaces the appellation
38 Ibid, Article 7 of the GTA purporting not to be modifying the ICJ Ruling but indeed
in the region.39
5. Under international law Ambazonia assumes primarily responsibility for
law and order, as well as for international peace and security in the
Bakassi peninsular, its territorial waters and air space. The fact that there
is an Ambazonian government in exile only means that nations of the
world are under an obligation to offer Ambazonians the assistance needed in their struggle to liberate themselves from
subjugation by
(GTA)
But he preferred to be
39 This author wrote Bakassi: Corrigendum to the Green Tree Agreement, to the UN
boundaries; and then from there each would argue its case for expansion
(see fig 2).
make; and that would have ended the Bakassi case by June/July 1994.
But French Agents succeeded to get the Nigerian legal team back this
false pretence; gave Cameroon locus standi it did not have, to drag
Nigeria to a very predictable humiliating defeat. These same people
must have either hidden from President Olusegun Obasanjo the map of
the United Republic of Cameroon
(URC)
diplomatic recognition. There are moral grounds upon which international relationships ought to be built; it is the duty of the World Body
or Member States thereof to defend that morality the Golden Rule.
8. Under international law, primary responsibility for law and order, as
well as international peace and security in Bakassi, its air space and territorial waters falls on Ambazonias government in-exile. It would need
moral and material assistance to have this come to fruition as peacefully
as possible, short of which, it is still a moral obligation protected by
international law for Ambazonians to defend themselves and their national territory from an aggressive neighbor, when such a neighbor is
a manipulator of the rule of law as badly as Cameroun authorities have
always been.
(just
(Mbuh,
of compromise solution below and adopt it to make peace, not war with
Cameroun authorities, if they are accessible; failure of which Cameroun
must respect her boundaries at independence or face sanctions or an inevitable decision by Ambazonia to restore her sovereignty rights, nimporte
quo, nimporte comment! They wish to try? Resistance would be futile!
2. Acknowledge submitting claims that when tested with concrete, verifiable facts and legal provisions do not defend truths of the situations under dispute;
3. Agree and fix a timeline for implementing the UN Plebiscite results with
modifications to protect Ambazonian sovereign rights to include rotating
Presidency, separate international representation in sports and other economic and investment matters, etc.;
4. Redefine issue of nationality and make provisions which if violated by
one state would automatically secure total independence of the other;
5. Ensure and impose balanced bilingualism on both states from primary
through higher education, as opposed to co-habitation bilingualism in
false pretences of Cameroun claims of being a bilingual nation, when
indeed the language of instruction and execution of national policies is
French
SCNC appended);
(US)
(AHCC),
of its deputies;
8. An Ambazonian national, preferably this author to take over power from
fore part of the false pretence exercised by Nigeria and Cameroun over
the Bakassi peninsula;
4. By issuing death ordinances against Ambazonia operatives in postBakassi handover era, Cameroun authorities confirm EUT charges of
false pretence and fears of continuous and endless abuse of Ambazonians
in any future union of the two states;
5. EUT propounds that compromise solutions seem to be an international
order that seeks and actually does protect ruling status quo against the
back drop of serious violations of international law, as in Kenya,
Zimbabwe and Bakassi
(Germany)
after
as in the material world, the wages of evil and sin are all well known and
few spiritual leaders would claim differently in all religions, especially
Christianity
Under
warrants that
Ambazonia
sideration arguments that the 1961 UN Plebiscite was illegal, null and void
ab initio. The ruling, however, under-looked the fact that Cameroun
President Ahmadou Ahidjo had in 1961, after the UN Plebiscite by which
Northern Cameroons went to Northern Nigeria, protested the ICJ ruling
back then when he charge voter rigging in that territory. From these, several questions again beg for answers:
1. Did the ICJ ruling over the entire Cameroun-Nigeria boundary vindicate
Camerouns first President Ahmadou Ahidjo and now the UN in revisionist terms, regret not giving German Kamerun independence as
planned by the German Bundestag before World War I?
2. Did the ICJ ruling override its earlier ruling in Cameroun -v- Nigeria
over the post-1961 UN Plebiscite over Northern Cameroons sovereignty
and independence quest?
3. If so, what should now be done that would be legally efficacious in
keeping greater peace and security in the interest of collective rationality
over distractions fuelled by individual rationality, as the Bakassi Case
has proven?
4. In addition, by invoking the United Nations Resolution on the Two
Alternatives, did Cameroun authorities invariably shoot their own feet
before the battle for liberation of Ambazonia ever began?
5. Lastly, where do the two ICJ rulings stand as far as Trusteeships of both
Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
now stand,
Conclusion
The controversy over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute has not ended; indeed the real battle has just begun and it is intrinsically woven in to
the sovereignty dispute over Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons)
entire British Cameroons not just Bakassi Peninsula, which by 1960 was
comprised of Southern Cameroons
(Ambazonia)
(1 Co. 6:7),
(Gal. 3:21-24)!
fore, God will hold those who have caused senseless bloodshed in
Ambazonia accountable, if The Law of Nations should fail them.46 By persecution, harassment, torture and death Camerouns President Paul Biya and
his predecessor Ahmadou Ahidjo pitted Ambazonians against Camerounians
and melted life out of bodies and crust in rent-seeking misadventures. Paul
Biya, especially has so suddenly forgotten the small Biblical lessons he
learnt at the seminary that, by Justice a King gives a country stability.47
The Law of Nations invoked by Ambazonia in domestic and international remedies exhaustion phases is as good as the law of God and of
Mother Nature. We cannot accept one and reject the other. They will,
standing in the path of Justice about to be rendered by and in defence of
the very law they have rejected
(Jn. 12:47-50).
have faith in the law, like Ambazonians do, but are afraid or are ashamed
that if they defend truth and the law, harm from other humans whose interests would be at stake would visit them are not different from Pharisees.
Of them, the Bible says, For they love the praise from men more than
praise from God.48
Utilization of the Bakassi dispute as a distraction a wag the dog policy,
or as an instrument to legitimize Cameroun re-colonization of Ambazonia
and tolerate Nigerian benefactors by having Northern Cameroons as part
of Northern Nigeria have now been exposed thanks to the wrangling
over Bakassi Peninsula. Just as Nigeria could not contest and win Bakassi
over her 1913 boundary treaty, so too would Cameroun be in limbo, unable
to contest, win and hold comfortably both Bakassi and Ambazonia
(and the
entire British Cameroons, which by the 1913 Anglo-German treaty knocks out Northern
16:19.
48 For details see John. 12:42-43; Psalms 96:9-10, 110:6; Daniel 9:11.
The Expected and Projected Role of International Law in Resolving
and Securing Sustainable Peace and Security over the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute 179
ing over Bakassi. The rule of law invoked in treaties and treaty agreement
violations are here exposed enough to indicate that the case of Ambazonia
-v- Cameroun
surpasses
doors, legally, for good things to happen to all. A free Ambazonia, her
North and her South, a country whose rivers flow of milk and honey, a
great and beautiful mountainous country that in frustration worshipped
idols, backslidded and was cast away into the arms of the devil, a new
covenant with God makes her His Sanctuary, a New Israel
(Eze. 37:15-28).
To the world, Ambazonians and this author say: Fear not; we bring the
promise of the reign of God, light, peace, prosperity, greater interdependence and life for all humanity! For where there is God, there is life!
The controversy between Ambazonia and Cameroun, like all disputes,
would end. The rest lies with the Karma of the United Nations as we await
redress from the High Offices and dignitaries of World Bodies and
Intelligentsia. At the moment of concluding this essay, Cameroun authorities are utilizing power outage to torture the population of Ambazonia;
armed gangs are holding cities hostage and breaking and looting their bank
coffers; and even the President and his Body Guard are confused as to who
actually attempted fleeing with billions of looted funds, while attending the
63rd Session of the UN General Assembly. These are indicators that sooner
or later the masses would grow weary and if they were previously gun-shy,
would rise up, with or without guns and greater chaos shall reign and in
all, the Cameroun government misinterpretation, misrepresentation of historic political, legal and diplomatic instruments would hardly escape blame.
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Introduction
No doubt, education as a social process, public system and discipline
has the potential of being a powerful tool for social change and progress
and empowerment of peoples, two major benefits of peaceful societies
where conflicts are duly managed.
University education is intended to educate and train high level personnel to conduct major and human endeavors.
United Nations Organization, since its establishment in 1945, in the aftermath of the deadly World War II, has been committed to peace and security around the world. Not always the UN role in obtaining results for
peace and security has been successful. In the long darkness of the cold
war, UN principles were disdained and disrespected by many parties, either
superpowers or insurgent groups. So it happens in current times of the
struggle against the terrorism.
However, United Nations continues to be a focus of hope especially for
less developed countries and vulnerable groups of peoples.
The University for Peace is a United Nations mandated institution,
which should contribute mainly to international peace. In order to understand its educational model it is important to know the political and his-
(UNITAR, a autono-
mous body within the United Nations with the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of the
Organization through appropriate training and research. (http://www.unitar.org/about_en.htm)
(ibid)
human beings the spirit of understanding, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, to stimulate cooperation among peoples and to help lessen obstacles and threats to world peace and progress, in keeping the noble aspirations proclaimed in the Charter of United Nations.
(Article 2-Charter of
UPEACE)
The studies carried out at the University shall focus on the topic of
international peace.
The University shall, inter alia, grant masters degrees and doctorates
under terms and conditions established by the Council.
(Idem)
(1978-1982)
forces for the establishment of the University for Peace in 1980. Even
though UPEACE has a global mandate, its history, actual possibility,
major infrastructure, legality and legitimacy is in Costa Rica, where
headquarters are located.
UPEACE is part of the UN efforts to offer education and training for
peace and security.
UPEACE complements the role and functions of other similar organizations such as UN Institute for Training and Research and the
United Nations University. In fact, the Rector of the United Nations
University is Ex-Officio member of the Council of the University for
Peace.
UPEACE is a higher teaching oriented institution to offer, mainly,
post-graduate degrees at Masters and Doctoral levels in peace and
conflict related subjects. Ideally, UPEACE academic programmes
should be benefited of the research and applied research that is undertaken by UNITAR and United Nations University.
The niche for the programmes offered by UPEACE is in international
peace and related matters. The guiding principles of the academic programmes at UPEACE should be the purposes and principles of the
United Nations as stated in its Charter.
UPEACE is an autonomous institution that enjoys academic freedom
and its budget is not part of the United Nations budget, and derives
its revenues from voluntary contributions.
American University)
Introduction
While it is absolutely necessary to seek ways to end conflicts and build
lasting peace, it is critical to ask the question: Whose responsibility is
it? We often hear our parents say: If you broke it, fix it. Often, the parties
involved in conflicts and wars are adamantly opposed to resolving it quickly
irrespective of the amount of lives lost and the sufferings endured by the
citizens. The process of conflict resolution and peace building is usually
assumed by a third party. In many conflict areas around the world, third
parties have stepped in to try to bring about an end to the conflicts. Third
parties are usually some other governments, civil societies/NGOs, womens
groups, other governments agencies, or international organizations.
In order to engage in meaningful and productive dialog on effective ways
to deal with conflicts and build peace in communities that have been ravaged
by conflict, it is essential to first understand the nature of the causes of
various conflicts. The next step is to take measures to prevent such conflicts
in the future by understanding and incorporating these identified causes of
conflict in the reconciliation, conflict resolution, and peace building and
1 Portions of this paper have previously been presented in Excavating the Past,
Prospects for the Future: Lessons from Womens Groups in Cameroon on Peace and
Justice at the UN Peace and Governance Conference in Tokyo, Japan.
(Orjuela, 2003).
The
Of the 193 countries in the world, 46 nations are experiencing some form
of conflict either internally or with neighbors. About thirty three percent
or fifteen of these countries are in Africa
(PeaceWomen, 2006).
The Rwanda
(re)training,
(Fisher, 1998; Barrow & Jennings, 2001; Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001; Lewis, &
Wallace 2000).
(2004).
(Human
Rights Commission Reports and Resolutions, 2003; CEDAW, 1993; Rapp, 2006; Hamilton,
2000; Women Waging Peace, 2003; Mutamba and Izabilia, 2005).
Regardless of the causes of conflict, women and children are the groups
affected the most by it. Researchers of conflict are overwhelmingly
unanimous on this fact. Mention the word conflict and sad images of the
genocide or mass killings in Rwanda come to mind. What is so terrible
about the situation in Rwanda is that the death of so many people could
have been prevented had the world, led by the United Nations, recognized
the gravity of the situation and intervened at the appropriate time with
the way humankind views conflict today and in the future. During the short
time of the massacres, the Tutsis and Hutus turned on each other killing
men, women and children in a brutal and systematic manner; those who
survived the genocide describe that era as senseless and merciless killings
according to a female survival that this author interviewed in 2004 in
Rwanda. It is almost twelve years since the genocide and from an outsider
looking into the Rwandan society for the first time it would appear that
the country is a peaceful, lively and progressive place. What lies hidden
beneath the faces of the nationals is a burden that even now they are very
reluctant to discuss. It is now against the law to ask someone in Rwanda
about their ethnicity because it is generally believed that ethnic conflict was
the root cause of the genocide.
Women are affected differently by war and conflict regardless of where
they are taking place. Studies conducted on this issue reveal that women
and girls are usually the victims of rape and sexual violence and widowed
while men are mostly, imprisoned or killed
During
conflict women also suffer other forms of violence against such as murder,
sexual slavery, forced pregnancy and forced sterilization; thousands of other
women are victims of rape, trauma, physical injuries, and distrust of the
society
(Division for the Advancement of Women, 2000; Mutamba & Izabiliza, 2005).
Many
regard women mainly as victims of war and conflict but this view fails
to acknowledge the crucial part they play in conflict resolution. Women are
forced to embrace roles that are necessary for survival not only for
themselves but for orphans and others in their communities as well.
The post genocide government of Rwanda, realizing the critical role of
women in rebuilding the nation, adopted a policy that promotes gender
equality
(PeaceWomen, 2006).
The United Nations also has been instrumental in promoting the active
participation of women in conflict resolution. Starting with the Beijing
Conference in 1995 and following in 1998 with a conference by the United
Nations Commission on the Status of Women, governments and the international community have been encouraged to implement policies and programs
that make women partners in the discussions on conflict resolution and to
include measures to ensure gender sensitive justice, address the specific
needs and concerns of women refugees and displaced persons, and increase
the participation of women in peacekeeping, peace-building, pre- and postconflict decision-making and conflict prevention
of Women, 2000).
With the frequency of wars and conflicts in many parts of the world,
it seems inevitable that womens experiences in the process are needed to
bring about resolutions quickly and ensure that they last. We can see the
role that women in Afghanistan and Iraq have assumed since the wars began
in that part of the world as current examples of how women quickly become
a part of conflict resolution and peace building. Womens groups have been
active in fostering dialogue in societies that traditionally do not recognize
equal rights for women as compared to men. Wars and conflicts have
(UNICEF)
of Women, 2000).
(CAMAUW)
works with womens groups at the village levels to resolve long standing
conflicts by conducting sensitization workshops for women and leaders
from the two villages, examining the possible causes of conflict in a
community, the consequences for society and the important role of women
as peacemakers
From north to south and east to west, women from all works of life are organizing into groups formally or informally beginning at the grass roots
levels to put an end to conflicts and rebuild communities. Without wavering they put the interest of the general community first by regarding them
as one large family that must live together peacefully.
Resolution
(UNSC)
unanimously adopted
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Resolution 1325 marks the
first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and unique
impact of armed conflict on women, recognized the under-valued and underutilized contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping,
(Peace
Women, 2006).
(October 2006)
reconciling in a way we didnt know. She adds that the only solution
was to go together with my countrymen even the killers. There was no
alternative,
(January to
between farmers and cattle owners. The conflict had been going on for many
years with no lasting resolution and the women were fed up with the
situation. In addition to this conflict, violence also erupted when men of
one village dragged a traditional ruler or chief from his car and beat him
to death for taking large sums of money as bribes from rich cattle owners
and giving them more land taken from farmers. The government failed to
negotiate successfully. It is a taboo for a male to see members of this group
of women naked and this rule is widely respected. The police officers and
military officers were helpless since they could not face the naked women.
The occupation of the governors office yielded immediate results as even
the governor being male could not face the women. His wife
than the women)
(much younger
(Burundi)
(Burundi)
(ANC)
that
(South Africa)
(South Africa)
(Cameroon)
(Authors emphasis).
and
countries.
Historical, African womens uprising or rebellions or wars served as a
springboard for the more contemporary womens movements; leading us to
conclude that these womens self mobilized rebellions/uprisings also
provided the foundation for womens gentle approach to resolving conflict
and reinstating peace. The examples of womens approaches to conflict
resolution and peace building discussed in this paper stress a non-violent
cause. No weapons whatsoever are used except when men join in the struggle
as in the case in Nigeria and Cameroon. Justice is stressed for the community
and not just for women. Peace is essential for the continuity of a healthy
and prosperous society. With the many conflicts and wars within and between
many African countries, it is necessary to refrain from the pressures to deal
with conflicts just to settle them and give the appearance of peace on the
surface. Pulling from some of the womens strategies described in this paper
could open up new ways into long lasting dialog and subsequent resolutions
thus paving the way for peace. Unfortunately, many of the conflict resolution
and peace negations are notorious for excluding women from the negotiation
tables. Womens groups ought to be the conveners and leaders of such
endeavors given the failure rate of conflict resolution headed by men.
Women view themselves as creators and preservers of life. When life is
threatened they instinctively respond to save it. When conflicts erupt that
threaten the security of their communities they rally to bring about stability
and order. Since the womens world conference in Beijing in 1995, African
womens groups have gained support from global groups sympathetic to their
course. These groups helped to bring African womens struggles to the tables
at international conferences. Many African governments have finally taken
notice of the growing importance of womens roles in the development of
their nations and have begun paying more attention to their needs. Furthermore,
many international donor organizations are stipulating the inclusion of wom-
(PSI),5
(CRS)6
and numerous
conflict regions where the focus is on women and children. For additional information
on the organizations activities, visit: http://www.care.org.
5 PSI Rwanda, Burundi, and the Great Lake Regions is instrumental in conflict
resolution and peace building by working with both women and men organizations
to rebuild lives, families, and communities. To get a complete overview of their
activities, visit: http://www.psi.org.
6 See more about the programs and services of CRS at: http://www.crs.org.
(Steinburg, 2003).7
(Nigeria,
to train leaders/managers
(Ekiyor, 2001).
Conclusion
Bringing about lasting peace in conflict areas and preventing further
conflict requires continuous action. We are gathered here today to tackle
a crucial issue that threatens all of us directly or indirectly. It is therefore
our collective responsibility to address this challenge through venues such
as our meeting today to discuss, pull resources together, and act as advocates to end or prevent conflict and ensure that peace building is lasting.
As educators we can instill in our students the importance of peace building and provide training/internship programs that introduce them to organizations that are engaged in conflict resolution and peace building activities
in our communities and elsewhere. As activists at the international, regional, and local levels we can introduce and support legislation and policies
7 Summerized from a speech presented by Donald K. Steinburg, on March 6, 2003 to
the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. For a full report visit:
http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/2003/18759.htm.
that build friendly, understanding, and trusting neighborhoods with the aim
of preventing conflicts in the first place. Guaranteeing the rights and dignity of all citizens must be a key consideration for lasting peace. Our focus
should be in devising projects to prevent conflict rather than curing it for
the old saying prevention is better than cure still holds in conflict resolution and peace building today.
Conflict resolution and peace building can not be achieved without the
involvement of more than half of the population
(women).
In many conflict
areas women are now the majority of the population. Additionally, women
and children are affected most by the effects of conflict and wars. The
participation of both men and women is needed to achieve lasting peace.
Networking and collaboration with other NGOs within the country and internationally is needed to exchange ideas and support one another. The research
on women and peace building point to the advantages of such a union and
encourage governments to implement policies that empower women to be
leaders at all levels of the society. Women should be strategically represented
in bilateral and/or intergovernmental and international decision making bodies
that address conflict resolution and peace building activities.
The Rwandan example demonstrates the importance of women in peace
building and stresses the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation in the
peace building process. Rather than wait for a crisis to emerge before
scrambling for solutions, the global community should convene on a regular
basis to discuss strategies for preventing conflicts in the first place and
training local leaders to recognize and deal with the causes before they
escalate into mass killings and violence against women.
Proverbs and Maxims Relating to Peace and Non-Violence
1. Reciprocity in peace brings about dialogue.
2. Peace brings about progress, war only destruction.
Saddexle, Somali)
If there was no laying down of arms, the old women, naked and on their
knees, would crawl towards the foolhardy combatants and say to them:
We are your mothers,
We do not want war,
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PeaceWomen, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325: History and
(1945-
and continuing to our present time, always with the threat of using
of children, especially those without parents and families, the equal right
of gender in decision making, the protection of environment and forests,
the moral education for social behavior code, education to overcome preju-
from illiterate and poverty areas, including those children without parents
and families, but their organizers and leaders are educated, intelligent and
knowledgeable with training from good income family. Their Terrorist actions completely deviate from a basic moral standard common to all, yet
they are willing to kill so many innocent families and ready to massacre
lots more by inciting national or religious hatred towards these countries
and their people. The golden rule of global ethics states, Putting oneself
in the place of another
for mankind.
(Buhhdism), That
(Muhammad); Never
(Luke 6:31)
been misguided and are being used as living bombs, because they lack of
the opportunity of education for independent thinking and global ethics
training.
It is necessary to change the poverty imbalanced gap between the rich
and the poor for the foundation of an unforced world peace. As this extreme gap is the cause of all kinds of crisis and violence. There are pioneer
model persons in our economic society who give their wealth and power
for the interests of humanity, such as Bill Gates family, Warren E. Buffett
and many other donators who are ordinary people, but want to help educate
the masses and strive for peace. These generous people have donated large
percentages of what they have accordingly to support disaster incidents.
This philanthropy is the hope of our future development for a caring and
harmonized world peace without borders.
In the past, nationalism and racism produced world war leaders similar
to Hitler, so today we need to expand our vision and emphasize the importance of global ethics to prevent history from repeating itself. This educational movement can help solve those hard issues, especially for understanding the dangerous of nationalism, and awakening to oneness of entire
human race, every one is the member of the big earth family. We are all
linked together, we have no choice. This is the second episode of 17 years
towards world peace with structures of mutual and inter-dependent relationships.
The Third Episode of world peace with a world conscience: How to solve the paradox of war and conflict?
(2009-Future)
George Carlin said We conquered outer space but not inner space. Weve
done larger things, but not better things. Weve cleaned up the air, but polluted the soul. Weve conquered the atom, but not our prejudice. We have
multiplied our possessions, but reduced our values. We talk too much, love
too seldom, and hate too often. We wish to solve the conflicts over territories in peaceful ways and governments have been using traditional negotiation skills and diplomatic procedures for almost three thousand years.
Have we found any real fair solutions to settle these conflicts to satisfying
both sides without protesting and complaining after? We have so many bilateral or six lateral territory disputers from longer borders to small islands;
we have so many newer or newest rocket-atomic bomb weapons aimed in
different directions; we have out of control drug addicts and AIDS spreading wars, we have rapidly increased orphans crying in six continents, obliviously, we havent found amicable solutions to overcome these war
tragedies. This is the reason we are turning to non-governmental organizations, who represent peoples opinions to consult on the oldest issues under new conditions outside of the governments diplomatic systems.
The UN, which originally was a government assembly organization, has
become todays UN/NGO combined working team, fulfilling incredible jobs
mostly on a volunteer basis. It is by working in tandem with NGO volun-
teers and supporters, that the limited resources of the UNs global mission
has been leveraged to extraordinary levels, as much as 100 to one. Together
they have done some remarkable things such as:
Millions of refugees, mostly women and children, are receiving food,
shelter, medical aid, education and repatriation assistance.
Safe drinking water has been made available to billions people in rural
areas during this last decade.
A 75 percent increase in immunization rates has saved the lives of
more than 3 million children each year, and 7 million more from going blind from the river blindness and dying from the guinea worm
and other relentless and remote diseases, etc.
In the 5th September, 2003, UN General Assembly conference report
Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further changes, had
not mentioned of how to improve the NGOs function with the UN, but
in the report of 60th General Assembly, 5 July, 2006 and 21, November,
st
2006, the 61 session of the forum on General Assembly and the UN foundation with NGOs relationships concluded that: participation of civil society, in collaboration with other stakeholders, is essential to the success of
the United Nations.
In order to unify the peoples minds and their power of influences,
NGOs must also transform themselves and overcome their own prejudices
to improve and strengthen themselves. We suggested NGO self-education
program in following aspects:
1. Emphasize every UN/NGO member free their mind from creating competitiveness rather than cooperation. A more universal attitude concerning the worlds problems will provide a greater understanding for NGOs
to work together effectively
2. Promote principles to overcome and reduce attitudes of self-centeredness
and improve UN/NGOs decision-making process. This will assist UN-
NGLS, NGOIC to help unify and bridge the gaps between States and
NGOs. Also, it will increase decision-making transparency and help unify UN/NGOs.
3. When NGOs suggestions and resolutions with similar contents have
overlapping goals, they should try to merge them into one resolution
through full and frank consultation to find out the common parts acceptable to the related parties. They can be merged with recommendations,
suggestions and resolutions with complementary points to embrace each
other.
The term of NGO appeared on the horizon when the UN was established, the first one worldwide NGO, CONGO
Relations with UN)
growing like tidal waves. When people unify their steps and consult constructively suggestions to solve all humans problems, this becomes a new
growing power of helping peaceful solutions for all kinds of nations
conflicts. It will not only help in solving the territory and natural resource
dispute and fighting, but also cooperating in managing global crisis affecting every ones daily survivals.
In order to root out the causes of war and armed conflicts, there must
be education available for every village resident, fostering an awareness of
how small and vulnerable our global village is. With all the aspects of natural disasters like global warming, can we stop it or keep it from entering
any of our territory? When the hurricanes approach, do we have any way
to defeat it and keep it outside our boarder lines? It is impossible to separate the integrity of the whole earth, because we are all born within this
inter-related universe.
The damage caused by modern war can no longer be controlled by individual country leaders and the so-called conquering victories can only
bring ashes and destruction as their results. To solve this paradox of endless
Conclusion
A stable structure for developing a harmonized world must incorporate
a shift in measuring our values and worth such as work performed in a
spirit of service should be placed on a higher level. Many Non-Governmental
Organizations are presently serving vast areas of our global society to help
those in need, struggling to create change, and provide education for the
less fortunate. People, who have developed a conscience from I to We,
will play a major role in bringing about a better world by promoting education in global ethics for every nations peoples starting from the grassroots
level to the top.
There is a traditional saying regarding the Chinese dream: The Great
Oneness under the Sky. This philosophical concept for equality and world
unity is universal to all nations. World unity is the goal towards which a
Contributors
Sungho Kang (kang@khu.ac.kr) is on the faculty of the Center for the Reconstruction
of Human Society, Kyunghee University in Seoul, Korea. He specializes in international relations with a particular interest in conflict resolution and International
cooperation. He has been involved in NGO activities as Director for Program
Planning at the Global Common Society (GCS) International, an international NGO
based in Seoul. He was on the Steering Committee of the 2008 International NGO
Conference on History and Peace and acted as the Director for program planning
for the Korea Organizing Committee of the 1999 Seoul International Conference
of NGOs. In addition, he is leading an NGO named International Network for
Peace and Conflict Resolutionas its representative. He has written or edited books
and articles including NGO Networking for Peaceful Conflict Resolution (in Korean,
2008), Strategies for the Implementation of UN Millennium Development Goals in
Korea (in Korean, 2005), and White Paper of the 1999 Seoul International Conference
of NGOs (2000).
John W. McDonald (jmcdonald@imtd.org) Ambassador John W. McDonald is a lawyer,
diplomat, former international civil servant, development expert and peacebuilder,
concerned about world social, economic and ethnic problems. He spent twenty
years of his career in Western Europe and the Middle East and worked for sixteen
years on United Nations economic and social affairs. He is currently Chairman and
co-founder of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (www.imtd.org), in
Washington D.C., which takes a systems-approach to Beace Building on the national and international level. In February, 1992, he was named Distinguished
Visiting Professor at George Mason Universitys Institute for Conflict Analysis and
Resolution, in Fairfax, Virginia. He was one of the six co-chairs at the 2008 Seoul
International NGO Conference on History and Peace. He has written or edited eight
books on negotiation and conflict resolution including the groundbreaking Multi
-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace (3rd edition, 1996). He published
most recently The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and Peace Building : Stories and
Lessons (2008)
Contributors 235
eration, and pioneer human rights focused, non-for-profit, and public interest serving national research and advocacy organization in Bangladesh. He is also a Senior
Staff Reporter of the Monthly Upakul Paribesh Barta, a national news paper in
Bangladesh which is published by Coastal Development Partnership (CDP) focused
on environment, water & river management, climate change and governance issues
etc. He wrote several books and articles including Effectiveness and Accountability
of ADB Project in South-West Bangladesh (2008), River Erosion in the Southwest
Region of Bangladesh and its Distressed People (2004).
Justice Mbuh (jmbuh@yahoo.com) has been engaged for a long time in the academic
field and recently he is involved in the foreign affairs of the Republic of Ambazonia
(Southern Cameroons) Government in Exile as Acting Minister. He is teaching at
National National Polytechnic, Nkwen, Bamenda, NWP, Cameroun as well as at
the Department of Economics of Ecole Normale Superieure Annex de Bambili
(ENSAB) at University of Yaound 1, Yaound, Cameroun. He is the author of several books such as Ambazonias Challenge to the United Nations (2007), Inside
Contemporary Cameroun Politics (2005), International Law and Conflicts: Resolving
Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa (2004).
Victor Valle (vvalle@upeace.org) is currently Dean and professor of the UN mandated
University for Peace with headquarters in Costa Rica, Central America. He has a
long career in international cooperation for educational development, university education and high level management training in public enterprises. He spent from
1981 to 1992 as Senior Educator in the Organization of American States, based
in Washington D.C., the regional organization of all the countries in the Western
Hemisphere. He has written several books and articles about education, social issues
and politics. During early1990s he was a member of the National Commission for
Peace, in charge of verifying the UN mediated Peace Accords that ended the civil
war in El Salvador, Secretary-General of the Salvadoran political party and member
of the Socialist International, National Revolutionary Movement, a political ally of
the insurgency during the whole civil war.
Rebecca N. Mbuh (inaneh@yahoo.com) is a professor of business administration at
Sookmyung Womens University, Seoul, Korea, since 2001. She received her Ph.
D from the University of South Carolina in 1993. After receiving her doctorate,
Dr. Mbuh worked at Allen University, Columbia, South Carolina, first as Director
of Institutional Research and Effectiveness and adjunct professor of Business
Contributors 237
Administration, then as Dean of Academic Affairs, and from 1999 as Provost. She
received a research grant and spent a year conducting research on women managers
in Cameroon and Indonesia. She is the author of several articles and book chapters
on womens issues (particularly African women) and has presented numerous papers at conferences in the United States of America and internationally. She is the
co-author of a book Women in the New Millennium: The Global Revolution (March
2006) and Full Moon (June 2006). Dr. Mbuh is the editor for the Asian Women
journal and is a regular contributor of articles to the South Carolina Black Media
Group newspapers in the United States of America.
Yuahn Rao (PRIDE9@aol.com) is Founder/President of the Pacific Rim Institute for
Development & Education, (PRIDE), Non-profit International NGO, in Special
Consultant status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
(ECOSOC). He was a scientist of physics. He was engaged in the joint research
and technology project for the Perceptual Systems of Psycho-Physics in the
Department of Psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles. He was
a former instructor of advanced studies at the Central Civil Engineering Ministry
of China and thesis instructor at University of Science and Technology of China.
He is credited with over 16 publications on diversified interdisciplinary subjects
related to space-time correlation and localization. He is also a member of New
York Academy of the Sciences and Scientific Research Society of North America.
He has organized three Global Ethics Symposia in Beijing and Los Angeles hosted
by PRIDE with the participation of many delegates from both the US, China, and
other countries. He assisted many Chinese government delegations in different
fields to study and being trained in the U.S.
Keyworld : Conflict Resolution, Conflict Management NGO, Civil Society, Territorial
Issue, Territorial Dispute, Peace Building, Preventive Diplomacy, Citizen
Diplomacy, Second Track, NGO Networks, Multi-Track Diplomacy