Contents

Contents......................................................................................................................................1
Introduction................................................................................................................................3
Conflict.......................................................................................................................................4
Conflict Management- a definition........................................................................................4
Curve of conflict....................................................................................................................4
Durable peace.....................................................................................................................5
Stable peace........................................................................................................................5
Unstable peace...................................................................................................................6
Crisis..................................................................................................................................6
War.....................................................................................................................................6
Analytical Framework............................................................................................................7
Actors.................................................................................................................................7
Root causes.........................................................................................................................8
Issues, scope and stage.......................................................................................................8
Power, resources and relationships....................................................................................9
History of the relationship..................................................................................................9
Aid and its forms........................................................................................................................9
Participants in aid.......................................................................................................................9
The consequences of conflict from a humanitarian point of view...........................................10
Aid agencies: What is their purpose?.......................................................................................10
1

The role of aid......................................................................................................................11

Gaps filled by aid agencies..................................................................................................12
Issues and Challenges in the Provision of Aid.........................................................................13
Problems with Humanitarian Aid.........................................................................................13
Efficiency and Effectiveness............................................................................................13
Political Dilemmas...........................................................................................................14
Criticisms of Humanitarian Organizations.......................................................................14
Problems with Development Assistance..............................................................................16
The role of Aid agencies in conflict management....................................................................17
Conclusion................................................................................................................................18
References................................................................................................................................21

Introduction
In Branczik (2004)s literature review, the effect of extended internal conflicts have become
generalised and fatal. The Post-Cold War conflicts resulted in over five million casualties,
and 95 percent of these have been civilians. She concludes that these realisations have
compelled extensive humanitarian relief efforts and development assistance to rebuild wartorn countries when clashes have ended. Perrin (1998) concurs that the proliferation of
crises around the world has led to a sharp increase in the scale of humanitarian aid required to
meet the vital needs of the people affected by them for food, water, medical care and shelter.
He posits that humanitarian organizations have a choice between direct needs fulfilment and
support of local services in meeting the required needs.

Regarding the stage of the conflict when aid agencies enter the scene, Lund (2009) observes
that statistical research on third-party diplomacy supports the belief that acting before high
levels of conflict intensity is better than trying to end them. Development assistance has been
seen to be a long-term strategy for violence prevention. Perrin (1998) discusses the benefits
aid can offer while also highlighting the negative consequences that can arise in conflict
zones when aid is given usually in a neutrality principle. This essay discusses the roles aid
agencies can assume in conflict management. It will commence by defining conflict and its
management.

Conflict
Conflict Management- a definition
Zartman (2007) defines conflict as an incompatibility of possibility of positions. It implies
the presence of mutually exclusive views. He explained conict management as endeavours
to move a conict from violent to political means of pursuit a conflict whose resolution
denotes the settlement of contested matters in Zartman (2006). Pammer and Killian (2003)
delineate the management of conflict into three main dimensions:
1. The repertoire of formal and informal, autonomous and intervention based,
procedures available for confronting and handling the conflict,
2. The understandings and skills for recognizing and making sense of conflict, for
imagining alternatives, and for communicating to pursue resolution,
3. The individual and community relationships context within which conflicts may
emerge, feel, and be understood as problems by participants, and evolve, escalate,
or de-escalate.
The above definitions of conflict refer to the presence of clashes between the interests of
individuals or entities. These expressions of the interests are violent in nature. The varied
selection of means to resolve such clashes is known as conflict management. Such means
include the identification through analysis of the conflict. This essay will base on Lund
(2009) who described the curve of conflict to inform conflict analysis. This curve will be
referred to situate the activities of aid agencies in conflict management.

Curve of conflict
Lund (2009) advised that, in the abstract, progress of an armed conflict can be modelled
using a curve that passes through a series of different stages: durable peace, stable peace,
unstable peace, crisis and war. There are many intermediary stages peculiar to the
development of each distinct conflict. This paper seeks to highlight the roles aid agencies can
influence the dynamics of armed skirmishes.
4

Durable peace
Lund clarifies,
Durable (or Warm) Peace involves a high level of reciprocity and cooperation, and the
virtual absence of self-defence measures among parties, although it may include their
military alliance against a common threat. This relies on shared values, goals, and
institutions, economic interdependence, and a sense of international community.
Perrin (1998) writes that aid agencies enable extensive exploratory missions, engage in
dialogue with a broad range of groups (mainly Track 1 and Track II) involved in conflicts.
Stable peace
As Lund expounds,
Stable (or Cold) Peace is a relationship of wary communication and limited cooperation (e.g.
trade) within an overall context of basic order or national stability. Value or goal differences
exist and no military cooperation is established, but disputes are generally worked out in
nonviolent, more or less predictable ways. The prospect for war is low

Lund (2009) details that aid agencies should disseminate episodic warnings to official bodies
and the public, together with suggested responses. He mentions intergovernmental and bilateral agencies that have set up in-house systems such as the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID). The USAID produced a fragile states strategy that
involved a watch list to classify priority countries for attention.

Unstable peace
Lund indicates,

Unstable Peace is a situation in which tension and suspicion among parties run high, but
violence is either absent or only sporadic. A negative peace prevails because although armed
force is not deployed [or employed], the parties perceive one another as enemies and
maintain deterrent military capabilities... A balance of power may discourage aggression, but
crisis and war are still possible.

Lund (2009) guides that aid agencies should promote preventive measures to an array of
policies that shape the structural environment within which conflicting actors operate.
Crisis
In Lunds words,
Crisis is tense confrontation between armed forces that are mobilized and ready to fight and
may be engaged in threats and occasional low-level skirmishes but have not exerted any
significant amount of force. The probability of the outbreak of war is high.

As an example, Lund (2009) mentions the World Banks offer in 2000 to support the land
reform in Zimbabwe following the worsening of its crisis over land. Major development
agencies now spearhead intra-state conflict prevention. These agencies have sustained several
assessments of the conflict drivers and peace capacities in particular countries.
War
Again we turn to Lund who says,
War is sustained fighting between organized armed forces. It may vary from low-intensity but
continuing conflict or civil anarchyto all-out hot war. Once significant use of violence or
armed force occurs, conflicts are very susceptible to entering a spiral of escalating violence.
Each side feels increasingly justified to use violence because the other side is. So the
threshold to armed conflict or war is especially important.

The United States Institute of Peace views efforts by outside parties at terminating
aggressions as Peacemaking or Conflict Management borrowing form Lund (2009). They
advise that where an agreement to end hostilities has been reached, such outside parties might

consider Peace Enforcement or Conflict Mitigation. This essay will take a broader view as
indicated by Pammer and Killian (2003) to include all actions taken to prevent escalations,
stop hostilities and reconstruct following violent engagement. An analytical framework will
be discussed below that helps in positioning aid agencies and their roles in conflict
management.

Analytical Framework
Where the curve of conflict helps in analysing the evolution of a conflict, the analytical
framework helps provide insights into the various forces driving a conflict at a particular
moment. It discusses the actors, root causes, issues at stake, power and resources available as
well as the history of the actors relationships.
Actors
An analysis of conflict should identify the actors in a conflict. Aid organisations are one pf
the actors in the conflict and are potential peacemakers hopefully. To understand, the actors,
the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) assesses an individuals behaviour in
when the concerns of two entities appear to be irreconcilable. Thomas and Kilmann (1974)
delineate a persons behaviour along two basic dimensions: (1) assertiveness, representing the
degree to which the individual endeavours to satisfy his or her own concerns, and (2)
cooperativeness, the extent to which the subject attempts to placate the other persons
concerns. They explain variations in the combinations of these two dimensions to result in
five modes: competing, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, and accommodating. These
are expounded on below as per Thomas and Kilmann (1974).

Competing is an assertive and uncooperative, a power-oriented mode describing the pursuit

of one partys interests at the other persons expense, employing any power that seems
appropriate to win his or her position. Collaborating combines both assertiveness and
cooperativeness. It involves reframing of the issues to find a creative outlook for solutions.
Compromising is intermediate in both assertiveness and cooperativeness and lies on a middle
ground between competing and accommodating, giving up more than competing but less than
accommodating. Compromising might mean splitting the difference. Avoiding is
unassertive and uncooperative and may manifest as diplomatically circumnavigating an issue.
Accommodating is the opposite of competing. The subject disregards his or her own position
to satisfy the concerns of the other person.

Root causes
In all conflicts, the actors, mostly the primary actors, raise various grievances. These could be
land as in the infamous lebensraum or other natural resources as water.

Issues, scope and stage

Pursuant to this, any interest in conflicts should understand how root causes manifest
themselves in existing disputes. The phase and intensity of the conflict should be determined
to advise on appropriate action.
Power, resources and relationships
In addition, a study of the relationships among the leaders of each group, as well as the
resources available to each side should be done to understand and forecast the actions of the
various actors in the conflict.

History of the relationship

Previous attempts at intervention should inform current efforts at conflict management.In
view of the conflict curve and components of the analytical framework, this essay will
discuss aid and its various form then highlight the participants in aid.

Aid and its forms

Branczik (2004) writes that humanitarian aid pursues averting human fatalities and promote
access to basics survival needs. In comparison, development assistance aims at the
reconstruction of a country's infrastructural network, institutions, and the macro-economy.

Participants in aid
Branczik (2004) goes on to list he four main actors in humanitarian aid and development
assistance. These are:
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs): The prototype actor in humanitarian aid and
development assistance is the United Nations (U.N.) and its various agencies. The Bretton
Woods institutions and regional development banks likewise fund development projects.
Unilateral assistance: Several countries such as the United States of America direct aid
unilaterally through their own foreign-aid and development agencies.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): NGOs assume a pivotal role in providing
humanitarian aid and development assistance, both directly and as partners to U.N. agencies.
They offer advantages over IGOs or foreign governments. As an example, they are less
limited by political constraints and their diversity and independence allows them to work in
challenging contexts.

The Military: The military acts principally to ensure a secure environment in which relief
agencies can operate. In specific contexts, the military may also provide aid directly, typically
when IGOs and NGOs are overstrained or unable to cope with security difficulties. In other
instances, the military manages and coordinates the broader humanitarian response and to
deal with technically and physically demanding needs, such as restoring communications
and supply routes.

The consequences of conflict from a humanitarian point of view

This paper will refer to these participants as aid agencies from this point onwards. Perrin
(1998) acknowledged the presence of malnutrition, illness, wounds, torture, harassment of
specific groups within the population, disappearances, extra-judicial executions and the
forcible displacement of humans in several armed conflicts. He advises that apart from their
direct effects on the populations disturbed, the costs of these calamities for local systems
warrant reflection. These range from the destruction of crops and places of cultural
significance, the breakdown of economic infrastructure and of health-care facilities.

Aid agencies: What is their purpose?

Martens (2005) contends that the foremost role of aid agencies is to solve the ownership
problem resulting from incomplete feedback loop in foreign aid. They achieve this through
mediation between donors and recipients interests, or preferences. In economic terms,
conditionality is the price borne by the recipient to get access to transfers where preferences
are non-aligned. He writes that agency is given relative financial autonomy and its funds are
mobilised on international capital markets rather than taxpayers money. This gives them
more room for flexible decision making and raise more financial resources than member
10

states fiscal limitations would permit. An additional advantage for donor countries to work
through aid agencies is for them to realise greater soft power than would be available
otherwise.

The role of aid

The aim of humanitarian aid as seen by Perrin (1998) is to assist the victims of armed
conflict, without discrimination, in coping with these problems. The need for external
assistance arises when the parties to a conflict are incapable or disinclined to bear that
responsibility. This is where Humanitarian aid comes in. Perrin (1998) uses two parameters:
the level of violence and the duration of conflict that are akin to Lunds curve of conflict.
Humanitarian aid affects the undercurrents of conflict by acting on both its length and the
level of violence.

According to Lund (2009), some development agencies support non-official diplomacy

initiatives that are intended to influence domestic power politics. The desire for soft power
inspires consuls and military officials to explore the efficacy of development and other noncoercive policies. In contrast to conditional aid, project aid in health and education is used to
ameliorate social challenges and promote economic growth. Lund cites papers that show
stabilising effects of such project-tied aid.
Project aid, however, may result in horizontal inequities since it is implemented through
divisible programmes more so where neo-patrimonial systems issue resources and life
opportunities as is prevalent in Africa. It is imperative for aid agencies to channel funds
through legitimate existing institutions. This enables incumbent regimes to respond in ways

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that do not immediately threaten their status while permitting them to resolve incipient
difficulties.

Gaps filled by aid agencies

As presented in Hoffmann (2014), the new generation of tools has to be wide-ranging. He
cites the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability which includes the effects of employing aid
in conflict resolution. He narrates the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) findings on why
peace processes such as the Dinka-Missiriya peace process had not been successful. The
USIP realised that lack of resources, weak mediatory capacity, and absence of trusted and
trained third-parties together with a failure to implement agreements were the major
impediments in peace processes. Aid agencies can assume programmatic roles, such as
providing expertise and funding to fulfil policy objectives.

For sound decisions to be made, aid agencies should strengthen their information role,
exploiting their program experience, on the ground evaluations, and relationships with
actors, from the ordinary people to the official level, to inform policy decisions. These
agencies can also lend their expertise in specific situations in a policy role where particular
decisions about program design and implementation can demonstrate to be decisive to a
country or regions conflict dynamics. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) was influential in the design and membership of the complex
Congolese peace processes of Sun-City and Lusaka.

12

Issues and Challenges in the Provision of Aid

Humanitarian aid and development assistance are measured on efficiency and effectiveness
which dependent upon the particularly complex political, economic, and social undesirable
consequences attendant to them. Lund (2009) laments that even if humanitarian and
development aid have improved, resources reserved for conflict prevention, with the
exception of a few dedicated funds, have not.

Problems with Humanitarian Aid

Efficiency and Effectiveness
Branczik (2004) offered a concise discussion of the challenges associated with aid. The
discourse below is informed by that paper. Effective and opportune humanitarian relief
operation, though an exceedingly difficult undertaking, can save thousands of lives. The
prospective beneficiaries may be situated within conflict zones or in poorly accessible regions
making it precarious for humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance. This potentially results
in aid selectively reaching the more accessible regions. The effective operationalization of aid
is hampered by coordination challenges given the proliferation of agencies, the difficulty of
obtaining accurate intelligence, and the capriciousness of humanitarian crises.

Political Dilemmas
Humanitarian aid gives the appearance that the international community is at least doing
something, but "humanitarian intervention in the absence of a political solution solves
nothing as intimated by Branczik (2004). In fact, aid can become a contested resource. Aid

13

leakage, or 'political taxation' of aid, refers to circumstances in which part of the aid goes
directly to the belligerent parties for their direct use or trade for arms.

Aid is fungible as it causes the aggressive parties to forego worrying about providing food to
populations and troops thereby prolonging fights. Perrin (1998) however contends that
preconceived ideas for example that humanitarian aid always prolongs conflict must
be shunned if the way humanitarian aid influences the development of conflicts is to be
judged fairly. He adds if we are to evaluate that aid accurately, its effect on victims (its
primary purpose) and on the conflict itself both need to be analysed. By combining these two
factors, it is possible to make an objective assessment and draw conclusions for future work.

Criticisms of Humanitarian Organizations

There are limitations in the accountability of the humanitarian and development
organisations. There are few obstacles to forming an NGO and even fewer comprehensive or
enforceable performance criteria for NGOs. Codes of conduct have been developed, such as
the Red Cross Code of Conduct (1994), but compliance is voluntary. Recently though, aid
agencies have devoted substantial resources in consolidation of their internal architecture to
improve standards. In addition, they have initiated to investments in accountability systems to
the recipients of aid and donors. Furthermore, institutional memory is difficult to accumulate
in aid agencies given the high staff turnover such organisations. This criticism is worsened
considering that aid is seen as a business.

14

Competition for 'humanitarian market share.'

Aid agencies contest for space to maintain a visibility in order to secure funding. This can
have significant influence the decision making of these institutions. This is further intensified
by the impression of skewed press coverage of disasters.

The dilemma of neutrality:

While the 1994 Code of Conduct of the International Federation of the Red Cross demands
that aid agencies be neutral, the effects of aid are valued by recipients and those who do not
receive it. It is political and therefore neutrality is a difficult principle to apply. Additionally,
it would be unsatisfying to provide charitable assistance to people and fail to protect their
human rights. Taking sides though can compromise the efforts and the staff of aid agencies.
Another source of criticism for aid agencies is the way they distort local economies. They
drive prices upwards and leave the local populace worse off sometimes. Related to this is the
way their budgets are.

Lifestyle and budgeting issues:

Arguably a significant portion of the money for aid programs, especially with international
organizations such as the United Nations, goes toward administrative expenses instead of the
anticipated beneficiaries. This can create dilemmas in relief work since as aid workers often
risk their lives in challenging circumstances. Maxwell et al (2008) recognises the scourge of
corruption such as the sex-for-food scandal that surfaced in West Africa in early 2002, and
the recent follow-up report that reinforces these findings and the culture of impunity that
surrounds them. Other examples cited were incidents in the Hurricane Katrina and in the aid

15

responses to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which serve to emphasise the multiplicity of
environments and that corruption risks arise in developed as well as developing countries

Problems with Development Assistance

Several of the demerits discussed above for humanitarian aid apply equally to development
assistance though the latter has issues particular to it too. For instance, development
assistance can encourage clashes if it is managed independent of prevailing social and
political conditions. Structural issues within the aid agencies architecture mean that they are
not capacitated to tackling the needs of fragmented societies. Measures of success are related
to money disbursed, rather than the program outputs. However, as Boyce (2013) documents,
focusing exclusively on expanding the size of the economy with no consideration of how that
pie is divided, is an approach "singularly ill-suited to war-torn societies."

He understood that all peace settlements are based on a balance of power between warring
sides, any measure that disproportionately benefits or hurts one side can make both sides
reassess their positions, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the peace. Aid
administered through government will favour those in power, while channelling aid in a way
that bypasses central government can decrease a government's leverage, also causing
problems. It becomes imperative for these agencies to be immersed in peace negotiations to
link peace building and economic reconstruction thereby improving overall harmonisation of
post-conflict development.

Aid Conditionality
16

Although conditionality can be very effective, those enforcing it may face significant
difficulties mostly where regimes can access alternative sources of revenue. The likely cost to
worse-off members of society must be assuaged by engaging 'smart sanctions' with
humanitarian exemptions.
Efficiency and Effectiveness of Development Assistance
Development assistance may impede local aptitudes to solve problems when dependence on
aid takes root. Moreover, skilled members of the local population are often engaged by
foreign agencies in well paid but low-level posts thereby undermining local spurs to direct
their growth paths.

The role of Aid agencies in conflict management

The activities of aid agencies have been fall into two broad categories: direct operations, or
operational NGOs (including humanitarian relief and conflict resolution NGOs), and
advocacy NGOs. Stahn (2001) notes that aid agencies have increasingly become main
providers of public welfare and sources of employment. In several countries, they fill
important interim gaps in the public administration through provision essential social such as
health and education. Andrew Natsios in Aal (1994) identified four central roles for NGOS:
early warning functions, human rights monitoring, relief and rehabilitation, and conflict
resolution activities. He cautions though that it may be damaging for any NGO to undertake
all these roles concurrently.

Because of their close involvement with local communities, NGOs are in an excellent
position to serve an early warning function, alerting the international community to potential
breakdowns in a distressed countrys government or in relations among the countrys major

17

domestic groups. In such a way, NGOs can serve as the first step in preventive action to avert
future complex emergencies. Jan Eliasson in Aal (1994) detailed steps such as fact-finding
missions that can precede peacekeeping operations and peacemaking to provide information
for prevention of crises. Furthermore, the NGOs access to policymakers should be a resource
tapped into during advocacy for governmental policies that stem the outbreak of violence.

Cawthra (2010) observed that donors were basically omitted from SADCs initiatives to set
up much-needed structures for mediation in the region even though SADC struggled to
arbitrate in the Mozambique and Zimbabwean crises. Cawthra in the Southern African
Security Review (2013) observed that the donor terrain is also in the process of changing as
emerging powers, particularly BRICS, begin to show greater interest in ODA. As the review
notes,
most of this assistance has taken the form of train-and-equip or the building of
security infrastructure, such as the new Zimbabwe Defence College built by the
Chinese on the basis of a $98 million loan. However, the preferred mode of operation
by BRICS, especially regarding security, is bilateral development assistance (usually
in the form of loans) to individual SADC countries, rather than working through the
regional organisation, and (as far as this author could ascertain) never through NGOs.

Conclusion
According to the Aal (1994) report, humanitarian relief NGOs are regularly the first to arrive
on the scene of complex emergencies where they become trapped in their endeavour provide
relief assistance. The report advises that such aid agencies have to expand their traditional
role to embrace guaranteeing political stability and providing public services in situations of
severe crisis. To influence peace operations, the extreme strategy of discontinuing all forms
of aid so as to avert its objectionable effects can have devastating costs for the victims of
18

conflict such as lack of food, absent medical care and humanitarian presence. This is clearly
not tolerable.

Some schools of thought advocate for availing humanitarian aid on condition that
humanitarian principles are respected by the parties to the conflict. Tomasevski (1996) argues
against this saying that the linkage between aid and human rights is dominantly punitive, in
that people whose government is violating their rights are likely to get additionally victimized
by the withdrawal of aid. Yet other campaigners feel that sharing the aid equally between the
parties to the conflict amounts to basing humanitarian aid on political considerations, and no
longer on the victims needs, with the result that humanitarian aids impartiality is called into
question since giving aid in order to gain access to the victims is tantamount to rewarding
those who, by initially refusing access to the victims, violate international humanitarian law.

Consequently, aid agencies need to make more rigorous needs assessments accounting for the
socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. This allows the tailor-making of strategies
grounded on reinforced compensating mechanisms and support for the prevailing institutional
frameworks. Such efforts move in tandem strengthening local capacity. To sum it,
humanitarian assistance is best targeted and minimised to just cover exigent needs. It is also
expected that aid agencies assist in ensuring or at least monitoring that human rights are
upheld in conflict zones. They should protect victims of conflicts through applying the rules
of humanitarian law such as forbidding torture, respecting individual dignity.

19

Brancho (2001) reviewed literature and appreciated that protagonists of NGO participation in
formal mediation processes reason that since traditional instruments of negotiation,
mediation and conflict management failed in intractable conflicts the key rests in the usage
of informal mediators. Brancho (2001) offers a counterargument. He argues that if aid
agencies are to use Track III then these efforts can only supplement the formal processes.
Hoffmann (2014) concluded that aid agencies should employ strong analytical frameworks
that respond to local contexts while supporting local structures for sustainability. This is
supported by Adelman et al (1996) who intimated that aid agencies should act as sentinels
collecting data, analysing information and alerting stakeholders of impending conflicts.
Moreover, the neutrality principle should not be interpreted to mean doing nothing as
genocides occur.

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