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A2.

Deters Chinese Agression


1. China views the bases as a threat to their interests and have started
modernizing in order to combat US presence in Asia.
Johnson, William Obamas pivot to Asia faces a changing Chinese military. Reuters.
April 7, 2015 < http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/04/07/china-to-the-unitedstates-the-pacific-is-no-longer-a-big-american-lake/>
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army is rapidly modernizing, thanks to a growing
budget and an emphasis on military hardware. Rather than compete head-on with U.S.
forces too ambitious a goal for a military that still suffers from corruption, recruitment
challenges and other weaknesses China wants to make the PLA strong enough that

the United States will steer clear of regional disputes. As the United States pivots to
Asia, the Chinese worry over what they see as a U.S. strategy of containment. To
China, increased U.S. military-to-military exchanges with Vietnam and Cambodia, as well as
new agreements with the Philippines over naval bases, look like attempts to keep China from
what it considers its rightful place in the region.

Ways of modernization if opponents request specifics.


To flex its military muscle, China has taken a two-pronged approach, developing ways to
counter U.S. forces from the safety of its mainland bases, while using the PLA and
maritime militia to pressure countries in the region. Firepower is key. China, which has long
used mainland-based cruise missiles to maintain pressure on Taiwan, is expanding that
effort so that cruise and ballistic missiles can reach all 23 U.S. bases in Japan, from Honshu
Island to Okinawa. Since these missiles can also be launched from naval bases and aircraft,
even remote U.S. bases like Guam are at risk. China has also started developing a land-based
ballistic missile that may pose a threat to U.S. ships. China is also using the PLA, coast guard
and navy to pressure neighboring countries, especially Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines.
From conducting air exercises over the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the northern
Philippines, to using the coast guard to counter Philippine fishing boats in the Scarborough
Shoals, China is determined to show the United States that it can enforce its claims in the
region and maintain its defenses along an arc from northern Japan, through the
Philippines, to Indonesia.

2. The

Chinese have been developing missiles capable of hitting Okinawa


indicating that the island is not suitable for missile defense and threat
deterrence. The rate at which these missiles are being produced provide
reason behind the claim that the Chinese are indeed modernizing.
*MRBM means medium range ballistic missiles
*IISS: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Heginbotham, Eric The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving
Balance of Power RAND Corporation. 1996-2017. <
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf
>

In 1996, IISS assessed that China had a small but indeterminate number of surfaceto-surface missiles in its inventory. By 2010, that inventory had expanded to roughly 350
400 DF-15s and 700750 DF-11s. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense reported
that, in total, China had at least 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles. All of Chinas
SRBM-equipped brigades are based within range of Taiwan, and in recent years, China has also
introduced new SRBMs able to hit more distant targets.13 These include the DF-15B (range
600800 km), as well as a new missile, the DF-16 (range 8001,000 km). The DF-16 is a twostage missile that straddles the boundary between SRBMs and MRBMs. Given its reported
range, the DF-16 is capable of striking targets on Okinawa and, given its smaller size, it is
probably able to do so at a smaller financial cost than employing DF-21Cs (discussed below) for
the same task.Both because the DF-16 can attack targets beyond Taiwan (and may be especially
well suited to strike U.S. bases on Okinawa) and because of its two-stage construction, we list
the missile as an MRBM in Table 3.1 and discuss future build rates in that context (below).
Janes Strategic Weapons Systems suggests that the DF-16 will replace the DF-15 and perhaps
also the DF-11.16 The 2015 edition of The Military Balance credits China with having

approximately 12 launchers in service which, depending on the number of reloads


per launcher, could suggest anywhere between 24 and 48 missiles.

A2.Backlash and Anti US Sentiment


The government cannot act because there is no clear opinion concerning the
bases. General base opposition has been decreasing ever since the Cold War.
Yoo, Joo Hyon When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases
in Okinawa The Korean Journal of International Studies. Dec. 10, 2014.
<http://www.kjis.org/journal/view.html?uid=144&&vmd=Full>
Base activists and the people of Okinawa are not easy for the central government to
handle. One major reason lies in the fact that there is a clear division within the
Okinawans. The level of opposition varies among the residents of Okinawa, ranging from a
radical demand of removing all US forces completely from the island to a moderate request of
reducing forces. However, what is clear is that the FRF plan is not very popular. A public survey
conducted by Kyoto News Agency and Ryukyu Shimpo revealed that only 9.6 percent of the
people of Okinawa supported the central governments plan to build alternative facilities in
Henoko (Takehiko 2004). Another survey conducted by the Okinawan Prefectural Government
in 2012 revealed that about 49 percent of respondents were not satisfied by the central
governments FRF plan while 22.3 percent said neither positive nor negative (Rykyu Shimpo
2014). In the same survey, only 9 percent of respondents were satisfied. However, this does not
necessarily mean that everyone in Okinawa is vocally opposed to the plan. Some people tend to
accept the reality that they have to live with US forces. Like civil society groups and base
activists, the general population of Okinawa believes that removing US forces from the island is
a most desirable outcome. However, they understand that it is impossible to remove US bases
from Okinawa completely within a short period of time (Fackler 2012). As a recent study has

revealed, although Okinawans attitudes toward US bases evinced a strong enmity


historically, the degree of the opposition has gradually decreased since the end of the
Cold War (Kagotani and Yanai 2014). Some residents in Okinawa have a flexible approach to
the US bases. For example, the Nago fishing cooperative is a local pro-base group in
Henoko. It has a strong influence on the FRF plan because the Okinawan governor
is required to obtain this groups consent before he approves commencing
preconstruction surveys in the waters off Cape Henoko (Ji Ji 2013). A leader in the
fishing association and other residents, including several military landowners, constitute the
Henoko Administrative Committee, an important decision-making body. The committee has

been in favor of the plan proposed by the central government mostly because of
Henokos village-wide financial dependency on the central government (Williams
2013).

Split opinions concerning the desirability of the U.S. bases.


Riehart, E. Ian, Chanlett-Avery, Emma The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and
the Futenma Base Controversy Congressional Research Service. Jan. 20, 2016 <
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42645.pdf>

The views of Okinawans are far from monolithic. Many residents of base-hosting
communities appreciate the economic benefits, whether as employees on the bases,
as local business owners who serve American customers, or as landowners of base
property. Some locals resent the actions of outsiders who focus on environmental
issues at the expense of economic development. Prorelocation authorities point to the
village of Henoko (in Nago City municipality) as an example of local citizens who are more in
favor of additional U.S. facilities than the broader population, though this may have to do with
the monetary compensation that Tokyo provides to specific host communities. There is also a
generation gap between older Okinawans with personal memories of past incidents and
younger residents who may not be as involved in the anti-base activist movement. There

appear to be no reliable opinion polls that might illuminate the extent of the
opposition to U.S. Presence across demographic categories.