[G.R. Nos. 142915-16.

February 27, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERT CHIU y WAN and MARK ANTHONY
MOLINA y DELA PEA, accused.
ROBERT CHIU y WAN, appellant.

This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
95, convicting the appellant Robert Chiu y Wan a.k.a. Robert Chu in Criminal Case No. 9879368 for violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659 (possession of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu) and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine of P1,000,000, and
convicting him and accused Mark Anthony Molina in Criminal Case No. 98-79369 for violation of
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, involving the sale
of 1.13 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride and sentencing them to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum,
as the maximum penalty.[2]
The Indictments
On November 3, 1998, appellant Robert Chiu was charged of violating Section 16, Article
III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article 1 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No.
7659, in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-79368. The accusatory portion of the
said Information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 220.40 grams of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, a
regulated drug without the necessary license and/or prescription, therefore, in violation of said
law.[3]
On the same date, another Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-79369 was
filed, charging the appellant and Mark Anthony Molina for violation of Section 15, Article III in
relation to Section 2(e)(f)(o), Article 1 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell or offer for sale 1.13 grams of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, which is a regulated drug.[4]
The appellant and Mark Anthony Molina were arraigned, assisted by counsel, and pleaded
not guilty to the charges against them.
The Case for the Prosecution[5]
Sometime in September 1998, the Central Police District Criminal Investigation Unit,
Special Operations Group, headed by SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez and PO1 Jose R. Salazar,
conducted surveillance operations on a suspected shabu dealer, Daniel Henares. In a test-buy
operation held on October 5, 1998, Salazar, with the assistance of a civilian informant, bought a

sachet of shabu worth P2,000.00 from Henares at his residence in San Juan, Metro Manila. A
few days later, on October 11, 1998,[6] Henares was apprehended for the said sale.[7]
During the tactical interrogation conducted by the policemen, Henares admitted that he
acquired the illegal drugs from appellant Robert Chiu, a resident of No. 29 North Road,
Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Q.C.[8] Fernandez and other police officers of the Special
Operations Group conducted surveillance operations at the appellants residence. They learned
that Molinas father owned the house that the appellant was renting. [9] The police officers then
decided to conduct a test-buy operation against the appellant. Fernandez and Salazar were
designated as the poseur-buyers. A female informant, who also happened to be a close friend of
the appellant, would then introduce them to the latter.
At about 8:00 p.m. of October 19, 1998, Fernandez and Salazar, together with the female
informant, proceeded to the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao,
Quezon City. When the guard on duty saw the female informant, he opened the gate and led
her, Salazar and Fernandez to the house, which was approximately fifteen meters from the
road. The informant introduced Fernandez and Salazar to the appellant as buyers of shabu.
Salazar was able to purchase P3,000.00 worth of the prohibited drug from the appellant. PNP
Forensic Chemist Edwin Zata examined the drugs and submitted Physical Sciences Report No.
D-3418-98, which stated that the drug gave positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[10]
On October 26, 1998, Fernandez filed with the RTC of Pasay City an application for a
search warrant for the search of the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan
(Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, entitled and docketed as People vs. Robert Chiu, Search
Warrant No. 98-0059.[11] Attached to the application were the following: (a) Fernandez affidavit
showing that the house subject of the search was occupied by the appellant; (b) the deposition
of Salazar;[12] (c) the request for the examination of 2.19 grams of shabu earlier purchased from
the appellant; (d) the results of the forensic examination; [13] and, (e) a sketch of the house,
prepared by Salazar.[14]
On October 26, 1998, Executive Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch
109, conducted an inquiry into the application.Fernandez testified that although the subject of
the search and the objects to be seized were located in Quezon City, the application for the
search warrant was filed in Pasay City because of the possibility that the regulated drug would
be removed therefrom by the appellant. [15]Moreover, there was a need for confidentiality; if the
policemen filed their application in the RTC of Quezon City, there was a possibility that the
information would reach Molina and the appellant. Salazar gave the same response when
questioned by the court.[16] The court then issued an Order granting the application and issued
Search Warrant No. 98-0059[17] which commanded the search any time of the day or night of the
house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan (Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, and to
seize the substances, articles and objects therein described.[18]
To make certain that the appellant was in the house to be searched when the search
warrant was to be implemented, police operatives led by Fernandez and Salazar decided to
conduct another buy-bust operation against the appellant. Fernandez prepared a P1,000.00
peso bill for the purchase of shabu and placed his initials thereon.[19]
On November 1, 1998, Fernandez, Salazar, two other officers and the female informant,
stationed themselves at the Petron gasoline station located two blocks from the subject
premises. At about 9:00 a.m., Salazar and the lady informant proceeded to the house at No. 29
North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. The security guard opened the
gate and led the two inside. Salazar informed the appellant that he wanted to buy shabu
worth P1,000.00 because he had a prospective buyer. The appellant asked Molina to get the
shabu from the room upstairs. The latter did as he was told and when he returned, handed over
to the appellant a plastic sachet containing approximately 1.13 grams of the white crystalline
substance which, in turn, was handed over to Salazar.[20] Salazar later reported to Fernandez
that the appellant was in the house. Armed with the search warrant, Fernandez, Salazar, PO1

Gerardo Granado, PO1 Corpuz and other police operatives forthwith proceeded to the house.
The appellant was just about to leave. Fernandez and the members of the team identified
themselves as police officers and told the appellant that they were in the house to execute the
search warrant issued by Judge Lopez. They showed the warrant to the appellant. After the
appellant read the same, Fernandez suggested that the appellant voluntarily surrender the
articles and substances listed therein. The appellant accompanied Salazar and Fernandez to the
second floor and pointed to his room where the shabu was kept.[21]
Fernandez had Barangay Chairman Emmanuel Gozun and Barangay Kagawad Oscar
Joves summoned to the house to witness the search to be conducted. When the barangay
officials arrived, Fernandez, Salazar and the other police officers, accompanied by the barangay
officials, searched the rooms of the house and found a Giordano bag containing the following
items:
1. undetermined quantity of white crystalline granules placed inside a
transparent plastic envelope;
2. one (1) pc. weighing scale;
3. one (1) cal. .38 revolver ARMSCOR bearing SN 71539;
4. five (5) rds. of cal. 38 ammunitions;
5. two (2) rolls of aluminum foils;
6. seven (7) pcs. tooter;
7. one (1) pc. forceps.
8. one (1) bottle of ethyl alcohol;
9. seven (7) pcs. lighter;
10. several pcs. of transparent plastic envelopes;
11. three (3) pcs. (sic) of scissors.[22]
During the search, the appellant and Mark Anthony Molina stayed in the sala. The
appellant and Mark Anthony Molina were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City, where they
were detained. An Inventory[23] of the articles seized based on the search warrant was prepared
in the presence of the barangay officials. The appellant did not sign the inventory but signed an
Affidavit of Orderly Search [24] in the presence of the barangay chairman and barangay kagawad.
Fernandez, Salazar and Granado executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension.[25]
On November 1, 1998, Police Superintendent Cecilio Aguila transmitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory two heat-sealed plastic bags containing white crystalline substances weighing 1.13
grams,[26] and another sachet containing white crystalline substances weighing 220.40 grams.
[27]
The first sachet contained the shabu purchased by Salazar on November 1, 1998 while the
second sachet contained the shabu which Fernandez and Salazar found when the search
warrant was implemented. As requested, Forensic Chemist Isidro Cario conducted a qualitative
examination[28] of about 10 grams of the 220.40 grams contained in the second sachet and of the
substances contained in the first sachet. He signed Physical Sciences Report No. D-3594-98
stating that the specimens gave positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. [29]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant testified and adduced documentary evidence that he and his wife, Macrina
Chiu, were residents of No. 29-B Times Street, West Triangle, Quezon City. He was a
naturalized Filipino citizen. He and his wife had been renting the said house from its owner,
Aurora Perez, since November 1, 1987. [30] However, when they could no longer afford to pay the
monthly rental, he and his family were impelled to transfer to his parents house at Estacio
Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. His wife operated a beauty parlor while he was
engaged in the business of buying and selling motor vehicles, motorbikes and generators for
which he earned between P40,000.00 to P60,000.00 a month. The appellant first met Mark
Anthony Molina in 1997, and thereafter, was a frequent visitor at No. 29 North Road, Barangay

Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. He had sold Molinas motorbike but had not yet taken
delivery thereof because it needed some repairs.
The appellant testified that he was out with friends in the evening of October 31, 1998. At
about 5:00 a.m. the next day, or on November 1, 1998, he was on his way home. However,
since the members of his household were probably still asleep and no one would open the gate
for him, he decided to go to Molinas house at North Road and find out how the repairs on the
motorcycle were coming along. He stayed there until late that morning. He had P5,000.00 in his
wallet which he intended to lend to his friend who lives in the Molina compound. He also
intended to visit the graves of his loved ones at the cemetery.
When the appellant was about to leave at 8:30 a.m., Fernandez and Salazar barged into
the house, identified themselves as policemen and demanded to know if he was Robert
Chiu. When he replied that he was, the policemen handcuffed him. The police officers went to
the second floor where they herded Molina, his son and his girlfriend to the ground floor. The
policemen were carrying a Giordano bag. Fernandez had Salazar fetch Barangay Chairman
Gozun and Barangay Kagawad Joves. The appellant then signed the Inventory Report and the
Affidavit of Orderly Search. The policemen confiscated two guns, one of which was placed in a
box. The appellant and Molina were then brought to Camp Karingal on board the latters L-300
van. Fernandez then divested him of his wallet, and was told that he would be released if he
could furnish information on the dealings and whereabouts of a drug pusher named Palit Ulo. He
pleaded to Fernandez to return the P5,000.00 to him, but Fernandez got a chair and hit him with
it. The appellant parried the chair with his left elbow. Fernandez then brought him out of the
room. When he asked Fernandez what he wanted, the latter remained silent. Fernandez later
returned him to the sala. At 9:30 p.m. that evening, he and Molina were brought to the police
station for inquest.
The appellant further testified that on October 19, 1998, he was in Alabang visiting a
friend. He denied selling shabu to Salazar in the house at North Road.
The Case for the Accused Mark Anthony Molina
Molina testified that he was the Vice-President for Operations of the ARB Construction
Company, a family corporation which developed residential subdivisions in Las Pias, Cavite,
Novaliches and Muntinlupa. He was also a member of the Board of Directors of the Immaculada
Concepcion Colleges in Bacoor, Cavite, also owned and controlled by his family. As vicepresident of the ARB Construction Company, he received P20,000.00 a month, and as a
member of the Board of Directors of the school, he received P12,000.00 a month. He had a sixbedroom house in Soldiers Hill, Muntinlupa City, constructed on a 1,400-square-meter lot. He
had it rented for P20,000.00 a month since 1994 as he and his wife Ditas Alcorez had by then
separated. He and his four-year-old son lived with his parents at No. 54 Van Durren, North
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
The office of the ARB Construction Company was located at No. 27 North Road, Barangay
Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Q.C., adjacent to the office at No. 29 North Road, was a two-storey
house owned by the company. There were two bedrooms in the second floor where he and his
son Miguel Raphael and his girlfriend Rosemarie Pinky Abaya slept. There was a sala and a
kitchen on the ground floor, and there was a motor pool beside the house. The ARB
Construction Company engaged the services of the Viscayno Security Agency to provide
security services to the office. Rodelito Adriano was assigned to guard the house at No. 29 North
Road.
Molina stated that he met the appellant Chiu for the first time when they were introduced
to each other by Chester Tan, a dealer of computer equipments. As the appellant was an
electrician and a very good salesman of used cars, they became business partners. The
appellant often went to his house at No. 29 North Road, and even used to sleep there two or
three times a week. Molina confirmed that the appellant had just sold his 1957 Model EMW
motorcycle.

In the afternoon of October 30, 1998, a certain Mang Elio visited Molina at No. 29 North
Road. He was carrying a plastic bag and wanted to see the motorcycle in the garage. Shortly
after midnight, Mang Elio told Molina that he was leaving to visit a relative. Mang Elio left his
plastic bag, and Abaya later took it. In the meantime, Molina sought the appellants help in
putting up his 1957 Model EMW motorcycle for sale. The appellant arrived in the house in the
early morning of November 1, 1998. Molina, his son, and Abaya, were still asleep in one of the
rooms at the second floor. At about 9:00 a.m., Fernandez suddenly barged into the room and
identified himself as a policeman. Fernandez pointed a gun at Molina and ordered the three of
them to go downstairs. They did as they were told and in the sala, saw Salazar, security guards
Adriano and Cortes, and the appellant, who was already handcuffed.
Fernandez showed Molina the search warrant issued by Judge Lopez. Momentarily, Joves
and Gozun arrived and witnessed the police officers search the two bedrooms in the second
floor. After thirty minutes, the barangay officials and the police officers came down, carrying with
them the Giordano bag left by Mang Elio. The policemen prepared an inventory of the items
contained in the bag.
Molina complained that one of his guns which was taken by the policemen was not
included in the inventory. The policemen demandedP200,000.00 from him, and had him call his
mother, but the latter refused to give money. Molina, his maid, the appellant, and Abaya, were
brought to Camp Karingal on board the L-300 van owned by the ARB Construction
Company. Fernandez later asked him to testify against the appellant and declare that the latter
owned the plastic bag. Fernandez warned that he would be charged for the sale of shabu if he
refused to do so. Molina did not accept Fernandez offer.
Molina testified that he had no idea whether shabu was sold to Salazar in the morning of
November 1, 1998.
On January 27, 2000, the trial court promulgated a decision finding the appellants guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-98-79368, the Court finds the accused Robert Chiu y Wan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, involving the illegal possession of 220.40 grams of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as shabu, a regulated drug, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a FINE of One Million Pesos;
and
2. In Crim. Case No. Q-98-79369, the Court finds both accused, Robert Chiu y Wan and Mark
Anthony Molina y dela Pea, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
Section 15 of Republic Act 6425, as amended by Republic Act 7659, involving the sale of 1.13
grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride locally known as shabu, a regulated drug, and are
hereby sentenced each to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as the minimum penalty, to six (6)
years of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum penalty.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the costs.
The plastic sachets containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as shabu
(Exhs. D-1 and D-2) are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of
Court is hereby ordered to deliver or cause the safe delivery of the said items to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for safekeeping and disposition after the finality of this judgment.[31]
The appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision. According to the
appellant, Fernandez and Salazar did not adduce evidence before Pasay City Judge Lopez to
prove the urgency of issuing a search warrant in a court having jurisdiction other than the place
where the said warrant would be enforced. Consequently, any evidence obtained based on the
said search warrant was inadmissible. Furthermore, the search warrant was antedated. It was,

likewise, asserted that the Physical Sciences Report submitted by Forensic Chemist Isidro Cario
was unreliable because of the courts failure to conduct a qualitative examination of the
specimen.
The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged because (a) Forensic Chemist Edwin Zata did not testify and identify
Physical Sciences Report No. D-3418-98;[32] (b) the appellant signed the Affidavit of Orderly
Search[33] but did not sign the Inventory Receipt;[34] (c) the appellant was a victim of extortion
perpetrated by Fernandez and Salazar; (d) the collective testimonies of Fernandez and Salazar
were incredible; and, (e) Daniel Henares was not informed of his constitutional rights when he
was interrogated by the policemen.
The trial court issued an order denying the appellants motion. He then appealed the
decision. The accused Mark Anthony Molina did not appeal the decision.
In his Brief, the appellant reiterated the grounds in his motion for the reconsideration of the
trial courts decision and assigned the same grounds as errors which merit the Courts perusal.
The appellant asserts that there was no compelling reason for Fernandez and Salazar to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the Executive Judge of the Pasay City RTC. The
appellant asserts that confidentiality is not a compelling consideration for urgency contemplated
in SC Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, and as held by this Court in Malaloan vs. Court of
Appeals,[35] and Ilano vs. Court of Appeals.[36] The appellant finally posits that the application for
a search warrant should have been filed in the RTC of Quezon City which had primary
jurisdiction over the matter. Consequently, the appellant insists, the search warrant issued by
Judge Lopez was defective and the articles/objects seized on the basis thereof were
inadmissible in evidence.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that:
The Regional Trial Court of Pasay City correctly issued the search warrant in this case, albeit it
was served in Quezon City. It has been settled that there is no law or rule which prohibits a
branch of a regional trial court to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. After all, a search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. Thus, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals (244 SCRA 346 [1995]), this Honorable Court
reiterating the ruling in Malaloan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (232 SCRA 249 [1994]) held
that when necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and
place, a court may issue a search warrant covering a place outside its territorial jurisdiction.
What is important is the strict implementation of the search warrant within the premises
specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing court (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume Two, 1995 Edition, pp.
533-535).[37]
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Section 1, SC Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, which was in force when the
application for a search warrant was filed, provides viz:
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violations of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes
against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of
firearms and/or ammunitions and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended,
shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court
under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,[38] we held that a search warrant is merely a judicial
process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has

already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, such application for a
search warrant may be filed in territorial jurisdiction other than where the illegal articles sought to
be seized are located. We also held that Circular No. 19 [39] was never intended to confer
exclusive jurisdiction on the Executive Judge mentioned therein; it is not a mandate for the
exclusion of all other courts and that a court whose territory does not embrace the place to be
searched may issue a search warrant where the application is necessitated and justified by
compelling consideration of urgency, subject, time and place, thus:
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive
jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves
directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other
judges as was the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act
only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial
jurisdictions. The phrase above- quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the
assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and
not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts[40]
Urgent means pressing; calling for immediate attention. [41] The court must take into
account and consider not only the subject but the time and place of the enforcement of the
search warrant as well. The determination of the existence of compelling considerations of
urgency, and the subject, time and place necessitating and justifying the filing of an application
for a search warrant with a court other than the court having territorial jurisdiction over the place
to be searched and things to be seized or where the materials are found is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court where the application is filed, subject to review by the appellate
court in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, Fernandez filed the application for a search warrant with the Pasay City RTC
instead of the Quezon City RTC because of the possibility that the shabu would be removed by
the appellant from No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. Indeed,
as shown by the evidence, the appellant had a residence other than No. 29 North Road where
he sold shabu. There was also the pervading concern of the police officers that if they filed the
application in Quezon City where the appellant plied his illicit activities, it may somehow come to
the knowledge of Molina and the appellant, thus, rendering the enforcement of any search
warrant issued by the court to be a useless effort. We find and so hold that Judge Lopez did not
err in taking cognizance of and granting the questioned application for a search warrant.
Additionally, the appellant did not raise, at the trial court, the issues of the validity of the
search warrant, the propriety of its enforcement in Quezon City, as well as the admissibility of
the shabu against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized. The appellants objection to
the admissibility of the search warrant was grounded merely on the lack of veracity (sic)
thereof. Such omission constituted a waiver by the appellant of the protection under Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution.[42]
The appellants contention that the date of the trial courts issuance of the search warrant
which appears to be October 21, 1998 was alteredand made to appear October 26, 1998
without authority from the issuing judge is belied by the records. Even a cursory reading of the
search warrant will readily show that the date October 21, 1998 originally typewritten on the
search warrant was altered and changed with the authority of Judge Lopez as shown by the
latters initials beside the date 26th day of October 1998. The alteration was authenticated by no
less than the Executive Judge herself.
Case law has it that the forensic chemist is not mandated to examine the entire mass of
shabu confiscated by the policemen, in this case, 220.40 grams. It is enough that a sample of
the said substance be subjected to qualitative examination. In People vs. Julian Fernandez,
[43]
andPeople vs. Medenilla,[44] we held that a sample taken from one package is logically

presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by
the accused himself. The appellant failed to adduce such evidence.
There was no need for the prosecution to present Forensic Chemist Edwin Zata because
the shabu he examined was not the subject of the cases filed against the appellant in the trial
court. The prosecution presented Forensic Chemist Isidro Cario who affirmed the veracity of his
report on his examination of the shabu subject of the charges against the appellant.
The bare fact that Daniel Henares was not informed of his constitutional rights when he
confessed to the police officers that the shabu he had sold to Salazar on October 19, 1998 was
from the appellant, is irrelevant in this case. The appellant was not arrested on the basis of the
information relayed by Daniel Henares to the police officers. A test-buy operation was conducted
against the appellant on October 19, 1998 before the application for a search warrant was filed
by the police officers with Judge Lopez on October 26, 1998. The appellant was arrested by the
police officers only after the sale of shabu by the appellant to Salazar on March 1, 1998 and the
subsequent implementation of the search warrant on the said date.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-79368 and 98-79369
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 134217 May 11, 2000

KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by GEMMA
DEMORAL-SAVAGE, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region
VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE SOSMEA,respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and
managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which
resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners

located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by
respondent Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza,
president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), 1 Supervising
Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for
search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 2 The application sought the
authorization to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were
allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was
issued by respondent Judge on 16 October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following
day by NBI agents. 3 Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture, indicated in the
Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have remained
in NBI custody up to the present. 4
On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime
they were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable
cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not
particularly describe the things to be seized. 5
On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally
alleged that the assailed warrant was applied for without a certification against forum
shopping. 6 On 30 January 1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the
Supplemental Motion to Quash. 7 On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of
their motion to quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion
to Quash but adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order
sought to be reconsidered. 8 The denial of their last motion 9 prompted petitioners to come to this
Court.
The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving
jurisdiction over the offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the
existence of the crime.
Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not
designated as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the Regional
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for
IPR. The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The
sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated Special Court for
IPR for the 7th Judicial Region. 10 Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96
was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the
Regional Trial Courts. 11
The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative
orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by
the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may
entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. 12 The authority to issue search warrants is inherent
in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. 1 In the instant case, the
premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of
the respondent court. 14
Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR.
Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases
involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all
matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one
court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not

by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order. 15 The power to issue search
warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in
Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95.
Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed
outright since it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as
authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 16 In that case, we sustained the
quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as
private respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he
was denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no
allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The
Rules of Court as amended requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting any
mention of "applications." 17 In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the
matter, required such certification even from "applications." Our ruling in Washington Distillers
required no such certification from applications for search warrants. Hence, the absence of such
certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.
The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents
punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan
Herrero seems to agree as he filed the corresponding Information against petitioners on 17
March 1998. 18 However, since the IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion
contrary to the view herein expressed would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code
provides
All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic
Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed
(emphasis ours). 19
The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents,
referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the
repeal of the article.
The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The
assailed acts specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the same, for the
purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco and the buying public. 20 The Code defines "unfair
competition" thus
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith
by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his
business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or shall commit
any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be
subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the
packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other
feature of their appearance which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the
goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or
dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the
public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods
or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other
means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the
services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the
public; or

(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or
who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated
to discredit goods, businesses or services of another. 21
There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the
controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at
all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute against the State
and liberally in favor of the accused, 22 for penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by
intendment, implication or any equitable consideration. 2 Respondents invoke jurisprudence to
support their contention that "unfair competition" exists in this case. 24 However, we are
prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair Competition
found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts constitute patent
infringement as defined by the same Code
Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. 76.1. The making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing a patented product or a product obtained
directly or indirectly from a patented process, or the use of a patented
process without authorization of the patentee constitutes patent
infringement.25
Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of the IPR Code,
we are constrained to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such application would be beneficial
to the
accused. 26 Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the possibility of any criminal liability
attaching to the acts alleged, then that Code must be applied here.
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. 27 Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the
search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore
defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues
raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search
warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in
accordance with established jurisprudence.28
In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information they allege that the trial court denied their motion
to transfer their case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and we fail
to find any trace of such motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in the
records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with
regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12. 29 This attachment being immaterial we shall give
it no further attention.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998,
denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and
the Supplemental Motion to Quash dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the
Order dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998, is
SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by virtue of
the illegal search warrant.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135503. July 6, 2000]

WILLIAM A. GARAYGAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the court
that issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence of the service of the
warrant?
On 30 July 1996 the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding over
Branch 23, issued Search Warrant No. 96-505[1] upon application of the Presidential Task Force
on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (PTFIC). The warrant authorized a search of the house
of petitioner William A. Garaygay located in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, a place outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. Thereafter the PTFIC through its Regional Task Group
conducted a raid on the house of petitioner resulting in the seizure of several items of firearms,
explosives, ammunition and other prohibited paraphernalia.
On 7 August 1996 an Information for violation of PD 1866[2] was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Lapu-Lapu City[3] against petitioner who upon being arraigned pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence dated 26 September 1996 on the
ground that the search warrant was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 19, [4]and
that it was a general warrant.
On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the motion to quash should have been filed with
the RTC of Manila which issued the warrant. But petitioner reminded the trial court of People v.
Bans[5] where we ruled Generally, an order of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be modified or altered by any
court of concurrent jurisdiction. Given the facts of this case, however, this rule cannot be
applied.
There could have been no problem had the court which issued the search warrant was
likewise the same court before which the criminal case is pending as a result of its issuance.
But if the criminal case which was subsequently filed by virtue of the serach warrant is raffled
off to a different branch, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant issued should be
consolidated with that branch trying the criminal case (see Nolasco v. Pao, 139 SCRA 152
[1985]), the rationale is to avoid confusion as regards the issue of jurisdiction over the case
and to promote an orderly administration of justice.
Treating the argument of the prosecution as a prejudicial question, the trial court resolved the
same ahead of the merits of petitioner's motion to quash and held x x x x Thus, the Court cannot afford to ignore the long established rule that "courts of equal
rank and jurisdiction are proscribed from interfering with or passing upon the orders or
processes of its coordinate counterpart, except in extreme situations authorized by
law," People vs. Woolcock, et al., May 22, 1995, 244 SCRA 235. Further, in the light of the
guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, May 6, 1994, 232
SCRA 249, this present motion under consideration should have been filed with the RTCBranch 23 of Manila. Said guidelines are quoted below, thus:
1) The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue
search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances
that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the
same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.

2) When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be
filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to
the appropriate high court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing
court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be
deemed waived (emphasis supplied).
x x x x Moreover x x x x we are of the considered view that the issuing court (RTC-Br. 23,
Manila) is in a vantage position to resolve this instant motion inasmuch as it has in its
possession all the available records and can, therefore, make an intelligible assessment of
the evidence on hand.[6]
On 17 January 1997 the trial court thus denied petitioners motion to quash and ordered the
Branch Clerk of Court to set the case for pre-trial conference.[7]
Petitioner questioned the denial of his motion to quash in a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. In its assailed Decision of 18 May 1998 the appellate court dismissed the
petition and on 11 September 1998 rejected likewise his motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals explained x x x x This ruling (People v. Bans) is, however, applicable only when, as in the Bans case,
two different branches of the same Regional Trial Court are involved. With regard to the case
at bar, the search warrant was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 23). On
the other hand, the criminal case is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City
(Branch 54). Thus, the ruling in the case of People v. Woolcock, 244 SCRA 235, is applicable.
That case involved two courts having different geographical jurisdictions x x x x[8]
For resolution now before this Court are these issues: (a) whether the trial court of Lapu-Lapu
City where the criminal case was filed is clothed with authority to resolve the Motion to Quash
Search Warrant . . . ; and, (b) whether the search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila is
valid.
Aside from invoking People v. Bans anew, petitioner cites Nolasco v. Pao[9] which was quoted
in Bans It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or
Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the
service of the Search warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the
Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the
right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Assuming that the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City is not vested with authority to resolve the issue of
the validity of the search warrant, petitioner now submits to this Court the issue for resolution.
He argues that a search warrant to be valid must particularly describe the place to be
searched. In the present case, the search warrant merely stated, among others, that "William
Garaygay a.k.a. William Flores/Willy Ybaez of Brgy. Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu x x x
x" When the shanty where he was then sleeping was searched by the authorities they found
one (1) 9mm Glock pistol duly licensed in his name. Thereafter, he was dragged to an
abandoned building about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away. It was in that abandoned
building where the authorities allegedly found the firearms, explosives, ammunition and other
paraphernalia alluded to in the Information. Petitioner next argues that the search in his
shanty and in the abandoned building was made by elements of the PTFIC without any
witness, in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 126, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides
that "[n]o search of house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or, in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality."
Petitioner submits that, necessarily, all the items confiscated by the authorities on the basis of
the invalid search warrant should be excluded in the criminal case for being "fruits of the
poisonous tree."

In 1967, in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez,[10] we ruled that relief from a search warrant claimed to be
invalid should be sought in the court that issued it. We emphasized that any other view would
be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which
is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may
otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's
lawful orders. This doctrine was reiterated in Templo v. de la Cruz[11] where the accused
likewise questioned the validity of the search warrant before a court of concurrent jurisdiction,
different from the court which issued the warrant. Subsequently however, in Nolasco v. Pao,
we declared that "the pendency of the Search Warrant Case and of the Subversive
Documents Case before two (2) different courts is not conducive to an orderly administration
of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one
Court or Branch and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court or Branch as a result
of the service of the Search Warrant, the Search Warrant Case should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the
Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the
right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained."
People v. Bans substantially restated the doctrine in Nolasco v. Pao, i. e., when a search
warrant is issued by one court, if the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a
branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of
the warrant should be consolidated with the branch trying the criminal case. We explained
further therein the underlying reason for the rule
x x x x If the rule had been otherwise, i.e., if the issuing court had been allowed to resolve
the Motion to Quash the search warrant despite the pendency of a criminal case arising
therefrom before another court, it would give rise to the absurd situation where the judge
hearing the criminal case will be bound by the declaration of of the validity of the search
warrant made by the issuing judge, and the former will thereafter be restrained from
reviewing such finding in view of the doctrine of non-interference observed between courts
of concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. Such a situation will thus make it difficult , if not
impossible, for respondent court to make an independent and objective appreciation of the
evidence and merits of the criminal case. For this reason, the court trying the criminal case
should be allowed to rule on the validity of the search warrant in order to arrive at a
judicious administration of justice.
People v. Woolcock upon which the trial court and the Court of Appeals heavily relied,
appeared to have reverted to Templo v. de la Cruz when this Court said that "the remedy
for questioning the validity of a search warrant can be sought in the court that issued it, not
in the sala of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction." At any rate, the latest jurisprudence
on the matter is People v. Court of Appeals[12] where, as in the present case, the second of
five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals was interpreted. The
subject guideline, cited in the reasoning of the trial court, concerns possible conflicts in the
exercise of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search
warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used
as evidence in the criminal case. We clarified the principle in People v. Court of
Appeals thus x x x x Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a
motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with
the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or
that in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the
other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule
against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is
what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing
court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the
suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is
offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are
involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress
evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping,
a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The
resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court (underscoring supplied).
Conformably therewith, we hold that petitioner's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To
Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu
City.
The second issue raised by petitioner involves factual matters which should be properly
addressed to the trial court. No compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge on a matter
more appropriately within the province of the trial court.[13]
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals which
sustained the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence, as well as its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE. Instead, we rule that the Regional Trial Court of LapuLapu City has jurisdiction to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude
Illegally Seized Evidence; accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, particularly
Branch 54 thereof, or whichever branch the case may be properly assigned therein, is directed
to conduct its proceedings thereon with deliberate dispatch taking into account the time already
lost. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD
SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
DECISION
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the Peoples petition forcertiorari to
invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the Peoples motion for
reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of
Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days
to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was
not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.

1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant
before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in
his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F,
Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr.
Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent
9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the
seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches,
pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags including cash
amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which were
never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the
respondents upon order of the court on respondents motion or request.Included allegedly
are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1)
fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the search warrant are: (a)
three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e)
assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made
without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging
to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to
witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged; ** and on the same date, submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To
Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January
15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on
petition for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises
searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had been
established as contained in the order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to
the Abigails Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building as it is
correspondingly called only Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigails Variety Store to
Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors
used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be
reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly granting the motion to
quash search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration **:

10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent
reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred
to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. The action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division
of the Appellate Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case
for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:[6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the
search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular
inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an
order dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein
petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent to, Abigails Variety
Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to
the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched
-- was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said
SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and not even mentioned
in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who)instead ** directed them to
search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December 15, 1995
-- this, too, being the address given in the Application for Search Warrant dated
December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team
Leader. The untenability of the claim is made more patent by the Peoples admission,
during the hearing of its petition forcertiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was
in truth not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the
motion for reconsideration.[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge
Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996,viz.:[8]
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place
mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger
James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were all
EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and who
were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH
to say in TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the
words KATABI, or KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang
papasukin namin or if they happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN,
they were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS
RESIDE or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the
place they are going to raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place
(herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being
handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in
violation of the law.[9]

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the
warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[10]
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search
warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down inNolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152)
which overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60
SCRA 295).It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued
by one court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch
thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more
substantial than the search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal
case has the right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully
obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil
aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court
of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the
issuing Court and overturning the latters determination of probable cause and
particularity of the place to be searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the
application for warrant despite the clear evidence ** to the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the
tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal
although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to
that rule; and
6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the
warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner
thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was
validly issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually
residing, or more explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for
the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. It claims tha tone of said officers, infact, had been able to surreptitiously enter
the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who
eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to
be searched and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what
objects should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place they had in mind -- the first of
four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what
the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately
described in the search warrant.

The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of the
premises to be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they
wrote down a description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge
reproduced in the search warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And the scope of the
search was made more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the
warrant that the search be limited only to the premises herein described.
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5)
distinct places in the area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety Store, and four (4)
separate and independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure
and are contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a
person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others.Each of the five (5) places is
independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front
door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one
of the residential units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next to the store
(Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of
the store and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge
Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having
received the warrant -- which directs that the search be limited only to the premises herein
described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment units at the
rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have
simply assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated,
according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of
their application -- was sufficient particularization of the general identification of the place in
the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief
of Staff, AFP,[11] allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon
perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case
was for seizure of subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at No. 19. Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82 [b]). Objection was
made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address
(No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive
material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was
obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the Judge had issued two warrants
for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search
warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant
20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be
searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity
caused by the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the warrant could consult
the records in the official court file.[12]
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious typographical
erro involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but
the search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search
warrant. InBurgos, the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on
the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the
warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of

minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge
issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This
should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched -although not that specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this
case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair
game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution
which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched
as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of
choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open
wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant
that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization
of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.
The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge
Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A perusal of the record
however shows that all that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies
between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the
identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. [13] In Judge Casanovas view, said
inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the
determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause
before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the
trouble is, to repeat, that the place described in the search warrant -- which, of course, is the
only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -- was not that which the police
officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually
subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the
warrant. In fine, while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards
Abigails Variety Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 -- the first of the four (4) apartment
units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which the private respondents were
then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: [14]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be serched, and the things to be seized.,
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause,
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe

the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to
the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a
search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily
brought into operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation **
(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought
to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building
housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly
marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had
been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among
others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the
return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which
** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the
remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously
availed of.The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that
the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is
different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument
that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office opines that where a
search warrant has been issued by the court otherthan the one trying the main criminal case, the
proper recourse of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court
and not before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards
filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5) policy guidelines laid down by this Court
in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case. Said second guideline reads: [19]
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal
case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and
shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing
court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in
the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, other they
shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court
and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another
court, it is not the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder
seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time for
the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal action is pending. However,
the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does
so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion
Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines
which indeed is what properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is

pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the
warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search
warrant and a motion to supress evidence are alternative and not cummulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appopriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand,
the criminal action in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch
80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant,
or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly
been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal
action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress
evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in
accordance with which the latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of
September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of
the Orders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in
the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby
AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156413
April 14, 2004
ARIEL C. VALLEJO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION, JUDGE
ISAAC R. DE ALBAN, Regional trial Court, Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, and FRANKLIN M.
JAVIER, NBI Head Agent, Cagayan Valley Regional Office II, Ilagan, Isabela, respondents.

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, to review and reverse the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 24265
dismissing the petitioner's petition as well as its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 denying
the motion to admit petition for certiorari.
Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the province of Isabela. On February 16,
2000, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent, Franklin M. Javier, filed a sworn application
for search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan, Isabela, Branch 16, worded as
follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned HEAD AGENT of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Cagayan Valley Regional Office Ilagan, Isabela hereby requests that a Search Warrant be
issued on the Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the
purpose of seizing the following documents, to wit:
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES, Official Receipts in the Cashier's
Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our Primary Entry Book under no. 496 and other
pertinent documents related therewith;

02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of
the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without the corresponding
payment of Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax.
all of which documents are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony
that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213,
RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office.
This application is founded on a confidential information received by the undersigned, a peace
officer, on information which I have personally investigated and founded as follows: The Office
of the Registry (sic) of Deeds of Isabela is keeping and hiding Fake Land Titles, and
embezzling or stealing from the government thru non-payment of Capital Gains Tax and
Documentary Stamps.
That upon the facts above-stated, I have caused to believe and verily believe that the said
Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds located at the Provincial Capital, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela
and/or in the said Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds the above-described documents are
hidden and kept.2
On the same date, Presiding Judge Isaac R. de Alban issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03
against the petitioner, thusly worded:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath NBI Head Agent
Franklin M. Javier and his witness that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
Falsification of Land Titles under Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A
3019 (Anti-Graft) has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good
and sufficient reasons to believe that the Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibagu,
Ilagan, Isabela has in its possession and control the following:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office,
Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent
documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of
the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding
payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the
premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the above mentioned
documents/subject of the offense and bring to this court said documents and persons to be
dealt with as the law may direct. You are further directed to submit return within 10 days from
today.3
On February 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the search warrant, which the
trial court denied in its Order dated February 29, 2000. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order on the ground that the questioned search warrant was in the
form of a general warrant for failure to describe the persons or things to be seized and was
violative of the Constitution; hence, null and void. The motion was, likewise, denied for lack of
merit.
On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and prayed that the entire record of the
case be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 24265.
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petitioner's
appeal as follows:
The appealed order denying a motion to quash the search warrant is interlocutory and not
appealable. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (c); Rule 50,
Sec. 1 (i) and Sec. 2, 2nd paragraph, in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 18, Revised Rules of
Court).
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner filed a motion to admit petition for certiorari on August 29, 2000 before the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent Franklin M. Javier, for and in behalf of the NBI, filed his comment on the petition
where he alleged his version of the facts as follows:
4.1 On 08 December 1999, the undersigned received a "tip-off" (i.e. from the respondent
himself, ATTY. ARIEL VALLEJO) about the presence of "fixers" who were allegedly submitting
to him fake titles;

4.2 The undersigned together with other operatives of the Cagayan Valley Regional Office
(CAVRO) NBI, Isabela, Ilagan, conducted surveillance and entrapment operations to confirm
the veracity of reported, (sic) As a result thereof, the "fixer" was later apprehended in
"flagrante delicto" and was subjected to investigation together with other employees of the
Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela;
4.3 Thereafter a certain, MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, a clerk assigned at the Register of Deeds of
Isabela, volunteered to provide CAVRO operatives vital information and later on turned
witness considering her knowledge of the "scheme" being used by corrupt employees
assigned at the said office;
4.4. On 16 February 2000, after confirming information relayed to us by witness MS.
REMEDIOS BIRI, the undersigned applied for a search warrant against the Office of the
Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. The respondent presiding Judge HON. ISAAC DE ALBAN of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Isabela, Ilagan finding the existence of "probable cause"
issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03;
4.5 On 16 February 2000, operatives of CAVRO headed by the undersigned served aforecited
search warrant. Found and seized inside the premises of the Register of Deeds if Ilagan,
Isabela were several fake titles/documents; On 2 March 2000, a Return of the search warrant
was made informing the respondent presiding judge of its positive findings; 5
Respondent Javier asserted that contrary to the position of the petitioner, the things to be
seized were particularly described in the questioned warrant. Furthermore, considering the
volume of the documents to be seized, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide the
court with the technical descriptions of all the official receipts and the titles, including the
reference number or mark of the documents. To require such task is to render the application
of the search warrant nil, as no such search warrant could be granted. According to
respondent Javier, there was no way that the court could determine with precision the exact
details of the things to be seized. The law does not require that the things to be seized must
be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities.6 Respondent Javier also posited that the article "Judicial Form No. 39
known as the Primary Entry Book" could not or would not have been mistaken for any other
documents; similarly the "Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawer of every table of
employees of the Register of Deeds" clearly indicates the documents to be seized. 7
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's motion in its Resolution dated November 28,
2002 on the following grounds:
First. We earlier dismissed movant's appeal because it was a wrong choice of remedy to
assail an order denying a motion to quash the search warrant. Movant himself has conceded
that:
"the relief that was resorted to by your appellant from the denial of his motion to quash search
warrant subject of the case was under the imports of an ordinary appeal and that it was not
the proper remedy under the premises."
Second. Movant's petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
purportedly to cure the procedural defect he incurred cannot be countenanced. He admitted
that his petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. The correct dismissal of an appeal
becomes a final judgment of the appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a
copy thereof upon the accused or his counsel.
Third. Movant cannot simultaneously or alternately resort to a petition for review under Rule
45 (ordinary appeal) and/or petition for certiorari under Rule 65 (special civil action). They are
mutually exclusive remedies having different legal grounds for their availment. Thus, the
dismissed appeal cannot be incorporated with movant's petition for certiorari which should
have been first resorted to upon denial of his motion to quash and docketed as a special civil
action (SP).
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit petition for certiorari
are DENIEDfor lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant petition.
The Petitioner's Arguments
The petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in committing the following:
A. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE RESOLUTION
OF THE RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONER'S APPEAL

ON THE RESPONDENT'S REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S

MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT;
B. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER
RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, SEEKING TO CORRECT THE ERROR OF
JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS
THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF THE SAID REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT;
C. FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE ON PETITIONER'S
APPEAL OR CASE, AND BY REASON OF THIS FAILURE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS
SERIOUSLY INJURED AND MADE SUBSERVIENT TO THE TECHNICALITY OF THE
RULES;
D. FAILING TO ACT UPON PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MAKE A
RULING ON THE MATTER OF THE PATENT NULLITY OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT IN ITS EXECUTION
EXTREME PREJUDICE RESULTED AND THAT BY REASON FOR WHICH RELIEF IS
EXTREMELY URGENT;9
According to the petitioner, by its failure to consider the petition on the merits, the Court of
Appeals allowed technicality rather than substantial justice to prevail, considering that the
issue involved is a constitutional right, no less than the right of one to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The petitioner claims that in the implementation of the questioned search warrant, damages of
far reaching implications were sustained not only in the functional operations of the Office of
the Register of Deeds, but also in the business transactions involving lands in the province of
Isabela. According to the petitioner, millions of documents of various nature were seized and
hauled out of the premises of the office by the respondent Javier, which continue to be in the
latter's custody.
The petitioner further asserts that the search warrant issued by the RTC is in the nature of a
general warrant. There was no particularity as to what documents were to be searched and
seized. While the warrant made mention of "fake land titles," there was no mention of which
titles were spurious. The petitioner points out that the Register of Deeds is the repository of all
land titles within the territorial jurisdiction of the province of Isabela, and millions of such titles
are kept thereat. The phrase "undetermined number of land transfer transactions without the
corresponding payment of capital gains tax and payment of documentary stamps" is, likewise,
a dangerous supposition, as there are millions of documents on various land transactions kept
in the registry. Anent the phrase "blank forms of land titles kept inside the drawers of every
table of employees of the Register of Deeds," the petitioner asserts that no conceivable wrong
could have been committed therein, as it was the normal practice for employees to have such
blank forms in hand, in preparation for their issuance after thorough examination of the
propriety of documents submitted in support thereof. However, the petitioner asserts that not
every employee can take hold of such blank forms but only those designated as examiners.
There was no mention in the warrant of the names of the employees who purportedly kept the
blank forms.
According to the petitioner, the warrant was a wanton, sweeping authority for the NBI agents
who raided the Registry Offices and confiscated and seized every document in sight. It was a
"fishing expedition" for the raiding party to obtain any kind of conceivable evidence to support
the offense for which it was applied.
The petitioner also contends that the warrant is patently objectionable for having been issued
despite the fact that the application therefor contained more than one offense, in violation of
Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner concludes that the search warrant in question, being in the nature of a general
warrant, violated the constitutional as well as the statutory requirements for its issuance, and
as such, is null and void.
The Position of the Office of the Solicitor General 10
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, agrees with the petitioner and opines that the
strict application of the rules of procedure should be relaxed in this case.
The OSG also asserts that it cannot sustain the questioned CA Resolutions of September 6,
2000 and November 28, 2002 for the reason that the subject search warrant is a patent nullity.
It submitted the following reasons for such conclusion:

First. The subject search warrant issued by the RTC was not just for one offense, but for at
least three offenses, namely: violation of a) Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
(Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister); b) Article 213 of
the same Code (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses); and, c) Rep. Act No.
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Second. The things to be seized were not particularly described in the search warrant, leaving
the officer of the law with limitless discretion in its implementation on what articles to seize.
Third. From the contents of the search warrant itself, the raiding team could not have
distinguished which of the land titles kept in the custody of the Register of Deeds in Iligan,
Isabela were fake, and which of them were genuine. The warrant did not define the
parameters upon which the fake land titles could be gauged with sufficient clarity and
definiteness, such as distinguishing marks.
Fourth. The issue regarding the validity of a Torrens title is a judicial question.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be granted.
The Court's Ruling
The issues in this case are as follows: a) whether or not the technical rules of procedure may
be relaxed in the case at bar; and, if so b) whether or not the warrant issued by the RTC was
valid.
A Relaxation of Technical Rules
Is Warranted in this Case
According to the OSG, the petitioner's motion to admit petition for certiorari was filed beyond
the sixty-day reglementary period. The petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order
dated February 29, 2000 denying the motion to quash search warrant on March 6, 2000.
Thus, he had only until May 5, 2000 within which to file a petition for certiorari. Realizing that
the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court he earlier filed with the Court of Appeals was
not the proper remedy, the petitioner filed his motion to admit petition for certiorari only on
August 29, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period. However, considering that the
petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the
appellate court should have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure
and yielded to considerations of substantial justice.
We agree. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of
rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be avoided.11 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends
of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more
delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.12
The issue involved in this case is no less than the legality of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.13 It behooved the Court of Appeals to look past rules of technicality and to resolve the
case on its merits, considering that the petitioner therein was invoking a constitutional right.
The appellate court should have, thus, considered the petitioner's appeal under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. Thus, in
dismissing the petitioner's appeal, and, thereafter, the motion to admit petition for certiorari,
the appellate court gravely abused its discretion. Indeed, the court has discretion to dismiss or
not to dismiss an appeal, but such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining
in each case.14
The consequence of our ruling would be for the Court to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve
on its merits CA-G.R. No. 24265 by delving into and resolving the issue raised therein on
whether or not Judge de Alban of the RTC of Isabela, Branch 16, committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Search Warrant No. 2000-03. However, such step would unduly prolong
the resolution of the case. We shall act on the petition, considering that the lone issue raised
is one of law, and an invocation of a constitutional right at that. It is an accepted rule that the
Court may resolve the dispute and serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to
the lower court for further proceedings, if, based on the records, pleadings, and other
evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon.15 We take cognizance of this petition in view
of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 16

The Search Warrant in Question

is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
for Lack of Particularity
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant, viz.:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the foregoing constitutional
and statutory requirements; failure to comply therewith constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 17
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission.18 Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for.19 Any description of the
place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable
certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.20
However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be
seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing
under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion
of the officer executing the warrant.21 Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be
so particularly described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other property.22
A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in question readily shows that it failed to pass this
test of particularity. The questioned warrant directed the peace officers to search and seize
the following in the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds of Isabela:
4. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial
Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents
related therewith;
5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the
Registry of Deeds;
6. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of
Capital Gains Tax and payment of Documentary Stamps.23
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used in the
warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the records pertaining
to all the transactions of the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure.
Such tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the explicit command of the Constitution that
there be a particular description of the things to be seized.24 The executing officer's sole
function is to apply the description to its subject matter, which function may frequently involve
the exercise of limited discretion in identifying the property described. A description of such
generality, however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited discretion as to what
property shall be seized, is repugnant to the Constitution.25 As we held in the early case
of People v. Veloso:26
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory
provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search

warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there
is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading
effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going into the full length
of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.27
The Search Warrant Must
Be Issued for One Specific
Offense
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant28 for having been issued for
more than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213 of the
Revised Penal Code, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense.29 In fact, a careful perusal of the application for the warrant shows that
the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by the petitioner constituting a violation
of any of the aforementioned offenses..
Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having been issued in contravention of
the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and existing jurisprudence. As the
Court, through Justice Concepcion held in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno:30
To uphold the validity of the warrant in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice, or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above-quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. 31
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2000 and
November 28, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The respondent National Bureau of
Investigation is hereby ORDERED to return to the petitioner all items seized from the subject
premises.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104988 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and ATTY. VINCENT A.
ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and Investigations Division, DENR, respondents.
G.R. No. 106424 June 18, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
RI CHUY PO, respondents.
G.R. No. 123784 June 18, 1996
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ATTY. VINCENT A. ROBLES, Chief, Special Actions and
Investigation Division, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
ATTY. NESTOR V. GAPUSAN, TIRSO P. PARIAN, JR., and FELIPE H. CALLORINA,
JR., respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
The first and third case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to
the Second and Third Divisions of the Court, respectively. They were subsequently
consolidated with the second, a case of the Court en banc.

Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila, and with a Lumberyard at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as
such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles
were, during all the time material to these cases, the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the Special Actions and
Investigation Division (SAID) of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and
slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322, loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them
at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. 1 The team was not able to gain
entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. 2
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano
R. Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. 3
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed
to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally
sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the
legitimacy of their source and origin. 4
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and
signed by the owner or his representative. The owner is prohibited from disposing them until
further orders. 5
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of
fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the required documents covering the seized
articles because some of them, particularly the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in
the Province of Quirino Robles denied the motion on the ground that the documents being
required from the petitioner must accompany the lumber or forest products placed under
seizure. 6
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his memorandum-report recommending to Secretary
Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang Lumber,
Inc. for operating an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga
Lumber (a banned specie) without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the Mustang Lumberyard including the truck with Plate
No. CCK-322 and the lumber loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR compound in the event its
owner fails to submit documents showing legitimacy of the source of said lumber within ten
days from date of seizure;
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr.
Ruiz, or if the circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and
shorts if and when recommendation no. 2 pushes through;
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as the lumber loaded
therein for transport lumber using "recycled" documents. 7

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469 and directing the petitioner to explain in
writing within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent another letter to Robles informing the latter
that the petitioner had already secured the required documents and was ready to submit
them. None, however, was submitted. 8
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued another order wherein, after reciting the events
which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with law" the approximately 311,000 board feet
of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and sticks found inside the petitioner's
lumberyard. 9
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order or preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST
CIVIL CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branch 35 of the
said court. The petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any
search and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-322 and its cargo
of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions
with a total value of P38,000.00; and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for
lack of prior notice and hearing and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of
Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR agents went to the
business premises of the petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The
team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit
had already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard
was open, the team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber.
Upon investigation, the team was informed that the lumber loaded on the trailer was to be
delivered to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon the sales invoice covering the
transaction. The members of the team then introduced themselves to the caretaker, one Ms.
Chua, who turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, who was then out of town. The team's photographer was able to take photographs
of the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber
in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by issuing a receipt
therefor. 10
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990 incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition forcertiorari and prohibition. The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branch 24 of the said
court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against the
petitioner's president and general manager, Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed down a resolution 11whose dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft. of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered
by legal documents be released to the rightful owner, Malupa. 12

This resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, who served
as Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging." 13
On the basis of that resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with
Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po with the violation of Section 58 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter,
the CRIMINAL CASE). The accusatory portion of the information reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully have in his possession truckloads of almaciga and
lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including
almaciga and supa, without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 14
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila rendered its decision 15 in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering the confiscation in favor of the Government the approximately
311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the Lumberyard of the petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is hereby set aside and vacated, and
instead the respondents are required to report and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said 311,000
board feet of Lauan, supa and almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be dealt with as
directed by Law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate and prosecute the appropriate action before the
proper court regarding the Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions
Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
judgment;.
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that the Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, shorts and
sticks mentioned above in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be returned to said petitioner
is withheld in this case until after the proper court has taken cognizance and determined how
those Lumber, shorts and sticks should be disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1
April 1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that
search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the
settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle. 16 As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and
lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure
was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the
search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even
question. 17 And, although the search warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa,
and lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid because it is settled that the executing
officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during the conduct of the
search. 18
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the Government for the reason that since the

articles were seized pursuant to the search warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio they
should have been returned to him in compliance with the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that
the same had been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the petitioner's lumber
dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or
to Suspend Proceedings based on the following grounds: (a) the information does not charge
an offense, for possession oflumber, as opposed to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even grantingarguendo that lumber falls within the purview of
the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were taken by
virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of
Manila, the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the Court of Appeals, which involves the
legality of the seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 19
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and possession thereof without the required legal documents is penalized
therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, for the
definitions of timber and lumber, and then argued that exclusion of lumber from Section 68
would defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest resources. 20
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL CASE, 21 respondent Judge Teresita DizonCapulong granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal documents required by forest laws and regulations is
not a crime. 22
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in the order of 18 October 1991, 23 the
People filed a petition forcertiorari with this Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends that
the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash
and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 24 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings on the issues raised. As to the claim that the
truck was not carrying contraband articles since there is no law punishing the possession
oflumber, and that lumber is not timber whose possession without the required legal
documents is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the commercial nature of the forest product involved has
always been foisted by those who claim to be engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is that when appellant was required to present
the valid documents showing its acquisition and lawful possession of the lumber in question, it
failed to present any despite the period of extension granted to it. 25
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution of 3 March 1992. 26 Hence, the petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which was filed on 2 May 1992. 27
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of Manila handed down a decision in the
SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the
petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and
(d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal
as CA-G.R. SP No.33778.
In its decision 28 of 31 July 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CAG.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained the grounds relied upon by the trial court in

dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on the definition of "lumber" by Webster, viz.,
"timber or logs, especially after being prepared for the market," and by the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or adapted for various
building purposes," the respondent Court held that since wood is included in the definition
of forest product in Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended, lumber is necessarily included
in Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a forest officer or employee can seize the forest
product involved in a violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in part as follows:
Sec. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions. -- A forest officer or employee of the Bureau or
any personnel of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall arrest even
without warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products or possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in the
resolution of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this Court on 27 February 1996 a
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting with G.R. No. 106424 with which the other
two were consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the
ground that it does not charge an offense. Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion reasoning that the subject matter of the information in the CRIMINAL CASE is
LUMBER, which is neither "timber" nor "other forest product" under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and hence, possession thereof without the required legal documents is not
prohibited and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, an information may be
quashed on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense. It has been
said that "the test for the correctness of this ground is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the
offense, 29 and matters aliunde will not be considered." Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information
state the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.

Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and
(b) possession of timber forest products without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this
omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber from the section's coverage, do the facts averred
in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion that lumber is
not solely its subject matter. It is evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in the
possession of the private respondent, without the required legal documents, are truckloads of
(1) almaciga and lauan; and
(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga
and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber."
They cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because they are separated by the words
"approximately 200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and not with the preposition "of."
They must then be raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers under Section 3(q) of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, which reads:
Sec. 3. Definitions. -xxx xxx xxx
(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest plant, the associated water, fish game, scenic, historical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the items covered by the information. The public and
the private respondents obviously miscomprehended the averments in the information.
Accordingly, even if lumber is not included in Section 68, the other items therein as noted
above fall within the ambit of the said section, and as to them, the information validly charges
an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in his dissenting opinion that this
Court go beyond the four corners of the information for enlightenment as to whether the
information exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the pleadings and the annexes
thereto, he arrives at the conclusion that "only lumber has been envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view. First, his proposition violates the rule that only
the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the law violated must be considered in
determining whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On
the contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of
the annexes he referred to, 30 cannot lead one to infer that what the team seized was
all lumber. Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team found approximately four (4) truckloads ofnarra
shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the resolution 31 of the investigating prosecutor,
which served as the basis for the filing of the information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of
almaciga and supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 63 of PD
705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents
is not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that such possession is penalized in the said
section because lumber is included in the term timber.

The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former
is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for
the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallbond,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly,
the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs
after being prepared for the market."32 Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in
a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. 33 And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should
we. Ubi lex non distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash the information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The petitioner has miserably failed to show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents. The seizure of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the
power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by
P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the
FIRST CIVIL CASE, the search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be
lawfully conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate 34 that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant
issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other
exceptions are (3) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search. 35
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at
any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one
day, the same may be continued the following day or days until completed. Thus, when the
search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under the same
warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period. 36
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified therein nor included in the term forest product, the
same hardly merits further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the petition in this case palpally fail to shaw prima
facie that a reversible error has been committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged
decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We
must, forthwith, deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need to require the respondents to
comment on the petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial
court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner never disputed the fact that its lumber-

dealer's license or permit had been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The
suspension was never lifted, and since the license had only a lifetime of up to 25 September
1990, the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess, sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber.
Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative had the authority to seize the
Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended, which provides as follows:
Sec. 68-A Administrative Authority of the Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned. . . .
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail
view of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue
is totally irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which involves administrative seizure as a
consequence of the violation of the suspension of the petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended.
They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the
decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public in light of the urgent need to
take firm and decisive action against despoilers of our forests whose continuous destruction
only ensures to the generations to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the
environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to violate our laws for
the utilization and protection of our forests.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991 and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po"; (c) REINSTATING the information in the said
criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her successor to hear and decide
the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 on the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112659

January 24, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI (at large), accused. FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI, YAMBA
LISASI BHOLA, and ZARIATU AMIDU, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On June 7, 1993, appellants FATI OMOGBOLAHAN Y ALABI,1 YAMBA LISASI BHOLA,2 and
ZARIATU AMIDU3pleaded not guilty to the charge of Violation of Section 4, Article II, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 64254 embodied in an Information, dated April 2, 1993, as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
That on or about the 31st of March, 1993 and sometime prior thereto in Manila and other
parts of Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, deliver, give away, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport 8,225.31 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, and/or act as
brokers in any of the aforesaid transactions with or without consideration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
A fourth accused, Thai national SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI, escaped from the Pasay City Jail
before the arraignment. He remains at large.5
The evidence of the prosecution establish that in the early afternoon of May 31, 1993,
accused Leangsiri was arrested at the arrival area of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the country 8,225.31 grams of heroin6 hidden under
the false bottom of a black suitcase.7 He informed the authorities that he was to deliver the
contraband to three (3) people8 at the Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.9
Leangsiri was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old
MIA for further investigation. 10 The head of the command, MAJOR ALBINO SABLAYAN,
formed a team, headed by SR. INSP. ADOLFO SAMALA, 11 to conduct follow-up operations in
the case. 12 The team and agents of the Bureau of Customs proceeded to the Las Palmas
Hotel, 13 where they allowed Leangsiri to check into Room 504 with the confiscated black
suitcase containing the heroin. 14
At around eight o'clock in the evening, two hours after checking in, Leangsiri received a
telephone call from his contact. Leangsiri was told that the black suitcase would be picked up
at about ten o'clock that night. 15 He relayed the information to his escorts, NARCOM agents
SPO3 FABIAN GAPIANGAO 16 and SPO4 ELPIDIO BALNEG. 17 Thereupon, the two

NARCOM agents positioned themselves inside the washroom, with its door opened a fraction
to give them visual access to the rest of the hotel room. 18
On the ground floor and outside perimeters of the Las Palmas hotel, Samala and other
NARCOM and Bureau of Customs agents were watching for unusual and suspicious
events. 19 From where he sat at the hotel's coffee shop, Samala noticed appellant Amidu
paced around the lobby for nearly an hour.20 At about ten p.m., Amidu's co-appellants,
Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the hotel. 21 As Amidu flashed a "thumbs up" sign to them,
they all headed for the elevator and went up to the fifth floor of the hotel. 22
They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri stood up from the bed in which he
sat, 23 opened the door, and let the three appellants in. 24 Leangsiri took the black
suitcase 25 and brought it to the dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view of
NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg. Leangsiri opened the suitcase and displayed its
contents to his visitors. 26
Appellants briefly examined the black suitcase and two (2) transparent plastic bags which
contained the heroin. 27After the examination, Leangsiri closed the suitcase and handed it
over to appellants. 28 Appellants started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when
Gapiangao and Balneg barged out of the washroom, identified themselves as NARCOM
agents, and made the arrest. 29
Minutes later, Samala and his companions joined Gapiangao, Balneg, and the four foreigners
in Room 504. 30Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola identified themselves by presenting their
respective passports. Appellant Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in
Room 413 of the same hotel. 31 Further questioning of appellants revealed that Omogbolahan
and Bhola were billeted at the Royal Palm Hotel, also located in Manila. 32
Accompanied by the hotel's owner and security officer, Samala searched appellant Amidu's
room. Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with
the name "SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI" written on it. 33 The paper and Amidu's other possessions
were confiscated. 34
The NARCOM and Customs teams then proceeded to the Royal Palm Hotel where appellants
Omogbolahan and Bhola were billeted. The agents coordinated with the security officers of
the hotel, who stood as witnesses when the former entered and searched said appellants'
room. Their efforts yielded two black suitcases each with false bottoms and both smaller than
that confiscated from Leangsiri. 35 Masking tape and an empty transparent bag were also
found in the room. 36
Appellants denied any involvement in the transport of heroin by Leangsiri. They told a different
tale. 37
Appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola were staying at Royal Palm Hotel. On that fateful night of
March 31, 1993, they went to the Las Palmas Hotel to meet co-appellant Amidu and an
American named David. When they got to the fourth floor of the hotel, and as they made their
way to Room 413 (Amidu's room), they were accosted by some people who forcibly brought
them to Room 504. They explained that they were at the hotel to meet Amidu. Some of those
who intercepted them left the room and returned with Amidu. Appellants' money and jewelry
were taken from them. Those who dispossesed them turned out to be policemen.
Appellants were driven to the Royal Palm Hotel. Only one of the policemen entered its
premises as appellants and the others remained in the car. Afterwards, appellants were
brought to NARCOM headquarters. Together with Leangsiri, they were presented to the
media as members of an international drug syndicate.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of conspiring to
transport heroin in violation of Section 4, R.A. 6425. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
xxx
xxx
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, finding all the accused
(herein appellants ) FATI OMOGBOLAHAN y ALABI, YAMBA LISASI BHOLA and ZARIATU
AMIDU, "guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime described in the Information, and

hereby sentences them to suffer a penalty of "life imprisonment" plus a fine of P30,000 for
each of (them).
The case as against accused Suchinda Leangsiri is hereby ordered archived.
The "Heroin" of about 8,225.31 kgs. is hereby ordered destroyed in the manner provided by
law.
SO ORDERED.
On September 9, 1993, appellants filed a motion for new trial grounded on the following I. THAT ERRORS OF LAW OR IRREGULARITIES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED DURING THE
TRIAL PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF HEREIN ACCUSED (HEREIN
APPELLANTS);
II. THAT NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DISCOVERED WHICH THE
ACCUSED (APPELLANTS) COULD NOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE HAVE
DISCOVERED AND PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL, AND WHICH IF INTRODUCED AND
ADMITTED, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE THE JUDGMENT.
The purported new and material evidence consists of the testimony of a certain Julita Thach
Camerino, a Thai citizen, who narrated in her affidavit:
1. That (she) is at present a detention prisoner at the Manila City Jail, Old Bilibid Prison
Compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
2. That on or about 11:00 o'clock in the morning of 31 August 1993, (she) noticed the arrival of
inmates (appellants) into (the prison) compound, and (Amidu) was still crying;
3. That after a few minutes, Zariatu Amidu started banging her head against the concrete wall,
but after a few attempts she was prevailed upon to stop by another woman;
4. That (she) inquired from some of the inmates the reason why Zariatu Amidu was behaving
that way, and found out that she and the two other male detainees were just sentenced by the
Court of very severe penalty of life imprisonment;
5. That (she) pitied (appellants) of the fate that befell them and (her) conscience rebelled and
started tormenting (her) since (she) knows that they are innocent of the crime charged against
them of transporting heroin into the country;
6. That (her) conscience compelled (her) to approach them and voluntarily offered (her) help,
if it is still possible under the situation, whatever assistance (she) could extend to let justice
prevail and reveal the truth out of that incident on the evening of 31 March 1993, at Las
Palmas Hotel, because (she) was with the police at the NAIA, acting as an interpreter
between Suchinda Leangsiri and the police when the former was being interrogated at the
NARCOM Headquarters at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in the afternoon of
31 March 1993, and into the evening of said date at Las Palmas Hotel;
7. That in the process of (her) questioning of Leangsiri, the latter revealed to (them) that he
was going to deliver his stuff of heroin to someone at Las Palmas Hotel but did not identify the
person whom he was going to meet at the hotel nor mention the name/s of the same;
8. That on or about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 31 March 1993, (she), Suchinda Leangsiri,
and the police team arrived at Las Palmas Hotel wherein (she) and Leangsiri were instructed
to proceed to the desk counter and check-in, and got Room 504 to occupy;
9. That (she), Suchinda Leangsiri and a police officer whom (she) knew as Emil went to Room
504 to await for someone who would allegedly pick up the stuff of heroin but the claim or
testimony that SP03 Gapiangao and SP04 Balneg were also inside Room 504 together with
Suchinda Leangsiri is absolutely false;
10. That at around 9:30 that evening, the police brought inside Room 504 two black males
whom (she) later knew as Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati Omogbolahan Alabi;
11. That while inside Room 504, (she) heard the two, Yamba Lisasi Bhola and Fati
Omogbolahan Alabi, protesting and complaining to the police why they were brought inside
Room 504;
12. That the two further explained to the police that they were about to visit a lady friend
billeted at Room 413 of the same hotel;
13. That after hearing that information, (she) was requested by Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz to go with
him, and (they) immediately went inside Room 413 and forcibly brought Zariatu Amidu to
Room 504 to join with the two male black nationals already inside;

14. That afterwards, (they) brought (appellants) in the vicinity of Royal Palm Hotel, where
(they) search the room of the two black males and found no prohibited drugs;
15. That from Royal Palm Hotel, (they) went back to NARCOM Headquarters at NAIA, where
(she) divested the three black nationals of their cash and pieces of jewelry, and turn them over
to Sr. Insp. Dela Cruz for safekeeping;
16. That (she is) am going to state further the other details and related matters in court during
my testimony in the trial of the case against (appellants);
xxx
xxx
xxx38
The trial court denied the motion, ratiocinating thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court reviewed the records of the case, the transcript of stenographic notes, and the
pertinent laws and jurisprudence, and the Court finds, and so holds, that the findings and
conclusions regarding the guilt of the herein accused (appellants), as well as the sufficiency of
the evidence against them, are amply supported by the evidence, and the present motion did
not ventilate any new matter as to warrant the said findings to be disturbed and/or set aside.
With respect to the alleged newly discovered evidence, the Court disagrees with the stance
taken by the accused (appellants) on this point. The testimony of Julita Thach Camerino could
not be considered newly discovered, as said person was brought to the premises of the Court
for identification during the trial of this case. Besides, her testimony, summarized in the
undated Affidavit submitted by the accused (appellants) on September 24, 1993, does not
inspire confidence, considering that this witness was convicted by this Court for violation of
the dangerous drugs law, as amended.
xxx
xxx
xxx39
Appellants now impugn the trial court's decision and its denial of their motion for new trial, and
raise the following assignments of error:
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE EXISTENCE OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN AND AMONG THE ACCUSED;
II. THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO INTRODUCE DIRECT AND/OR
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CREDIBLE
TESTIMONIES AND OTHER SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE THREE
ACCUSED.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CONFLICTING
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION AND OTHER EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE
ACCUSED;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.40
We affirm appellants' conviction for reasons we shall discuss in seriatim.
One. We hold that the trial court correctly found that appellants conspired with Leangsiri to
transport eight-and-a-half kilos of heroin.
Appellants submit a two-pronged argument assailing the finding of conspiracy. The first prong
urges that there is neither direct nor circumstantial evidence linking them to the transport of
heroin by Leangsiri. The second prong posits that only Leangsiri's testimony can prove their
alleged conspiracy. The running fault in appellants' line of reasoning is obvious to the eye.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 41 It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence
that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence. 42 Proof of previous agreement to
commit the crime is not also essential to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during, and after the commission of the
crime can show its existence. In a host of cases, we have upheld the finding of conspiracy
where it is shown that the accused acted in concert to attain the same objective.
In the case at bar, the positive testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Gapiangao, Balneg, and Samala established the concerted acts of appellants
aimed at carrying out the unlawful design of transporting the heroin confiscated from
Leangsiri. when Leangsiri was interrogated after his arrest, he revealed to the authorities that

he was to deliver the contraband to three (3) people at the Las Palmas Hotel. Later, while in
Room 504 of said hotel, Leangsiri received a telephone call in the presence of Gapiangao and
Balneg, by which he was informed that the heroin would be picked up from him at ten o'clock
in the evening. Shortly before the designated pick-up time, Samala saw appellant Amidu (who
had been waiting in the lobby of the hotel for almost an hour) flash a "thumbs up" sign to
appellants Omogbolahan and Bhola when they arrived at the hotel. The three (3) appellants
then took the elevator and went up to the fifth floor. They knocked on the door of Room 504,
and Leangsiri let them into the room. In full view of Gapiangao and Balneg, appellants
examined Leangsiri's heroin, and took it and the suitcase with the false bottom in which it was
hidden. Appellants were on their way out of the room with the suitcase and heroin when they
were arrested by Gapiangao and Balneg. These facts show beyond doubt that appellants
conspired with Leangsiri to transport the illegal drug heroin.
Two. We also hold that there was delivery of the heroin under Section 4 of R.A. 6425, from
Leangsiri to appellants even though Leangsiri and the heroin were already under the control
of the NARCOM on the evening of March 31, 1993. Too far out from the fringes of reason is
appellants' argument that since the NARCOM agents had already taken Leangsiri and the
heroin into their custody and control, it is the NARCOM agents who should be liable for
transporting the said heroin confiscated from Leangsiri.
Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 provides, inter alia:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. . . .(Emphasis supplied)
The proviso applies to the NARCOM agents in the case at bar. In bringing Leangsiri and the
heroin to Las Palmas Hotel, the NARCOM agents were performing a lawful act in furtherance
of their follow-up operations. They went to the hotel to apprehend appellants to whom delivery
of the illegal drug was to be made.
Appellants also argue that, even assuming arguendo, they were caught in possession of the
heroin, they cannot be held liable under Section 4 of R.A. 6425 because they were neither
delivering nor transporting the drug. They postulate that said provision does not penalize the
recipient of the delivered contraband. 43
The same argument was raised and rejected by this Court in People vs. Lo Ho Wing. 44 In Lo
Hong Wing, the authorities gathered from their intelligence and surveillance activities that the
accused were going to bring illegal drugs (shabu) into the country. The accused were arrested
while on-board a taxi cab which they hailed and boarded at the NAIA. In rejecting the defense
argument that there was no delivery, transporting or dispatching of shabu made by the
accused therein, we held:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The information charged the accused of delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six (56)
tea bags containing metamphetamine, a regulated drug. The conjunction "or" was used,
thereby implying that the accused were being charged of the three specified acts in the
alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted of "delivery" because the term
connotes a source and a recipient, the latter being absent under the facts of the case. It is
also argued that "dispatching" cannot apply either since appellant never sent off or disposed
of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant contends that he cannot also be held liable therefor
because the act of transporting necessarily requires a point of destination, which again is nonexistent under the given facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the meaning of the operative acts of which
appellant and his co-accused were charged in relation to the facts of the case. There is no
doubt that law enforcers caught appellant and his co-accused in flagrante delicto of
transporting a prohibited drug. The term "transport" is defined as "to carry or convey from one
place to another." The operative words in the definition are "to carry or convey." The fact that
there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding that the act of transporting was

committed. It is immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached. Furthermore,

the argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical conclusion that he and his co-accused did
not intend to bring the metamphetamine anywhere, i.e., they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where the transport of a prohibited drug was
interrupted by the search and arrest of the accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an act
had already been commenced. Otherwise, there would be nothing to interrupt.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the case at bar, appellants were on their way out of Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel
carrying the suitcase with a false bottom containing 8.5 kilos of heroin when they were
arrested by the NARCOM agents. At that point, they were in the act of conveying the heroin to
an unknown destination. Their act was part of the process of transporting the heroin. They
were all involved in a conspiracy. The act of Leangsiri in transporting the heroin is appellants'
act. They cannot isolate and separate themselves from Leangsiri, for in conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.
Three. We further rule that the heroin (Exhs. "C" and its sub-exhibits) and the suitcase with
false bottom (Exh. "F") are admissible against appellants.
It is inaccurate for appellants to claim that these evidentiary exhibits were formally offered only
against Leangsiri. They were also offered against them. As correctly noted by the Solicitor
General in his Brief:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The records show that on July 2, 1993, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuo and
State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu formally offered Exhibits "A" to "Q" and their submarkings
against Leangsiri, (Omogbolahan), Bhola and Amidu (Original Records, pp. 67-71). . . .45
Four. We now come to the argument of appellants that the piece of paper found in Amidu's
hotel room, with the name "SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI" written on it, 46 should not have been
admitted by the trial court.
The Revised Rules of Court provide that "(a) person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. 47 We interpreted this provision in Nolasco
vs. Pao, 48 thus:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided . . . that is to
absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person
at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously
cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
We then held that the warrantless search made by the authorities on the accused's apartment
which was located a few blocks away from where she was arrested was illegal for being "an
untenable violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right and guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures."
Nolasco, however, has undergone some mutations. In subsequent cases, we validated
warrantless searches madenot only on the person of the suspect but also in a permissible
area within his reach. 49 We ruled that the reach of a valid warrantless search goes beyond
the person of the one arrested and includes the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. 50 The immediate control test was enunciated in the American case
of Chimel vs.State of California. 51 In that case, defendant was arrested in his home for
burglary of a coin shop. Afterwards, the arresting officers conducted a search of his entire
three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, a small workshop, and drawers. Various
items - primarily coins - were found through the search, and were admitted in evidence
against him by the trial court, which convicted him of burglary. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the conviction as it struck down the warrantless search on the ground that the
search of the accused's home went far beyond his person and the area from within which he
might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence
against him.

The inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest

outside the suspect's person and the premises under his immediate control admits of an
exception. The exception obtains when thePlain View Doctrine applies as explained in People
vs. Musa, 52 in this wise:
. . . Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California, police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information
that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the
building manager a passkey to defendant's apartment, and entered it. There they found the
defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one
of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, as
small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green
leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the
package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it
was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing
the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not
constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view." . . .
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the
basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of
the prosecution's evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not, searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. . . . Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following limitations on the application of the doctrine.
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification - whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused - and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece
of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of
the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidu's telephone and
address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing
Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of
this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the
prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining evidence still established their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Five. We uphold the calibration of the credibility of witnesses made by the court a quo. The
trial court judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses first-hand, and
his findings are entitled to great weight.
The inconsistencies in Gapiangao's, Balneg's, and Samala's testimonies alluded to by
appellants hardly relate to the material parts of their testimonies which sufficiently proved the
elements of the crime at bar. It is a well-entrenched rule of evidence that corroborative
testimonies, in order to be credible, need not coincide on all aspects. Given the natural
limitations of the human senses, the immaterial and slight discrepancies in the testimonies of

witnesses, far from weakening their probative value, serve to strengthen their credibility.
Imperfect senses cannot be the source of perfect testimonies. 53
Neither is the credibility of the prosecution witnesses crumpled by the fact that the testimonies
of some prosecution witnesses during the trial were not exactly and totally reflected in their
Joint Affidavit, dated April 1, 1993. 54 We have held before that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in
his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to
afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. . . .55
In checkered contrast, the testimonies of appellants are incongruous with reality. The story
proffered by appellant Omogbolahan, for instance, is too obviously melodramatic and
incredible to be believed. His story begins in February, 1992, with his wife and two children
being killed in a civil war in his native land of Liberia. Distraught, he decided to migrate to the
United States of America. 56 He first flew to Thailand, where he stayed for six months without
managing to learn a single Thai word. 57 Despite his language inadequacy, he was able to
land a job in a cargo company in that country. He did not befriend any Thai national. Neither
did he apply for an American visa in Thailand. 58
He then heard from two co-Liberians named Jabar and Samsi that it was easy to obtain an
American visa from the United States embassy in the Philippines. Omogbolahan flew from
Thailand to our country. He stepped on Philippine soil on March 16, 1993, only to learn that
Jabar and Samsi had long left the country. 59 Instead of going to the United States embassy at
Roxas Boulevard or any of the many travel agencies doing business in the country, he spent
his first two weeks here making the rounds of bars and clubs in the Ermita area, hoping to
meet fellow Africans and American citizens who could help him obtain an American visa. In
this clubs, he allegedly befriended his co-appellant Bhola 60 and an American named David
whom he was supposed to meet on the fateful night of March 31, 1993. Omogbolahan soon
moved in with Bhola at the Royal Palm Hotel, and David promised to help him obtain his
American passport. 61
Omogbolahan's a story is clearly a fabrication designed to provide him with a convenient
defense and to elicit sympathy from the courts. The testimonies of his co-appellants are
equally incredulous. They are also tattered with inconsistencies. As observed by the Solicitor
General, they could not even get their occupations straight, viz.:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Appellant Zariatu Amidu is a native of Ghana, Africa, 38 years old at the time she testified, a
widow and as shown in her passport, a seamstress by occupation. However, in her testimony;
she stated that she is a plain housewife, (tsn July 21, 1993, pp. 4 and 27)
On the other hand, appellant Yamba Lisasi Bhola is a native of Kinshasha, Zaire, Central
Africa, 37 years old at the time he testified, married and a high school graduate. . . . In his
testimony, he stated that he is a trader . . . Later on, he stated that he was working for the
New Star Investment in Thailand as marketing officer.62 (tsn July 16, 1993, p. 23)
Lastly, Fati Omogbolahan Alabi was 27 years old at the time he testified and an elementary
graduate and plumber according to his passport. In his testimony, however, he claimed to be
a technician.63 (tsn July 13, 1993 p. 4).
Six. We finally hold that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
appellants' motion for new trial.
We find appellants' first argument in moving for a new trial as baseless. As discussed above,
the purported errors and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against the
substantive rights of appellants do not exist.
Appellants' second argument as to the necessity of a new trial is likewise unmeritorious.
Section 1 Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court grants an aggrieved party the right to move
for new trial on the ground, among others, of "(n)ewly discovered evidence, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at the trial, and which if
presented would probably alter the result (thereof)." 64 Newly discovered evidence, in order to

warrant a new trial, must meet three requirements, viz: (1) it must have been discovered after
trial; (2) it could not have been discovered and produced at the trial despite reasonable
diligence; and (3) if presented, it would probably alter the results of the action. 65
In the case at bar, appellants were unable to prove that, even with the use of reasonable
diligence, they could not have obtained Camerino's testimony during the trial. On the contrary,
as correctly noted by the trial court, Camerino was identified in open court by appellant Bhola
on July 26, 1993.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that Camerino's prospective testimony would acquit appellants.
Firstly, her affidavit embodies a narration of events almost identical to that presented by
appellants. As has been discussed earlier, the defense version of what occurred on the
evening of March 31, 1993 is incredible and difficult to believe. Secondly, Camerino's claim
that she was a member of the team that arrested appellants is belied by the testimony of
prosecution witness Samala on rebuttal, viz:
xxx
xxx
xxx
STATE PROS.:
One Julita Camerino appeared before this Honorable Court and accused through counsel
claim she was a member of the team which arrested the three Africans now the accused in
this case. What can you say to that?
A:
I don't know that person, sir.
Q:
Were there instances or occasions before the date of March 31, 1993 when you met
this Julita Camerino?
A:
I don't know, sir.
Q:
You don't recall any?
A:
I don't recall any, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Court:
Cross?
ATTY. BORJA:
Capt. Samala, is it not a fact that Julita Camerino served as your interpreter during the
custodial investigation after the arrest of the Thai National in the person of Suchinda
Leangsiri?
A:
No, sir.
ATTY. BORJA:
She was not there at any moment from March 31 to April 1, 1993 at the police headquarters
or at the Las Palmas Hotel?
A:
I don't know that person, sir. 66
Her credibility is also questionable considering the fact that she herself has been previously
convicted of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated August 31, 1993, and the Order, dated October 11,
1993, of the RTC of Manila, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 93-118913 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP),petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT
COMMAND, respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct
the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer,
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in
its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of
Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear
for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of
the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on
several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car
subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority
to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been
harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their

routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against
unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People's Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners
who do not allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as
real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is
purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful
search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light
therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the
government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units,"
not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and
violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought
about by deteriorating economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly
consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is howeverreasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in
uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily
lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military
manning the checkpoints was ordered by the National Capital Regional Command Chief and
the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87367 February 19, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER ALFONSO y ABLAZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leoncio L. Alangdeo for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is the task of the prosecution in every criminal action to prove that the accused is guilty. It is
not for the accused to prove that he is innocent. In the case at bar, the accused virtually
collaborated with the prosecution. By his own words, no less than by the evidence of the
People, he pronounced his own conviction.
The charge against him was violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for transporting and
carrying marijuana, committed on September 2, 1988, in the Province of Benguet. 1
Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution namely, PO1 Arturo Ellazar and Capt.
Valentino Gaerlan. Ellazar testified that at about noon of the afore-mentioned date, he and his
team-mates from the Narcotics Command were manning a checkpoint they had established
along the national highway at Acop, in the municipality of Tublay of the said province. Their
purpose was to ferret out drug traffickers reported to be coming from the Mountain Province.
As they were inspecting each approaching vehicle, they noticed the herein accused, whom
they subsequently identified as Peter Alfonso, sneak out from the back of a truck and start
scampering. Suspicious, Ellazar gave chase and called Alfonso to stop. Instead, the fleeing
man kept running, pausing briefly only to throw the bag he was carrying at his pursuer. Ellazar
stopped to pick up its scattered contents and directed M/Sgt. Rogelio Raguine to continue the
pursuit. Raguine finally caught his quarry after Alfonse jumped into asayote plantation in a
ravine below the road. The suspect was taken to the NARCOM headquarters for
investigation. 2 The eight bundles of dried leaves with flowering tops which had spilled out of
Alfonso's bag were taken to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination. They were found by
Capt. Gaerlan, forensic chemist, to be positive for marijuana. 3
Alfonso had a different story to tell. He said that on September 1, 1988, he had gone to his
uncle in the Mountain Province to borrow P20,000.00. He claimed he wanted to buy a lot
worth P50,000.00 but he had only P30,000.00. He got the loan the following day and at about
noon started to look for transportation to take him to Baguio City. While waiting, he was
approached by Maria Codasa, a townmate of his, who handed him a multi-colored bag and
requested him to deliver it to her son, who would be waiting at the Dangwa Station Canteen in
Baguio City. Alfonso agreed. A truck loaded with vegetables arrived and, as he knew there

were no more regular buses coming at that time, he hitched a ride at the back. When they
reached Acop, he saw long-haired men in civilian clothes stopping every vehicle and he
became worried about the P20,000.00 he was carrying, thinking the men might be holduppers. So he surreptitiously alighted from the truck and, leaving the multi-colored bag on the
side of the road, started running. Some men began chasing him. He did not stop even as he
heard several shots and finally he dived for cover into a sayote plantation. Here he wrapped
his money and buried it, taking care to mark the place with a stick. When he heard his
pursuers identifying themselves as soldiers, he came out and gave himself up. 4 At NARCOM
headquarters, he was visited by his wife and his brother-in-law, Roy Agtulao, whom he
directed to the place where he buried the money. Agtulao later testified that he found the
buried money in the place Alfonso had indicated. 5 Abellon Olsim, Alfonso's uncle, affirmed
that he did lend his nephew P20,000.00 on September 2, 1988. 6
The trouble with Alfonso's story is that it is unbelievable. Worse, he told it in a manner that
failed to convince the trial judge, 7 who felt that the accused "was not telling the truth," had
"that shifty look," and "could not even look straight in the eyes of the Presiding Judge when
probed for details." Even the testimonies of the corroborating witnesses "were perfectly
matched" and obviously part of a "well rehearsed plan."
The rule is to accord much weight to the impressions of the trial judge, who has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses directly and to test their credibility by their demeanor on
the stand. By such observation, he is able to ascertain whether they are honoring their oath or
lying in their teeth and to base his factual findings on this appraisal. In the absence of a
showing that such conclusion are far-fetched or arbitrary, they are judiciously accepted on
appeal and even considered conclusive on the reviewing court.
In the case at bar, the very substance of the defense evidence supports the case of the
prosecution. Or perhaps we should say the very lack of substance. The Court finds Alfonso's
testimony a wild tale, indeed, that only emphasizes and affirms his guilt.
Given the evidence that had established a formidable case against him, Alfonso should have
exerted more efforts to shift the burden of evidence back to the prosecution. Indeed, he
offered a likely story that he failed to substantiate. He gave no details of the lot he said he was
purchasing, not even its location or owner. Maria Codasa, who he said had given him the bag,
disappeared completely although he claimed she was his townmate. Asked to deliver the bag,
he did not even bother to check its contents, as he could easily have done because it was
open (the bundles of marijuana spilled out when he hurled it at Ellazar). He said he was afraid
that the long-haired civilians were robbers, but they were in fact wearing military
uniforms 8 and he could not have mistaken that the vehicles were being stopped at a
checkpoint. The fact that he sneaked out and ran which he does not deny plainly shows
he had something to hide, and it was not the money he was supposed to be carrying but the
marijuana.
The defense now contends that the marijuana should not have been admitted in evidence
against Alfonso because it was illegally seized after an invalid warrantless search. The
argument is groundless. In fact, there was no search at all as Ellazar picked up the marijuana
bundles after Alfonso himself had left or scattered them on the road. When he was
apprehended in the sayote plantation, Alfonso no longer had the marijuana bundles on him.
There was no need to search him and no seizure of any article was made from him.
At that, even if it were assumed that there was, indeed, a search or seizure, it would still have
been lawful even without a warrant because the NARCOM agents simply stumbled upon the
marijuana bundles, which were "open to eye and hand" on the road. Seizure of the articles in
such circumstances was valid even if made without a warrant.9
The Court is satisfied that the prosecution, with the unwitting aid of the defense, curiously
enough, has established the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He
must therefore suffer the penalty imposed upon him for the serious crime of poisoning the
health and future of the nation.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against the accused-appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31,
1990, 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of
selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana
leaves, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of
the 9th Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th
Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust
operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist
of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the
prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga,
leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City,
instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari
Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM
agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of
Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer
had also described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one
newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM
office and turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt.
Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani
was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN
GA955883) by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun,
Chief of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The
team under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was
arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the
marijuana. The two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles.
Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer,
Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the
NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari
Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa
from where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani

what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked
money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and
gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani
walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams,
riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned
to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house:
Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to
be Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's
house, the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house.
Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari
Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the
money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest
and brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa
gave his true name Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaperwrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought
at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt.
Lego inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for
laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory
was by way of a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped
"RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined
the marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she
examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the
results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989,
(Exh. "J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two
newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written
with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaperwrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh.
"E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial,
the words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and
"D"). Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh.
"L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC
Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC
Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa;
and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at
Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year
old child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that
afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of
their house, putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves
as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door
was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply
announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's
house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were

just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he
did not know. He also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was
living with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away.
Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told
him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian,
Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM
agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was interpreted
to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and
Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not
belong to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of
counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his
fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa
lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the
NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it
was on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents.
The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single
question, Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that
he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be
maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana
to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did
not sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling
marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support.
Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary
imprisonment. 6
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt
and impugns the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because:
(1) prior to the buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were
personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged
giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he
conducted a test-buy operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana
for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the
same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust
operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by
T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the
appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani
was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic
places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani
what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana.12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked
P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back two paper wrappers
containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see that
there were other people in the house. 14

After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the prearranged signal of raising his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani,
went inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the appellant and unable to
find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his
wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the
buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent
conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by
contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not
know each other is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of
marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during
the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may
be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana.17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible
for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the
place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not
crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily
prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v.
Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant
case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant
may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt.
Belarga. The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90
meters away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale.
The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot
distinguish between marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the
cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant
contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his
conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his
companion were certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseurbuyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating
that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as
they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes
because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of
marijuana cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those
cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to
15 meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant
hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain
articles between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.

Q Could you please tell us?

A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I
saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he was met by one person and
later known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants and later on I saw that
Sgt. Ani handed something to him, thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the
house and came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have
seen, from a distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for
the latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani
received from the appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony,
nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing,
presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to
conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville, Zamboanga City
on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and
reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the
following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents
who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to
Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of the
NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the
appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in
strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place. 29
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt.
Ani. Additionally, the Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the
poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because
of their distance or position will not be fatal to the prosecution's case 30 provided there exists
other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the poseur-buyer, which is
sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after
Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and
arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but
didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the marked money to his
wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen." 32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they
opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the
admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order
ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v.
Diokno, 34 declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be
effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated

that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of
search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and
seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the
arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909,
the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . .
" 38 Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement
agents may seize the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting
him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen,
found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information
that the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the
building manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the
defendant husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one
of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a
small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green
leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the
package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it
was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing
the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not
constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. 43The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis
of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the
following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a
prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece
of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. 46

It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view"
doctrine will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is
not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room.
Failing to retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents
searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was,
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure.
The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk
to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the
NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for
more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the
kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the
NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the
contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM

agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what
may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately
apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does
not apply and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be
presented in evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the
damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that
the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the
guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.