TTAB Ruling and CAFC Briefs in IP Atty Spat

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Hearing: May 13, 2015
Mailed: May 22, 2015
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____
Innovation Law Group, Ltd.

v.
Alley
_____
Opposition No. 91202418
_____
Neil D. Greenstein of Techmark for Innovation Law Group, Ltd.
Ryan E. Alley of Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law for Ryan E. Alley.
_____
Before Bergsman, Shaw and Goodman,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Ryan E. Alley (Applicant) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS (in standard characters) for legal
services in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade
secret procurement, transfer, and enforcement, in Class 45.1
Application Serial No. 85342228 was filed on June 9, 2011, based upon Applicants claim
of first use anywhere at least as early as May 26, 2011 and use in commerce since at least
as early as June 2, 2011.
Innovation Law Group, Ltd. (Opposer) opposed the registration of Applicants

mark on the ground of likelihood of confusion pursuant to Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), alleging that Applicants mark is likely
to cause confusion with its previously registered marks listed below:
1. Registration No. 2090854 for the mark TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO
BUSINESS ASSETS (typed drawing form) for legal services relating to intellectual
property law and strategy, in Class 42;2
BUSINESS ASSETS (standard characters) for the services listed below:
Business consultation in the field of intellectual property
issues, innovation management, corporate formation,
development and launching of new products, processes
and services and transactions involving intellectual
property assets, in Class 35; and
Consultation services in the fields of new product
development, technology transfer, protection and
licensing of intellectual property, and patent and
industrial property licensing, in Class 42;3 and
3. Registration No. 3215068 for the mark INNOVATION LAW GROUP
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS and design, shown below, for
business consultation services in the field of business performance and strategy,
in Class 35.4
Registered August 26, 1997; renewed. Prior to November 2, 2003, standard character
drawings were known as typed drawings. A typed mark is the legal equivalent of a
standard character mark. TMEP 807.03(i) (January 2015).
Registered August 15, 2006; Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.
Registered March 6, 2007; Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.
-2-
Applicant, in his Answer, denied the salient allegations in the Notice of

Opposition.
I.
Preliminary Issues.
A. Stipulation for testimony affidavits or declarations in lieu of depositions.

On October 24, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to use affidavits or
declarations in lieu of depositions.5 The stipulation was approved in an Order dated
October 31, 2013.6
B. Applicants cross-motion to perfect his declarations.
On March 17, 2014, Opposer filed a motion to strike Applicants declarations on
the ground that they were not properly verified as being under oath.7 In response,
Applicant moved for leave to properly execute his declarations.8 In an Order dated
June 30, 2014, the Board granted Applicants cross-motion for leave to properly
execute his declarations.9 Applicant refiled properly executed declarations on July
15, 2014.10
35 TTABVUE. Citations to the record in this opinion are to the TTABVUE docket entry
number and the electronic page number where the document or testimony appears.
5
37 TTABVUE.
46 TTABVUE.
47 TTABVUE.
56 TTABVUE. The Boards Order and Opposers Brief on the case, where Opposer
renewed his objection to the admissibility of Applicants declarations crossed in the mail.
For purposes of clarity, the Board reiterates the holding in its June 30, 2014 Order.
9
10
60 TTABVUE and 61 TTABVUE.
-3-
C. Applicants motion to resubmit his brief.

On July 15, 2014, one day after filing his brief on the case and one day after the
due date for filing his brief, Applicant filed a request to re-submit[] its main brief
to replace the Brief of July 14 containing many errors11 with a copy of the
corrected brief. Opposer objected to the late filing of the corrected brief on the
ground that Applicant added additional case law and entirely new arguments.12
Because the Board decides cases based on the evidence of record, and not
arguments, Applicants request to file a corrected brief is granted.
D. Numerous objections lodged by the parties.
The parties have lodged numerous objections. None of the evidence sought to be
excluded is outcome determinative. Moreover, the Board is capable of weighing the
relevance and strength or weakness of the objected-to testimony and evidence,
including any inherent limitations, and this precludes the need to strike the
testimony and evidence. Given these facts, coupled with the number of objections,
we see no compelling reason to discuss the specific objections in detail. As necessary
and appropriate, we will point out any limitations applied to the evidence or
otherwise note that the evidence cannot be relied upon in the manner sought. We
have considered all of the testimony and evidence introduced into the record. In
doing so, we have kept in mind the various objections raised by the parties and we
have accorded whatever probative value the subject testimony and evidence merit.
11
59 TTABVUE 2.
12
66 TTABVUE 7.
-4-
II.
The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122(b),
37 C.F.R. 2.122(b), the application file for the mark being opposed. The parties
submitted the testimony and evidence listed below:
A. Opposers testimony and evidence.
1.
Testimony declaration of Diane van Os, the first web master of
Opposers website and a former colleague of Opposers principal Jacques M. Dulin,

with attached exhibits;13
2.
Testimony declaration of Richard W. Parks, a mechanical engineer and
businessman;14
3.
Testimony declaration of Robert F. Dennis, an attorney and former
colleague of Jacques M. Dulin, with attached exhibit;15

4.
Testimony declaration of Laurel Black, expert witness on marketing in
the field of corporate identity, brand building, communications and business

collateral, with attached exhibits;16
5.
Testimony declaration of Kirk V. Thomas, a software engineer;17
6.
Testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin, the owner of Opposers
marks, with attached exhibits;18
13
38 TTABVUE 2-10.
14
38 TTABVUE 11-14.
15
38 TTABVUE 15-21.
16
38 TTABVUE 22-27.
17
38 TTABVUE 28-35.
-5-
7.
Rebuttal testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin with attached
exhibits;19 and
8.
Rebuttal testimony declaration of Laurel Black.20
B. Applicants testimony and evidence.

1.
Testimony declaration of Ryan E. Alley proffered to challenge the
testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin;21 and

2.
III.
Testimony declaration of Ryan E. Alley with attached exhibits.22
Standing
Opposer introduced copies of its pleaded registrations showing the current
status and title to the registrations printed from the electronic databases of the
USPTO in the declaration of Jacques M. Dulin.23 Because Opposer has properly
made of record its pleaded registrations, Opposer has established its standing.
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir.
63 TTABVUE 2-55. See paragraph 6 at 63 TTABVUE 5 where Mr. Dulin attested that he
is the owner of the marks in the pleaded registrations. I adopted and used the mark
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS in 1996, promptly applied for
federal registration in connection with IP legal services, and received Federal Trademark
Registration No. 2,090,854 in 1997. I have continuously used that mark - - first as a sole
proprietor and then through Innovation Law Group, Ltd., my professional corporation,
since its first use in 1996 in connection with my IP legal services.
18
19
46 TTABVUE 2-18.
20
46 TTABVUE 19-25.
21
60 TTABVUE.
43 TTABVUE. Pursuant to the Boards June 30, 2014 Order noted above, Applicant filed
a properly executed declaration at 61 TTABVUE. In discussing Applicants testimony and
evidence, the Board will reference 43 TTABVUE because the exhibits are affixed to that
TTABVUE entry.
22
23
63 TTABVUE 3-4 and 13-30.
-6-
2000); Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185, 189
(CCPA 1982).24
IV.
Priority
Because Opposer has properly made of record its pleaded registrations, Section
2(d) priority is not an issue in the opposition as to the marks and the services
covered by the pleaded registrations. King Candy Co. v. Eunice Kings Kitchen, Inc.,
496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108, 110 (CCPA 1974).25
V.
Likelihood of Confusion
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of
likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177
USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d
1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion
analysis, two key considerations are the similarities between the marks and the
similarities between the services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper
Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (CCPA 1976) (The fundamental inquiry
mandated by 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential
characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.). These factors, and any
other relevant du Pont factors in the proceeding now before us, will be considered in
this decision.
24
Applicant, in his brief, admitted that Opposer has standing. 59 TTABVUE 8.
Applicant, in his brief, admitted that Opposer has priority. 59 TTABVUE 8. Applicant
also stipulated that Opposer has priority. 15 TTABVUE 2.
25
-7-
We
focus
our
analysis
on
Registration
No.
2090854
for
the
mark
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS (typed drawing form) for

legal services relating to intellectual property law and strategy because if we do
not find a likelihood of confusion with that mark and its associated services, then
there would be no likelihood of confusion with the marks in the other pleaded
registrations. See In re Max Capital Group Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1245 (TTAB
2010).
A. The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the services, established, likelyto-continue channels of trade, and classes of consumers.
Applicant is seeking to register his mark for legal services in intellectual
property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret procurement,
transfer, and enforcement. The description of services in Opposers pleaded
registration is legal services relating to intellectual property law and strategy. For
purposes of determining likelihood of confusion, the services are identical.
Because the services described in the application and Opposers registration are
identical, we must presume that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are
the same. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (even though there was no evidence regarding channels of trade and classes of
consumers, the Board was entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining
likelihood of confusion); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752, 159 USPQ
721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally identical goods, the channels of trade
and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same); American Lebanese Syrian
Associated Charities Inc. v. Child Health Research Institute, 101 USPQ2d 1022,
-8-
1028 (TTAB 2011) (where there are legally identical services, marketing channels of
trade and targeted classes of consumers are the same).
B. The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are made, i.e.,
impulse vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
Opposer argues that because a significant portion of the consumers shopping for
the Parties' respective IP legal services are ordinary people who think they have
invented something, as opposed to sophisticated corporations or in-house counsel,
the average purchaser is not especially sophisticated in selecting intellectual
property counsel.26 Opposer references the following testimony:
1. Diane van Os Testimony Declaration 6 - most consumers of intellectual
property legal services are not sophisticated regarding the legal services industry
and that such consumers are not highly selective in evaluating their lawyer
options.;27
2. Robert Dennis Testimony Declaration 13 - [m]any [IP] clients are quite
unsophisticated.;28
3. Jacques M. Dulin Rebuttal Declaration 8 - listing numerous examples of
the non-commercial and non-sophisticated client types that fall within providing
Legal services in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and
trade secret procurement, transfer, and enforcement.29
26
Opposers Brief, p. 34 (55 TTABVUE 35).
27
38 TTABVUE 4.
28
38 TTABVUE 19.
29
53 TTABVUE 4-5.
-9-
Regarding the importance of the tagline, Mr. Dulin provided the testimony
below:
7.
[P]rospective clients frequently make positive
remarks about [Opposers] mark, TRANSFORMING
IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS. For example, clients
have indicated to me that [Opposers] mark piques their
interest in what we do, and motivates them to contact us.
We at [Opposer] do not even keep track of all the positive
comments we have received about [Opposers] mark, but
we have repeatedly heard that it is a catchy slogan that is
cool and communicates the general feeling that we
understand our clients needs.30
In essence, Mr. Dulin testified that Opposers catchy slogan that is cool generates
initial interest on behalf of potential intellectual property clients. This testimony
arguably supports Opposers contention that consumers of intellectual property
legal services do not exercise a high degree of care when selecting counsel as they
are influenced by a cool and catchy tagline rather than an analytical and logical
approach to selecting counsel.
Applicant argues, to the contrary, that consumers of intellectual property
services exercise a high degree of care when selecting their intellectual property
provider.
For the past three years in my current solo practice and
for over four years with a large IP boutique, I have been
involved with client servicing and development for a
broad range of consumers in all areas of IP, including
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. These
consumers have included completely IP-unaware
individuals and startup companies, small and medium
sized US firms involved with IP only as an enforcement
target, and large international conglomerates seeking
30
53 TTABVUE 4.
- 10 -
maximal IP procurement. From my experience, all

potential and engaged consumers of IP legal services
exercise extreme care in selecting IP legal services
providers, due to the identity-driven nature of
professional legal services, the remarkable cost of IP legal
services, and the highly-commercial nature of IP
involvement.31
To support his argument, Applicant introduced Exhibits 9-18 to his
declaration.32 Those exhibits are articles and pamphlets from providers, public
interest websites, and bar associations discussing how consumers should select
legal service providers.33 Presumably, consumers use an Internet search engine to
inquire how to select an intellectual property attorney, and the Internet search
engine retrieves one of the proffered articles, or something similar.
Applicant testified that consumer selection of legal services providers is
extremely identity driven, being most influenced by referrals and in-person
introductions that exchange personal information about the provider and relatively
much less by advertising.34 According to Applicant, the hiring process generally
includes an initial interview, including information about Applicants experience
and expertise, costs, and information regarding how the legal services are provided
and billed.35 On the other hand, Applicant testified that he has never been
31
Alley Declaration 12 (43 TTABVUE 8-9).
32
43 TTABVUE 163-197.
33
Alley Declaration 16 (43 TTABVUE 10).
34
35
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identified by or asked about [his] slogan Building Assets from Ideas in these
conversations.36
Laurel Black, Opposers expert witness on marketing in the field of corporate
identity, brand building, communications and business collateral, testified to the
following distinction between sophisticated and unsophisticated inventors:
The taglines under consideration here [Applicants
BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS and Opposers
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS]
are also distinctive in providing this goal: the
development of the idea into an asset. For unsophisticated
inventors, the taglines crystallize a path to a goal. For
sophisticated inventors, or entrepreneurs and executives
whose responsibility is to protect the Intellectual Property
of a company, the tagline appears concisely expressive,
and therefore shows that the firm understands that the
company needs to convert its IP into assets, exactly what
the prospect seeks.37
With the exception of Mr. Dulins testimony about Opposers cool and catchy
tagline, Opposers witnesses provide only broad brush conclusions that consumers of
intellectual property law services do not necessarily exercise a high degree of care.
Only Applicant provides any testimony regarding the process those consumers use
to select intellectual property counsel: that is, consumers for intellectual property
services make their purchasing decisions through referrals and interviews.
However, Applicant testified that he is not aware that the tagline or service mark at
36
Alley Declaration 17 (43 TTABVUE 11-12).
Black Declaration 6 (38 TTABVUE 24). Ms. Black also testified that Applicants
testimony is not reliable because it was based on unsupported and sweeping
generalizations which are on their face unprovable and self-serving. Black Rebuttal
Declaration 6 (53 TTABVUE 21). On the other hand, Ms. Black did not proffer any
opinions on the level of purchasing care exercised by consumers of intellectual property
services of what role the tagline plays in the selection of intellectual property counsel.
37
- 12 -
issue in this proceeding played any role in the purchasing decision which is contrary
to Mr. Dulins testimony that the tagline creates initial interest on behalf of
potential clients.
Based on the nature of the services at issue, we find that purchasers selecting
intellectual property counsel would exercise a high degree of care. For example,
selecting intellectual property counsel is not an everyday purchase; intellectual
property law services involve special laws requiring consultation with experts;
intellectual property law services are expensive; and consumers have a specific
purpose for requiring intellectual property counsel. Nothing in the record is to the
contrary and we do not find Mr. Dulins initial interest testimony persuasive. On
the other hand, Applicants testimony about the personal referrals and interviews
that characterize the selection of intellectual property counsel rings true, with the
caveat that Applicant was not aware of the service mark at issue playing a role in
the purchasing decision.
We find that the degree of care weighs in favor of finding that there is no
likelihood of confusion.
C. The number and nature of similar marks in use in connection with similar
services.
Applicant argues that he introduced into evidence 67 purported distinct
individuals or organizations using a tagline or phrase similar to the mark in
Opposers pleaded registration TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS
- 13 -
ASSETS.38 The following table lists the most relevant examples of law firms using
the same or similar marks as taglines:
Website
TTABVUE
Hoffmann & Baron, LLP

Transforming Ideas Into Assets
43 TTABVUE 217
Jeff Schell
43 TTABVUE 321
The Fletcher Law Firm PLLC

Turning Your Ideas Into Assets
43 TTABVUE 327
Fountainhead Law Group

43 TTABVUE 330
FirstPoint IP
Turning Ideas Into Assets
43 TTABVUE 333
Scott Redmond (Patent Agent)

43 TTABVUE 336
Clock Tower Law Group

Transform Ideas Into Assets39
43 TTABVUE 337
Santangelo Law Offices, P.C.

43 TTABVUE 354
Alley Declaration 21 (43 TTABVUE 35). We did not consider third-party use from
entities outside of the United States.
38
Mr. Dulin testified that after sending the Clock Tower Law Group a protest letter, that
firm agreed to stop using the tagline Transform Ideas Into Assets. 63 TTABVUE 7-8.
39
- 14 -
Website
TTABVUE
Steve Gruber Intellectual Property

43 TTABVUE 357
Boston Legal Consultant Group, LLC

Turning Concepts Into Assets
43 TTABVUE 365
Wells St. John

Creating Value From Ideas
43 TTABVUE 377
Greg Osterloth
43 TTABVUE 395
Securing Patents that Turn Abstract Ideas into Tangible
Assets and Real Revenue
AdamsIP, LLC
Ideas Into Assets
43 TTABVUE 396
Bateman IP
Where Innovation Becomes Assets
43 TTABVUE 400
Paul W. Fulbright, PLLC

From Ideas to Profits
43 TTABVUE 403
Emerson Thomson & Bennett, LLC

Ideas Are Valuable
43 TTABVUE 410
Inventa Capital PLC

Turning Innovation To Capital
43 TTABVUE 411
The table below lists examples of law firms using the same or similar terms in
advertising text:
Website
Clever Ventures
TTABVUE
43 TTABVUE 334
We turn ideas into assets. We build and sell innovations

Creators of seminal disruptive-technologies used by tens
We create companies and product revolutions.40
40
The excerpt from the website was not complete.
- 15 -
Website
TTABVUE
The Marbury Law Group, PLLC
43 TTABVUE 361
Transforming ideas into valuable IP assets in order to gain a

competitive advantage is a hallmark of our practice.
Thomas/Horstemeyer
43 TTABVUE 371
Thomas Horstemeyer, LLP (Thomas/Horstemeyer) is

Atlantas IP boutique the largest Atlanta-based intellectual
property law firm providing services in litigation, patent,
copyright and trademark. This allows us to specialize and
deliver our clients the singular expertise needed to turn great
ideas into valuable assets.
Kelly & Krause, LP
43 TTABVUE 373
Experience
matters.
We
are
intellectual
property
practitioners with multiple years of IP law experience on top
of years of industry experience as technologists. We create
value by turning ideas into assets.
Law Offices of CR Miles
43 TTABVUE 374
Having a great idea is one half of the equation. The other half
is CR MILES a team of experienced, thoughtful intellectual
property attorneys with decades of experience helping some of
Americas top inventors and business owners. CR MILES is
the perfect firm to turn your ideas into assets.
Balser & Grell IP Law, LLC
43 TTABVUE 375
A business identity, reputation, goodwill and brand are all

critical in establishing a competitive edge in todays
marketplace, and investment in these areas actually equates
to real profits. It is obvious then that the importance of
protecting a business trademarks, which operate as the
embodiment of the identity, reputation, goodwill, and brand
attached to the business quality goods and services is
constantly increasing. Thus, our trademark practice is one
way that we help turn our clients ideas into assets.
- 16 -
Website
TTABVUE
Bruce Berman, From Ideas To Assets: Investing Wisely In 43 TTABVUE 379

Intellectual Property. This book is advertised as a detailed
overview of what intellectual property assets are and how
they work.
Swanson & Bratschun, L.L.C.
43 TTABVUE 398
We will help you look at your breakthrough engineering or

life science discovery from every standpoint. We will guide
you from idea to asset.
Opposer asserts that some of the third-party uses are not trademark use but
fair use of a term used in its primary descriptive sense.41 For example, The Marbury
Law Group, PLLC (Marburylaw.com) uses a similar term in the following manner:
Strategic Intellectual Property Counselling

Transforming ideas into valuable IP assets in order to
gain a competitive advantage is a hallmark of our
practice.42
Likewise, Thomas|Horstemeyer, LLP (tkhr.com) uses a similar term in text, not as
a trademark, as shown below:
Thomas Horstemeyer, LLP (Thomas|Horstemeyer) is
Atlantas IP boutique the largest Atlanta-based
intellectual property law firm providing services in
litigation, patent, copyright and trademark. Our
attorneys practice solely in IP law and have a wide
variety of education and industry experience. This allows
us to specialize and deliver our clients the singular
expertise to turn great ideas into valuable assets.43
The same with Kelly & Krause, L.P. (Kelly-krause.com):
41
Opposers Brief, pp. 36-37 (55 TTABVUE 37-38).
42
43 TTABVUE 360-361.
43
43 TTABVUE 371.
- 17 -
Experience matters. We are intellectual property

practitioners with multiple years of IP law experience on
top of years of industry experience as technologists. We
create value by turning ideas into assets.44
Opposer also asserts that many of the third-party uses are not similar to
Opposers mark TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS45 citing
the book title FROM IDEAS
TO
ASSETS: INVESTING WISELY
IN
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY46 and the Emerson Thomas & Bennett, LLC (etblaw.com) webpage
using the registered trademark IDEAS ARE VALUABLE as a tagline.47
The third-party use corroborates what we intuitively knew about the mark in
Opposers pleaded registration TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS
ASSETS: that is, the mark is highly suggestive. In fact, that is the essence of Laurel
Blacks testimony as set forth below:
5.
Both of the marks at issue are word marks as
distinct from logos or composite marks (logos + words),
and both function as branding taglines, telling the
prospective client the strategic goals the respective firms
offer, with respect to providing the legal services.
Taglines, also known as slogans, function to provide
prospects with a condensation of the essence of the service
or product offered, so that they can quickly get what the
firm can do for them. Such taglines are intended, in
connection with services, to motivate the prospect to make
initial contact, or in the case of an Internet presence, to
click on the Contact Us button on the firms web page.
Such contact motivation is a key goal of professional
services brand development taglines.
44
43 TTABVUE 373.
45
Opposers Brief, p. 37 (55 TTABVUE 38).
46
43 TTABVUE 379.
47
43 TTABVUE 409.
- 18 -
6. In this regard, the Registered mark of the Opposer is

very distinctive in telling a prospect what the Opposers
suite of services does for them. It conveys a sense of
process for the prospect, who we know has an idea, yet
who may not have a clear concept of his or her goal. The
taglines under consideration here are also distinctive in
providing this goal: the development of the idea into an
asset. For unsophisticated inventors, the taglines
crystallize a path to a goal. For sophisticated inventors, or
entrepreneurs and executives whose responsibility is to
protect the Intellectual Property of a company, the tagline
appears concisely expressive, and therefore shows that
the firm understands that the company needs to convert
its IP assets, exactly what the prospect seeks. The
insights provided by the tagline also self-evidently serve a
client retention and loyalty-building purpose.48
The facts presented in this case show that there are many third-party users of
marks or taglines that are similar to the mark in Opposers pleaded registration in
connection with intellectual property law services. Not surprisingly, the parties
contend that the roles the marks play in their marketing efforts differ. As noted
above by Applicant, he is not aware that the tagline or service mark at issue in this
proceeding plays any role in the purchasing decision.49 On the other hand, as
recounted by Mr. Dulin above, the tagline generated initial interest on the part of
potential clients.
While we find that this factor weighs against finding that there is a likelihood of
confusion, we must keep in mind what the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
the predecessor or our primary reviewing court, said in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
48
38 TTABVUE 23-24.
Laurel Black testified that [t]he insights provided by the tagline also self-evidently serve
a client retention and loyalty-building purpose. 38 TTABVUE 24. It is not self-evident to
us how the tagline serves those purposes in that the performance of counsel is going to
drive client retention, and loyalty lasts only so long as counsel serves a purpose.
49
- 19 -
Ltd. v. Natl Steel Constr. Co., 442 F.2d 1383, 170 USPQ 98, 99 (CCPA 1971), in
finding likelihood of confusion between uses of NATIONAL in a cancellation
proceeding:
Neither trademarks nor the public are adequately
protected unless decisions in cases of this kind are based
on a realistic appraisal of the likelihood of purchasers or
prospective purchasers being confused as to source
regardless of theoretical weakness of a mark.
With that in mind, we turn to the similarity of the marks.
D. The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties in terms of
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
We now turn to the du Pont likelihood of confusion factor focusing on the
similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound,
connotation and commercial impression. du Pont, 177 USPQ at 567. In a particular
case, two marks may be found to be confusingly similar if there are sufficient
similarities in terms of sound or visual appearance or connotation. Kabushiki
Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Satellite Intl, Ltd., 29 USPQ2d 1317, 1318 (TTAB 1991),
affd mem., 979 F.2d 216 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in the original; citation
omitted). See also Eveready Battery Co. v. Green Planet Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1511, 1519
(TTAB 2009), citing Krim-Ko Corp. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 390 F.2d 728, 156 USPQ
523, 526 (CCPA 1968) (It is sufficient if the similarity in either form, spelling or
sound alone is likely to cause confusion.).
In comparing the marks, we are mindful that where, as here, the services are
identical, the degree of similarity necessary to find likelihood of confusion need not
be as great as where there is a recognizable disparity between the services. Coach
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Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874,
23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Jansen Enters. Inc. v. Rind, 85 USPQ2d
1104, 1108 (TTAB 2007); Schering-Plough HealthCare Products Inc. v. Ing-Jing
Huang, 84 USPQ2d 1323, 1325 (TTAB 2007).
Finally, [t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but
instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial
impression such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a
connection between the parties. Coach Servs. Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 101
USPQ2d at 1721 (citation omitted). See also San Fernando Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD
Electronics Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA 1977); Spoons
Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), affd mem., 972
F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992). The proper focus is on the recollection of the
average customer, who retains a general rather than specific impression of the
marks. LOreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Winnebago
Indus., Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air
Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
Applicants mark is BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS and the mark in
Opposers pleaded registration is TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS
ASSETS. The marks have similar meanings and engender similar commercial
impressions. We find that both marks mean and engender the commercial
- 21 -
impression that the law firms help their clients develop ideas into assets. See also
the Laurel Black testimony discussed infra.
With respect to the appearance and sound of the marks, we note that the marks
are not identical. Nevertheless, they are similar because they share the words
Assets and Ideas in taglines that mean the same thing. Trademark law does not
require exact similitude to conclude that two marks are similar. Hercules Inc. v.
Natl Starch and Chem. Corp., 223 USPQ 1244, 1246 (TTAB 1984). Thus, the
differences between the marks at issue do not obviate their similarity.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the marks are similar in their entireties in
terms of appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression.
E. The length of time during and conditions under which there has been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion.
The absence of any reported instances of confusion is meaningful only if the
record indicates appreciable and continuous use by Applicant of his mark for a
significant period of time in the same markets as those served by Opposer under its
mark. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1645, 1660
(TTAB 2010), affd, 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Gillette
Canada Inc. v. Ranir Corp., 23 USPQ2d 1768, 1774 (TTAB 1992). In other words,
for the absence of actual confusion to be probative, there must have been a
reasonable opportunity for confusion to have occurred. Barbaras Bakery Inc. v.
Landesman, 82 USPQ2d 1283, 1287 (TTAB 2007) (the probative value of the
absence of actual confusion depends upon there being a significant opportunity for
actual confusion to have occurred); Red Carpet Corp. v. Johnstown American Enters.
- 22 -
Inc., 7 USPQ2d 1404, 1406-1407 (TTAB 1988); Central Soya Co., Inc. v. North
American Plant Breeders, 212 USPQ 37, 48 (TTAB 1981) (the absence of actual
confusion over a reasonable period of time might well suggest that the likelihood of
confusion is only a remote possibility with little probability of occurring).
Applicant began using his mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS in May
2011.50 Since Opposers testimony period closed December 2, 2013, there have been
two and one-half years of simultaneous use of the parties marks without any
reported instances of confusion.
Although Applicant is licensed to practice law in California and Virginia, he has
advertised on the Internet which is national in scope.51 There is no other testimony
or evidence regarding Applicants advertising or geographic trading area. On the
other hand, Mr. Dulin, on behalf of Opposer, testified that he has an active practice
as an IP lawyer based in Washington state, and serve[s] clients primarily in
California, Illinois, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Florida, Kansas, Arizona,
and Washington.52 In addition to Internet advertising, Opposers mark has been
advertised on a firm truck in California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah,
Wyoming and Colorado.53
Because we do not have any evidence regarding the extent of Applicants
advertising or the geographic scope of his practice, we cannot make a finding as to
50
43 TTABVUE 5.
51
43 TTABVUE 4 and 6.
52
39 TTABVUE 10 and 53 TTABVUE 2.
53
39 TTABVUE 9.
- 23 -
whether after two and one-half years of simultaneous use, there has been an
reasonable opportunity of confusion to have occurred. Accordingly, we find that this
du Pont factor is neutral.
F. Balancing the factors.
Despite the fact that the mark in Opposers pleaded registration is highly
suggestive and, therefore, entitled to only a narrow scope of protection or exclusivity
of use and the fact that the consumers will exercise a high degree of consumer care
in making their decision to select intellectual property counsel, because the marks
are similar, the services are identical and the presumption that the services move in
the same channels of trade and are sold to the same classes of consumers, we find
that Applicants mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS for legal services in
intellectual property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret
procurement, transfer, and enforcement is likely to cause confusion with
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS for legal services relating to
intellectual property law and strategy.
Decision: The opposition is sustained and registration of Applicants mark,
BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS, is refused.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 15-1976 Alley v. Innovation Law Group, Ltd.
(OPPOSITION NO. 91202418)
Ryan E. Alley, dba
Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law
Appellant,
v.
Innovation Law Group, Ltd,
Appellee.
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_________________________________________|
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board.
PRINCIPAL BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
Ryan E. Alley
PO Box 3698
Arlington, VA 22203
(571) 335-7300 (Telephone)
(571) 732-1878 (Facsimile)
ryan@alleylegal.com
Appellant
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 2
Filed: 11/02/2015
Form 9
FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

v.
Alley
Case No.

15-1976
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Counsel for the (petitioner) (appellant) (respondent) (appellee) (amicus) (name of party)
certifies the following (use "None" if applicable; use extra sheets
appellant
if necessary):
1.
The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is:
Ryan E. Alley, dba Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law
2.
The name of the real party in interest (Please only include any real party in interest
NOT identified in Question 3. below) represented by me is:
Ryan E. Alley
3.
All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10 percent of the
stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are listed below. (Please list each party
or amicus curiae represented with the parent or publicly held company that owns 10 percent
or more so they are distinguished separately.)
None
4.
The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for the party
or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency or are expected to appear
in this court (and who have not or will not enter an appearance in this case) are:

Ryan E. Alley, attorney
September 3, 2015
/s/ Ryan Alley
Date
Signature of counsel
Please Note: All questions must be answered

Ryan E. Alley
cc:
Printed name of counsel

Reset Fields
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................ii
I.
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES....................................................................1
II.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.....................................................................1
III.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES..............................................................................1
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................................................................2

Statement of the Facts.......................................................................................3
V.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.................................................................14
VI.
ARGUMENT..............................................................................................................15
A.
Standard of Review..........................................................................................15
B.
The Board Found Similarity Between the Marks

Based Only on Dissected, Commonplace Elements..................................16
C.
The Board Unreasonably Concluded there was no

Opportunity for Confusion to Occur...........................................................25
D.
The Board Failed to Consider Evidence and Argument

On Relevant Dupont Factors...........................................................................30
E.
Conclusion........................................................................................................33
ADDENDUM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
In re E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973)........................Passim
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2000)...................................16
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002)................16
On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
229 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000)............................................................................16, 27
Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph Learning L.L.C.,
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..................................................................................16
Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Inst. of Tech.,
492 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1974)..................................................................................17
In re Natl. Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1985)..........................16, 17, 21, 22, 25
Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC,
14-1853 slip op. (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20, 2015)..................................................................17
Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GMBH & Co. KGAA v. New
Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 14-1789 slip op. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015)........Passim
Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915 (C.C.A.P. 1976)...........................17, 21
Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods., 866 F.2d 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1989)....................17, 30
Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000).........17, 18
Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Saltzon Drapery Co.,
254 F.2d 158 (C.C.P.A. 1958)..............................................................................21-22
Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc.,
963 F.2d 350 (Fed. Cir. 1992)..............................................................................22, 30
ii
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King Candy Co. v. Eunices Kings Kitchen, Inc.,

496 F.2d 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1974)............................................................................24-25
Palm Bay Imports v. Veuve Clicquot Prods., 396 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)..............23
G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd.,
917 F.2d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1990)............................................................................25-26
Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).........26
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001)................26, 30
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)...................................................28
Grupo Indus. Camesa v. U.S., 85 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)..........................................29
In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)..........................................30
B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2015)..............................30-31
In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012)..............................................................32
Statutes
15 U.S.C. 1052(d)....................................................................................................................2
15 U.S.C. 1063..................................................................................................................1, 16
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1)...............................................................................................................1
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(2) ..............................................................................................................1
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(3)...............................................................................................................1
15 U.S.C. 1071(b)....................................................................................................................1
15 U.S.C. 1607.........................................................................................................................1
28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(B) .........................................................................................................1
iii
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Trademark Manual of Board Procedure

TMBP 509.01(b)(2)..............................................................................................................26
iv
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I.
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Appellant is aware of no other appeals or cases relating to this Opposition or appeal.

II.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal of Opposition 91202418, decided by a panel of the

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the USPTO under 15 U.S.C. 1067. A final
decision in that Opposition issued on May 22, 2015, and Appellant timely appealed by
a Notice of Appeal filed in this Court and the USPTO on July 21, 2015 under 15
U.S.C. 1071(a)(2) and 37 C.F.R. 2.145(d)(1). No party elected under 15 U.S.C.
1071(a)(1) to proceed in district court under 1071(b).
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1) and 28
U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(B). Upon receipt of the certified list from the USPTO under 15
U.S.C. 1071(a)(3), this Court docketed this appeal on September 3, 2015 as appeal
number 15-1976.
III.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether confusion is likely between the Appellants Application 85/342,228

on the word mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS for legal services in
intellectual property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret
procurement, transfer, and enforcement and Appellees Registrations 2,090,854;
3,129,158; and 3,215,068 all for variations of the slogan TRANSFORMING IDEAS
INTO BUSINESS ASSETS for related services.
1
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IV.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant and Applicant Ryan Alley, doing business as Ryan Alley Intellectual
Property Law (Applicant), seeks reversal of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
decision in Opposition 91/202,418 decided May 22, 2015, with instructions to register
Applicants Application 85/342,228.
On June 9, 2011, Applicant filed an application for registration on the Principal
Register in the USPTO for the word mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS
(Applicants mark) as actually used by Applicant in legal services in intellectual
property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade secret procurement,
transfer, and enforcement. The USPTO assigned the application serial number
85/342,228.
Following a search uncovering no conflicting marks, the Examining Attorney
allowed the application, and Applicants mark was published for opposition on
November 2, 2011. Appellee and Opposer Innovation Law Group, Ltd. (Opposer)
filed a Notice of Opposition on November 3, 2011 claiming a likelihood of confusion
with, and dilution of, US Registrations 2,090,854; 3,129,158; and 3,215,068, on
variations of TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS (Opposers
marks) for legal services relating to intellectual property.
A panel of the Board sustained the Opposition in a final decision issued May
22, 2015 (panel decision), finding a likelihood of confusion between Applicants
mark and Opposers marks under 15 U.S.C. 1052(d) based on a subset of argued
2
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DuPont factors. The panels decision was designated as non-precedential, and is

published at ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/v?pno=91202418&pty=OPP&eno=72.
Applicant timely appealed the panel decision to this Court.
Statement of Facts
Background and Parties
Applicant and Opposer are both providers of legal services in intellectual
property, with practices on opposite sides of the country. (A63006, A61002) Both
Applicant and Opposers principals are registered practitioners with the USPTO and
members of the bar of this Court. (A63002-3, A61002)
While creating a website for his practice in the spring of 2011, Applicant
formulated the slogan building assets from ideas as a unique way of capturing the
building block theme of the new website and new practice logos using arranged
squares. (A61003) After adding the slogan to the website and marketing materials,
Applicant filed for a trademark registration on the word mark building assets from
ideas in June 2011 for legal services in intellectual property (the field at issue).
(A61004)
Prior to applying for registration, Applicant had never heard of Opposer or
Opposers Marks; however, shortly after applying Applicant was contacted by
Opposers principal with threats of a trademark opposition should the application be
maintained. (A61004) Opposer is a small IP law practice in Washington state that uses
3
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its marks with a slogan transforming ideas into business assets in connection with
its practice. (A63003) Opposer advertises with its mark in accordance with regulations
governing attorney advertising in several jurisdictions and online. (A63009-11) In
November 2011, Opposer filed an opposition to Applicants registration based on its
US registrations backing these uses. (A01004-8)
IP Services Landscape
Intellectual property law involves making ideas into assets. (A61033) The
profession generally gives inventions, creations, and other products of the mind a
legal anchoring and property form for transfer, development, exclusion, etc. like any
other property, with certain limitations. Prior to and continuing through the
Opposition, many different providers and parties in IP use phrases like turning ideas
into assets to describe IP law and caption their services. (A61032-33) In the
Opposition, Applicant identified nearly 70 different third parties using similar
formulations and collected over 150 different instances of such public use to describe
IP legal services, which it submitted as evidence. (A61032-33) A subset of third-party
uses, whose full use is of record, is shown in the following abbreviated table for just
IP providers with online materials, with the use found at the publicly available URL:
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Transforming Ideas into AssetsSM [slogan on page banner];

transform those ideas into assets [practice description, first
sentence]
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com;
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Filed: 11/02/2015
http://www.hoffmannbaron.com; http://www.hbiplaw.com
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
Transforming Ideas into Assets (SM) [slogan on page banner];

transform those ideas into assets [practice description, first
sentence]
http://www.hoffmannbaron.com/about.asp
Transforming Ideas into Assets [article title]
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com/releases/NJBIZ%20Transfor
ming.pdf
transform those ideas into assets [pg. 10, middle column, first
sentence of sponsor description]
http://cewit.org/conferences/conference2009/docs/Program0
9Final.pdf
Hoffmann & Barron transforms ideas into assets [pg. 24,
bottom, final sentence of sponsor description]
URL(s)
http://www.aertc.org/conference09/docs/2009AdvancedEner
gyConference.pdf
Pin Cite(s)
Hoffmann & Barron transforms ideas into assets [final sentence

of sponsor description]
URL(s)
http://www.aertc.org/conference09/exhandspon.html
Pin Cite(s)
Hoffmann & Barron transforms ideas into assets [pg. 30, fifth
sponsor, final sentence of sponsor description]
URL(s)
http://www.aertc.org/conference2010/docs/ConfProgram_VI
EW.pdf
Pin Cite(s)
Hoffmann & Barron transforms ideas into assets [final sentence

of sponsor description]
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
http://www.aertc.org/conference2010/exhandspon.html
Transforming Ideas into AssetsSM [slogan at bottom end]
Case: 15-1976
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Document: 14
Page: 12
Filed: 11/02/2015
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com/releases/IP%20Today%20Jul
y%202002%20Reprint.pdf
Transforming Ideas into AssetsSM [slogan at bottom end]
http://www.hoffmanbaron.com/releases/IP%20Today%20De
c%202002%20Reprint.pdf
Transforming Ideas Into Assets [slogan on page heading]
http://about.me/jeff.schell
TRANSFORM YOUR IDEAS INTO MARKETABLE
ASSETS [picture caption]
http://www.rockymountainpatent.com
transform your idea into an asset [final paragraph, first sentence]
http://www.meetup.com/PatentsForStartups/
Transform Your Ideas Into Marketable Assets [page subtitle];
transforms your ideas into marketable assets [company
description first sentence]
https://www.elance.com/s/potentpatent/about
Turning your ideas into assets [slogan on page subheading]
http://www.fletcheriplaw.com/
Turning your ideas into assets [tagline]
https://plus.google.com/114137428428042912749/about
Transforming Ideas into Assets [title of firm overview page]
http://fountainheadlaw.com/Firm_Overview.htm
Transforming Ideas into Assets [title of firm overview page]
http://www.web.archive.org/web/20100924091427/http://w
ww.fountainheadlaw.com/Firm_Overview.htm
6
Case: 15-1976
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Document: 14
Page: 13
Filed: 11/02/2015
Turning Ideas into AssetsSM [slogan under firm name]

http://www.firstpointip.com
We turn ideas into assets [first sentence]
http://www.cleverindustries.com/
Creating value from Ideas since 1978 [slogan under About Us]
http://www.cleverindustries.com/
Turning ideas into assets [slogan at end of listing]
http://www.yellowpages.com/san-francisco-ca/mip/scottredmond-30551292
Transform ideas into assets. [first page, right side slogan]
http://www.clocktowerlaw.com/clients/showbrochure.pdf
Pin Cite(s)
Turning intangible ideas into business assets [homepage heading]
URL(s)
http://web.archive.org/web/20041009235230/http://www.cl
ocktowerlaw.com/main.html
Pin Cite(s)
Turning Ideas Into Assets [flyer title]; www.idea-asset.com [right

column, bottom]
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
http://www.idea-asset.com/Asset/Forbes.pdf
turn their creativity and ideas into significant proprietary
assets [final sentence]; The idea Asset Group [caption under firm
name]
http://www.idea-asset.com/
turn their creativity and ideas into significant proprietary
assets [final sentence]; The idea Asset Group [caption under firm
name]
http://web.archive.org/web/20080204145430/http://www.ide
a-asset.com/
7
Case: 15-1976
Pin Cite(s)
Document: 14
Page: 14
Filed: 11/02/2015
Transforming Ideas Into Assets [center homepage slogan]
URL(s)
http://48754447.wix.com/gruberip-from-scratch;
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Aaa
TRJG2booJ:48754447.wix.com/gruberip-fromscratch+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us
Pin Cite(s)
turning ideas into assets [left, second paragraph, second sentence];
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
http://www.neugeborenlaw.com/index.php?id=23
Transofrming ideas into assets [first sentence under Experience]
URL(s)
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/steve-gruber/33/763/265
Pin Cite(s)
Transforming ideas into valuable IP assets [second page, first

sentence]
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
http://www.marburylaw.com/practice/strategic-intellectualproperty-counseling.html
Transforming ideas into valuable IP assets [first sentence]
http://web.archive.org/web/20100620203136/http://www.m
arburylaw.com/content.asp?pl=542&contentid=543
Turning concepts into assets [word mark]
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4009:usbq
.2.1
TURNING CONCEPTS INTO ASSETS [page subheading]
URL(s)
http://www.bostonlegalconsultantgroup.com/services
Pin Cite(s)
Turning Concepts Into AssetsSM [slogan under firm name]
URL(s)
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Boston-Legal-ConsultantGroup-LLC/187041421312166
Pin Cite(s)
Concepts2Assets [second page twitter handle]; Turning concepts

into assets [second page, first Objective sentence]
8
Case: 15-1976
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
Document: 14
Page: 15
Filed: 11/02/2015
http://www.twitter.com/Concepts2Assets
Turning Concepts Into AssetsSM [slogan under firm name]
https://sites.google.com/site/bostonlegalconsultantgroup/
Turning concepts into assets [objective section under name]
http://www.pinterest.com/concepts2assets/
turn great ideas into valuable assets [right middle, final sentence]
http://www.tkhr.com
turning ideas into business assets [middle section Establishing
your IP. . ., second paragraph, second sentence]
http://correllpatents.com/index.html
turning ideas into assets [final sentence]
http://www.kelly-krause.com/profile.html
turn your ideas into assets [first paragraph, third sentence]
http://www.crmiles.com/contact-us
turn our clients ideas into assets [bottom section Trademark,
first paragraph, final sentence]
http://www.bgiplaw.com/practice.htm
CREATING VALUE FROM IDEAS [word mark]
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4006:gjjm
76.2.1
Creating Value From Ideas. [central page slogan]
http://www.wsrgm.com
Creating Value from Ideas [central flyer slogan above firm name]
Case: 15-1976
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Document: 14
Page: 16
Filed: 11/02/2015
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78160349&d
ocId=SPE20030819131448#docIndex=13&page=1
From Ideas to Assets [book cover, item title]
http://www.amazon.com/From-Ideas-Assets-InvestingIntellectual/dp/0471400688
From Ideas to Assets [book cover, item title]
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd0471400688.html
turn ideas into assets [middle page, first sentence]
http://brodyberman.com/
Pin Cite(s)
From Ideas to Assets [near bottom New Book section, book cover
and title]
URL(s)
http://web.archive.org/web/20020527172451/http://brodybe
rman.com/
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
From ideas to ASSETS [right ad column, middle]

http://ipcloseup.wordpress.com/
Bruce Berman, IP Hall of fame Academy member [second page,
middle]; From Ideas to Assets [fourth page, second paragraph, final
sentence]
http://www.iphalloffame.com/Academy.aspx
Pin Cite(s)
From Ideas to Assets, [second page, entry 11]; 11th bestseller on

Amazon.com in Patent category [first page, left department listings]
URL(s)
http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/10960/refpd
_zg_hrsr_b_1_4_last
Pin Cite(s)
Turn Abstract Ideas into Tangible Assets [tagline under name];

turn their ideas into tangible assets [summary, first paragraph,
third sentence]
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Case: 15-1976
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
Document: 14
Page: 17
Filed: 11/02/2015
http://www.linkedin.co/in/gregosterloth
Ideas to Assets [image caption/slogan]
http://www.adamsiplaw.com/
guide you from idea to asset [second page, second paragraph, final
sentence]
http://sbiplaw.com/practice-areas/
WHERE INNOVATION BECOMES ASSETS [word mark]
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4007:erue
4r.3.1
Where Innovation Becomes Assets [right side slogan after firm
name]
http://www.batemanip.com/
Pin Cite(s)
WHERE INNOVATION BECOMES ASSETSTM [top left under

firm name]
URL(s)
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/documentviewer?caseId=sn78410262&d
ocId=SPE20050526120231#docIndex=7&page=1
Pin Cite(s)
URL(s)
FROM IDEAS TO PROFITS [word mark]

http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4807:6adh
d3.3.2
Pin Cite(s)
FROM IDEAS TO PROFITS [top left, slogan under firm name]
URL(s)
http://www.lawofficeofpaulwfulbright.com/admin.lawofficeof
paulwfulbright.lawoffice.com/index.html
Pin Cite(s)
FROM IDEAS TO PROFITS [top left, slogan under firm name]
URL(s)
https://web.archive.org/web/20090105205040/http://www.la
wofficeofpaulwfulbright.com/admin.lawofficeofpaulwfulbright.
lawoffice.com/index.html
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Dozens of other uses, from books, presentations, flyers, online media, programs, and
other marketing with the ideas/assets formulation to describe IP procurement were
submitted from third parties in the Opposition. (A61011-32) Opposer did not contest
the substance of this third party evidence. Despite the fact that Opposer kept
meticulous records of all contact owing to its mark and advertising, there was no
evidence that any of these third party uses ever caused confusion. (A63009-10,
A61006)) Opposer introduced evidence of only a single quasi-successful policing of
the above uses; the use was still uncovered by Applicant through the Internet.
(A63007-8)
The field at issue legal services in intellectual property is highly regulated
with regard to entry into the profession, marketing ones legal services, and engaging
clients. (A61006-11) Nearly all jurisdictions require that legal services be advertised
with a name and contact information for the attorney, not just a slogan or trade name.
(A61007) Moreover, because of the expense and individualized nature of the
professional service, consumers are always aware of the ultimate provider and source
of their services. (A61010-11) Indeed, personal interaction with the providing attorney
is nearly always the initial step before consummating legal services in IP.
The Opposition and Panel Decision
Applicant introduced significant evidence of third-party use, including all those
previously described, to show that Opposers mark was weak and entitled to narrow
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scope under 2(d) of the Lanham Act. (A61011-33) Applicant further introduced
dictionary evidence and testimony as to the descriptive elements of Opposers marks,
to highlight how the marks should be emphasized when compared. (A61032) The
multiple third-party uses were significantly closer in appearance to Opposers marks
than Applicants mark and thus also showed lack of confusion during concurrent use.
(A61033-34) Applicant further argued, based on evidence on pricing, regulations, and
norms in the IP industry, that the services at issue are consumed with great care, due
to their expense and professional, commercial nature. (A61006-11) Applicant lastly
argued that the trade channels between Applicant and Opposer were wholly different
owing to the professional-based nature of legal services, that Opposer used its marks
on a single, small source of services, and that any actual confusion that could
hypothetically occur based on the marks would be de minimus. (A59039-42)
Opposer alleged that Applicants mark was a mere inversion of its own, and
that the marks said the same thing for the same services. (A01004-8) Opposer
submitted testimony of a brand consultant testifying to the descriptive impression
imparted by the marks as well as their similarities. (A38022-27) Opposer also
submitted evidence that its marks were known by others in the industry and
advertised throughout several states over several years, showing mark strength.
(A38011-21, A63009-11) Opposer also alleged without specificity or evidence that
Applicant had fraudulently sought registration, testifying that Applicant should have
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known of Opposers marks and not attempted to register its own. (A01007) Lastly,
Opposer submitted pages of evidentiary objections. (A00004)
The panel sustained the Opposition, finding a likelihood of confusion based
primarily on the similarity of the marks and overlapping field at issue. (A00007) In
comparing the marks, the panel focused solely on the shared words asset and idea
and their meaning within the marks, finding similarity because both marks used these
terms. (A00020-22) The panel found that the field of services are purchased under a
high degree of care. (A0009-13) While the panel agreed with Applicant that the
numerous third-party uses showed weakness in Opposers marks, it downplayed this
finding as theoretical. (A00013-20) The panel declined to weigh the lack of
confusion during concurrent use and nowhere acknowledged Applicants arguments
and evidence about de minimus extent of potential confusion under the twelfth DuPont
factor, single-service usage under the ninth DuPont factor, and differing trade channels
under the third DuPont factor, despite weighing the last factor for Opponent.
(A00008, A00022-24) The panel overruled all evidentiary objections in rather
summary fashion. (A00004)
V.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The TTAB panel decision should be reversed because it is not supported by

substantial evidence and is contrary to law. The most prominent error in the decision
below is its dissection of Applicants and Opposers marks under the first DuPont
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factor. The panel based its conclusions of similarity entirely on two shared words in
the marks. The panel failed to consider the suggestive, commonplace nature of these
words in comparing mark elements and ignored other, dominant mark terms
completely.
Further, the panel failed to consider all evidence of record as to concurrent use
without evidence of confusion under the eighth DuPont factor. The panel failed to
resolve its contradictory statements about the extent of Applicants promotion of its
marks and overlooked compelling evidence of lack of search engine confusion as well
as lack of confusion between any of the myriad third party uses that were actually
closer in form to Opposers marks than Applicants marks.
Lastly, the panel did not give due process or adequate consideration to fullydeveloped arguments, supported by evidence of record, on the third, ninth, and
twelfth DuPont factors. Indeed, the panel was completely silent about Applicants
arguments and evidence on these factors. Board decisions may have preclusive effect
on other proceedings, and this Court must ensure the Board is fully considering
arguments and evidence on relevant DuPont factors.
VI.
A.
ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a mark is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of the goods or
services under 2(d) of the Lanham Act depends on the relevant factors set out in In
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re E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (hereinafter DuPont
factors). In an Opposition to registration under 15 U.S.C. 1063, the Opposer bears
the burden of establishing that confusion is likely based on the DuPont factors.
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
On appeal, the Boards findings on individual DuPont factors are reviewed for
substantial evidence. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265
(Fed. Cir. 2002). That is, the Boards factual determinations as to a DuPont factor will
be upheld if they are reasonable, account for the record as a whole, and are based on
something more than a scintilla of evidence. See On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online,
Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This Court, however, reweighs the
individual DuPont factors de novo in the ultimate, legal determination of likelihood of
confusion, giving no deference to the Board. See Coach Services, Inc. v. Triumph
Learning L.L.C., 668 F.3d 1356, 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
B.
THE BOARD FOUND SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE MARKS BASED

ONLY ON DISSECTED, COMMONPLACE ELEMENTS
The first DuPont factor inquires as to the similarity or dissimilarity of the
marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial

impression. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. The caselaw is diverse and legion that a
comparison under this factor absolutely cannot dissect out descriptive or
commonplace mark elements for exclusive consideration. Massey Junior College, Inc.
v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 492 F.2d 1399, 1402 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Natl. Data
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Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises
LLC, 14-1853 slip op. at 11 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20, 2015); Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur
Draussen GMBH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 14-1789 slip op.
at 11-12 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015). Quite the opposite, marks must be compared in
their entireties, with emphasis on unique and non-descriptive elements under the first
DuPont factor. See Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 916-17 (C.C.P.A.
1976); Natl. Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, n. 2; Keebler Co. v. Murray Bakery Prods.,
866 F.2d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227
F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
The panel below did not follow this caselaw. The analysis of actual mark
elements was severely truncated, comparing only the two words ideas and assets
and a descriptive gist using the same. Here is that analysis in its entirety:
Applicants mark is BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS and the mark
in Opposers pleaded registration is TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO
BUSINESS ASSETS. The marks have similar meanings and engender
similar commercial impressions. We find that both marks mean and
engender the commercial impression that the law firms help their clients
develop ideas into assets. See also the Laurel Black testimony discussed infra
[sic - supra].
With respect to the appearance and sound of the marks, we note that the
marks are not identical. Nevertheless, they are similar because they share
the words Assets and Ideas in taglines that mean the same thing.
Trademark law does not require exact similitude to conclude that two
marks are similar. Hercules Inc. v. Natl Starch and Chem. Corp., 223 USPQ
1244, 1246 (TTAB 1984). Thus, the differences between the marks at issue
do not obviate their similarity.
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(A00021-22) As seen, the panel repeated the marks and then dissected out only
assets and ideas for actual comparison. The panel further compared a descriptive
connotation with these two words - both marks mean . . . develop ideas into assets.
This was the extent of the panels reasoning, which then abruptly concluded with a
finding of similarity.
While stating in passing that marks must be compared in their entireties, the
panel never did so. There is no discussion of the whole marks different leading terms
building and transforming, different ordering, different prepositions, wholly
excluded business element between the marks, or how these cause different
appearances, sounds, and meanings between the marks. This is despite record
evidence and argument that the divergence in first words, length, and mark ordering
result in very different appearances, sounds, meanings, and commercial impressions.
(A59024-27, A61034-36) Indeed, the panels short analysis was essentially completely
dissection-based, certainly more so than the comparatively thorough analysis reversed
in Jack Wolfskin. Compare A760016-20 (TTAB panel opinion in Jack Wolfskin case
with over three pages comparing several aspects of mark elements) with Jack Wolfskin,
2014-1789 slip op. at 12-13 (reversing the same for dissection); see also Packard Press,
227 F.3d at 1357 (Board may not simply state, but must give actual explanation of
how, it considered marks in their entireties). In sum, the panels terse conclusion of
similarity based exclusively on two words excerpted out of the marks runs afoul of the
anti-dissection rule and should be reversed.
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But what is more problematic here is that the dissected terms asset and
idea are very commonly used to market IP legal services in the same manner as the
marks. Moreover, development of the idea into an asset describes the IP legal
services at issue. All of this was found by the panel itself. (A00013-19) These findings
were supported by overwhelming evidence of third-party use of idea/asset
formulations in IP law. (A00013-19) They were also supported by dictionary showings
of descriptiveness (A43198-216, A40022-32) and admissions by Opposer (A0001819). Yet, as seen above, the panel never discussed or accounted for this evidence in
comparing the marks or selecting out only ideas and assets for emphasis. Without
revisiting every third party use in detail (there are well over 100 uses from nearly 70
distinct providers of record, summarized in a table at A61011-33), a few
representative uses are sufficient to demonstrate how the panel erred by overlooking
the uses and mark descriptiveness shown by the same when comparing the marks.
For example, Hoffmann & Baron, a large IP law firm with thousands of
patents issued in its name, has for the nearly a decade used Transforming Ideas into
Assets as its service mark throughout several different types of advertising. (A4321720, A43229, A43255, A43262, A43292, A43295, A43306, A43308-18, A61033-34)
Many other IP attorneys and firms have for years used stand-alone slogans like
turning ideas into assets (A43321-22, A43326-33, A43336-37, A43353-57), turning
concepts into assets, (A43363-69) and creating value from ideas (A43376-78) as
registered trademarks and slogans in print and online media. (A61033-34). An
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Amazon best-selling book by IP Hall of Famer Bruce Berman is titled From Ideas to
Assets. (A43379-94) Several different patent offices use slogans like Turning Ideas
into Assets. (A43423, A43428, A43442, A43445) There are additionally dozens of
different descriptive uses from providers of IP legal services about how they develop
ideas into assets, including WIPOs long-standing teaching that protection of a
companys [IP] is a crucial step in . . . turning ideas into business assets. (A43412-19)
The Board satisfied itself with identifying a few dozen of these uses before concluding
that Opposers marks overall were highly suggestive (A00013-19), and actual uses in
the record are several fold those identified in the opinion below (A61011-33).
Opposer itself submitted testimony that its marks are descriptive. Opposers
brand consultant directly testified that Opposers marks tell[] the prospective client
the strategic goals . . . with respect to providing legal services, that such taglines
provide . . . the essence of the service or product provided and Opposers marks
tell[] a prospect what the Opposers suite of services does for them. (A38023-24)
The Board agreed with these statements. (A00018-19) This is nothing less than an
admission that Opposers marks describe legal services in intellectual property, the
field at issue. As seen, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence accepted by the
Board in its opinion - showing that the terms asset and idea were very commonly
used by IP legal services providers for years and that the gist of developing ideas into
assets was highly suggestive of the field of service at issue.
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The panel erred in divorcing these findings of descriptiveness from its

comparison of the marks. Commonplace and descriptive elements are not supposed
to receive emphasis under the first DuPont factor, let alone form the exclusive basis
for similarity as they did below. Tektronix, 534 F.2d at 916-917 (a common, highly
suggestive portion is usually insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion); Natl. Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060 (consumers rely more on the nondescriptive portion of each mark to distinguish the same). Thus, everything in the
marks except asset and idea should have been given emphasis, not ignored. The
panel offered no rationale or explanation as to why it took the exact opposite course why the non-unique elements asset and idea and the admittedly-descriptive gist of
developing an idea into an asset were exclusively relied upon in determining
likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the panel gave no indication that it even recognized
its own determinations that idea, asset, and developing ideas into assets were
commonplace and highly suggestive when comparing the marks. (A00020-22) This is
reversible error. See Jack Wolfskin, 14-1789 slip op. at 14 (if the Board places heavy
emphasis on an oft-used mark element under the first DuPont factor, it must provide a
rational reason for doing so).
The point, however, is bigger than mere procedure. Comparing marks in their
entireties, with emphasis on non-descriptive and unique portions, ensures that a mark
will not preempt an entire field or wrongly be found likely to confuse on aspects that
consumers would never consider. See Sure-Fit Products Co. v. Saltzon Drapery Co.,
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254 F.2d 158, 160 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (a mark cannot preempt the field of a descriptive
term); Natl. Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060 (consumers rely more on the nondescriptive portion of the marks); see also Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art
Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 352 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Section 2(d) does not focus on
similarity of competing marks in the abstract. Rather the test evaluates objective
evidence that the competing marks, when used in the marketplace, are likely to
confuse the purchasing public about the source of the products).
The panels faulty comparison runs headlong into these pitfalls of preemption
and overbreadth; the dissected analysis below would find likelihood of confusion
between any marks using asset and idea to express the process of developing ideas
into assets for legal IP services, because these were the only mark elements considered
below. Such an analysis would find a likelihood of confusion among coexisting
registrations of the same developing ideas into assets gist (such as the US
Registrations on Creating Value from Ideas; Where Innovation becomes Assets;
or From Ideas to Profits all for legal services, at A43376, A43339, and A39402) and
the many idea/asset slogans currently in use without any confusion. This cannot be
correct.
Had the panel properly compared the marks in their entireties with emphasis
on non-descriptive aspects, it would have avoided the above problems while equally
finding that the first DuPont factor weighed for no likelihood of confusion between
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the relatively different marks at issue here. Nonexclusive reliance on the common
assets and ideas words, combined with consideration of the whole marks
differing building and transforming leading terms, the omission of business
from Applicants mark, the different ordering and preposition between the marks
would have shown that the marks are more dissimilar than similar. That correct
analysis, as extensively argued and supported by evidence below (A59024-27), follows.
Building and transforming merit emphasis under the first DuPont factor
owing to their leading position and because the remainder of the mark terms are
much more common (at least in the case of Applicants building, for which there is
no third-party use of record). See Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (leading position may
merit emphasis). Building does not sound or appear like transforming. The terms
have different starting hard consonants, different numbers of syllables, different
internal flow, mutually exclusive lengths and letters except for the generic ing
ending. (A61034) Building and transforming are not synonyms. (A61034-35,
A43198-216) Building does not impart a commercial impression of a radical change
in nature, or consuming one thing in favor of another as transforming does.
(A61035 -36) Instead, building gives an impression of directly, manually
constructing or assembling a larger whole from individual pieces whose nature does
not change and can be seen as built into the larger whole. (A61035-36) Thus, when
considered in the context of IP legal services, building is fanciful in that ideas
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cannot be physically put together. Transforming wholly lacks this fanciful

connotation in the field at issue and has a distinct, more descriptive meaning.
Taking transforming and building in the marks in their entireties,
Opposers mark Transforming Ideas into Business Assets uses the more common
idea-into-asset ordering, causing transforming to work on ideas, whereas
Applicants mark uses a distinct order and preposition, causing assets to be the
worked-upon noun in Building Assets from Ideas. Applicants mark omits the
business term, resulting in a much shorter overall spoken phrase and allowing
building to directly work on assets. These differences cause the marks in their
entireties to look different when seen and sound different when spoken. As to
protectable connotation, the leading transforming and building invoke different
mental imagery and recollection with the remainder of the marks a consumptive
conversion versus a physical assembling. Taken with the reversed word order, entire
business omission, and preposition changes, consumers are more likely to recall a
manual manipulation of assets from Applicants mark, as opposed to a conversion
process undertaken on ideas from Opposers Marks and the third-party uses.
These are not nit-pick differences. As demonstrated by the several third-party
uses, dictionaries, and caselaw, supra, these are the only non-descriptive aspects the
consuming public could use to differentiate among players in a crowded field and are
variations Opposer should fairly expect a competitor to adopt based on its use of
descriptive terms. See King Candy Co. v. Eunices Kings Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d
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1400, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (when exposed to suggestive and commonplace terms,
the public easily distinguishes slight differences in the marks); Natl. Data Corp.,
753 F.2d at 1060.
In sum, the panel below did not comply with the required procedure in
comparing marks for similarities and dissimilarities in their entireties under the first
DuPont factor. Its analysis improperly dissected out two words from the marks for
comparison, and, in doing so, wrongly focused on the most commonplace and
descriptive aspects of the marks. Had the panel followed the approach set out in the
caselaw, which requires as a matter of law that marks be compared in their entireties
with any emphasis going to arbitrary or fanciful aspects, the first DuPont factor would
not have been weighed for a finding of likelihood of confusion. The Boards finding
to the contrary, using the wrong legal procedure for comparing marks, is not
supported by substantial evidence. See Jack Wolfskin, 14-1789 slip op. at 14.
C.
THE BOARD UNREASONABLY CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO

OPPORTUNITY FOR CONFUSION TO OCCUR
The eighth DuPont factor inquires as to the length of time during and
conditions under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. A sufficient amount of time must pass with
concurrent use in overlapping geographies before an absence of confusion in the
record will cause this factor to weigh against a likelihood of confusion. See G.H.
Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 F.2d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (over
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ten years of concurrent marketing without evidence of confusion showed confusion

was unlikely); cf. Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (geographic separation undercutting value of eighth DuPont factor);
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (lack of
evidence of duration for concurrent sales undercutting value of eighth DuPont factor).
Although there was no evidence of actual confusion over several years of
concurrent use, the panel seized on geographic dissimilarity to weigh the eighth
DuPont factor neutral:
Because we do not have any evidence regarding the extent of
Applicants advertising or the geographic scope of his practice , we

cannot make a finding as to whether after two and one-half years1 of
simultaneous use, there has been an [sic] reasonable opportunity of
confusion to have occurred.
(A00023-24) (emphasis added)
Applicant appreciates the deferential nature of the standard, but this finding is
not supported by substantial evidence. The finding does not account for the record as
a whole, contradicts the panels own findings, and ultimately does not have a scintilla
Although not directly relying on temporal insufficiency to dismiss this factor, the
panels formulation of 2.5 years of concurrent use is unreasonable. The panel
accounted for time only through the end of Opposers initial testimony period.
Opposer, however, could have reopened testimony if it discovered new evidence of
actual confusion at any time before the panel decision of May 22, 2015. See TMBP
509.01(b)(2). This is over 4 years of concurrent use with opportunity for actual
confusion to be submitted into the record. At any rate, both 2.5 and 4 years are
adequate windows for actual confusion to have occurred given the amount of
advertising of record, if it were ever likely.
1
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of evidentiary support. Cf. On-Line Careline, 229 F.3d at 1085. Here is the panels
immediate prior finding:
Although Applicant is licensed to practice law in California and Virginia,
he has advertised on the Internet which is national in scope . . . .
Opposer [is] based in Washington state, and serve[s] clients primarily in
California, Illinois, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Florida, Kansas,
Arizona, and Washington. In addition to Internet advertising,
Opposers mark has been advertised on a firm truck in California,
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming and Colorado.
(A00023-24) (internal quotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). As seen, the
panel in fact found that both Applicant and Opposer advertised their marks nationally
on the Internet. This directly contradicts the panels later statement that they lacked
any evidence regarding the geographic scope of Applicants practice.
Moreover, in making the statement regarding the overlapping national
character of the marks promotion, the panel relied on testimony that a website very
prominently bearing Applicants mark (http://alleylegal.com) had received over
30,000 unique visitors with over 80,000 views across the entire US in the same time
period. (A61004-6, A43047). This evidence further included search engine data that
Applicant and its mark were indexed in the Google search engine for over a year, yet
no search of Opposer or its marks yielded Applicants website during that time, as
reported by Google. (A61004-6, A43048-68). That is, advertising prominently
displaying Applicants mark were quite widely and nationally consumed through visits
and search engines for over three years alongside Opposers marks, with neither
consumer nor search engine confusion.
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As seen, the panel was extremely well-supported in finding that all marks were
concurrently and nationally advertised, available, and widely consumed via the
Internet. But the panel directly contradicts this record and its findings when it
abruptly concluded that it did not have any evidence as to the geographic scope or
extent of Applicants advertising. (A00023-24) Fairly considering the whole record,
the panel here had evidence of a large amount of concurrent and geographicallyoverlapping use between the marks in the same field without confusion, and no
detracting evidence, to weigh against a likelihood of confusion under the eighth
DuPont factor. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)
(substantial evidence test considers supporting and detracting evidence in the whole
record to determine if agencys conclusion has more than a scintilla of aggregate
support).
Lastly, the panel ignored alternative evidence under the eighth DuPont factor.
Applicant argued and pointed to a lack of evidence - that Opposer (or Applicant)
had ever been confused with any of the third-party IP legal service providers, despite
the voluminous record of their large number, many years of use, and marks closer in
appearance to Opposers marks than Applicants mark. (A59041) Opposer testified
that it has widespread advertising of its marks and took careful note of all client
interactions. (A63009-10) Thus, if confusion between any of the several third party
marks and Opposers marks had occurred, it would have made its way into the record
28
Case: 15-1976
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Page: 35
Filed: 11/02/2015
here. Surely at the very least, if confusion were at all likely, Opposer would have been
contacted by a party seeking Hoffmann & Baron, owing to that IP firms size, national
practice, and longstanding use of the nearly identical service mark Transforming
Ideas into Assets in the same IP legal services. Opposer would have recorded and
trumpeted such evidence as showing confusable consumers and policing here.
While the eighth DuPont factor has traditionally been considered in terms of
concurrent use between the marks of the two parties at bar, there is no reason why
as here lack of confusion between an Opposers marks and third-party marks that
are all in widespread and longstanding use in the same field with ample recordation
opportunity should not equally indicate a lack of likelihood of confusion2. The panel
below should have considered the argued evidence of the several closer third-party
marks that had generated no known confusion in evidence under the eighth DuPont
factor. See Grupo Indus. Camesa v. U.S., 85 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (If the
one who determines the facts which underlie the order has not considered evidence or
argument, it is manifest that a hearing has not been given). Had the panel properly
considered the evidence of extent of Applicants marketing of its marks discussed
above, as well as the lack of Internet confusion and confusion between the third party
In the alternative, the panel and this Court may consider evidence of lack of
confusion between an Opposers marks and several closer, longstanding third party
marks under the catchall 13th DuPont factor.
2
29
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 36
Filed: 11/02/2015
marks, the only reasonable conclusion would have been, at a minimum, to modestly
weigh the eighth DuPont factor against a likelihood of confusion.
D.
THE BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT

ON RELEVANT DUPONT FACTORS
The Board is not required to analyze in detail each and every DuPont factor
argued by the parties it may base its decision on individual factors it finds
dispositive to the issue of likelihood of confusion. Kenner Parker Toys, 963 F.2d at
352 (different factors may play dominant roles in determining likelihood of
confusion); see In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(Boards acknowledgement that parties argued each DuPont factor was sufficient even
though the Board gave full analysis only to a subset of the factors it deemed
important). The Board cannot, however, outright ignore evidence argued by the
parties, certainly not with respect to factors it does weigh. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1362
(it is the duty of the . . . board and this court to find, upon consideration of all the
evidence, whether or not confusion appears likely); Han Beauty 236 F.3d at 1336
(The Board must consider each factor for which it has evidence).
The requirement for consideration of evidence is doubly important following
the Supreme Courts decision in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S.
___ (2015), which established that a TTAB decision in an opposition will often
establish likelihood of confusion for infringement purposes through issue preclusion.
30
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Document: 14
Page: 37
Filed: 11/02/2015
Following B&B Hardware, a partys evidence and argument before the TTAB in an
opposition may be its only chance to establish and argue any record with respect to
likelihood of confusion. As such, it is now more vital than ever that the Board give
thorough consideration to evidence and arguments actually made on applicable
DuPont factors in an opposition.
Here, the panel gave every indication that it ignored Applicants arguments and
evidence about de minimus extent of potential confusion under the twelfth DuPont
factor and single-service usage under the ninth DuPont factor. As to the twelfth factor,
Applicant argued that any hypothetical confusion that might initially occur between
Applicants and Opposers marks would immediately be stemmed by differences in
Applicants and Opposers names and personal characteristics. (A59039-40) Applicant
cited evidence of record of the highly personal nature of the field at issue,
professional legal services in IP (A43144-A43197), as well as several regulations
requiring attorney identification in legal advertising nationwide (A43069-A43143), to
support the argument that confusion could not extend beyond de minimus levels in the
field at issue here, and certainly not through actual consumption of services from a
mistaken provider. (A59039). As to the ninth factor, Applicant argued that Opposer
Marks are used on a single niche service those offered from a single office and
pointed to Opposers admission of the same in evidence. (A590039, A63006).
With respect to the third DuPont factor differing trade channels the panel
did discuss this factor. The panel summarily weighed the factor as favoring a
31
Case: 15-1976
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Page: 38
Filed: 11/02/2015
likelihood of confusion because the field of services at issue overlapped, which makes
the trade channels presumptively the same. (A00008, citing In re Viterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (condoning a presumption of shared trade channels where
there was no argument or evidence of record on the factor).) But there was argument
and evidence of record that trade channels between distinct IP attorneys would also
be distinct, because of the personal-based nature of referrals and individual skills and
experience that differed between service sources. (A59041-42) Applicant pointed to
evidence and admissions of record that consumers choose IP attorneys based
primarily on referrals and personal characteristics to support this argument. (A5904142, A59034-36, A59039-40)
As seen, Applicant had significant arguments and evidence on the third, ninth,
and twelfth factors. But the panel decision never mentioned either of the twelfth or
ninth DuPont factors or gave any indication that Applicant made argument and
submitted evidence on these factors. While weighing the third DuPont factor, the
panel never acknowledged that Applicant made contrary argument based on evidence
of record. Indeed, the panels caselaw cited in connection with the third DuPont factor
applies only in instances where no evidence of record on that factor. Viterra, 671 F.3d
at 1362. Thus, there is no way to tell if the panel even realized any of these arguments
had been made or if the evidence existed, let alone if any of it was given fair
consideration. This does not comply with DuPont or Due Process. Id., 476 F.2d at
1362.
32
Case: 15-1976
E.
Document: 14
Page: 39
Filed: 11/02/2015
CONCLUSION
The panel below weighed the large numbers of closer marks in use in the same
field of service under the sixth DuPont factor and the extreme care consumers exercise
in consuming legal services in IP under the fourth DuPont factor against a likelihood
of confusion. These findings were well supported. Had it followed the legal procedure
for comparing marks under the first DuPont factor, the panel would have concluded
that factor also weighed against a likelihood of confusion. Further, had it properly
considered the entire record, the third, eighth, ninth, and twelfth factors would have
weighed against a likelihood of confusion as well. Thus, this court should reverse the
finding of likelihood of confusion, because upon weighing the relevant DuPont factors
de novo, the only reasonable conclusion is that Opposer has carried a small minority of
the factors and failed to meet its burden of proving a likelihood of confusion. See Jack
Wolfskin, 14-1789 slip op. at 17 (reversing likelihood of confusion determination
based on improper dissection under first DuPont factor alone.)
Dated: November 2, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law,
By: /s/Ryan E. Alley
Ryan E. Alley
PO Box 3698
Arlington, VA 22203
(571) 335-7300 (Telephone)
(571) 732-1878 (Facsimile)
ryan@alleylegal.com
Appellant
33
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 40
Filed: 11/02/2015
ADDENDUM
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,
Mailed May 22, 2015....................................................................................A00001-24
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 41
Filed: 11/02/2015
This Opinion is Not a

Precedent of the TTAB
Hearing: May 13, 2015
Mailed: May 22, 2015
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

_____
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

v.
Alley
_____
_____
Neil D. Greenstein of Techmark for Innovation Law Group, Ltd.
Ryan E. Alley of Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law for Ryan E. Alley.
_____
Before Bergsman, Shaw and Goodman,
Administrative Trademark Judges.
Opinion by Bergsman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Ryan E. Alley (Applicant) seeks registration on the Principal Register of the
mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS (in standard characters) for legal
services in intellectual property, including patent, trademark, copyright, and trade
secret procurement, transfer, and enforcement, in Class 45.1
Application Serial No. 85342228 was filed on June 9, 2011, based upon Applicants claim
of first use anywhere at least as early as May 26, 2011 and use in commerce since at least
as early as June 2, 2011.
A0001
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 42
Filed: 11/02/2015
Innovation Law Group, Ltd. (Opposer) opposed the registration of Applicants

mark on the ground of likelihood of confusion pursuant to Section 2(d) of the
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. 1052(d), alleging that Applicants mark is likely
to cause confusion with its previously registered marks listed below:
BUSINESS ASSETS (typed drawing form) for legal services relating to intellectual
property law and strategy, in Class 42;2
BUSINESS ASSETS (standard characters) for the services listed below:
Business consultation in the field of intellectual property
issues, innovation management, corporate formation,
development and launching of new products, processes
and services and transactions involving intellectual
property assets, in Class 35; and
Consultation services in the fields of new product
development, technology transfer, protection and
licensing of intellectual property, and patent and
industrial property licensing, in Class 42;3 and
3. Registration No. 3215068 for the mark INNOVATION LAW GROUP
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS and design, shown below, for
business consultation services in the field of business performance and strategy,
in Class 35.4
Registered August 26, 1997; renewed. Prior to November 2, 2003, standard character
drawings were known as typed drawings. A typed mark is the legal equivalent of a
standard character mark. TMEP 807.03(i) (January 2015).
Registered August 15, 2006; Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.
Registered March 6, 2007; Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.
-2-
A0002
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 43
Filed: 11/02/2015
Applicant, in his Answer, denied the salient allegations in the Notice of

Opposition.
I.
Preliminary Issues.
A. Stipulation for testimony affidavits or declarations in lieu of depositions.

On October 24, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to use affidavits or
declarations in lieu of depositions.5 The stipulation was approved in an Order dated
October 31, 2013.6
B. Applicants cross-motion to perfect his declarations.
On March 17, 2014, Opposer filed a motion to strike Applicants declarations on
the ground that they were not properly verified as being under oath.7 In response,
Applicant moved for leave to properly execute his declarations.8 In an Order dated
June 30, 2014, the Board granted Applicants cross-motion for leave to properly
execute his declarations.9 Applicant refiled properly executed declarations on July
15, 2014.10
35 TTABVUE. Citations to the record in this opinion are to the TTABVUE docket entry
number and the electronic page number where the document or testimony appears.
5
37 TTABVUE.
46 TTABVUE.
47 TTABVUE.
56 TTABVUE. The Boards Order and Opposers Brief on the case, where Opposer
renewed his objection to the admissibility of Applicants declarations crossed in the mail.
For purposes of clarity, the Board reiterates the holding in its June 30, 2014 Order.
9
10
60 TTABVUE and 61 TTABVUE.
-3-
A0003
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 44
Filed: 11/02/2015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 2d day of November, 2015, I have electronically filed the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the appellate CM/ECF system. Counsel
for all parties to the case are registered CM/ECF users and will be served by the
appellate CM/ECF system.

Ryan E. Alley
PO Box 3698
Arlington, VA 22203
(571) 335-7300 (Telephone)
(571) 732-1878 (Facsimile)
ryan@alleylegal.com
Appellant
Case: 15-1976
Document: 14
Page: 45
Filed: 11/02/2015
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TYPE-VOLUME

LIMITATION, TYPEFACE REQUIREMENTS, AND TYPE-STYLE
REQUIREMENTS
1.
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B). The brief contains 7,204 words, excluding the
parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6). The brief has been prepared in a proportionally
spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in 14-point Garamond type.

Ryan E. Alley
PO Box 3698
Arlington, VA 22203
(571) 335-7300 (Telephone)
(571) 732-1878 (Facsimile)
ryan@alleylegal.com
Appellant
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 1
2015-1976
Filed: 12/16/2015
In The
United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit
RYAN E. ALLEY,
dba Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law,
Appellant,
v.
INNOVATION LAW GROUP, LTD.,

Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE - PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD IN
OPPOSITION NO. 91202418
_____________
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
_____________
Jacques M. Dulin, Esq,

INNOVATION LAW GROUP, LTD.
237 N. Sequim Ave.
Sequim, WA 98382
(360) 681-7305 (Telephone)
(360) 681-7315 (Facsimile)
dulin@innovationlaw.com
Counsel for Appellee
GibsonMoore Appellate Services, LLC
206 East Cary Street Richmond, VA 23219
(804) 249-7770 www.gibsonmoore.net
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 2
Filed: 12/16/2015
Fomo I
FORM 9. Ctrtlfiat. ol lnt.rast
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH E FEDERAL CI RCUIT

R~n .
v.
Allt)'. tic.
ln,,...uon I.Aw Oroup. Lid.
Case No.
15-19iG
CER1'1 FICATB OF 11\'TEREST

Coun~I
I.
ror lho (pellt1oncr) (uppcllont) (re1pondent) (oppcllec) (amicus) (nomc of pony)

certifies the followmr (u6C "None if applicable; u6C extrn shceui
Tho ruu name of every party or omic111 represented by mo 1a:
ln110V1111on ..... ,.. Oroup, Lid
2.
The nome of the real party in interest (Plon6C only mcludo any real party Tn Tntercn
NOT identified m Quc~tion 3. below) rcprcsentad by me is:
3.
All parent corpc>rotions and any publicly held componif!ll thal own 10 pcroentof the
stock or tho party or nmicus curiao represented by mo oni listed below. (Ploa&e list each party
or amicus cunne representA>d with the parent or publicly he ld company thnt owns 10 pen:ent
or more" they arc distingu~hod separately.)
I. 181 Tho niiffioe or all low firms and the partner or 0880CU1tca th11t opponrcd for tho party
or amicus now repre11ented by me m thc "rial court or agency or arc expected to appear
m ~court (and who have not or will not enter on oppcarnncc m this cose) arc:
TfCh..\lark;
Nt~
0 Ol'fGlll..tn. Cov.,_I for ApfMIH/Opp,..r beloro the TTAB
It! Jecq- M Ovhn. ll.q.
S.plmber 15, 2016
Du to
Please Note: All questions must be oruiwcrcd
cc:
S1gnoture of counsel
Jocquu M Duhn. Eoq
Printed nnmo o.f counsel
Ntal 0 . Creen.a&etn. &.q.
.......
'
~-,.c"\,.
'
'
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 3
Filed: 12/16/2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST .................................................................................i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................iv
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES ....................................................................ix
I.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................................ 1
II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE....................................................................... 1
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................... 2
IV.
A.
TTAB Decision Appealed-from by Appellant/Applicant Alley ........... 2
B.
Appellant/Applicants Application ....................................................... 2
C.
Institution of Opposition Following Notice to Appellant Alley ........... 2
D.
Opposition Proceedings and Evidence Adduced .................................. 3
E.
The TTAB Decision and Opinion ......................................................... 5
F.
Findings by the Board ........................................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................. 7

A.
Opportunity for Actual Confusion to Have Occurred ........................... 7
B.
Degree of Sophistication of Clients .................................................... 12
C.
Informing a Client Is a Duty, Whether Sophisticated or Not.............. 15
D.
Function of Both Marks in Marketing Legal Services: Contact

Motivation ........................................................................................... 16
ii
Case: 15-1976
E.
Document: 17
Page: 4
Filed: 12/16/2015
Policing Efforts by Appellee/Opposer/ILG of its Incontestable

Marks ................................................................................................... 18
VI.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................ 28
VII.
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................ 31
A.
Standard of Review ............................................................................... 3
B.
The Board Properly Considered the Marks in their Entirety It

is Appellant Who Improperly Dissects the Marks .............................. 34
C.
Appellant Conflates Consumer Sophistication with the Function

of the Marks Likelihood of Initial Interest Confusion ..................... 42
D.
There Was Substantial Evidence for the Board to Find

Insufficient Opportunity for Confusion to Occur ............................... 47
E.
Appellants Purported Good Faith is Legally Insignificant ................ 53
F.
Any Doubts Should be Resolved in Favor of Appellee, the Prior

User...................................................................................................... 54
VIII. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 54
CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE
iii
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 5
Filed: 12/16/2015
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases:
A.T. Cross Company v. Jonathan Bradley Pens, Inc.,
470 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1972)(Friendly, J) ...................................................... 54
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v.
The American National Bank of St. Joseph,
201 USPQ 842, 1978 WL 21292 (TTAB 1978) ........................................... 39
Blaw-Knox Co. v. Siegerist,
300 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. MO 1968), affd and modifd in part
414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969) ......................................................................... 45
Boyds Collection Ltd. v. Herrington & Co.,
65 USPQ2d 2017 (TTAB 2003) .................................................................... 51
Carslile Chem. Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd.,
434 F.2d 1403 (CCPA 1970) ......................................................................... 54
CBS Inc. v. Morrow,
708 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..................................................................... 10
Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 33
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197 (1938)....................................................................................... 32
Corporation Habanos, S.A.,
102 USPQ2d 1085 (TTAB Feb 16, 2012) ..................................................... 39
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp.,
222 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir 2000) ..................................................................31, 32
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith,
279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................ 50
iv
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 6
Filed: 12/16/2015
Exxon Corp. v. Fill-R-Up Systems, Inc.,

182 USPQ 443 (TTAB 1974) ........................................................................ 51
Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc.,
624 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2010) .......................................................................... 46
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
544 F.2d 1098 (CCPA 1976) ......................................................................... 32
Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc.,
930 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1991) .......................................................................... 43
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Proc. Indus. S.A.,
100 USPQ2d 1584 (TTAB 2011) .................................................................. 43
Hercules Inc. v. Natl Starch and Chem. Corp.,
223 USPQ 1244 (TTAB 1984) ...................................................................... 34
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ..................................................................... 32
HRL Associates Inc. v. Weiss Associates Inc.,
12 USPQ2d 1819, 1989 WL 274391 (TTAB 1989),
affd on other grounds,
902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ..................................................................... 44
In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973) .......................................passim
In re Gartside,
203 F.3d 1305 (2000) .................................................................................... 32
In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc.,
315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ...................................5, 31
Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GMBH & Co., KGAA v.
New Milennium Sports, S.L.U.,
14-1789 slip op. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015) .......................................35, 37, 40
King Candy Co. v. Eunice Kings Kitchen, Inc.,
496 F.2d 140 (CCPA 1974) ........................................................................... 45
v
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 7
Filed: 12/16/2015
Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH,

517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. PA 1981) ................................................................ 45
Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.,
96 USPQ2d 1701, 1713 (TTAB 2010), affd. mem.
2011-1052, 2011 WL 5400095 (Fed. Cir. Nov 9, 2011) ............................... 53
Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Institute of Technology,
492 F.2d 1399 (CCPA 1974) ......................................................................... 42
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Natl Steel Constr. Co.,
442 F.2d 1383, 170 USPQ 98 (CCPA 1971) .........................................6, 20
Mattel Inc. v. Funline Merchandise Co.,
81 USPQ2d 1372 (TTAB 2006) .................................................................... 33
McNeil-PPC v. Guardian Drug Co.,
984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ........................................................... 45
Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc.,
918 F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990) .................................................................10, 33
On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
229 F.3d 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 32
Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton,
214 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ..................................................................... 43
Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,
94 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 1996) ............................................................................... 41
Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Bakers Franchise Corporation,
150 USPQ 698, 1966 WL 7286 (TTAB 1966), affd,
404 F.2d 985 (CCPA 1969) ........................................................................... 40
Safer Inc. v. OMS Investments, Inc.,
94 USPQ2d 1031 (TTAB 2010) .................................................................... 51
Shen Manufacturing Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd.,
393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ....................................... 33
vi
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 8
Filed: 12/16/2015
Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc.,

748 F.2d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ....................................................................... 42
Squirtco v. Tomy Corp.,
697 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ........................................................................ 41
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP,
746 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ..................................................................... 43
Television Enterprise Network, Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc.,
630 F. Supp. 244 (D NJ 1986) ....................................................................... 45
Top Tobacco, L.P.,
101 USPQ2d 1163, 2011 WL 6099691 (TTAB Nov 21, 2011) .............19, 52
Statutes:
15 U.S.C. 1052(d) ...........................................................................................32, 45
15 U.S.C. 1057 ...................................................................................................... 29
15 U.S.C. 1067 ........................................................................................................ 1
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1) ............................................................................................... 1
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(2) ............................................................................................... 1
15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(3) ............................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(B) ......................................................................................... 1
Regulations:
7 C.F.R. 11.18(b) .................................................................................................. 31
37 C.F.R. 2.106(b)(2)(ii) ....................................................................................... 28
37 C.F.R. 2.145(d)(1) .............................................................................................. 1
vii
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 9
Filed: 12/16/2015
Other Authorities:
4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
23:6 (4th Ed.) .........................................................................................44, 45
TBMP 704.08(b) ...................................................................................................... 51
TBMP 708 (2nd Rev. 2004) ...................................................................................... 52
TMEP 1207.01(b) ................................................................................................. 43
Trademark Rule 2.122(e) ......................................................................................... 51
Trademark Rule 2.20................................................................................................ 31
viii
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 10
Filed: 12/16/2015
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Appellee certifies that there have been no previous appeals in this case, and
is unaware of any case that will directly affect or be directly affected by the
Courts decision in this case.
ix
Case: 15-1976
I.
Document: 17
Page: 11
Filed: 12/16/2015
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal of Opposition 91202418, decided by a panel of the USPTO

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (herein TTAB) under 15 U.S.C. 1067. A
final Decision and Opinion in the Opposition issued May 22, 2015(A000001-24).
Appellant filed Notice of Appeal in this Court and the USPTO on July 21,
2015 under 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(2) and 37 C.F.R. 2.145(d)(1). Appellee timely
entered its appearance on Sept 15, 2015.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(1)
and 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(B). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1071(a)(3), this Court
docketed this appeal on September 3, 2015 as appeal number 15-1976.
II.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
In a case of Initial Interest Confusion, whether the TTABs ruling, based

on a thorough review of the relevant duPont factors, that there is likelihood of
confusion between Appellants slogan BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS
and Appellees incontestable Registrations: 2,090,854; 3,129,158; and 3,215,068,
all for the marks TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS for
identical services, is supported by substantial evidence.
Case: 15-1976
III.
A.
Document: 17
Page: 12
Filed: 12/16/2015
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TTAB Decision Appealed-from by Appellant/Applicant Alley
Appellant Ryan Alley, doing business as Ryan Alley Intellectual Property

Law (Alley), seeks reversal of the TTAB Decision in Opposition 91/202,418
decided May 22, 2015 (A00001-24). That Decision sustained the Opposition of
Appellee and refused registration of Alleys mark, BUILDING ASSETS FROM
IDEAS.
B.
Appellant/Applicants Application
On June 9, 2011, Appellant filed application SN 85/342,228 for registration

on the Principal Register for the slogan mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM
IDEAS (Alleys slogan mark)(A74001- 2), alleging actual use for legal services
in the field of intellectual property law, including patent, trademark, copyright, and
trade secret procurement, transfer, and enforcement.
C.
Institution of Opposition Following Notice to Appellant Alley
Following publication for opposition on November 2, 2011 of Appellants

slogan mark, Appellee, Innovation Law Group, Ltd. (herein per context:
Appellee, Opposer or ILG), was notified by its watch service, Thompson
Reuters, of Appellants filing (A63007, 7 b.). ILG notified Alley of its concerns
regarding his filing to register a confusingly similar mark (A01007, 10, Exh 7 9
at A01026-31). After Alley continued use which ILG deemed inappropriate, ILG
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filed a Notice of Opposition on November 3, 2011 (A01001 - 31) claiming a

likelihood of confusion with, and dilution of, incontestable US Registrations:
2,090,854; 3,129,158; and 3,215,068, on the standard character slogan and
composite marks TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS
(ILGs marks) (A01001-20; A75001 7) in Classes 35 and 42, inter alia for legal
services relating to intellectual property law and strategy. Registration 3,215,068 is a
composite mark. Appellee is also owner of Registration 4,031,077 dated March 12,
2013 for the slogan mark TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO ASSETS for legal
services relating to intellectual property law, strategy, transactions and enforcement
in Class 45 (A53006, 13; Exh 26 at A53013-16). The TTAB considered
Appellees incontestable Registration 2,090,854 as exemplary of its registrations for
purposes of the likelihood of confusion issue in the Opposition. (A00008)
D.
Opposition Proceedings and Evidence Adduced
The parties stipulation for testimony affidavits or declarations in lieu of

depositions was approved by an Order dated Oct 31, 2013 (A37001).
In a Decision on Appellants Motion for Summary Judgment (A26001-8), the
Board held that they did not find relevant the Alley evidence regarding an alleged
lack of actual confusion given applicants admitted limited use of his mark only on
[his] website and related Internet pages linking thereto. . . and because the 17
months of concurrent use of the parties marks. . . is relatively short (A29006, n 6).
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Numerous objections to the evidence were filed by both parties. The Board
considered Appellees objections to the admissibility of Appellants opinion
Declarations and proffered evidence of 3rd party website use1, holding (A00004)
(emphasis supplied):
None of the evidence sought to be excluded is outcome
determinative. Moreover, the Board is capable of weighing the
relevance and strength or weakness of the objected-to testimony and
evidence, including any inherent limitations, and this precludes the
need to strike the testimony and evidence. Given these facts, coupled
with the number of objections, we see no compelling reason to
discuss the specific objections in detail. As necessary and
appropriate, we will point out any limitations applied to the evidence
or otherwise note that the evidence cannot be relied upon in the
manner sought. We have considered all of the testimony and
evidence introduced into the record. In doing so, we have kept in
mind the various objections raised by the parties and we have
accorded whatever probative value the subject testimony and
evidence merit.
Appellant stipulated that Appellee has standing and priority, the services and
the trade channels are the same (A29002-3). The TTAB so ruled (A00006-7).
Appellee ILG provided eight Testimony Declarations supported by evidence
(A00005-6), of which four: Dulin: van Os: Parks: and Dennis, were percipient
witnesses as to the use and effect of Appellees marks (A38001-21 and 36-149;
A63002-55). Appellee also provided two expert Declarations: Kirk V. Thomas, an
Internet, website, and Google Analytics expert (A38028-35); and Laurel Black, a
Appellee did not waive its objections to admissibility by responding to them

below or here. The Board should have excluded the alleged 3rd party use and the
unsupported self-serving opinions of Appellant.
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nationally-renown marketing expert in the field of corporate identity, brand building,

and communications (A38022-27). Appellant only provided declarations by himself,
offering no expert or independent percipient witnesses. (A43002-37; A6002-37;
A43002-37, refiled as A61002-37). In rebuttal of statements in the Appellants
declarations, Appellee provided two rebuttal declarations: one each of Dulin
(A53002-18; Exhibits at A38036-149), and marketing expert Black (A53019-25).
E.
The TTAB Decision and Opinion
After Oral Argument, a panel of the Board unanimously sustained the

Opposition of ILG, and Refused Registration (A00001-24). The Decision was
rendered in a non-precedental, 24 page, Opinion by Administrative Trademark
Judge Bergsman, focusing in detail on the sole issue of likelihood of confusion.
Judge Bergsman prefaced the Decision by stating (A00007)(emphasis supplied):
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all
of the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors
bearing on the issue of likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973).
See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65
USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The Board focused on two key considerations: a) Similarities between the
marks, and b) Similarities between the services, finding that For purposes of
determining likelihood of confusion, the services are identical)(A00008). The
Board noted that besides those considerations, any other relevant du Pont factors
in the proceeding now before us, will be considered in this decision. (A00007)
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F.
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Findings by the Board
In its Decision, the Board made eleven findings in connection with its review
of the duPont factors (at: A00008; A00013; A00014, fn 38; A00018; A00019-20;
A00021-22; A00024). Appellant below provided Internet cites to alleged 3rd party
use which were objected-to by Appellee on grounds of: lack of foundation; hearsay
and/or irrelevant; and lack of authentication and corroboration. In its evaluation the
Board deemed such citations of similar taglines simply corroborated what we
intuitively knew. . . the mark [of Appellee ILG: TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO
BUSINESS ASSETS] is highly suggestive. (A00018) The Board followed the law
that suggestive marks are entitled to protection, stating (A0019-20):
we must keep in mind what the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the predecessor or our primary reviewing court, said in
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Natl Steel Constr. Co., 442
F.2d 1383, 170 USPQ 98, 99 (CCPA 1971), in finding likelihood of
confusion between uses of NATIONAL in a cancellation proceeding:
Neither trademarks nor the public are adequately protected
unless decisions in cases of this kind are based on a realistic
appraisal of the likelihood of purchasers or prospective
purchasers being confused as to source regardless of theoretical
weakness of a mark.
The Board held that both marks mean and engender the [same] commercial
impression (A00021-22) and are similar in their entireties in terms of
appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression.(A00022). The Board
concluded its analysis holding (A00024)(emphasis supplied):
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we find that Applicants mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM

IDEAS for legal services in intellectual property, including patent,
trademark, copyright, and trade secret procurement, transfer, and
enforcement is likely to cause confusion with TRANSFORMING
IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS for legal services relating to
intellectual property law and strategy.
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee disagrees with Appellants Statement of Facts as being slanted and

incomplete, and accordingly supplements the Statement of Facts as follows:
A.
Opportunity for Actual Confusion to Have Occurred
First, Appellant, Ryan E. Alley, is proprietor of Ryan Alley Intellectual

Property Law, engaged in solo IP practice since mid- 2011 in Arlington, Virginia.
During all times of the prosecution of his application, the Opposition and this
Appeal, he only references online advertising (A63009-11), in a website under
his trade name: Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law. No other interstate
commerce marketing evidence was adduced. The evidence shows Appellants
mark was invisible on the Internet between his inception in May 2011 until March
2013 (A43006; A38031; A63011-12).
Alley stated under oath in his application that the date of his first actual use
of the slogan mark in interstate commerce, via the Internet, was at least as early as
May 26, 2011. However, by his own admission, Appellants mark was not
Internet searchable for almost 2-years thereafter, Alley having instructed a designer
creating his website that the slogan was to be embedded in a trade name image
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block (A43006). The impossibility of searching his slogan, because it was

embedded in an image, was called to Appellants attention in Appellees January
2013 Thomas Declaration (A38028-35, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11). Thomas testified about
the non-searchable location of the Alley slogan (A38032-33)(emphasis supplied):
11. To prove the point addressed in the paragraphs above, on
January 9, 2013, I went to Google and entered the following search:
site:alleylegal.com "building assets from ideas". This is a focused
Google search going directly to the Alley Website and searching for
the exact phrase in quotation marks. This query I searched resulted in
no documents found on the Alley Website for that exact phrase (the
upper or lower case of the words is immaterial to the search). This is
because those exact words are found only in the embedded image
and the hidden keywords of the Alley Website, and those words
are not indexed by Google and are not searchable. Because of
these facts, I believe that no one searching in Google just for the
words building, asset, or idea would find the Alley Website
because those words are not repeated in the actual displayed text
of the Alley Website (outside of an embedded image or outside of
the linked blog portion of the site which could change more
frequently). Likewise, the actual phrase, building assets from ideas
is not repeated in the displayed text of the Alley Website and this
exact phrase would not be found by a Google searcher, using those
search terms.
That shows Appellants slogan was invisible in the sole marketing channel
he used in 2011, 2012 and part of 2013. After the Thomas testimony, Appellant
changed his webpage, he says in March 2013, by embedding the slogan into text.
At the same time he copied Appellees gear theme.2 Until well into the Opposition
testimony period, March 2013, the only way to find Appellant on the Internet was
(A38028-35, 66-67; A63011-12; A53003). See Alley Testimony Declaration, Feb

28, 2014, 7 (A43006, 7).
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through his trade name, not the slogan which he seeks to register. For nearly two
years, the invisible Alley slogan could serve no marketing function, per se, and
could not be the basis for an instance of actual confusion.3
Appellant testifies that consumer selection of legal service providers is
identity driven, resulting from referrals and in-person introductions followed
by interviews with potential clients.4 Appellant testifies to a lack of marketing
function of his slogan, stating in his Declaration of Feb 28, 2014: I have never
been identified by or asked about my slogan Building Assets from Ideas in
these conversations (with potential clients) (A43011-12, 17).5 Appellants
marketing identity is his trade name: Ryan Alley Intellectual Property Law.6
Second, by arguing that no actual confusion means no likelihood of
confusion (not the law), Appellant seeks to misdirect the Court by misrepresenting
there is significance in geographical separation of physical location of the parties.
Appellants Statement of Facts misrepresentation is: Applicant [Appellant ]
and Opposer [Appellee] are both providers of legal services in intellectual
In this regard, since invisible, no attempt to link Appellees mark with his could
show up in Google Analytics.
4
Alley Declaration 02-28-14, 16 (A43011, 16).
5
This comment appears to be an attempt at misdirection.
6
Of course that raises the question, if his slogan serves no marketing function, why
should Appellant want such a slogan mark, much less fight so hard to register it
when he could easily pick another slogan? It follows by Appellants actions that he
admits the slogan is a powerful client motivation-to-contact tool.
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property, with practices on opposite sides of the country, Appellants Brief, pg

3. He also states Opposer is a small IP law practice in Washington state, id.
In contrast to Appellant, Appellee provided uncontested documentary and
testimonial evidence showing an extensively advertised broad practice scope: a
long period of National and International legal practice, including continuous use
of its registered slogan marks since 1996 (A63002-55; A38036-149; A38002-10,
15-21). During the use of its registered mark TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO
BUSINESS ASSETS, Dulin, the principal of Appellee, was a partner of the wellknown Virginia firm of Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Meyer and Neustadt,
managing its West Coast Office, then located in San Jose, CA. In addition, Dulin,
during his >40-years of practice (as ILG for the past 15) has been admitted in, and
has had clients in, Virginia, Illinois, California and Washington, as well as
extensive practice before the USPTO in Virginia.
Third, Alley argues that the period of geographic isolation7 and lack of a
documented instance of actual confusion is 4 years (Appellants Brief, p 26, n 1),
including time after testimony closed and counting the almost 2-year invisibility
period. Based on this, Alley seeks to overturn the Boards finding that the argued
Geographical isolation is irrelevant in view of Alleys heavy reliance on the

Internet. Both parties being registered to practice before the USPTO, their patent
practices are nationwide. See Argument below pg 33, fn 33 citing Octocom Sys.,
Inc., v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc., 918, F.2d 937 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See CBS
Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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concurrent use period is given a neutral weighting in the DuPont factors

analysis. However, the Board accorded Alley a period of 2 years of
simultaneous use from the close of Opposers testimony period to the date of
decision. That is generous in favor of Appellant, in that it gives him credit during
this litigation, and an additional period of 3 months during invisibility. Since the
Opposition was filed on Nov 3, 2011, mid-way through the admitted 2011-2013
invisibility period (A43006), there is substantial evidence to support an even
shorter period of barely over 2 years for an opportunity for actual confusion to
arise. Factually, this factor should not weigh neutral, but rather toward a finding of
likelihood of confusion, particularly in view of no evidence of other types of
advertising or scope of practice by Appellant.
The Boards found a significant gap in Appellants evidence: we do not
have any evidence regarding the extent of Applicants advertising or the
geographic scope of his practice. That finding is well supported. The absence
of Appellants evidence is not factual evidence of absence of potential for
confusion. The burden was on Appellant to prove the extent of his advertising and
geographic scope beyond an Internet listing of his trade name, during which his
slogan was embedded in a non-searchable image.
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B.
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Degree of Sophistication of Clients
Appellant conflates representations of his process of informing prospective

clients after initial contact, with the degree of care taken by sophisticated
purchasers of IP services, while ignoring the Initial Interest Confusion nature of
this case.
As a result of Alleys client informational process arguments, the Board
found that purchasers selecting intellectual property counsel would exercise a
high degree of care (A00013). The Board weighed the degree of care in favor of
finding no likelihood of confusion. Rather, the facts show that weight should be no
worse than neutral, yet the function of the marks to motivate contact is a highly
positive factor showing likelihood of pre-sale confusion, also known as Initial
Interest Confusion.
Appellee and Appellant market to both sophisticated and unsophisticated
clients. As for Appellant, a sole IP practitioner representing individuals, some of
his clients are unsophisticated. Alley acknowledges this, stating in his Declaration:
I have been involved with client servicing and development for a broad range of
consumers. . ., including completely IP-unaware individuals and start-up
companies. . (A43008, 12), which he calls unsophisticated consumers
unfamiliar with IP. . . (A43012, 18).
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Appellees slogan speaks to both classes of consumers equally,

unsophisticated and sophisticated potential clients, albeit in somewhat different
ways. Appellees slogan mark functions as a strong tool to motivate clients to
contact the service supplier: It tells both classes of clients what Appellee does and
that it understands their goal for IP protection (A38022-27; A38011-14; A3800110; A63002-55; A53002-29). The nature of the services, the channels of trade and
the targeted classes of consumer clients are the same for both parties. These are
three positive factors in favor of likelihood of confusion (A00008 9).
Appellees mark is fully searchable8. Indeed, the flash page of Appellees
website highlights the two words held by the Board to be key in the likelihood of
confusion analysis: IDEAS and ASSETS, which are inscribed on two rotating,
inter-meshing gears (A38067). Significantly, Appellants webpage at the same
time, and for some unknown period, used gears as the background image right next
to his slogan (A38066).9
Appellee provided uncontested expert testimony by nationally renown
branding expert Black. She compared the distinctive nature of Appellees
registered mark with the tagline (slogan) of Appellant (A38024, 6):
8
9
See Thomas Declaration, yielding 19 pages of results, A38028-36 at pg 32, 13.

Leading to a reasonable inference of bad faith.
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The taglines under consideration here [Appellant/Applicants

BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS and Appellee/Opposers
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS] are also
distinctive in providing this goal: the development of the idea into an
asset.
With respect to unsophisticated inventors, Blacks unrebutted expert
testimony explains how this type of trademark functions (A38024, 6)(emphasis
supplied): For unsophisticated inventors, the taglines crystallize a path to a goal.
Black then testified regarding sophisticated inventors, entrepreneurs and executives,
likewise un-rebutted, as follows (id)(emphasis supplied):
For sophisticated inventors, or entrepreneurs and executives
whose responsibility is to protect the Intellectual Property of a
company, the tagline appears concisely expressive, and therefore
shows that the firm understands that the company needs to convert its
IP into assets, exactly what the prospect seeks.
Appellant Alley conflates the duty of fully informing a prospective client
after initial contact, with their degree of sophistication (ability to understand the
information). The Board looked to the declaration testimony of Appellant reciting
his disclosures to prospective clients as showing clients take a great degree of
care in selecting attorneys to represent them. But that occurs after the marks have
functioned as they should, to motivate the client to make initial contact with the
attorney/firm (see discussion in the Argument below, VII C., pp 43-47). It is only
after initial interest contact motivation that the degree of care informational
process begins, in satisfaction of Bar requirements. Factually, the Board over-
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weighed a post-confusion, required informational process as a degree of care

factor.
C.
Informing a Client Is a Duty, Whether Sophisticated or Not
As to informing the client, Appellant does no more than what Appellee

does, and states on the ILG Contact Us page (emphasis supplied)(A01001-31;
see A01006-7, Exh 5-6 at A01021-25):
We can answer your general questions about our legal practice by
phone or email. But in order to answer specific questions about your
project, and to help you determine whether you would like to
retain us as your Intellectual Property Counsel, we offer a one-onone Initial Client Conference, which can last up to two hours.
There we will answer all of your questions, provide you with
information about the process, and advise you on options for
pursuing your project.
Fully informing a client, regardless of whether they are sophisticated or not is a
requirement of all Bars, and is not solely determinative of the degree of care
exercised by purchasers of the legal services offered. The degree of care more
properly should be weighed at the initial point of encounter, the presentation of the
contact-motivation slogan. Thus, as to degree of care, at worst, that factor is
factually neutral, as information must be provided to both classes of prospective
clients equally.
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D.
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Function of Both Marks in Marketing Legal Services: Contact

Motivation
As a result of extensive Appellant testimony about the informational

disclosure after client contact, Appellees testimony about the function of the
mark was under-weighed by the Board, which under-weight Appellant seeks to
perpetuate. When Dulin testified that some of Appellees clients remarked that its
registered mark is cool (A53004), that was not proffered as evidence that
prospective clients for IP services are unsophisticated. Rather, Appellees evidence
points out that the nature of the mark functions as contact motivation: to inform
prospective clients of both a path to a goal and that the firm understands that the
prospect needs to convert its IP into assets. (A38022-27; A38011-14; A38001-10;
A63002-55; A53002-29).
Indeed, the unrebutted expert evidence is that both marks function to
provide contact motivation, a key goal of professional services brand
development. Black, the nationally renowned branding expert, testified in her
Declaration, 5 (A38023-24)(emphasis supplied):10
5. Both of the marks at issue are word marks as distinct from logos
or composite marks (logos + words), and both function as branding
taglines, telling the prospective client the strategic goals the
respective firms offer, with respect to providing the legal services.
Taglines, also known as slogans, function to provide prospects with a
condensation of the essence of the service or product offered, so that
10
Her Declaration was cited with approval by the Board. Alley did not provide
admissible evidence in rebuttal, merely self-serving, irrelevant attorney opinion.
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they can quickly get what the firm can do for them. Such taglines
are intended, in connection with services, to motivate the prospect
to make initial contact, or in the case of an Internet presence, to click
on the Contact Us button on the firms web page. Such contact
motivation is a key goal of professional services brand
development taglines.
Dulin testified in his rebuttal Declaration (A53004, 7) that: clients have indicated
to me that the ILG mark piques their interest in what we do, and motivates them
to contact us. Appellant agrees, stating I conceived Applicant Mark as a catchy
way of restating intellectual property services that used the quirky term build. .
. (A43002, 3; refiled as A61002,3)(emphasis supplied). Appellants slogan is
alleged by him to be catchy whereas ILGs is cool, but factually they both
serve the same function: contact motivation.
Appellant consistently refers to his mark, as a slogan or four word
slogan, Appellant Declaration, (A43003, -8, -33; 7, 17, 24; refiled: A61003),
and in his brief in the Opposition below (A59013, -19, -27, -28). Appellants
slogan is a catchy way to motivate prospective clients to inquire about his services,
only after which Alley induces them to engage him.
As further factual evidence before the Board, percipient witness Parks,
Treasurer and principal of TP Solar, Inc. of Paramount, CA a solar cell equipment
manufacturer, testified on the importance of contact motivation as an important
function of Appellees mark (A38013, 5)(emphasis supplied):
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5. On checking out ILGs website, I was immediately struck by the

ILG slogan Transforming Ideas Into Business Assets. I found the
slogan to be creative, attention-getting, and insightfully outside the
box. When hiring a lawyer I believe it is important that the lawyer
knows more than just "the law" but also that the lawyer knows how to
apply the law toward client goals. While some applications of the law
are "standard" other situations require the lawyer/advocate to be
creative and to consider the facts and issues from a number of
different angles. ILG's slogan immediately conveyed to me that the
firm thinks creatively and strategically. I believe these characteristics
exhibit cost effective, goal oriented lawyering, characteristics of the
type of law firm that we were looking for as being best for my
company's needs. The slogan was a powerful and primary
motivation for me to call Mr. Dulin regarding the services of ILG,
and how a long distance relationship would work out. Accordingly
I promptly called and interviewed him by phone.
Parks continues in his Declaration 6, id., to describe the subsequent information
interview, after which Appellant/ILG was engaged by TPSI. This is solid factual
evidence of the initial interest nature and function of Appellants marks. Appellee
presented no evidence whatsoever on this decisive factor.
E.
Policing Efforts by Appellee/Opposer/ILG of its Incontestable

Marks:
Under the heading IP Services Landscape` in Appellants Brief, Alley

presents a list of 62 Internet sources spread over 8 pages purporting to show
third party uses. Appellant claims this provides factual support for his argument
about concurrent use without occurrence of actual confusion. No registrations
are cited. Appellee, Opposer below, filed objections to these citations on the
grounds that they were neither probative of use in commerce as trademarks, nor
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accompanied by non-hearsay evidence indicating the length of time of alleged

usage, the degree of exposure or the impact of such uses.11 Indeed, Appellant cites
repeatedly to web.archive.org, or webcache, or 404 Page not found links.
Appellee pointed out to the Board below that descriptive fair uses are
irrelevant under the 6th duPont factor, and factually inconsistent with Alleys
argument that his similar slogan is a trademark suitable for registration.12
Appellants 62-item Brief-list is a misleading rehash of his submission
below, which the Board fully considered. The Board broke the list down into
potential trademark uses vs. text uses, some in ads, leaving out many misleading
duplicates (multiple links to the same site, making it appear like more than one
user), books and articles, non-legal services uses, and entities outside the United
States. The Board considered in detail the resulting 17 most relevant examples of
law firms using the same or similar marks as taglines (see chart at A00014 16)13.
After a thorough review, the Board held that the third party use only
corroborates what we intuitively knew. . . [Appellees mark]. . . is highly
suggestive (A00018). The Board then pointed out, regardless, suggestive marks
11
A66002-34, 11-13, Citing Top Tobacco L.P., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 2011 WL
6099691, *8-9 (TTAB Nov 21, 2011).
12
A66012, n 6. Appellant argued to the Board that Appellees mark contained
commonplace elements (his Brief, p 16), and that the record lacked any
evidence of suggestiveness. Not only does Appellant confuse the burden of
proof, but Appellees incontestable registrations establish, as a matter of law, that
its marks are not descriptive.
13
Indeed, Appellants prolix list constituted 135 cites, most duplicates.
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are entitled to protection, citing Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Natl Steel
Constr. Co., 442 F.2d 1383 (CCPA 1971). All three of Appellees marks are
incontestable.
Rather than address any supposed errors in the Boards analysis and
distillation of the original 67-item list down to 17 most relevant ones, Appellant
merely repeats all of them in his Statement of Facts as if they were proven uses.
Appellant argues that the Board erred in the weight given them as if they were
facts. This is misdirection, as there was no legally probative real use evidence
proffered by Appellant to support the alleged use cites.
Essentially Appellant, in disregard of the limitations on this Courts
resources, invites the Court to take hours to examine each of his mass of links. As
a matter of fact, the Board already did that detailed analysis, winnowing down the
Alley cites to a 17-item list, because, as non-existent or mere archives, the
remainder cannot be evidence of current use. The excess Alley cites are simply
Internet fossils which are not probative of 3rd party concurrent use. Appellant does
not point to any probative evidence he provided the Board that anyone looking for
legal services would search The Wayback Machine, web.archive.org, or Google
webcache pages. Factually, those are simply not trademark use evidence.
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By way of factual analysis of Appellants Brief list14: the first 10 items

(corresponding to Board #1) are the same, referring to Hoffman and Baron. Per its
standard practice of contacting infringers, Appellee is in contact with it to
terminate its use (A53005-6; A63008). As for Appellants #s 11, 12, Schell, dba
Rocky Mountain Patent (Board #2), Appellee sent him a cease and desist letter; as
a result he abandoned his trademark application. Others are non-trade mark uses
and irrelevant. For example Appellants, #13 (not listed by the Board) leads to a
social page that states The Meetup Group youre looking for doesnt exist. #14
was a site for linking freelancers with jobs; its non-legal services trademark use
page no longer exists (not listed by the Board). #15, 16 Fletcher (Board #3) has
been sent a cease and desist letter. Appellee sent a cease and desist letter to
Fountainhead Law, #17, 18 (Board #4), and it agreed to terminate use. #19 (Board
#5), firstpointip cite leads nowhere, a blank page, and is meaningless as
showing any use.
Appellants #s 20, 21, 22 (Board #6) are duplicates to Scott Redmond, a
San Francisco patent agent, dba Clever Industries; #20, 21 in fact do not use the
slogan; the URL goes to a password protected log-in page for existing clients of
Innovation Center; #22 is Redmonds listing, and there is no longer the use
14
In the fact summary which follows, Appellee follows the 17-item list in the
Board Opinion (A00014-16) rather than the 62 items in Appellants Brief. Thus the
first item in the Boards chart is herein termed Board #1, and that is keyed to the
items from Appellants list in the chart on his Brief pages 4-11.
21
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attributed. #23, 24 (Board #7) are duplicates of Clock Tower Law; Appellee sent
it a cease and desist notice; it agreed to stop use (A63007-8). #25 27 (Board #8)
are to the Santangelo Law Offices - The Idea Asset Group: #25 returns a 404
Not Found page; #26, the Home page, does NOT show the phrase Alley claims it
does, nor under the firm name; #27 returns a notice Wayback Machine doesnt
have that page archived.
As for #28 and 30 (Board #9), Steve Gruber Intellectual Property; #28
returns a Wix.com Error 404 page not found notice; #29 has no such language,
and after contact by Appellee, the language in #30 was deleted from his Linkedin
profile. Appellants #s 31, 32, Marbury Law, #31 is a 404 not found link, while
#32 is not archived. Thus, the Board did not put 31-32 on its list. Appellants #s
33 38 (Board #10), Boston Legal Consultant Group, LLC is not a law firm
offering Intellectual Property Law services; rather, it is a 1-person business
consulting service of Karmiah Boston in Atlanta Georgia; #33 returns a blank
page with the message bad file descriptor; #34 is a Facebook page in which the
slogan is cut-off and essentially unreadable; none of 33- 38 are legal services
trademark usages.
The Boards chart #s 11, 12 and 15 17 use very different phrases. Board
#17 is not for IP legal services. Board #13, Adams IP, LLC (Appellant #55), does
not now appear to use the phrase Ideas Into Assets; rather, it uses three cycling
22
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images with the phrases: Enforcing rights for our clients, Pat. Pend.; Protecting
Business from Coast to Coast; and Building Assets One Filing At a Time.
Board #14, Bateman IP (Appellants #57 59), as of May 1, 2015 has merged
with another firm and no longer uses the phrase Where Innovation Becomes
Assets.
The Board table (A00015 - 17) recites 8 examples of ad text (herein items
A H). Item A is again Redmond, who has ceased. Item B, Marbury Law is not
found. Item G on pg 17 is a book title, not a legal services slogan. The rest are just
text, not shown by admissible probative evidence to be trademark uses for the
services in issue.
Thus, out of the 17 the Board singled-out after its thorough review as being
the most relevant examples of Internet cites: 2 have no active page (#5 and 11):
2 more are not offering legal services (#s 10 and 17); 5 more are no longer using
the listed phrases, if they ever did (#s 6, 8, 9, 13, 14); 4 more have or had different
phrases or slogans (#8, 12, 15 and 16); 2 more have cease and desist demands
pending (#s 1 and 3); and the remaining 6 have all stopped their usages of concern
after enforcement by Appellee (#s 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9). See A63002-55, A53002-18
and A38036-149 for Appellees on-going policing efforts resulting in the stopping
of the alleged third party uses.
23
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The facts in evidence show that as part of its policing efforts, Appellee uses
Thompson Reuters watch services to notify it of newly filed trademark
applications (A63006-7; Exh 22-1 through 22-79 at A38069-149). Thompson
promptly notified ILG of the filing by Appellant for registration of his slogan
BUILDING ASSETS FROM IDEAS (A63007, 7b). Appellee requested Alley
choose another slogan. Appellee did not threaten Alley with an Opposition.
Rather, Appellant merely informed Alley that if he did not withdraw his
application, the next step would be an Opposition proceeding, as ILG had done on
previous occasions with other applicants (e.g., A63007). Appellant did not drop
his application, so Appellee filed an Opposition Petition. The Trademark Office
agreed that there were grounds for Opposition, which was instituted.
Alley claims in his Declaration that he, personally, conducted a . . .
USPTO trademark database search . . . using asset and idea in
combination and did not find Appellees marks (A43002-3, 5, emphasis added;
refiled as A61002-3). However, Appellees percipient witness van Os, a registered
patent and trademark paralegal with then-13-years experience in the field, testified
that an identical USPTO TESS search in fact turns up Appellees three
uncontestable registrations, TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS
ASSETS. In her uncontested testimony she states (A26144; A38008-9), and her
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Exhibits B-1 and B-2 show (A26149-150), that she searched both (Ideas) and
(Assets), and its inverse: (Assets) and (Ideas), with identical results:
10. Anyone searching the USPTO Trademark Search (TESS)
database, even doing the Basic Wordmark Search under (Assets) and
(Ideas) or (Ideas) and (Assets) would find the marks of the
Opposer, see Exh B. [A26149-150, Exh B-1, B-2]
The Board had the following van Os search evidence before it (A26149; A38008):
Items 1, 3, 4 and 7 are Appellees marks (#1 is now Reg. 4,031,077). Item 2
is Appellant/Alleys application. Items 5 and 6 are examples of Appellees
enforcement against Keschner (A63007; A26080-82) and citation of Appellees
25
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mark against Cherdak, whereupon he abandoned his application (A63007, 47-48).

A TESS search today under (Ideas) and (Assets) shows abandonment by Rocky
Mountain Patent (Schell) who Appellee requested to cease and desist use.
It is uncontested fact that the ONLY registrations in such a combination
search are those of Appellee.15 Appellants claim of no search results are contrary
to fact. Appellant does not otherwise claim, much less substantiate, that he did any
competent or thorough clearance search before filing his application.
Vigorously pursuing Appellant as part of enforcement by Appellee is
substantial evidence of strong efforts to police its registered marks. There is
substantial evidence in the record, on which the Board fairly relied, to find that
Appellee has adequately policed all its marks over the years.16 Appellee has
successfully retained ownership of its trade name after misappropriation17. It also
stopped confusingly similar uses of its Ideas/Assets marks, in addition to
15
A 2-minute TESS search today confirms a combination search produces

Appellees registered marks. The simplicity of locating ILGs registrations
evidences a lack of candor and bona fide good faith on the part of Alley, reflecting
broadly on the weight to be given to his self-serving opinions in his remaining
declarations.
16
See Dulin Declaration Exh 15 (A38036-45) and Exh 22 (A38069 148).
Appellee had spent tens of thousands of dollars in out of pocket costs and time
value of firm services for policing the mark at issue (A26054, 4 i, and today that
number is obviously in excess of 6 figures.
17
ILG v Gottlieb, Cancellation Petition 92-043533 Granted; Gottliebs mark
cancelled 9/24/2005; ILGs superseding Reg 3,105,968. (A26093-102; A3803645).
26
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Appellant: by Keschner18; Fountainhead19; Clock Tower Group20; Palet Valo21;

Harshaw Research Group22; Thomas Communications, Inc.23; and Rocky Mountain
Patent LLC24, with others pending.
Thus, in the period of 2004 to date, Appellee/Opposer has been involved in
active policing of its suite of marks, initiating 12 actions and currently successful
in 10, with this one actively on-going, and one other in discussion. The law does
not require Appellee to sue everyone at once; it is entitled to manage its resources
without loss of its trademark rights. Indeed, in view of the facts of extensive
enforcement by Appellee, there is substantial evidence to support that its continued
active efforts strongly weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion.
18
ILG v Elizabeth M. Kechner Ideas Are Assets; ILG Opposition sustained

3/17/2008 (A26080-82).
19
ILG v Fountainhead Law Group, Cease and Desist sent 7/18/2012 after which
Fountainhead stopped use.
20
ILG v Clock Tower Group, Cease and Desist sent 7/18/2012 after which Clock
Tower stopped use (A26053-54, 86-87).
21
ILG v Palet Valo, Cease and Desist of June 11, 2004 resulted in Palet Valo
stopping thereafter (A26054, 89-92).
22
ILG v Harshaw Research Group, July 6, 2004; Cease and Desist by ILG
complied-with by Harshaw (A53002-18; Ex 25-1 and 25-2 at A53011-12)..
23
ILG v Thomas Communications, Inc.; Thomas SN 11/041592 for Business
Transformation & Innovation was abandoned by it on 3/2/2007 (A53002-18; Exh
24-1 and 24-2 at A53009-10).
24
ILG is currently challenging Hoffman and Barron over its mis-use (A53005-6).
27
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VI.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case is about Initial Interest Confusion, not about informing a postcontact prospect about the attorneys background in order to gain engagement.
While the factual findings of the Board are supported by substantial evidence of
record, properly weighed in the light of the nature and function of the marks in the
arena of Initial Interest Confusion, the result would be even stronger for the
conclusion of likelihood of confusion in favor of Appellee.
The Board reviewed all the duPont factors relevant to this case for which
evidence was properly made of record. Appellee has long-standing priority, and
all its marks, TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS, are
incontestable.25 Appellant has stipulated that the services, channels of trade, and
target consumers are identical.26 Since Appellant filed no counterclaim, he is
barred from attacking Appellees registrations directly or collaterally on the basis
that they are either generic or merely descriptive27 (A260012). Appellants
purported good faith in choosing his mark is legally insignificant, and his claim
25
A fact that Appellant fails to mention in his Brief; Opposer has registered
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO ASSETS for IP legal services, Reg. 4,301,077,
made of record at A53006, 13; Registration shown at (A53013-16).
26
(A16003; A26009-11)Appellant makes reference to his personal referral
network, as if Opposer, in this field for 50 years has none. It is the nature of the
channel of trade that is identical, even if their networks are not the same.
27
37 C.F.R. 2.106(b)(2)(ii).
28
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that he did not know of Appellees marks is, frankly, incredible. Appellant ignores
that by law he is on constructive notice of Appellees rights.28
Appellants evidence of use or descriptive use of similar phrases or marks
by others is by links to websites, many of which are dead ends, not found, not
trademark use, or merely fossil listings. His evidence is not accompanied by any
probative, authenticated, admissible, non-hearsay corroborating evidence. A
website does not per se establish use. Internet listings of words or phrases do not
constitute marketing channel overlap and at best are probative only for what they
show on their face, not as proof of the matters he argues are asserted therein.
In essence, Appellant asks this Court to radically change the law to declare
anything on the Internet has a conclusive degree of probity, regardless of a lack of
foundation, being hearsay and/or irrelevant, and lacking authentication or
corroboration.
Nor would individual words of a mark, arguably descriptive or
commonplace element[s], entitle applicant to use the words in combination in a
confusingly similar trademark manner. In connection with unproven use by others
of arguably somewhat similar slogans, the Board determined that at best they go to
suggestiveness of Appellees mark, not evidence of no likelihood of confusion.
Indeed, some are clearly closer to Appellants mark than Appellees. The
28
15 U.S.C. 1057; van Os Declaration, 10 and Exh B-1, B-2 (A38008-9; see
A26012).
29
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continuous enforcement efforts of Appellee have been substantial over the period
of 2004 to date, addressing all of the alleged uses considered by the Board; as
such its enforcement efforts weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Accordingly, the sole key issue on appeal is the similarity of the marks as
they function as motivation to generate initial client contact. Appellants thinly
veiled collateral attack on Appellees marks is an improper attempt to cloud that
key issue of similarity by arguing each separate word is descriptive.29 Properly
considered in their entirety, Appellants mark BUILDING ASSETS FROM
IDEAS slogan is a mere inversion of Appellees incontestable marks,
TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS. Both marks convey the
identical commercial impression. Appellees nationally-renown branding experts
strong testimony is uncontested factual evidence that both marks serve the same
marketing function: both are branding taglines that motivate the prospect to
make initial contact.30
29
Appellant uses the term common element, by which he means the word is
descriptive. Appellants arguments that Appellees marks are descriptive of legal
services are legally precluded and should be stricken because Appellees
registrations are incontestable. Hence, a per curiam affirmance is proper.
30
Alley attempts to blunt testimony of Black, not by providing factual admissible
evidence of an expert, but rather by deliberately conflating an attorneys duty to
fully inform a prospective client of his services, with the degree of sophistication of
the prospect. He also professes that his slogan is unimportant to his marketing,
stating I have never been identified by or asked about my slogan Building
Assets from Ideas in these conversations (with potential clients)(A43011-12,
17). Why fight so hard for a useless slogan unless in fact it is a contact motivator?
30
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Appellant does exactly what he claims the Board erred in doing: he dissects
the marks while trying to make an argument against the finding of similarity.
Appellants self-serving, unqualified, personal opinion declarations proffered as
evidence are suspect, as exemplified by the lack of credibility of his claim that he
did not find any of Appellees marks in his personal pre-filing search, yet all of
which are found in a brief TESS search.31 Appellants declarations should be given
little, if any, weight. Appellants opposed mark poses a clear likelihood of confusion
with Appellees mark. The Boards Decision should be sustained per curiam.
VII.
A.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review:
The Board based its likelihood of confusion Decision on the appropriate

standard of review. Appellant takes no issue with that. The Board stated its
determination under Section 2(d) was based on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors bearing on the issue of likelihood
of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (CCPA 1973)
(emphasis supplied). See also In re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (A00007). Only the factors for which evidence has properly
been made of record should be considered as the duPont court explains, the
relevant factors when of record, must be considered, Cunningham v. Laser
31
Alley has a duty of candor under 37 C.F.R. 11.18(b) and Trademark Rule 2.20.
(See A52006-7; A38008; A26149).
31
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Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 946 (Fed. Cir 2000), quoting duPont, id. at 567
(emphasis in original). There is no separate burden of proof hurdle for each factor
individually, id. at 951.
In this Appeal, the Boards findings on individual duPont factors are
reviewed for substantial evidence. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc.,
281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Boards factual determinations as to a
relevant duPont factor will be upheld if they are reasonable, account for the
record as a whole, and are based on something more than a scintilla of evidence.
See On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed. Cir.
2000). See also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (2000) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938), Substantial evidence means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion). Appellee below proved a likelihood of confusion by a preponderance
of the evidence, Cunningham, id. at 951.
In any likelihood of confusion analysis, the focus is on the two key
considerations: the similarities between the marks, and the similarities
between the services. See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098 (CCPA 1976) (The fundamental inquiry mandated by 2(d)32 goes to
the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and
32
15 U.S.C. 1052(d).
32
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differences in the marks.). The evidentiary elements of the factors recited in

duPont are not listed in order of merit, and in any particular case one element or
group of elements may play a dominant role, duPont, id 1361-62. As held by this
Court, Neither we nor the board, however, need consider every duPont factor,
Shen Manufacturing Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350,
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A single duPont factor may be dispositive in certain cases,
though typically the key considerations are the similarities between the marks
and goods or services recited in the parties registrations and applications. Mattel
Inc. v. Funline Merchandise Co., 81 USPQ2d 1372, 1374 (TTAB 2006).
Here the Board found the services are identical (A72007-8); neither party
contests that finding. This key factor identity of services weighs strongly in favor
of likelihood of confusion. Where the services are identical, the degree of similarity
necessary to find likelihood of confusion need not be as great as where there is a
recognizable disparity between the services, Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012); accord Mattel Inc., id. at 1374.33
33
In a failed attempt to distinguish services, Alley argued there are different

channels of trade based on different personal referral networks (A59041-42). But
[t]he authority is legion that the question of registrability of an applicants mark
must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the
application regardless of . . .the particular channels of trade or the class of
purchasers to which the goods are directed. Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston
Computer Servs., Inc. 918 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied).
Notably, Alley failed to provide any evidence of his own personal referral
network, much less define it.
33
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B.
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The Board Properly Considered the Marks in their Entirety It is

Appellant Who Improperly Dissects the Marks.
The Board was rigorous in its analysis, citing the same governing law that
Appellant invokes here (A00020-21). The Board found that the marks are similar
in their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, meaning and commercial
impression (A00022). In its analysis, the Board determined that the marks are
similar because they share the words Assets and Ideas in taglines that mean
the same thing. Trademark law does not require exact similitude to conclude that
two marks are similar. Hercules Inc. v. Natl Starch and Chem. Corp., 223 USPQ
1244, 1246 (TTAB 1984). Thus, the differences between the marks at issue do not
obviate their similarity.(emphasis supplied.)
Appellee here focuses on the 2 principal arguments in Appellants Brief.
First, Appellant argues the Board erred on the 1st duPont factor, comparison of the
two marks. Second, Appellant argues extensively that the Board erred on the 8th
factor, enough time for opportunity for confusion to occur, by not considering the
entire record; he attempts a re-weighing but fails to show there was no substantial
evidence for the Boards findings.
In the spirit of throwing in the kitchen sink, Appellant mentions in passing
that the Board did not weigh fully the 3rd (trade channels), 4th (extreme care
exercised by consumers), 6th (closer marks in the same field of service), 9th
(single service useage; a niche single office), 10th (market interface) and 12th
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(potential for conflict) factors. Appellant says the Board was correct in its findings
on the 4th and 6th duPont factors. Appellant does not focus on factors 2, 5, 7, 11
and 13, although he asks the Court to consider his evidence on the 8th factor
under the catchall 13th DuPont factor.
Here, as to Key Factor 1, comparison of the marks, Alley asks this Court
to analyze every term in his slogan mark against every term in the Appellees
incontestable marks. In so doing, Alley engages in a detailed, semantic nit-picking
dissection of the marks, thereby engaging in exactly what this Court found was
error in the Jack Wolfskin case, yet on which he relies to show dissection is
contrary to law! Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung fur Draussen GMBH & Co., KGAA
v. New Milennium Sports, S.L.U., 14-1789 slip op. (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 2015).
Contrary to Appellants argument, the Boards discussion of the terms
Ideas and Assets in its Opinion is not dissection, but rather is appropriate
attention to the overall meaning and commercial impression of the two marks,
while simply pointing out the undisputable fact that Appellants slogan uses the
identical words used in the incontestable registered marks of Appellee. The
Boards focus and analysis is supported by substantial evidence, see the
Declarations of branding expert Black, cited herein (A38022-27 and A53019-25,
and supported by Parks at A38011-14, and van Os at A38001-10).
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Appellant focuses on word order of Ideas and Assets, beating a onenote semantic drum during his dissection, arguing that the word order in his slogan
is inverted. Then, from mere word-order inversion, he argues there can be no
likelihood of confusion. Yet on this issue, the Board had very substantial evidence
of the branding-expert Blacks detailed factual testimony to weigh against
Appellants self-serving arguments. Black testified on rebuttal (A53019-25, 21
5)(emphasis added):
. . . Rather, the Alley Declaration is focused on very narrow
interpretations of individual words, relying primarily on detailed
semantics for its defensibility, rather than the overall impression
conveyed by the marks as a whole. The Alley Declaration arguments
seek to establish that the rules of vocabulary and grammar govern the
understanding and impression of the marks. In my real-world
experience, I have found that rules of vocabulary and grammar do not
govern the impression given by the marks. In my opinion the
commercial impression created by the two marks is essentially the
same: they convey the same abstract concepts via metaphor: the
conversion of ideas into assets (regardless of word sequence as
explained in my earlier Declaration of Nov. 22[A38023-28].
Alleys unsupported suppositions and naked arguments that comprise
his Declaration overly rely on simplistic word-by-word distinctions in
an attempt to establish that his word mark is memorably different
from the ILG mark, even though they both relate to the same concept.
In my practice I have found that concepts described in word marks are
necessarily condensed in the minds of consumers to be effectively
memorable. Thus, contrary to the Alley Declaration, in my opinion
based on all my years of experience in precisely this field, nuances
of sentence structure are not key to their understanding,
impression or market effectiveness.
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Nationally renown branding expert Black testified in her first Declaration

that there is no significant difference in the sense of the message by word order
inversion, (A38023-28, 7, p 24)(emphasis supplied):
7. In analyzing the two marks, I note first that the dominant words
are the same: IDEAS and ASSETS. These dominant words are
linked in phrasing conveying the meaning that one devolves from or
into the other. That is done by a present participle of an action verb.
Although the order of the dominant words is inverted in the
Applicants mark, the prepositions are converse, FROM being
the inverse of INTO, such that the meaning is the same. That is,
inverting the order requires using the converse prepositions in order
for the tagline to convey the necessary meaning. This usage does not
constitute a significant difference in the sense of the message, in my
opinion.
After Appellant provided his personal declaration that engaged in an extensive
Jack Wolfskin-type dissection, Black testified in rebuttal as follows, (A53019-25,
6, 7, 8, 10, 11, p 22-24)(emphasis supplied):
6. The Alley Declaration makes some assertions that are obviously
off-point or not true. For instance, he asserts in Paragraph 22 that the
US public has been significantly exposed to [change]ing ideas into
assets to describe legal services in intellectual property. I dont see
any marketing or branding-related evidence to support such a
sweeping opinion. My marketing and branding experience tells me
that it is more likely that the majority of the American public,
unsophisticated as he points them out to be, has little or no
understanding of intellectual property issues, much less the nuances of
phrases describing IP legal services. The unsupported and sweeping
generalizations in the Alley Declaration, which are on their face
unprovable and self-serving, are unreliable opinions on which no
marketing/branding professional would rely. Additionally, the
semantic review in Paragraph 24 of the Alley Declaration features a
level of analytical minutiae to which no average reader of a word
mark would resort in order to gain a useful understanding of the
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services that the mark conveys. In my brand creation experience of

creating, designing and executing trade marks for my clients use to
attract customers and clients, people dont focus on detailed
semantics in word marks they focus on general concept
impressions conveyed by the marks.
7.
In my view, the legal services consumer would not be focused
on the two word mark slogans at the semantic level that the Alley
Declaration asserts is relevant. In short, the Alley Declaration
arguments are merely semantic nit-picking, rather than a
consideration of the overall commercial impression, which is
conceptual in nature as to what services are being offered and
metaphorical as to a process being involved in the services
offered. Word marks are primarily about impressions created,
and here the impressions of the respective marks are essentially
identical.
8.
As my analysis in my Declaration of November 22, 2013
detailed, the metaphor portrayed by the Alley word mark slogan is
essentially identical, and confusingly similar to the metaphor of
the word mark slogan of ILG. My analysis in my earlier Declaration
remains sound: Both of the marks at issue are word marks as distinct
from logos or composite marks (logos + words), and both function as
branding taglines, telling the prospective client the strategic goals
the respective firms offer, with respect to providing the legal services.
Taglines, also known as slogans, function to provide prospects with a
condensation of the essence of the service or product offered, so they
can quickly get what the firm can do for them. Such taglines are
intended, in connection with services, to motivate the prospect to
make initial contact. Such contact motivation is a key goal of
professional services brand development taglines.
....
10. Then the Alley Declaration states In Applicants Mark,
Building is fanciful in that ideas cannot be physically put together,
and an asset requires some metamorphosis from an ideas intangible
nature, like a legal transformation, not a mere assemblage of the same,
to be created. In essence, the Alley Declaration recognizes the
metaphorical nature of the two slogans when it says ideas cannot
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be physically put together. A synonym for a metamorphosis is

a transformation. And Alley recognizes that a legal
transformation is involved in the impression given by his slogan
mark. In essence, he necessarily agrees with ILG that the overall
impressions of the two marks are identical. Further, this rebuts his
assembling argument discussed above in paragraph 9. Finally,
Alley is taking the position that both slogan marks are fanciful. For
all the above reasons, Alleys declaration actually supports my
conclusion that the overall commercial impression of the
respective marks is the same, regardless of their specific wording.
11. Accordingly, I conclude that the Alley Declaration does not
establish Applicants mark is other than a mere inconsequential
variation of the Registered mark, metaphorically conveying the
same meaning and functioning in the same way as a contact
incentive, with the only differences being details of syntax. In my
opinion, speaking as they do to the same class of trade and offering
identical services via the Internet, there is a likelihood of confusion
between the parties marks.
Appellant provided no expert rebuttal testimony evidence.
Appellants arguments based on his subjective beliefs and speculation are
properly excluded. Corporation Habanos, S.A., 102 USPQ2d 1085 (TTAB Feb
16, 2012)(testimony that is based upon subjective belief or unsupported
speculation is excluded.).
The inverted word order argument by Appellant is not only factually
erroneous (see Black Declarations A38023-28 and A53019-25), but also legally
erroneous, as it is contrary to scores of cases. See, for example, Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association v. the American National Bank of St.
Joseph, 201 USPQ 842, 1978 WL 21292 (TTAB 1978)(The [reversed elements]
39
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marks convey the same meaning and create substantially similar commercial
impressions. Board lists a number of prior decisions involving reversed
elements.); Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Bakers Franchise Corporation, 150 USPQ
698, 1966 WL 7286 (TTAB 1966), affd, 404 F.2d 985 (CCPA 1969)
([A]pplicants mark is but a transposition of opposers mark). In her first
Declaration Black testified (A38024, 8) Significantly, Applicant [Appellant
here] did not use CONSTRUCTING, but rather used a transformational word,
BUILDING. Further, Building Assets is close in sound and meaning to
Business Assets to a consumer.
Finally, Appellant stresses the use of the first term of his slogan, Building,
as being different from Transforming in Appellees mark, which he calls
magical.34 This is another instance of impermissible dissection, see Jack
Wolfskin, supra. As Black notes in her expert rebuttal testimony, both slogans are
metaphors, and Building conveys a process, just as does Transforming
(A53023, 9)(emphasis supplied):
9. With respect to an alleged conceptual difference between
Building and Transforming, the Alley Declaration does not
support his argument. At Paragraph 26 Alley says Building gives
an impression of physically constructing or assembling a large whole
from individual pieces whose nature does not change, like building
wooden logs into a cabin. Again, that is overly narrow, as both
slogans are metaphors and Building conveys a process, just as
34
Clearly, if Appellees term TRANSFORMING is magical, then Appellants

mark is necessarily less distinctive.
40
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does Transforming. In addition, the physical act of building does

in fact involve a change in nature, such as: mortar, gravel, sand and
water being changed into concrete for foundations, walls, entire
buildings, floors, counter tops, tiles, walk ways, driveways, etc.; or a
tree changed into various shapes, sizes and types of lumber, which
then are changed into three dimensional structures; or architectural
plans or interior designs changed into the physical structure or
dramatically different finishes and furnishings. Building is
transformative, as is recognized in The Property Brothers HGTV
show, whose slogan is We Show You Inspiration and
Transformation.
As Appellant himself states in his Declaration (emphasis supplied): In
Applicants [Alleys] mark, Building is fanciful35 in that ideas cannot be
physically put together36, and an asset requires some metamorphosis from an
ideas intangible nature, like a legal transformation, not a mere assemblage of
the same, to be created (A43034, 25; refiled A61034). Essentially, Appellant
admits the two slogans convey the same commercial impression, considering the
35
Asserting BUILDING is fanciful is inconsistent with Appellants many pages of

arguments and hundreds of pages of purported Internet evidence allegedly showing
that Appellees mark is nothing more than descriptive of the services (A59016-25),
yet Appellants mark is necessarily less distinctive as it does not use a magic word.
Appellant is judicially estopped from taking a position inconsistent with his lead
argument, see Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600,
605 (9th Cir. 1996) on the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent positions.
Appellants position is wholly inconsistent with the fact of his application for
registration, Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
36
A cognitive neuroscientist would disagree on an electrochemical brain function
level; this is mere self-serving, attorney argument posturing as fact.
41
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marks as a whole, as the Board held.37 That testimony of Alley is substantial

evidence supporting the Boards finding that there is a likelihood of confusion.
Finally, Appellant relies on unauthenticated, hearsay webpage sources
offered without foundation, as showing what he alleges is common use of
individual terms. But even if various combinations of the words in Appellees
marks, or analogous words, have been used as common elements by others, such
use does not entitle applicant to use the words in a confusingly similar trademark
manner. See Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d
669, 675-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(Descriptive use of the word spice does not entitle
applicant to sue the word in a confusingly similar trademark manner.)(emphasis
supplied).
Appellants dissection analysis is irrelevant, because the marks are to be
considered in their entireties. Massey Junior College, Inc. v. Fashion Institute of
Technology, 492 F.2d 1399, 1402 CCPA 1974). Dissecting the marks side-by-side
and analyzing their nuanced linguistic differences in excruciating detail, as
Appellant does, ignores the function of a slogan mark as pointed out in the two
Black Declarations (A38022-27 and A53019-25). Side-by-side mark component
37
Also submitted as Opposition evidence was Alleys initial website home page
design, which used an assemblage of gears, just as had Appellees flash page.
Compare A38066, Exh 20-1 (Alleys gears) with A38067. Exh 20-2 (Appellees
flash page with rotating gears labeled Ideas and Assets). Only after the Opposition
started did Alley concoct his Building argument, and so changed his home page
to show a blocks image; indicia of bad faith.
42
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dissection is not what consumers do, nor is it how likelihood of confusion is

analyzed. TMEP 1207.01(b), citing Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322,
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
C.
Appellant Conflates Consumer Sophistication with the Function

of the Marks Likelihood of Initial Interest Confusion
Precedent requires that the likelihood of confusion decision be based on the

least sophisticated potential purchasers Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion
Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Although the services recited
in the application also encompass sophisticated investors, Board precedent requires
the decision to be based on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.), quoting
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Fage Dairy Proc. Indus. S.A., 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1600 (TTAB
2011), judgment set aside on other grounds, 2014 WL 343267 (TTAB Jan 22,
2014). See also, Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293
(3d Cir. 1991)(stating, in the context of a trademark infringement case, that when
a buyer class is mixed, the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably
prudent purchaser will be equal to that of the least sophisticated consumer in the
class.)(emphasis added).
The Boards finding that purchasers selecting intellectual property counsel
would exercise a high degree of care (A00014) overweighs, to Appellees
detriment, the final, Bar-mandated informational step of the service-sales process.
A more proper weighting accounts for the function of the marks at issue, the
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contact motivation nature of the marks which play a key role in Initial
Interest Confusion. Applicant sold the Board on the view that the full clientintake process will ultimately inform the prospective client of the attorneys true
identity by the time a sale is consummated, that is, by the time the attorney is
retained.38 Appellant still argues here that there will be no likelihood of confusion
based on the intake process requiring a 2nd step of fully informing the client.
But Applicants repeated ultimate intake-process argument, in its many
variations, completely misses the point of the nature of the marks and how they
function. By the time a consumer has engaged with Appellant as a result of his
confusingly similar slogan, it is too late for Appellee. The damage has already been
done, Appellant has improperly obtained a coveted interview, a clear advantage
over Appellee, to its damage.
This is classified as Initial Interest Confusion which Appellee has the right
to prevent. See HRL Associates Inc. v. Weiss Associates Inc., 12 USPQ2d 1819,
1989 WL 274391 (TTAB 1989), affd on other grounds, 902 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir.
1990)(Initial Interest Confusion is actionable under Lanham Act 2(d) in PTO
inter partes proceedings.) McCarthy is on-point in explaining initial interest
confusion and why it is actionable in cases such as this Opposition, even where
there may be an extended purchasing process by sophisticated consumers: 4
38
A59014, 15, 33-35.

44
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McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 23:6 (4th Ed.); Television

Enterprise Network, Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 244 (D NJ
1986); Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. PA 1981);
Blaw-Knox Co. v. Siegerist, 300 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. MO 1968), affd and modifd
in part 414 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1969).
Initial Interest Confusion analysis is applied to a purchasing process that is
drawn out over a period of time, HRL, id; McNeil-PPC v. Guardian Drug Co.,
984 F. Supp. 1066 (E.D. Mich. 1997)( Defendant has already accomplished what
it set out to do, which is to confuse the consumer at the point when he first reaches
for the product on the shelf. It is at that point that the damage is done.) Here the
attorney, Appellant, has induced the potential client to contact him so Appellant
can obtain a coveted (and absolutely necessary) interview. It is at that early point
Appellant has done damage to Appellee. See 4 McCarthy, id.
Appellants primary argument, that prospective legal services consumers
will eventually figure out who he is, is no defense to likelihood of Initial Interest
Confusion. This is true whether the Board determined Appellees marks are weak
or strong, see King Candy Co. v. Eunice Kings Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 140
(CCPA 1974). Appellant merely argues for possible subsequent cure through an
interview process, but the law is clear: whatever the degree of subsequent cure
there arguably might be, later cure is no defense to Initial Interest Confusion.
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The bottom line for the entire issue over sophistication of purchasers
and the extensive Bar-required client-informing step, is that likelihood of
confusion exists whether confusion is later cured, a point not addressed by
Appellant in his briefing before the Board or this Court, and which was not
accorded due weight by the Board.39 Thus, for example, the Board did not even
mention the testimony of Parks, Treasurer and principal of TP Solar, Inc. of
Paramount, CA a solar cell equipment manufacturer. Parks testified (A38013,
5)(emphasis supplied):
5. On checking out ILGs website, I was immediately struck by
the ILG slogan Transforming Ideas Into Business Assets. I
found the slogan to be creative, attention-getting, and insightfully
outside the box. When hiring a lawyer I believe it is important that
the lawyer knows more than just "the law" but also that the lawyer
knows how to apply the law toward client goals. While some
applications of the law are "standard" other situations require the
lawyer/advocate to be creative and to consider the facts and issues
from a number of different angles. ILG's slogan immediately
conveyed to me that the firm thinks creatively and strategically. I
believe these characteristics exhibit cost effective, goal oriented
lawyering, characteristics of the type of law firm that we were
looking for as being best for my company's needs. The slogan was a
powerful and primary motivation for me to call Mr. Dulin
regarding the services of ILG, and how a long distance
relationship would work out. Accordingly I promptly called and
interviewed him by phone.
39
See also Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.
2010).
46
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Parks continues in his Declaration 6, id., describing the subsequent

informational interview, upon which ILG (Appellee) was engaged by TPSI.40
Further, van Os testified (A38005)(emphasis supplied):
7. Because of my experience working in intellectual property law, I
am aware that it is difficult to describe succinctly what intellectual
property lawyers do, in an all encompassing and distinctive way.
Based on my experience as an intellectual property professional and
my experience working for Innovation Law Group, the service mark
Transforming Ideas Into Business Assets is so highly distinctive as
to motivate a prospective client to investigate further into the
nature and quality of Mr. Dulin's services. In my experience with ILG
and since, the Ideas Assets linkage in the ILG tagline was a
key to that prospect contact motivation, as it spoke to ILGs
strategic understanding of the role of IP for their needs.
Neither Parks or van Oss testimony on this factor was contested by Appellant. It
was not commented-on by the Board. Their Testimony is solid evidence of the
initial interest nature and function of Appellees marks. Appellant presented no
evidence whatsoever on this vital factor.
D.
There Was Substantial Evidence for the Board to Find

Insufficient Opportunity for Confusion to Occur.
Appellant argues (his Brief, pp 25-30) that the Board seized on geographic
dissimilarity to give neutral weight to the 8th duPont factor, evidence for or
against opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred. He claims the Board
40
Importantly, the reference by Mr. Parks to a long distance relationship is

strongly indicative of the potential for future actual confusion. TP Solar Inc was
then and still is located in Paramount CA; it is of public record that ILG has
represented TP Solar in the USPTO, the EPO, Taiwan and China, and in patent
infringement litigation in D. MN and in the C.D. CA.
47
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(seemingly wrongly per his argument) in fact found that both Applicant and
Opposer advertised their marks nationally on the Internet (id., p 27). The Board
noted a lack of Appellants evidence on this factor (A00023)(cite omitted):
Although Applicant is licensed to practice law in California and
Virginia, he has advertised on the Internet which is national in scope.
There is no other testimony or evidence regarding Applicants
advertising or geographic trading area.
Thus, the Board was commenting on Appellants lack of evidence about details of
his practice area, his alleged contacts network and his advertising on other than
the Internet. Alley points to no evidence that he adduced during the Opposition
that goes to those aspects of opportunity for confusion to have occurred, on which
it was his burden to move forward. The Board simply cant weight what is not
there; hence the soundness of its ruling that we cannot make a finding whether
after two and one-half years of simultaneous use, there has been a reasonable
opportunity of confusion to have occurred. Board Opinion, (A00023, 24).
As noted in Appellees Statement of Facts above, in fact the Alley mark was
invisible for almost two years, until well into this Opposition, embedded by him in
his home page gears-image box. Thus, the Board was over-generous to Appellant
in according 2 years of simultaneous use of both marks on the Internet which is
national in scope. Appellees position is that only after Appellant made his slogan
Internet searchable, claimed to be March 2013, was there any opportunity for
Internet-based confusion to have begun; that was after Opposition was instituted.
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Further, the number of unique visitors in the same time period is hearsay
and not authenticated. That period includes invisibility, when such visitors could
neither search via his slogan mark, nor see it in search results. Further, he does not
distinguish between trade name and trademark searches, or searches broadly for
IP attorneys, patent attorneys or any other search string. The Alley slogan
mark during invisibility could not be indexed in the Google search engine.
Appellant admits any indexing by Google was only an unstated time of over a
year. Nor is he clear about what was indexed. That period is not the 2 years
the Board accorded Appellant. The weight on this 8th factor favors Appellee.
Appellant then claims a listing under his trade name on the Internet is
advertising prominently displaying Applicants mark even though he testifies
that the mark served no marketing purpose ever.41 Appellant also claims such
trade name advertising was widely and nationally consumed through visits
and search engines for over three years alongside Opposers marks, with neither
consumer nor search engine confusion. Besides being mere self-serving opinion,
without foundation or corroboration and obvious hearsay, now, one year has
been inflated into three years, even though invisible for almost two. Appellant has
not a scintilla of evidence that his advertising was consumed, whatever that
41
I have never been identified by or asked about my slogan (A43011-12,

17).
49
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means, by anyone, much less a search engine. Nor does he show how a search
engine could be confused or how the marks were alongside each other.
The overlap suggested by the mere existence of the Internet has been
inconsistently argued by Appellant. He argues the Internet is significant overlap for
the purpose of factor 8, concurrent use without actual confusion. But then
Appellant ignores the Internet as an element of factor 10: providing market
interface between Appellant and Appellee. Appellant cannot have it both ways.
The Board balanced these factors well, pointing out lack of evidence on factor 8,
and invisibility cannot weigh for Appellant. Yet, the common potential trade
channel weighs factors 3 and 10 in favor of Appellee. Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v.
Smith, 279 F,3d 1135, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) ( [t]he vast majority of companies
today utilize some form of an Internet site and, therefore, this factor alone cannot
be determinative.)
Finally, Appellant argues there is a voluminous record of alleged third
party uses, citing Internet sources. That questionable evidence has been fully
analyzed in the supplemental Statement of Facts above, pp 18-27. Appellants then
67-sources list of 135 web pages (Alleys Exhibits A1 PPP1) was analyzed by
Appellee for the Board (A46002-67, see chart at pgs 14-62), of which the Board
was fully cognizant and reviewed in detail (A00004). In turn, the Board distilled
them down to 17 listings, all of which Appellee has addressed in its policing
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efforts, see supplemental Statement of Facts above, pp 18-27. Appellee showed

Appellants list items: were not disclosed to Appellee as required during discovery;
lack foundation and corroboration; are irrelevant (under the 6th factor, for
example); constitute hearsay; are filled with duplications; include obvious nontrademark use, such as books and articles using phrases not in connection with IP
legal services, and irrelevant foreign listings; include web archive dead-ends, pages
not found, and pages having no such phrases as he claims were used.
The probative value of Internet documents is limited and may not be used
to demonstrate the truth of what has been printed in them, TBMP 704.08(b).
Appellant provided the Board with no extrinsic evidence of the extent to which a
particular website has been viewed. Accordingly, the Board could not conclude
that there has been an impact (or not) on the marketplace that Appellant asserts.
Contrary to Appellants position with respect to such 3rd party websites,
pursuant to TTAB evidentiary rules, a website does not per se establish use. Safer
Inc. v. OMS Investments, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1031 (TTAB 2010, precedential), n.
13 (Documents submitted under notice of reliance pursuant to Trademark Rule
2.122(e) are generally admissible and probative only for what they show on their
face and not as proof of the matters asserted therein. Boyds Collection Ltd. v.
Herrington & Co., 65 USPQ2d at 2020 n.8; Exxon Corp. v. Fill-R-Up Systems,
51
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Inc., 182 USPQ 443, 445 (TTAB 1974); TBMP 708 (2nd Rev. 2004) and the cases
cited therein.) At best they may go to the suggestiveness of the marks.
The precedential case, Top Tobacco, L.P., 101USPQ2d 1163, 2011 WL
6099691 (TTAB Nov 21, 2011) is directly on-point (at *8-9):
North Atlantic argues in its brief that there is extensive use by third
parties of marks containing the term CLASSIC, for tobacco related
products, . . . As to the evidence of actual use of the term CLASSIC in
third-party marks on tobacco products, this is not accompanied by any
other evidence indicating the length of time said marks have been in
use, the degree of exposure, or the popularity of such marks vis--vis
the relevant purchasing public. Accordingly, this factor remains
neutral in our analysis.
Indeed, in Top Tobacco, the third party marks included registrations, whereas
here no third-party registrations are cited by Appellant. Every single attempt to
register a confusing mark has been confronted by Appellee and defeated (A6300255; A38036-149; A53002-18; TESS search record, A38008).
In short, the Board fully considered all the Appellants cites, and there is no
reversible error in the weight, or lack of weight, given them in evaluating an
alleged 3rd party use duPont factor. All Appellant argues is that the analysis
and weighing of the Board, which argument he terms deferential [in] nature, did
not come out as he wanted. He erroneously claims the panel ignored alternative
evidence under the eighth duPont factor42 re-arguing for the third time his
alleged third party use. He claims there is no way to tell if the panel even
42
Appellants Brief, p 28.

52
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realized any of these arguments had been made or if the evidence existed, let
alone if any of it was given fair consideration.43 Lets see: Appellant provided all
those cites to the Board, argued them at the Hearing before the panel, and detailed
analysis of them appears on pages 13 17 of the Boards Opinion (A00013-17),
taking more than 20% of it. Appellant has nothing to complain about, and has
pointed to no evidence on the 8th duPont factor that contradicts the Boards
Decision. The Board cannot weigh in his favor, a factor without convincing
evidence for it, which he failed to produce.
E.
Appellants Purported Good Faith is Legally Insignificant
Appellant claims he adopted his slogan mark without prior knowledge of

Appellees mark, in spite of a trademark search having been done personally
by him. Appellee has shown that claim is incredible. Regardless, the Court need
not go there, as a claim of good faith adoption of a mark will not prevent a finding
of likelihood of confusion. Mag Instrument Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 USPQ2d
1701, 1713 (TTAB 2010), affd. mem. 2011-1052, 2011 WL 5400095 (Fed. Cir.
Nov 9, 2011).
43
Appellants Brief, p 32.

53
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F.
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Filed: 12/16/2015
Any Doubts Should be Resolved in Favor of Appellee, the Prior

User
Although Appellee strongly believes the merits of this case point strongly in
its favor, should the Court have any remaining doubt as to the weight accorded the
factors by the Board, any such doubt should be resolved against the newcomer,
Appellant/Alley. It is well settled that one who adopts a mark similar to another
[here, in meaning and initial interest function] for closely related goods [here,
identical services] acts at his peril and any doubt there might be must be resolved
against him. Carslile Chem. Works, Inc. v. Hardman & Holden Ltd., 434 F.2d
1403, 1405 (CCPA 1970). See also, A.T. Cross Company v. Jonathan Bradley
Pens, Inc., 470 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972)(Friendly, J)(It should be known by
this time that this Court does not look with much favor on the businessman who,
out of the wealth of words available, chooses as a trademark one which comes as
close as he dares to a well-known mark on the identical product).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Boards non-precedential Decision, as expressed in its Opinion, is
clearly based on substantial evidence. The Court should decline Appellants
invitation to rule that everything on the Internet has per se a conclusive degree of
probity, regardless of a lack of foundation, being hearsay and/or irrelevant, and
lacking authentication or corroboration. The Boards Decision should be Affirmed,
per curiam.
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Appellant testified that his slogan mark serves no marketing purpose. Hence,
he can simply pick another slogan, rather than encroach on incontestable marks
that serve, for Appellee, an active and significant contact-motivating function.
Considered in their entirety, the marks have the same meaning to the consumer of
the services, and there is a clear likelihood of initial interest confusion. That it
might be clarified later by Bar-mandated disclosures is irrelevant. The law is that
initial interest confusion is real, results in likelihood of diversion of a coveted
interview, and conveys an improper advantage to Appellant in derogation of
Appellees incontestable rights. The refusal to register Appellants mark deserves
deference for its detailed review of the evidence, and should be Affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Jacques M. Dulin
Jacques M. Dulin, Esq,
237 N. Sequim Ave.
Sequim, WA 98382
(360) 681-7305 (Telephone)
(360) 681-7315 (Facsimile)
dulin@innovationlaw.com
Counsel for Appellee
55
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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on this the 16th day of December 2015, I electronically
filed the foregoing Brief of Appellee with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
System, which will send notice of such filing to all registered users.
I further certify that, upon acceptance and request from the Court, the
required paper copies of the foregoing will be deposited with United Parcel Service
for delivery to the Clerk, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20439.
The necessary filing and service were performed in accordance with the
instructions given to me by counsel in this case.
/s/ Melissa A. Dockery
Melissa A. Dockery
GIBSON MOORE APPELLATE SERVICES
P.O. Box 1460
Richmond, VA 23218
Case: 15-1976
Document: 17
Page: 67
Filed: 12/16/2015
With Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements,
and Type Style Requirements
1.
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(7)(B) because:
this brief contains 13,602 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2.
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using
Microsoft Word in 14 Times New Roman.
Dated: December 16, 2015
/s/ Jacques M. Dulin

Jacques M. Dulin

TTAB Ruling and CAFC Briefs in IP Atty Spat

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This Opinion is Not a

Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: May 22, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Innovation Law Group, Ltd.

Opposition No. 91202418

Innovation Law Group, Ltd. (Opposer) opposed the registration of Applicants

Registered March 6, 2007; Sections 8 and 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged.

Opposition No. 91202418

Applicant, in his Answer, denied the salient allegations in the Notice of

A. Stipulation for testimony affidavits or declarations in lieu of depositions.

60 TTABVUE and 61 TTABVUE.

Opposition No. 91202418

C. Applicants motion to resubmit his brief.

Opposition No. 91202418

Testimony declaration of Diane van Os, the first web master of

Opposers website and a former colleague of Opposers principal Jacques M. Dulin,

Testimony declaration of Richard W. Parks, a mechanical engineer and

Testimony declaration of Robert F. Dennis, an attorney and former

colleague of Jacques M. Dulin, with attached exhibit;15

Testimony declaration of Laurel Black, expert witness on marketing in

the field of corporate identity, brand building, communications and business

Testimony declaration of Kirk V. Thomas, a software engineer;17

Testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin, the owner of Opposers

marks, with attached exhibits;18

Opposition No. 91202418

Rebuttal testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin with attached

Rebuttal testimony declaration of Laurel Black.20

B. Applicants testimony and evidence.

Testimony declaration of Ryan E. Alley proffered to challenge the

testimony declaration of Jacques M. Dulin;21 and

Testimony declaration of Ryan E. Alley with attached exhibits.22

63 TTABVUE 3-4 and 13-30.

Opposition No. 91202418

Applicant, in his brief, admitted that Opposer has standing. 59 TTABVUE 8.

Opposition No. 91202418

TRANSFORMING IDEAS INTO BUSINESS ASSETS (typed drawing form) for

Opposition No. 91202418

Opposers Brief, p. 34 (55 TTABVUE 35).

Opposition No. 91202418

Opposition No. 91202418

maximal IP procurement. From my experience, all

Alley Declaration 12 (43 TTABVUE 8-9).

Alley Declaration 16 (43 TTABVUE 10).

Alley Declaration 16 (43 TTABVUE 11).

Alley Declaration 17 (43 TTABVUE 11).

Opposition No. 91202418

Alley Declaration 17 (43 TTABVUE 11-12).

Opposition No. 91202418

Opposition No. 91202418

Hoffmann & Baron, LLP

The Fletcher Law Firm PLLC

Fountainhead Law Group

Scott Redmond (Patent Agent)

Clock Tower Law Group

Santangelo Law Offices, P.C.

Opposition No. 91202418

Steve Gruber Intellectual Property

Boston Legal Consultant Group, LLC

Wells St. John

Paul W. Fulbright, PLLC

Emerson Thomson & Bennett, LLC

Inventa Capital PLC

We turn ideas into assets. We build and sell innovations