Republic Act No.

9225
Loida Nicolas Lewis v. Commission on Elections 497 SCRA 649
Facts
Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, sought registration and certification as overseas absentee
voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23,
2003, they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their
lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art.
IV of the Constitution.
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the
COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the
petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to
meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1,
2004 a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day),
COMELEC filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition.
Consequently, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in
said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of
Comment) stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual
citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so,
observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had
rendered the petition moot and academic.
Issue
Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering that
under the circumstances the same has already been rendered moot
and academic?

Held
The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the petition
moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners participation in
such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental
issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of allowing dual citizens
to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, which
however, remains unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not
petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that
law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that
dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the
absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may
exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A.
No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]
Dual Allegiance
Mercado v. Manzano 307 SCRA 630
Facts
Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent received the highest votes from the election but his
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent
was not a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and acquired
US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution & laws under the
principle of jus soli. However, he was also a natural born Filipino
citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time of his birth.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent is

both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.

condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of

different states.

Under Sec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship are

disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Dual Citizenship
Loida Nicolas Lewis v. Commission on Elections 497 SCRA 649
(2006)
-same

Issue
Whether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from holding the
office for which he has been elected?
Held
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born
in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of the latters
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country, the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854,
Sec.20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, mere dual citizenship does not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their CoC, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their

Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship

Bengson v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 357
SCRA 545
Facts
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections
in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were running for Congress.
Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson.
Bengson then filed a quo warranto proceeding in the HRET (House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is not a
natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be
disqualified from holding office. The HRET subsequently declared
and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he
is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz
however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in
1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without consent from the
Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his
Filipino Citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 2630 which provides
that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines
Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
such citizenship.

Issue
Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen?
Held
Yes. Bengsons contention that Cruz is no longer a natural-born
citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the
term natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
In Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.
Under said law, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a natural-born Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
Moy Ya Lim Yao Vs. Commissioner Of Immigration
G.R. No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 Scra 292
Facts
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She
was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount
of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung
would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as

in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized

representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action
of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order
her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing
which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either
English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result,
the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen
upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen?
Held
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the
alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the
same privilege.

Children of Filipino Parents

Serra v. Republic, L-4223 May 12, 1952
Act Violating Law and Ordinance
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292
Facts
Respondent herein is the judge who rendered the decision
dismissing the petition of the prosecutor to charge Manuel Opulencia
in violation of Municipal ordinance S1 of 1974 for illegal installation of
electric wire do reduce electric consumption for his factory Opulencia Ice Plant. An information however was filed after almost 9
months. The responded herein then moved to quash the charges for
grounds of prescription, that since the violation is classified as light
felony, only two months is given for prescription.
The lower court granted the motion to quash. The prosecutor then,
after the motion was granted, filed another charge against the
respondent company owner, on ground of theft. That according to the
prosecutor, illegal installation which is punishable under the
municipal ordinance and theft of electricity punishable under the
RPC are different.
Isseue
Whether the dismessal fo the first case can be properly pleaded by
the accused in the motion to quash.
Held
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available
where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the
first and second offenses ma be based upon the same act or set of
facts.
But the protection against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently udner a national statude, provided
that both offenses spring from the same act or set of facts.

The first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the

same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be
twice put to jeopardy provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charges is not included or does not icnlude,
the crime charged it he other case. The second sentence applies
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that
one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation
of the statues. If two charges are based on one and the same act,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution under other.
In the case at bar, the Supreme held that the theft of electric current
contended by the prosecutor is indeed part of the offense charged
under the municipal ordinance of Batangas, which is the illegal or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring because immediate
physical effect of the installation is the inward flow of electric current
into Opulencias ice plant.
The petition is dismissed.
Act Violating Law and Ordinance
Yap v. Lutero L-1266, April 30, 1959
Facts
Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of the crime of estafa for
misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00. After the
records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, he filed
a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA granted the motion and
allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on condition
that he will secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he
will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and
private complainant. He sought the reduction of the bail but it was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA,
by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his right
to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he
secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his
liberty of abode and travel.

Issue
1. Whether the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of
petitioner's right against excessive bail.

2. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being
invoked by petitioner, are not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution states:

2. Whether the condition imposed by the CA violative of the liberty of

abode and right to travel.

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Held
1. The setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to
bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The
amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil
liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is
to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction
of the civil liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow
because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of
civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court.

The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail

constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above
provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to
ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at
the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented
from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in
case he does so.