Topic: Violation of the Instructions to Head Watchers issued by

the Office of the Bar Confidant (bringing a digital camera inside

the bar examination room)
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio
RE: Melchor Tiongson, Head Watcher, during the 2011 bar
examinations, B.M. No. 2482, April 1, 2014
Facts: The Office of the Bar Confidant designated Tiongson, an employee
of the Court of Appeals, to serve as head watcher for the 2011 Bar
Examinations on 6, 13, 20 and 27 November 2011. During the second
Sunday of the bar examinations, Tiongson brought his digital camera
inside Room No. 314. Padilla, Puruganan and Padre alleged that after the
morning examination in Civil Law, while they were counting the pages of
the questionnaire, Tiongson took pictures of the Civil Law questionnaire
using his digital camera. Tiongson allegedly repeated the same act and
took pictures of the Mercantile Law questionnaire after the afternoon
examination.
In a Memorandum addressed to the CA Clerk of Court Atty. Teresita R.
Marigomen, the OBC revoked and cancelled Tiongsons designation as
head watcher for the remaining Sundays of the bar examinations. The
OBC found Tiongson guilty of dishonesty and gross misconduct for
violating a specific provision in the Instructions to Head Watchers
prohibiting the bringing of cameras to the bar examination rooms.
Issue: Whether Melchor Tiongson is guilty of Grave Misconduct for
violating the Instructions to Head issued by the Office of the bar
Confidant.
SC: NO
Misconduct is grave if corruption, clear intent to violate the law
or flagrant disregard of an established rule is present; otherwise,
the misconduct is only simple. If any of the elements to qualify the
misconduct as grave is not manifest and is not proven by substantial
evidence, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for
simple misconduct. On the other hand, dishonesty refers to a persons
disposition "to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Tiongson is liable for simple misconduct only, because the elements of
grave misconduct were not proven with substantial evidence, and
Tiongson admitted his infraction before the OBC.

The Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service classify simple misconduct as a less grave offense punishable by
suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense.
Under the same Rules, we can consider Tiongsons length of service in the
CA of 14 years, more than ten years of service in the bar examinations
and his first time to commit an infraction as mitigating circumstances in
the imposition of penalty. As a CA employee, Tiongson disregarded his
duty to uphold the strict standards required of every court employee, that
is, to be an example of integrity, uprightness and obedience to the
judiciary. Thus, he must be reminded that his infraction was unbecoming
of a court employee amounting to simple misconduct.

Topic: Gross Ignorance and Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part

of the Judge
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ09-2200, April 2, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Lorenzana filed a complaint against respondent Judge
Ma. Cecilia Austria. He alleged that in the course of special proceeding,
the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in the
Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection,
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary
Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Likewise
petitioner alleged that respondent committed an act of impropriety when
she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called
"Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for
the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her
upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing
was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she
admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best
suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and
equity to all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also
submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan,
hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative
disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative
complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she
contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period
prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of
time under Section 11, Rule 4 of the Rules pertains not to the SC, but to
the rehabilitation court.
In arriving at its recommendation the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the
law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Issue: Whether respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and grave abuse of discretion.
SC: NO

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the

decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be
proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or
had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent
was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious
error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his
allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this
Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his
official duties renders him liable. As a matter of policy, in the absence of
fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous.
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct A judge should always
conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary
as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more
caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should
possess the virtue of gravitas. Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary
bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her
condescending attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are
displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

Topic: Code of Judicial Conduct

Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Gershon N. Dulang v. Judge Mary Jocylen G. Regencia, A.M. No.
MTJ-14-1841, June 2, 2014
Facts:
In the Verified Complaint, Dulang filed a complaint against
respondent judge Mary Jocylen Regancia for gross inefficiency, gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and
serious dereliction of duty. He alleged that on May 4, 2009, he moved for
the resolution of an ejectment case, given that the same had been filed as
early as year 2000 and had already been submitted for
resolution. Notwithstanding the summary nature of the ejectment
proceedings, Judge Regencia rendered a Judgment dismissing the
ejectment case only on February 18, 2011 or more than 11 years since its
filing. Likewise petitioner filed before the OCA, alleging that despite the
filing of a notice of appeal from Judge Regencias February 18, 2011
Judgment, the latter nevertheless issued an Order dated August 1, 2011
directing the postmaster and postal carrier of the Cebu Central Post
Office, Cebu City to certify Dulangs receipt of a copy of the said
Judgment. In this regard, Dulang accused Judge Regencia of gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, serious misconduct, and
serious dereliction of duty, contending that by filing his appeal, the latter
was already stripped of her jurisdiction over the case and should not have
issued the said order. Dulang claimed that this effectively stalled the
administration of justice, much to his prejudice.
In her Comment Judge Regencia maintained that no trial was held in Civil
Case No. 212-B as the parties merely filed their respective position papers
and that she could have easily resolved the said case if not for another
case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59.
She also commented that she issued the August 1, 2011 Order because
the defendant in the ejectment case, Emmanuel Flores opposed Dulangs
notice of appeal. She explained that this order was merely intended to
determine whether or not Dulang filed his appeal within the reglementary
period.
Issue: Whether Judge Regencia may be held administratively liable for
undue delay in rendering a decision.
SC: YES
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that
"a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods" and echoed in Section 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which

provides that "judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the
delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable
promptness."
It is undisputed that Civil Case No. 212-B was already submitted for
resolution on October 17, 2008. Being an ejectment case, it is governed
by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty
(30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within
which a decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia
rendered judgment only about two (2) years and four (4) months later, or
on February 18, 2011. While rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in
the orderly and speedy disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded
as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been mindful of the plight of
judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder
them from promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has
allowed extensions of time due to justifiable reasons. However, Judge
Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the
disposition of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable
for undue delay in rendering a decision

Topic: Suspension from the Practice of Law

Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes

Jose Francisco T. Baens v. Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio, A.C No.

10378, June 9, 2014
Facts: This is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of
respondent for violation of Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, commenced thru a complaint-affidavit filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) by complainant.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant alleged, among others, that the
respondent: (1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the
expenses in the said case, failed to file the corresponding petition, and it
was the complainants wife who successfully instituted Civil Case No.
2463-08, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on December 8, 2008; (2)
even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons dated
December 15, 2008, belatedly filed an Answer and was able to file it only
on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in the
Summons; (3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of
improper venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are
residents of Dasmarias, Cavite; (4) never bothered to check the status of
the case and thus failed to discover and attend all the hearings set for the
case; and (5) as a result, Civil Case No. 2463-08 was decided on October
27, 2009 without the complainant being able to present his evidence.

In his Answer, the respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and
explained that: (1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant
to go over said draft after which he proceeded to file the same with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City; (2) the complainant was aware
that said petition will be filed in Malabon City as the latter had signed the
verification and certification of the petition; (3) the case became pending
and was later on withdrawn because of the complainants refusal to
testify; (4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact
that he still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the
verification thereof; (5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the
case because he did not receive any notice from the trial court; and (6) it
was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court has

already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed
counsels.

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of

the Code and recommended that the respondent be suspended for six (6)
months from the practice of law on the ground that respondent failed to
diligently attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his
responsibilities considering the fact that he has already been fully
compensated. The IBP Board of Governors increased the recommended
period of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.

Issue: Whether respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.

SC: YES

The Court sustained the IBPs findings and the recommended sanction of
suspension from the practice of law since the attendant facts of the case
show substantial evidence to support the respondents delinquency.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders
or notices from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place,
securing a copy of such notices, orders and case records was within the
respondents control and is a task that a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the
preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of procedure that fully
fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent. It
was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary
and incidental to the advancement of his clients cause of action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of

the progress of his clients case with the trial court, and neither did he
resort to available legal remedies that might have protected his clients
interest. Although a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy
to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or
defense within the authority of law to support his clients interest. When a

lawyer agrees to take up a clients cause, he covenants that he will

exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights.

Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of

candor, fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of
the Code. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not
only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community
to the legal profession.

In this case, the respondents reckless and inexcusable negligence

deprived his client of due process and his actions were evidently
prejudicial to his clients interests. A lawyers duty of competence and
diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or
giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the
handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination
even without prodding from the client or the court.

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17,

and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him." It further mandates that "a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence," and that "a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the
complainants case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with
competence and diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted
fidelity. By failing to afford his client every remedy and defense that is
authorized by law, the respondent fell short of what is expected of him as
an officer of the Court.

Topic: Duties of a Lawyer

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Euprocina I. Crisostomo, et al. v. Atty. Philip Z.A. Nazareno, A.C.
No. 6677, June 10, 2014
Facts: Complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications
against forum shopping attached to the complaints for rescission and
ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter
made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings
have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any other
court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for
rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB
against Rudex and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed
by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition,
complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a
notary public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc.
No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were
separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission
and ejectment.
IBP Investigator recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a
period of six (6) months for his administrative violations. The Investigating
Commissioner found that there were unassailable proofs that the
certification against forum shopping attached to Rudexs ejectment
complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared, considering
that at the time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps.
Siotings rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was
already pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared
its existence, more so, since both complaints involve the same transaction
and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission complaint would
amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint. In this relation, the
Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim
innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudexs counsel but the
notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the
subject certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively
liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation, but modified the
recommended penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1)
month.

Issue: Whether Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable and

accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month.
SC: YES
The Court affirms the IBPs findings with modification as to the penalty
imposed. Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the
violation of the certification requirement against forum shopping.
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false
entries in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or
direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which read as follows:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH
TO
THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false
declarations in the certifications against forum shopping attached to
Rudexs pleadings, for which he should be held administratively liable.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of
cases, Atty. Nazareno as mandated by the Rules of Court and more
pertinently, the canons of the Code should have truthfully declared the
existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty.
Nazareno did not even bother to refute the charges against him despite
due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBPs
resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty to be

imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBPs finding on this
score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat, a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to
have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in one of his
pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazarenos infractions are of a similar nature,
but recognizing further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing
discussion, had repetitively committed the same, the Court hereby
suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as
a notary public, considering that he assigned only one document number
(i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached
to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite
the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate
notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary
shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among
others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that
he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping
attached to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they
identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending
actions or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The
administrative liability of an erring notary public in this respect was
clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses
Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge
of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline
the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case,
respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent
also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes

lawyers from engaging in

immoral, or deceitful conduct.

unlawful,

dishonest,

Topic: Disbarment; Duty of a lawyer in receiving the money of his

clients
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes
Amado T. Dizon v. Atty. Norlita de Taza, A.C. No. 7676, June 10,
2014
Facts: This concerns an administrative complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Norlita De Taza for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant
sums of money from her client purportedly to expedite the proceedings of
their case which was pending before the Court.
Complainant alleged that he, along with his siblings engaged the services
of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of
Eliza T. Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with
G.R. No. 174552.The complainant claimed that, Atty. De Taza demanded
the sum of P75,000.00 from him to expedite the proceedings before the
Court. This amount was over and above the parties stipulated retainer
fee as evidenced by a contract.

According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a

month earlier or in January 2007, Atty. De Taza had already demanded
and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from
his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered
to him, which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the
Court.

On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura,
Manila and learned that the Court had already denied the petition on
November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Tazas representations that the
case was still pending. Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant
instituted a complaint for disbarment against Atty. De Taza. He also
attached several affidavits and documents from other individuals who
attested that Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off
her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda Pineda executed an affidavit which
was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued 11
checks in her favor amounting to P481,400.00, which were all dishonored
by the bank. Demand letters sent to her went unheeded.

In a Resolution, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment.

However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved. The Court, in
its Resolution, held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed
served and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing
of her comment. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended that Atty. De Taza be

suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.

Issue: Whether Atty. de Taza should be held administratively liable for

issuing bouncing checks, demanding and/or receiving money from her
clients under the guise of having the proceedings before the court
expedited.

SC: YES
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute
the accusations against her. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment
will not be a hindrance for the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction.
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, is required." Based on the documentary
evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza
manifested a propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks
and incurring debts which she left unpaid without any reason. The
complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Tazas
involvement in an estafa and violation of BP No. 22 case filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Angeles City for drawing checks against a
closed account, among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other
creditors. Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a
member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is
not only a symbol but also an instrument of justice, equity and fairness.

"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of

personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of

public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also
shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the
deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public
order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment
to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously
and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should
hold in high esteem."

Atty. De Tazas actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were
even worse as she had the gall to make it appear to the complainant that
the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and ruled in their favor
in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was
employed by Atty. De Taza just to milk more money from her clients.
Without a doubt, Atty. De Tazas actions are reprehensible and her greed
more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to
defraud her client.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular

purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client. In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money
is baseless and non-existent. Thus, her demand should not have even
been made in the first place.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
disbarment or suspension of a lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation
of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed

only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and,
equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and

the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,

especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."

"The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption

and malpractice. For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the
embers of mistrust on the judicial system with such irresponsible
representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated."

All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report
and recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to
suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two years.

Topic: Fidelity to Duty of Court Personnel; Impartiality and

impropriety of a judge
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Emilie Sison-Barias v. Judge Marino E. Rubia, et al, A.M. No. RTJ14-2388, June 10, 2014
Facts: Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending
before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia. The cases are intestate
proceeding, guardianship proceeding and a civil action for annulment of
contracts and reconveyance of real properties. In all these cases, a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and part of the estate of
complainants husband was involved.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice
in the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then
informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen
Pecaa, the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito, met
with respondent Pecaa on February 20, 2010. During this meeting,
complainant informed respondent Pecaa of the delay in the publication
of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration.
Respondent Pecaa asked complainant to meet her again at her house in
Bian, Laguna. Complainant went there with Enrique. Respondent Pecaa
then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since
respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the
properties to Evelyn Tanael.
Issue: Whether the respondents are administratively liable.
SC: YES
For respondent Pecaa, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a
position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel
is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than
to interact with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence
that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaa should
have refused to meet with complainant in her home. She should have
refused any other form of extended communication with complainant,
save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This
continued communication between complainant and respondent Pecaa

makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of propriety
mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaa admitted to meeting with complainant several times,
despite the formers knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court
where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged
between them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with
complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority of
complainants attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaa
failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant,
even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative
case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaa violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel:
CANON I: FIDELITY TO DUTY
Respondent Pecaas actions constitute a clear violation of the
requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all
their actions. Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively
liable for her actions. Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel,
respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity
mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of
respondent Pecaas actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment.
At the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. As a judge, he had
the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were
under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their
office.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not
only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all
activities.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and

exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional

aspects.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.
It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what
to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the
judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges are not only
required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a
just decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's
conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's
probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach.
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety
performance of all the activities of a judge.

are

essential

Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued

meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of
required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood
position that the meeting was a chance encounter, and,
impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.

to

the

after the
propriety
by their
thus, no

Respondent Judge Rubias actions belittled the integrity required of judges

in all their dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions,
respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and
propriety fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a
member of the judiciary.

Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility (Rules 10.01; 11.02;

18.04); Expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in
dealings with client
Ponente: Justice Lucas Bersamin
Henry Samonte v. Atty. Gines Abellana, A.C. No. 3452, June 23,
2014
Facts: On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who
had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case. In the administrative
complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional
misconduct by Atty. Abellana. On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty.
Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of
falsification of documents. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of
duty was baseless.
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in
handling certain aspects of his clients case, like not filing a reply to the
defendants answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters
raised in the answer.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Abellana.

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings
of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the
practice of law for one year.
Issue: Whether Atty. Abellana is lawfully suspended from the practice of
law for one year.
SC: YES
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These
expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this
country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession.
By the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and
has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court
hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to clients request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the
RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that
he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as promised,
instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually done so. His
explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on
account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the
falsification, because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and
less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to
remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as
a member of the Law Profession than his transactions with his client.

The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the handling of Samontes case

was entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings
of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client
way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the
RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order
issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that the RTC Judge
exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the belated offer
of evidence in the interest of justice.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It
deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading
his client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the
handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not
close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting
his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty.
Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their relationship had
been tainted with mistrust.

Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 17; Canon 18,

Rule 18.03, Rule 18.04; Canon 15)
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes
Almira C. Foronda v. Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr., A.C. No. 9976, June
25, 2014

Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by lmira C. Foronda against

Atty. Jose L. Alvarez, Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). The grounds are the following:
(1) Fraud and deceit in luring the complainant in transacting
business with the respondent;
(2) Dishonesty and misrepresentation when the respondent
misinformed the complainant that her annulment case was
already filed when in fact it was not;
(3) Issuing unfunded checks as payment for the respondent's
obligations to the complainant;
(4) Violation of Canon 15.06 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilities when the respondent represented to the
complainant that he knows of court personnel who will help
facilitate the complainants annulment case;
(5) Violation of Canons 16.01 and 16.03 for failure to return
the complainants money despite numerous demands; and
(6) Violation of Canon 18.04 when the respondent
misinformed the complainant regarding the status of her
annulment case.
Issue: Whether Atty. Alvarez, Jr. violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
SC: YES
In his Supplemental Affidavit, Atty. Alvarez admits the delay and
apologizes for it. For delaying in filing the petition for complainant,
respondent should be deemed guilty of violating Canons 17 and 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which pertinent read:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and the negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Respondent lied about the delay. The allegations of complainant about
how respondent lied to her about the delay in the filing of the petition are
very detailed. While denying he misrepresented to complainant that the
petition has been filed when it was not, respondent did not care to refute
also in detail the allegations of complainant. In his Answer, he simply
denied the same for the reason that he has no sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth thereof. It should be noted, however, that the

allegations pertains to things respondent said and did, and are therefore,
matters which he knew or should have known. His denial is therefore
tantamount to an admission. In doing so, respondent is guilty of violating
not only Canon 15 but also Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which read:
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENT.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the clients request for information.
Respondent induced complainant to lend him money at 5% interest per
month but failed to pay the same. This is admitted by respondent. Rule
16.04 provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Obviously, respondent borrowed money from his
client and his clients interest was not fully protected. In fact, respondent
repeatedly failed to comply with his promise to pay complainant. The fact
that he subsequently paid complainant more than the amount due from
him as part of the settlement of the criminal complaint filed by her
against him hardly serves to mitigate his liability.
He issued two sets of checks which were dishonored when presented for
payment. This is admitted by respondent.

Topic: Suspension from the practice of law

Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen
Victor Lingan v. Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmu P. Baliga,
A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Victor Lingan against
Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga on November 16, 2000.
Complainant alleged that respondents, both notaries public, falsified
certain public documents, as follows:
A complaint for annulment of title with damages filed by Isaac Villegas
against complainant with the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Respondent Calubaquib signed the verification and certification of nonforum shopping of the complaint as notary public and entered the same
as Doc. No. 182; Page No. 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996, which
according to the records of the National Archives, the document entered
as Doc. No. 182; Page 38; Book No. CLXXII; Series of 1996 in respondent
Calubaquibs notarial register was an affidavit of one Daniel Malayao.
A special power of attorney dated September 10, 1996 executed by Isaac
Villegas appointing respondent Calubaquib as his attorney-in-fact to
enter into a compromise agreement under such terms and conditions
acceptable to him which was notarized by respondent Baliga and entered
as Doc. No. 548, Page No. 110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996, which
according to respondent Baligas notarial register, Doc. No. 548; Page No.
110; Book No. VIII; Series of 1996 pertains to an affidavit of loss of one
Pedro Telan, dated August 26, 1996.
A petition for reappointment as notary public for and in
Tuguegarao,Cagayan by respondent Baliga, which was notarized by
respondent Calubaquib and entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 31,
Page No. 08, Book No. CXXX, Series of 1995. However, Notarial Register
Book No. CXXX was for the year 1996 and entered there as Doc. No. 31,
Page No. 08 was a cancellation of real estate mortgage dated January 11,
1996.
Respondents Calubaquib and Baliga both admitted the incorrectness of
the entries and simply attributed them to the inadvertence in good faith
of their secretary and legal assistants to whom they had left the task of
entering all his notarial documents.
Issue:
SC: YES

Whether respondents violated the Notarial Practice Law.

It is abundantly clear that the notary public is personally accountable for

all entries in his notarial register. Section 245 of the Notarial Law
provides that every notary public shall keep a register to be known
as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his
official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such
record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and
paying the legal fees therefore. The failure of the notary to make
the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of
commission under Section 249 (b).
Respondents cannot be relieved of responsibility for the violation of the
aforesaid sections by passing the buck to their secretaries, a
reprehensible practice which to this day persists despite our open
condemnation. Respondents, especially Calubaquib, a self-proclaimed
prominent legal practitioner, should have known better than to give us
such a simple-minded excuse.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless or routinary act but one
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized to do so may act as notaries public. The protection
of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized
to act must be prevented from inflicting themselves upon the public, the
courts and the administrative offices in general.
Being not only lawyers but also public officers, respondents should have
been acutely aware of their responsibilities. Respondents acts did not
amount to mere simple and excusable negligence. Having failed to
perform their sworn duty, respondents were squarely in violation of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Topic: Disciplinary action against lawyer

Ponente: Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno
Mercedita de Jesus v. Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470,
July 08, 2014
Facts: A disbarment complaint filed by De Jesus against respondent on
the grounds of grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
Complainant alleged that respondent had drafted and notarized a Real
Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as
its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued
complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. Respondent
had also notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized by
respondent without the signature of the lessees. The other contract was a
sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain
Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be
alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant
submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by
respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainants
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the principals named
therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-in-fact, Florina
B. Limpioso (Limpioso).
IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of respondent and her
disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath
as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties
who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondents
explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the
three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate
crafting of the real estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold
respondent liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of
Governors unanimously adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with the
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one year.

Issue:

Whether respondent can be subjected to disciplinary action.

SC: YES
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization
process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished.
In this case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of
the mortgaged market stall. That complainant comprehended the
provisions of the real estate mortgage contract does not make respondent
any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating
a wrongful act. Clearly, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed
by complainant is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement
bore the lessees signatures, she could have given complainant a certified
photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a
rarity in respondents practice as a notary public. Records show that on
various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documents that were either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties.
Technically, each document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it
is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in
his or her presence.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally
appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and truth
of what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also violated Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer
that she shall do no falsehood.

Topic: Administrative case for disbarment

Ponente: Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno
Dante La Jimenez & Lauro G. Vizconde v. Atty. Felisberto L.
Verano, Jr., Adm. Case No. 8108, July 15, 2014
Facts: Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the
Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") were the accused in cases filed by the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of
dangerous drugs. In a Joint Inquest Resolution the charges were dropped
for lack of probable cause.
It was revealed during one of the hearing conducted by the House
Committee on Illegal Drugs that respondent had prepared the release
order for his three clients using the letterhead of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had admitted to drafting
the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and
unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority to use the
DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts unbecoming a member of
the bar.
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchored his Complaint on respondents alleged
violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for legal processes. Atty. Lozano contended
that respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in
drafting the said order and sending it to a high-ranking public official,
even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution
dropping the charges against his clients for lack of probable cause,
arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of Brodett
and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together
with their families, came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to
release his clients. Sheer faith in the innocence of his clients and fidelity
to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order.
Respondent admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the
Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything may be expedited." In
any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed
by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no
effect at all.

Issue:

Whether respondent is administratively liable.

SC: YES
Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner,
states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and
refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives
the appearance of influencing the court."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain
special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is
precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the
codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any
act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of
an ongoing case, lest the peoples faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the
administration of justice. To that end, their clients success is wholly
subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest, which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the
pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyer shall not
state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule, Rule 15.07,
mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and the principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a clients cause must always be within
the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of
the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar.
In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting
standards.

Topic: Quantum of Evidence in disbarment; Canon 7 of Code of

Professional Responsibility; Duty of Lawyers
Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes
Raul M. Francia v. Atty. Reynaldo V. Abdon, A.C. No. 10031, July
23, 2014
Facts: In a verified complaint filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), Raul M. Francia
prayed for the disbarment and imposition of other disciplinary sanctions
on Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. Abdon for violation of the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his position paper, the complainant alleged that he had a meeting with
the respondent at the Makati Cinema Square to seek his assistance with
respect to a pending case in the Court of Appeals involving the labor
union of Nueva Ecija III Electric Cooperative (NEECO III). The respondent,
who is a LA at the National Labor Relations Commission, San Fernando,
Pampanga, told the complainant that he can facilitate, expedite and
ensure the release of a favorable decision, particularly the award of assets
and management of NEECO III to the union. To bolster his representation,
he told him that the same regional office where he was assigned had
earlier rendered a decision in favor of the labor union and against the
National Electrification Administration. With the respondents assurance,
the complainant yielded. In December 2006, the complainant met the
respondent to discuss their plan and timetable in securing a favorable
ruling from the CA. The respondent told him that in order to facilitate the
release of such favorable decision, the union must produce the amount
of P1,000,000.00, a considerable portion of which is intended for Justice
Sundiam, the ponente of the case and the two member justices of the
division, while a fraction thereof is allotted to his costs.
Shortly thereafter, the complainant met the respondent again and handed
him the amount of P350,000.00, which was raised out of the individual
contributions of the members of the union, as partial payment for the
agreed amount and undertook to pay the balance as soon as the union is
finally allowed to manage and operate the electric cooperative. In turn,
the respondent assured him that a favorable ruling will be rendered by the
CA in no time. On January 4, 2007, the union was advised by their counsel
that the CA has already rendered a decision on their case and the same
was adverse to them. This infuriated the union members who then turned
to the complainant and demanded for the return of the 350,000.00 that
they raised as respondents facilitation fee. The respondent promised to
return the money but asked for a few weeks to do so. After two weeks, the
respondent turned over the amount of P100,000.00, representing the
unspent portion of the money given to him and promised to pay the

balance of P250,000.00 as soon as possible. The respondent, however,

reneged on his promise and would not even advise the complainant of the
reason for his failure to return the money. Thus, the complainant was
constrained to give his car to the union to settle the remaining balance
which the respondent failed to return.
Issue: Whether respondent should be disbarred.
SC: NO
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court found that the evidence submitted by the complainant fell short of
the required quantum of proof. Aside from bare allegations, no evidence
was presented to convincingly establish that the respondent engaged in
unlawful and dishonest conduct, particularly in extortion and influencepeddling. Firstly, the transcript of the alleged exchange of text messages
between the complainant and the respondent cannot be admitted in
evidence since the same was not authenticate in accordance with A.M.
No. 01-7-01-SC, pertaining to the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Without
proper authentication, the text messages presented by the complainant
have no evidentiary value. The Court cannot also give credence to the
affidavits of Pena and Demillo which, on close examination, do not prove
anything about the alleged transaction between the complainant and the
respondent. The complainant miserably failed to substantiate his claims
with preponderant evidence. Surely, he cannot prove the respondents
culpability by merely presenting equivocal statements of some individuals
or relying on plain gestures that are capable of stirring the imagination.
Considering the lasting effect of the imposition of the penalty of
suspension or disbarment on a lawyers professional standing, the Court
cannot allow that the respondent be held liable for misconduct on the
basis of surmises and imagined possibilities. A mere suspicion cannot
substitute for the convincing and satisfactory proof required to justify the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer.
The respondent, however, is not entirely faultless. He has, nonetheless,
engendered the suspicion that he is engaged in an illegal deal when he
introduced the complainant to Vistan, who was the one who allegedly
demanded P1,000,000.00 in facilitation fee from the union members.
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a
"lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

profession." For, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members. It is every lawyers duty to maintain the high
regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his
actions beyond reproach. The Court reiterated its directive to the
members of the Bar to be mindful of the sheer responsibilities that attach
to their profession. They must maintain high standards of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.

Topic: Court Officers; Gross Inefficiency

Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Flora P. Holasca v. Anselmo P. Pagunsan, A.M. No. P-14-3198, July
23, 2014
Facts: In her complaint-affidavit, Holasca charged Sheriff Pagunsan with
Gross Misconduct and Serious Dereliction of Duty in connection with his
delay and refusal to implement the writ of execution issued in an
ejectment case. Holasca was the plaintiff in the ejectment case. After
obtaining a favorable judgment, she sought the execution of the decision
through Sheriff Pagunsan. She narrated that on February 11, 2009, Sheriff
Pagunsan, accompanied by a male companion,(allegedly a Process
Server) and Francisco J. Calibuso, Jr. (Clerk of Court III, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cavite City, went to the occupied to serve a
copy of a Writ of Execution. There, Sheriff Pagunsan allegedly told the
defendants not to talk to anybody regarding the payment of damages in
the ejectment case. Sheriff Pagunsan likewise told the defendants:
"marami pala kayong gamit na pwede kong hilain pero huwag kayong
mag-alala, hindi ako hihila kahit ano".Before leaving the premises, Sheriff
Pagunsan advised the defendants to see him in his office on February 13,
2009. Holasca further alleged that Sheriff Pagunsan did not conduct an
inventory of all the chattels found inside the house of the defendants, or
evict the latter from its premises.
Issue: Whether Sheriff Pagunsan with Gross Misconduct and Serious
Dereliction of Duty
SC: YES
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice because
they are tasked to execute final judgments of the courts, which would
otherwise become empty victories for the prevailing party, if left
unenforced. As agents of the law, sheriffs are mandated to uphold
the majesty of the law, as embodied in the decision, without
unnecessary delay to prevent injury or damage to the winning
party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up" the sheriffs
implementation of the writ. Once the writ is placed in their hands, sheriffs
are duty-bound to proceed and see to it that the execution of judgments is
not unduly delayed. The duties of the sheriff in implementing writs of
execution are explicitly laid down in the Rules of Court (Rules).
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules provide
for the manner a writ for the delivery or the restitution of real property
shall be enforced by the sheriff. Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules, on the

other hand, requires sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of
execution after its implementation. These provisions leave no room for
any exercise of discretion on the part of the sheriff on how to perform his
or her duties in implementing the writ. A sheriffs compliance with the
Rules is not merely directory but mandatory.
In the present case, The Court found that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss in
performing his mandated duties. To recall, the Writ of Execution was
issued by the RTC on February 4, 2009. Sheriff Pagunsan served the Writ
on February 11, 2009, giving the defendants three (3) days or until
February 14, 2009 within which to voluntary vacate the premises.
However, there was no showing that the writ had been fully implemented
or the property delivered to the complainant on February 14, 2009. In
fact, the records would show that Sheriff Pagunsan did not return to the
premises on the said date or any date thereafter; nor made any personal
follow-ups from the defendants. In short, no other action was undertaken
by Sheriff Pagunsan to implement the writ of execution.In addition to
Sheriff Pagunsans delay and reluctance to implement the writ, he also
failed to collect the money judgment in favor of Holasca. Despite the
opportunity to collect, Sheriff Pagunsan did not do anything. In his answer,
he even admitted that he did not conduct an inventory of the defendants
personal properties. Such failure to carry out what is purely a ministerial
duty, together with his delay in the implementation of the writ,
demonstrates his incompetence and gross inefficiency in the performance
of his official duties. For Sheriff Pagunsans lapses in the procedures in the
implementation of the writ of execution, the Court found him guilty of
Gross Inefficiency. Under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 19,
series of 1999 gross inefficiency is classified as a grave offense. Gross
inefficiency is punishable by suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal from the service for
the second offense. However, considering that this is Sheriff Pagunsans
first infraction, he should be meted with the penalty of suspension of nine
(9) months and one (1) day without pay after taking into account the
attendant circumstances, namely, the excessive disregard of the cited
Rules of Court provisions, mitigated by the character of the offense as the
first by Sheriff Pangusan.
Moreover, Calibusos participation in the ejectment case is clearly not
connected with his judicial duties as court personnel. Nonetheless, the
Court stressed that Calibuso, as an employee of the judiciary, must
maintain a neutral hands-off attitude in dealing with party-litigants, in this
case, in the execution of a decision.

Topic: Disbarment; Violation of Notarial Law

Ponente: Justice Bienvenido Reyes
Aemerita B. Mahilum v. Atty. Samuel Sm. Lezama, A.C. No. 10450,
July 30, 2014
Facts: On May 24, 2006, the respondent notarized a Deed of Donation
executed by her estranged husband, Rodolfo Mahilum as donor, and their
common daughter, Jennifer Mahilum-Sorenson as donee, pertaining to the
donor's share of one-half portion over a parcel of land. Attached to the
complaint is a copy of the deed of donation dated February 7, 2006
bearing the signatures of Rodolfo and Jennifer, as well as the notarial seal
and signature of the respondent on the acknowledgment portion attesting
to the personal appearance of Rodolfo and Jennifer before him when the
same was notarized on May 24, 2006. According to the complainant, she
has personal knowledge that Jennifer could not have personally appeared
before the respondent on May 24, 2006 or even on February 7, 2006
because during those dates, she was in the United States of America
(USA) working at the State Fund Office in California.
In his Answer, the respondent asserted that the donor, donee and
instrumental witnesses to the donation were all physically present when
the document was signed. He stated that he is personally acquainted with
Rodolfo and he had no reason to cast doubts upon him when he
introduced his daughter Jennifer who came all the way from the USA to
visit her father. The respondent further averred that the complainant has
a long-running feud with Rodolfo and she and some of their common
children are using this complaint as part of her personal vendetta against
Rodolfo who happens to be friends with the respondent. The parties were
summoned for mandatory conference before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Negros Occidental Chapter, whereby both of them
undertook to present documentary evidence showing the actual
whereabouts of Jennifer during the dates in question.
The complainant submitted a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration
showing the arrival and departure records of Jennifer in the Philippines.
Based thereon, Jennifer did not enter the Philippines in the year 2006.
Despite opportunity to submit evidence rebutting the foregoing
certification, the respondent failed to file any.
Issue: Whether respondents notarial commission should be revoked.
SC: YES

The Court agreed with and sustains the IBPs finding that the official
record from the Bureau of Immigration showing that Jennifer never
traveled to the Philippines in the year 2006 substantially established that
indeed she could not have personally appeared before the respondent
when he notarized the deed of donation on May 24, 2006. Certainly, the
conclusive import of the contents of such certification cannot be
overcome by the respondents mere counter-allegations unsupported by
any corroborative proof.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103, or the Notarial Law mandates that
affiants must personally appear to the notary public. Corollary, under
Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, a
commissioned notary public is enjoined from performing a notarial act
unless the affiant is: (1) in his presence at the time of the notarization;
and (2) personally known to him or otherwise identified by him through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The purpose of the rule was emphasized in Angeles v. Ibaez, thus: The
physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to
ascertain that the document is the parties free act and deed. The
respondent is, without doubt, familiar with the above rules and duties,
having been a notary public for 35 years. But he, nonetheless, failed to
observe them. Contrary to the IBPs findings that such failure was due to
carelessness; the Court found and so held that the respondent
deliberately disregarded the Rules on Notarial Practice and the Notarial
Law. It must be emphasized that the public and the courts accord
conclusiveness of due execution in notarized documents. By
affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent
misled the public that Jennifer personally appeared before him and
attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the deed when in fact
she did not. Such misconduct can also usher in precarious legal
consequences should the deed of donation later on spawn court
intervention.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby found Atty. Samuel SM. Lezama GUILTY of
violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, his incumbent notarial commission is REVOKED and he is
DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for ONE (1)
YEAR, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8000
August 5, 2014
CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA,
Respondent.
Facts:
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was
invited as maid of honor in her best friends wedding on December 9,
2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her
United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent
who represented himself as an immigration lawyer.
Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal
Services (Contract), whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and
secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainants favor prior to
the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid
respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook
to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.
The parties likewise stipulated that should complainants visa
application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of
the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any courtissued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said
downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking
within the agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for
interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund of the
downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for
estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.
Ruling:
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an
immigration lawyer, which resulted to complainant seeking his assistance
to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of
P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however,
respondent has no specialization in immigration law but merely had a
contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who supposedly
processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to
prove Pinedas identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he
submitted were all self-serving and thus, as correctly observed by the

Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and

consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondents
deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the
legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to
practice law.
Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform
his obligations under the Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the
issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a flagrant
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the
cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence,
and to attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon
him. Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by
his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable, as in this case.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16
of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P350,000.00 that
complainant paid him, viz.:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. x x x.
Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The
highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics.

Topic: Habitual Absenteeism

Per Curiam
A.M. No. P-14-3232
August 12, 2014
Re: Report of Judge Rodolfo D. Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities [MTCC], Tangub City, Misamis Occidental, on the Habitual
Absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez, Jr., Process Server, same court.
Facts:
Judge Rodolfo D. Vapor, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Tangub City, Misamis Occidental, informed the Office of the Court
Administrator of the habitual absenteeism of Filigrin E. Velez, Jr., the
process server of his court. He reported that for the first quarter of 2011,
respondent Velez incurred twenty-three (23) absences.
Respondent Velez admitted having incurred the aforesaid absences.
He explained that the absences were reasonable because he was
undergoing treatment for liver disease, urinary tract infection and iron
deficiency at that time.
On 1 December 2011, Judge Vapor informed the OCA that
respondent Velez failed to report for work for the entire months of October
and November 2011. He recommended that respondent Velez be dropped
from the rolls.
In his letter dated 20 February 2012,Judge Vapor reported that while
respondent Velez returned to work for the month of January 2012, he was
no longer given any task and his duties were distributed to the courts
utility worker and sheriff. Judge Vapor reiterated his recommendation for
the dropping of respondent Velez from the rolls.
The OCA recommended that respondent Velez be found guilty of
habitual absenteeism and, accordingly, be dismissed from the service.
Issue:
Whether or not Velez is guilty of habitual absenteeism and,
accordingly, be dismissed from the service.
Ruling:
Yes.
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002, an officer or employee in
the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave

credit under the leave law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at
least three (3) consecutive months during the year.
It is evident from the records that respondent Velez is guilty of
habitual absenteeism for incurring unauthorized absences for the period
covering 1 January up to 1 December 2011. In the Resolution dated 11
July 2012 in A.M. No. 12-6-47-MTCC, the Court disapproved the application
for leave filed by respondent Velez for the period 1 March 2011 up to 1
December 2011. All the absences he incurred during that period were
thus considered unauthorized.
Respondent Velez was earlier charged for his unauthorized
absences and tardiness in2009. Accordingly, the Court in a Resolution
dated 23 April 2012 in A.M. No. P-11-2899, suspended him for six (6)
months and one (1) day. This instant administrative case is therefore the
second incursion of respondent Velez.
Under Section 46 (b) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service, frequent unauthorized absences in reporting for duty
is classified as a grave offense punishable by suspension of six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal from the
service for the second offense.

Topic: Dishonesty and Misconduct

Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
A.M. No. P-14-3222
August 12, 2014
(Formerly AM. OCA IPI NO. 11-3609-P)
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE B. LAGADO and CLERK OF COURT II
JOSEFINA C. EMPUESTO, both of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
MAHAPLAG, LEYTE, Complainants, vs. CLERK II BRYAN ANTONIO
C. LEONIDO, Respondent.
Facts:
Complainants alleged that on February 22, 2011, respondent
Clerk II Bryan Antonio C. Leonido intercepted and withdrew checks
representing their second quincena salary as well as their share in the

Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for Judges Fund from
the Mail Distribution Center, Postal Office of Tacloban, Leyte without their
authority and knowledge.
According to complainants, Leonido was able to claim the subject
checks from the postal office by submitting a forged authorization
purportedly from Clerk of Court II Josefina C. Empuesto and presenting a
photocopy of his Supreme Court identification card. Thereafter, Leonido
allegedly kept the subject checks in his possession without informing
complainants of such fact. Learning about what had transpired, residing
Judge Jose B. Lagado repeatedly tried contacting Leonido, but to no avail.
Eventually, on February 25, 2011, complainants were able to
recover the subject checks through Leonidos wife who turned them over
to a certain Edgar M. Miralles, a court aide of the MTC. As complainants
averred, this was not the first time that Leonido fraudulently intercepted
checks of other MTC employees.
Issue:
Whether or not Leonido should be held administratively liable
for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
Ruling:
Yes.
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or
betray; unworthiness; lack of integrity; lackof honesty, probity, or integrity
in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness.13 It is a
malevolent act that makes people unfit to serve the judiciary.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by
the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of the public officers official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failureto discharge the
duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.
In this case, the OCA correctly found Leonido guilty of Dishonesty
and Gross Misconduct for fraudulentlyintercepting the subject checks
through the use of a falsified authorization letter purportedly signed by
Empuesto and keeping such checks in his possession without the
complainants knowledge and authority. The subsequent return of the
subject checks to their lawful owners is of no moment as it did not change
the unlawful nature of Leonidos acts which is tantamount to stealing.

Topic: Removal of a Judicial Officer

Ponente: PERALTA, J.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2390
August 13, 2014
JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE SIBANAH E.
USMAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Catbalogan City, Samar,
Respondent.
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Josephine Jazmines
Tan (complainant) against Judge Sibanah E. Usman (respondent),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan City, Branch 28,
Samar for bribery and corruption, relative to Civil Case No. 7681 and
Criminal Case No. 6536.
Complainant is one of the plaintiffs and accused in Civil Case No.
7681 and Criminal Case No. 6536, respectively, then pending before
Branch 28, presided by respondent. She claimed that relative to said
cases, respondent was paid P250,000.00 by their opponent, a certain
Allan Tan, through Jaime Cui, Jr., as evidenced by a receipt stating:
"Received P250,000.00 (Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos) from Mr.
Jaime Cui, Jr. as full payment in CC No. 6536 & 7681 to be given to Judge
S.E. Usman" and signed by Nilda C. Cinco, OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of
the same court.
Complainant further accused respondent of knowingly issuing an
unjust interlocutory order when he cited her in contempt. She pointed out
that in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266,2 the Court found respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent argued that since complainant's allegations and issues
had already been raised and threshed out in A.M. No. RTJ-11-2266,
following the principle of res judicata, the instant complaint should not be
given due course. Respondent countered that the allegations of bribery
and corruption are baseless and unfounded.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), due to the conflicting
versions of the parties, recommended that the instant administrative
complaint be referred to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals in
Cebu City, for raffle among the justices in Cebu City on who shall conduct
the investigation.

After investigation and evaluation, the Investigating Justice

recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
Ruling:
Yes.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct but difficult to prove.
The complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such
an accusation. Bare allegation would not suffice to hold respondent
liable.9 In the absence of showing direct and convincing evidence to
prove the alleged bribery, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of said
charge.
In the instant case, no evidence was presented showing that
respondent in fact accepted or received money or anything from Cui in
relation to the subject cases. Neither was there any evidence to show that
respondent judge unlawfully or wrongfully used his official function for his
own benefit or personal gain.
By merely presenting a "receipt" with a tenor that money in the
amount of P250,000.00 was received by Nilda Cinco in behalf of
respondent to support an accusation of bribery will not stand alone. As
correctly observed by the OCA, while it may be considered as proof that
indeed there was money received, it does not prove however that
respondent received the same.
Notably, while complainant presented the subject receipt, there was
no allegation as to how she acquired the receipt and from whom she
obtained said receipt. It did not help also that the due execution and
authenticity of said receipt was not sufficiently established considering
that the parties thereto, Mr. Cui and Ms. Cinco, swore in their affidavits
and during the hearing that no money was received and that no receipt
was issued thereto. Likewise, complainant, despite notice, failed to attend
the hearing of the case, hence, she failed to substantiate and corroborate
her claim of bribery and corruption against respondent.
Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge
connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, it would entail dismissal
from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.
The Rules of Court requires that if a judge should be disciplined for
grave misconduct or any graver offense, as in this case, the evidence
against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less.
Before any of its members could be faulted, competent evidence should
be presented, since the charge is penal in character. Thus, the ground
for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,

corruption, or incompetence. The general rules in regard to

admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, respondent enjoys the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties as well as the
presumption of innocence.
Topic: Dishonesty, Gross Neglect of Duty and Gross Misconduct on
the Part of a Clerk of Court
Per Curiam
A.M. No. P-06-2227
August 19, 2014
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. ATTY.
MARIO N. MELCHOR, JR., FORMER CLERK OF COURT VI, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, BILIRAN (now PRESIDING
JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, CALUBIAN-SAN ISIDRO,
LEYTE), Respondent.
Facts:
A financial audit was conducted by the Fiscal Monitoring
Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from March 14 to
20, 2006, on the books of account of then Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran (RTC), Atty. Mario N. Melchor, Jr.
(Melchor). The audit covered the court transactions from September 1,
1997 to February 28, 2006.
In the course of the fiscal audit examination, members of the
financial audit team discovered evidence of irregularities in the handling
of the financial transactions of the court as well as shortage in its financial
accountabilities. There were shortages of massive amounts from various
funds collected and handled by Melchor totaling P1,939,547.80.
Melchor failed to remit numerous cash bonds collected from the
cases, amounting to P715,841 .00 to the Court's legitimate bank account.
When folders of several cases were examined, the audit team found
evidence of unrecorded collections of cash bonds. Worse, official receipts
were cancelled to conceal the unreported collections. In lieu of the
supposed cancelled transactions, new receipts were then issued
containing considerably understated amounts of the bonds collected.
Melchor likewise failed to present and maintain an official cashbook
for the Fiduciary Fund from September 1, 1997 up to the time of the audit.
Anent the (Judicial Development Dund) JDF and the Special Allowance for
the Judiciary Fund (SAJF), no entries were made in the cashbooks from
October 25, 2005 up to the time of audit.
As recommended by the audit team, Hon. Enrique C. Asis, Executive
Judge of RTC, Naval, Biliran immediately relieved Melchor from his duties
and responsibilities.
Melchor, thereafter, assumed office as Municipal Circuit Trial Collli
(MCTC )Judge of Calubian San Isidro, Leyte, but had yet to receive his
initial salary for lack of clearance from the Financial Management Office.
He prayed that the administrative case against him be considered closed
and terminated.

The OCA revealed that the amounts of P2,505.00 and P20.00

returned by Melchor were not the only sho1iages that he failed to remit on
time. As previously illustrated in the table, he likewise incurred shortages
in the collection for the JDF in the amount of P40,873.00, which was
restituted only on March 14, 2006; SAJF for the amount of P99,326.80 and
returned only on March 16, 2006; and FF collections totaling P796,841,00
that was restituted on various dates, the latest being on March 24, 2006.
In the Resolution, the Court denied Melchor's request for the release
of his initial salary and other benefits as Presiding Judge of MCTC,
Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte.
The OCA held that although the shortages were eventually
restituted as reflected in the deposit slips presented to the Fiscal
Monitoring Division, it should be not disregarded that Melchor violated
various court circulars. The OCA likewise opined that Melchor's promotion
as a judge should not be taken to mean that the infractions he committed
while in the service as Clerk of Court were forgotten.
Issue:
Whether or not Melchor should be dismissed from service.
Ruling:
Yes.
By his own admission, Melchor knowingly used the court funds in his
custody to defray the hospitalization expenses of his child. As Clerk of
Court, Melchor was entrusted with delicate functions in the collection of
legal fees. He acted as cashier and disbursement officer; and was tasked
to collect and receive all monies paid as legal fees, deposits, fines and
dues, and controls the disbursement of the same. He was designated as
custodian of the court's funds and revenues, records, properties and
premises, and should be liable for any loss or shortage thereof.
Administrative Circular No. 3-200035 equally requires that the
aggregate total of the deposit slips for any particular month should always
be equal to, and tally with, the total collections for that month as reflected
in the Monthly Report of Collections and Deposits and Cash Book.
Evidently, the accounting of the total collections and remittances did not
tally in this case.
SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93, as incorporated into the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, likewise provide the guidelines for the
accounting of court funds. All fiduciary collections shall be deposited
immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with
an authorized government depository bank. In SC Circular No. 5-93, the
Land Bank was designated as the authorized government depository.
Furthermore, Section B( 4) of Circular No. 50-9537 directs that "all
collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary collections
shall be deposited within twenty four (24) hours by the Clerk of court
concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines, in
the name of the court as instructed in Circular No. 13-92."
Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as clerk
of court and cash clerks, should deposit immediately with the authorized
government depositories the various funds they have collected. Being the

custodian of court funds and revenues, it was Melchor's primary

responsibility to immediately deposit the funds received by his office with
the Land Bank and not to keep the same in his custody.
By failing to properly remit the cash collections constituting public
funds, Melchor violated the trust reposed in him as the disbursement
officer of the Judiciary. Delayed remittance of cash collections constitutes
gross neglect of duty because this omission deprives the court of interest
that could have been earned if the amounts were deposited in the
authorized depository bank. It should be stressed that clerks of court are
required by SC Circular No. 13-92 to withdraw interest earned on deposits,
and to remit the same to the account of the JDF within two (2) weeks after
the end of each quarter. Delay in the remittance of court funds in the
period required casts a serious doubt on the court employee's
trustworthiness and integrity. As held In Re: Report on the Judicial and
Financial Audit of RTC-Br. 4, Panabo, Davao Del Norte and Office of the
Court Administrator v. Recio, failure of the Clerk of Court to remit the
court funds is tantamount to gross neglect of duty, dishonesty
and grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
The audit team likewise uncovered that the cash shortages in the
collection of various court funds, such as the GF, SGF, JDF, SAJF for the
Judiciary Fund, and FF. Although the said shortages were already
restituted, his failure to deposit the correct amount upon
collection was already prejudicial to the court, it did not earn
interest income on the said amount or was not able to otherwise
use the said funds. Thus, even when there is restitution of funds,
unwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves
administrative sanction, and not even the full payment of the
collection shortages will exempt the accountable officer from
liability.
Melchor's failure to manage and properly document the cash
collections allocated for the JDF is likewise a clear violation of
Administrative Circular No. 5-93.
The fact that Melchor tampered with several official receipts of the
cash bond collections, even devising a way to further conceal his
misdeed, demonstrated a serious depravity on his integrity. It exemplified
gross dishonesty, which undermines the public's faith in courts and in the
administration of justice as a whole.
Undoubtedly, the said transgressions and Melchor's blatant violation
to comply with the aforementioned Court circulars designed to promote
full accountability for public funds does not only amount to gross
neglect; it also constitutes grave misconduct. It should be
emphasized that the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires
strict compliance of the rules and regulations of the collection and
accounting funds,

Melchor's promotion as a judge during the pendency of this

case cannot be considered by the Court either as a mitigating or
an exculpatory circumstance to excuse him from any
administrative liability. A judge is still bound by the same principle
enshrined in Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution. Melchor's current
position in the judiciary will not merit any leniency from the Court.
In the same vein, Melchor's contention that the withholding of his
salary as a judge was already penalty in itself. It was a mere
precautionary measure and not in any way a form of penalty as he would
still be compensated for actual service rendered.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that Melchor is guilty of
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and gross misconduct. Under Section
52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct are
classified as grave offenses with the corresponding penalty of dismissal
for the first offense. All his retirement benefits, except accrued leave
benefits, are forfeited and he is barred from re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

Topic: Award of Attorneys fees

Ponente: Justice Mariano del Castillo
Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casino, Inc. v Fernandez, G.R. No.
193426, September 29, 2014
Facts: On July 1, 1997, respondent filed Civil Case No. 237-0-97 for
recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner, on the
premise that on June 13, 1997, he went to Legenda with his brothers
Ludwin and Deoven; that he handed over Legenda casino chips worth
US$6,000.00, which belonged to him, to his brothers for the latter to use
at the casino; that petitioner accosted his brothers and unduly and
illegally confiscated his casino chips equivalent to US$5,900.00; and that
petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the same to him
despite demand. His Complaint prayed for the return of the casino chips

and an award of P50,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 exemplary

damages, P30,000.00 attorney's fees, P20,000.00 litigation expenses, and
costs.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals awarded Attorneys fees
in favour of the respondent
Issue: Whether the award of Attorneys fees is proper
SC: YES
The award of attorney's fees is proper. Under Article 2208 of the Civil
Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when the defendant acted in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim, or in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. Petitioner's act of arbitrarily confiscating the casino
chips and treating Ludwin and Deoven the way it did, and in refusing to
satisfy respondent's claim despite the fact that it had no basis to withhold
the chips, confirm its bad faith, and should entitle respondent to an
award.

Topic: Gross Immoral Conduct for failure to promptly account to

his client the funds received in the course of his professional
engagement and return the same upon demand
Ponente: Justice Mariano del Castillo
Rolando Viray v. Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas, A.C. No. 7337,
September 29, 2014
Facts: Complainant engaged the services of respondent relative to a
labor case he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III. On February
26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and ordered the
nominal award amounting to P189,491.60.00. Subsequently, an Alias Writ
of Execution was issued relative to decision. During the implementation of
the writ, complainant discovered that respondent had already collected in
instalments the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez.
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses
Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf.
Complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to
him the amount of P95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of P20,000.00. But
respondent did not respond.
Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure
to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his
professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
SC: YES
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct. The Code of Professional
Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship. Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty
to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "a lawyer
shall deliver the funds of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions received payments
for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez. But respondent neither informed the
complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. Respondent
withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said amount, which he
merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Such failure
and inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an
accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption
that he converted it to his own use. His unjustified withholding of the
funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and

client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from the client. He is obliged
to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he
has collected for his client. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for
his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected for his
client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting. Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate
his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes
him attorney's fees. Respondent's failure to immediately account for and
return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed
in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

Topic: Violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and

Impropriety
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion
Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio Lucmayun, A.M. No. MTJ-131837, September 24, 2014
Facts: Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the
respondent met in a waiting shed in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that
meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him into signing a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of a lot. Unknown to the
complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called
"Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had deceptively inserted in order
to strip him of his ownership of the lot. After signing the document and as
notarized by a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata without the complainants
presence, the respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no longer
had any right over the property. In March 2005, the father of the
respondent, Pedro Lucmayon, ordered him to cease cultivating the land
because of the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.
Issue: Whether respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and Impropriety
SC: YES
Respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The intent of
the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of
private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties
and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of
his official functions. When a member of the bench serves as
administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of
losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his
principal conflicts with those of the litigant who comes before his court.
The only exception to this rule is when the estate or trust belongs to, or
the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere
with the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code defines
"immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives within
the second degree of consanguinity. In this case, since complainant
clearly does not fall under respondents "immediate family" as defined,
the latters appointment as the formers attorney-in-fact is not a valid
exception to the rule.

Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety. Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an
exacting standard of morality and decency. For no position exacts
a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at
all times. A judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated
from his personal existence. A judge should personify judicial integrity and
exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. In the administrative complaint, the respondents acts of: (1)
making the complainant sign at least two (2) documents consisting of
SPA and Waiver of Rights without the presence of a counsel; and (2)
allowing the notarization of the documents outside the presence of the
executor, amount to impropriety.

Topic: Violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR;

Misappropriating clients money
Ponente: PER CURIAM
CF Sharp Crew Management Inc. v. Nicolas c. Torres, A.C. No.
10438, September 23, 2014
Facts: Complainant hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by
profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to
serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and
management of legal cases and medical related claims instituted by
seafarers against complainants various principals.
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondents
request,
complainant
issued
checks
in
the
amounts
of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00, and P296,808.40
as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua. However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in
the amount of 145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the
checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International
Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch. With respect to Sampani,
complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts
of P216,936.00 andP8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the
requested amount of P652,013.20, through checks not issued by
complainant.
In a Report and Recommendation dated August 1, 2009, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable for
violating the CPR, and accordingly recommended that he be meted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.
SC: Yes.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the
findings of the IBP in its report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent; and (b) the
monetary award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is
highly fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and
good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or

received for or from his client. This is the standard laid down by Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyers failure
to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in
him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics.
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that
complainant had duly proven its charges against respondent. In particular,
complainant had exposed respondents modus operandi of repeatedly
requesting the issuance of checks purportedly for the purpose of settling
seafarers claims against the complainants various principals, only to
have such checks (except for the check in the amount of 145,650.00
issued to Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account,
particularly International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch. It
is well-settled that "when a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if
he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client." This, respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondents acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty,
abuse of trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and
betrayal of his clients interests which he is duty-bound to protect. They
are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct." Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a
basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, the Court deems it proper
to modify the penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides
that in similar cases where lawyers misappropriated their clients money,
the Court imposed upon them the ultimate penalty of disbarment from the
practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares III, the Court
disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his clients money intended for
securing a certificate of title on the latters behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v.

Reyes, the same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who
misappropriated the insurance proceeds of her clients deceased
husband.

Topic: Disbarment
Ponente: Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.
Mariano R. Cristobal, v. Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta, A.C. No. 9925,
September 17, 2014
Facts: Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law
Office for the filing of a "petition for recognition for the minors Codie
Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell Green" before the Bureau of
Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner signed the "Special
Contract of Legal Services" in behalf of said law office. Respondent also
received from complainant the "full and package price" of P 160,000 for
the filing of the petition for recognition. No such petition, however, was
filed.
Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent for the latter's
failure to file the petition for recognition and return the amount
of P160,000 despite demand.
In his comment, respondent explained that the petition for recognition
was not filed because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file the petition,
misplaced it and did not inform him of such fact. He also claimed that he
begged complainant to forgive him and assured him that he will return the
money. However, respondent failed to refund the money on time for he
was "hard up in funds." Eventually, he was able to save enough and
refunded the money to complainant. Respondent likewise begs
forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his mistake.
In
addition,
respondent
submitted
complainants
Affidavit
of
Desistance. In the said affidavit, complainant said that respondent cried
for forgiveness and that he has forgiven him. Complainant confirmed that
respondent had already refunded the amount he paid.
Issue:
Whether respondent must be disbarred for violating Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
SC: No.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
The court held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that
lawyer's duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.

Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve

complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.
He himself admits that the petition for recognition was not filed, seeks
forgiveness from the Court and promises not to repeat his
mistake. Complainant also submitted official letters from the Bureau of
Immigration that indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan
supposedly lost the petition for recognition and failed to inform
respondent cannot absolve him of liability for it was his duty not to
neglect complainant's case and handle it with diligence.
The court note that while respondent failed to refund immediately the
amount paid by complainant, he nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that
he eventually was able to fully repay complainant and begged
complainant's forgiveness.
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Bautista, we found Bautista negligent in handling
Voluntad-Ramirez's case and ruled that he is guilty of violating Canon 18
and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We admonished
Bautista to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his
duty to his clients and ordered him to restitute to VoluntadRamirez P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. In said case, we cited
Carino v. Atty. De Los Reyes where the respondent lawyer who failed to
file the complaint-affidavit before the prosecutor's office restituted
the P10,000 acceptance fee paid to him. The respondent lawyer in Carino
was reprimanded by the Court with a warning that he should be more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
Therefore, the court find Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta LIABLE for violation of
Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he
is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Topic: Malpractice as a Notary Public; Territorial Jurisdiction in

Notarization
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. v. Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe, A.C. No.
7184, September 17, 2014
Facts: Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. charged respondent, previously of the Public
Attorney's Office, for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance
of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter,
despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of
Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra
judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De
Nieva" dated "25th day of 1999" (subject document), stating that he is a
"notary public for and in the City of Marikina." To prove his claim,
complainant attached a Certification dated May 26, 2005 issued by the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina
City, certifying that per the courts record, respondent is not a
commissioned notary public for the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994
to the date of issuance. Respondent admitted that he indeed notarized
the acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he was not
commissioned as a notary public at that time. To prove his defense, he
attached a Certification dated August 23, 2006 issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of his
appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities
of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999
under Appointment No. 98. Further, respondent, thru the comment,
incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for
malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the
instant administrative case against him.
In a Report and Recommendation, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyers
oath. In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent
be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a
notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he
be disqualified as such.
On reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution dated
March 8, 2014, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution,
imposing, instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and
disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for the
decreased period of one (1) year.
Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.

SC: NO
Respondent, admitted himself that he was commissioned as notary public
only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San
Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, thus, could not notarize
the subject documents acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said
notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the
RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary publics jurisdiction is
crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice:
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as
notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of
the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless
either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court.
Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12,
Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as
amended, of which Section 240, Article II states:
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary
public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province. The
jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be coextensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do
any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary
public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact,
uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of
falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyers oath.
Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the
issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality
definitely more than casual.
With respondents liability herein established, and considering further the
attendant circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first

time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, the
Court finds that suspension for a period of six (6) months from the
practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is disqualified
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year
and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked.

Topic: Violation of Rule 1.01 Canon of the Code of Professional

Responsibility
Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil v. Atty. Roberto L. Uy, A.C. No.
9115, September 17, 2014
Facts:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L.
Uy for unprofessional and unethical conduct. Private complainant Rebecca
was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita Uy Lim by
virtue of an order issued by RTC. Rebecca averred that respondent
continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order declaring
her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacitas properties. She added
that respondent mortgaged a commercial property in favor of the PS Bank
despite an existing trust agreement. Respondent however denied
Rebeccas allegations. The IBP issued a recommendation finding
respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01 Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty
of suspension. Despite Rebeccas motion to withdraw, the administrative
case filed continued.
Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.
SC: YES
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the
legal profession, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the
errant lawyers penalty depends on the factual circumstances of each
case.
The court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by,
as admitted mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
apparent dispute over the same. Respondent should have exhibited
prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have
exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property

violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily,
members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant measure,
respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but
also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of
the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.
Although to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the
IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1
of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of
P15,000.00 would suffice.

Topic: Violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio
Imelda Cato Gaddi v. Atty. Lope M. Velasco, A.C. No. 8637,
September 15, 2014
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi
against Atty. Lope M. Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Gaddi was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada
Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch
of BLSS in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya (BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada
(Angelo), the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing that Angelo
agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano. However, Angelo informed the
management that he did not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelos
complaint, the police officers apprehended the swimming instructors of
BLSS in Solano. Worried, Gaddi pleaded with Angelos wife, Kristina Marie,
and the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for permission to leave the
office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of acceding to her plea, they
commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission that the BLSS in
Solano was unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the
office without the handwritten admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing
the handwritten. Subsequently, Gaddi found out that Angelo filed a
complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano using her handwritten
admission, which was already notarized by Velasco. Thus, Gaddi filed the
present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Issue: Whether respondent violated the 2004 rules on notarial practice.
SC: YES
Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries
public that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and
routinary act. Notarization converts a private document to a
public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; for this reason,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public
should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the
document is in the notarys presence personally at the time of
the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified through competent evidence of identity. At

the time of notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or
mark the notary publics notarial register. The purpose of these
requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of
the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatorys free
act and deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a
notary public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary
public is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a
notarial certificate that is incomplete.
In the present case, contrary to Velascos claim that Gaddi appeared
before him and presented two identification cards as proof of her identity,
the notarial certificate, in rubber stamp, itself indicates: SUBSCRIBE AND
SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT
EXHIBITING
TO
ME
HIS/HER
C.T.C.
NO.__________ISSUED
AT/ON___________. The unfilled spaces clearly establish that Velasco had
been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the signatory to the
document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a
notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi;
otherwise, he could have ascertained that the handwritten admission was
executed involuntarily and refused to notarize the document.
Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. Velasco did not even present his notarial register to rebut
Gaddis allegations. It is presumed that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced.

Topic: Disbarment for Failure to File the Petition for Adoption

despite receiving his Legal fees
Ponente: Justice Antonio Carpio
Melody R. Nery v. Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana, A.C. No. 10196,
September 9, 2014
Facts: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nevy against
Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana for failing to file the petition for adoption despite
receiving his legal fees and for making Nevy believe that the petition was
already filed.
Despite demand to reimbursed the amount of Php 100,000.00 she paid
him, private respondent refused to do so. Sampana argued that Nerys
allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana
admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of
annulment of marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially
frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age, civil status
and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted.
Thus, Sampana suggested that "if the alien adopter would be married to a
close relative of Nery, the intended adoption by an alien could be
possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents,
including the marriage contracts and the certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy certification. Nery
furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification.
Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not
file it because he was still waiting for the certification. Sampana denied
that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment
case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could
have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed
to refund the amount Nery paid him, after deducting his legal services
and actual expenses. The IBP found Sampana guilty of malpractice for
making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees.
Issue: Whether the recommendation of the IBP should be affirm.
SC: YES
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients
cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence,
skill and competence, regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to
the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.

Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package
fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee,
he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his
duty of due diligence and candor to his client. Sampanas proffered
excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to
Nery that if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act
provision, which Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can jointly adopt
a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her
Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to adopt is
waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana
misinformed Nery of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the
annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana
neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money
given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients funds
upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for
his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of
the public confidence in the legal profession.

Topic: Disbarment; Unethical practice of filing frivolous

administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts
Ponente: Justice Lucas P. Bersamin
Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Br. 51,
Sorsogon City v. Atty. Juan S. Dealca, A.C. No. 7474, September
09, 2014
Facts: On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance
in Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines v. Philip William
Arsenault then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. The former
then petitioned to re raffle the case because of previous adverse
encounters with the presiding judge where he does not appear before the
incumbent judge, and the latter will not hear cases handled by the
undersigned. This petition, however was not granted and prompted Judge
Madrid to file a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing
Atty. Dealcas unethical practice of entering his appearance and then
moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous
adverse incidents between them. On his comment, the respondent stated
that because of the petitioners failure to grant his proper motions in said
criminal case, he should be disbarred. Upon investigation of IBP-Sorsogon,
it found that Respondent filed, among others, four cases which aroused
out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to
secure a favorable action from the court, and all these four cases are
precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies
available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in
filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of
the court.
Issue: Whether Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal
complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
SC: YES
The court does not agree on the argument of respondent that he filed
such administrative cases against judges and court personnel because as
a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. The Lawyers Oath
is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation
thereof by an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension,
or other disciplinary action. The oath exhorts upon the members of the
Bar not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty

under his Lawyers Oath not to initiate groundless, false or unlawful suits.
The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that
the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed,
as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his
clients propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against
his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Courts duty
to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and
lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are
intended to vex and harass them, among other things. Ergo respondent
indeed filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyers Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility

Topic: Grave Abuse of Authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross

Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service
Ponente: Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
Office of the Court Administrator v. Executive Judge Owen Amor,
RTC, Daet, Camarines Norte, A.M. No. RTJ- 08-2140 October 7,
2014
Facts: According to the memorandum filed by Judge Manuel E. Contreras
against Respondent Executive Owen Amor, he had acted in grave abuse
of authority, Grave Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical
to Judicial Service because of instances he had committed; one of which is
the impounding of a tricycle because it bumped the respondents vehicle
and the owner was unable to pay the amount demanded for the incurred
damages, such act of the judge was then concealed by Head Guard
Quintin Fernandez. Another act of respondent which is considered as Acts
Inimical to Judicial Service is his habitual absence especially during
Mondays and Fridays, resulting in delays in the disposition of cases in
violation of existing laws and circulars on speedy trial. One particular act
of such judge also shows gross insubordination and Acts Inimical to
Judicial Service when he visited Judge Contreras sala and suggested that
he should not follow through the charge of indirect contempt against one
Atty. Freddie Venida because he had much gold, instead he should exploit
such situation to gain from Atty. Venida which was rejected by Judge
Contrera. The memorandum then was treated as an administrative
complaint to which respondent was required to comment, but to no avail.
Thus, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 2, 2001, ordering
respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for such failure, and to submit his comment on Judge
Contrerass Memorandum which was then again unheeded. Respondent
then filed a certificate of candidacy for the 2002 Barangay Elections,
resulting in his automatic resignation from the service effective June 7,
2002
Issue: Whether respondent acted in grave abuse of authority, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Insubordination, and Acts Inimical to Judicial Service
SC: YES
Grave abuse of authority is defined as a misdemeanor committed
by a public officer, who, under color of his office, wrongfully
inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other
injury; it is an act characterized with cruelty, severity, or
excessive use of authority; while Misconduct, on the other hand, is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the

public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must

be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling and
such acts are inimical to judicial service, and thus, constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service as they violate the norm of
public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the peoples
faith in the Judiciary.
The respondent is correctly found to be guilty of the charges against him.
Respondents failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities
afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the
natural order of things, a man would resist an unfounded claim or
imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to remain
silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such,
respondents silence may thus be construed as an implied admission and
acknowledgement of the veracity of the allegations against him.
Respondent was also correctly found guilty of Gross Misconduct and
Insubordination for refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the
Court to file a comment on the administrative complaint against him.
Verily, a judge who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to
comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. Such willful
disobedience and disregard of the directives of the Court constitute grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor
and integrity attached to his office. In this case, it is noteworthy that
respondent was afforded several opportunities, not to mention a generous
amount of time to comply with the Courts lawful orders, but he has failed
and continuously refused to heed the same. Hence the totality of
respondents acts warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from
service.

Topic: Notarizing false Affidavit

Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes
Domado Disomimba Sultan v. Atty. Casan Macabanding A. C. No.
7919, October 8, 2014
Facts: Complainant was running as mayor in the May 2014 election
thereby filing his certificate of candidacy. Consequently, an Affidavit of
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor dated April 10,
2007 was notarized and submitted by the respondent to the COMELEC,
withdrawing the complainants candidacy without the latters knowledge
or authorization. When complainant learned such, he alleged that he
neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to
prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal
be ignored and that his name be retained on the list of candidates. The
COMELEC Second Division then found merit in the complainants petition
and ordered the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the
position of mayor; a subpoena was then given and required the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the signature appearing on the
Affidavit of Withdrawal because it was elevated to the COMELEC en banc;
the result then stated that the signature in the Affidavit of Withdrawal and
the specimen signatures of the complainant were not written by one and
the same person. On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present
administrative complaint against the respondent with prayer for his
disbarment. The respondent was then suspended from the practice of law
for six months and suspended from being commissioned as Notary Public
for two years. As adjudged by the IBP Board of Governors
Issue: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable based
on the allegations on the complaint
SC: YES
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side
is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
In the case at bar, the complainant adduced preponderant evidence that
his signature was indeed forged in an affidavit which the respondent
notarized and submitted to the COMELEC. Consequently, the respondent
should be held administratively liable for his action. "Where the notary
public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by

reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or

consent to the doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also
commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to;
most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to be
part of illegal transactions." In fact, the respondent admitted that the
affidavit was notarized in his office without the presence of the
complainant. Hence Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively
liable for misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law for one
year. Further, his notarial commission, if any, is revoked and he is
disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years.

Topic: Grave Misconduct

Ponente: Justice Estala Perlas-Bernabe
Re: Anonymous letter v. Judge Corazon Soluren, A.M. No. P-14321, October 8, 2014
Facts: In the Anonymous Letter, it was alleged that Judge Soluren had
been instructing the party-litigants to deposit with her court settlement
money for various cases in her sala. It was elaborated that Tuzon would
merely acknowledge receipt of the settlement money for the different
cases through handwritten notes without issuing any official receipts
therefor; after which, Judge Soluren would order the dismissal of the
corresponding cases. However, when the parties requested for the release
of the said money, Tuzon would fail to timely comply with the same.
In an Indorsement dated March 5, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) referred the Anonymous Letter to Executive Judge
Evelyn A. Turla (Executive Judge Turla) of the same RTC, for her discreet
investigation and report. In compliance, Executive Judge Turla sent a
letter dated March 15, 2013 to the OCA with Tuzons comment attached
thereto, stating that she did not find any act of irregularity or any
unauthorized collection on the part of the RTC.
Tuzon admitted his receipt of various amounts as settlement money for
the different cases pending before Judge Solurens sala. He, however,
explained that, on orders of Judge Soluren, he merely accepted the said
amounts from the parties who were willing to settle the civil aspect of
their respective cases and kept them in the courts vault. He also
admitted not having issued official receipts for the amounts he received,
not being an accountable officer in possession of such receipts.
The OCA deemed Tuzons acts as a form of Grave Misconduct for which he
should be held administratively liable.
Issue:
Whether Tuazon should be held administratively liable for the
charge of Grave Misconduct as recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator.
SC: NO
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct
must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The misconduct must imply a wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be

connected with the performance of the public officers official duties

amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate Grave
Misconduct from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must
be manifest in the former.
When Tuzon readily acknowledged that he accepted various amounts of
settlement money from party-litigants and kept them in his custody
without authority to do so and without issuing any official receipts, he
clearly went beyond his duties as a Legal Researcher of the RTC as
enumerated in Item 2.2.1, Subsections 2 (2.2.), Section D, Chapter VI,
Volume I of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, as follows:
2.2.1. Legal Researcher
(1) verifies authorities on questions of law raised by part[y]litigants in cases brought before the Court as may be assigned
by the Presiding Judge;
(2) prepares memoranda on evidence adduced by the parties
after the hearing;
(3) prepares outlines of the facts and issues involved in cases
set for pre-trial for the guidance of the Presiding Judge;
(4) prepares indexes to be attached to the records showing
the important pleadings filed, the pages where they may be
found, and in general, the status of the case;
(5) prepares and submits to the Branch Clerk of Court a
monthly list of cases or motions submitted for decision or
resolution, indicating therein the deadlines for acting on the
same; and
(6) performs such other duties as may be assigned by the
Presiding Judge or the Branch Clerk of Court.
Considering the absence of any proof that Tuzons actions were tainted
with corruption, or with a clear intent to violate the law, or would
constitute a flagrant disregard of an established rule say for instance, by
the actual misappropriation of any amount which came to his possession
Tuzon cannot be held liable for Grave Misconduct but only for Simple
Misconduct which is punishable by suspension for a period of one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months at the most without pay. That
being said, the Court deems it proper to impose the maximum of the
foregoing penalty.

Topic: Section 2 Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court

Personnel
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Judge Juan Gabriel H. Alano vs. Padma L. Sahi, A.M. No. P-143252, October 14, 2014
Facts:
In the administrative complaint filed by Judge Juan Gabriel H.
Alano of the 2nd MCTC of Sumisip, Maluso and Lantawan, Basilan Province
against Padma L. Sahi (Sahi), Court Interpreter I of the same court,
alleged that Sahi brokered for party litigants and solicited money and gifts
in exchange for favorable decisions in the election protest cases pending
before his court, despite constant reminders to his staff that they should
never demand, solicit, or receive money, gifts or other benefits from any
party litigants.
On her part, Sahi denied that she defied the order given by Judge Alano in
relation to soliciting gifts or money from party litigants.
The Court ordered Executive Judge Reynerio G. Estacio of the RTC of
Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 14 for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Estacio was convinced that respondent had
indeed, been into the activities of brokering for party litigants and
soliciting money or gifts, in consideration for favorable decision. Judge
Estacio therefore recommended that Sahi be dismissed from service, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of
the government, including government-owned and controlled corporation,
and forfeiture of all her benefits, except accrued leave credits.
Issue: Whether Sahi violated Section 2 Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel
SC: YES
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, provides
that "court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or
benefit shall influence their official actions," while Section 2(e), Canon III
states that "court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan,
gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from
which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is
to influence the court personnel in performing official duties."
In the present case, the corrupt practice of Sahi in soliciting and receiving
bribe money from party litigants on the pretext that they will obtain a
favorable judgment undoubtedly degraded the judiciary and diminished

the respect and regard of the people for the court and its personnel. Such
practice constitutes grave misconduct in office which is appalling. It is a
grave offense that carries an equally grave penalty. Under Section 22(c) of
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, gross misconduct is
classified as a grave offense. The penalty for this offense is dismissal even
for the first offense.
The Court has repeatedly held that the conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.

Topic: Dishonesty, Usurpation of Official Functions and Illegal

Exaction
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Frumencio E. Pulgar v. Paul M. Resurreccion, A.M. No. P-09-2673,
October 21, 2014
Facts: Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar denounced in a complaint-affidavit Court
Interpreter Paul M. Resurreccion of the RTC, Br 276, in Muntinlupa City, for
committing acts of extortion, illegal exaction, and blackmail by using his
position to extort money from him, a law practitioner, inexchange for nonexistent goodwill, and for violation of Administrative Circular No. 31-90.
Court Stenographer Maricar M. Eugenio testified in favor of Resurreccion.
She thereby laid the responsibility for the ex parte reception of the
evidence on Gina Bacayon, then the acting clerk of court. She claimed
that being the stenographer recording the ex parte presentation of
evidence on February 26, 1997, she was the one who had asked for the
payment of the transcript of the stenographic notes from Atty. Pulgar.
However, her testimony invited suspicion of her covering up
Resurreccions malfeasance, leading to her being likewise investigated
and made to answer for dishonesty.
In the report and recommendation of investigating Judge Guerrero, he
held Resurrecion not liable for extortion because there was neither force
nor intimidation commited by him in demanding money from a lawyer or
litigant. However, Resurrecion was found guilty of exacting money for
some legal fees that do not exist. Judge Guerrero found impropriety on the
part of Eugenio covering up the wrongdoings of their comrade by
testifying falsely and should also be penalized for trying to mislead the
Court by making such false testimony. Her actuation amounts to neglect
in the performance of her official function as co-player in the
administration of justice.
In the first report of the OCA, the dismissal of Resurrecion from service
and show cause from Eugenio for her not to be held administratively was
recommended. In the second report, Eugenio was found GUILTY of
dishonesty and simple neglect of duty
Issue:
Whether Resurreccion is guilty of grave misconduct due to
acts of dishonesty, usurpation of official functions and illegal exaction.
SC: YES

To enforce the constitutional tenet, that a public office is a public

trust, the Court has incessantly reminded that officials and
employees involved in the administration of justice should
faithfully adhere to their mandated duties and responsibilities.
Any act of impropriety on their part - whether committed by the highest
judicial official or by the lowest member of the judicial workforce - can
greatly erode the people's confidence in the Judiciary. This is because the
image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct of its
personnel; hence, it becomes their constant duty to maintain the good
name and standing of the Judiciary as a true temple of justice.
The Supreme Court ruled that the recommendation of the OCA for the
immediate dismissal of Resurreccion from the service is warranted. His
acts of dishonesty, usurpation of official functions and illegal
exaction demanded that we classify his acts as grave misconduct.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule must be manifest. They were so in his
case. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consisted in his acts
of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position or character of his office to
procure some benefit for himself or for another, contrary to the rights of
others. The collection of the fees had no legal basis whatsoever; hence,
his illegal exactions were outrightly and plainly corrupt. It then becomes
unavoidable for us to judge his transgressions as motivated by the lust for
money and power, rather than having proceeded from his unfamiliarity
with standing rules and guidelines.
Dismissal from the service was called for because of the grave nature of
Resurreccion's offense, he thereby revealed his absolute unworthiness to
remain in the service of the Judiciary. Indeed, he should not be allowed to
serve a minute longer in the Judiciary lest the reputation and integrity of
the service be prejudiced. Under Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, serious dishonesty and grave
misconduct, among others, are grave offenses punishable by dismissal
from the service.

Topic: Dishonesty
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Concerned Citizens of Naval, Biliran v. Florante F. Ralar, A.M. No.
P-14-3278, October 21, 2014
Facts: Petitioner charged Florante F. Ralar, Court Stenographer III of
Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court in Caibiran, Biliran with dishonesty
through falsification of public documents. It was alleged that he did not
state in his application his having been previously employed in the Bureau
of Post. Upon verification, it was found out that prior to his employment in
the Judiciary he had been actually employed as a Letter Carrier and was
dismissed for committing mail pilferage. He misappropriated his collection
when he was employed as a Revenue Collection Clerk. Despite knowing
nothing about stenography, he had obtained a falsified certification of his
knowledge of stenography to secure an appointment to his present
position. He had even asked court litigants for money in consideration of
assistance extended to them in cases pending in court.
Ralar denied the accusation of dishonesty and averred that all allegations
against him is unsubstantiated.
The Office of the Court Administrator found basis to hold Ralar guilty of
dishonesty.
Ralars Personal Data Sheet (PDS) showed that the latter deliberately
concealed the fact that he was previously charged administratively and
was eventually penalized for acts of dishonesty while he was still an
employee of then Bureau of Post. His PDS also showed that portions in
same inquiring as to whether he have been formally charged and have
been found guilty of any administrative offense where the latter put a
check mark beside the boxes indicating "No" answers.
The fact that respondent Ralar affixed check marks in the "No" answer
box clearly shows his intention to misrepresent himself in order to gain
employment in the government. Indeed, his actuations fall squarely as an
act of dishonesty.
OCA recommended the dismissal of Ralar from the service with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Issue: Whether Ralar is guilty of dishonesty.
SC: YES

Dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence.

Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the
respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was
committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning
he could have had at that moment.
Ralars invocation of the right to face and to confront his accusers
was misplaced, for the charge was soon easily substantiated by the
results of the OCAs legitimate queries put to the various offices of the
public service in which he had previously served.
He committed falsification of an official document when he did not
disclose in his written application for his present position his having been
formally charged administratively, and having been found guilty of such
charge became indisputable. His omission, being designed by him to
misrepresent his qualifications for the position he sought, constituted
gross dishonesty that the Court cannot tolerate.
No more essential is that policy than in the Judiciary, for no other office in
the Government exacts the greatest demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness from public employees and officials than the Judiciary. As
such, the Judiciary deserves the best from all its employees and officials.
Dishonesty and falsification malevolent and abhorrent have no place in
the Judiciary.
Ralar was guilty of dishonesty, which is defined as the absence of
integrity; the disposition to betray, cheat, deceive, or defraud; or the
intentional violation of truth. Pursuant to Section 46, Rule 10 of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Case in the Civil Service,
dishonesty, classified as a grave offense, is penalized with
dismissal for the first offense.

Topic: Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the

Court
Ponente: PER CURIAM
Jean Paul V. Gillera, et al. v. Maria Consuelo Joie Fajardo, A.M. No.
P-14-3237, October 21, 2014
Facts: An administrative complaint was filed before the OCA against
Maria Consuelo Joie A. Fajardo, the Court Sheriff of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna. Complainants alleged that respondent
committed conduct unbecoming a court officer by her (a) non-payment of
house rental fees; (b) issuance of bouncing checks; (c) falsification of a
deed of absolute sale and Official Receipt No. 8010; (d) harassment; and
(e) ill-gotten wealth.
Complainants Spouses Jean Paul and Suzette Gillera owned a house and
lot and they leased it to respondent Maria Consuelo Joie A. Fajardo.
Fajardo issued three post-dated checks for the November 2007, December
2007, and January 2008 rentals. The bank, BDO, dishonored the first two
checks for being drawn against a closed account. Fajardo ignored
demands to replace the checks and failed to pay the rentals.
Spouses Gillera incurred debts to MMG Construction and Development
Corporation, a family corporation owned by complainant Atty. Jillina M.
Gerodias. The Spouses Gillera were then leasing MMG's warehouse.
Spouses Gillera designated HFC another Gerodias-owned company, to sell
their house and lot occupied by Fajardo and apply the proceeds to their
debt with MMG.
Fajardo offered to buy the house and lot from HFC on the condition that
the mortgage with BDO over the house and lot should first be discharged.
HFC paid the Spouses Gillera's loan with BDO to release the mortgage.
Fajardo and HFC agreed on the sale of the house and lot for P3.1 million
with F350,000.00 as earnest money and the balance to be paid after one
(1) month. Fajardo failed to pay the balance. After seeking extensions, she
issued HFC three (3) post-dated checks but the same bounced.
Fajardo claimed that she was issued Official Receipt No. 8010 and given
the deed of absolute sale signed by the Spouses Gillera as sellers and
Fajardo's mother as buyer. She continued to occupy the property without
paying rent, prompting the Spouses Gillera to file for unlawful detainer.
Issue: Whether guilty of dishonesty and conduct unbecoming an officer of
the court

SC: YES
Sheriffs, as front-line representatives, play a crucial role in our justice
system, having the important task of executing our courts' final
judgments. Sheriffs must conduct themselves with integrity at all
times as "once he[/she] loses the people's trust, he[/she]
diminishes the people's faith in the judiciary." Respondent's acts
failed to meet the high standards of conduct expected from the position
held.
She anchored her non-payment on an alleged agreement with
complainant Suzette Gillera that rental arrears would be written off if
respondent buys the house and lot, and her contention that her mother
did buy the house and lot. Both Executive Judge Sonia T. Yu-Casano and
the Office of the Court Administrator found that no agreement
materialized. In fact, the court in the ejectment case found respondent
liable for rental arrears. Thus, respondent's continuous refusal to pay
a just debt amounts to "conduct unbecoming of a public
employee."
Worse, respondent testified during investigation that her mother had
bought the house and lot, and respondent produced anew documents
already rejected by the ejectment court.
It was found that respondent presented a falsified Official Receipt No.
8010 and passed off a deed of absolute sale copy, bearing her mother's
signature, to serve as a faithful reproduction of a nonexistent original
document.
Fraudulently issuing bouncing checks behavior compounds respondent's
acts of presenting forged documents and making untruthful testimony, all
in all depicting her as "lacking in personal honesty and good moral
character that render her unworthy of public confidence."
Dishonesty refers to "intentionally making a false statement on
any material fact." Dishonesty involves "a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity, lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
The rules consider dishonesty as a grave offense such that the first
offense merits dismissal from the service and carries with it
"cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision."

Dishonesty need not be committed in the performance of official

duty as to warrant the penalty of dismissal.
And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person
charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government officer or
employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct,
even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they
affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its
service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and
well, because by reason of his government position, he is given more and
ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men,
even against offices and entities of the government other than the office
where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his
grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared
to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of
an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty
inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to
continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.
This court has emphasized that "court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and
faith in the judiciary." Consequently their conduct "must not only be, but
must also be perceived to be, free from any whiff of impropriety, both with
respect to their duties in the judiciary and to their behavior outside the
court." This court will not tolerate acts or omissions "diminishing or
tending to diminish public trust and confidence in the courts."

Topic: Legal Ethics - Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility (A lawyer should not engage in an
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct)
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION
OF
COURT
EMPLOYEES
(PACE),
represented by its President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL,
Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10134. November 26, 2014
Facts:
This is complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia
C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. AlibutdanDiaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national
convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during
the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City; that during the 12th
convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for
the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the
last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of
Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 12007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for each
PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation
report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies
belonging to the association as a matter of procedure despite a letter of
demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz; and that the new set of
PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president,
Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they
failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo
conventions.
Issue:
Is the respondent liable?

Ruling:
Yes. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's
honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act
with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing
parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath
to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients.
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to
that profession which society entrusts with the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for others to
emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of
PACE; her running for re-election, including her non-admission that she
ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by
the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval
or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including
herself even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were
definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was much to be
desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

Topic: Legal Ethics - CANON 2 (SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that

not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in view of a reasonable observer); CANON 4 (SEC. 1.
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities); and CANON 3 (SECTION 2. Judges shall
ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary)
Ponente: SERENO, C.J.
ANTONIO S. ASCAO, JR., CONSOLACION D. DANTES, BASILISA A.
OBALO, JULIETA D. TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E.
LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L. NOGUERA, FIDEL S.
SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T. TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, AND MARIVEL B. ISON, Complaints,
v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR., BRANCH 45, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ],
January 12, 2015
Facts:
Complainants were allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market
stalls in the public market of Occidental Mindoro. The Mayor of the
Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T.
Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly wanted to demolish the
public market, so that the Municipality can use the space to erect the new
San Jose Commercial Complex. Thus, on 26 June 2012, complainants
filed a Petition for Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction

(WPI) against the Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was docketed
as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and was raffled to respondents sala.
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none of whom were parties
to the case, were all allowed inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012
hearing, only 12 out of the more than 500 members accompanying
complainants on that day were allowed to enter. Worse, all the
complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta D.
Toledo, who was scheduled to give her testimony that day. Complainants
also claimed that the questions propounded by respondent to their
witnesses were all geared towards establishing that they should have no
right to oppose the Mayors plan, as this will be good for all and the
progress and development of the municipality. At the next hearing held
on 3 July 2012, Mayor Villarosa stepped out of the courtroom to take a
call. He exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of
the court.
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3 July 2012,
respondent argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and
admonished petitioners without basis or justification. They further
claimed that respondent judge asked complainants confusing and
misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging
to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.
Thus, complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with
serious violations of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and
Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Issue:
Is the judge liable?
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners claim that respondent berated, scolded, confused and
admonished their witnesses without basis or justification. In the 2 July
2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that apart from raising his
voice when addressing Toledo and making abrasive and unnecessary
statements to her, respondent also made insulting, sometimes
needlessly lengthy statements in open court. Respondent failed to
conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others
subject to their influence, direction or control.
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness.
The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge
must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his
words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control.

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2

and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable
observer.cralawred
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the
courts permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent
appeared to serve as the formers advocate. He did so by declaring in
open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the
latter had an important appointment to attend.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.
Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of Canon 3, which
reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and
out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public,
the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and
of the judiciary.
Topic: Betrayal of his client's trust and for misuse of information
obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to
the advantage of another person
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Daria O. Daging v. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis, A.C. No. 9395,
November 12, 2014
Facts: This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an
Affidavit Complaint filed by Daria O. Daging before the IBP, Benguet
Chapter, against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis.
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music
Lounge. She leased from Benjie Pinlac a building space located at No. 22
Otek St., Baguio City where she operated the bar.

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal from Davis &

Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos
Saganib Sabling. This eventually resulted in the signing by the
complainant, the respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement.
Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac
terminated the lease. Together with Novie Balageo and respondent, Pinlac
went to complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein,
and informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar.
Complainant averred that subsequently respondent acted as business
partner of Balageo in operating the bar under her business name, which
they later renamed Amarillo Music Bar.
Complainant filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before
the MTCC, Branch 1, Baguio City. At that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office
was still her counsel as their Retainer Agreement remained subsisting and
in force. However, respondent appeared as counsel for Balageo in that
ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an Answer with
Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
Investigating
Commissioner
rendered
a
Report
and
Recommendation finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust
and for misuse of information obtained from his client to the disadvantage
of the latter and to the advantage of another person. He recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Upon motion of the
respondent, it reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for
misuse of information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the
latter and to the advantage of another person.
SC: Yes.
It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement
dated March 7, 2005 with respondent's law firm. And during the
subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented and
defended Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the
ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact,
respondent filed on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to
the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated July

11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his
appearance for Balageo.
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent
transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 15.03 -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client." The prohibition against
representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if
the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests. In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba, this Court emphasized
that lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling
Law office, her case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling.
He was not privy to any transaction between Atty. Sabling and
complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles
that he could not have taken advantage of an information obtained by his
law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. We are not impressed.
A lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the party who has
engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into public
disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus,
respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information
acquired by his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the
complainant, even assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably
aware of the fact that complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent
should have immediately informed both the complainant and Balageo that
he, as well as the other members of his law firm, cannot represent any of
them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be representing
conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and
Balageo to instead engage the services of another lawyer.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand
or suspension from the practice of law ranging from six months to two
years.

Topic: Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019
Ponente: Per Curiam
Marilou T. Rivera v. Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, November
18, 2014
Facts: Complainant filed a complaint-affidavit with Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent judge with bribery, gross misconduct,
immortality and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with
immorality for maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not
his wife.
In a Supplemental Affidavit, dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated
charge that Judge Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in
fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an illicit affair with a woman
his wife; and (3) exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against her in
efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.

her
(1)
not
her

Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross

misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She
recommended that the judge be dismissed from the service, with
prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and
likewise recommended the forfeiture of the judges retirement benefits.
Issue: Whether the recommendation is proper.
SC: Yes.
The Court upheld Justice Fernandos findings and recommendation as it
found sufficient basis to dismiss respondent Judge Blancaflor from the
service
On the charge of bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 3019.
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a
motion to reduce bail, it appears from the records that he abused this
prerogative in the cases of Catuday and Namplata. Through Judge
Blancaflors inaccessibility (he was usually not in the court in the
afternoon) and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty,
Catuday and Namplata and the people working for the approval of their

motions (Rivera and De Mata) suffered inordinate delay and frustrations in

securing the motions approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor
gave De Mata and Rivera a run-around in Catudays and Namplatas cases
for no plausible reason other than the judges strong antipathy towards
Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which mandates that "judges shall
perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice," and that
they "shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."
Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catudays motion
was not filed with the OCC and never reached him. Justice Fernando found
otherwise, citing the Order of Judge Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge of the
RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion when Judge Blancaflor was
attending a seminar in Tagaytay City. Judge Ongkeko could not have
issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was more
surprising was Judge Blancaflors refusal to acknowledge and to act on the
order of approval. This belies Judge Blancaflors excuses for not acting on
Catudays motion and lends credence to Riveras submission that the
judges refusal was to spite her.
The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplatas bail bond.
As the records show, Judge Blancaflor approved Namplatas motion for
reduction of bail. The judge admitted his approval during the
investigation. When he was asked: "Do you clearly remember Judge that
you reduced it as shown by your signature from P60,000,00 to P40,000.00
bail?," he answered: "That is correct sir, that day," referring to March 27,
2008. Yet, he refused to approve Namplatas temporary release. In fact, in
his Comment to Riveras supplemental complaint, he disowned the
marginal note he made on a copy of Namplatas motion reducing his bail
bond to P40,000.00.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards
demanded of the office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again,
judges have been reminded thatas magistrates, they must comport
themselves in such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise, can
bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as
the epitome of integrity and justice. Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed
to pass this "searching scrutiny."
On the charge of immorality for allegedly maintaining an illicit
relationship with Villamar who is nothis wife Justice Fernando aptly
observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no evidence, except general

denials to disprove his moral indiscretion, which appeared to be widely

known in the community at the time material to the case. As the records
show, statements made here and there by witnesses and personalities
drawn into the case confirm the special relationship between Judge
Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar had no hesitation in speaking
for the judge on matters concerning him and his work.
Topic: Extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee; Ephemeral electronic
communications in evidence
Ponente: Per Curiam
Ella M. Bartolome v. Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, A.M. No. P-11-2979,
November 18, 2014
Facts: Ella M. Bartolome filed against Rosalie B. Maranan, Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, charging her with
extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a court employee.
The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the
amount of P200,000.00, which was later reduced to P160,000.00, to
facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage. She further
alleged that the respondent undertook to have the case decided in her
favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings of
the case.
Based on the complainants pleadings and evidence, the OCA, submitted
its Report to the Court, finding enough evidence to prove the respondents
involvement in anomalous activities and recommending immediate
dismissal.
Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty of the charge and dismissed from
service.
SC: Yes.
The respondents bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting
the complainants accusation that she demanded money on the promise
that she would facilitate the annulment of her (complainants) marriage.
The respondents actions from the time the complainant started
communicating with her on October 21, 2009 and thereafter through a
series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until the entrapment
operation on November 11, 2009, showed that the complaint is indeed
meritorious. The respondents text messages sent to the complainant
corroborate that she promised to expedite in exchange for a monetary

consideration ofP160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer who
would file the annulment case the complainants annulment case once it
is filed.
Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible
evidence, subject to certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic
communication"
refers to
telephone conversations,
text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video,
and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or
has personal knowledge thereof. In the present case, we have no
doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of
the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these
text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone
number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her
conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and
that the cellphone number reflected in the complainants cellphone from
which the text messages originated was hers. She confirmed that it was
her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus Cavite
Police conducted
The Court totally agrees with the OCAs finding that the respondent is
guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The respondents assertion that Bartolome is a fictitious name
because the complainant has not stated in her complaint her exact
address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal and text
message contacts between them. In the absence of supporting evidence,
the claim that the complaint against her is pure and simple harassment
orchestrated by persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural
allegation.
As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and
integrity is expected of the respondent at all times. She should be the
personification of the principle that public office is a public trust. The
respondent unfortunately fell extremely short of the standards that should
have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting money from the
complainant, she committed a crime and an act of serious impropriety
that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected
the peoples confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the
duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the judiciary by peddling
influence to litigants, thereby creating the impression that decision can be
bought and sold. The Court has never wavered in its vigilance in
eradicating the so called "bad-eggs" in the judiciary. We have been
resolute in our drive to discipline and, if warranted, to remove from the

service errant magistrates, employees and even Justices of higher

collegiate appellate courts for any infraction that gives the Judiciary a bad
name. To stress our earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been
unflinching in imposing discipline on errant personnel or in purging the
ranks of those undeserving to remain in the service.

Topic: Grave misconduct, dishonesty, estafa and other deceits

Ponente: Per Curiam
Angelito Miranda v. Ma. Theresa M. Fernandez, Clerk III,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Quezon City, A.M. No. P-14-3270,
November 18, 2014
Facts: The complaint was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
After finding that the respondent is a court employee, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed and referred the complaint to this Court, through
the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action, pursuant to
the Courts ruling in Maceda v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, et al.
The complainant acts as an agent of money lenders Manuel P. Miranda
and Josephine Miranda Cabusao (creditors). The respondent obtained a
loan of P124,800.00 from the creditors, through the complainant. The
transaction was evidenced by an Agreement which provided that the
amount of loan shall be paid in equal installments of P2,600.00 every 15th
and 30th day of the month until fully paid; the first payment was to start
on January 12, 2010.
As security for the loan, the respondent surrendered her ATM Card No.
1727165289 to her creditors to allow them to withdraw the amount

of P2,600.00 every payday from her salaries deposited with the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
On July 15, 2010, the respondents creditors went to the bank to collect
the amount due from her bank account. When the respondents ATM card
was inserted into the ATM machine, it was retained by the ATM machine
with the advisory receipt stating "Invalid Card." This happened because
the respondent had blocked her ATM card to prevent withdrawals by her
creditors. It appeared that the respondent reported to the LBP that she
had lost her ATM card. The report enabled her to withdraw her salary over
the counter and led to the issuance of a new ATM card in her favor.
A day after discovery of the fraud, the complainant sent the respondent a
demand letter which she ignored. She continuously failed to comply with
her undertaking. The complainant, acting as the representative of the
creditors under a Special Power of Attorney dated July 19, 2010, filed the
present administrative complaint against the respondent.
Issue: Whether the respondent is guilty as charged.
SC: Yes.
The Court directed the respondent to show cause why she should not be
disciplined or held in contempt for her failure to file the required comment
despite her receipt of the two (2) directives from the OCA, and to submit
the required comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The
resolution carried the warning, that upon further failure, the Court shall
take the necessary action against her and decide the administrative
complaint on the basis of the record at hand. The respondent received a
copy of the June 10, 2013 resolution on July 30, 2013, but still failed to
comply. Thus she is considered to have waived her right to submit
controverting evidence.
Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that a public employees failure
to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Section 22,
Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, as modified by the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, defines "just debts" as those (1) claims adjudicated by a
court of law or (2) claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor. By the respondents failure to file her
comment on the complaint despite the OCAs two (2) directives and
warning, she is deemed to have admitted the existence and justness of
the claim against her. The obligation having remained unpaid since the

demand was made upon her conclusively speaks of her willful refusal to
settle the same.
The respondents liability does not end there. The blocking of the ATM
card she surrendered to her creditors and her act of securing a new ATM
card from the LBP to avoid payment of her indebtedness constitute
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
Dishonesty refers to the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.
The respondent has failed to file her comment on the letter complaint
despite receipt of the two (2) directives sent to her and the show cause
resolution of June 10, 2013. The respondents failure to comply with
the Courts directives constitutes gross misconduct and
insubordination. Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, or an unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer; misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, as established by substantial evidence.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19,s. 1999 classifies willful failure to pay
just debts as a light offense punishable by reprimand for the first offense.
Dishonesty and grave misconduct are both classified as grave offenses
punishable by dismissal for the first offense.
It is clear that the respondent is guilty of the offenses charged. As an
employee of the judiciary, the respondent is held to the highest ethical
standards to preserve the integrity of the courts. These standards include
the moral and legal duty to settle contractual obligations when they
become due. To preserve decency in the judiciary, court employees must
comply with just contractual obligations and act fairly and adhere to high
ethical standards. The respondents actions, although arising from a
private transaction, stained the image of her public office. Like any other
member of the judiciary, the respondent is expected to be a model of
fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her
personal actuations, involving business and commercial transactions.
The Court finds the respondent separately liable for three administrative
offenses of willful failure to pay just debts, gross misconduct and
insubordination and dishonesty. She has demonstrated her unfitness to be
in the judiciary service, thus warranting her dismissal from the service.
Under Section 55, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, when the respondent is found guilty of two or

more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that which

corresponds to the most serious charge or count and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances

Topic: Dishonesty for allowing another person to take his 2000

Civil Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test
Ponente: Per Curiam
Civil Service Commission v. Herminigildo L. Andal, Security Guard
II, Sandiganbayan, Quezon City, A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November
18, 2014
Facts: Herminigildo L. Andal is employed as permanent Security Guard II
of the Sandiganbayan. The investigating officer, Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Roland B. Jurado, found him guilty of dishonesty for allowing

another person to take his 2000 Civil Service Professional ExaminationComputer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT). Justice Jurado recommended that
respondent be meted out the principal penalty of suspension from office
for one year, and the accessory penalties of being barred from taking any
civil service examination and disqualification from promotion.
The Supreme Court en banc issued a Resolution re-docketing the case as
an administrative matter. In the same Resolution, the Court resolved to
refer this case to then Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Justice
Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Court adopted the recommendations of the OCA. However, due to the
administrative case against Justice Gregory S. Ong, then pending before
the Supreme Court, the same directed the Sandiganbayan to refer the
instant case for investigation, report and recommendation to the most
senior justice after Justice Ong.
Petitioner CSC claimed that respondent had applied for the CSPECAT
scheduled for 24 January 2000 and that it appeared that he passed the
test with a rating of 81.08%. But based on the differing photographs in
the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) and his Civil Service Application Form, the CSC
averred that he had not taken the test himself.
Respondent admitted that he could not have taken the test on 24 January
2000, since he was in the province nursing an alcohol hangover. As his
defense, he maintained that he had not authorized another person to take
the test for him. Respondent alleged that the impersonation was
perpetrated by a group of employees who disliked him for revealing their
drinking sprees and doping sessions to their superiors. He further
narrated that in 2007, he learned from his co-employee, Larry Lincallo,
that the impersonator was Emmerson Nucom, the latters high school
classmate. Aggrieved, respondent executed a Complaint-Affidavit in 2012
charging Nucom with impersonation before the CSC.
Justice Jurado disbelieved the claims of respondent. Moreover, Justice
Jurado disregarded the circumstance that respondent had filed an
impersonation case against Nucom. For the investigating officer, the fiveyear hiatus between knowledge of the identity of the impersonator in
2007 and the execution of the Complaint-Affidavit in 2012 belied the
authenticity of the claim that respondent was aggrieved by the
impersonation.
Thus, Justice Jurado sided with petitioner and found respondent guilty of
dishonesty. But the investigating officer did not dismiss but only
suspended him.

Issue: Whether the respondent if guilty of dishonesty.

SC: Yes.
After a judicious examination of the records, the partially adopt the above
recommendation.
Justice
Jurados
Investigation
Report
and
Recommendation is supported by the evidence on record showing that
respondent did not take the CSPE-CAT of 24 January 2000. Firstly, by
claiming that he was nursing a hangover on the day of examination,
respondent was effectively admitting that he did not take the test; and
logically, he did not earn for himself the 81.08% passing rate. Secondly,
the pictures in his Civil Service Application Form and PSP are entirely
different. In other words, it cannot be doubted that another person took
the test under his name.
Despite this established fact, respondent still tries to refute the charge of
dishonesty by claiming that the actual examinee impersonated him and
took the test without his knowledge. Indeed, to be found guilty of
dishonesty, there must be substantial evidence that respondent
intentionally made false statements or practiced deception in securing his
permanent employment with the Sandiganbayan.
Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
this administrative case, is that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. This standard is satisfied in the present case so long as there
is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if the evidence may not be overwhelming
or even preponderant.
The impersonation theory of respondent, claimed to be perpetrated by his
officemates, is incredible.
First, the claim of respondent is self-serving and uncorroborated by any
witness. Second, it is more reasonable to believe that the employees who
had an axe to grind against him would rather have him fail than pass the
test. Third, as Justice Jurado aptly pointed out, it defies reason that the
actual examinee would take the test for the benefit of another without
any recompense. Fourth, even assuming arguendo that respondent had
an unauthorized impersonator, he should have alerted the CSC or the
Sandiganbayan as soon as he received the passing grade. Respondents
scheme of passing the blame to the actual examinee is old hat.
All told, the facts of this case cannot support the conclusion that
respondent was completely innocent of dishonesty in obtaining
his
eligibility
for
permanent
employment
with
the

Sandiganbayan. Respondent, who admitted that he did not take the

test, took credit for his false rating. Worse, after knowing that another
person had taken the test on his behalf, he did not even attempt to earn
his eligibility on his own accord. Basic honesty would have required
transparency and uprightness in the actions of an employee of the
judiciary.
By perpetrating his false eligibility and letting it remain on record,
respondent concealed and distorted the truth in a matter of fact relevant
to his office. His actions thus speak of his disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and
straightforwardness.
The reduced penalty of suspension cannot be justified by the alleged
mitigating circumstances of satisfactory performance, length of service
and non-utilization of the acquired eligibility.
Dishonesty cannot be tolerated from government officials or employees,
even when official duties are performed well. First-time offenders found
guilty of grave dishonesty involving falsification of their civil service
examination results already merit the penalty of dismissal from service.

Topic: Serious neglect of duty and violation of Republic Act No.

3019
Ponente: Per Curiam
Novo A. Lucas v. Rolando A. Dizon, Sheriff IV of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
A.M. No. P-12-3076, November 18, 2014
Facts: Novo A. Lucas (complainant) charged in a complaint-affidavit
Rolando A. Dizon, Sheriff IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, with serious neglect of duty and
violation of R.A. No. 3019, for delaying the implementation of the Writ of
Execution issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Domingo in a case for
collection of sum of money against Francisco Pascual.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He claimed that when he
and complainant first met, he explained the process of implementing the
writ especially the need to demand from Pascual the fulfillment of the
judgment before any seizure of personal properties could be made. He
accused complainant of not being interested in the rules as his concern
centered on proceeding immediately to Pascuals residence. He claimed
that on the day they were to proceed to Pascuals residence, complainant
informed him that there was no need to proceed to the house of Pascual
because an arrangement had been made.
OCA found respondent liable for gross neglect of duty but agreed with
Investigating Judge Tribiana that there was no sufficient evidence to
support the charge of violation of R.A. No. 3019 against respondent.
Issue: Whether the respondent liable for gross neglect of duty.
SC: The transaction is an equitable mortgage.
The last standing frontier that the victorious litigant must face is often
another difficult process the execution stage. In this stage, a litigant who
has won the battle might lose the war. Thus, the sheriffs, being agents of
the court, play an important role, particularly in the matter of
implementing the writ of execution. Indeed, sheriffs "are tasked to
execute final judgments of courts. If not enforced, such decisions are
empty victories of the prevailing parties. They must therefore comply with
their mandated ministerial duty to implement writs promptly and
expeditiously. As agents of the law, sheriffs are called upon to discharge
their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the
courts writs and processes and implementing its order, they cannot

afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice."
Engraved in jurisprudence is the rule that the sheriff's duty in the
execution of a writ is purely ministerial. Once the writ is placed in his or
her hands, a sheriff is obligated to execute the order of the court strictly
to the letter and with reasonable promptness, taking heed of the
prescribed period required by the Rules.
In this case, respondent is charged for failing to perform his ministerial
functions in the implementation of the writ of execution issued in favor of
complainant. In this regard, the Court agrees with the recommendation of
the OCA that respondents omissions clearly qualify as gross neglect of
duty.
Lastly, respondent utterly failed to make periodic reports, thus, depriving
the court of the opportunity to know and ensure the speedy execution of
its decision. Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such
periodic report is mandatory, to wit:
SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be
returnable to the court issuing it immediately after judgment has been
satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within
thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the
court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect
during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion.
The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the
proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole
of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies
thereof promptly furnished the parties. Had he done so, the difficulties he
had in dealing with complainant would have been mitigated. Records also
show that this is not the first instance that respondent faced issues of this
kind. The Court takes note that in another administrative
matter, respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for simple
neglect of duty. This time around, however, the circumstances prevailing
in this case reveal respondent's gross and palpable neglect of his sheriff
duties - a grave offense according to the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), which is
punishable with dismissal from the service.
Hence, for the infractions committed, respondent should be meted out the
penalty of dismissal from service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture
of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

Topic: Absolute Sale v. Equitable Mortgage

Ponente: Per Curiam
Office of the Court Administrator v. Mrs. Aurora T. Zuniga, et al,
A.M. No. P-10-2800, November 18, 2014
Facts: This case originated from the financial audit conducted by the
Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD) of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) on the books of account of the Municipal Trial Court, Virac,
Catanduanes (MTC). The financial review was brought about by the fund
shortages discovered by state auditor Madeleine S. Rivera of the
Commission on Audit (COA) for the period from August 21, 2003 to
June19, 2007 in the amount of P294,797.75.
Specifically, the financial audit team examined the books of account of
the MTC covering the period from March 3, 1985 to March 31, 2008, under
the following accountable officers: Mrs. Aurora T. Zuiga (respondent),
Mrs. Paz T. Tacorda, Mrs. Minda H. Cervantes, Mr. Pepito F. Lucero, Mr.
Garibaldi L. Sarmiento, and Ms. Sonia T. Bagadiong.
The financial audit team reported that these court employees shared the
task of acting as Officer-in-Charge/Accountable Officer from 1985 up to
the dates of the audit. The audit team disclosed that Tacorda incurred a
shortage of P10.00 from the Judicial Development Fund (JDF);
Cervantes, P4,100.00 from the Fiduciary Fund (FF); Lucero, P1,095.00
from the JDF and P600.00 from the General Fund (GF); Sarmiento, 384.00
from JDF andP1,626.00 from the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
(SAJF), although said amounts were already restituted on April 25,
2008; and Zuiga a total of P278,811.85, as well as accountabilities from
her FF collections.
Issue: Whether the respondents are guilty of the charges.

SC: Yes.
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court finds the
recommendation of the OCA to be correct.1awp++i1
SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93, as integrated in the 2002
Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, provide the guidelines for the
accounting of court funds. All fiduciary collections upon receipt shall
be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned with
an authorized government depository bank. In SC Circular No. 593, the LBP was designated as the authorized government
depository. Furthermore, Section B(4) of Circular No. 50-95 directs that all
collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and other fiduciary
collections shall be deposited with the LBP within twenty-four
(24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned as instructed in Circular
No. 13-92.
Zuiga, as Clerk of Court, was entrusted with the delicate functions of
collecting legal fees. She acted as cashier and disbursement officer of the
court and was tasked to collect and receive all monies paid as legal fees,
deposits, fines and dues, and controls the disbursement of the same. She
was also designated as custodian of the courts funds and revenues,
records, properties and premises, and should be liable for any loss or
shortage thereof.
Zuiga, however, failed to properly account for her FF collections and to
judiciously deposit the same with the Land Bank within twenty-four (24)
hours upon receipt. She was also unable to explain the shortage
ofP269,363.35 from her July 10, 2007-March 31, 2008 transactions.
Moreover, she failed to provide proper documentation to completely
support the cash bond withdrawals amounting to P232,860.00 spanning
from June 26, 1992 to December 31, 1995 which she claimed to have
been refunded to bondsmen/litigants. Circular No. 50-95 provides for the
guidelines on how to make withdrawals from the court fiduciary funds.
As can be gleaned from the said provision, supporting documents such as
a court order from the judge authorizing the withdrawal and
acknowledgment receipts of the bondsmen or litigants must be fully
presented. Failure to strictly comply with these requirements would make
the withdrawals unauthorized. Thus, after recomputation, Zuiga still had
a shortage of P134,050.00 representing unauthorized FF withdrawals due
to insufficient documentation.
Clearly, Zuigas unorganized method of managing and documenting the
cash collections allocated for the JDF was a serious violation of
Administrative Circular No. 5-93, the pertinent portion of which reads:
3. Duty of the Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge or
accountable officers.- The Clerks of Court, Officers-in-Charge
of the Office of the Clerk of Court, or their accountable duly
authorized representative designated by them in writing, who

must be accountable officers, shall receive the Judiciary

Development Fund collections, issue the proper receipt
therefor, maintain a separate cash book properly marked
CASH BOOK FOR JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND, deposit
such collections in the manner herein prescribed, and render
the proper Monthly Report of Collections for said Fund.
In fact, Zuigas unjustified failure to comply with the Courts circulars
designed to promote full accountability for public funds even constitutes
gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct. No protestation of good faith
can override the mandatory observance of court circulars. It should be
emphasized that the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court requires
strict compliance with the rules and regulations of the collection and
accounting funds

Topic: Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No.

3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC
Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo v. Judge Celso L. Mantua, Regional Trial
Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360,
November 19, 2014
Facts: Dorothy Fe Mah-Arevalo (complainant), Court Stenographer of the
Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte, Branch 17 (RTC), filed before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), against Judge Celso L. Mantua
(respondent) of the same court, accusing him of Disgraceful/Immoral
Conduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, Violation
of Republic Act No. 3019, Gross Violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct,
Abuse of Authority, and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
It was alleged that respondent: (a) used the Hall of Justice, particularly his
chamber, as his residence; (b) openly brought his mistress in court as
observed by all of his staff, especially by a former Utility Worker of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of the same station, Dyndee Nuez; (c) used the
court process server, Benjamin Pepito, as his personal driver; (d)
delegated his work load to his legal researcher, Atty. Elmer Mape, because
he could no longer attend to the same due to his many vices; (e)
committed gross ignorance of the law when, in one criminal case that he

handled, he proceeded to trial and allowed the private complainant to

testify in open court even if the accused was not assisted by counsel, and
furthermore, extorted money from the accused in the amount
of P200,000.00; (f) asked for gasoline, personal allowance, and other
benefits from the local government; and (g) failed to decide cases within
the prescribed 90-day period because he was waiting for litigants to offer
him monetary consideration.
Investigating Justice found respondent guilty of violating Canon 2 and Rule
2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and accordingly, recommended that
he be fined in the amount of 25,000.00. Giving credence to complainants
consistent and spontaneous answers as well as her demeanor in the
witness stand during her testimony, the Investigating Justice concluded
that respondent indeed made his chamber in the Hall of Justice as his
residence, a prohibited act under SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 and
A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC. Similarly, the Investigating Justice also believed
Nuezs testimony that respondent indeed brought his mistress and slept
with her inside his chamber, finding no reason for Nuez to fabricate a
story. The Investigating Justice, however, exonerated respondent from the
other charges for failure of the complainant to substantiate the same.
Issue: Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for
Immorality and violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation
to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
SC: Yes.
SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of
Justice may only be used for functions related to the administration of
justice and for no other purpose.
In this case, complainants evidence had sufficiently established that
respondent used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and
dwelling place. As correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice
and the OCA, respondents defense that he rented a house did not negate
the possibility that he used the Hall of Justice as his residence, since it is
possible that a person could be renting one place while actually and
physically residing in another.
Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent
guilty of Immorality. Immorality has been defined "to include not only
sexual matters but also conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative
of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare." It is a serious charge which may
be punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from service,

forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine except
accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in
an extramarital affair with his mistress. There is no doubt that engaging in
an extra marital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards
expected of the members and employees of the judiciary but is also a
desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which the Court
abhors and is, thus, punishable.

Breach of the Lawyers Oath

Code of Professional Responsibility
Ponente: J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA v. ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA., A.C. No.
4697/ A.C. No. 4728, November 25, 2014
Facts:
Herein complainant and respondent entered into a "Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 involving a parcel of
coconut land for P15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent
represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee
simple" the subject property and that the said property is "free from all
liens and encumbrances." The deed also provided that respondent, as
vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property,
and if not repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew the
instrument/agreement."

Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the

period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the contract was made
even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated May 10,
1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant remained in
peaceful possession of the property until December 1989 when he
received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI)
informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI,
that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that
complainant should therefore vacate the property.
Complainant was alarmed and made an investigation. He found out
that TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name
of Philippine National Bank (PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after
foreclosure proceedings; that TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T7235 in the names of respondent and his wife on January 4, 1982
pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and
respondent; and respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on
March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the property, and subsequently
obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991. Complainant was
subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa
and the instant administrative cases against respondent. In both
complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Consolidated Answer filed before the IBP, respondent denied
that his agreement with complainant was a pacto de retro sale. He
claimed that it was an equitable mortgage and that, if only complainant
rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the
total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation with modification as follows:
respondent is (1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with
warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more
severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00 received in
consideration of the pacto de retro sale, with legal interest.
Issues:
1. Whether respondent violated his oath as a lawyer.
2. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
SC:

YES.
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years,
but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the P15,000.00
consideration, plus interest.

1.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and
complainant is actually one of sale with pacto de retro or of equitable
mortgage, respondents actuations in his transaction with complainant, as
well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for
the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing required from lawyers, for which respondent should be
held administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an
oath where he undertook to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and
"conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion." He gravely violated his oath.
2.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and
deceit when he entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
with the latter. He made it appear that the property was covered by TCT
No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owners copy of
the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already
been cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of
PNB. He did not even care to correct the wrong statement in the deed
when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on
January 4, 1982, or barely a month after the execution of the said deed.
All told, respondent clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and
deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Under Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to
personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover
expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand,
Rule 1.01 states the norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.
HYPERLINK
"http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/ac_4697_2014.html" \l
"fnt22" 22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized
by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful."
"Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality
although the concept is broad enough to include such element.
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity,
integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other hand,
conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:
The actions of respondent in connection with the execution of the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. Thus, respondent deserves to
be sanctioned.

Respondents breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good

faith, and dishonesty are compounded by his gross disregard of this
Courts directives, as well as the orders of the IBPs Investigating
Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the
Courts referral of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation), which caused delay in the resolution of these
administrative cases.
Respondents disregard of the directives of this Court and of the
Investigating Commissioner, which caused undue delay in these
administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice
of law for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is
proper.

Topic: Reinstatement of a Disbarred Attorney

Ponente: PER CURIAM
Conrado N. Que v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr., A.C. 7054
November 11, 2014
Facts:
In a decision dated December 4, 2009, the SC disbarred Atty.
Revilla from the practice of law on the following grounds: abuse of court
procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-shopping;
willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before
the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and
unauthorized appearances in court.
The respondent filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion praying that his license to practice law be restored based on
humanitarian considerations, but the SC En Banc resolved to deny the
petition for lack of merit. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has
already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and
weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage
five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the
years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his
time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay
Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter
Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to
practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being
shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He expressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his
misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be
reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he
submitted a Medical Abstract evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney
disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth
Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration for the third petition to SC.
Issue:
attorneys

Whether or not respondent be reinstated in the roll of

SC: No. While Revilla expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken
full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the
blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his
wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to
submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in
the legal profession. SC thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent
had completely reformed.
The Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical
condition, however, the SC stressed that in considering his application for
reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine
whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this
requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can
demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and
deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him
from the practice of law stands.

Topic: Neglect of Clients interest

Ponente: Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
Felipe Layos v. Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva, A.C. No. 8085,
December 1, 2014
Facts: Atty. Marlito Villanueva is Felipe Layos counsel in a criminal case
wherein the formers constant failure to appear during court hearings
resulted in the RTCs issuance of an Order waiving the defenses right to
cross-examine a prosecution witness. Despite the issuance of such order,
respondent remained absent and thus, complainant was only able to
move for reconsideration, thru respondent, only four (4) years later which
was denied in an Order. Aggrieved, complainant, also thru respondent,
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, the
petition was dismissed and CA likewise chastised respondent for his lack
of candidness and fervor on his part to champion the cause of his client,
considering that, inter alia: (a) respondent never bothered to know the
outcome of the hearings where he was absent from; (b) it took respondent
a long amount of time before moving to reconsider the RTCs June 26,
2003 Order; and (c) respondent never questioned the appearances of
other lawyers as complainants counsel during his absence. Citing as basis
such disquisition by the CA, complainant filed the instant administrative
case against respondent.
Respondent denied being remiss in his duty as complainants counsel.
IBP Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.
Issue: Whether should be held administratively liable for the acts
complained of.
SC: YES

Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR,
it is the lawyers duty to serve his clients interest with utmost
zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep abreast of all the
developments in his clients case and should inform the latter of the
same, as it is crucial in maintaining the latters confidence, to wit:
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND
HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for
information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his
client of whatever important information he may have acquired
affecting his clients case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate
review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the
case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in
the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the clients interests. In this
connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the
lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just
a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted fealty to the clients cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that since missing the April 4, 2002
hearing due to car trouble, respondent no longer kept track of
complainants criminal case and merely assumed that the same was
already amicably settled and terminated. Thereafter, when respondent
finally knew that the case was still on-going, he attended the November
15, 2005 hearing, and discovered the RTCs issuance of the June 26, 2003
Order which is prejudicial to complainants cause. Despite such alarming
developments, respondent did not immediately seek any remedy to
further the interests of his client. Instead, he passively relied on the
representations of the court employees that they would send him a copy

of the aforesaid Order. Worse, when he finally secured a copy on April 4,

2006, it still took him over a year, or until April 21, 2007, just to move the
RTC to reconsider its June 26, 2003 Order. Naturally, the RTC and the CA
denied the motion for being filed way beyond the reglementary period, to
the detriment of complainant. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess
and exercise in such matters of professional employment.
While the Court agrees that respondent should be held administratively
liable for the foregoing acts and thus, must be suspended from the
practice of law, it nevertheless deems that the IBPs recommended period
of suspension of six (6) months is too harsh a penalty, given the
complainants seeming disinterest in the developments of his own case.
This is evidenced by complainant not communicating with respondent,
getting other lawyers referred to him by his friends despite having a
counsel of record, and being indifferent despite being informed of a
standing warrant of arrest against him.
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his
best efforts in the prosecution or defense of a clients cause. A lawyer who
performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession. Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of
administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and
disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict
compliance with ones oath of office and the canons of professional ethics
is an imperative.

Topic: Violation of the code of professional responsibility and

lawyers oath; Effect of contributory cause on complainants side
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza
Raul C. Lanuza and Reynaldo C. Rasing v. Attys. Frankie O.
Magsalin III and Pablo R. Cruz, A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688,
December 03, 2014
Facts: On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision favoring Lanuza
and directing PHI to reinstate him with full backwages.
As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA
decision, but the CA denied the motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution. On
July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of
Resolution from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered
mail the Compliance, dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC
Law Office. In the said Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of
Resolution was received on July 23, 2007 based on the Registry Return
Receipt (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA.
Wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the
respondents, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office
(QCCPO) to issue a certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the
said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. In the October 25, 2007
Certification issued by the QCCPO, Chief of the Records Section Fallarme,
stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin
was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July
16, 2007, based on the log book of postman Pecante.
The complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have
induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt of the Notice of
Resolution or at least had the knowledge thereof when she signed and
stamped on the 2nd return receipt the date - July 23, 2007. They
contended that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz stood to benefit from the
additional seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered date as they, in
fact, used the altered date in their subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin
and Cruz falsely alleged such in the compliance filed before the CA; the
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari; and
the petition for review on certiorari filed before this Court. The
complainants insinuated that Atty. Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately
misled the CA and this Court by filing the above-mentioned pleadings with
the full knowledge that they were already time barred.
In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Salvador
B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the
administrative complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go should be held
administratively liable based on the allegations in the complaints.
SC: NO
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always
rests on the complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if
the complainant establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant
evidence that warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an
attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges
made against him until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further
presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties in
accordance with his oath.
In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be
inconclusive, thus, insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts
alleged in the complaint.
Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the
Registry Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices,
decision and resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and
convincing evidence to prove that the respondents intentionally and
maliciously made it appear that they received the CA notices, decision
and resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO Certifications. The
complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the only logical
explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO
Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents
must have induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for
the purpose of extending the period to file, the otherwise time-barred,
motion for reconsideration. Verily, this leap of inference proffered by the
complainants is merely anchored on speculation and conjecture and not in
any way supported by clear substantial evidence required to justify the
imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.

Topic: Notarization by the office secretary in the absence of the

lawyer
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza
Atty. Aurelio Angeles, Jr. v. Atty. Renato Bagay, A.C. No. 8103,
December 03, 2014
Facts: A letter was submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr., the
Provincial Legal Officer of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato
C. Bagay, for his alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was
out of the country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.
These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by the
Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized while
respondent was outside the country. The letter contained the affidavits of
the persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a
common statement that they did not see respondent sign the documents
himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or the documents
came out of the office already signed. Upon verification with the Bureau of
Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato C. Bagay departed
from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned on April 8, 2008. The
copy of the Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration was also
attached to the letter.
When CBD Director Alicia Risos-Vidal required Atty. Angeles, Jr. to
formalize the complaint, the latter replied on September 30, 2008 stating,
among others, that his June 11, 2008 Letter was not intended to be a
formal complaint but rather a report on, and endorsement of, public
documents by Atty. Bagay while he was out of the country, and that any
advice on how to consider or treat the documents concerned would be
welcome.
On December 3, 2008, Atty. Risos-Vidal opted to endorse the matter to the
Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
This Court, in its Resolution, dated February 2, 2009, resolved to note the
letter of Atty. Angeles, Jr., dated September 30, 2008, and require
respondent to comment on the said letter.
In his comment respondent claimed that he was not aware that those
were documents notarized using his name while he was out of the
country. Upon his own inquiry, he found out that the notarizations were
done by his secretary and without his knowledge and authority. The said
secretary notarized the documents without realizing the import of the
notarization act. Respondent apologized to the Court for his lapses and

averred that he had terminated the employment of his secretary from his
office.
The Court then referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. The report and Recommendation of Atty. Felimon C.
Abelita III as Investigating Commissioner found that the letter of Atty.
Angeles, Jr., dated June 11, 2008, was not verified, that most of the
attachments were not authenticated photocopies and that the comment
of respondent was likewise not verified. Atty. Abelita III, however,
observed that respondents signature on his comment appeared to be
strikingly similar to the signatures in most of the attached documents
which he admitted were notarized in his absence by his office
secretary. He admitted the fact that there were documents that were
notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed by his office
secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by his own
admission, it was established that by his negligence in employing an
office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial seal and records
especially pertaining to his notarial documents without the proper
training, respondent failed to live up to the standard required by the Rules
on Notarial Practice.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said
recommendation in its Resolution, dated September 28, 2013 immediate
revocation of respondents commission as notary public and his
disqualification to be commissioned as such for a period of two (2) years.
Issue: Whether the notarization of documents by the secretary of
respondent while he was out of the country constituted negligence.
SC: YES
Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for reconsideration that
the 18 documents were notarized under his notarial seal by his office
secretary while he was out of the country. This clearly constitutes
negligence considering that respondent is responsible for the acts of his
secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides
that a Notary Public refers to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules. A notary publics secretary is
obviously not commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
Respondent cannot take refuge in his claim that it was his secretarys act
which he did not authorize. He is responsible for the acts of the secretary
which he employed. He left his office open to the public while leaving his
secretary in charge. He kept his notarial seal and register within the reach
of his secretary, fully aware that his secretary could use these items to
notarize documents and copy his signature. Such blatant negligence

cannot be countenanced by this Court and it is far from being a simple

negligence. There is an inescapable likelihood that respondents flimsy
excuse was a mere afterthought and such carelessness exhibited by him
could be a conscious act of what his secretary did.
Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A person
who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this
responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.
As to his plea of leniency, the Court cannot consider it. Respondent claims
that for the 21 years that he has been practicing law, he acted as a notary
public without any blemish and this was his first and only infraction. His
experience, however, should have placed him on guard and could have
prevented possible violations of his notarial duty. By his sheer negligence,
18 documents were notarized by an unauthorized person and the public
was deceived. Such prejudicial act towards the public cannot be tolerated
by this Court. Thus, the penalty of revocation of notarial commission and
disqualification from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years is
appropriate.
Because of the negligence of respondent, the Court also holds him liable
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). His failure
to solemnly perform his duty as a notary public not only damaged
those directly affected by the notarized documents but also
undermined the integrity of a notary public and degraded the
function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such
negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. Where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon
his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to
do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyers not
to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf as
notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law. By
leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with his
secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize
documents without any restraint.
Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the CPR,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The people who came into his office
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity being
conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be
converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that the

notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any force
and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were notarized
by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession was eroded.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, an additional penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is in order.
Respondent should remember that a notarial commission is a
privilege and a significant responsibility. It is a privilege granted
only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with
public interest. As we have declared on several occasions,
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notary public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not
qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing
upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in
general.
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus,
notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of public instruments would be undermined.
Let this serve as a reminder to the members of the legal profession that
the Court will not take lightly complaints of unauthorized acts of
notarization, especially when the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in our legal system hang in the balance.

Topic: Violation of Code of Professional Responsibility

Ponente: PER CURIAM
Erlinda Foster v. Atty. Jaime Agtang, A.C. No. 10579, December
10, 2014
Facts: IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint filed by Erlinda Foster against respondent for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts as a lawyer. Respondent was
directed to answer but failed to do so.
Respondent was notarized a deed of absolute sale which the complainant
entered into with Tierra Realty. Complainant agreed to engage his legal
services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they
signed a contract and complainant paid the acceptance fee and for
incidental expenses.
Respondent asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days,
for the repair of his car to which the complainant agreed without interest.
Being aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name a lot
she had previously purchased, complainant referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for
reformation of contract with damages. Respondent requested and
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case
No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development
Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court records.
On April 23, 2010, respondent requested an amount of P70,000.00 or
P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency. Complainant
obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainant expressed gave the amount of P25,000.00 and the balance
of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable judgment. On November
2, 2010, respondent insisted that the remaining amount and complainant
handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having
been notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on
December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of the case
with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there.
Instead, one of the office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.

On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a

copy of the motion for reconsideration.
On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy
of the reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to
be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however,
complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the
same occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondents
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of wine given to
the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments on
the
case
had
been
set
the
following
month.
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of
respondent as her counsel, after her friend gave her copies of documents
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since
December 2007. Subsequently, complainant requested respondent to pay
her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee and the actual
cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.
Issue: Whether
Responsibility

respondent

violated

the

Code

of

Professional

SC: YES
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with respect to respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of
the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged
violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also
differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is
well-established that a lawyers conduct is not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined
for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he

clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case
were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted
to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He
demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the
same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant
who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is
highly improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors
of litigation, would propose such amount that would further burden her
financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more than willing
to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the
trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable
in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to
disclose to his client the actual amount due, consistent with the
values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the
legal profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account
for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used
for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use
in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross
violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he
received various amounts from complainant but he could not account for
all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts
presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess
money from the alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the
client. When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to the client.
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September
29, 2010. At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in

his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the case, and left
the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not
only guilty of misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop
here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of
the CPR, which states that a lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client. In his private capacity, he requested
from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts.
Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent,
was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the
rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. The acts of
requesting and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter
failing to pay the same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of
fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations
to
complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure
to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also
a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the
peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They
must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited
in connection with the performance of the lawyers professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty
of misconduct on both scores.
With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting
interests, the Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented

insufficient evidence of respondents lawyering for the opposing party,

Tierra Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients
most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can
only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests. 33 Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of
the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in
the rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial
evidence to hold respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in
handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to
which
he
had
rendered
services
in
the
past.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because
the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of
his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence
is abused or violated the entire profession suffers.
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of the
lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the CPR. For the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to
those who are qualified and who possess good moral character. The
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a

member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following

grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office;
(3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney
for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his
duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in
general, the public. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the
Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and
the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting
interests, respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession. The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by
their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.

Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and

Lawyers Oath; Lawyer-client Privilege
Ponente: Justice Jose Mendoza
Caroline Castaeda Jimenez v. Atty. Edgar B. Francisco, A.C. No.
10548, December 10, 2014
Facts: Commission on Bar Discipline received a complaint filed by
Caroline Castaeda Jimenez against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations
of the CPR.
Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint
for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when
she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her
personal lawyer and Clarion Realty and Development Corporations
corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a
disciplinary case against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting
interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarions transactions. More
significantly, the principal documents relative to the sale and transfer of
Clarions property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the
members of his law office. Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property.
Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant
argued that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she
reposed on him as a lawyer.
IBP-BOG adopted and approved the findings of the CBD which found Atty.
Edgar B. Francisco administratively liable for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
Issue: Whether there were Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and
the Lawyers Oath
SC: YES
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and
abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary
thereto. A lawyers personal deference to the law not only speaks of his
character but it also inspires respect and obedience to the law, on the
part of the public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct
to
be
observed
by
all
lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct does not necessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad
enough to include such element. To be dishonest means the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle,
fairness and straightforwardness while conduct that is deceitful
means
the
proclivity
for
fraudulent
and
deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another
who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon.
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good
moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote
the publics faith in the legal profession. 19 To say that lawyers must at all
times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes
and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is
imperative that they live by the law.
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to
obey the laws, do no falsehood, and conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the
cause of their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and
justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at
the expense of truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill
motives and malicious intentions.

Rule on Conflicting
Communication

Interests

and

Disclosure

of

Privileged

With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting

interests and disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates
from the findings of the IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The
relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued
with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients
most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can
only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyers duty in this
regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests Thus, even if
lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
decline professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of
the prohibition against conflict of interest.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply.
In Mercado v. Vitriolo, the Court elucidated on the factors essential to
establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by
voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and
by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to
no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission

of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was

given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a
compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction
of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counteroffer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in
his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element
of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional
capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended
for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have
been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal
assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the
evidence on record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As
discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship
between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the advice regarding the sale of the Forbes property was
given to Atty. Francisco in confidence.

Topic: Disbarment; Violation of a lawyers duty under the Code of

Professional Responsibility; Retaining Lien
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen
Spouses Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro v. Atty. Isagani A.
Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26, 2014
Facts: Complainants engaged the services of respondent to facilitate the
transfer of title to property, in the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to
complainants. They gave respondent a check for P68,250.00 for the
payment of transfer taxes and a check for P13,800.00 for respondents
professional fee.
Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants repeated
follow-ups. Complainants subsequently referred the case to the
barangay. Respondent refused to return the amount complainants gave
for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then issued a certificate to file
action. They also sent a letter demanding the refund of the money
intended for the transfer taxes. Respondent still did not return the money.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16,
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended the disciplinary action of censure and warning.
Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the money of his
clients.
SC: YES
It has been said that [t]he practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality.
Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and values of the legal
profession
exposes
the
lawyer
to
administrative
liability.
An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated the Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds
and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful
fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.
Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When an
attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been
demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
A lawyers duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is clear; he should promptly account to the client how the money
was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose,
he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of
the money does not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule
16.01
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility.
The lawyers failure to return the clients money upon demand gives rise
to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.
Respondent admitted that there were delays in the transfer of title of
property to complainants name. He continuously assured complainants
that he would still fulfill his duty. However, after three (3) years and
several demands from complainants, respondent failed to accomplish the
task given to him and even refused to return the money. Complainants
alleged failure to provide the necessary documents to effect the transfer
does not justify his violation of his duty under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Respondents assertion of a valid lawyers lien is also untenable. A valid

retaining lien has the following elements:
(1) lawyer-client relationship;
(2) lawful possession of the clients funds, documents and papers; and
(3) unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees.
Further, the attorneys retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of
the account between the attorney and his client, and applies to the
documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorneys
possession in the course of his employment.
Respondent did not satisfy all the elements of a valid retaining lien. He
did not present evidence as to an unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees.
The enumeration of cases he worked on for complainants remains
unsubstantiated. When there is no unsatisfied claim for attorneys fees,
lawyers cannot validly retain their clients funds or properties.

Topic: Sheriff's duties as an agent of the law

Ponente: Lucas Bersamin
Conchita Bahala vs. Cirilo Duca, Sheriff III, MTCC, Br. 1, Cagayan
De Oro City
A.M.
No.
P-08-2465
January 12, 2015
Facts: On August 6, 1999, the MTCC rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
98-July-817 that was adverse to Bahala. Pending appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) rendered a judgment on the compromise agreement of the
parties, pursuant to which Bahala paid the balance of the money
judgment, remained in the premises during the agreed extension of two
years, and paid her monthly rentals. By the end of the two-year extension,
she offered to sell the building standing on the property that she had
supposedly built in good faith. Not wanting to pay for the building, the
plaintiff opted to execute the judgment. On August 1, 2002, Sheriff Duca
served the writ of execution, but demanded P2,000.00 from her in order
to delay its implementation. She delivered the amount demanded on a
Saturday at the Hall of Justice in the company of her friend, Helen Peligro.
Bahala averred, too, that Sheriff Duca had served the writ on her more
than 10 times, and that she had given him either P200.00 or P100.00
each time. In 2003, she started to evade Sheriff Duca whenever heserved
the writ.
Without filing his return on the writ, Sheriff Duca served a notice of
auction sale on February 21, 2003, stating the amount of P210,000.00 as
the rentals-in-arrears due and demandable. The amount was allegedly his
erroneous computation of the rentals-in-arrears due because it was not
based on the decision of the RTC. Consequently, Bahala opposed the sale.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
Despite the clear order of the RTC, Sheriff Duca proceeded with the
auction sale on May 13, 2003,7 and awarded the building to the plaintiff
as the sole and highest bidder. He subsequently forcibly removed all the
personal belongings of the actual occupants of the building, and placed
them outside the building and along the street. He padlocked the
building, and warned Bahala and her lessees not to re-enter the premises.
When she told him that his act was illegal, he retorted: Akong himuon ang
akong gusto, akong ning i-padlock ang imong building, walay makabuot
sa ako. (I will do what I want. I will padlock your building and nobody will

stop me from doing this). Later that afternoon, she started to voluntarily
demolish the building, but he ordered her to stop the demolition,
threatening to file a case against her otherwise.
Sheriff Duca denied all the allegations.
The Court resolved to re-docket this case as a regular administrative
matter, and referred it to the Executive Judge of the RTC in Cagayan de
Oro City for investigation and recommendation.
In his report,then Executive Judge Edgardo T. Lloren found and
concluded that Sheriff Duca had committed simple misconduct for not
filing his periodic report on the writ pursuant to Section 14, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, and for adopting the computation of arrears made by the
plaintiff. Accordingly, Judge Lloren recommended that Sheriff Duca be
suspended for six months and one day without pay; and that the charges
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be dismissed for
lack of merit.
The OCA agreed with Judge Llorens finding that Sheriff Duca had
committed simple misconduct in basing the amount stated in the notice of
auction sale on the computation submitted by the plaintiff. It also found
Sheriff Duca liable for simple neglect of duty for not complying with the
requirements of Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and
recommended his suspension without pay for six months and one day
with stern warning against the commission of similar acts or omissions.
Issue: Whether or not the recommended penalty is proper.
SC: No.
As an agent of the law, a sheriff must discharge his duties
with due care and utmost diligence. He cannot afford to err while
serving the courts writs and processes without affecting the
integrity of his office and the efficient administration of
justice.15 He is not given any discretion on the implementation
of a writ of execution; hence, he must strictly abide by the
prescribed procedure to avoid liability.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires a sheriff
implementing a writ of execution (1) to make and submit a return to the
court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the judgment; and
(2) if the judgment cannot be satisfied infull, to make a report to the court
within 30 days after his receipt of the writ and state why full satisfaction
could not be made. He shall continue making the report every 30 days in
the proceedings undertaken by him until the judgment is fully satisfied in
order to apprise the court on the status of the execution and to take
necessary steps to ensure speedy execution of decisions.
Although Sheriff Duca thrice served the writ on Bahala, he filed his
return only on October 7, 2003 after her property had been levied and
sold on public auction. His excuses for his omission, that his "job was not

yet finished," and that he had informedthe plaintiff on the status of its
implementation, did not exculpate him from administrative liability,
because there is no question that the failure to file a return on the writ
constituted "simple neglect of duty," defined as the failure of an employee
to give his attention to the task expected of him, signifying a disregard of
a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.
In this regard, the OCA correctly observed:
As deputy sheriff, respondent could not be unaware of Section 14,
Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure x x x
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, it is mandatory for a sheriff to make a
return of the writ of execution to the court issuing it. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the
writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons
therefore. The court officer is likewise tasked to make a report to the court
every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the
judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. The raison d
etrebehind this requirement is to update the court on the status of the
execution and to take necessary steps to ensurethe speedy execution of
decision.
A careful perusal of the records show that the writ of execution was
issued on August 1, 2002. However, it was only more than a year later or
on October 7, 2003 when respondent sheriff was able to file his return of
the writ. In his testimony before the investigating judge on March 7, 2005,
he was not even sure on when he first served the writ of execution upon
complainant but admitted of having served the same at least three (3)
times yet he failed to timely make a sheriffs return as required under
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent though
belatedly submitted his sheriffs return and furnished a copy thereof to
the complainant only on October 7, 2003.
Due to respondents failure to make a timely return and periodic
progress report of the writ, the court was obviously unaware of the
auction sale of defendants property conducted by respondent-sheriff on
March 3, 2003 that in its Order dated May 5, 2003, it enjoined respondent
sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of defendants property and
directed him to execute the parties agreement regarding ejectment and
removal of defendants buildings/structures from the leased property of
the plaintiff. By then, subject property was already auctioned and
awarded to plaintiff, being the highest bidder and defendants agents
already ejected from subject property per his Sheriffs Return of Service
dated October 7, 2003.

Clearly, respondent sheriff is derelict in his submission of the returns

thereof. His explanation that "his job was not yet finished and talked to
the plaintiff regarding the same"is utterly wanting. A finding that he was
remiss in the performance of his duty is thus proper under the attendant
circumstances. For such nonfeasance, respondent is guilty of dereliction
or simple neglect of his dutyas a sheriff, because he failed to submit his
Report of Service within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof and make
periodic reports to the court until the judgment was fully satisfied. In fine,
the gravamen of respondents shortcoming is in his failure to observe Sec.
14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Without doubt, Sheriff Duca played an indispensable part in the
administration of justice. His duties as a sheriff included the prompt
enforcement of judgments and the efficient implementation of orders and
writs issued by the court. Any move or actuation in the discharge of his
duties that denoted complacency, or reflected inefficiency, or constituted
impropriety would equate to the disregard of the office he held. Thus, his
lapses in complying with Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
constituted sufficient ground to order his dismissal, suspension from office
or payment of a fine.
Sheriff Ducas liability was not limited to his failure to file
the return on the writ. The OCA recommended that he be found
liable also for simple misconduct because he was guilty of the
irregularity of relying on the computation of the plaintiff in
charging Bahala for the arrears in rentals amounting to
P210,000.00.
Compounding this liability was his admission of not inquiring
whether Bahala had paid her rentals or not to the plaintiff.
To be sure, the amount of P210,000.00 stated in the notice of levy
did not conform with the writ of execution that stated the following
amounts to be due to the plaintiff from Bahala.
It was Sheriff Ducas duty as court sheriff to know the
computation of the amount due in accordance with the writ of
execution. He should have ensured that only those ordained or
decreed in the judgment would be the subject of execution. To
accomplish this, he must himself compute the correct amount due from
the judgment obligor or garnishee based strictly on the terms of the
executory judgment, and, if necessary, he must verify the amount from
the court itself; in other words, he could not rely on the computations
submitted by private individuals not duly authorized to do so by
the issuing court. He could not delegate the official duty to
compute or reckon the amounts to be realize through execution
to such individuals. In adopting the computations submitted by the
plaintiff without himself determining whether the computations
conformed to the terms of the judgment and the writ, he was guilty of
simple misconduct, an act that related to any unlawful conduct prejudicial
to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.

Sheriff Duca should discharge his duties as a court sheriff with

utmost care and diligence, particularly that which pertained to the
implementation of orders and processes of the court. In the discharge of
his duties, he acted as an agent of the court, such that any lack of care
and diligence he displayed would inevitably cause the erosion of the faith
of the people in the Judiciary.
The Court modified the recommended penalty of suspension from
office without pay for six months and one day. Under the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple neglect of duty
and simple misconduct are less grave offenses punishable by suspension
from office of one month and one day to six months for the first offense.
The offense charged being Sheriff Duca's first violation, he was
appropriately punished with suspension from office without pay
for three months, with a stern warning that the commission of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Topic: Quantum meruit

Ponente: Marvic Mario Victor Leonen
The
Law
Firm
of
Laguesma
Magsalin
Consulta
and
Gastardo vs.The Commission on Audit and/or Reynaldo A. Villar
and Juanito G. Espino, Jr. in his capacities as Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively

G.R.
January 13, 2015

No.

185544

Facts: Clark Development Corporation, through its legal officers and after
the law firms acquiescence, "sought from the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel [OGCC] its approval for the engagement of
[Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo] as external counsel."
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel denied the
request. Clark Development Corporation then filed a request for
reconsideration.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, through
Government Corporate Counsel Amado D. Valdez (Government Corporate
Counsel Valdez), reconsidered the request and approved the engagement
of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. It also furnished Clark
Development Corporation a copy of a pro-forma retainership contract
containing the suggested terms and conditions of the retainership. It
instructed Clark Development Corporation to submit a copy of the
contract to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel after all the
parties concerned have signed it.
In the meantime, Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo
commenced rendering legal services to Clark Development Corporation.
At this point, Clark Development Corporation had yet to secure the
authorization and clearance from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel or the concurrence of the Commission on Audit of the
retainership contract. According to the law firm, Clark Development
Corporations officers assured the law firm that it was in the process of
securing the approval of the Commission on Audit.
Clark Development Corporation, through its Board of Directors,
approved Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardos engagement as
private counsel. In 2003, it also approved the assignment of additional
labor cases to the law firm.
Consequently, SClark Development Corporation requested the
Commission on Audit for concurrence of the retainership contract it
executed with Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo. According to
the law firm, it was only at this point when Clark Development
Corporation informed them that the Commission on Audit required the
clearance and approval of the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel before it could approve the release of Clark Development
Corporations funds to settle the legal fees due to the law firm.
Theresfter, State Auditor IV Elvira G. Punzalan informed Clark
Development Corporation that its request for clearance could not be
acted upon until the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
approves the retainership contract with finality.
Government
Corporate
Counsel
Agnes
VST
Devanadera
(Government Corporate Counsel Devanadera) denied Clark Development
Corporations request for approval on the ground that the proforma

retainership contract given to them was not "based on the premise that
the monthly retainers fee and concomitant charges are reasonable and
could pass in audit by COA." She found that Clark Development
Corporation adopted instead the law firms proposals concerning the
payment of a retainers fee on a per case basis without informing the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. She, however, ruled that the
law firm was entitled to payment under the principle of quantum meruit
and subject to Clark Development Corporation Boards approval and the
usual government auditing rules and regulations.
Afterwards, Clark Development Corporation relayed Government
Corporate Counsel Devanaderas letter to the Commissions Audit Team
Leader, highlighting the portion on the approval of payment to Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo on the basis of quantum meruit.
The Commission on Audits Office of the General Counsel, Legal and
Adjudication Sector issued a "Third Indorsement" denying Clark
Development Corporations request for clearance, citing its failure to
secure a prior written concurrence of the Commission on Audit and the
approval with finality of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.
It also stated that its request for concurrence was made three (3) years
after engaging the legal services of the law firm.
This was appealed to, but the Commission on Audit rendered the
assailed decision denying the appeal and motion for reconsideration. It
ruled that Clark Development Corporation violated Commission on Audit
Circular No. 98-002 dated June 9, 1998 and Office of the President
Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated August 27, 1998 when it engaged the
legal services of Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo without the
final approval and written concurrence of the Commission on Audit. It also
ruled that it was not the governments responsibility to pay the legal fees
already incurred by Clark Development Corporation, but rather by the
government officials who violated the regulations on the matter.
Clark Development Corporation and Laguesma Magsalin Consulta
and Gastardo separately filed motions for reconsideration, which the
Commission on Audit denied in the assailed resolution dated November 5,
2008. The resolution also disallowed the payment of legal fees to the law
firm on the basis of quantum meruitsince the Commission on Audit
Circular No. 86-255 mandates that the engagementof private counsel
without prior approval "shall be a personal liability of the officials
concerned."
Laguesma Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo filed the instant petition
for certiorari.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Commission on Audit erred in ruling that
petitioner should not be paid on the basis of quantum meruit and that any
payment for its legal services should be the personal liability of Clark
Development Corporations officials.
2. Who shall be liable to pay the law firm?

SC: 1. No.
The Commission on Audit did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in disallowing the payment to petitioner on the basis of quantum meruit.
Respondents disallowed Clark Development Corporation from
paying petitioner on this basis as the contract between them was
executed "in clear violation of the provisions of COA Circular No. 86-255
and OP Memorandum Circular No. 9[.]" It then ruled that the retainership
contract between them should be deemed a private contract for which the
officials of Clark Development Corporation should be liable, citing Section
10385 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.
In jurisprudence, quantum meruit:
literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for
determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an express
agreement. The recovery ofattorneys fees on the basis of quantum
meruitis a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it and
also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An
attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the
effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account certain factors in
fixing the amount of legal fees.
Here, the Board of Directors, acting on behalf of Clark Development
Corporation, contracted the services of petitioner, without the necessary
prior approvals required by the rules and regulations for the hiring of
private counsel. Their actions were clearly unauthorized.
It was, thus, erroneous for Government Corporate Counsel
Devanadera to bind Clark Development Corporation, a
government entity, to pay petitioner on a quantum meruit basis
for legal services, which were neither approved nor authorized by
the government. Even granting that petitioner ought to be paid
for services rendered, it should not be the governments liability,
but that of the officials who engaged the services of petitioner
without the required authorization.
2. The officials of Clark Development Corporation.
The amendment of Commission on Audit Circular No. 86-255 by
Commission on Audit Circular No. 98-002 created a gap in the law,
because the liability of the officials who violated the circular was removed.
It cannot be denied that petitioner rendered legal services to Clark
Development Corporation.1wphi1 It assisted the corporation in litigating
numerous labor cases90 during the period of its engagement. It would be
an injustice for petitioner not to be compensated for services rendered
even if the engagement was unauthorized.
The fulfillment of the requirements of the rules and regulations was
Clark Development Corporations responsibility, not petitioners. The

Board of Directors, by its irresponsible actions, unjustly procured for

themselves petitioners legal services without compensation.
To fill the gap created by the amendment of Commission on
Audit Circular No. 86-255, respondents correctly held that the
officials of Clark Development Corporation who violated the
provisions of Circular No. 98-002 and Circular No. 9 should be
personally liable to pay the legal fees of petitioner, as previously
provided for in Circular No. 86-255.
Bases:
Section 103 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:
SEC. 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures. -Expenditures of
government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor.
Jurisprudence:
The fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in
lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal liability of the government
official who hired his services without the prior written conformity of the
OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be.

Topic: Fiduciary relationship between the counsel and the client

Ponente: Bienvenido Reyes
Marilen G. Soliman vs. Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy
A.C.
No.
10568
January 13, 2015
Facts: Soliman claimed that she engaged the services of Atty. Amboy in
2009 in connection with a partition case. In accordance with the Retainer
Agreement between the parties, Soliman agreed to pay Atty. Amboy
P50,000.00 as acceptance fee. Upon the latters engagement, Soliman
paid her P25,000.00. Later on, Atty. Amboy advised Soliman to no longer
institute a partition case since the other co-owners of the property were
amenable to the partition thereof. Instead, Atty. Amboy just facilitated the
issuance of the titles to the said property from the coowners to the
individual owners; the P25,000.00 already paid to her was then treated as
payment for her professional services.
In November 2008, Soliman gave Atty. Amboy P16,700.00 as payment for
the transfer tax. In the second quarter of 2009, Atty. Amboy told Soliman
that there was a delay in the issuance of the titles to the property
because of the failure of the other co-owners to submit certain
documents. Atty. Amboy then told Soliman that someone from the
Register of Deeds (RD) can help expedite the issuance of the titles for a
fee of P80,000.00. Atty. Amboy told Soliman that her contact in the RD
agreed to reduce the amount to P50,000.00.
Meanwhile, Soliman deposited the amount of P8,900.00 to Atty. Amboys
bank account as payment for the real property tax for the year 2009.
Thereafter, Soliman deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Atty. Amboys
bank account as payment for the latters contact in the RD.4
Atty. Amboy informed Soliman that the certificates of title to the property
were then only awaiting the signature of the authorized officer. However,

Atty. Amboy failed to deliver the respective certificates of title of Soliman

and her co-owners to the subject property. In 2010, Atty. Amboys
secretary informed Soliman that their contact in the RD was asking for an
additional P10,000.00 to facilitate the release of the said certificates of
title. Soliman then refused to further pay the amount being asked by Atty.
Amboys secretary.6Thereafter, Soliman kept on asking Atty. Amboy for
any update on the release of the said titles, but the latter was not
responding to her queries. Soliman and Atty. Amboys secretary went to
the office of a certain Atty. Marasigan, Deputy RD of Manila. Soliman
asked Atty. Marasigan if he received the 50,000.00 as payment for the
release of the said titles. Atty. Marasigan denied having received any
amount to facilitate the release of the titles and claimed that the reason
why the same could not be processed was that Atty. Amboy failed to file
certain documents.
Soliman further claimed that Atty. Amboy thereafter refused to release the
pertinent documents she gave to her for the processing of the titles to the
property or give back the P50,000.00 that was already paid to her.
For her part, Atty. Amboy admitted that she had a retainer agreement
with Soliman, but denied having received any amount from the latter
pursuant to the said agreement.
On May 29, 2012, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner
of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) issued a Report and Recommendation,10 which
recommended the suspension of Atty. Amboy from the practice of law for
six (6) months. The Investigating Commissioner opined that Atty. Amboy
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by failing to observe due
diligence in dealing with Soliman. It also opined that she failed to inform
the latter of the status of the proceedings for the issuance of the said
titles.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, which
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, albeit with the modification that the period of Atty.
Amboys suspension from the practice of law was increased from six (6)
months to two (2) years and that she was ordered to return the entire
amount she received from Soliman.
Atty. Amboy sought a reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 20,
2013, but it was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the the penalty imposed by the IBP Board of
Governors should be affirmed by the Court.
SC: Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states that a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his clientand that he should
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer
is mandated to serve his client with competence and diligence;to

never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; and to keep his

client informed of the status of his case and respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
The circumstances of this case clearly show that Atty. Amboy, after
receiving P25,000.00 as payment for her professional services, failed to
submit material documents relative to the issuance of separate
certificates of title to the individual owners of the property. It was her
negligence which caused the delay in the issuance of the certificates of
title.
To make matters worse, Atty. Amboy abetted the commission of an illegal
act when she asked from Soliman the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid to
her "contact" inside the office of the RD in order to facilitate the release
of the said certificates of title. Further, notwithstanding the payment of
P50,000.00, Atty. Amboy still failed to obtain issuance of the said
certificates of title. Insteadof procuring the release of the certificates of
title as she promised, Atty. Amboy asked for an additional P10,000.00
from Soliman.
Clearly, this is not a simple case of negligence and incompetence
by a counsel in dealing with a client. Atty. Amboys acts
undermined the legal processes, which she swore to uphold and
defend. In swearing to the oath, Atty. Amboy bound herself to
respectthe law and legal processes.
The Court further finds improper the refusal of Atty. Amboy to return the
amount of P50,000.00 which she paid inorder to facilitate the release of
the certificates of title. To reiterate, upon inquiry, Atty. Marasigan, the
Deputy RD of Manila, denied having received any amount from Atty.
Amboy. In not returning the money to Soliman after a demand therefor
was made following her failure to procure the issuance of the certificates
of title, Atty. Amboy violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 16.03 thereof, which requires
that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
upon demand. It is settled that the unjustified withholding of money
belonging to a client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. "A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."
Thus, Atty. Ditas Lerios-Amboy was found GUILTY of violating Rule 16.03,
Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She was suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years, effective upon receipt of this Resolution. Furthermore, she
was also ordered to return to Marilen G. Soliman the entire amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) she received from the latter, plus legal
interest thereon, reckoned from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

Topic: Gross misconduct - ground for disbarment

Ponente: [Per curiam]
Fernando W. Chu vs. Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr.
A.C.
No.
10573
January 13, 2015
Facts: Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes
involving his company, CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC). Atty.
Guicos legal services included handling a complaint for illegal dismissal

brought against CVC. The Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a

decision adverse to CVC. Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.
According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at
Atty. Guicos residence in Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked
him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision. On June
10, 2007, Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised
P300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told him to proceed to his office
at No. 48 Times Street, Quezon City, and togive the money to his
assistant, Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called
Atty. Guico to confirm that he had delivered the money to Nardo.
Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at
the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. Atthe UCC Coffee
Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu a copy of an alleged draft decision of the
NLRC in favor of CVC. The draft decision6 was printed on the dorsal
portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico.
On that occasion, the latter told Chu to raise another P300,000.00 to
encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision. But Chu could
only produce P280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guicos office on July
10, 2007 accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio
Elipane. However, it was Nardo who received the amount without issuing
any receipt.
Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in
December 2007. However, Atty. Guico referred him to Nardo who in turn
said that he would only know the status after Christmas. On January 11,
2008, Chu again called Nardo, who invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot
Plaza in Quezon City. Once there, Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC
Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the negative
and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with
Atty. Guico who would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept
it.
On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC.
Chu confronted Atty. Guico, who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing
of a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an appeal
in the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal
counsel on May 25, 2009.
The IBP Commissioner, after Chu filed his complaint, found that Atty.
Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving P580,000.00 from
Chu; and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of
extortion and misrepresentation that caused dishonor to and contempt for
the legal profession.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of the IBP Commissioner
Villanueva, but modified the recommended penalty of disbarment to three
years suspension.

Issue: What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

SC: Yes.
Chu credibly insisted that the draft decision was printed on the dorsal
portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guicos office, inferring that
Atty. Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office.
Despite denying being the source of the draft decision presented by Chu,
Atty. Guicos participation in the generation of the draft decision was
undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chus insistence by
conceding that the used paper had originated from his office, claiming
only that used paper was just "scattered around his office." In that
context, Atty. Guicos attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper
from his office was futile because he did not expressly belie the forthright
statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated by way of deflecting the
imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could
have been easily taken from his office by Chus witnesses in a criminal
case that he had handled for Chu, pointing out that everything in his
office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was "open to the public xxx
and just anybody has access to everything found therein." In the Court's
view, therefore, Atty. Guico made the implied admission because he was
fully aware that the used paper had unquestionably come from his office.
Guico committed the imputed gross misconduct by demanding
and receiving P580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable
decision. Atty. Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in
his defense, but such denial did not overcome the affirmative testimony of
Chu. We cannot but conclude that the production of the draft decision by
Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure
the chances of obtaining the favorable result in the labor case.
The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility is a continuing
condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the Legal Profession.
To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render any service or
give advice to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that
he was bound to uphold and obey, for he or she was always bound as an
attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the Legal Profession. Verily, he or she must act and comport himself
or herself in such a manner that would promote public confidence
in the integrity of the Legal Profession. Any lawyer found to
violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue
such membership in the legal profession.
Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel
Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable
decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery and
corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality
as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon

appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross
dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical
commitments under the Lawyers Oath not to delay any man for money or
malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an
individual lawyer as well as in the Legal Profession as a whole. In doing so,
he ceased to be a servant of the law.
Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal
Profession. Grave misconduct is "improper or wrong conduct, the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent
and not mere error of judgment."28 There is no question that any gross
misconduct by an attorney in his professional or private capacity renders
him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the
imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good
moral character is an essential qualification for the admission of an
attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.
Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to
suspend him from the practice of law for three (3) years would be too soft
a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred, for he exhibited his
unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal profession.
Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico
be ordered to return the amount of P580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That
amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the guise of serving the
latters interest as the client. Although the purpose for the amount was
unlawful, it would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for
and to return the money to Chu. It did not matter that this proceeding is
administrative in character.
Hence, Atty. Guico was found guilty of the violation of the Lawyers Oath,
and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and was DISBARRED from membership in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines. His name was ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility

Ponente: Martin S. VILLARAMA, JR.
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN

Facts: In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief
Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a
member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post
and transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance. On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of
Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed
with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The GIS identified
Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President. Mired
with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on
December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC. On
July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline claiming that Atty. Limpin
violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a
stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew
that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was he
elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. He also never
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as
Chairman and President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS
with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and
President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with
SEC requirements. It would have been corrected in the future but
unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She
averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting
held on March 3, 2008. The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013
Resolution adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for
reconsideration but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors.
Issue: Whether Atty. Limpin is guilty as charged.
SC: Yes.
The Court adopted the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty.
Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with
the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer
who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating
the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated [t]he
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only
where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges

pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in

accordance with his oath.tualLawlib
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may
be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among
these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties,
the Court agreed with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held
any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the
GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification
of the statements contained therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that
Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never
signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which
would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. In
filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin
committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a
lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Also, in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of
having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of
the corporation despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with
respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
The Court held respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, she was SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility

Ponente: Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Reynaldo G. Ramirez v. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang - Margallo, A.C.
No. 10537, February 3, 2015
Facts: Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) engaged Atty. Mercedes BuhayangMargallos (Atty. Margallo) services as legal counsel in a civil case for
Quieting of Title. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal
services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the
controversy instead of attorneys fees. It was also agreed upon that
Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1, 000.00 per court appearance.
The RTC ruled against Ramirez. Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal
the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the CA. The Appeal
was perfected and the records were sent to the CA. Ramirez was directed
to file his Appellants Brief and so he notified his counsel who likewise
agreed to prepare one. Ramirez then kept on asking his counsel for any
updates on the appeal. Atty. Margallo afterwards informed Ramirez that
his Appeal had been denied. She told him that the CAs denial was due to
Ramirezs failure to establish his filiation with his alleged father, which
was the basis of his claim. Atty. Margallo also informed him that they
could no longer appeal to the SC since the Decision of the CA had been
promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already
lapsed. Ramirez went to the CA. There, he discovered that the Appellants
Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and
Apologies for filing beyond the reglementary period.
Ramirez then filed a complaint before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Ramirez alleged that
Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By way of defense, Atty.
Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for
travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had
candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50%
chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an
agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the
land subject of the controversy.

The dispute was set for mandatory conference before the

Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. The Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission. The
Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to
Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. Upon MR of Ramirez, the
recommended penalty was increased to suspension from practice of law
for two (2) years. Atty. Margallo then filed a Petition for Review and
alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the
cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first time a
Complaint was filed against her.
Issue: Should the petition be granted?
SC: No.
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as
legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination between respondent
Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable but was not due to the lack of
diligence of her client. This cost complainant Ramirez his entire case and
left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not
because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a
person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the
requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no
longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no
proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an
admission that she abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of
an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible
means to protect complainant Ramirezs interest, which is contrary to
what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these
reasons, she clearly violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Atty. Margallos position that a two-year suspension is
too severe considering that it is her first infraction cannot be sustained.
Atty. Margallos neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in
court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost
prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence
as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that
lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be
no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Topic: Code of Professional Responsibility; proper penalty

Ponente: Justice Estela M. Perlas - Bernabe
Spouses Henry A. Concepcion and Blesilda S. Concepcion v. Atty.
Elmer A. dela Rosa, A.C. No. 10681, February 3, 2015
Facts: Atty. Elmer A. Dela Rosa served as the retained lawyer and counsel
of spouses Henry A. Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion
(Blesilda) from 1997 until August 2008. As such, he handled many of their
cases and was consulted on various legal matters, among others, the
prospect of opening a pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said
business, however, failed to materialize. Aware of the fact that his clients
had money intact from their failed business venture, Atty. Dela Rosa called
Henry to borrow the amount of P2,500,000.00, which he promised to
return, with interest, 5 days thereafter. The spouses agreed to lend him
the amount and so issued 3 checks in his name. However, Atty. Dela Rosa
failed to make good his promise. Despite repeated demand from the
spouses and even from their new lawyer, Atty. Kathryn Jessica dela Serna,
Atty. dela Rosa still did not pay the agreed amount. He even claimed that
a certain Jean Charles Nault, one of his other clients, was the real debtor.
The spouses then brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa but still to no avail. Hence, they filed a letter-complaint
before the IBP CBD charging Atty. Dela Rosa with violation of Rule 16.04
of the CPR. The rule prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from clients
unless the latters interests are fully protected by the nature of the case
or by independent advice.
Upon recommendation of the Investigating Officer, Atty. dela Rosa
was found guilty of violating: (a) Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides
that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice; (b) Canon 7 which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the IBP;
and (c) Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all
monies and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Atty. Dela Rosas actions degraded the integrity of the legal profession
and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and 16 of the CPR. his
failure to appear during the mandatory conferences further showed his
disrespect to the IBP-CBD.
The IC then recommended that Atty. Dela Rosa be disbarred and
that he be ordered to return the P2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
stipulated interest. The IBP Board of Governors approved the IC report but
reduced the penalty against the respondent to indefinite suspension from

the practice of law and ordered the return of the P2,500,000.00 to the
complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated interest.
Issue: W/N Atty. Dela Rosa should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR?
SC: Yes.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between
a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and confidence. And as
true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and confidence" is prone to
abuse. Atty. Dela Rosa borrowed money from spouses Concepcion who
were his clients and whose interests, by the lack of any security on the
loan, were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and confidence in Atty.
Dela Rosa, spouses Concepcion relied solely on the formers word that he
will return the money plus interest within five (5) days. However,
respondent abused the same and reneged on his obligation, giving his
previous clients the runaround up to this day. Accordingly, there is no
quibble that Atty. Dela Rosa violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally
held administratively liable on this score.
Considering the amount involved and atty. Dela Rosas refusal to
pay his debt, the SC deems it apt to suspend him from the practice of law
for three (3) years, instead of the IBP's recommendation to suspend him
indefinitely. The SC ruled that its decision should not involve Atty. Dela
Rosas civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the
aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this administrative case,
and thus cannot be sustained.

Topic: Disbarment by reason of conviction for the crime of

homicide which involves moral turpitude.
Ponente: Per Curiam
Garcia v. Atty. Sesbreo, A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457,
February 03, 2015
Facts: On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreo before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed
as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia
Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and Angie
Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and
practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in 1992,
Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was
eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo,
representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support
against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the
filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie
Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned
from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias children learned about his
return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only on parole. Garcia alleged that
homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo should
not be allowed to continue his practice of law.
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia
filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD . In
his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was
commuted and the phrase with the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory
penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term
of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that homicide does not involve
moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Garcias complaint was motivated
by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for
representing Garcias daughters in court.
Issue: whether or not the conviction for the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude.
SC: Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court

has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral
turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not
involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes
mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it
cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by classifying a crime asmalum in se or as malum prohibitum, since
there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are
mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat
a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive
clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreo cited In re
Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was
granted an absolute and unconditional pardon which restored his full
civil and political rights, a circumstance not present in these cases. Here,
the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute and
unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can
extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this
case, the executive clemency merely commuted to an indeterminate
prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment the
penalty imposed on Sesbreo. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.

Topic: Suspension of a lawyer for falsification of documents

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe
Spouses Umaguing v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 10451, February 04,
2015
Facts:
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of
SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose
Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants lodged an
election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November
7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance
fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous
expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants,
Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case but
the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the
November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5Atty. De Vera then rushed the
preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election
protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material
witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera),
which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the
aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera,
they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera
allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding
(Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names. The signing over of Lachicas and
Almeras names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa AlmeraAlmacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized
before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the
integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of
fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as
their counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case. In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Veras
disbarment.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the
accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on
the statements of his clients. Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing
of Lachicas falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge and
likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and
charged with the corresponding criminal offense.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. De Vera will be held administratively liable

SC: The SC ruled on the affirmative.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with
the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity,
and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar,
for they have been given full expression in the Lawyers Oath that every
lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member
of the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that [a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyers Oath
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
submitting a falsified document before a court.

Topic: Disqualification from being commission as a Notary Public

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe
Salita v. Atty. Salve, A.C. No. 8101, February 04, 2015
Facts: On December 14, 2002, Salita the registered owner of a parcel of
land located at Tagum City (subject property)applied for a loan from one
Jocelyn Rodriguez (Rodriguez) in the amount of P50,000.00 and, in such
regard, signed blank documents, including an incomplete Promissory
Note . Subsequently, here structured the aforesaid loan and further signed
several documents prepared by the latter, including two (2) Real Estate
Mortgage Agreements dated November 9, 2005 and November 18, 2005.
On November 15, 2006, Salita was able to pay his loan in full.
Notwithstanding such full payment, Rodriguez, on September 17, 2007,
instituted an ejectment complaint against Salita presenting in furtherance
of his cause the pre-formed Deed of Absolute Sale and the two (2) REM
instruments signed by the latter. Upon checking the said documents,
Salita discovered that the Deed of Absolute Sale had already been
notarized by Atty. Salve and his Community Tax Certificate Numbers were
allegedly falsified.
Aggrieved, Salita filed a criminal case for falsification of public
documents against Rodriguez and Atty. Salve. Salita likewise filed the
instant administrative case against Atty. Salve. In his defense, Atty. Salve
vehemently denied that he falsified the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In a Report and Recommendation dated January 4, 2010, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner dismissed Salitas
complaint for lack of merit.
In a Resolution dated December 29, 2012 (December 29, 2012
Resolution), the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation dismissing the
case for lack of merit.
On reconsideration, however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution dated March 8, 2014 (March 8, 2014 Resolution) setting aside
its December 29, 2012 Resolution and accordingly, recommended the
suspension of Atty. Salves notarial commission for a period of three (3)
months. It, however, failed to state the reasons for imposing the
suspension.
Issue: Whether or not Salve should be held administratively liable.
SC: The SC ruled in the affirmative.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons

who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated
because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge
of and are personally sworn to. Otherwise, their representatives names
should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the
instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
document into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from
the records of this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all
the parties therein personally appeared before him; (b) they are all
personally known to him; (c) they were the same persons who executed
the instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (e) they acknowledged personally before him that they
voluntarily and freely executed the same.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Reynaldo T. Salve is found GUILTY of
gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he isDISQUALIFIED
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

Topic: Misconduct/Judicial Ethics

Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Jill M. Tormis v. Judge Meinrado P. Paredes , A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
Facts: In her affidavit/complaint dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged
Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes
in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011
at the Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in
August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother,
Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges
involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also
mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a
judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his
discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes
was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon
Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted
addict. She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates
who was present, Rhoda L. Litang(Rhoda), informed her about the
inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop
the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in
Tacloban City. He also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O.
Lachica v. Judge Tormis (Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended
from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a
cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused for the warrant
she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was
the one who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he
recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense
worse than that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13,
2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita
Guioguio in a case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 148434-R, then pending before Branch 8,
MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case). Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be
administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Judge Paredes however denied the accussations of Jill in his
comment and stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases,
some of which he had investigated and as a result recommended
sanctions against Judge Tormis thus, Judge Tormis is now using Jill to get

back at him. He also averred that although he discussed in his class the
case of Lachica v. Tormis, he never discussed the involvement of Judge
Tormis in the marriage scams nor her sanctions and that he never
personally attacked Judge Tormis dignity and credibility. Regarding the
specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he
personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary
release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the
approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of
A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for
bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special
days. Judge Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As
Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following
business day, a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit
the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the
receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault
that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in
the afternoon of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the
administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an
administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of
his judicial duties.
Issue: Whether Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned because of
his actuations.
SC: The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of
Justice Diy except the penalty of reprimand as being imposed as
reprimand. Judge Paredes is indeed guilty of conduct unbecoming a Judge
when he uses of intemperate language during class discussions was
inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as
corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and
clearly insensitive and inexcusable.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions
was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by
invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not
without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a
correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary
of which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled

for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in
his language.
Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater
circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell
short of this standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he
cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge
Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be
reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in
the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private
activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:
CANON 2: INTEGRITY: Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in
or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only
occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There
is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. A judges official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject
of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify
honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.
As regards to Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave
misconduct when he personally received cash bail bond in relation to the
Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was
merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M.

No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for

bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official
holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the
accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt
of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor.
Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot
be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in
the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond
under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court
where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the
place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the
Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that
executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and
prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their
functions in relation to court administration. In the instant case, Judge
Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an
Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio
posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment for cash bail bond was
made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the
Guioguio case was then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC,
Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was
the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be
present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned for duty
during Sundays. Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation
made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the
two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient
evidence.
The Supreme Court ruled that, considering that this is the first
offense of judge Paredes the penalty to be imposed should be admonition
and not reprimand.

Topic: Notarization Law; Presence of the Parties before the

Notary Public; Obedience of Lawyers; Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
Ponente: Leonenj, J.
Anudon v. Cefra, A.C. No. 5482, 10 February 2015
Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the
document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the
document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the
absence of the parties is a breach of duty.
Facts: Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita)
are brother- and sister-in-law. Complainants and Jimmys brothers and
sister co-own a 4,446-square-meter parcel of land located in Sison,
Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 69244.
Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy
and Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and
provides services as notary public in the Municipality of Sison,
Pangasinan.
On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
over a land covered by TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon
(Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso), Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and
complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as vendors, while the name of
Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the vendee.
Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
falsified. They alleged that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Moreover, they did not sign it before Atty. Cefra. The National Bureau of
Investigations Questioned Documents Division certified that Jimmy and
Juanitas signatures were forged. This is contrary to Atty. Cefras
acknowledgment over the document, which states:
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Municipality of Sison,
personally appeared JOHNNY ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA
ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON, who exhibited to me
their respective Community Tax Certificates as above-indicated, known to
me and known to be the same persons who executed the foregoing Deed
of Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is their free act
and voluntary deed.
This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a
parcel of lot, consists of two pages and have been signed by the parties
and the respective witnesses on each and every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN
In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita
stated that it was physically impossible for their brothers and sister,
Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and
Benita were in the United States on the day the Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite.
Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, with Jimmy and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of
falsification of public document against Atty. Cefra and Paran.
Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a
Complaint with this court on August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of
Atty. Cefras conduct as lawyer and notary public.
In the Resolution dated September 19, 2001, this court required
Atty. Cefra to comment on the administrative complaint. Atty. Cefra filed
multiple Motions for Extension of Time, which this court granted. Despite
the allowance for extension of time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this
courts order to file a Comment. This court fined Atty. Cefra in the
Resolutions dated March 12, 2003 and November 17, 2003. In both
Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his Comment.
Atty. Cefras continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court
to order his arrest and commitment. Thus, the National Bureau of
Investigations agents arrested Atty. Cefra at his residence on January 14,
2007.
Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment on January 15, 2008. In
his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the
sale of the property covered by TCT No. 69244. He narrated that on July
10, 1998, Juanita and Jimmys wife Helen Anudon went to his residence to
consult him on how they could sell the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to
Paran. Atty. Cefra claimed that he assisted in the preparation of the
documents for the sale, which included the deed of sale and the
acknowledgment receipts for payment. On August 13, 1998, Parans
relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed of Absolute

Sale to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnnys son, Loejan Anudon
(Loejan) to have the document signed.23 Viola Carantes and Lita Paran
informed Atty. Cefra that they witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign
the document. Loejan affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny, and his
uncle and aunt, Alfonso and Benita.
Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of
Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita "with the full knowledge and permission of the
three." He allowed this on the basis of his belief that this was justified
since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale for the amputation of his
mothers leg. It clearly appeared that Loejan forged the three (3)
signatures. Loejan did not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of
his father, uncle, and aunt.
According to Atty. Cefra, he "notarized the questioned document in
good faith, trusting in complainants words and pronouncements; with the
only purpose of helping them out legally and financially."
After receiving Atty. Cefras Comment, this court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Juanita appeared without any counsel and manifested her intention to
solicit the services of the Public Attorneys Office. She also informed the
Investigating Commissioner that her co-complainant, Jimmy, had already
passed away. The mandatory conference was held on February 20, 2009.
On the same day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an Order
terminating the mandatory conference and requiring the parties to submit
their respective Position Papers.
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefras conduct in
notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law. In addition,
Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Hence, the
Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefras
notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. The Investigating
Commissioner also recommended the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-24937 dated May 14, 2011, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. However,
they recommended that the penalty imposed on Atty. Cefra be modifed:

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year and immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and
Perpetual Disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public.
Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to temper the recommended penalty against him. In
Resolution No. XXI-2014-9342 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines proposed to lower its
original penalty against Atty. Cefra: Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year, his notarial practice, if presently
existing, immediately REVOKED and his notarial practice SUSPENDED for
two (2) years.
On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that
both parties no longer filed a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI2014-93.
Issue: Whether Atty. Cefra should be given a penalty.
SC: Yes.
We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law
and the Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document
without requiring the presence of the affiants.
The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and
reliability of a document. As this court previously explained:
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a
public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified
or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and
the courts and administrative offices generally.
The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103. This law refers
specifically to the acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and
documents. Section 1(a) of this law states that an acknowledgment "shall
be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done."

The
2004
Rules
on
Notarial
Practice
reiterates
that
acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the
notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment."Acknowledgment" refers to an act
in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and
integrally complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the
instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes
stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he
acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to
sign in that capacity.
Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: SEC. 2. Prohibitions.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved
as signatory to the instrument or document
(1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.
The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person
executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without
physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute
his or her duty under the law.
Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in
the document express the true agreement between the parties.
Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of
notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties
appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This
cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the
notary public acknowledging the document.
Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land.
Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review
the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was
brought to Atty. Cefra by Parans representatives, who merely informed
Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have

exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the

vendee.
It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors
might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In
addition, the possibility of forgery became real.
Aside from Atty. Cefras violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty.
Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This canon requires "a lawyer to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this courts order
to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already
required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him.
Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the
National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on
January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this courts order. Atty.
Cefras actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.
The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon
1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts.
Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court,
"wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a
ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefras
disobedience to this courts directive issued in 2001 was not explained
even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience
was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this
infraction.
We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra
should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct.

Topic: Gross ignorance of the law

Ponente: Justice Marvic M.V.F Leonen
Chua Keng Sin v. Judge Job M. Mangente, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Brance 54, Navotas City, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851, February 11, 2015
Facts: Chua Keng Sin and his brother Victorio Chua separately filed their
complaints for slight physical injuries against each other before the
Lupong Tagapamahaya. Chua Keng Sin filed his Complaint earlier than
Victorio. When Victorio learned that his Complaint would be considered as
a counterclaim, he decided not to attend the scheduled hearings set by
the Lupon. Instead, Victorio filed a Complaint for attempted murder
against his brother before the Office of the City Prosecutor. Due to
Victorios failure to appear before a Lupon, Chua Keng Sin was able to file
a Complaint for slight physical injuries with the Office of the City
Prosecutor as well. The Lupon also issued a Certification to Bar
Action/Counterclaim . . . against Victorio due to his failure or refusal to
appear in the hearing. The two claims were jointly heard and it was
recommended that both brothers be charged with slight physical injuries.
The separate cases filed were then raffled to separate branches of the
MTC.
The case against Chua Keng Sin was raffled to Branch 54 of the
MTC, presided by Judge Mangente. Chua Keng Sin filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Victorios Complaint was filed in court without
the required certification to file action. Furthermore, the Lupon had issued
a certification to bar action/counterclaim against Victorio. The MTD was
denied on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading . . . under the Rule
on Summary Procedure. An MR of the Order was filed. After almost two (2)
years, Judge Mangente denied the MR on the ground that the Lupon had
issued a certificate to file action. In the meantime, Chua Keng Sin filed a
Motion for determination of probable cause assailing the Resolution of the
reviewing prosecutor for upgrading the offense of slight physical injuries
as charged with to attempted homicide. The same Motion was denied by
Judge Mangente even before the expiration of the period for Chua Keng
Sin to file his Reply.
Chua Keng Sin then filed a Complaint against Judge Mangente for
gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency relative to a criminal
case for slight physical injuries. Chua Keng Sin argued that Judge
Mangentes refusal to grant his MTD was violative of Section 412 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits the filing or institution of
a complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon directly in court of any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the Lupon, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached

as certified by the Lupon. Contrary to Judge Mangentes interpretation,

the certification to file action issued by the Lupon was in favor of Chua
Keng Sin, not his brother Victorio. The certification did not authorize
Victorio to pursue his own action. Chua Keng Sin further argued that Judge
Mangentes denial of his MTD was also violative of "Section 18 of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which provides for the dismissal of
cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation where there is no
showing of compliance with such requirement. Complainant also averred
that the delay in resolving the Motion was in violation of Rule 37, Section
4 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was decided two (2) years after the
prosecution filed its Comment, instead of resolving it within 30 days from
the time it was submitted for resolution.
As to the denial of his Motion to determine probable cause, Chua
Keng Sin averred that Judge Mangente violated his right to due process
when the Motion was resolved before the expiration of the period given to
him to file his Reply.
Issue: Is Judge Mangente guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
SC: Yes. Judge Mangente is suspended from service for six months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply
apply the law. "Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is gross
ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was "gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence
because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of
the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted).
Judge Mangente was careless in disposing the Motions filed by Chua
Keng Sin, in a criminal case no less. The OCA correctly underscores that
his experience as a public attorney and prosecutor should have ingrained
in him well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot be
relieved from the consequences of his actions simply because he was
newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These circumstances are
not unique to him. His careless disposition of the motions is a reflection of
his competency as a judge in discharging his official duties.
Judges are to be reminded that it is the height of incompetence to
dispense cases callously and in utter disregard of procedural rules.
Whether the resort to shortcuts is borne out of ignorance or convenience
is immaterial. Judges took an oath to dispense their duties with

competence and integrity; to fall short would be a disservice not only to

the entire judicial system, but more importantly, to the public.
Respondent's failure must not be brushed aside. We find the imposition of
suspension for six (6) months to be justified.

Topic: Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,

Rule 10, Section 46 (Serious dishonesty); Career Service
Professional Eligibility
Ponente: Per Curiam
Civil Service Commission, as represented by Director IV Maria
Leticia G. Reyna v. Jovilyn B. Dawang, Court Stenographer I,
Municipal Trial Court, Talugtog, Nueva Ecija, A.M. No. P-15-3289,
February 17, 2015
Facts:
Respondent Jovilyn B. Dawang is a Court Stenographer 1 in
the Municipal Trial Court of Talugtog, Nueva Ecija. Dawang had been
working as a stenographer for various courts in a temporary capacity
since 1993, until she qualified as a permanent employee upon obtaining
her Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility. In the Letter
dated June 21, 2011, the Civil Service Commission informed the Office of
the Court Administrator that it was charging Dawang with serious
dishonesty. According to the Civil Service Commission, Dawang conspired
with another individual during the Career Service Professional
Examination held on August 18, 1996. Dawang, then Jovilyn S. Borillo,
asked an impersonator to take the examination in her stead. The
impersonator placed her own 2x2 photograph on the picture-seat plan of
the examination under the name of Jovilyn S. Borillo. The complete
personal circumstances and alleged signature of Dawang were affixed on
the documents for the exam. "The impersonator passed the examination
and consequently, a Certificate for Career Service Professional Eligibility
was issued in the name of Dawang." Dawang filed a modified Personal
Data Sheet on October 11, 1996. In its Item No. 18, she included the
qualification "Career Service Professional" with a rating of 84.86%. On
May 29, 2007, the Examination, Recruitment, and Placement Office
required Dawang to show cause "why she should not be administratively
charged for having employed fraud in acquiring her Career Service
Professional
Eligibility.
Dawang did not comply with the Examination, Recruitment, and

Placement Office's Show Cause Order. On May 17, 2011, the Civil Service
Commission found a prima facie case against Dawang, and she was
formally charged with two (2) counts of serious dishonesty.
Issue:

Whether Dawang is guilty of serious dishonesty.

Ruling: Yes.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Office of the Court Administrator's
Report. Dawang's acts constituted serious dishonesty. Upon examination
of Dawang's photograph on the picture-seat plan of the August 18, 1996
Career Service Professional Examination and her photographs on her
Personal Data Sheets, the Court shared the Civil Service Commission and
the Office of the Court Administrator's conclusion that the individual
whose picture appears on the picture-seat plan is not Dawang. The
differences
are
apparent
even
to
an
ordinary
person.
Allowing another person to take the examination on one's behalf is an act
of dishonesty. Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray." The Court further held that even if it will
believe Dawang's narrative, her acts after learning she apparently passed
the exam are marred with serious dishonesty. When she received the
letter from the Civil Service Commission and the Certificate of Eligibility
without her taking an actual examination, her first instinct was to confirm
her eligibility. She did not question how she could have passed without
physically taking the examination.
Despite her knowledge that the examination was on August 18, 1996,
nothing in Dawang's narrative shows that she went to the Civil Service
Commission on such date. An honest individual would have inquired why
she did not receive through post the notice informing her to take the
examination. Only a dishonest individual would accept the favorable
results of an examination she did not take. Dawang's Personal Data Sheet
filed on October 11, 1996 documented her dishonesty. She wrote that her
Civil Service Eligibility included "Career Service Professional." On the field
for date, she wrote "August 18, 1996." She also noted that her rating was
"84.86%" and that the place of examination was "Juan Sumulong High
Sch. M.M." She had the courage to write all these details, yet she
admitted in her sworn statement that she did not take the examination on
August 18, 1996. If she did not take the examination on the said date at
the said venue, then it is impossible for her to score in the examination.
Yet, in her Personal Data Sheet, she declared under oath that she did.

Under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule
10, Section 46, serious dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal from the service. In Civil Service Commission v. Dasco, this court
dismissed a court stenographer who misrepresented that she took the
Career Service Professional Examination. The facts in Dasco are identical
with the facts of this case. The difference is that respondent
in Dasco stated that the disparity between her appearance on the pictureseat plan and her actual appearance was because the latter was affected
by stress and fatigue, and that the signatures were different because she
was pasmado when she signed one of the documents.
For her dishonesty, Dawang does not deserve to be a stenographer in the
judiciary. She should be dismissed from service.

Topic: Violation of Civil Service Rules

Ponente: Per Curiam
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Reynaldo C. Alcantara,
Utility Worker I, Br. 70, and Joseph c. Jacinto, Electrician, Hall of
Justice, both of the Regional Trial Court, Burgos, Pangasinan, A.M.
No. P-15-3296, February 17, 2015
Facts: This case stemmed from an undated Letter-Complaint, addressed
to Executive Judge Elpidio N. Abella, Regional Trial Court, Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, charging respondents Reynaldo C. Alcantara and Joseph C.
Jacinto with the commission of several illegal activities in violation of Civil
Service Rules. Alcantara worked as Utility Worker I, Branch 70, Regional
Trial Court, Burgos, Pangasinan, whereas Jacinto was an electrician at the
Hall
of
Justice
in
the
same
city.
In the Report dated July 17, 2013, Executive Judge Abella recommended
that Alcantara and Jacinto be immediately dismissed from service. He
found that as early as 2009, Alcantara and Jacinto received and encashed
checks of their co-workers without consent. Executive Judge Abella found
that Alcantara's and Jacinto's actions constituted grave misconduct and
recommended their dismissal from service.
Issue:
Whether respondents are guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty.
SC: Yes.
The Supreme Court adopted the findings and recommendations of the
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator.
Dishonesty is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of, integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray." Grave misconduct is committed when there has been
'"a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.' The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established
rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must
necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct."
In Rojas, Jr. v. Mina, respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct and
dishonesty for stealing and encashing Special Allowance for Judges and
Justices checks payable to several trial court judges without their consent.
Similarly, in Re: Loss of Extraordinary Allowance Check No. 11-6739 of

Judge Eduardo Jovellanos, respondent Rosario Santos was held

responsible for stealing, encashing, and converting for her personal use
the amount covered by the check issued to Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos.
In this case, Alcantara and Jacinto admitted to taking and encashing
checks of their co-workers without permission. There is no doubt that their
acts of repeatedly stealing the checks and forging the signatures of their
co-workers constitute grave misconduct and dishonesty. Their alleged
remorse for what they have done does not erase the transgression they
committed. "This Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables
who undermine its efforts toward an effective and efficient administration
of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public." Under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Rule 10,
Section 46, serious dishonesty and grave misconduct are punishable by
dismissal from service even if for the first offense. This court held that we
have not hesitated to impose the ultimate penalty. This Court had never
and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the
norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the
faith of the people in the justice system.

Topic: Violation of administrative code; Habitual absenteeism is

considered prejudicial to the best interest of the public service
Ponente: Per Curiam
Office of the Court Administrator v. Tyke J. Sarceno, A.M. No. P11-2930, February 17, 2015
Facts: As early as on December 4, 2009, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended the bringing of an administrative
complaint for habitual absenteeism against respondent Tyke J. Sarceno,
Clerk III of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, in Manila. The
recommendation was based on a finding that Sarceno had incurred 92
days of unauthorized absences in the months of June 2009 to September
2009, inclusive.
In his comment, Sarceno explained that he had been experiencing
abdominal pains, high fever, and influenza in the latter part of May
2009; that when the abdominal pain had become unbearable in the
following month, he had applied for sick leave; that he did not seek
medical assistance but only resorted to self-medication, believing that he
was only experiencing a common illness; that due to this, he could not
produce a medical certificate to support his application for sick leave; that
in July 2009, he had applied for vacation and sick leaves alternately to
cover his absences; that he had then sought medical assistance upon
finding out that he was also suffering gonorrhea; that he had returned to
work on August 14, 2009 to file the necessary leave application; that he
had applied for vacation leave to cover the whole month of September
2009 because the nature of his illness had required an extended time for
recovery; that he had harbored neither malicious intent nor bad faith in
incurring his absences; that he entreated that the medical certificate
attached to his comment be accepted, confessing that he had belatedly
filed it due to embarrassment and threat of ridicule brought about by
his sickness; and that he was committing himself to correct his
shortcomings and serve with enthusiasm and excellence.
Even so, Sarceno continued to incur unexplained absences. His continuing
absenteeism was discovered by Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief,
Administrative Services of the OCA, who had meanwhile sent a telegram
requesting Presiding Judge Germano Francisco D. Legaspi of Branch 31 of
the Regional Trial Court in Manila to direct Sarceno to submit his bundy
cards for July 2010 and August 2010 lest the OCA would recommend that
Sarcenos salary be withheld; Accordingly, Judge Legaspi recommended
that Sarceno be dropped from the rolls, or, in the alternative, that
appropriate administrative charges be brought against him for habitual
absenteeism. On February 22, 2012, the Court promulgated its resolution
dropping Sarcenos name from the rolls, and declaring his position as

Clerk III of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila as
vacant.
Issue: whether the court is correct in its action.
SC: Yes
Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 provides that an employee in the Civil
Service shall be considered habitually absent if he or she incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave
credit under the law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least
three (3) consecutive months during the year.
The OCA found that Sarceno had incurred absences totaling 92 days
spread in the months of June, July, August, and September, all in 2009.
Such absenteeism already merited the imposition of the penalty for
habitual absenteeism. Still, Judge Legaspi reported that as of the writing
of his letter to Atty. Bahia on September 8, 2010, Sarceno had incurred a
total of 37 absences in 2010, 34 of which were in the months of July,
August and September, all in 2010. The OCA observed that as of the
writing of its AMFA on December 14, 2010, Sarceno had remained absent
without official leave. The frequency and the number of Sarcenos
absences rendered him guilty of habitual absenteeism, and indicated that
he had thereby exceeded the allowable days of monthly leave credits.
Conduct is prejudicial to the public service if it violates the norm of public
accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the peoples faith in
the Judiciary. By the habituality and frequency of his unauthorized
absences, Sarceno did not live up to the degree of accountability,
efficiency, and integrity that the Judiciary has required of its officials and
employees. His position as Clerk III was essential and indispensable to the
Judiciarys primary mandate of the proper administration of justice. This
mandate dictated that he as a court employee should devote his office
hours strictly to the public service, if only to repay and serve the people
whose taxes were used to maintain the Judiciary. His habitual absenteeism
severely compromised the integrity and image that the Judiciary sought to
preserve, and thus violated this mandate.

Topic: violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Conflict of interest
Ponente: Leonen, J.:
Roberto Bernardino v. Atty. Victor Rey Santos, A.C. No. 10583,
February 18, 2015
Facts: In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino)
filed a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be
investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro
Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina
Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina
Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty.
Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to
succeed to and inherit the estate of said deceased who did not
leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and
Mariano Turla, filed a Complaint for sum of money with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order against
Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir
of Mariano Turla, which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented
clients with conflicting interests.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months. It
found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew
that the death certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano
Turlas Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove
that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turlas estate.
In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and
approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.

Issues: Whether Atty. Santos violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon
10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whether the
penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is
proper.
SC: Yes.
The court accepted and adopted the findings of fact of the IBP Board of
Governors Resolution but modified the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary
obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat
all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform
their counsels of the facts of their case.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest
means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists,

respondent would necessarily refute Mariano Turlas claim that he is
Rufina Turlas sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse,
he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the Report
of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Likewise, the court accepted and adopted the IBP Board of Governors
finding that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead
by any artifice.
The respondents act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing
the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of
Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent
failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards
of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to
do his duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of
the Lawyers Oath but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court noted that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors
Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that
it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to impose
sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
Parenthetically, it is the Supreme Court that has the constitutionally
mandated duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty to
assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on
Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
"proceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person."
However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation of
the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best, the
penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued
with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to

his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
Statethe administration of justiceas an officer of the court."
Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This
disciplinary authority is granted by the Constitution and cannot be
relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and Resolutions
rendered by this court.

Topic: Affixing signature at the jurat portion of the administrative

complaint prepared by her father
Ponente: Sereno, CJ.
Benito B. Nate v. Judge Lelu P. Contreras, Branch 43, Regional
Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2406, February
18, 2015
Facts:
This administrative case concerns allegations that respondent
Judge Lelu P. Contreras committed three counts of grave misconduct while
she was still holding the position Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial
Court in Iriga City, Camarines Sur (RTC-Iriga City). According to the
complaint, respondent allegedly notarized an administrative complaint;
certified a document (a labor complaint) as a true copy of the original;
and appeared as counsel for her father in a hearing before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Clerks of court are indeed authorized to act as
ex officio notaries public under the Administrative Code of 1987 in relation
to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court. On the other hand, the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees prohibit public officials and employees from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The 2004 Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice were not yet in force
when respondent committed the purported offenses.
Issues: Whether Contreras is administratively liable for the following
acts:
1. Affixing her signature to the jurat portion of the administrative
complaint prepared by her father
2. Authenticating documents as genuine copies of the original labor
complaint
3. Appearing as counsel before the IBP on behalf of her father
SC:
1. YES. Respondents act of affixing her signature to the jurat portion
of the administrative complaint prepared by her father had no direct
relation to her work as the then clerk of court of RTCIriga City.
Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the proceedings involving
the disbarment and discipline of attorneys shall be conducted
before the IBP. This means that clerks of court are not among the
touch points in the regular procedure pertaining to complaints
against an attorney. Neither may a pleading in a case involving
lawyers be filed with the RTC.
2. YES. We apply the same legal reasoning to the second act of
respondent being complained about; that is, her certification of a

copy of her sister-in-laws labor complaint.1wphi1 Respondent

herself admits that the document was filed before the National
Labor Relations Commission in Naga City, not the RTCIriga City.
Thus, in the regular course of her duties, she would not have come
across, encountered, or been in custody of the document. While we
agree with her that clerks of court are allowed to perform the
notarial act of copy certification, this act must still be connected to
the exercise of their official functions and duties meaning to say, it
must be done in connection with public documents and records that
are, by virtue of their position, in their custody.
3. We recognize that the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees does allow for limited exceptions.
Section 7(b) thereof in relation to Rule X, Section 1(c) of its
implementing rules, provides that public officials and employees are
prohibited from engaging in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution, law, or regulation; and under
the condition that their practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions.
In the instant case Respondent has satisfactorily proved that she
was granted authority by this Court to "represent her father in
Administrative Case No. 6089 provided that she files the
corresponding leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
of the case and that she will not use official time in preparing for the
case."

Topic: Lawyer-client relationship

Ponente: Reyes, J.
Michael Ruby vs. Atty. Espejo and Atty. Bayot, A.C. No. 10558,
February 23, 2015
Facts: The complainant engaged the services of the respondents. On
September 15, 2009, complainant gave Atty. Espejo the amount of
P50,000.00 as payment for filing fee. However the actual filing fee that
was paid by her was only 7,5610 and she failed to account for the excess
amount given despite several demands. Thereafter the complainant
alleged that the respondents failed to update him as to the status of his
complaint. He further claimed that Atty. Bayot had suddenly denied that
he was their counsel. Atty. Bayot asserted that it was Atty. Espejo alone
who was the counsel of the complainant and that he was merely a
collaborating counsel. Atty. Bayot further claim that Atty. Espejo, trough
complainant's consent, merely assisted for the sole purpose of drafting a
complaint. He pointed out that he had no part in the retainer agreement
that was entered into by the complainant and Atty. Espejo. He also denied
having any knowledge as to the P50,000.00 that was paid to Atty. Espejo
as filing fee. The IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution suspending
the respondents from the practice of law for a period of one year. On
march 22, 2014, the Board of Governors issued a resolution which
dismissed the case insofar as Atty. Espejo in view of her demise.
Issue: Whether Attorney-client relationship exist between Attorney Bayot
and complainant
SC: Yes.
The evidence on record including Atty. Bayot's admissions point to the
conclusion that a lawyer-client relationship existed between him and the
complainant. Atty. Bayot was the one who prepared the complaint that
was filed with the RTC. He likewise prepared the motion to serve summons
through publication. He likewise appeared as counsel for the complainant
in the hearings of the case before RTC and advise the complainant on the
status of the case. More importantly, Atty. Bayot admitted that he
received P8,000.00 which is part of the acceptance fee indicated in the
retainer agreement. The foregoing circumstances clearly established that
a lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Bayot and the
complainant. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To
establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.
Further, acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.

Topic: Willful neglect of duty and serious misconduct due to graft

and corruption and extortion
Ponente: Per Curiam
Astorga and Repol Law Offices, represented by Atty. Arnold B.
Lugares v. Alexander D. Villanueva, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 60, Makati City, A.M. No. P-09-2668
February 24, 2015
Facts: This is an administrative Complaint filed by Astorga and Repol
Law Offices against Alexander D. Villanueva, Sheriff IV of Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City for "willful neglect of duty and serious
misconduct in office due to graft and corruption or extortion with a prayer
that a penalty of dismissal . . . or other appropriate sanctions be meted
against him." Astorga and Repol Law Offices represented FGU Insurance
Corporation in a Complaint for damages filed against NEC Cargo Services,
Inc. The Complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
and raffled to Branch 66 presided by Judge Ricardo R. Rosario. On August
23, 2004, Judge Ricardo R. Rosario issued a Decision in favor of FGU
Insurance Corporation. NEC Cargo Services, Inc. and Albert Tamayo, a
third-party defendant-appellant, appealed the Decision before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the Appeal in its Resolutions dated
July 20, 2005 and December 20, 2005. These Resolutions became final
and executory. Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa issued the Order
granting Astorga and Repol Law Offices Motion to Appoint Special Sheriff.
Sheriff Villanueva was assigned to execute the Decision.
On October 29, 2008, Sheriff Villanueva and Atty. Arnold B. Lugares (Atty.
Lugares) started coordinating with each other for the execution of the
Decision.
During
the
meeting,
Sheriff
Villanueva
allegedly
demanded P8,000.00 to execute the Decision.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of evidence. It found that Atty. Lugares failure to
prosecute the case invited suspicion that the Complaint was not filed with
sincerity of purpose, or that a settlement was reached to cover up his
misconduct. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that Atty.
Lugares should show cause why he should not be held in contempt of
court for filing an unfounded Complaint against Sheriff Villanueva.
In the Resolution, Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of the
Office of the Court Administrator by dismissing the case and requiring
Atty. Lugares to show cause.
Atty. Lugares filed a Compliance with Motion for Reconsideration where he
manifested that he was willing to prosecute the case. He alleged that "he

was not furnished . . . a copy of the Investigation Report of Judge

Salvador." He claimed that no amicable settlement was reached with
Sheriff Villanueva and that he had no improper motive in filing this
case. He attached as annexes the photographs of the text messages that
Sheriff Villanueva sent him. In the Resolution dated March 5, 2012, this
court recalled the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 dismissing the
administrative Complaint for lack of evidence and ordered the case to be
reopened.
Executive Judge Pozon concluded that Sheriff Villanueva did not commit
gross neglect of duty. He stated that Atty. Lugares was not able to provide
evidence to substantiate his claim that Sheriff Villanueva did not perform
his duty. On the other hand, Sheriff Villanueva was able to provide the
affidavit of Atty. Escasias, Jr., confirming that when Sheriff Villanueva met
with Atty. Lugares, it was to ensure the execution of the Decision.
Issue: Whether respondent Sheriff Alexander D. Villanueva is guilty of
misconduct due to willful neglect of duty and corruption or extortion.
SC: Yes.
Court must reverse the findings of Executive Judge Pozon. Respondent
should be subject to disciplinary sanctions.
A review of the facts is called for when the finding of a lack of
administrative liability is premised on the supposed absence of evidence,
but an examination of the record shows that there is evidence to support
the allegations.99Even if respondent is initially exculpated based on an
alleged lack of evidence to support the allegations, this court can still
conduct its own assessment of the evidence on record and impose the
corresponding administrative liability.100
Respondents neglect to faithfully execute his duties as Sheriff is
supported
by
substantial evidence.
In Executive Judge Pozons Report and Recommendation, he stated that
Atty. Lugares failed to provide evidence showing that respondent
committed the actions alleged in the Complaint. His exculpation of
respondent from liability was primarily based on the fact that Atty.
Lugares was unable to present his outgoing text messages.
Contrary to Executive Judge Pozons position, however, Atty. Lugares was
able to prove that respondent committed actions that warrant
administrative liability.
In previous administrative cases involving other court personnel, text
messages were admitted as evidence and given probative value by this

court.104 In those cases, the court considered the content of the text
messages and the identification of the person sending them as
substantial evidence to prove the commission of administrative offenses.
Atty. Lugares was able to present the text messages he received in his
cellular phone. He attached photographs of the screen of his cellular
phone, showing the messages as they were received. He submitted
respondents calling card105 that contained the same phone number seen
in the text messages. Through this calling card, he was able to prove that
respondent was the source of the text messages. Respondent denied
meeting with Atty. Lugares, but he never denied sending the text
messages to him.
The content of the text messages from respondent and the circumstances
within which they were made constitute substantial evidence that justify
the finding of administrative liability. The presentation of text messages
that Atty. Lugares sent to respondent is not necessary. Respondents text
messages sent to Atty. Lugares show an actual evasion of duty to
implement the Writ of Execution. The contents of the text messages
sufficiently prove his manifest refusal to properly implement the Writ of
Execution.
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and must be dismissed
from the service.
Having found substantial evidence to prove Atty. Lugares allegations,
respondent must be held accountable by this court. He has failed to
uphold the high standard of integrity required by a position in the
judiciary. He has violated Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to secure
unwarranted benefits, privileges or exemptions for themselves or for
others.
SEC. 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit
based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or
benefit shall influence their official actions.
Respondent has been found guilty of soliciting money from litigants in
order to execute his duties as a Sheriff. This deplorable behavior in some
court personnel must be stopped.

Topic: Gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct

Ponente: Per Curiam
Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Emmanuela A.
Reyes, Municipal Trial Court, Bani, Pangasinan, A.M. No. P-102872, February 24, 2015
Facts: Office of the Court Administrator issued a Memorandum relative to
the examination conducted on Reyess books of accounts covering the
period of June 15, 2004 until March 31, 2009. It directed Reyes to explain
in writing why she should not be held administratively liable for the
delayed remittances of collections of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF), Fiduciary Fund (FF), Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF),
Sheriffs Trust Fund (STF), and Mediation Fund (MF) for the years 2004 to
2009. Interests earned on Fiduciary deposits which were withdrawn from
the Fiduciary Fund Account were likewise not deposited promptly to the
proper fund account on the day they were withdrawn. Reyes reasoned
out that since no one called her attention, she had presumed that there
was nothing wrong as long as the courts collections were intact in her
possession. Also, the Landbank branch in Alaminos City is fourteen (14)
kilometers away such that she would only go to the bank if she needed to
withdraw from the courts Fiduciary Fund Account. As to the interests on
Fiduciary deposits, Reyes did not present any explanation.
The audit team then evaluated said explanation and it found that the
delayed remittances resulted to loss of interests that should have
otherwise been earned had the collections been deposited promptly to
their respective fund accounts. Lack of provision for transportation
expenses is a lame excuse for non-remittance of collections, since
personal money spent for a valid undertaking would be subject to
reimbursement. Reyes should also have immediately remitted the
aforesaid interests to the proper fund account on the day they were
withdrawn. After a thorough review and evaluation of the case, the OCA
recommended that Reyes be directed to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for the
interest that should have been earned and deposit the same to the SAJF
Account. Reyes was likewise sternly warned that a repetition of her failure
to promptly remit the courts collections to their respective fund accounts
in the future would be dealt with more severely.
For failing to submit the courts monthly financial reports to the Revenue
Section, Accounting Division, Financial Management Office (FMO), OCA,
Reyess salaries were withheld in February 2009. These were, however,
subsequently released in November 2010 upon her compliance with the
directives of said office.
Thereafter, Reyes was directed to comment to another OCA Memorandum

dated April 16, 2012 with regard to the audit teams examination of her
books of accounts for April 1, 2009 to October 31, 2011 and December 2,
2011 to January 6, 2012. Reyes was required to explain the shortages she
incurred amounting to P217,869.40, partial unremitted collections of
P112,175.00, unauthorized withdrawal of P82,755.00 from the Municipal
Treasurers Office (MTO) of Bani in May 2005, late issuances of several
Official Receipts in December 2011, and delayed remittances of
collections of the JDF, FF, SAJF, General Fund (GF), STF, and MF for the
years 2009 to 2011. She was also directed to deposit the total amount of
P217,869.40 but she was only able to settle P35,110.00, still leaving a
deficit of P182,759.40. As to the unauthorized withdrawal of P82,755.00,
Reyes explained that she withdrew the amount upon instruction of
Emmanuel R. Odero, former Sheriff IV of the Alaminos RTC and Officer-inCharge, in order for the latter to remit the same to the SC Account. But
when she gave the money to Odero, the official receipt was also left with
him. For the late issuances of receipts, Reyes merely blamed this to the
confusion and harried minds brought about by the holidays. However, she
failed to justify the incurred shortages and delayed remittances of
collections.
From the audit report and investigation, the OCA recommended that
Reyes be dismissed from the service for gross neglect of duty, dishonesty
and grave misconduct, with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service,
including government-owned and controlled corporations. It also ordered
her to deposit any remaining balance of the shortages and penalties
within one (1) month from receipt of the Courts Resolution, after the
money value of her leave credits shall have been applied to her
accountabilities. Further, it imposed a fine of P5,000.00 for the nonremittance and delayed deposit of court collections, and a penalty of
P1,437.28 for the loss of interest that should have been earned had the
collections been immediately remitted.
Issue: Whether Reyes be dismissed from the service for gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct, with forfeiture of all benefits
except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the
government service, including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
SC: Yes.
The Court affirms the findings and recommendations of the OCA. Reyes
should thus be held administratively liable for gross neglect of duty,
dishonesty, and grave misconduct.
After her salaries were released, Reyes was not only late in her deposits,

she had also ceased remitting her collections beginning July 2011 and
resumed her non-submission of financial reports to the FMO, OCA. If not
for the emergency audit of her accounts at the Bani MTC on January 9,
2012, her continuous abuse of authority as an accountable officer of the
court would have gone unnoticed. Reyes also failed to present any proof
that the court ordered her to withdraw the amount of P82,755.00 from the
Bani MTO in May 2005.
The undeposited collections and delayed remittances resulted to loss of
interests that should have accrued had the collections been deposited
promptly to their respective fund accounts. Under Section 3-C of the JDF
and SAJF procedural guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, as
amended, dated August 20, 2004, the daily remittance of JDF and SAJF
collections is required. In relation to this, Section 4 of OCA Circular No.
50-95 provides that all collections from bailbonds, rental deposits and
other Fiduciary collections shall be deposited by the Clerk of Court
concerned, within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof with the
Landbank of the Philippines. Indubitably, Reyes violated the trust reposed
upon her as a collecting officer of the judiciary. The Court cannot tolerate
non-submission of financial reports, non-reporting and non-deposit of
collections, undue delay in the deposit of collections, unauthorized
withdrawal, and non-explanation of incurred shortages and undeposited
collections. Reyes failed to fully settle her deficit in the court funds
despite the ample time given to her to do so. The request for an
extension of time to be able to come up with the amount needed is
merely a delaying tactic to evade full responsibility for the violation
committed.
Said infractions certainly constitute gross negligence, dishonesty, and
grave misconduct which are serious offenses that deserve the penalty of
dismissal under Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases. Failure to completely settle her accountability may
likewise give rise to criminal liability.

Topic: Conflicting interests

Ponente: Perlas- Bernabe, J.
Wilfredo Anglo v. Atty. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, et al., A.C. No. 10567,
February 25, 2015
Facts: Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law
Office(law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De
La Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2)
consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty.
Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent
complainant. On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft
was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural
Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a certain Michael Villacorta
(Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was represented by the law firm, the
same law office which handled complainants labor cases. Aggrieved,
complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents, alleging that
they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR.
Respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law
Office, but explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but
one that is subject to certain "arrangements." According to them, each
lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for the maintenance of
the entire office; and expenses for cases, such as transportation, copying,
printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer separately,
allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees
exclusively. As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the
other lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled
collaboratively. Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the
law firm since its inception. They averred that complainants labor cases
were solely and exclusively handled by Atty. Dionela and not by the entire
law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified theft case
filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Pealosa, a new associate who
had no knowledge of complainants labor cases, as he started working for
the firm after the termination thereof. IBP Commissioner found
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and
recommended that they be reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of
Atty. Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.
The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases
by the respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty.
Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as
respondents, through Atty. Pealosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms,

created a connection that would injure complainant in the qualified theft

case. Moreover, the termination of attorney-client relation prov
ides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client.
Issue: Whether respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
SC: Yes.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The
prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste;
the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested
by mere expiration of professional employment.

Topic: Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

ANTONINA S. SOSA vs ATTY. MANUEL V. MENDOZA
A.C. No. 8776; MAR 23, 2015
BRION, J.:

FACTS:
Ms. Sosa alleged that on July 28, 2006, she extended a loan of
P500,000.00 to Atty. Mendoza at an interest of P25,000.00 to be paid not
later than September 25, 2006. They agreed that a penalty or collection
charge of 10% per month shall accrue in case of default.
To ensure the payment of the obligation, Atty. Mendoza signed a
promissory note and issued a postdated check for P500,000.00.
Atty. Mendoza failed to comply with his obligation on due date. Upon
demand to pay, he requested Ms. Sosa not to deposit the postdated
check. She acceded and deferred the deposit of the check based on Atty.
Mendozas promise that he would later pay. The check was subsequently
returned/dishonored after Ms. Sosa finally deposited it sometime in
October 2006; it was Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Ms. Sosa then
obtained the services of a lawyer, Atty. Ernesto V. Cabrera, to legally
address Atty. Mendozas failure to pay.
On January 11, 2010, Atty. Cabrera sent a letter to Atty. Mendoza
demanding payment of the loan plus interest and collection charges. Atty.
Mendoza ignored the demand letter despite receipt, as proven by the
Registry Receipt and Registry Return Receipt. Likewise, he did not, in any
manner, contact Ms. Sosa to explain why he failed to pay.
In view of the repeated failure of Atty. Mendoza to pay, Ms. Sosa
filed the complaint for disbarment or suspension, charging Atty. Mendoza
for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Mendoza from the practice of law
for six (6) months, likewise ordering him to return the amount of the debt
with legal interest.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Mendoza is liable not only administratively but also civilly.

RULING:
NO.
While the Supreme Court agreed with the punishment meted out by
the IBP, it differed with its recommendation ordering Atty. Mendoza to pay
the amount of the loan plus legal interest.
The case is solely an administrative complaint for disbarment and is
not a civil action for collection of a sum of money. The administrative
complaint only requires substantial evidence to justify a finding of liability,
while a civil action requires greater evidentiary standard of
preponderance of evidence.
A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford
no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted
solely for the public welfare.

Topic: Disbarment
Jessie T. Campugan and Robert Torres v. Atty. Federico Tolentino,
Jr. et al.;
and
Jessie Campugan and Robert Torres v. Atty. Constantine Caluya, Jr.
et al.
A.C. No. 8261 and A.C. No. 8725; March 11, 2015
DECISION: BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS:
Atty. Victorio, Jr. is the counsel of the complainants Campugan and
Torres in a civil action for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-290546, impleading defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort,
Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused the
annotation on the title their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the
notice of lis pendens. Complainants alleged that the property covered by
the subject TCT was inherited by them from their parents, nevertheless, it
was unlawfully registered under the name of defendants. During the
pendency of the trial, both parties entered into an amicable settlement
which caused the dismissal of the case. The annotation in the title was
later on cancelled pursuant to letter-request appearing to be filed by Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., counsel of defendants. Feeling aggrieved by their discovery,
the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr.
despite their having paid him for his professional services, the
complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They
submitted that the cancellation resulted from the connivance and

conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the
taking advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by
respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the
acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Hence, they filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Victorio, Jr., Atty.
Cunanan, Atty. Quilala and Atty. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court
order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the complaint for disbarment should prosper.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held that it is a well entrenched rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as
an officer of the Court. However, it appears in this case that the officers of
the Registry of Deeds merely acted on their ministerial duty in the
cancellation of the annotation. In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, the
Court underscores that: x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous
or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but
a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether
the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
With respect to the conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, such was not established by clear and convincing evidence. The
records indicated their own active participation in arriving at the amicable
settlement. Even assuming that the lawyers initiated and participated in
the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong herein because
pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if
it will admit of a fair settlement. Anent the complainants charge of
abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., his assistance resulted to a fair
settlement, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his
legal fees. The complainants did not show any unfaithfulness. Therefore,
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any
other matters subsequent to the termination of civil case, unless there is
a stipulation to the contrary. The Law Profession did not burden its
members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence,

the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between

the attorney and the client.

Topic: Lawyers Liability

Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe
Shirley Olayta-Camba v. Atty. OtilloSyBongon
Facts: In her complaint, complainant alleged that on March 1, 2000, she
engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of titling and/or
reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late
BernabeOlayta, situated in the Municipalities of Camalig and Guinobatan,
both in the province of Albay. In connection therewith, she claimed to
have given the aggregate amount of P112,499.55 to respondent, broken
down as follows: (a) P20,000.00 as partial payment for legal services; (b)
P162.00 as payment for certification fees; (c) P5,000.00 as advance
payment for the reconstitution of titles; (d) P30,000.00 as payment for
land taxes and titling of properties; (e) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; (f)
P19,337.55 as payment for documentary stamps on the estate of
BernabeOlayta; and (g) P28,000.00 as payment for Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) Taxes. Despite the foregoing, respondent failed to update
complainant regarding the status of the matters referred to him. Thus,
complainant terminated her engagement with respondent and demanded
for the return of P112,499.55, but to no avail. Hence, she filed the instant
complaint before the Court.

In his defense, respondent asserts, inter alia, that he only received

P55,000.00 and that the rest of the money was received by a certain
Rowena Delos Reyes-Kelly who was not an employee of his law firm.
Further, respondent averred that he had already offered to return the
amount of P30,000.00 to complainant, claiming that he already earned
the fees for legal services in the amount of P20,000.00 for having studied
the matter entrusted to him and drafted the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
(Deed) that underwent several revisions.
The Court, in a Resolution dated August 15, 2011, referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation dated April 17, 2013, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule
16.01 and Rule 16.03,Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed
engaged respondents services, and that the latter received legal fees in
connection therewith. Despite this, respondent did not perform his
undertaking in accordance with the engagement and likewise failed to
return complainants money despite demands. The foregoing acts were
deemed to be in violation of the lawyers oath, as well as the CPR, thus,
rendering respondent administratively liable for the same. However, in
view of respondents old age, his condition of having undergone a triple
heart bypass surgery, and considering that this is his first offense, the
Investigating Commissioner opted to mitigate the administrative penalties
imposed upon respondent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for the acts complained of.
Ruling: After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with
the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such clients cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether
he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18of the CPR.
As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner,
complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of titling

and/or reconstituting the titles to the real estate properties of the late
BernabeOlayta, as well as preparing the Deed, and in connection
therewith, allegedly gave various amounts to respondent, of which the
latter admitted the receipt of only P55,000.00. Despite the foregoing,
respondent failed to comply with his undertaking and offered the excuse
that the reconstitution of the titles and the preparation of the Deed were
delayed due to the Deeds several revisions; and that BernabeOlaytas
surviving heirs were living in different places, making it difficult to secure
their presence, much less obtain their signatures to the said Deed.
Furthermore, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03,
Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P55,000.00
that he personally received from complainant despite repeated demands.
Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned
immediately to the client. As such, a lawyers failure to return the money
to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed
on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employmentand, hence, must be disciplined
accordingly.