History and Philosophy of Psychology

Part II Philosophy of Psychology

basic problems, concepts and issues in the philosophy of science and the
philosophy of mind
relevant for psychologists
Theoretical issues in psychology
I.

II.

What is science?
- Theory of science (Ch. 1, 2)
epistemology, arguments, theories, explanation
- Philosophy of science (Ch. 3, 4)
demarcation, relativism
- Sociology of science (Ch. 5)
What is the mind?
Philosophy of mind (Ch. 6, 7, 8)
mind-body, reduction, computer model

Philosophy of Science/Mind
issues:
1. Objective or human and fallible? Relativism?
- Objective: positivism
- Relativism (social constructionism)
2. Psychology: reducible to neuroscience, or autonomous science?
(Hobbes, Helmholtz Churchland)
Philosophy of science

Reflecting on characteristics science: science vs. speculation/superstition

- E.g., astrology vs. astronomy?
- (demarcation) criteria: onderscheid science en pseudo science
Objectivity, rationality, truth?
- History of science: all theories partly wrong
pessimist induction: problem for objectivity of science

Issue 1: demarcation

Demarcation pseudo/science:
- Science guarantees objectivity and truth, against superstition
(bijgeloof) and propaganda (positivism)
- Demarcation criterion for genuine (echte) science
Philosophy of science
- Focus on objectivity in: positivism, realism, foundationalism, objectivism
- Focus on subjective/social (human, fallible, prejudiced, irrational) in:
relativism (Kuhn/Feyerabend, social constructionism, sociology of
science CH. 4 & 5)

College 8 (1): Introduction, theory of science

Chapter 1
1

Theory of science; basic ideas of scientific method (Ch. 1)

Views on the sources and justification of knowledge
epistemologie: een richting in de filosofie die zich bezighoudt met
bewerngen over kennis
(2 opvattingen: realisme en idealism/relativisme)
Realism
Idealism
Mind-independent world,
World exists only in our mind
pictured in representations and
- Focus on subjective mind
theories
(or group)
- Focus on objective world,
Knowledge is constructing
mirrored in mind
Subjective, realism
- Knowledge is representing
Truth is coherence
- Objective
(theories are truth if they are
- Truth is correspondence
consistent with rest of our
(theories are truth if they
knowl.)
correspond with nature)
- Statement fits in theory
- Statements corresponds with
facts, picture: copy theory of
truth
Problem: Gods eye view
Problem: subjective,
relativist
How to verify (controleren)
World no more than
dream?
correspondence? (je kan niet uit wereld)
No way to get
outside theory
(Kant: Ding an Sich)
(Berkeley)
Problem for realism: Gods eye view
how to compare world with theory?

No way to get out of theory to access world directly

(except God?)
Hillary Putnam (pragmatic realism)
the mind and the world jointly make up the mind
and the
world (cf Kant)

Realism, idealism, pragmatism

Pragmatism

Knowledge as coping, successful adaptation: interaction of subjective &

objective factors
Knowledge is functional, adaptive activity (evolution)
Theory/knowledge as instrument; interests and goals
Truth is success in experiment and practice
truth is practically, experientially successful
Alternative for representational (correspondence) theory of truth

Realism

World exist knower-independent

Objective
Knowledge is pictures the objective world (representing)
Truth is correspondence between knowledge and world

Relativism (an extreme version: idealism)

World is (partly) constructed by the knower (subject)

Subjective
Knowing is constructing
Truth is coherence with the rest of knowledge, or consensus with group
(Kuhn paradigm)

Everyday knowledge and scientific knowledge

Wilfred Sellar made the classical distinction between the manifest and the
scientific image
(concept of man in the world)
On the one hand there is the image of refined categories of common sense
On the other hand the image in term of postulated underlying reality
These often seem in conflict, each claiming to be the true and complete
account of man
1. Het manifeste beeld is echt (dagelijks), wetenschappelijk beeld is een
afgeleide manier om het te beschrijven
2. Het wetenschappelijke beeld is echt, manifeste beeld is een
verschijning daarvan
Sellars said that both are real, for realizing that science if not finished but
might progress and recreate in its own terms the concept of the manifest
image
the relation between science and common sense is a continuum, in the
sense that
scientific methods are restricted and regimented outgrowth of human
praxis
Characteristics of scientific knowledge
wetenschap is georganiseerde common sense (Nagel): kenmerken
wetenschappelijke kennis
1. Systematic (coherent, logical)

 Ideally formalized, mathematically or logically computable system

(Newton);
at least coherent: inference ticket (prediction by deduction)
Taxonomy, natural kinds
Well-defined domain
Unification: same laws everywhere, ideally
2. Well-defined methods (methodisch)
Regulated by norms and prescriptions (e.g., data-analysis, p-values)
Methods determine what counts as legitimate questions and valid data
and acceptable explanations (e.g., behaviorism: only S-R)
3. Reduction to more basic level, underlying causes
Underlying causes explain macro-phenomena
Reducing to more basic theories (e.g. atomic structure explains chemical
reactions)
Reductionism: nothing but: ideology that everything can be explained
by physics, and there is nothing but matter in motion
4. Objective: testable
Objectivity is relative, not detached from human context;
i.e., inter-subjective, verifiable
Clear and unambiguous (ondubbelzinnig geformuleerd)
5. Revisable
Anti-dogmatic: open, nooit definitief
Falllibilism (Popper)
Science vs. common sense
common sense vs. the scientific worldview

Eddingtons two tables

- Visible table: solid, color, size, weigt
vs. molecular (space with protons/neutrons/electrons)
- What is the real table
What is real? Common sense illusory?
- E.g. Freud: illusion of rationality, really dark desires
- E.g. altruism in evolutionary psychology: really selfish gene
manifest vs. scientific image (Sellars)
- Visbible vs. underlying and explanatory (e.g. water H2O; depression
dopamine)
- Sellars: both in stereoscopic view
Gradual difference: more methodical, etc.

Scientific vs. common sense knowledge

Methodical: scientific vs. common sense knowledge gradual difference

in:
- Reliability
- Generality
Common sense is local, limited application, rules of the thumb
Science in principle, potentially universal, conditions of application
are explicit
Continuum: science is organized common sense

Arguments; justifying knowledge

4

Induction: generalizing from observations

from individual observations to general statements
- Not formalisable in logic
- No certainty in generalisations (geen zekerheid in generalisaties)
No logical certainty, but new knowledge
(example: lots of swans were observed, all were white, maybe all
swans are white)

Deduction: deducing from general law

from general statements to individual statement
- Logical certainty, formalization
- Argumenten moeten valide zijn en de premissen moeten kloppen
Logical certainty; because conclusion contained in premises: no new
knowledge
(example: all humans are mortal, Socrates is human, so Socrates is
mortal

Abduction: inference to the best explanation

- Finding the best hypotheses
- Soort terugredeneren
No logical certainty, new hypothetical knowledge about causes
(example: All CJD patients ate beef, beef may be the cause of CJD)

Problem of induction

Every generalization can be disconfirmed by a new observation:

all swans are white until
- No certain knowledge, therefore no laws (Hume: no more than habit)
Even worse: induction and confirmation cannot be formalized, no logically
compelling methodologically sound rules for induction
je hebt categorien nodig voor je kunt beginnen aan inductie, maar de
vorming van
categorien gebeurt juist door inductie
- turquoise swans are not swans (but flamingos) or are they? Black
swans?
- Taxonomy and natural kinds: whale is mamal, not fish
- E.g.: raven paradox: (x) (fx > gx) = (x) (-gx > -fx)
Induction is generalizing over observation uninteresting?
- Bacon - empiricism: listing facts, drawing generalisations
- Hume: induction problem, no certainty
- Popper: uninteresting, more of the same, better bold conjectures
(vermoedens)

Justification vs. discovery

Classical philosophy of science
sharp divide between:

Context of justification: proofs, justifying hypotheses; methodological

rules and norms
(focus op normatieve criteria die een theorie kunnen rechtvaardigen)
normative: how science should be done
5

Context of discovery: generating hypotheses, creativity, psychological

processes, social circumstances (focus op beschrijving van historische,
sociale, psychologische factoren die relevant waren bij de ontdekking)
descriptive: how science is done
- Sociology, psychology of science

Modern philosophy of science:

Discovery and justification cannot be clearly distinguished

norms change with history and context (pragmatism, Kuhn)
Heuristics: finding rules, guidelines, for discovery (vergelijk abduction)
- E.g., natural selection as principle

Facts and theories

Theories (coherent set of statements) indispensable

(onmisbaarr/noodzakelijk):
- Standard terms for description (e.g., CS, CR, UCS, UCR; testscores)
- Theory: coherent, unifying (inference ticket = gevolgtrekking)
- Prediction = explanation; testable
- unobservables: many scientific concepts are unobservable (energy
IQ)
connecting observations by theory
- Facts: there is no such thing as pure observation
theory-ladenness: theory influences observation
- Strict distinction between fact and theory impossible
more like a hierarchy from factual to theoretical statement
Theories, laws and data: hierarchy of language levels from (more)
factual to (more) theoret.
1. Theories: a deductive system of related statements
Partly unobservable, connected with correspondence rules to
observations
2. Experimental laws: single statements about invariant relation
between concepts, inductive generalizations (empirische generalisatie)
Moet ook standhouden onder niet onderzochte omstandigheden
(counterfactual)
Empirische generalisatie: bij observeerbare feiten
Theoretische wetten: onobserveerbare feiten
3. Assigning numeric values to concepts (e.g. P = 1.2, V = 3.2, where
P is pressure and V =..)
4. Primary data: observations (e.g. instrument readings)
- Higher = more theoretical, general, predictive
- Lower = data, visualizing the model
- The lowers levels interpret the higher levels, connect theory and data
and they provide visualisable or conceptual models
- Correspondence rules connect theoretical notions with measurement
operations
(e.g. P is the reading of a manometer)

Empirical cycle
1. Observation
6

2. Induction, abductie
hypothesis: generalization (theorie, law)
3. Deducing a prediction from a theory
may require operationalization: defining concepts as measurement
operations (IQ)
4. Testing hypothesis
observation = confirmation or disconfirmation
5. Evaluation 2. Hypothesis: revised theory

discovery in 1,2,5
justification in 3,4
Induction is conjecture, no methodological prescriptions
Explaining = predicting = deducing from a theory
Operationalization: defining a concept as a measurement operation
(intelligence = IQ test)
sometimes necessary stage in hypothesis testing
Testing and evaluation are theory-laden
rejecting or revising hypotheses depends on the interpretation of the
data, and revisions
in the theory and background assumptions (dis/confirmations is not
absolute)
- Quine-Duhem thesis: theory underdetermined by data, changing
background assumptions may salvage a theory in the face of
disconfirming data

Science characteristics

Proving explanations for observations (data)

- Theories about causes
- Reduction microstructural explanation
Experiments: leading to confirmation or falsification
- Intervention and manipulation (not only observation)
Unification: connecting theories
Taxonomy: natural kinds, cutting nature at its joins

Voorwaarden voor causale wetten

veel wetten zijn niet causaal
1. Er moet een relatie zijn tussen oorzaak en gevolg
oorzaak moet een noodzakelijk en voldoende conditie zijn voor het
effect
2. Oorzaak en gevolg moeten in hetzelfde ruimtelijke domein liggen, of ze
moeten verbonden zijn in de ruimte
3. De oorzaak moet voorafgaan aan het gevolg en het gevolg moet kort
daarna plaatsvinden
4. De relatie moest assymetrisch zijn: het n veroorzaak het ander
Summary checklist

Realism, relativism, pragmatism

Truth, knowledge
7

Systematicity, unification;
- Objectivity, revisability
- Explanation prediction
- Reduction
Common sense vs. science
manifest scientific image
Induction, deduction, abduction
- Induction problem
Theory-ladeness
- Fact-theory hierarchy
Justification discovery
Empirical cycle

College 9 (2): Kinds of explanation

Chapter 2
Kinds explanation

Three kinds of explanation

er zijn verschillende manieren om theorien en feiten te verifiren
(controleren)
1. Nomological explanation (explain by law: D-N model)
2. Hermeneutic understanding
3. Functional explanation
Explaining is an answer to a why question
1. Subsuming under a general law
2. Understanding meaning for a subject, empathy
3. Show function of a trait (what trait is for)

Deductive-nomological (lawful) explanation

objectieve & rigoureuze verklaring , vooral geschikt voor harde wetenschap
(natuurkunde)

Deductive-nomological model: explanation is subsumption under

covering law
show how a phenomenon is an instance of a general law
- Volgens dit model is een verklaring pas wetenschappelijk als het aan
bepaalde normen van logica voldoet
Deduction of a statement describing a fact from a general (formalized) law
+ boundary conditions
- E.g., copper expands when heated; this piece of mental copper;
therefore it expands
- E.g., learning as instance of laws of association
D-N (deductive-nomological) explanation:
- Explaining = deducing from law (L) + boundary conditions (C)
explanandum deduced from explanans

De gebeurtenis die een verklaring vereist (explanandum), moet

doormiddel van deductive verklaard kunnen worden door een algemene
wet (explanans/ covering law)
L: covering law: general law of nature

L1 , Ln: set van algemene wetten

C1 ,Cm: set van specifieke condities
E: verklaring

Problems with nomological explanation

Problem with D-N model: not every deduction is a real explanation

- E.g.: flagpeople shadow derived from its length and the position of the
sun
but also vice versa
Problem with D-N model in social sciences
- Motives not causes, reasons not laws (Dilthey)
het model verklaart niet hoe algemene wetten gevonden moeten
worden, waardoor
het probleem van inductie blijft bestaan
- Interpreting behavior, not objective description
vs. observaties zijn niet neutral maar theory laden (theorie benvloed
observatie)
Common sense beschrijvingen zijn subjectief door context en de
daaruit vs. volgende interpretaties
hierdoor zijn de explanandum & explanans niet logisch
onafhankelijk
Vergelijk behaviorism: objective R, conditioning laws

Problems with D-N in social sciences

Geertz: in social sciences thick description, description of behavior as

meaningful in context, mixing observation and interpretation/explanation
meer dan een passieve registratie, ook cultuur en de daarbij horende
betekenisstructuren
spelen een rol (hermeneutic understanding)
- Eye blink (objective behavior, muscle contraction) vs. wink (meaningful
action in context
thick description)
9

E.g., iniation rite: only understandable in nexus of meanings, form of

life of trible

De rol van voorspelbaarheid, waarschijnlijkheid en pseudoverklaringen

Empirical content (mate van voorspelbare informative) is belangrijk

criterium goede theorie
- Empirical support komt voort uit het testen van een theorie
- De premisen van een model zijn vaak niet volledig zeker waardoor
statistische kans een rol gaat spelen en de theorie minder betrouwbaar
wordt
Binnen de sociale wetenschappen komen pseudoverklaringen vaak voor
lijken een observatie te verklaren, maar doen dit in werkelijkheid niet
- Voorbeeld Molier: Waarom werkt opium slaapverwekkend? Omdat het
een kracht bezit die je tot slapen brengt

Hermeneutic understanding

Verstehen (Dilthey)
in tegenstelling tot verklren (nomological explanation)
Understanding and explicating human actions and texts
persons as texts
Hermeneutic circle: interpretatie gaat heen en weer tussen brede
achtergrond en specifieke details (een test kan bijdragen aan het begrijpen
van de persoonlijkheid van een patient, maar om de test te interpreteren is
wel enige kennis van de patient nodig)
Understanding vs. nomological explanations
- Web of meaning in context vs. disconnected facts
- Individual meaning vs. general laws
- Actions in context vs. physical movements
- Understanding meaning vs. prediction and control
- Intentional: motives, reasons, intentions vs. causes

Explanation vs. understanding

Explanation
- Natural science
- Events
- Causes
- Causal laws
- Objective
- Generalizing
- Facts

Understanding
- Human/social
science
- Actions
- Reasons, motives
- Meanings
- Intersubjective
- Unique
- Experience

Continuum
In psychology
- Nomological explanatory psychology: experimental, biological
psychology
- verstehende hermeneutic psychology: non-directive (Rogerian)
therapy, psycho-anal.
10

Solution: explanation-understanding continuum

- No complete objectivity in hard science: theory-ladenness, facts under
interpretation
- Hermeneutic psychology partly objective: protocol, questionnaire;
measuring therapy eff

In het 2e deel van de 19e eeuw onstond een methodestrijd tussen

naturwissenschaften en geisteswissenschaften
- Natuurwetenschappen zochten naar algemene wetten en generalisatie
(nomothetic)
- Mensenwetenschappen zochten naar begrip voor specifieke
gebeurtenissen (ideograph.)

Functional, teleological explanation

function: what a trait does, which goal it serves (teleological)

Functional explanation: function of a trait explains why it is there (hart:

pumping blood)
verklaring die zegt wat iets doet i.p.v. wat iets is: kijkt naar functie,
werking en ontwerp
- Kijkt niet naar algemene wetten of voorspellingen
Alternative for nomological causal explanation: functions does not fit into
the D-N model
Teleologie: leer waarin beweerd wordt dat alle dingen een doel hebben
- Controversile leer: de Aristotelian view waarin beweerd wordt dat de
natuur het intrinsieke doel bepaald (steen is zwaar en wil terug naar
grond), is circulair en terugwerkend in de tijd
- Ondanks de controversie wordt de leer vaak gebruikt in de biologie
hier wordt ook vaak gesproken van adaoptionisme: natuurlijke
selectie als enige
oorzaak van een kenmerk van een organisme (is een foute
redernering aangezien in
werkelijkheid kenmerken vaak een bijproduct zijn van het design/
berusten op toeval
Typical for biology (adaptation, functions selected in evolution) and
evolutionary psychology (function of consciousness, stereo-vision,
jealousy)
Problems with functional explanation: possibly pseudo-explanation,
circular, trivial
if a traits exists then because it must be adaptive
Panglossian: matre Pangloss (Voltaire): best of all possible worlds
(Gould & Lewontin)

2 soorten functies
1. Functionele psychologie is causal en kijkt naar welke bijdrage een
eigenschap aan het hele systeem levert

11

In psychology: function of mental capacities, what these do, causal role

vergelijk James on consciousness

2. Evolutionaire psychologie kijkt waarin een bepaalde functie is

geselecteerd
- Evolutionary psychology: cognition, emotions, jealousy, perception, etc.
Selected for survival (in hunter-gatherer society)
Explained in terms of adaptive function (in environment of
evolutionary selection)
Functionalism in philosophy of mind: mind as function
functionalism: philosophical view on the nature of mental processes (Ch. 6,7)

Functionalisme: theorie die de geest (mind) ziet als function of virtuele

machine
Mental processes as functional organization of an abstract machine
(computer, brain, robot)
- Mentale staat als koppelaar van perceptive en gedrag
Causal role between input and behavior
- De mentale rol heeft daarmee een causale rol voor het verbinden van
input en output
Functional explanation, explains behavior
- E.g. hunger
- E.g. information processing, flow charts in cognitive psychology explain
memory, attention

Functionalism in philosophy of mind: no reduction

Multiple realization: a function can be realized in different kinds of

material substrate; mental functions, e.g., thinking in computers or brains
verschillende mechanismen kunnen dezelfde causale rol hebben
- De computational theory of mind komt voort uit het functionalism
en bestudeert cognitie als een abstracte machine
- Volgens Cummins deelt de functional explanation functies onder in
subfuncties (geheugen verklaren a.d.h.v. LTM, STM en werkgeheugen)
functies passen vaak in hirarchie waarbij de functies hoger in rang,
complexer zijn
Every function materially realized (no dualism, no disembodied minds)
But in different ways (no single mind-brain mapping) therefore no
reduction

Multiple realization: no reduction

multiple realization: many mind-brain relations

12

Three kinds of explanation

why questions
1. Because D-N: instance of general laws (causes)
2. Because Hermeutics: meaningful, rational (in context) reasons/motives
3. Because function: what a process/property does
- Selected function (evolutionary psychology)
- Designed function (computer metaphor)
Overzicht van de verklaringstypen

Reduction and levels of explanation

Reductionism: nothing but matter in motion

- Problem: ignores organization higher level
higher-order pattern not to be found in molecules
- Verschil reduction & reductionalism
Reduction: verklaren van macrofenomeen d.m.v. micofenomenen
Reductionalism: filosofische positive waarin gesteld wordt dat alles
te reduceren zou zijn naar basis fysica
Pluralism: several kinds of explanation and scientific domains may coexist
contra reductionism
2 belangrijke aspecten van reductive: kijk op de wereld & op theorien
Reduction in D-N model: theory reduction

13

Theory reduction: reductive stelt dat de complexe dingen in de

wereld aggregaten zijn van simple dingen end at alle theorien terug te
voeren zijn naar basis wetenschap
Theory deduces from more basic theory + boundary conditions
Sociology psychology neurophysiology biochemistry
(complex
simple)
unified science (positivism): single kind of explanation (most basic,
ideal physics)
Complexity assumption: aanname waarin wordt beweerd dat alle dingen
begrepen kunnen worden door hun bestanddelen
Newton: alles kan begrepen worden door bewegende deeltjes (Laplaces
dream)
Nothing buttery perspectief: alles kan verklaard worden door
wetenschap
elke reductie leidt hier tot eliminatie
- Er kan ook beweerd worden dat het de legitimiteit van de concepten
blijft bestaan
(pijn hangt samen met neurofysiologische pijn en pijn verwijst dus naar
2 dingen)
Eddington illustreerde dit probleem a.d.h.v. 2 tafels:
1. Wetenschappen
2. Dagelijkse gebeurtenissen
de echte tafel is de wetenschappelijke, de andere is illusive (niet
verbindbaar)

Theory reduction
Theory reduction: higher level theory deduced from basic theory plus
bridge laws
- Het klassieke theorie reductie model stelt dat een higher level theory
bestaat uit lower level theories (een complexe theorie kan afgeleid
worden uit een simple)
Bridge laws connect theories, identify terms between higher and lower
level theories
(e.g. temperature is average kinetic energy of gas molecules)
- Een higher level law wordt hierin gezien als een lower level law samen
met boundary conditions (specifieke condities waaronder de wet geldt)
E.g., deduction of thermodynamics (T, V, T of a gas) from statistical
mechanics (kinetic energy of gas molecules)
Nagel stelde 2 voorwaarden aan theorie reductive
1. Deducibility: een theorie moet af zijn en geformaliseerd
2. Connectability: theorien moeten verbonden kunnen worden d.m.v.
bridge laws
In dit klassieke reductie model beperken nieuwe theorien de oude
theorien en maken ze meer begrijpelijk, waardoor theorien zich
ontwikkelen eliminatie vindt dus niet plaats

Problems with classical theory reduction

14

Meaning of central terms changes, old theory corrected: no bridge laws, no

connection between higher and lower level theories hence no reduction
possible
- Een probleem met dit model was dat in werkelijkheid bijna altijd
corrective plaatsvindt van de gereduceerde theorie (eliminatie vind dus
wel plaats
- Daarnaast komen bridge laws weinig voor omdat termen vaak niet
overeen komen
Classical reduction no good model, does not fit scientific development
no good examples in history of science
Classical theory reduction model fails

Responses to failure of classical reduction

non reductive materialism & eliminativism

Solution 1: autonomy (non-reduction)

- Autonomy for higher level (multiple realization = no reduction)
psychology has its own concepts and laws
Ziet psychology/ hogere niveaus als autonoom
Veranderingen in hogere niveaus (mind) vinden niet plaats zonder
veranderingen in lagere niveaus (hersenen) = supervience
Bridge laws komen volgens deze theorie niet voor door multiply
realized mentale processen (verschillende mechanismen hebben
dezelfde causale rol)
- Functionalism (Ch. 7 Fodor)
Solution 2: eliminativism (new wave reduction)
- Higher level theory abandoned
Oude theorie is foutief of niet complete en wordt gecorrigeerd of
volledig vervangen door de nieuwe theorie van een langer niveau
Hogere niveaus worden gelimineerd
- Psychology disappears, turns into neuroscience (Ch. 8 Churchland)
Psychologie word took gelimineerd

Reduction vs. elimination

Reduction: identification of higher level entities with lower level ones

- Retains ontology: the reduced phenomenon really exists (e.g. temp. is
kinetic energy)
- Problem: failed (no bridge laws, no reduction)
Elimination: replacing higher level entities and theories by lower level ones
- Replaces ontology: higher level entities do not really exist
e.g. neurospeak replaces pain, consciousness, meaning, etc.

Explanatory pluralism
reasons and causes

Problem: explaining or understanding behavior

- Behavior described as action (goal-directed, rational, motivated)
- Human science (DIlthey)

OR
15

Physical movements, caused mechanically?

Natural science (behaviorism)

Solution: several levels of description and explanation, coexisting in

parallel
humans both causal-physical and intentional
- Explanatory pluralism anti-reduction

Een vraag die gesteld kan worden is of reasons en caused van elkaar
verschillen en of we gedrag moeten verklaren op begrijpen
- De radicale materialisten (zoals Churchland) vonden dat reasons
voortkomen uit folk psychologie (dagelijks gebruikte common sense
psychologie, bestaande uit slechte theorien m.b.t. interne activeiten)
- Minder radicale materialisten (zoals Davidson) geloofden dat acties
voortkomen uit overtuigingen en verlangens
De oplossing ligt in het explanatory pluralism waarin er verschillende
niveaus van beschrijvingen en verklaringen bestaan
mensen zijn hierin zowel intentioneel als causaal

Checklist

Kinds of explanations
- D-N
- Hermeneutical
- Functional
Theory of reduction; eliminativism; autonomy
Functionalism, multiple realization
Explanatory pluralism, levels

College 10 (3): Logical positivism, demarcation and objectivity

Chapter 3.1 3.5
Philosophy of science: demarcation

Ch. 1, 2: Standard image of science, received view from Logical

Positvism
- Received view of science: positivism, empiricism, realism
manier van wetenschap bedrijven
- Objective facts, general laws
explanation = deriving from general law of nature
- Criteria for justification, knowledge, rationality
- Theory-observation distinction: theory tested against empirical data
observation assumed to be unproblematic
Ch. 3: Philosophical reflection on objectivity, observation/theory,
verifiability

16

Demarcation criterion: what distinguishes genuine science from

metaphysics speculation, superstition, pseudoscience, etc.
criterion for rationality
- Zou ook een algemeen cirterium voor wetenschappelijke methoden
kunnen zijn
- Kan ook gebruikt worden om vooruitgang (scientific progress) objectief
te maken
Positivism
- Logical positivism: verification is demarcation (proberen theorie te
bevestigen)
- Popper: falsification is demarcation (proberen theory onderuit te
halen)
Post-positivism
- Kuhn, Feyeraband: relativism, no demarcation
- Lakatos: demarcation only post-hoc

Logical positivism (1930 1960)

Wiener Kreis: Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath

legitimate knowledge consists of observation and logical
connections between them
- 1907 begin
- 1922 Schlick succeeds Mach
- 1935 Carnap USA
- 1936 Schlick murdered
- 1938 Neurath Oxford
Beginning of philosophy of science:
- What is science?
- justification, demarcation criterion for pseudo/science
Received view on objectivity, empirical data, laws, explanation (Ch. 1,2)

Impact logical positivism

Log Pos is source of the received view of objectivity, explanation,

reduction, etc.
D-N: explanation is deducing from a general law and boundary conditions
theories are formalized systems, so that statements can be deduced
from each other, this
systems support a deductive-nomological method; hypotheses can
be deductively
derived from the theory
- Theories logical framework, deduction
17

- Observation statements
Reduction and unified science: all higher level sciences reducible to
basic physics
- Only one kind of observations (objective, empirical)

Against speculation and metaphysics

Vienna early 20th century

- Hothouse of art, ideologies, speculative metaphysics (Freud)
- Successes in physics: theories about unobservables
(vs. Mach: only sense data)
Difference between unobservables and speculation?
Demarcation criterion?
Log Pos: foundationalism, quest for certainty
- Secure foundation of knowledge in empirical data, observation (cf.
Comte)
- Criteria for meaningful language

Demarcation

Logical positivism
- Empiricism, but unlike traditional (British) empiricism
Locke, Hume: language (propositions, statements)
- Only statements that can be translated in direct sensory observation
can be considered meaningful
- Meaning of a statement is the way it can be verified
(aantonen/controleren)
- Unverifiable terms (God, Nothing) are non-sense
Demarcation between science and metaphysics
(speculation) is verifiablility pseudo-science is unverifiable

Logisch postivisiten zagen observatie als beginpunt van de wetenschap.

Het probleem was dat aan het begin van de 20e eeuw, theoretische
overwegingen een grote rol gingen spelen, in plaats van empirische en
experimentele resultaten
logisch positivisten bedachten als oplossing dat alle wetenschappelijke
uitspraken
verifieerbaar moesten zijn
- Theoretische termen die niet direct observeerbaar waren (electron)
moeten logisch afgeleid worden van axomias: niet bewezen, maar als
grondslag aanvaarde stellingen
(maken deel uit van een deductief systeem: bewijs van andere
stellingen)
- De axomias zouden door correspondentie regels gekoppeld worden
aan empirische uitspraken. Deze correspondentie regels geven van
theoretische termen de (mogelijke) observaties aan
Volgens logisch positivisten was verifeerbaarheid een
demarcatiecriterium
beweringen die niet logisch gekoppeld konden worden aan observaties
waren niet waar

18

en dus niet wetenschappelijk

Demarcatie: een universele, a-historische manier van wetenschap

bedrijven (Wiener Kreis)
- Verifieerbaarheid is het demarcatie criterium
- Wetenschappelijke kennis komt voort uit zintuigelijke informatie
(empirisme)
- Theorische termen (unobservables) zijn mogelijk wanneer deze
gerelateerd kunnen worden aan observaties
- Observaties worden volgens de logisch positivisten gezien als feiten
neutraal observeren zou mogelijk zijn

Logical positivism: source of knowledge is observation + logic

- Observations, elementary facts represented in statements
- Formal logic relations between statements (deduction)
Neutral observation language: observation statement (Protokollsatz)
represents (beeld af) elementary fact (e.g., meter readings)
Strict divide between observation (= sense data) and theory (= logic,
mathematics)

Empiricism:
- Induction: collecting observations, hypothetical generalizations
- Cumulation: progress by collection facts (Bacon)
- Verification: empirical confirmation of hypotheses
een theorie die overeenstemt met observatie, is waar
- Confirmation: gradation of more or less empirical support
een theorie die overeenstemt met observatie, wordt bevestigd
unobservables indirectly verifiable
in theory connected with observation through logical connections (vs.
Mach)

Normative, justification

Prevent speculation (= metaphysics): meaningless and unverifiable

Philosophy of science is about norms, how should science be done
Context of justification (discovery is private, accidental, no subject for
philosophy)
strict logical, methodological and sound epistemological criteria
- The task of philosophy of science is, to explain how and why science is
successful, and to discover, protect and promote the permanent criteria
for sound scientific method
Rational reconstruction of inquiry as observation, deduction and
verification
not necessarily how research is actually done

Cumulating theory- independent facts

Sharp divide between 2 kinds of knowledge:

- Logical: tautological, no new knowledge a priori (Kant)
- Empirical: observations, new facts a posteriori
19

Theory is coherent logical empty system, slots filled with empirical facts
rules of deduction between facts: formal, tautological (zelfde zeggen
op andere manier),
Science is cumulative: progress is cumulating objective facts, theoryindependent
but: theory-ladenness
- Scientific progress is made by amassing empirical data and connection
these into logically structured theories (scientisim)
- Neutral observations are possible, and observations statements picture
elementary facts

Cognitive revolution: different kind of data

information processing not S-R : no cumulation

Example in psychology: behaviorism

- Elementary observations (stimuli and responses)
- Laws (conditioning) predict objective behavior
- learning operationalized as quantifiable behavior (Thorndike)
- Unobservables (e.g. drive) as hypothetical constructs in black box
- Carnap: Psychology in physicalisher Speech (1932)

Summary Logical Positvism

Elementary facts observation statements + logical connections

between them
- Neutral observation statement is picture of an elementary facts
(Protokollsatze)
- Theory is tautological, empty structure
Theoretical terms and unobservables only permissible if logically
connected with (translatable in) observation (theory determined by data)
- E.g. election; gen (recessive allel); unconscious; intelligence;
personality
Keeping unobservables, speculation, metaphysics, theorizing out of
science
only observation, logic

Logical positivism: problems and later developments

Log Pos fails because of problems with observation and verification

(Wittenstein, Quine, Sellars, Hanson)
Problems with Log Pos decisive for later development in the philosophy of
science
1. theory-ladenness: observation not theory-independent
Quine, Sellars
2. Demarcation and progress problematic: no verification/cumulation
Popper, Kuhn
3. Psychology is about meaningful action: objectivity not possible &
desirable
anti-positivism (social constructionism)

Problem 1: Observation and reference

20

Log Pos assumes:

- Theory neutral observation statements
- Statements can be verified against reality (correspondence)
- Meaning is reference (representation, picture)
- Verifiability (meaning = method of verification, unverifiable = nonsense)
But: there is no such thing as objective neutral observation, pictured in
observation, that can be the foundation of theories
Log Pos: observation statements depict (sense) data
vergelijk Hume, Mach: sensations, Empfindungen

Wilfrid Sellars (1912 1989): Myth of the Given (1963)

- Observation is not directly seeing inner sense data
- There is no such thing as indubitable directly given sense data as
basis of observation
our mental states are given, we can be directly aware of them
Deze given zijn niet direct observeerbaar, maar theorie-geladen
Verhalen van een ervaing zijn niet direct waargenomen
een beschrijving van een mentale gebeurtenisis is geen
verslag van wat er
gegeven (given) is, maar theoretish en empirisch
falsificeerbaar
- All knowledge is theoretical: not incorrigible, not self-evident, no
certainty
- Undermines positivist neutral observation language
het draait niet om observatie, sommige dingen weten we gewoon

W.V.O Quine (1908 2000)

- Two dogmas of empiricism (1951)
log pos has 2 dogmas (aannames/vaste leerstellingen)
1. Strict separation observation and theory, between fact and
logic
= the belief in some fundamental dichotomy between true
statements which are
analytic (explaining the meaning of their terms; a circle is round)
and truths which
are synthetic (informing about the world; this book has 10
chapters)
Analytic statements: merely about language, about definitions
and the meaning of words & a priori (we know the truth before
any data are in)
Synthetic statements: about state of affairs (their truth
depends on the world) & posteriori (can only be checked
empirically)
2. Every observation statement can be verified in isolation
from other statements
= the belief that each meaningful statement is in itself an
observation, a report of
immediate experience of the world, and that each of these can
21

be considered in
isolation of other statements (elementary facts)
Quine against dogmass
1. No sharp distinction between synthetic (empirical) and analytic
(theoretical); all knowledge theory-dependent
the meaning of or the definition of a term is not pre-existing and
pre-given, but is
grounded in usage and dependent on context
Pure neutral observation statements cannot exist
2. Single hypotheses cannot be unambiguously verified in isolation;
theory is holistic network, verified as a whole (theoretical holism)
an individual statement has no empirical content on its own,
words get their
meaning from their relations to other world
Epistemological (kennisleer) holism:
holisme: eigenschappen van een systeem kunnen niet wordden
verklaard door de
som van alleen zijn componenten te nemen
a. No knowledge is a priori and immune to empirical refutation
(weerlegging) and no knowledge is completely theory independent
b. In case of conflict between theory ad observation we cannot
summon certain statements in isolation; the whole system of beliefs
must stand to trail
(a priori kennis is niet mogelijk want kennis is niet theory
onafhankelijk)
So, theory is underdetermined by the facts; changing theoretical
assumptions can change impact of observations = Quine-Duhem
these
observations can be reconciled (overeenstemmen) with a theory in
many ways
Duhem: discrepant experimental results can be made fit
(changes in theory)
The evidence itself does not unambiguously either support a
hypothesis or lead to its rejection: theories are underdetermined
by evidence, data or observations
Verification requires some human judgement

Wittgenstein (1889 1951)

hield zich bezig met taalfilosofie en logica
- Log pos: meaning is picturing, representation is correspondence
between observation statement and elementary fact
Wittgenstein I: Abbildung, picture theory of meaning
= elementary states of affairs in the world are pictured in language
(wat er gebeurt in de wereld wordt uitgedrukt in taal en is eruit af
te leiden)
- Argument tegen het logisch positivisme van Wittgenstein: taal is een
instrument om social te communiceren, geeft geen beeld van
gebeurtenissen

22

But: Wittgenstein II: began to criticize the positivistic theory of

language
elementary facts and their truth cannot be tested or verifying
separately, but
propositions form an interconnected whole (language compared with
games)
Meaning belongs to form of life, language game
words and statements have meaning only within the language
game
(= an activity and the meaning of an element of the game is
displayed in the
actions, in the way it is used) and the rules of the game
determine how they can
be used
Language is a tool, meaning is the way it can be use: meaning is
use
finding the rules of the language game: theory of meaning
= words and sentences het their meaning in a context of social
exchange
(sentences are used as tools to command, to question)
aanval op positivistiche observatietaal
- Knowledge is inherently social, instrumental; not a representation
- Pragmatism, relativism ( social constructionism)
Thus: first phase was meaning is picturing objective facts and second
phase was meaning as use in practice (form of life)

Observation vs. theory

But: N.R. Hanson (1958): observations are theory-laden

we literally see things differently through a different theory; seeing =
interpreting
(eyes receive the same sensation, depends on their knowledge and
theories)
- The observation appears in a context of background knowledge
- E.g. two astronomers watching sunrise: look at the same thing, see
something diff
Tycho (geocentric) sees: sun rises
Kepler (heliocentric) sees: earth rises
- Because observation is theory-laden, science is not just a systematic
exposure to the world; it is also a way of thinking about the world, a
way of forming conceptions
theorien maken het mogelijk om dingen te observeren en brengen
zo een systeem
aan (men ziet de wereld hierdoor anders: niet objectief)
- Hanson criticized the deductive-nomological philosophy of
science: this system does
not tell us how laws are decided on in the first place

Summary - Problems log pos (1)

23

Observation is theory-laden, not given (Sellars)

Theoretical and observation statements cannot be separated (Quine
holism)
Language not only representation but form of life (Wittgenstein)
Verification of a theory against theory-independent, objective observation
(sense data) nog feasible
verification as demarcation criterion is nog going to work

Summary checklist

Demarcation
Logical positivism
- Verifiability as demarcation
- Dichotomy observations and logic/theory; a prior, a posteriori
- Statemtens picture reality
Sellars Myth of the Given
Quine: holism, no direct verification
Wittgenstein: meainig is use, not correspondence
Hanson theory-ladenness
Verfification as demarcation does not work

College 11 (4): Philosophy of science: Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos

Chapter 3.6 3.10
Problem 1 (log pos): Observation and reference
1. Observation: no pure elementary observation statements
- Sellars: sense data theoretical; not given
- Quine: no shard separation between observation and theory;
holism: hypotheses cannot be verified in isolation
- Hanson: observation always interpreted, theory-laden
- Wittgenstein II: meaning is use in language game social
Problem 2: Verification and falsification; problem of induction

Problem of induction (black swan)

verification impossible, confirmation never certain
- Verificatie: statement vergelijken met observatie demarcatie
criteria Log Pos
- Het is onmogelijk om generale wetten te verifiren (voldoende
empirisch bewijs te vinden), ze kunnen alleen bevestigd worden
(confirmatie: aantal observaties die je statement ondersteunen
Carnap v.d. Wiener Kreis)
Popper: but falsification is logically certain
a single observation may lead to rejection of a hypothesis
So: falsification is characteristic of genuine science
- Specify what would make a hypothesis false
falsificatie: laat zien dat een statement (voorspelling) onjuist is

24

Probleem met falsificaty (aangetoond door Kuhn en Lakatos):

wetenschappers wijzen hun theorie niet af als er tegenbewijs is (ze
maken ad hoc constructieve hypothesen)

The positivist Hans Reichenbach (1930)

The principle of induction is of supreme importance for scientific
method; it
determined the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it from science
would mean
nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide the truth
or falsity of its
theories. Science would no longer have the right to distinguish its
theories from the
fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poets mind.

Popper on the problem of induction (1959):

Many people believe that the truth of universal statements is
known by experience;
yet it is clear that an account of an experience, e.g. an observation,
can in the first
place be only a singular statement and not a universal one. And it
is far from obvious,
from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring
universal statements
from singular ones no matter how numerous. For any conclusion
drawn in this way
may always turn out to be false.
What characterized the empirical method is its manner of
exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to
be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems
but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison
the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for
survival

Verification and falsification

Karl R. Popper

Specify what would refute (rather than confirm) a hypothesis

Falsifiability demarcation criterion: pseudo-science is unfalsifiable
Als een theorie een bepaald effect voorspelt, end it effect uitblijft, is de
theorie fout
(hoe specieker een theorie, hoe meer fenomenen hij uitsluit, hoe beter
volgens Popper)
Wiener Kreis deden juist zo breed mogelijke theorien
- Popper was een anti-dogmatist: discussie moet vrij zijn, elke
hypothese kan waar zijn zolang het te verwerpen is (dogma: iets wat
voor zeker wordt aangenomen, God bestaat)
Popper wil dat we kritisch blijven, theorien die gepresenteerd
worden als waar en
25

die imuun zijn voor kritiek, zijn pseudoscience (Freud: achteraf post
hoc verklaringen)
Zon systeem kan niet bekritiseerd worden, het doel hiervan is
gelovigen te bewijzen dat ze gelijk hebben doel zou kennis
vergaren moeten zijn
Logik der Forschung (1934/1959): logic of scientific discovery
Conjectures and refutations (1963)
vermoedens/gissingen & weerleggingen
- Confirmation uninteresting: more of the same
- Bold (improbable) conjectures, not verification/confirmation, for
scientific progress
- Conjectures free, unconstrained (ongedwongen); more improbable =
more informative
- Refutations: rigorous rejection in case of falsification
- Bucket vs. searchlight: data collection vs. bold hypothesis

Popper: conjectures and refutations

Conjectures
- Theorys empirical content = number of predictions
- Bold conjectures have more content most interesting
Refutations
- Radical rejection of a falsified hypothesis (theorie verwerpen en nieuwe
bedenken)
- No ad-hoc hypotheses (= dogmatism): pseudo-science
Freud is always right post hoc (Adler)
Evolutionary model: variation and selection; knowledge never finished or
definitely true; anti-foundationalism
Rational = open to criticism
- fallibilism;;, criticism, anti-dogmatism
- In politics: against totalitarian ideologies (Marx, Hegel: historicism)
immune to critique
Anti-authoritarian, anti-totalitarian (Open Society)

Popper: falsification???

Demarcation criterion
- Log pos: verifiability: does not work, abandoned
- Now falsifiability (Popper)
- Radical rejection characteristic of genuine science, ad-hoc hypothesis
are dogmatism
Falsifiability does not work as demarcation criterion either
- Wanneer is het tegenbewijs = subjectief
- The sophisticated falsificationist will recognize that there are no
undubitable observations, and hence (Lakatos) that there are no hard
and fast rules for when a theory had to be rejected
- Observaties zijn theorie-geladen, dus je kan nooit bewijzen dat ze bij
jou theorie horen
Respectable scientists will (dogmatically) hold on to a disconfirmed
hypothesis
relying on ad-hoc hypotheses has proved a good strategy
26

So falsifiability not necessarily characteristic for good science

Paradigms and relativism

Thomas Kuhn (1923 1996): The structure of Scientific Revolutions (1960)

Introductie van een rol voor geschiedenis in de ontwikkeling van de

wetenschap
tegen positivisten: volgens wetenschap was tijdloos, logica is nodig, net
als observaties
(historische, sociale en persoonlijke factoren doen niet mee aan
wetenschap)
- Volgens Kuhn variren criteria voor rationaliteit en justification in de
geschiedenis
thoerien & sociale bewegingen bepalen wat wordt geaccepteerd als
legitiem science
- Presentism: huidige standpunten zijn criteria voor echte wetenschap
(afh. generatie)
Paradigm: no falsification, dogmatism characteristic for scientific practice;
relativism
historische en sociale framework wetenschap: bepaald data & methode
gebruik
- Framework obligatory for scientists, indispensable condition for
research
Paradigm is more than theory: techniques, laboratories
geheel van theorien, statements, concepten, worldview, technieken,
etc.
- Social organization (Ph. Ds, journals, academies, conferences, funding)
- Perceptual training: exemplars (vgl. Hanson) denken gevormd
door paradigma
learning to see and replicate exemplars, success-stories
Exemplars: problemen, fenomenen, success stories die een
paradigma karakteriseren (als student moet je deze herkennen
en reproduceren)
Wetenschappers werken volgens het gangbare paradigm en
trainen hun studenten ook in dit denkkader
zo creert het paradigma haar eigen kennis, gewenste
onderzoeksdata
Paradigm is dogmatic, a worldview
- E.g., Artistotles physics vs. Newton vs. Einstein
- E.g., atomic theory
- E.g., behaviorism
- Anomalies (disconfirmation) ignored (vs. Popper)
Normal science
- No falsification, but applying and extending paradigm
necessary for elaborating paradigm
- Using, not testing the framework
- puzzle solving application to new domains, improved technology, etc.

27

Onderzoek is het uitwerken van het paradigm onder de aanname dat er

een oplossing is voor de onzekerheden van de vorige paradigm;s
wanneer dit niet lukt, komt er spanning en uiteindelijk een revolutie
Abnormale resultaten veroorzaken een crisis

Kuhn: revolution

Revolution: after crisis transition to new paradigm

ontwikkeling van wetenschap = een cyclus
No rational reasons: criteria for rational theory choice (demarcation!)
only valid within paradigm, not between paradigms
revoluties zijn irrationeel: paradigmas zijn onderling niet te vergelijken
- De paradigmas zijn beperkt gedlig (alleen in eigen context)
je kunt maar bij 1 paradigma horen
- Er is geen absolute betekenis en waarheid
het ene paradigm is niet noodzakelijk beter dan het andere
Only mob psychology, propaganda, power play to revolution (paradigm
change)

Kuhn: paradigms

Phases of scientific development (cyclus)

- Pre-paradigm: only data collection, no framework
- Paradigm: normal science between revolution (puzzle solving)
crisis: too many? Anomalies (abnormaliteiten)
revolution: paradigm loses hold, new methods, data, criteria,
institutions
new paradigm (normal science)
next crisis

Kuhn: revolution and incommensurability (onmeetbaarheid)

Incommensurability of paradigms: no criteria for comparison

After revolution: working in a new world (worldview)
als je van concepten en procedures verandert, verandert je data ook
(theorie geladen)
- Paradigmas kunnen vergelijken worden met de language gamesvan
Wittgenstein
het is een manier van leven
New paradigm not better but different
- Wat er achter de paradigma veraneringen zit is niet de waarheid, maar
de worsteling tussen verschillende onderzoeksrichtingen
hierdoor is relativisme onvermijdelijk: sociale en historische
kenmerken bepalen de
uitkomst van de crisis, niet de waarheid
- Aangezien paradigmas onderling niet te vergelijken zijn, kan er dus ook
geen maat zijn voor vooruitgang in wetenschap we kunnen de wereld
alleen anders zien, niet beter
No cumulation, no progress

28

 L. Fleck (1935): Origin and development of scientific facts

Denkstil, Denkkollektiv in microbiology
Kuhn: paradigms and relativism

Paradigm is world view, produces its own confirmation (specific

methods, exemplars) are incommensurable, no rational rejection (cf.
Popper)
Paradigm shift is Gestalt switch: no comparison with previous views
New world view is different, not better
No cumulative progress
Relativism: no demarcation
Dogmatism within paradigm, irrational choice (revolution) between
paradigms

Sophisticated falsificationism
Imre Lakatos (1922 1974)

Between Popper and Kuhn: dogmatism and falsification

hij stelt dat vooruitgang en rationaliteit wel mogelijk zijn, maar behoud
ook paradigmas
Research programs (cf. paradigm):
1. Hard core (dogmatic, not falsifiable)
2. Protective belt auxiliary hypotheses (ad-hoc): hulphypotheses
- In case of disconfirmation, ad-hoc hypothesis to protect hard core
hulphypothesen kunnen aangepast worden om afwijkende resultaten
te verklaren
Dogmatism within program: protect hard core
- Progress, new knowledge or applications, when ad-hoc hypotheses work
out
- E.g. astronomy: predicts missing planet (not reject laws of gravity), if
successful, then progressive program

Competition between research programs

- Degenerating (only ad-hoc, no new discoveries)
vs.
- Progressive (new knowledge, extending research program)
het programma met empirsche progressie is superieur aan het
programma dat
degenereert (achteruit gaat) en dus geen empirische progressie
toont
29

Rational choice between programs possible

met een enigzins Popperiaans demarcatiecriterium (falsificatie),
doormiddel van een
achteraf selectiebe tussen de research programmes
Combines Kuhns paradigm (dogmatism) and Poppers falsificationism
(competition, progress)
Lakatos: rationality and demarcation, no relativism
but post-hoc, empirical (success/progress), no a priori, philosophical
demarcation
criterion for pseudo/science

Methdological anarchism
Paul Feyerabend (1924 1994)

Against Method (1975)

Radicalises Kuhn: promotes relativism
Anarchism in methodology
anarchisme: streven naar een situatie waarin niemand de leiding heeft
No demarcation: anything goes
alles mag, alles is goed (hij ontkent het bestaan van universele
methodologische regels)
Irrationality brings progress:
- counter induction: accept least confirmed theory (cf. Popper:
conjectures, not confirmation)
vooruitgang: door hypothesen tegen huidige theorien, bestaande
wetten breken
Established science is self-sustaining, maffia (cf. Kuhn: paradigm),
making its own data
Therefore, we should promote anti-science (e.g., alternative medicine)
Alternative approaches should have the opportunity to develop their own
paradigm
Feyerabend: Arguments from methodology do not establish the
excellence of science. There is no scientific method. Every project, every
theory, every procedure has to be judges on its own merits and by
standards adapted to the processes with which it deals. The idea of a
universal and stable method that is an unchanging measure of adequacy
and even the idea of a universal and stable measuring instrument that
measures any magnitude, no matter what the circumstances. There is nog
a single rule, however plausible and however firmly grounded in logic and
general philosophy that is not violate at some time or other
Methodologic anarchism: anything goes
Separation of science (cf. church) and state: school propagate
established science
no difference between science and mythology
Interesting as caricature: relativist outcome of anti-positivism

30

From positivism to Kuhn

relativism vs. success
From positivism to relativism?
- No demarcation criterion found
- No cumulative progress but irrational revolution
- Paradigms incommensurable (onmeetbaar), no truth
But science is more than theory
- Experiment (pragmatism): action, success
- Testable in successful manipulation
- No theoretical demarcation criterion, nor relativism

After Kuhn
Positivism, before Kuhn: science is theory, set of statements, formulae,
etc.
After Kuhn more focus on:
- Subjective factors (social, psychological)
- Organization of science, political pressure
- Techniques, skills, experiments
know-how, not as explicit as theory

Laudans historical meta-methodology

Hij wilde een meer empirisch onderbouwde methodologie maken:

normative naturalism
1. Geen vaste standaards voor rationaliteit, deze veranderen continu
2. Probleem oplossen is het werk van de wetenschap, niet de waarheid
ligt aan je cognitieve goal hoe je het het beste kunt oplossen
(verandert door de geschiedenis en context)

Demarcation criterion
objective vs. social

Logical positivism: yes, verifiability

Popper: yes, falsifiability
Kuhn: no, relativism (+/-)
Lakatos: yes, post-hoc (rational reconstruction)
Feyerabend: no, methodology is nonsense
De filosofie van de wetenschap in de 20e eeuw: zoektoch naar het
demarcation criteria

Summary

Problem 2: cumulative progress and verification

Popper: falsification
Kuhn paradigm domatic, no rational rejection; no progress but revolution
Lakatos: progress = dogmatism + rational choice
Feyerabend: no demarcation, no methodology
Kuhn & Feyerabend: relativism

31

College 12 (5): Philosophy of science: hermeneutics, relativism

Chapter 4 + 5.1 5.4
Hermeneutics, social construction, later developments (Ch.4)
Positivism: problems with objectivity in science

Problem 1: observation and reference (Quine, Wittgenstein)

Problem 2: verification and progress (Kuhn: revolutions)
- Post-positivism: demarcation fails, relativism; objectivity unattainable
(onbereikbaar)
Problem 3: anti-positivism: objectivity undesirable
1. Hermeneutics
2. Social constructionism (follows post-positivism)
New developments
- Realism vs. relativism
- Pragmatism

Anti-positivsm: history

19th century Germany

Enlightenment (French, British): positivism (Comte), elementarism,

scientism
progress, technology; individualism
Germany: feeling, intuiting rather than intellect; holism
historical relativism, back to pre-industrial era; empathy with nature
- Aktpsychology, phemenology
- Hermeneutics (Dilthey)
- (Gestalt psychology; holism)

Geisteswissenschaften
32

Nadat het positvisme ten einde was, ontstond opnieuw de vraag hoe wij de
sociale wereld konden onderzoeken
het objectivisme (realisme) en subjectivisme (relativisme) stonden
tegenover elkaar
- Subjectivistische wetenschappers keken naar de context, intenties en
interesses
ontwikkelden een beschrijvende (descriptive) filosofie

Subjective experience, meaning, unique historical events, tradition, holism

Descriptive, not explanatory or reductive
describing life from the inside; creative activity of the collective mind
Objectivity undesirable and inadequate
subjectivity and prejudice (Vorurteil) indispensable in human science

Post-positivism: the end of the positivistic tradition

Kuhn: positivism ends in relativism (subjectivisme)

Feyerabend: no methodological criteria
Incommensurability: knowledge is historical and contextual, not
universal (relativism)
Wittgenstein II: language (and knowledge) is tool in social exchange, not
objective represent.
Subjective, social, local historical factors dominant
(vs. positivism, foundationalism)
- Kritiek op postivisme en zijn empiristische epistemologie (kennisleer)
was de kijk dat er een onvermijdelijk hermeneutisch component zit
in de wetenschap van de mens
Post-positivism converges with continental philosophy
- Knowledge historically and socially situated, subjective
Hermeneutics
Social constructionism

33

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutiek: methode om de sociale wetenschap te begrijpen en te

interpreteren
staat in constrast met de objectieve method van verklaring in de fysieke
wetenschap
- De betekenis is een centraal concept
- Om de sociale, historische en psychologische concepten te begrijjpen is
het essentieel om de context te begrijpen en om de context te
begrijpen is het handig om delen van de context te begrijpen
(hermeneutic circle)
- Een belangrijk element is dat het gevoelig is voor geschiedenis
Hermeneutics stages:
- Initially textual criticism (classics, Bible)
- Later method of human sciences (contrast with natural sciences
Dilthey, 1990)
- Finally universal (radical) hermeneutics (Heidegger, 1927 & Gadamer,
1960)
Dialogue between investigator and object, both change
- Meaning of a text or work or art changes with history
- Interpreter changes through engagement with text, etc.
(Bilding, reading classics of Bible)
- Objective distance impossible, undesirable
Hermeneutics: dialogue interpreter and object
- Interpreter starts form his own subjectivity, personal and historical
situation
prejudices
dialogue no objective meaning, no final correct interpretation
- Like experiencing a work of art: both spectator changes his attitude,
and meaning of object changes
Ongoing interpretation, no final truth/meaning
- Not arbitrary: constrained by continuity of tradition (history, collective)

Radical hermeneutics
Martin Heidegger (1889 1976)

Anti-positivism: against objectivity

Was tegen het foundationalisme: echte kennis en wetenschap moet
gescheiden worden van irrationele of pseudo-wetenschap, door te bouwen
op veilige epistemologische fundamenten zoals empirisme en rationalism
Radical hermeneutics: all knowledge prejudiced
Heidegger Sein und Zeit (1927)
- Husserls student (phenomenology)
- Interpretation from ones own existence, situation: Dasein being
there
- Embodied subject (vs. Descartes Cogito)
- Embodied situetedness is primary, objectivity is secondary
- All knowledge is hermeneutical, contextual

H.G. Gadamer (1900 2002)

34

Gadamer: In hermeneutics, interpretation brings with it sensitivity to

history or, a sense of historical existence. We can only understand things
fromour own situation, though our situation is also a product of history.
Between subject and object there is a historical, hermeneutic
interaction, and therefore we cannot remain neutral or objective
observers. Human knowledge and experience is constant conversation
with tradition applied to the question of our times. Language is the most
important medium om the hermeneutic experience of the world: the world
presents itself in language and communication
iets begrijpen door het na te spelen in onze eigen situatie

Radical hermeneutics: all knowledge prejudiced (Vorurteil)

Gadamer: Wahrheit und Methode (1960)
Heideggerrs student, influenced by Dilthey
Dialogue; subjective contribution
Indispendable; tradition & historicity
hermeneutic circle between understanding the whole and grasping
the details (of a text)
no objective starting point, nor final correct interpretation; no objective
meaning
Tradition connects reader and text: constrains interpretation
In interpretation, subject and object change

Hermeneutics and Kuhn/ post-postivism

radical hermeneutics

All knowledge (including hard sciences, not only textual criticism and
interpretation)
- Starts from situated interpreter and his prejudices
- No objective criteria: different understanding, not better
- Anchored in continuity of language and tradition, not arbitrary
Radical hermeneutics is compatible with post-positivism (Kuhn,
Wittgenstein II)
- Prejudice perceptual training
- Form of life meaning social, not individual
- Tradition: language game, paradigm
- Radical situatedness: no escape from circle of interpretation
Sommige ideen van de hermeneutiek passen in de post-postivistische
wetensch.filosofie
- The given is a myth
- Epistemologisch holism: het geheel heeft voorang boven zijn delen
(context van belang)
- The theory-ladenness of observations
- Belangrijkheid van de historische context van de wetenschappelijke
producten & auteurs

Convergence hermeneutics and Kuhn

Circularity interpretation, perceptual training

Subjective input inevitable (prejudice, dogmatism)
No neutral stance outside tradition/history, no science outside paradigm
35

Social influence (Wittgenstein II: form of life, language game paradigm/

laboratory)
No neutral observations, no objective foundation
knowledge is human/social construction
- Social constructionism: nothing but human construction
collective idealism

Positivists: the exact natural sciences set the methodological standards

(meth. Holism)
Dilthey: we should distinguish between natural sciences and humanties
hermeneutics is the method for the humanities
Rorty: epistemology and hermeneutics are opposites (epistemology is the
hope of absolute objectivity and hermeneutics the denial of this)
there is no essential difference between human and natural science: bot
hermeneutical,
in the sense of interpretation, involving and understanding
- Neither are we justified in accepting the traditional distinction between
explanation in the natural and understanding in the social sciences =
universal hermeneutics
Taylor: rejects universal hermeneutics: the kind of understanding involved
in the two kinds of science is different
naturalistic requirement to avoid subject-related terms in inapplicable to
human science
Dreyfus: we cannot escape the hermeneutic circle, because our beliefs,
communication, actions, develop against a shared cultural background of
social practices, of know-how and skills. This context makes understanding
and communication possible
in natural sciences, scientists takes this background for granted, but in
the human
sciences, scientists must explore this background
Hesse: the logic of the natural science cannot serve as a model for the
social science and the traditional constrast between the two should be
36

reconsidered
what counts as facts depends on theory
- Hence, the circularity also is apparent in the natural sciences, human
and social factors are instrincic to all science
Hermeneutics and the humanities

Social/human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften):

- Objectivity impossible, interpreting the meaning of actions, subjectivity
indispensable and inevitable
- Inquiry as dialogue, persons as texts
Radical hermeneutics (Heidegger, Rorty)
- All knowledge hermeneutrical situated, prejudiced
- Including natural science: subjective, starting from historical prejudices
(Kuhn: paradigm)
Radical hermeneutics: no distinction between human and natural sciences
left
equally hermeneutical?
Remaining difference (Charles Taylor): rejects universal hermeneutics
- In social science subjective experience is object of investigation, in the
foreground
- In natural science subjective experience precondition of investigation,
in the background

Social constructionism
Richard Rorty, John Shotter and Kenneth J. Gergen

Post-positivism
- Subjective contribution (prejudice, paradigm)
- Objectivity impossible
- So: relativism?
Social constructionism
- Relativists conclusions from post-positivism
zij betwisten de objectieve en universele basis van psychologische
kennis
Traditionele pscyhologen zoeken staten en processen in de geest,
sociaal constructionisten zoeken dit in sociale relaties
- Contra correspondence theory of truth
correspondence theory of truth (realisme): waarheid bestaat in
de correspondentie
(mirroring) tussen een gedachte en de realiteit (hoe correspondentie
vast stellen?)
- Knowledge is social exchange, construction, not representation
(Wittgenstein II)

Gergen: social constructionism views discourse about the world not as a

reflection or map of the world, but as an artefact of communal exchange

Shotter: the basic function of language is not the representation of things

in the world. It works to create, sustain and transform various patterns of
37

social relations

Rorty: truth is not a correspondence between language and reality, but is

relative to a given
language system, and cannot be elevated out of the linguistic real.
Conversation is the ultimate context in which knowledge is to be
understood
pragmatism is anti-representationailisme

Social constructionism
Kenneth Gergen

Theory not a representation of reality (contra positivist picture theory of

language, observation statements)
Knowledge is manufactured, not found in the world (Kuhn paradigm)
Knowledge is social artefact, part of language game, form of social
exchange
Influenced by Wittgenstein II: language belongs to a form of life, meaning
is use
No empirical foundation for science
truth is consensus (not correspondence, as in realism)
Relativism: man-made knowledge, collective subjectivity (idealism)
Language is performative: makes (social) reality
(e.g. money, monarchy: conventions make reality)
Reality is negotiable

Social constructionism in psychology

Not psyche (character, mental processes), but social relationships
Psychology is not empirical: describing actions is interpretations of
meaning in social context
negotiable
Psychological concepts (e.g., aggression, Self, psychopathology) have no
basis in the facts
but forms of communication, tools in social exchange: conflict,
negotiation, (dis)approval
Psychological concepts have no basis in the facts: then why do
psychology?
Gergen: psychology can be emancipatory, transformational
- Exposing (deconstructing) ideology and interests (e.g. IQ and race)
- Democratization and liberating suppressed voices

Summary

Hermeneutics and social constructionism are varieties of anti-positivism

Objectivity rejected
Hermeneutics converges (samenlopen) with Kuhn
- Prejudices, tradition
Social constructionism (Wittgenstein II): language is tool in social
exchange, not representat.
Truth is consensus
38

College 13 (6): Philosophy of mind: functionalism, computation

Chapter 6.1 6.4, 6.8, 6.9 + 7
Philosophy of Mind (Ch. 6)

Philosophy of mind: mind/body; intentionality

Functionalism and multiple realization (Ch. 2)

Main issues
onderwerpen die onder de filosofie van de geest vallen:
1. What are mental processes (mind, psyche)?: mental states
- Tries to define what thinking really is: philosophy of mind
3 answers: symbol manipulation, (activations in) neural networks,
dynamic systems
2. What is the relationship of mind and brain? (mind-body problem):
relation mental & physic.
Autonomy (mind has its own study), reduction, elimination
3. What is mental representation (and intentionality)?: relation mind &
world
Aboutness: how is mind related to the world? (Bretano)
- Mental states are about something
4. What is the status of folk psychology?
- Eliminating (replace common sense psychology)
- Vindicating (when you know how the mind works, you can explain why
this kind of psychology is accurate)
Aspects of mental processes
what must be explained by psychology, what is typically mental (in contrast
with physical)
Rationality, intelligence:
- Slimheid, de mogelijkheid om moeilijke taken uit te kunnen voeren
- Something that is relatively new since the cognitive revolution of the
1970s (vs. S-R. mechanical and explanations: behaviorism): this made it
possible to focus on intelligence
Intenionallity:
- aboutness: knowing about, about mental content, you can think
about what you are
gonna do this afternoon (beliefs, desires, representations:
intentionele dingen)
- Bretano: de eigenschap van de geest, die kan gericht zijn op bepaalde
objecten
Consciousness:
- Descartes, introspection psychologist: focused on the content
- Freud focused on the unconsciousness
now it is a part of the psychology: how is consciousness possible in a
material system?

39

Consciousness involves the problems of intentionality and qualia

qualia: probeert bewustzijn te omschrijven door ervaringen en
gevoelens

Intelligence
Intelligent behavior possible without intentionality, knowing about
(webshops avatars like evy, who is gonna help you to buy something)
- MYCIN: diagnosis (computer systeem dat kan nagaan of mensen een
ziekte hebben en welk medicijn en welke hoeveelheid ze zouden
moeten krijgen o.b.v. artificial iq)
- (Turing test Dreyfus, Searle): kan een menselijke machine
intelligentie vertonen?
if you cannot distinguish between a person and a computer, and you
cannot tell,
which one is the computer, you must say that the computer is
intelligent
Turing machine: a general-purpose symbol manipulator
leads to the hypothesis that the brain is a (very complex)
machine that
calculated outputs, given some kind of input
Intentionality (representation) without consciousness?
- Searle: consciousness fundamental

Intentionality

Intentionality is aboutness: the property of mental states to represent

states of affairs
a mental content that represents some thought
Intentionality is a typical property of mind, not of matter (material things
like books may have derived intentionality)
Beliefs and desires have mental content and are therefore typical
intentional states (believing, desiring something)
Intentional states have semantics: they represent, or mean, or refer to
something
they have mental content
Cognition is an intentional state, it involves internal representation
Folk psychology explains behavior as a result of beliefs and desires, as a
product of intentional states
a human capacity to explain and predict the behavior and mentral state
of people
(processes and itens encountered in daily life such as pain use common
linguistic terms as
opposed to technical or scientific jargon)
Naturalising intentionality is showing how physical systems like brains
and computers can represent, thing, desire, etc. (when a computer has
data about the grades of a student can you say that a computer knows a
student?)

40

Naturalising intentionality is sometimes seen as a necessary condition

for scientific explanation of representation, cognition and folk psychology

Mind and body

three traditional views of mind and body:
1. Dualism: mind vs. body
- Interactionism: mutual(wederzijdse) influence Descartes
denkende en materile substantie onafhankelijk maar geest stuurt
lichaam (pituitary)
- Epiphenomenalism: mind as by-product , no influence on body
(the whistle on a stream engine: reflect the physical process, but does
not change it)
- Property dualism: different aspects (properties) of the same
underlying substance (cf. Fechner, Wundt) double-aspect theory:
mind and matter are not separate substances
An organism can be described either in mental or in physiological
terms, an these descripions are mutually irreducible (onherleidbaar)
- Methodological dualism: different approaches/sciences
(=autonomy)
2. Reductionism: mind = body/brain
- Identity theory: empirical identification of mental and physical
(1960s)
mentale toestanden zijn gelijk aan toestanden in het brein
- E.g., pain = firing C-fibres
- Bridge laws in D-N reduction
- Functionalism: verwierp deze theorie door te laten zien dat
verschillende metnale toestanden tot stand kunnen komen via
verschillende toestanden in het brein
3. Linguistic behaviorism
- Ryle, Wittgenstein II: analyses of concepts and the rules of language
games
woorden en taal over de geest beschrijven ook daadwerkelijk gedrag
- Dualism (Cartesian mind) is category mistake, violates rules of
the language game, confusion and philosophical pseudo-problems
(dualisme is ontstaan door conceptuele dwalingen in de taal)
je geeft een rondleiding over de campus van de universiteit en een
van je
gasten vraagt aan het eind van de rondleiding, welk gebouw is nou
eigenlijk
de universiteit (terwijl alles rond de campys bij de universiteit
behoort)
= misapplying a category
- Mental terms mean behavior (behavioral dispositions)
e.g. intelligent = clever behavior, high marks, good chess player,
etc.
- Mind-body problem dissolves: the Cartesian theatre is a category
mistake (bestaat niet)
41

 Isnt useful in psychology, only about philosophical problems (mindbody problem)

Later views on mind-body (after 1960)
functionalism

The end of behaviorism: only objective behavior can be studied

Cognitive revolution, computer and info-processing, exit behaviorism:
mental processes, representations are now legitimate and verifiable
Artificial intelligence (kunstmatig) : reasoning is symbol manipulation,
according to algorithm
- Weak AI: tries to write programs that can do tasks that require
intelligence
- Strong AI: claims to write programs that exactly stimulate human
thinking, that programmed computer can really think (is relevant for
the CTM)
Functionalism: mental processes functional states of a machine
(computer, brain)
= mind is software of the brain
mental processes are functions (characterized by their causal role: what
they do)
- Examples of multiply realized functional descriptions: carburetor,
mouse traps, fitness (any kind of physical properties)
- Example of psychological function: hunger (can be different in different
organisims but have the same role)
Mental states are states of a machine or a brain, implying that the actual
physical make-up of the machine (implementation) is irrelevant to the
functional role it realizes (the physical make-up of the computer is different
than from people, multiple realizability, this effectively precludes
identification of mental and physical events)
Against dualism: every function is realized in a material system, there is
no disembodied function, there is no disembodied mind
Against identity theory: functions can me multiply realized
Against behaviorism: mental processes really exist, really cause
behavior
linguistic behaviorism is wrong as well

Functionalism, multiple realization, reduction

Functionalism: mental process are functions, characterized by their

causal role
what they do
- When you are hungery, you focus on things that have to do with food
- Causal relations with input, output (behavior) and other mental states
Functionalism: is an idea of what the mind is
Wide functionalism: adaptive role, effect on the environment, biological
function
Narrow (or machine) functionalism: internal working of the system,
machine function (solipsist)

42

Language-based approach to Mind (Ch. 7)

Functionalism, multiple realization, (Non)-reduction

Functionalism + multiple realization = anti-reduction

Multiple realization: the same mental process (function) can be realized
in different physical systems (brain, computer hardware, etc.)
No identity, no reduction
- E.g., hunger in men and octopuses same functional state, same causal
role (foraging), but realized in different nervous systems

Functionalism: autonomous level

Thus, function is autonomous level of description and explanation,

domain of psychology, can be studies independent of brain
Cognitive explanation: generalization over knowledge, informational
states, beliefs
Cognitive predictions and laws
- E.g. problem solving, chess in computer and chess player (schaakspel)
predict his behavior in terms of what he knows and which goals he
has
Irreducible to brain or hardware

Functionalism, no dualism, no reduction

Functionalism is non-reductive materialism: all mental processes

materially realized
- No mental processes without physical realisation, no disembodied mind
materialism, not dualism
- No mind-brain identity (multiple realization, not single identity no
bridge laws)
no classical reduction

Dennetts stances: intentional, design, physical stance

brein en computers beschrijven a.d.h.v. 3 stances: verschillende soorten
brillen
(om te kijken naar een systeem en het vervolgens beschrijven)

Stance = point of view

Intentionality as a viewpoint, a tool for describing predicting
1. Intentional stance: employs beliefs and desires, information and
goals as concepts to describe and predict the behavior of complex
intelligent systems (chess computers, people, thermostats, etc.)
beschrijft voorspelling van gedrag met beliefs en desires en in
termen als doelen/info
In the eye of the beholder: partly subjective

43

 Describes objective real pattern of intelligent goal-directed

behavior; partly object.
Instrumentalism: true believer is a system for which the
intentional stance works
2. Design stance: explains a complex system on the basis of the
components or subroutines
beschrijft de onderliggende regels voor het systeem over hoe te
handelen
Shows how intelligent behavior is produced bu interaction of
subsystems (functional explanation)
Intentional stance is a loan on intelligent (e.g., scanner reads),
design stance repays by finding the mechanisms
3. The physical stance: explains a system (usually failure) form physical
processes (e.g., broken wires) de fysieke buitenkant van het
systeem

Way of understanding how different explanations coexists

verschillende manieren om de geest te beschrijven
Conclusion: different styles/levels of explanation can coecist in cognitive
science
- Dennet beschrijft de onderliggende regels voor het systeem over hoe te
handelen

Instrumentalism

The view that scientific theories, concepts and entities are instruments or
convenient tools that helps us understand the world and facilitate our
thinking, but do not convey (overdragen) literal truths and do not have
ontological import (in categorien onderbrengen)
Instrumentalism constrasts with realism which holds that beliefd refer to
something real in the world
In Dennets instrumentalism we can see his Wittgensteinian and Rylean
heritage
they argued that the meaning of mental terminology depends on
language games, rather
than on a reference to inner events

Computational theory of mind

Jerry Fodor

Two sorts of CTM:

1. Classical version (Fodor): mental states are symbol states, strings in
a formal language in the head, an mental processes are
transformations of these symbol strings
2. The connectionsist alternative holds that mental processes are
activation patterns in a multidimenstional vector space; this could also
be called a computational view of mind, although a completely different
kind of computation (numerical vs. logical) (Ch. 8)
44

Fodor Computational Theory of mind

orthodox philosophy of cognition: thoughts are symbol strings,
thinking is computing
symbolic formulae
- Fodor is an intentional realist: he thinks that intentionality is
ontologically real, a fact of nature, underwritten by computational
mechanisms, not just observer-dependent way of describing the
behavior of complex systems
Sources:
- Chomskys generative grammar
stated that abstract formal mentral structures, an inborn grammar,
can generate
corrext linguistic expressions (utterances): so it seemed plausible
that other kinds of
intelligent behavior could also be explained as being generated by a
formal-languagelike structure in the head
- AI: computer metaphor
- Philosophy of language, logic
- Functionalism: mental processes are functions, symbol manipulation,
software
Representations, beliefs en desires, thoughts, are symbol strings
Thinking is symbol manipulation, according to formul rules (algorithms)
Thinking is like a computer program (cf. AI)

LOT

LOT = formal language (computer language) of mind (Q1)

- synttactical, i.e. formal language = only form (= syntax, symbol
sequence) as in mathematics, logic
- Non content, meaning (= semantics)
- Computing logical formulae in the head (cf. Chomsky generative
structures)
- mentalese; innate language of thought

mechanical rationality (naturalizing intentionality)

- Thought is mechanically realized, as in computer (program)
- No humunculus, no mystery (cf. Dennet)
- Mechanistic, naturalistic explanation of mental causation
(how thought causes behavior)

Computational theory of mind (CTM) and folk psychology

CTM: view that the human mind/ the human brain is an information
processing system
and that thinking is a form of computing (manipulating symbols)
Folk psychology justified by CTM (Q4)
- Beliefs & desires are representations in LOT
- CTM explains folk psychology: like physics explains common sense
about everyday objects

45

Folk psychology also seems to give causal explanations: our desires an

beliefs produce physical behavior
Intentionality in physical systems (Q3)
Bretano-problem (how is thought, intentionality, mechanically possible)
solved?
refers to the artificial intelligence and the problem of giving a
naturalistic theory of
intelligent behavior
Bretano thought that mental states have content and meaning, and
this sets them apart
from the physical world

Summary computational theory of mind

CTM is a kind of functionalism

Cognition is symbol manipulation
Multiple realized (software of the brain)
Therefore, a computer can in principle (not in practice yet) literally think
contra Searle: intentionality and meaning not in syntactic machine

Computation theory of mind

Mind/brain

CTM cognitive psychology is autonomous vis--vis (recht tegenover)

neuroscience (Q2)
- Mind investigated without regard for neuroscience
- Methodological dualism: psychology about computation/symbols,
vs. neural activation
- Ontological monism: no disembodied mind, computation
implemented in brain

Problem of formality

Problem with LOT: formality condition

LOT = language of theory (thought as syntax)
Only form (syntax) of formulae in LOT determines behavior, not
semantics/meaning
- Syntax mirrors meaning: rationality, logical validity are reflexted
and realized in syntactic operations
Methodological solopsism: system in itself, no reference to
environment (Q3)
alles wat er toe doet is inside the head
Internalism: psychology ends at the skin
Syntax: about the form of statements, the logical or formal linguistic
relations between sentences of parts there of
Semantics: about the meaning of linguistic representations (uttercances)
and by extentions of mental representations (thoughts). Truth is a typical
semantic notin
Logic is truth preserving: if you enter true premises in valid
argumentation, you get true conclusions
46

Problem of intentionality

Problem with LOT and AI: rationality/intelligence may (?) be possible in

computational systems, but how about intentionality?
- Can we attribute knowledge, representations to a computer?
- E.g., MYCIN: program for medical diagnosis, does not understand
illness, physiology, anatomy etc.
- Syntax/form, not meaning
And: consciousness in computer?

Chinese Room (Searle): computation and understanding

CTM, Fodor: understanding meaning, and thinking (intentionality) is

manipulating meaningless uninterpreted symbols, according to formal
syntactical rules
Searle: symbol manipulation not sufficient for understanding
the Turing test is irrelevant and strong AI is wtrong
- Understanding should be attributed to the whole system
- The Englishman in his particular role of symbol manipulator is just a
part of the whole system, so this lack of comprehension does not prove
that comprehension is beyond any computational program
Thought experiment Chinese Room: symbol manipulating without
understand
he manipulate uninterpreted symbols according to some set of formal
syntactic rules

Brief description of the Chinese room (Searle)

English speaker, does not understand Chinese

Receives a stack of Chinese symbols, plus instruction how to manipulate
these (program)
Chinese symbols input processing by Englishman Chinese symbols
output
Gives correct answers to Chinese questions : stimulates Chinese
conversation (pass Turing test)
Englishman does what a computerprogram does: manipulating
uninterpreted symbols,
but doesnt understand Chinese

College 14 (7): Philosophy of mind: Connectionism, dynamic

systems
Chapter 8
Brain-based cognition: Connectionism (Churchland)

CTM (Fodor): LOT, logic, formal language as basic material of cognitive

processes
vs.

47

Paul & Patricia Churchland: neural networks (brain) as model for

cognition
connectionism, association, pattern recognition
Anti-Fodor, alternative for CTM
- Against LOT (Q1): neural networks
- Against autonomy (Q2): neuroscience
- Against solipsism (Q3): adaption
- Against folk psychology (Q4): elimination

Connectionism (Churchland)

(Pseudo)-neural networks
- neural activation patterns, not symbols and rules (Q1)
- Self-organising, not pre-programmed
- Cognitive tasks
- Pattern recognition is basis of cognition
Neuroscience (activation in networks) explains cognition
- No functionalism
- No autonomy for psychology (Q2)

Neural basis of cognition (Churchland)

Representations are activation patterns

Graceful degradation is case of lesions/damage to nodes,
neurologically plausible
Knowledge is coded in connection weights
Learning is setting weights

48

tuning in to the environment, not

preprogrammed
Cf. evolutionary adaption
naturalism

Vector space

Learning (e.g., recognizing rocks

from mines) is forming a prototype
A prototype is hot spot in vector
space;
A concept is a prototype, not a
symbol string

Conceptual similarity

Prototypes as hot spots in

activation space
E.g. face recognition by neural
networks:
family members group together in
activation space
Similarity between concepts
= distance vector space

Naturalism, elimination (Churchland)

Naturalism: representation is biological phenomenon, product of

evolution (Q3)
Language appears late in evolution, therefore no LOT
Functionalism is cheap explanation
Folk psychology (beliefs & desires) stagnating program, isolated form
scientific progress (Q4)
Folk psychology eliminated and replaced by neuro-speak (cf. phlogiston)

Eliminativism

Against elimination: is counter-intuitive: my beliefs, consciousness do

not feel neural
But Churchland: introspection theory-laden, not given; intuitions may
change (Sellars!)
Reconfiguring ones network, learning to see within a neuro-framework (cf.
Kuhnian revolution)

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Dualist: consciousness cant be understood

as property of neuron
Churchland: that is a failure of imagination
- E.g. DNA- life
Thought experiment The luminous room:
analogy
light couldnt possibly be electromagnetic
radiation,
because EM does not give light
- Churchland: a failure of imagination
But light is EM, learning to understood,
analogously, cognition is neural
Consciousness is neural phenomenon
- E.g. color sensations as hot spots in (neural) vector space
color sensations are activation vectors: predict qualitative
sensations

Classical symbolic vs. connectionist systems (Q1)

Fodor does not believe that networks are powerful enough to produce
systematic thought. Non-propositional representations are insufficient as
architecture of human cognition and language of thought is needed
thought characterized by productivity and systematicity
- Productivity: an infinite number of propositions can be generated
from a limited number of constituents (like language, limited numver of
words can create infinity of sentences)
- Systematicity: you cannot have a thought without the ability to
understand another thought that is alike
Thoughts composed of discrete symbols, that can be recombined (cut &
paste)
compositionality (like sentences from words), requires a formal structure
Networks not compositional, not powerful enough to simulate cognition
- Fodor: connectionism is association psychology, the worst of
Berkely & Hume
Fodor: compositionality
LOT indispensable (onmisbaar) for cognition (only game in town):
the only possible explanation for structure of thinking
Connectionists (Smolensky): thinking is network activation,
compositionality is a by-product
functional compositionality possible with
compression/decompression techniques without symbolic architecture

Folk psychology (Q4)

Folk psychology (belief-desire) is a kind of theory, explainds behavior

(Fodor + Churchland)
Fodor: folk psychology in principle correct theory, vindicated
(gerechtvaardigd door) by CTM

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Intentional realism: beliefs en desires exist really as symbol

structures, are causes of behavior
- Folk psychology is successful predictor
- Intentional laws, generalisations and predictions
Churchland: Folk psychology obsolete (onbruikbare) theory
- Stagnating program (Lakatos)
- No progress, no connections with current development in science
- Replace beliefs, desires etc. by neuroscience (how the brain codes
knowledge, ethics
= oxytocin, etc.)
- Eliminativsm
Problem was: can common sense (belief/desire) survive the neurocognitive revolution?
- Churchland: folk psychology is obsolete theory, eliminated
- Fodor: beliefs & desires real, cognitive laws, mental causes (reducible to
formulae in LOT)
Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett: belief and desires only descriptive
(intentional stance), not internal causes (design stance)
Folk psychology is not a theory at the same level as neuroscience, exists
alongstide neuroscientific explanation, different explanatory aims
Instrumentalism: folk psychology description and prediction, not literally
true/real

Cognition dynamic alternative?

Classical: mental representation characteristic for cognition

- Fodor: representation is symbolic string in LOT
- Churchland: representation is network activation/weights
Mobots and dynamical systems: internal representation and computations
redundant
dynamic self-organisation is enough
- Rodney Brooks: robot with response systems, direct interaction with
environment, without central representations
Dynamical systems theory: cognition is dynamical system, not
representational structure
believes cognition to be continuous and dynamic internation with
environment
Van Gelder: cognition is coping, is coupling to environment without
internal representation
- Cognition is on-line real-time interaction with environment
- Mathematical description: trajectory through state space
- Like Watt governor, continuous following and control of behavior and
environment; reciprocal causaliteit

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DST new approach, not many examples yet

embedded, embodied cognition

Internal representation redundant?

Conclusion (Clark, 2003):

- Lower, sensory-motor process directly coupled to environment
- Higher cognitive processes (abstract knowledge, not directly visible),
require representations and internal processing
Externalism: mental processes use external representation (cogntive
tools, language, notebooks, libraries, internet)
Leaky cognition: mind and world and body functionally inseparable
(vs. Descartes, Fodor: solipsism)

Classical
Computationalism
Formal, syntactical rules,
symbols

Connectionism

Dynamical systems

Weights and activation

patterns

Preprogrammed, no real
development

Selforganisation, learning
through adapting weights

Brittle program rules

Graceful degradation
under damage
Associationism

Coupled coevolving
systems, developing over
time
Evolving through state
space, circular causality,
continuous adaption
Smooth mutual adaption

Structured, language-like
architecture,
concatenating discrete
symbols
Productivity and
systematicity through
compositional
architecture
Functionalism, autonomy
for pscyhology

Development in time

Functional
compositionality

(trajectory through state

space)

Reductionist, (more or
less) brain-like cognition

Emergent properties of
organism-environment
system and development
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Representations are
symbolic structures
Solipsism, self-contained
mind

Representations are
activation patterns
Representations are
products of interaction
with environment

No representations
needed
Body mind and world
part of a single system

Summary

Neural networks: brain based model of cognition

Representations, concepts in network
Churchland elimination folk psychology
- Clack, Dennett: folk pscyhology as stance
Dynamical systems: no representations

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