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CA-G.R.SP NO.

80608
DECISION
We are not persuaded.
The case of Liguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr. 20 is incisive, thus:
xxx It must be remembered that the essence of due
process does not necessarily require a hearing, but simply a
reasonable opportunity or right to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side.
Due process is an administrative context does not require
trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. A
formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process. What is simply required is that the
party concerned is given due notice and is afforded an
opportunity or right to be heard. It is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on
which a fair decision can be made. To be heard does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or through pleadings, is accorded,
there is no denial of procedural due process.
The standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as
long as fairness is not ignored. In other words, it is not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted
by the parties as affidavits or witnesses may take the place of
their direct testimony. Considering that complaint was afforded
and opportunity to be heard through her pleadings, her right to
due process was not impaired.

Section 1-4, Rule I of the 2000 Revised Rules of Procedure of the


Securities and Exchange Commission provides for the summary nature of
SEC proceedings, thus:
SECTION 1-4, Nature of Proceedings.- Subject to
the requirements of due process, proceedings before the
Commission shall be summary in nature not necessarily
adhering to or following the technical rules of evidence
obtaining in the regular courts.

-----------------------------20 A/M/ No. RTJ-99-1509, August 8, 2002.

CA-G.R.SP NO. 80608


DECISION
Provided, however that the Rules of Court may apply
suppletorily in a suppletory manner whenever applicable.

Clearly, there is no denial of petitioners due process in the case at


bar. Despite the fact that no hearing was conducted by SEC in the
proceedings before it, the petitioner had been afforded ample opportunity
to present its side of the controversy, that is through its pleading. It was
able to file before the said agency it Answer with Grounds to Dismiss,
Counterclaim, & Opposition to Preliminary Injunction. Since the
proceedings before the said agency is summary in nature, a hearing or trial
type proceeding is not necessary. Hence, the filing of the said pleading by
the petitioner before the SEC meets the requirement of due process.
Moreover, the fact that the petition was not tried by a hearing officer as
provide for under the SEC Rules of Procedure but instead went directly to
the Commission en banc is of no moment. It must be noted that after the
petitioner filed the said responsive pleading before the SEC, the case was
transferred to the RTC wherein the pre-trial conference of the cases was
undertaken. During the said pre-trial conference, both parties agreed that
there is no issue of fact raised in the pleadings which prompted the
respondents to file a Motion for Judgment on the Pleading and/or Motion
for Summary Judgment. Thereafter, the case was returned to the SEC
wherein two Reiterative Motions to Resolve the Case on the Merits were
filed by the respondents. The petitioner did not oppose the said motions
nor did it bother to file any motion to set the case for hearing. In fact its
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed SEC Resolution, the petitioner
did not raise the issue that the case was not tried by a hearing officer. It is
only now in this petition that the petitioner raises the same. By failing to
question the said matter before the agency a quo, petitioner had indeed
acquiesced to and waived any question with regards to the same. Be that as
it may, we hold that due process was accorded to petitioner in this case
despite the fact that the case did not undergo through a hearing officer
since as previously discussed, the petitioner was able to ventilate its
position in the case at hand. There is therefore no basis to the claim of
denial of due process by the petitioner in this case.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner contends

CA-G.R.SP NO. 80608


DECISION
that its tradename was registered ahead of respondents trademark. It
postulates that a tradename is only an adjunct of the legal structure of the
entity created by the corporate name and without the name, there is no
trademark. It concludes that to uphold anothers trademark over that of
ones duly registered corporate name is a reversal of priority.
We do not agree.
In Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd., et. al. vs.
Developers Group of Companies, Inc., 21 it was held that:
xxx The two concepts of corporate name or business name
and trademark or service mark, are not mutually exclusive. It is
common, indeed likely, that the name of a corporation or
business is also a trade name, trademark, or service mark. xxx

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that INTEL is not only as


registered trademark of respondents but it is also a part of its corporate
name.
Section 18 of the Corporation Code provides that:
Sec. 18. Corporate name. - No corporate name may be
allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission if the
proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar
to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary
to existing laws. When a change in the corporate name is
approved, the Commission shall issue an amended certificate of
incorporation under the amended name.

In Lyceum of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. 22 the
Supreme Court explained the policy behind the aforestated prohibition,
thus:
the policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18 against the
registration of a corporate name which is identical or
____________
21 G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006.
22 G.R. No 101897, March 5, 1993.