April 30 Crim Digests

People v.
Amaca
Facts: An Information was filed by the Bais City Prosecutor against Amaca and one "Ogang,"
charging them with murder attended by evident premeditation and nighttime for attacking,
assaulting and shooting with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who, as a result thereof,
suffered fatal gunshot wound.
Bernardo Mangubat, member of the PNP of Canlaon City, testified that he inquired from the
victim about the incident, and the latter answered he was shot by members of the Civilian
Volunteer Organization (CVO) Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim
said he did not know the reason why he was shot. He was able to reduce into writing the
declaration of victim Vergara, and have the latter affix his thumbmark with the use of his own
blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding Amaca guilty of murder. It deemed the victim's
statement to Police Officer Mangubat, positively identifying Amaca, a dying declaration
sufficient to overcome the latter's defense of alibi.
The appellant alleges, among others, that he may be held liable ONLY FOR HOMICIDE since
treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation and nighttime,
although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven.
Issue: Whether or not the Amaca is guilty of murder or homicide
Held: Only homicide. The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the
assailant in the case at hand. However, the accused cannot be convicted of murder attended
by treachery, because the Information charged him with murder qualified only by evident
premeditation. The Constitution requires that the accused must be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. This failure to allege treachery in the Information
should benefit the appellant, because in a criminal case, the accused may be held accountable
only for the crime charged and every doubt must be resolved in his favor.
Moreover, in this case, treachery and nighttime may NOT be considered even as generic
aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses to convincingly show that the accused consciously and purposely adopted (1) such
means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate
the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture. This conclusion
is further bolstered by the simple fact that not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the
commencement of the assault or even the actual assault itself. Hence, they are not competent to
testify on whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and nighttime attended the
commission thereof. These circumstances cannot be appreciated on the basis of mere
presumptions or suppositions; they MUST BE PROVEN AS CLEARLY AS THE CRIME
ITSELF.
People v. Remalante
Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto
Facts: At about 4 PM, while Mercedes Tobias accompanied by Eusebio Gerilla and Lucia Pelo
was on her way home in the barrio of Guinarona, Leyte, coming from her farm in Maanghon,
she met a group of more than ten men all armed with rifles, some of them with beard
reaching the breast. Remalante, one of the men, approached, took hold of and dragged
Mercedes. She entreated him not to take her because she had done him no wrong. Remalante
continued to drag and struck her with the butt of his rifle on different parts of her body. The
companions of Mercedes were told to continue their way. They saw Mercedes being dragged
toward the sitio of Sawahon. Hardly had they walked one kilometer when they heard gun
reports. The following day Mercedes Tobias was found dead in Sawahon with two gunshot
wounds.
Remalante was charged with the complex crime of kidnapping with murder. His companions
have not been apprehended. The CFI found him guilty.
Issue: Whether or not Remalante is guilty of the complex crime of kidnapping with murder or
only murder
Held: Only murder. There is no sufficient evidence of intention to kidnap because from the
moment Mercedes Tobias was held and dragged to the time when the gun reports were
heard nothing was done or said by the appellant or his confederates to show that the captors
intended to deprive her of her liberty for some time and for some purpose and thereafter set
her free or kill her. The INTERVAL WAS SO SHORT AS TO NEGATE THE IDEA
IMPLIED IN KIDNAPPING.
HER SHORT DETENTION AND ILL-TREATMENT ARE INCLUDED OR FORM PART
OF THE PERPETRATION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER. It is murder because of the
concurrence of at least one qualifying circumstance, either of treachery, or of abuse of
superior strength, or with the aid of armed men, the first shown by the entry of the shots at the
back and the second and the third by the number of the armed captors.
The fact that the appellant grew beard reaching his breast as some of his companions did is a
positive and clear proof that he was a member of the group of marauders, dissidents, bandits who
were harassing the peaceful inhabitants of the town of Dagami and its environs. It is true that no
one witnessed the killing of Mercedes Tobias, but the acts of the malefactors show and constitute
conspiracy which renders the appellant liable for the crime committed by his companions.
People v. Sespene
Facts: In the afternoon, Leonardo Enerio left his home in barrio Tagbaya, Capiz, and went to
the field to tend his carabao. Left in the house were his wife Gloria, three minor children the
oldest of whom being 9 years of age, and a houseboy. Before departing, Leonardo Enerio left
behind his bolo and instructed the houseboy to split some firewood.
Between 6 and 6:30 o'clock that evening, Priscila Enerio, a sister of Leonardo, arrived at the
house to fetch the latter because their mother was seriously ill. Not finding her brother at home,
Priscila waited, and while she was conversing with Gloria and one Eliang from Buracay, Sajera
and Sajona arrived. Sajona sat himself on a chair inside the sala, while Sajera hid behind
the shutters in the balcony.
Sajona inquired about Leonardos whereabouts when the sound of chopping of banana stalks
in the backyard and the dropping of stones atop the roof, were heard. As they looked outside
Gloria and Priscila saw three individuals hiding behind Gloria's store.
Leonardo arrived, and just as he was about to step on the first rung of the ladder, Mangilog
suddenly appeared and rushing towards him, attacked the latter from the rear with a bolo. Taken
completely by surprise, the victim was struck on both shoulders. Sespee, Leonardo and
Calizo, each armed with a firearm, arrived and fired four shots at Leonardo. Gloria and
Priscila shouted for help.
Upon seeing the victim stand up and make an effort to escape, Sajona fired his revolver at
his victim. Sajera, who was behind, knifed the deceased on the nape. Still with life, Leonardo
made an attempt to flee from his assailants, but the latter surrounded him and so he was forced to
lean against the fence fronting the house. The fence broke due to weak condition and
Leonardo fell with it, his head touching the canal while his feet rested at the base of the fence.
While in this position, Sespee shouted "kill him" and one of them fired a shot at Leonardo.
The assailants fled from the scene.
A few minutes after Leonardo was brought into the house, he died. An information for murder
was filed against all of them except Mangilog who remained at large. All the defendants were
found guilty of murder, qualified by TREACHERY.
The Solicitor General maintains that the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances
of superior strength, aid of armed men and dwelling, and in view of the penalty attached by
the Code to the crimereclusion temporal in its maximum period to death he recommends
that the decision of the lower Court should be modified by raising the penalty to death.
Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of superior strength, aid of armed men
and dwelling should be appreciated separately from treachery
Held: No. The aggravating circumstances of superior strength, aid of armed men, and night
time which concurred in the commission of the offense, are INCLUDED IN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY and cannot be appreciated
separately from the latter circumstance.
As to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the Court entertains doubts as to its
applicability to the case at bar because the deceased was only about to step on the first rung
of the ladder of the house when he was assaulted by appellants.
(As to the motive of the crime, a week before the incident, Gloria went to collect from
defendants their debts for the tuba and sardines which they bought on credit from the store
of the offended party, but they replied that they had no money then. The day before the killing,
defendants returned to the store of the offended party and wanted to make purchases on
credit, but the offended party refused to extend them credit until they had paid their old
accounts. Sajona remarked: "If you will not be taken during the day, by evening you will be
taken." It appears further that sometime in March 1953, the offended party had a dispute with
Sespee and Leonardo regarding the boundaries of a certain piece of land, and that the same
was settled by the barrio-lieutenant and a councilor.
Whatever the cause of the killing, it is not absolutely necessary to find a motive therefor. The
question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is
or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt, as in the case at bar, it
is not indispensable to conviction to know the exact reason for the deed.)
People v. Manero
Facts: This was a gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A foreign
religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the
reveling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry, chanting the tune
"Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate,
miserable, spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Their leader picked up pieces of the
splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts
swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. For
their outrageous feat, the gang leader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer." But,
what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than
that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in their vineyard in the
hinterlands of Mindanao.
Informations for Murder, Attempted Murder and Arson were filed against defendants. The
trial court rendered judgment finding them guilty of the Murder of Fr. Favali with the
aggravating circumstances of superior strength and treachery, and the Attempted Murder of
Rufino Robles. Further, the Court finds accused Norberto Manero alias Commander Bucay
guilty of Arson for the burning of the motorcycle of Fr. Favali.
Around 10 in the morning, defendants were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Deocades at Km.
125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with defendant Arsenio
Villamor, Jr., private secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two
unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers
were discussed. Arsenio Villamor scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA,
starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr.
Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of having links with the communist
movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the complaining witness in
the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others are simply
"messengers." The conspirators agreed to Edilberto Maneros proposal that should they fail to
kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his stead.
Elpidio with two unidentified companions nailed a placard on a street-post beside the eatery of
Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as those found on the cigarette wrapper except
for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo." Elpidio also posted a wooden placard
bearing the same message on a street cross-sign close to the eatery.
Later, defendants proceeded to the house of "Bantil," their first intended victim. "Bantil"
confronted them why his name was included in the placards. Edilberto asked "Bantil" if he
had any qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at
the forehead of "Bantil." "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower
portion of his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was
extricated by his wife from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon
by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the
house of a certain Domingo Gomez. Norberto ordered his men to surround the house and
not to allow anyone to get out so that "Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then Edilberto
went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the face and accused him of
being a communist coddler.
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of
gunfire from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched
at the back of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded
desperados.
At 5 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the
house of Gomez. Norberto opened the motorcycles gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire
and burned the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced.
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo,
padre? Gusto mo bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me to break your head)?" Thereafter,
Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. Norberto taunted Edilberto if that was the only
way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate
body three times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually
SHATTERED THE HEAD OF FR. FAVALI, CAUSING HIS BRAIN TO SCATTER ON
THE ROAD. As Norberto flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and
sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms.
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants contend that the trial court erred in
disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which, if properly appreciated, would tend to
establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the intended victim was Fr. Peter
Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only one gunman, Edilberto; and, that there
was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the victim despite
their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
On their defense of alibi, Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting palay the
whole day some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Roger Bedao alleges that he was
on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato that morning,
taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in La Esperanza,
Tulunan, PAST NOONTIME. (maaga pa)
Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the defenses of alibi No.
2. Whether or not there is conspiracy Yes.
Held:
1. No. It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some
other place but that it must also be PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME at the time of its commission.
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being
present at the crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places
where they were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the offenses and the
locus criminis (the place of the crime), the defense of alibi is definitely feeble.
No physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only 15-20
minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some 1.5 hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the
place where he allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the
crime. Recently, we ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance
between two places is merely 2 hours by bus. More important, it is well-settled that the
DEFENSE OF ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
OF THE AUTHORS OF THE CRIME BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. The
presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all doubts that
they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore
removed. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
Two eyewitnesses testified that they were both inside the eatery when the appellants first
discussed their plan to kill some communist sympathizers. They also saw appellants when
Rufino Robles (Bantay) was shot. Further, at 5 that afternoon, appellants were very much at
the scene of the crime when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered.
2. Yes. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a
crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and
every act constitutive of the offense. It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed
where there is singularity of purpose, and unity in its execution is present.
It is clear that appellants were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in
perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by
the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a fighting stance to
discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They
surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving
so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to
ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the
conspiracy. WHILE APPELLANTS MAY NOT HAVE DELIVERED THE FATAL SHOTS
THEMSELVES, THEIR COLLECTIVE ACTION SHOWED A COMMON INTENT TO
COMMIT THE CRIMINAL ACTS.
(WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00
to P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of
P100,000.00; however, the award of moral damages is deleted.)
People v. Teehankee
Note: The HultmanChapman murder case was a murder case that gained wide publicity in the
Philippines during the early 1990s because Claudio Teehankee, Jr., the perpetrator of the crime,
was the son of the late former Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and the brother of former
Justice Undersecretary Manuel Teehankee. The case helped sway the public view and
lawmakers on crime and restore the death penalty in the Philippines.
Facts: Three separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman.
Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman, Maureen Hultman and other friends for a
party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party ended at past midnight. They then
proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour,
they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3 AM. Their
group returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leinos house to
eat.
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarias
Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino
to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house. She wanted to walk the
rest of the way because she did not want her parents to know she was going home that late.
Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk. When they reached the corner of Caballero
and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused
came up from behind them and stopped in the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his
car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D." Leino thought
accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his plastic
wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank I.D. Accused did not bother to look
at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it.
Chapman saw the incident. He asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?" Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body,
staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on the
sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and
leave Chapman alone.
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a
trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen.
When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She
repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help
us?"
Accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up.
Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accused's car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying
to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually,
accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino.
For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino.
Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness.
Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what
was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away.
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three people looking on
and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. The security guards of Dasmarias
Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and Maureen to the Makati Medical Center
for treatment. After 97 days of confinement in the hospital, Maureen died.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on
said date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then
in his house in Pasig. He admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi
Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good
running condition after its involvement in an accident.
The trial court convicted accused of the crimes charged:
1. Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Chapman
2. Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal shooting of Hultman
3. Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Leino
Accused claims that TREACHERY WAS NOT PRESENT in the killing of Hultman and
Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman
CONSCIOUSLY and DELIBERATELY adopted particular means, methods and forms in
the execution of the crime.
Issue: Whether or not treachery was present

Held: Yes, in the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman. But not in the killing of
Chapman.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes with treachery and
evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was CORRECTLY RULED OUT by the
trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a CASUAL ENCOUNTER or a
CHANCE MEETING on the street since the victims were unknown to the accused and viceversa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE TREACHERY IN THE
KILLING OF CHAPMAN. There is no evidence on record to prove that the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of
his criminal design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the moment.
Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial
encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The SHOOTING OF CHAPMAN WAS
THUS THE RESULT OF A RASH AND IMPETUOUS IMPULSE on the part of the
accused RATHER THAN A DELIBERATE ACT OF WILL. Mere suddenness of the attack
would not, by itself, constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, the
accused should only be held liable for HOMICIDE for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly attended the
commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that while seated, unarmed and begging for
mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused. Clearly, the accused purposely placed his
two victims in a COMPLETELY DEFENSELESS POSITION before shooting them. There
was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and
Hultman a period which the accused used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the
execution of the crime without risk to himself.
(IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial
court, dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1)
In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman, and
sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One
Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2)
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen
Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One
Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four
Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning
capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two
Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3)
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of
Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.
(4)
In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended parties the
sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.)
People v. Enguito
Facts: At about 3:00 o'clock dawn, Felipe Requerme, while driving his motorela with his wife
Rosita on board, picked up a passenger, Engr. Wilfredo Achumbre, near the Nazareno church
in Cagayan de Oro. Achumbre asked him to bring him across the Marcos bridge towards his
home. After travelling a distance of 300 meters, Requerme's motorela was bumped by a white
motor vehicle (Kia Ceres van). The vehicle kept pushing the motorela causing it to run very
fast. Because of the violent push the motorela turned around and fell on its right side, causing
the driver Felipe and his wife to sustain serious bodily injuries. Achumbre was able to run
towards the railings at Marcos Bridge but accused with intent to kill him rammed and hit
him with his vehicle, cutting his right leg and thereafter ran over him which was the direct
and immediate cause of his instantaneous death.
Georgita Achumbre, wife of the deceased, knows accused because he used to come to their house
and he and her husband were both employed with G & P Builders and they used to play
basketball together. When she confronted the accused at the police station why he killed her
husband, Enguito answered that he was mauled by her husband and it was an act of revenge.
The accused explained that the victim became angry when he was made to pay the bills of
Enguito's friend.
The trial court rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide with Less Serious Physical Injuries (suffered by Felipe Requerme) with the
aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle.
10
The CA found that since the evidence showed that accused killed the victim by means of
motor vehicle, he should be guilty of the crime of MURDER and not homicide.
Appellant contends that he DID NOT INTENTIONALLY CHOOSE the motor vehicle as a
means of committing the offense, and that at most, the vehicle was the only available means
to stop the deceased from escaping. He argues that it was his intention to apprehend and
surrender the deceased to the police for his previous act of mauling him but in the process, he
killed the deceased.
Appellant further contends that he should have been convicted of the crime of homicide with
mitigating circumstances of passion and voluntary surrender.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Enguito is guilty of murder with the use of a motor vehicle or only homicide Murder with the use of a motor vehicle.
2. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of passion and voluntary surrender can be
appreciated No.
Held:
1. The USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE QUALIFIES THE KILLING TO MURDER IF THE
SAME WAS PERPETRATED BY MEANS THEREOF. Appellant's claim that he merely
used the motor vehicle to stop the victim from escaping is belied by his actuations. By his
own admission, he testified that there was a police mobile patrol near the crossing. Accused
could have easily sought the assistance of the police instead of taking the law into his own
hands. Moreover, he did not stop the vehicle after hitting the deceased. Accused further used
the vehicle in his attempt to escape. He was already more than 1 kilometer away from the place
of the incident when he stopped his vehicle upon seeing the police mobile patrol which was
following him.
2. We find that these mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated in his favor. Accusedappellant was allegedly "still very angry" while he was following, bumping and pushing the
motorela which was in front of him. He was previously mauled by the deceased and allegedly
rendered unconscious by the blows inflicted on him. When he regained consciousness, he claims
that he wanted to look for a policeman to report that he was mauled. Clearly, appellants state
of mind after he was mauled and before he crushed Achumbre to death was such that he
was still able to act reasonably. In fact, he admitted having seen a police mobile patrol
nearby but instead, he chose to resort to the dastardly act which resulted in the death of
Achumbre and in the injuries of the spouses Requerme.
For passion to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, facts must be proved to show
causes SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL and to OVERCOME
REASON. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be
confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a
degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control.
11
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows

that ACCUSED WAS PURSUED BY THE POLICE. SPO3 Catiil testified that appellant did
not surrender but only stopped his vehicle when its RIGHT TIRE WAS ALREADY FLAT.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence or non-existence of a mitigating circumstance in
the case at bar will not affect the penalty to be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC
(under Article 63, an indivisible penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance). The crime committed is the complex crime of murder with less
serious physical injuries. Under Article 48, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The CA was correct in imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
(WHEREFORE, the decision convicting accused-appellant Thadeos Enguito of the complex
crime of Murder with Less Serious Physical Injuries and sentencing him to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Wilfredo Achumbre the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P1,680,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; P 16,300.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; and to further pay the spouses Felipe and Rosita Requerme the
amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages.)
People v. Whisenhunt
Facts: Accused was charged with the murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo, under an Information
which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa Santos
Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts of her body,
thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping off her head
and different parts of her body.
The evidence shows that accused and the deceased were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor
Corporation where accused was the Manager while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel
Manager. Both were married but estranged from their respective spouses. In April 1993,
Elsa resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit affair with
accused. It appears, however, that she continued the affair even after she resigned.
On September 23, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for accused, reported
for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit at the Platinum Condominium in
Greenhills. Accused ordered him to fetch Elsa at her parents house. He found Elsa standing at a
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corner near her parents house, carrying three bags. He brought Elsa to accuseds condominium
unit.
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At around noon, Lucy
asked if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused
who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused go inside the
room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.
On September 25, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium. While he was there, Amy
Serrano, Apex Personnel Manager, asked him if Elsa was still in accuseds condominium unit.
He answered yes. Amy gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned over to accused.
The latter then ordered him to drive Lucy the maid to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes,
since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. Thereafter, Demetrio returned to the condominium.
Accused asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to go to Apex to get a gas slip
and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the condominium and stayed in the servants
quarters.
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused came in. He asked
Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work
for him forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused shed tears and
embraced Demetrio. Then accused said, "May problema ako, Rio." Demetrio asked what it was,
and accused told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, "Bakit mo siya pinatay?" Accusedanswered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of "bangungot."
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused said that he had already
beheaded her. The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and
bought a big bag with a zipper and rollers.
When they returned to the condominium, accused asked Demetrio to help him wrap the body
in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accuseds bathroom and found the dismembered
hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. They packed all the garbage bags in the bag with the
zipper and rollers. Then, they brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accuseds car.
After that, Demetrio took the wheel and accused sat beside him.
Accused told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City. When they were near
Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused told Demetrio to turn into a narrow road and stop the car.
Accused took the plastic bags and dumped them by the roadside. He called Demetrio and
said, "Tayo na Rio, tuloy na tayo sa Bataan." (Whisenhunt family mansion in Bagac, Bataan)
Before reaching Bagac, accused ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a bridge. Accused
told Demetrio to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed another bridge and accused
threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. When they passed Pilar, Bataan, accused threw Elsas
violet Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary of Bagac, accused wrung a shortsleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it.
13
The next morning, accused ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car, saying, "Rio,
linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho." At 1:00 p.m., they started off for
Manila. As they passed a place called Kabog-kabog, he saw accused take out an ATM card.
Accused burned the middle of the card, twisted it and threw it out of the window. Demetrio
asked accused if he can get off since he wanted to go home to Fairview. Before Demetrio left,
accused-appellant told him, "Rio, you and your family can go on a vacation. I will give you
money." Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation going to Fairview.
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told him
to report the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal
Diaz to talk to him.
The following morning, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and his brothers went to the DOJ. They
were referred to the NBI, where Demetrio gave his statement.
A team of NBI agents proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. There, they
found a crowd of people gathered around the mutilated parts of a human body along the
road. The body parts had been discovered by tricycle drivers.
Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to retrace the route he took with accused going
to Bataan, to retrieve the items thrown away by accused. They were able to recover a violet bag,
one brown sandal and a shirt with violet and green floral prints.
The trial court rendered judgment, convicting accused of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength and outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim (Article 248, par. 6).
Issue:
1. Whether or not the circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present No.
2. Whether or not the circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim is
present Yes.
Held:
1. We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS
A WOMAN DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, ESTABLISH THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME WITH ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH. There ought to be enough proof
of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim.
ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH MUST BE SHOWN AND CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED AS THE CRIME ITSELF. In this case, nobody witnessed the actual killing.
Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of the pieces of physical
14
evidence, that accused deliberately took advantage of his superior strength in overpowering
Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from the photograph of accused that he has a
rather SMALL FRAME. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated against accused.
2. However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was
correctly appreciated by the trial court. The MERE DECAPITATION OF THE VICTIMS
HEAD CONSTITUTES OUTRAGING OR SCOFFING AT THE CORPSE OF THE
VICTIM, THUS QUALIFYING THE KILLING TO MURDER. In this case, accused not
only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed the
dismembered parts in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the ground.
(WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal
Case No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo
actual damages in the amount of P50,000.00; civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
and attorneys fees in the amount of P150,000.00.)
People v. Gonzales
Facts: On a day intended to pay homage to the dead, a pregnant woman was shot to death in
the course of her husbands altercation with the accused and his son along the Garden of
Remembrance within the Loyola Memorial Park in Marikina. The trial court found accused
guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly
sentenced him to death. This case is before us on automatic review.
At about 2:30 p.m. both families of private complainant Noel Andres and accused Gonzalez were
on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection near the Garden of
Remembrance, while Gonzalez was turning left towards the exit and Andres was headed straight
along the road to the exit. their two vehicles almost collided. Andres was able to timely step
on the brakes. The appellant continued driving while Andres drove behind appellants
vehicle for some time and cut him off when he found the opportunity. Andres got out of his
vehicle and knocked on accuseds car window.
Andres calmly told accused to be careful with his driving and informed the latter that he is
with his family and to this Gonzalez allegedly replied, Accidents are accidents, whats your
problem? Andres saw appellant turning red in anger so he decided to go back to his vehicle
when he was blocked by appellants son who said, Anong problema mo sa erpat ko?
Andres testified that he felt threatened and so he immediately boarded his vehicle and partially
opened the car window just wide enough to talk back to appellants son, Dino. SUDDENLY,
ONE OF HIS PASSENGERS SAID BINARIL KAMI. He turned to his wife Feliber
Andres and saw her bloodied and unconscious. His son Kenneth and nephew Kevin were
15
also wounded. Andres admitted that he and Dino were shouting at each other so he did not
hear the shot.
The defenses version of the incident is that Andres cut the appellants path by positioning his FX
obliquely along the appellants lane from the latters left side. Andres got out of his vehicle, stood
beside the appellants car window, and repeatedly cursed the appellant, Putang ina mo, ang
tanda-tanda mo na hindi ka pa marunong magmaneho. Ang bobo-bobo mo. The appellant stayed
inside his car and allegedly replied, Pasensiya ka na hindi kita nakita, nasilaw ako. Aksidente
lang. Dino, appellants son who rode in another vehicle, arrived at the scene and confronted
Andres. When Andres suddenly reached for something inside his vehicle, this prompted
appellant to get his gun from the glove compartment and feeling that his son was threatened
he got out of his car ready to shoot. When he saw that Andres did not have a weapon he put
down his hand holding the gun. This is when the appellants daughter Trisha arrived at the
scene, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. WITH
TRISHAS SUBSTANTIAL BODY WEIGHT PUSHING AGAINST HIM, APPELLANT
LOST HIS BALANCE AND THE GUN ACCIDENTALLY FIRED.
An Information for the complex crime of Murder, Double Frustrated Murder and Attempted
Murder was filed against accused.
The case records show that Feliber Andres, lived to give birth to a baby girl by caesarian section
and died the following morning. Kenneth and Kevin were treated for extraction of metallic
fragments on their faces. They were discharged from the hospital 6 days later.
The trial court rendered judgement finding that the shooting was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and held the appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder for the
death of Feliber Andres and two counts of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez and sentenced the appellant to the maximum of the imposable
penalty which is death.
The trial court took judicial notice on the feature of the automatic pistol used in this case
which is capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. Practically, the stages before an automatic firearm would be capable
of firing are as follows:
1) the loading of a bullet into the chamber of the gun;
2) the cocking of the hammer, if uncocked;
3) the releasing of the safety pin;
4) the pressing of the trigger to unleash the hammer so that the firing pin will hit the
cartridge to propel the bullet out to hit the target.
Realistically, it demonstrates that a gun will not fire even if the bullet is loaded in its
chamber if the hammer is uncocked; or even if cocked if the safety pin is engaged; or even if
the safety pin is disengaged if the trigger will not be pressed. However, even if the gun is
fired if it is not aimed and leveled to the target, the purpose of firing it shall not be
achieved.
16
Contrarily, ONCE A GUN IS DRAWN AGAINST A PERSON, THE MEANS, METHODS

AND FORMS EMPLOYED FOR ITS EXECUTION IS ALREADY CONCEIVED. And
once it is tended directly and specifically to insure its execution, it consequently PRODUCES
THE CONSCIOUS AND DELIBERATE INTENTION.
The defense asserts that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the attendance of
treachery and without the attendance of the said qualifying circumstance the crime committed is
homicide, not murder.
Appellant points out that the shooting happened in a matter of seconds and that it was preceded
by a heated argument between the parties. Such being the case, it is argued that the shooting
could not have been attended by treachery. There was no time for the appellant to consciously
and deliberately employ the mode of attack to insure its execution and at the same time to
eliminate any form of retaliation from the alleged intended victim.
Appellant also avers that the trial court erred in equating the use of an automatic pistol with
treachery. The fact that the gun was drawn and fired does not mean that the mode of attack was
consciously and deliberately employed.
Issue: Whether or not the crime was attended by treachery
Held: No. The shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for
the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder.
Treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the RPC is defined as the deliberate employment of
means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
intended victim might raise. For treachery to be appreciated two elements must concur: 1) the
employment of means of execution that would insure the safety of the accused from
retaliatory acts of the intended victim and leaving the latter without an opportunity to
defend himself and 2) the means employed were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.
The means employed for the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown
to have been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation
of the crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended
victim.
CHANCE ENCOUNTERS, IMPULSE KILLING OR CRIMES COMMITTED AT THE
SPUR OF THE MOMENT OR THAT WERE PRECEDED BY HEATED
ALTERCATIONS ARE GENERALLY NOT ATTENDED BY TREACHERY FOR LACK
OF OPPORTUNITY OF THE ACCUSED TO DELIBERATELY EMPLOY A
TREACHEROUS MODE OF ATTACK. The encounter between Noel Andres and the
appellant was a chance encounter. They were total strangers before their vehicles almost
collided. For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden attack must have been preconceived
by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter.
17
(Whether or not the attack succeeds against its intended victim or injures another or whether the
crime committed is graver than that intended is immaterial, as long as it is shown that the attack
is attended by treachery, the said qualifying circumstance may still be considered by the court.
Thus, the determining factor on whether or not the commission of a crime is attended by
treachery is not the resulting crime committed but the mode of attack employed in its
execution.)
TREACHERY IS NEVER PRESUMED. It is required that the manner of attack must be
shown to have been attended by treachery AS CONCLUSIVELY AS THE CRIME
ITSELF.
The FACT THAT THE APPELLANT FIRED HIS GUN FROM BEHIND THE VICTIM
DOES NOT BY ITSELF AMOUNT TO TREACHERY. There is no evidence on record that
the appellant deliberately positioned himself behind the victim to gain advantage over him
when he fired the shot. On the contrary, the evidence before us reveals that the position of the
appellants car was not of his own doing but it became so when Noel Andres overtook his car and
cut off his path.
(As regards the injuries sustained by the two children we find that the crime committed are two
counts of slight physical injuries. The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is
physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which
are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. Considering the nature and location of their injuries
and the number of days required for their treatment, we find that the crime committed for the
injuries sustained by the children are two counts of slight physical injurie. For evident lack of
criminal intent to kill complainant, the information for attempted homicide must fail.
The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete
defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were
not convincingly proved and none can be considered in the imposition of penalties. The
testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellants pretense of voluntary surrender.
Witness Ramos testified that the appellant drove away towards the gate of the memorial park
while he was questioning him after the shooting and had not Noel Andres and onlookers blocked
his path the appellant could have fled the scene of the crime.
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. For this mitigating
circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce
passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed
within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the
obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful
sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. Noel Andres act of shouting at the
appellants son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion
and obfuscation. Besides, Dino was shouting back at Noel Andres. It was not a case wherein the
appellants son appeared helpless and oppressed that the appellant lost his reason and shot at the
FX of Noel Andres.
18
The same holds true for the appellants claim of provocation on the part of Noel Andres.
Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the
provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation
varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres
towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient
provocation to shoot at the complainants vehicle.
The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative
is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his
son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them. Finally, the plea for the
appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is
likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable
disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested
from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The
appellants use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should
have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The
use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed.)
(WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED. The appellant is hereby
found guilty of homicide for the death of Feliber Andres and is sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 14 years 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. For each count of
the slight physical injuries committed against Kenneth Andres and Kevin Valdez, the appellant
is hereby sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor.)
People v. Ulep
Facts: In the aftermath of an incident where a certain Buenaventura Wapili went berserk at
Mundog Subdivision, Poblacion Kidapawan, Cotabato, Police Officer Ernesto Ulep was found
guilty of murder for killing Wapili.
Around 2 AM, Buenaventura Wapili was having a high fever and was heard talking insensibly
to himself in his room. His brother-in-law Leydan heard a disturbance inside the room, as if
Wapili was smashing the furniture. Unable to pacify Wapili, Leydan called Pastor Bonid of
the Alliance Church of Kidapawan to help him "pray over" Wapili, but they could not enter
the latter's room as he became wild and violent. Suddenly, Wapili bolted out of his room
naked and chased Leydan. Thereafter, Leydan with the aid of two of his neighbors attempted to
tie Wapili with a rope but was unsuccessful as Wapili was much bigger in built and stronger than
anyone of them. Wapili, who appeared to have completely gone crazy, kept on running
without any particular direction.
Thus, Leydan went to the house of a policewoman Plando, a neighbor, and asked for
assistance. As Wapili passed by the house of Plando, he banged Plandos vehicle parked
outside. Using a hand-held radio, Plando then contacted SPO1 Ernesto Ulep, SPO1 Edilberto
19
Espadera and SPO2 Crispin Pillo, all members of the PNP assigned to secure the premises of
the nearby Roman Catholic Church of Kidapawan.
SPO1 Ulep together with SPO1 Espadera and SPO2 Pillo arrived at the scene. The three police
officers, all armed with M-16 rifles, alighted from the jeep when they saw the naked Wapili
approaching them. The kind of weapon Wapili was armed with is disputed. The police
claimed that he was armed with a bolo and a rattan stool, while Wapili's relatives and neighbors
said he had no bolo, but only a rattan stool.
Ulep fired a warning shot in the air and told Wapili to put down his weapons or they would
shoot him. But Wapili retorted "pusila!" ("fire!") and continued advancing towards the
police officers. When Wapili was only about 2-3 meters away from them, ULEP SHOT THE
VICTIM WITH HIS M-16 RIFLE, HITTING HIM IN VARIOUS PARTS OF HIS BODY.
As the victim slumped to the ground, Ulep came closer and pumped another bullet into his
head and literally blew his brains out.
The post mortem examination concluded that the shots were fired at close range, perhaps
within 24 inches, judging from the powder burns found around some of the wounds in the body,
and that the wound in the head, which caused the victim's instantaneous death, was inflicted
while "the victim was in a lying position."
The Office of the Ombudsman for the Military filed an Information for murder against SPO1
Ulep. The accused insisted during the trial that he acted in self-defense. However, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting the accused of murder and sentencing him to death.
The trial court held that the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the alleged
aggression is not reasonable because the victim was already on the ground, therefore, there
was no necessity for the accused to pump another shot on the back portion of the victim's
head. Clearly the gravity of the wounds sustained by the victim belies the pretension of the
accused that he acted in self-defense.
(Appellant prays for his acquittal on the basis of his claim that the killing of the victim was in
the course of the performance of his official duty as a police officer, and in self-defense.)
Issue: Whether or not there was treachery
Held: No. This Court disagrees with the conclusion of the court a quo that the killing of Wapili
was attended by treachery, thus qualifying the offense to murder. We discern nothing from the
evidence that the assault was so sudden and unexpected and that accused deliberately
adopted a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Wapili, without the victim having
the opportunity to defend himself.
On the contrary, the victim could not have been taken by surprise as he was given more than
sufficient warning by accused before he was shot, i.e., accused fired a warning shot in the air,
and specifically ordered him to lower his weapons or he would be shot. The killing of Wapili
was not sought on purpose. Accused went to the scene in pursuance of his official duty as a
20
police officer after having been summoned for assistance. The decision to kill was made in an
instant and the VICTIM'S HELPLESS POSITION WAS MERELY INCIDENTAL TO HIS
HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY SHOT BY ACCUSED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS
OFFICIAL DUTY.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
CONSIDERING THE RULE THAT TREACHERY CANNOT BE INFERRED BUT
MUST BE PROVED AS FULLY AND CONVINCINGLY AS THE CRIME ITSELF, ANY
DOUBT AS TO ITS EXISTENCE MUST BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to murder,
accused may only be convicted of homicide.
(Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of the RPC may
be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence of two requisites, namely, that he
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or an office, and that
the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The SECOND REQUISITE
IS LACKING IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Accused and the other police officers involved originally set out to perform a legal duty: to
render police assistance, and restore peace and order at Mundog Subdivision where the victim
was then running amuck. There were two stages of the incident at Mundog Subdivision. During
the first stage, the victim threatened the safety of the police officers by menacingly
advancing towards them, notwithstanding accused's previous warning shot and verbal
admonition to the victim to lay down his weapon or he would be shot. As a police officer, it is to
be expected that accused stand his ground. Up to that point, his decision to respond with a
barrage of gunfire to halt the victim's further advance was justified under the
circumstances.
However, he cannot be exonerated from OVERDOING his duty during the second stage of
the incident - when he fatally shot the victim in the head, even after the latter slumped to
the ground due to multiple gunshot wounds. The VICTIM AT THAT POINT NO LONGER
POSED A THREAT and was already incapable of mounting an aggression against the police
officers. It cannot therefore be said that the fatal wound in the head of the victim was a
necessary consequence of accuseds due performance of a duty or the lawful exercise of a
right or office.
Likewise, the evidence at hand does not favor his claim of self-defense. The elements in order
for self-defense to be appreciated are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or
killed by the accused; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and,
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non. There can be no selfdefense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression
21
against the person defending himself. In the present case, the records show that the victim was
lying in a prone position on the ground - bleeding from the bullet wounds he sustained, and
possibly unconscious - when accused shot him in the head. The AGGRESSION THAT WAS
INITIALLY BEGUN BY THE VICTIM ALREADY CEASED WHEN ACCUSED
ATTACKED HIM.)
(WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1 ERNESTO
ULEP is found guilty of HOMICIDE, instead of Murder, and is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional medium
as minimum, to six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor minimum
as maximum. He is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Buenaventura Wapili in the amount
of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.)
People v. Antonio
Facts: What should have been an amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned
into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other. The
victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, a former professional basketball player, succumbed
instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly
precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder qualified by treachery by the trial court as the killer is Alberto "Ambet"
S. Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during
his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially acquainted. They both started
frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), in San Juan. Often, the two would meet
with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second floor of the
club. Their preferred games were poker or "pusoy dos", ordinary poker or Russian poker. Their
bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
In the final hours of November 1, 1996, Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then
president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for a poker session. Debdani failed to
appear, so Antonio and Tuadles decided to play "pusoy dos," a game for two players only.
They continued playing until around 9 in the morning of November 2, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument
arose. The prosecution alleged that without warning or cause, Antonio pulled his gun from
behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus employing treacherous means to
accomplish the deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony of a
security guard who testified as to how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, Antonio testified that Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonios gun from atop a
side table. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles hand and they
grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face
down to the floor. Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation
was to defend himself.
22
Antonio convinced the two security guards to accompany him to his home in Greenmeadows
Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to the San Juan Police Station. With them
was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonios residence
for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his lawyer. At
around 3 in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in
the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities.
An Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also charged as accessories
were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Cartalla.
Nieto for harboring or assisting the accused, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately said accused to the authorities and by giving false information which tended to
deceive the investigating authorities. Cartalla for concealing or destroying the effects or
instruments of the body of the crime, in order to prevent its discovery, by removing the laser
sight of the gun used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the
evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the crime laboratory service
of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
All three accused were found guilty as charged.
Issue: Whether or not treachery was present
Held: No. There was no treachery in this case. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a
killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of
attack for a specific purpose. Such deliberate or conscious choice is non-existent where the
attack was the product of an IMPULSE OF THE MOMENT.
Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of attack has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required
before any conclusion may also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery. There is no
such proof in this case.
There would be no treachery when the VICTIM WAS PLACED ON GUARD, such as when
a HEATED ARGUMENT PRECEDED THE ATTACK, or when the victim was standing
face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have been unforeseen.
(THIS!!!)
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His
criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there
was no treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought
of by the offender.
It was ANTONIO'S SUDDEN ANGER AND HEATED PASSION WHICH DROVE HIM
TO PULL HIS GUN AND SHOOT TUADLES. SAID PASSION, HOWEVER, CANNOT
CO-EXIST WITH TREACHERY. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In
23
treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and deliberately. One
who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot consciously employ a
particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. (THIS!)
Moreover, the proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before
the fatal shooting allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself.
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide.
(It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not make him an
accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he may be administratively liable for the
loss of a part of the evidence for the prosecution in this case.68
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No.
111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant
Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the
crime of HOMICIDE, and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles the
following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and absolved of all liability, both criminal or
civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ "Ambet", appellant Juanito Nieto y
Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of
P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.)
People v. Tomas
Facts: In an Information, the three accused were indicted for the crime of murder, allegedly
committed as follows:
24
That on or about July 19, 2006, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Municipality of
Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot several times one Estrella Doctor Casco
which [caused] her instantaneous death.
The victim, Estrella Doctor Casco, was based in the United States, working there as a
procurement specialist with Safeway, Inc. and as a planner. She arrived in the Philippines about
10 days before the incident.
At around 9:45 PM, Estrella, with her mother Damiana and caretakers Liezl Toledo and
Angelita Duque, were traversing the road towards her house in Tarlac after she had parked
her rented car at the house of Liezls mother-in-law. They had just come from the clinic of Dr.
Salvador for a medical check-up of Damiana.
Estrella was walking slightly ahead when appellants Tomas, Doctor and Gatchalian suddenly
came out from the side of the road. Tomas, Sr. and Doctor are cousins of Estrella.
WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING, TOMAS DREW A GUN AND SHOT ESTRELLA
TWICE AT A DISTANCE OF ABOUT 1.5 METERS AWAY. Gatchalian, without a gun,
supported Tomas by standing in a blocking position along the road, while Doctor positioned
himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita and poked a handgun at them, telling them to
lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally drop on the road but were in a kneeling
position.
When Tomas fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still
followed it with THREE MORE SHOTS when she was already prone on the ground. The
three accused fled towards the house of Tomas. Liezl shouted for help. Estrella was declared
dead on arrival at the hospital.
At the police station, both Liezl and Angelita categorically identified the three accused as the
ones who perpetrated the crime. On the same day, defendants were arrested in their respective
homes.
Liezl opined that what probably prompted the three accused to murder Estrella were the facts
that: (1) Tomas was removed as administrator of Estrellas properties in Tarlac; (2) Tomas
lost several cases against Estrellas father, Cecilio; (3) Tomas accused Estrella of instigating
and financing several cases filed against him; and (4) Cecilio filed a case against the father
of accused Doctor, involving an easement of a property.
Defendants averred that they were in their respective homes sleeping when the incident
happened. Since Tomas suffered a cardiac arrest in December 1988, he had regular attacks and,
on that day, feeling bad, he slept early at around 7 p.m.
25
The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty of murder. The RTC appreciated
treachery in the swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack upon the unarmed Estrella
without the slightest provocation. The CA affirmed.
Appellants contend, among others, the absence of treachery, since their simultaneous and
sudden appearance could not amount to it, for Tomas still had to draw his gun before shooting
Estrella, and Doctor still had to position himself behind Damiana and Angelita before
ordering them to drop or lie face down on the ground. Evidently, the VICTIM HAD AMPLE
OPPORTUNITY TO DODGE OR DEFEND HERSELF.
Held: Yes. While the party of Estrella was walking, appellants suddenly appeared from the
side of the road. Without uttering any word, Tomas drew his gun and shot Estrella twice,
while Doctor simultaneously poked a gun at Angelita and Damiana. And when Estrella
already fell down, Tomas shot her thrice moreperhaps to ensure her death. Then
appellants fled. It is, thus, clear that the shooting of Estrella was done with treachery. The
nefarious act was DONE IN A FEW MOMENTS; it was UNEXPECTED as it was SUDDEN.
The ACT OF DOCTOR IN IMMOBILIZING ANGELITA AND DAMIANA IN THOSE
BRIEF MOMENTS AFFORDED AND ENSURED APPELLANTS IMPUNITY.
(WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Tony Tomas, Sr. and Benedicto
Doctor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. This Court also finds accused Nestor
Gatchalian guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice to the offense of Murder. All of
the said accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly the heirs of the victim, the following:
1.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2.) The amount of PhP 50,000.00 as moral damages;
3.) The amount of PhP 30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4.) The amount of PhP 385,416.33 and another amount of USD 2,182.78 or its equivalent in
Philippine pesos at the time of its payment as actual damages; and,
5.) The amount of USD 368,000 or its equivalent in Philippine pesos at the time of its payment
for loss of income of the victim.)
Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
three Criminal Cases. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident in San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup and injured Noel Villanueva. Accused
were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder. Accused
were all members of the Integrated National Police stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga, barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, members of the Civil
Home Defense Force or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan.
26
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and
conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S.
Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different
parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
On the evening of the incident, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at
the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations. The company decided
to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession. With Licup in the passenger
seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly
proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve
on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely.
Both Flores and Villanueva allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down. After the
shooting, Flores jumped out of the jeepney when he saw petitioner Pamintuan emerging.
Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. Villanueva cried out and told
Flores to summon Salangsang for help as he and Licup were wounded. Flores dashed back to
Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was
also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney by two armed
men together with Pamintuan, to be taken to the hospital.
As soon as Flores and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the
Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. Licup later
expired at the hospital. Flores claimed that all the accused had not been known to him prior to
the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he
denied having had any rift. The bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were all on the passenger
side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.
Salangsang testified that he caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type
jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he remembered
to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay.
Only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the commander of the
Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga. He narrated that he and his men
received a summon for police assistance concerning a reported presence of armed NPA
members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their
uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them.
27
Yapyuco and his group met with Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four
men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan intimated
that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes had also brought in a number of armed men
and CAFGU members. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects,
hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where
the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. AS THE
JEEPNEY CAME MUCH CLOSER, PAMINTUAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS THE
TARGET VEHICLE, so they allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He
claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This inspired
them to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were
impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting
from the direction of a nearby house directly at the subject jeepney. (may mysterious
shooter daw)
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and
his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital.
From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the
people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was
likewise gone.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty only of HOMICIDE for the eventual death of
Licup, and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva.
The Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved
because first, it was not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing
injury to Villanueva and Licup began and developed, and second, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE
MUST BE SUPPORTED BY PROOF OF A DELIBERATE AND CONSCIOUS
ADOPTION OF THE MODE OF ATTACK AND CANNOT BE DRAWN FROM MERE
SUPPOSITIONS OR FROM CIRCUMSTANCES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
AGGRESSION.
The same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco
received the summons for assistance and the time he and his men responded at the scene,
there was no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that
circumstance.
Held: No. The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only. The allegation of EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is
consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as
instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest.
The same is true with TREACHERY, inasmuch as there is NO CLEAR AND INDUBITABLE
28
PROOF THAT the MODE OF ATTACK WAS CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY

ADOPTED BY PETITIONERS.
(WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate
sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup
in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00
as moral damages.)
People v. Tac-an
Facts: Renato Tac-an and Francis Escano were close friends being classmates in high school and
members of the local Bronx gang. Francis withdrew from the gang on the advice of his mother
who saw that Renato carried a handgun on his visits to their home. Things started turning sour
between the two, and came to a head on Dec 14, 1984. After an earlier altercation on that day,
Renato went home and got his gun. He entered the Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso
Pasilbas in Rm15 and shouted for Francis. After locating the victim he fired at him but missed.
He was later able to hit him in the head as he was running to the door with his classmates to
escape. After this, Renato paced outside in the hallway. A teacher unknowing that Renato was the
culprit, asked him for help unwittingly informing him that Francis was still alive. Renato
immediately re-entered the room and saying "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing
over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis
and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited on his
front chest just above the right nipple.
Tac-an was charged with illegal possession of firearms qualified with Murder under P.D. No.
1866. An amended information for murder was subsequently filed aggravated by the use of
illegal possession of firearms.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant under both informations.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery because before any shot was fired, Renato
had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement was a
warning to Francis and that the first three shots he had fired at Francis were merely warning
shots. Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had
uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a gun, appellant argues
29
that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient time to prepare for
the coming of appellant.
Appellant likewise contends that there was no evident premeditation, pointing out that
BARELY 15 MINUTES had elapsed from the time Renato left his English III class and the
time he returned with a gun.
Issue:
1. Whether or not illegal possession of a firearm is a special aggravating circumstance in
homicide and murder No.
2. Whether or not there was treachery Yes.
3. Whether or not there was evident premeditation Held:
1. No. There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the
fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death or reclusion perpetua. The
unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or
committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances
set out in Article 14 of the RPC.
However, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition or disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase
of the imposable penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed
firearm where such firearm was used to destroy human life.
2. Yes. The Court pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15
had no means of escape there being only one door and Room 15 being on the second floor of
the building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit as he stood on the teacher's platform
closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through the door.
Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to warn
Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel
Ungab.
That Renato fired three shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be
ascribed to the indifferent marksmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the
other students were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to evade
the shots.
The attack upon Francis had been carried out in a manner which disabled Francis from
defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally, the circumstance that Renato,
having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15 and fired again at Francis
30
who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious choice of
means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim without
risk to himself.
3. No. In order that evident premeditation may be taken into account, there must be proof of (a) the
time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of
the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the offender to
commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. The defense.
While there was testimony to the fact that before that fatal day, anger and resentment had
already welled up between Francis and Renato, there was NO EVIDENCE SHOWING
WHEN RENATO HAD FORMED THE INTENTION AND DETERMINATION TO
TAKE THE LIFE OF FRANCIS. Accordingly, we must discard evident premeditation as an
aggravating circumstance.
(ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the
following manner and to the following extent only:
1.
In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2.
In Criminal Case No. 4012 (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall be DELETED and
not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the
influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be
DELETED and not taken into account. There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present, the appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As so modified, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.)
People v. Pugay
Facts: Pugay and Samson were charged with murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength,
and the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body
of Bayani Miranda.
Bayani Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run
errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of the incident, a town
fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
The accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived. These persons appeared
to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking
31
nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling him with
a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing, PUGAY TOOK A CAN OF GASOLINE FROM
UNDER THE ENGINE OF THE FERRIS WHEEL and POURED ITS CONTENTS ON
THE BODY OF THE MIRANDA. Then, SAMSON SET MIRANDA ON FIRE, MAKING
A HUMAN TORCH OUT OF HIM.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased.
Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with
rags to extinguish the flame. The deceased was rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment.
The trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty but crediting in favor of Pugay
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Held: No. There is absence of proof that Samson had some reason to kill the deceased before
the incident. On the contrary, his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening.
For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended party might make.
As no sufficient evidence appears establishing any qualifying circumstances, Samson is only
guilty of HOMICIDE. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. The eyewitness
testified that Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning.
Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its
contents on the body of the deceased, Pugay knew that the can contained gasoline. The
stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring
the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable
consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the time
were making fun of the deceased. Accused is only guilty of HOMICIDE THROUGH
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE.
(There is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention between the two accused immediately before the commission of the crime.
There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused. Their meeting at the scene of
the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted
to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and
Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not
collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.)
32
People v. Buensuceso
Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the CFI of Bataan, convicting appellants
BUENSUCESO, AGUILAR, IZON and JOSON, all members of the police force of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, of Murder.
Between 5-6 in the afternoon, while prosecution witness Apolonio Salvador was in his small
store beside the market near the municipal building of Dinalupihan, Bataan, he saw Patrolman
Aguilar and Pariseo Tayag conversing as they were walking side by side, each resting his
hand on the shoulder of the other, going towards the municipal building.
Aguilar was trying to take the fan knife of Tayag, but could not take it because Tayag
prevented him from taking it by gripping it with his right hand and swaying it left and right
as if playing. At the suggestion of Aguilar, Tayag readily agreed to go to the office of the chief
of police.
When they arrived in the said office, there were two persons there: Mallo and Mallari. Mallari
was the municipal guard and in uniform. Subsequently, A HEATED ARGUMENT TOOK
PLACE BETWEEN AGUILAR AND TAYAG ARISING FROM THE LATTER'S
REFUSAL TO GIVE HIS FAN KNIFE TO THE FORMER. Patrolman de la Cruz appeared
at the doorway
When Tayag was about to leave the office, Chief of Police Canlas arrived and inquired what the
trouble was an about. Aguilar answered that the two of them had been cursed by Tayag. Tayag
asserted that he did not curse either of them, but that Aguilar was forcing him to give up his
knife. Tayag hurriedly left the office. He was followed by Aguilar, Mallari and de la Cruz
who walked fast, with Aguilar and Mallari holding guns. After having gone out of the
building, AGUILAR FIRED HIS GUN UPWARD.
Hearing the shot, Tayag turned around, then retreated backwards until he reached the fence of the
plaza. When Tayag was near the wooden fence, AGUILAR AIMED HIS GUN AT TAYAG
AND FIRED, HITTING HIM ABOVE THE RIGHT KNEE. Tayag continued to run
towards his house. Mallari and Aguilar went to the waiting shed to intercept Tayag. Then
there were several successive gun shots, more or less nine in number. After the commotion,
Tayag was seen lying prostrate on the ground.
A defense witness, a waitress, testified that the deceased together with some companions had
drunk beer inside Freddie's Restaurant before the shooting incident.
The trial court found them guilty of Murder.
Held: Yes. The crime is Murder, qualified by treachery. The victim was already retreating
backwards until he reached the fence of the town plaza when AGUILAR fired his revolver,
hitting the victim above the right knee. NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS
33
ALREADY HIT AND WOUNDED, HE WAS STILL SUBJECTED TO SUCCESSIVE

SHOTS. Certainly, the means employed by the accused tended directly and specially to
insure the execution of the crime without risk to themselves arising from any defense which
the victim might have made.
The killing of the victim was aggravated by abuse of superior strength as shown by the
number of assailants, which circumstance, however, is ABSORBED BY TREACHERY.
People v. Salufrania
Facts: Salufrania, by boxing and strangling Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania, his wife and who at
the time was 8 months pregnant, caused upon her injuries resulting in her instantaneous
death and the death of the child who was still in its maternal womb. Thus Filomeno was
charged with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion.
One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of appellant and deceased. He
stated that his father and mother quarrelled at about 6 in the evening; that during said quarrel,
he saw his father BOX HIS PREGNANT MOTHER ON THE STOMACH and, once fallen
on the floor, his father STRANGLED HER TO DEATH; that he saw blood ooze from the
eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell.
Pedro further testified that after killing his mother, the accused went out of the house to get a
hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the accused
killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep; that their father
arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on
the hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house
of his sister Conching in Tigbinan; that from Tigbinan the corpse was transferred to Gabon,
Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.
Pedro stated that he is now living with his uncle, Narciso Abuyo and refused to live with his
father, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other siblings should he reveal
the true cause of his mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo. The children first informed their uncle
that their mother died of stomach ailment and headache. When he asked why the children refused
to go home with their father, his nephew Alex told him that the real cause of death of their
mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and
strangled to death by their father. Immediately after learning the true cause of death of his sister,
Narciso brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities.
The trial court found the appellant guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to the penalty
of death. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of the complex crime
of parricide with intentional abortion, as there is no evidence to show that he had the intention
to cause an abortion.
34
Issue: Whether or not the accused is liable for parricide with intentional abortion
Held: No. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with UNINTENTIONAL ABORTION.
The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.
It has been clearly established:
(a) that Marciana Abuyo was 7-8 months pregnant when she was killed;
(b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband;
(c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the fetus in her
womb.
However, the intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing
on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not
sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely
intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
(WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00
awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the
recent decisions of the Court.)
People v. Porras
Facts: On the night of the incident, accused John Porras and Sergio Emelo went to the police
Station looking for Roldan Emelo of the Cavite City PNP, a cousin of the latter and was directed
to where he was. They had some food and drinks at the Banaue Restaurant and Emelo asked for
his black ammo pouch and some .38 caliber ammunition. They proceeded to the Aroma Beer
House where the victim, Rosendo Mortel, was tabled and wherein some misunderstanding
happened and Ronnie Mortel went out and was shot at close range by either Porras or
Emelo as seen by a waitress. After seeing Rosendo sprawled on the ground and bloodied, Poras
fled into an alley and thereafter returned and shot the prostrate victim twice, killing the
victim instantaneously.
An Information was filed charging appellants for murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The trial court rendered judgment finding Porras and Emelo guilty of murder and Emelo
guilty of frustrated homicide.
35

Held: No. The trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery against
appellants. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as conclusively
as the killing itself.
To appreciate it, two conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said
means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted.
The prosecution failed to definitively establish the manner in which the initial assault
against the victim was committed to justify the appreciation of treachery. IN ORDER TO
APPRECIATE TREACHERY AS A MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN A
CONTINUOUS AGGRESSION, THE SAME MUST BE SHOWN PRESENT AT THE
INCEPTION OF THE ATTACK.
With respect to the shooting of Bermas by appellant Emelo, the trial court properly discarded
the qualifying circumstance of treachery and correctly ruled that the crime committed is
Frustrated Homicide and not Frustrated Murder as alleged in the Information. The
shooting of Bermas who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing appellants was, at best,
done in a spur of the moment, an act which can hardly be characterized as treacherous for
it was NOWHERE PROVED THAT THE SAME WAS DELIBERATELY ADOPTED TO
DENY BERMAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
(When an act done is beyond the contemplation of the co-conspirators and is not a necessary or
logical consequence of the intended crime then only the actual perpetrators are to be held liable.
In this case, the conspiracy proven concerns solely the killing of Mortel and not the shooting of
Bermas. Thus, Emelo alone should be held liable for the crime of Frustrated Homicide.)
(WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No.
245-91, finding the appellants JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, Considering the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, respectively, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of the deceased Rosendo Mortel the amount of P50,000.00, plus actual damages and funeral
expenses in the amount of P67,000.00. The award for moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 which we find to be excessive is hereby reduced to P50,000.00. However, in
Criminal Case No. 246-91, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.)
People v. Castillo
36
Note: Tanalega was already a pharmacy graduate, but she had not yet taken and passed the
government examination conducted by the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners; and she had
worked as a pharmacy clerk in different drug stores in the City of Manila, before her
employment in the same capacity in the Escudero Drug Store.
Facts: Appellants Dr. Leon Castillo and Nena Tanalega Raymundo was accused of the crime of
frustrated murder by poisoning through reckless imprudence, committed as follows:
Silvino Belarmino presented a prescription at the Escudero Drug Store and requested Dr. Castillo
to prepare for him 1/3 of the formula. Dr. Castillo and Tanalega helped each other prepare
and dispense the said prescription.
In the afternoon of the same day, Belarmino took one of the capsules with a glass of water, and
left his house for a walk; and about 20 minutes after he had taken said medicine, he became
ill. He felt dizzy and had difficulty in breathing, and he could hardly stand as his knees
became shaky. About two hours after, complainant's legs began to stiffen, his stomach to
harden, his lips to draw back, and his tongue to shrink to his throat, and he could not talk;
and so complainant's family sent for a physician, Dr. Reyes. The following day, complainant
explained to him all that had happened and showed him the remaining four capsules. The
physician advised complainant not to take any more of said remaining four capsules.
Believing there must have been something wrong with the medicine he had purchased from
the Escudero Drug Store, Belarmino sent two of the four capsules to the Bureau of Science
for examination. The chemist submitted a report in which it was shown that appellants had
ERRONEOUSLY USED AND MIXED STRYCHNINE SULPHATE, A HIGHLY
POISONOUS SUBSTANCE, INSTEAD OF SPARTEIN SULPHATE.
Belarmino consulted his physician Dr. Sison, informing the latter of the medicine purchased by
him from the Escudero Drug Store and the symptoms he experienced. The said physician
informed him that he had been a victim of poisoning.
It has also been shown by expert testimony that 50.5 milligrams of strychnine sulphate found in
one of the capsules examined was sufficient to cause the death of herein complainant, if not for
the fact that, in compounding said prescription, phenobarbital and carbromal had been mixed
therewith, which two substances diminished the deadly effect of strychnine sulphate as poison.
Complainant caused the filing of an Information for frustrated murder by poisoning through
reckless imprudence against Dr. Leon Castillo and Nena Tanalega, as manager and pharmacy
clerk of the Escudero Drug Store, respectively.
The lower court rendered judgment finding Tanalega guilty of the crime charged, but
acquitting her co-accused Dr. Castillo.
The CA found Tanalega guilty of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Issue: Whether or not appellants are liable for frustrated homicide
37
Held: No. In view of the facts stated above, said judgment of conviction is untenable, on the
ground that the offense of frustrated homicide requires the concurrence of the ESSENTIAL
REQUISITE OF INTENT TO KILL, WHICH IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE
CHARGE OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE. Although, a charge for physical injuries, serious
or less serious, through reckless imprudence, is legally proper under the law, as in that case
the act sought to be punished is the material damage or injury actually done.
Appellant claim, among others, that no evidence has been adduced to show the nature or
extent of the injury, if any, sustained, and whether such injury, if any, had been caused by
the drug sold to him by the Escudero Drug Store, as no specimen had been taken from the
contents of the stomach of complainant for chemical examination and analysis; and that it
has not been possible, of course, to make any examination of the stomach of the complainant.
Furthermore, even admitting for the sake of argument, that the offense of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence were imputable to appellant, the corresponding action
should have been instituted against her within the period of 2 months as prescribed under
article 90 of the RPC. The information having been filed 7 months after the alleged offense
was committed, the corresponding criminal action had already prescribed.
(Defendant and appellant Nena Tanalega Raymundo is found guilty of having prepared one
medicine for another, under a false name, in violation of section 751 of the Revised
Administrative Code; and, in accordance with the provisions of section 2676 thereof, she is
hereby sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred pesos (P200), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of this instance; and with this modification the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon is upheld.)
Cortez v. CA
Facts: Assailed in this petition for review are the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26,
1970 affirming the conviction of petitioners for homicide in Criminal Cases Nos. 4376 and 4377
and less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 4375, and the resolution of June 25, 1970
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. This case was considered submitted for decision
on April 7, 1972.
Petitioners Arcadio Cortez, Paulino Sampang and one Benjamin Villanueva were charged with
the crime of murder for the deaths of Escolastica Pingol and Luis Baltazar and frustrated murder
for the injuries sustained by Santiago Baltazar. After joint trial, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch II, found Cortez and Sampang guilty of homicide in Criminal Cases Nos.
4375 and 4377. In both cases they were sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, ordered
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Escolastica Pingol and Luis Baltazar in the sum of
6,000 pesos and to pay each, one third of the costs. In Criminal Case No. 4376, the trial court
found Arcadio Cortez and Paulino Sampang guilty of less serious physical injuries and sentenced
38
to four (4) months of arresto mayor and to pay each, one third of the costs. Benjamin Villanueva
was acquitted by the court in those three cases [pp. 252-253, rec.]
From the judgment, Arcadio Cortez and Paulino Sampang appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
latter court rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, finding no cogent reasons to reverse the judgment appealed from, being in
accordance with the law and evidence on record, the same is hereby affirmed except the
indemnity in the two homicide cases, which is raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 pesos in
each case and each accused appellant to pay 1/3 of the costs in this instance. (p. 34, Rollo.)
The conviction was based on the following facts as found by the Court of Appeals:
Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock on the night of October 21, 1961 while Santiago Baltazar, his
wife Escolastica Pingol and his four sons Ruben, Pablo, Orlando and Luis, all of tender ages,
were sleeping in their house at Barrio Mitla, Porac Pampanga, the said Santiago Baltazar was
awakened by the barking of the dogs )pp. 1-2, 9 t.s.n, Nov. 27, 1962; pp. 12-13, t.s.n., Jan. 14,
1963). Then he heard a voice which he recognized as that of Arcadio Cortez for he knew him
long before the incident, asking "Are the owners of the house in?" (pp. 2-3, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962.,
pp. 12-13, Jan. 14, 1963). He peeped through a hole and there on the ground he saw and
recognized, for the moon was very bright, another man, Paulino Sampang, whom he knew very
well before the incident (pp. 2, 9, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962; p. 14, t.s.n., Jan. 14, 1963). Being the
owner of the house, Santiago Baltazar had no alternative but to go downstairs, however, before
he did that, he told his wife who was also awaken [sic] by the barking of the dogs that there were
three persons in all near their house (pp. 3-4, t.s.n., Jan. 24, 1963).
Upon reaching the ground, Santiago Baltazar approached Paulino Sampang who was armed with
a .22 cal. gun and asked him: "What is it you want, Abe?," to this question, Sampang replied: "If
you want to know, you come and see our Commander." When he said "Commander he was
referring to Arcadio Cortez who was under a bullcart. (pp. 7-11, t.s.n., Jan. 24, 1963; p. 3, t.s.n.,
Nov. 27,1962).
When Santiago Baltazar approached Arcadio Cortez, the latter moved away from him and
holding a (G)arand with his two hands over his head, told Baltazar: "Go back to your wife."
Baltazar started moving towards the house and upon reaching the foot of the stairs, he faced
them (Arcadio Cortez and Paulino Sampang). At this instance, Cortez and Sampang began
shooting at the house and also at him. Baltazar was hit in the right thigh. He fell and lost
consciousness (p. 4, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962).
When he regained consciousness, he saw nobody on the ground but he heard a voice inside the
house saying, "Go on, Go on." At the same time he also heard a thud as if someone was hacking
somebody with a bolo. He tried to rise but he was shot again in the right ear and consequently
fell unconscious a second time (p. 6, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962.
When he regained consciousness again he felt that his son Pablo was embracing him, saying
"Father you have been wounded." And while he heard the screaming of his other children, he
39
managed to go under the house and with a piece of rag he bound his wound. Then he crawled
upstairs. There he saw his wife and youngest son already dead. He examined her body and found
her having a bolo wound on her left shoulder and a bullet wound on the breast (p. 6, t.s.n., Nov.
27, 1962),
People began coming to the premises. Among them was Vice-Mayor Genaro Dimalanta to whom
Santiago Baltazar gave two unfired bullets which he found on the ground. They fell when the
Garand held by Arcadio Cortez jammed twice (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962, pp. 12, 17 t.s.n.,
Jan. 24, 1963).
The vice-mayor in turn brought Santiago Baltazar to the Pampanga Provincial Hospital where he
was hospitalized for two weeks. While there he was visited by two P.C. men, one of them was
Major Lim. They asked him whom he suspected and he said he didn't know, ... After having been
discharged from the provincial hospital, Baltazar was treated for more than two months in the
clinic of Dr. Benita Ayson in Manibaug Porac, Pampanga (pp. 6-8, t.s.n., Nov. 27, 1962.)
Medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Bienvenido Ignacio of the Pampanga Provincial Hospital
(Exh. D, p. 9, roll of exhibits) disclosed the following injuries sustained by Santiago Baltazar:
1.
Gunshot wound, tragus through and through with the entrance below and the exit, above
the tragus.
2.
Gunshot wound, slight of the superior portion of the right Pinna of the ear.
3.
Gunshot wound, 1 1/2 cm. in diameter antero medical portion of the middle third of the
right thigh with hematoma 2 inches above the wound.
4.
Probing direction of the wound upward, 3 1/2 inches in length.
5.
X-ray of the thigh, right. Metallic foreign body in the muscle tissue, median portion of
the buttocks.
Death certificate of Escolastica Pingol (Exhibit E) stated that the cause of death as certified by
Dra. Benita Ayson, was hemorrhage due to total wounds (gunshot).
And the death certificate of Luis Baltazar (Exhibit F) disclosed that the cause of death as found
by the same physician wall internal hemorrhage caused by trauma on the chest. (pp. 26-29,
Rollo; Italics supplied.)
1.
In the instant petition, petitioners' main contention is that there was insufficient
Identification in law to sustain a judgment of conviction. They assert that although Santiago
Baltazar identified them in court on November 27, 1962, he failed to reveal their names to P.C.
investigators on October 22, 1961, the morning after the crime was committed thus showing that
there was no proper Identification in law to sustain their convictions.
40
In not a few decisions, this Court has ruled that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrators of
the crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and his
testimony [People v. Catao G.R. No. L-9532,107 Phil. 861 (1961); People v. Bulan, G.R. No. L14934, 108 Phil. 932 (1960); People v. Lao Wan Sing, 125 Phil. 43 (1966), 18 SCRA 1076;
People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. L-37080, 122 SCRA 94, 92 SCRA 933 (1953); People v. Cabanit
G.R. No. L-62030-31, Oct. 4,1985,139 SCRA 94; People v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-68805 July 9,
1986, 142 SCRA 583; People v. Andres, G.R. No. 75355, October 29, 1987; and People v.
Renejane et al. G.R. Nos. 76954-55, February 26,1988.]
To explain the delay, Baltazar testified as follows:
Q:
A while ago in your answer to the cross-examination of counsel, you mentioned that it
was Paulino Sampang who fired the shot at you. Will you tell the Court the reason why you did
not mention Paulino Sampang to the P.C. officers when they interrogated you in the hospital?
A:
Because I was not sure of the Identity of the interrogators, that is the reason I did not
name names. Now that I am sure before this Honorable Court, I gave the names here.
COURT
Q:
Did you not say that somebody introduced himself as Major Lim?
A:
Yes, Sir, he introduced himself as such, but I doubted his true Identity. Besides I was
confident I would recover from my wound and I would be allowed to tell the whole story later
on.
Q:
What came to your mind when you said you doubted the Identity of the investigator?
A:
Because I was afraid that my family was still in the house and that these persons might
come back and harm them. That is the reason I did not mention these people.
Q:
Who are these persons you referred to?
A:
Arcadio Cortez, Paulino Sampang and Benjamin Villanueva (pp. 22-23, t.s.n., Nov.
1962).
The above explanation of Santiago Baltazar sufficiently accounts for his failure to reveal
immediately the identity of the culprits. It is both credible and convincing. His fear and
apprehension for the safety of his family and his guarded suspicion of the identity of the
investigators were reasonable reactions of an ordinary man agitated by a frightful and shocking
occurrence. He had just witnessed the violent deaths of his wife and youngest son. With the
memory of the traumatic experience still fresh in his mind, he reasonably entertained the belief
that to reveal the identities of the culprits would be tantamount to inviting their retribution.
Thus, in one case where the witnesses for the prosecution failed to divulge immediately the
identity of the criminals, This Court said:
41
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to report the malefactors to police officers who
investigated the crime immediately after the occurrence is understandable, considering that the
witnesses feared for their lives as the killers were still at large and armed, and with the shock of
the ambush still fresh in their minds, perhaps they considered the protection of the police
inadequate. [People v. Sampang, March 31, 1966, G.R. No. L-15843, 16 SCRA 516.]
Moreover, the delay complained of is partly attributable to the acts of petitioners and their
counsel. The records show that the criminal complaint was filed on October 27, 1961.
Petitioners' counsel moved for the postponement of the second stage of the preliminary
investigation three times, filed a motion to quash, postponed its hearing, changed his mind and
withdrew the motion to quash and with the conformity of petitioners, asked that trial on the
merits ensue. A period of four months had elapsed by them. Petitioners cannot now complain of
the belated identification considering that they are partly to blame for it.
Notwithstanding Baltazar's credible explanation for the delay, still, this Court examined the
record to ascertain the positiveness of Baltazar's testimony. After careful scrutiny, the Court finds
that Baltazar's narration of the facts is straightforward, direct and full of details which could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought. As such it deserves full faith and credence. He
stated that he saw Sampang twice; first, when he peeped through a hole, and second, when he
went down the house. He even saw Sampang point the gun at him before the latter fired. He also
identified Cortez whom he saw sitting under the bullcart and with who he conversed.
By quoting portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of Baltazar's testimony, petitioners
would like this Court to believe that when asked if he knew of any suspects, Baltazar mentioned
the names Eligio Ayson, Pablo Bengco and Celestino Bengco as his suspects.
A careful examination of the records shows that the three were mentioned by Baltazar not as his
suspects but as the people who went to his home requesting that his wife treat a sick person they
brought with them [pp. 19-22, t.s.n., Jan. 24, 1963.]
2.
Petitioners next question the credibility of Baltazar's testimony. They contend that even if
the testimony is positive, it should not be believed as it is uncorroborated and as it contains
contradictions.
There is no law requiring that a testimony be corroborated in order to be believed. It has been
held that the testimony of a single witness if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce
conviction [People v. Lao Wan Sing, supra, People v. Canada, No. 63728, September 15, 1986,
144 SCRA 121; People v. Tan, Jr., G.R. No. L-53834, November 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 614.1
Secondly, the contradictions and inconsistencies in Baltazar's testimony refer merely to minor
details which do not impair nor destroy its probative value and which in fact even strengthen its
reliability.
Above all, it is well settled in jurisprudence that the conclusions of the lower court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and respect. Unless there are substantial facts
and circumstances that have been overlooked, which if considered might affect the result of the
42
case, such findings are generally not disturbed on appeal [People v. Lao Wan Sing, supra; People
v. Baluarte, G.R. No. L-31180-81, October 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 356, People v. Brioso, G.R. Nos.
72028-31, November 9,1987; People v. Patog, G.R. No. 69620, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA
429; People v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-48606, July 11, 1986,142 SCRA 649; and People v. Patola
G.R. No. L-41265, February 27, 1986, 141 SCRA 397.] The reason for the above stated rule is
that the trial court is in a better position to observe the deportment and demeanor of witnesses to
determine the veracity of their answers. No compelling reasons exist here to justify a deviation
from that rule.
3.
Petitioners next contend that the failure of the court a quo to appreciate the ballistics and
chemistry reports as proof clearly tending to show their innocence, is in grave abuse of its
discretion.
This contention is untenable.
The evidence for the defense shows that six .30 caliber cartridges (Exhibit 1) recovered from the
scene of the crime and a .22 caliber slug (Exhibit 2) extracted from Santiago Baltazar's thigh
were examined to determine whether they came from eleven (11) Garand rifles and from one .22
caliber rifle rounded up the day after the crime was committed.
The ballistics report states that the six .30 caliber cartridges were fired from one gun but not from
any of those confiscated and that due to foreign marks, it cannot be determined from which gun
the .22 caliber slug came from.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no certainty that the fatal weapons were
included in those confiscated [Brief for Respondents, at p. 8.] The Courts of Appeals and the
Trial Court therefore did not err when they found that the ballistics report was "of no moment in
determining the guilt or innocence of the accused" [Court of Appeals, Rollo, at p. 13.)
The defense likewise presented a report (Exhibit "7") on the negative findings of a paraffin test
taken on Arcadio Cortez five days after the commission of the crime [Note that Paulino Sampang
was not subjected to a similar test, hence this defense is pertinent only with respect to Cortez.)
The Solicitor General contends that the paraffin test should not be considered in determining the
innocence of the accused as during the period of five days the gunpowder residue may already
have disappeared. The contention is well taken.
The chemical expert who conducted the test was Major Jose Fernandez, of the P.C. Central
laboratory who testified as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
According to the findings appearing in paragraph 7 (fiscal quoting exhibit 7)
miscroscopic examination on Arcadio Cortez, etc. reveal the absence of gunpowder residue. That
was your finding?
43
A:
Yes, Sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
To refresh your memory, I want to inform you that the crime subject of this case was
committed on October 21, 1961. It is a fact, is it not, that paraffin residue can be removed from
the hands by washing with soft [sic] or by other chemicals?
A:
Gunpowder may remain in the hands of the suspect within a period of 72 hours or more,
if there are so many rounds fired or four days more.
Q:
Even without doing anything on the hand, paraffin residue will disappear from the hand
after that period of time you have mentioned?
A:
Yes, Sir, so that washing with soft [sic] and water will not remove it. Within 72 hours is
the approximate time of the stay of the gunpowder, because we have to consider if the person is
perspiring.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
As I have said before, the crime subject matter of this case was committed at about 10:00
o'clock on October 21, 1961. In Exhibit 3, which is the letter of Col. Sangalang requesting your
office to examine the paraffin casts on both hands of Arcadio Cortez and others, states that the
same paraffin casts were taken at about 2300 hrs. on October 25, 1961 so that from 10:00 o'clock
October 21, 1961, four days and one hour had already elapsed?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
That four days and one hour is equivalent to 97 hours?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
According to you, paraffin residue may disappear at approximately in 72 hours?
A:
Maybe in 72 hours.
Q:
So that if Arcadio Cortez and others fired guns at about 10:00 on October 21, 1961 and
their hands paraffin cast 97 hours thereafter, the paraffin residue could not be found anymore?
A:
No gunpowder may be found anymore.
Q:
You said that if a person fires a gun in door [sic] without doing anything, in 72 hours the
powder residue will disappear?
Supposing said person at the same time fires in door [sic] several times, will the powder residue
stay more than 72 hours?
44
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
In your experience, as a chemical expert, have you come across cases where paraffin cast
disappear in less than 72 hours?
A:
Yes, sir, in open outdoor, naturally, little residue will be deposited and when there is little
gunpowder it may not be impressed on the hands of the firer.
Q:
In those cases where the firing was done in open air, the paraffin residue disappeared in
one day or two days?
A:
This is a factor of not having gunpowder in the hands of the firer when the wind is strong.
Q:
You came across cases where the person fired a gun and examined him within one day
and you did not find any paraffin residue?
A:
Yes, Sir in cases where there was strong wind. (tsn, pp. 3840, January 13, 1964).
xxx
xxx
xxx
A careful scrutiny of the report and testimony shows that the paraffin test is of weak probative
value, as it was taken five days after the incident happened, within which time the traces of
gunpowder may already have been erased.
4.
Petitioners next assail the trial and appellate court's reliance on their extrajudicial
confessions which are alleged to have been executed involuntarily, hence inadmissible.
The confessions were taken on October 21, 1961, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect.
The prevailing rule then was that extrajudicial confessions were presumed in law to be voluntary
and thus admissible. The burden of overcoming that presumption rested on the accused. This rule
was subsequently reversed such that, on the prosecution was imposed the burden of first proving
that constitutional guarantees were observed before an extrajudicial confession may be admitted
in evidence [People v. Jara, G.R. no. 61356-57, September 30, 1986, 144 SCRA 516.1 The shift
in the burden is the result of the adoption of the Miranda v. Arizona rule [384 U.S. 436 (1966)] in
section 20 of the 1973 Constitution. This rule however has no retroactive effect [Magtoto v.
Manguera, G.R. No. L-37201-02, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4, citing U.S. V. de los Santos, 54
Phil. 329; People v. Page, G.R. No. L-37507, June 7, 1977, 77 SCRA 348; People v. Castaneda,
G.R. No. L-32625, August 31, 1979, 93 SCRA 56; People v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-40106, March
13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497; People v. Zea, G.R. No. L-23109, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 77; People
v. Banaan, G.R. No. L-49385-87, July 2, 1986, 142 SCRA 410 People v. Ribadajo, G.R. No. L40294, July 11, 1986,142 SCRA 637; People v. Petenia, G.R. No. L-51256, August 12, 1986, 143
SCRA 361; People v. Pia, G.R. No. L-59604, November 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 581 and People v.
delos Santos, G.R. No. L-35598, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 311.]
45
As the confessions here were made before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which
incorporated the Miranda rule, they are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved by the
petitioners.
To rebut the presumption, the defense introduced as evidence the medical certificates executed
by Dr. Marcelino Benosa and his testimony that he examined the accused a day after they were
apprehended. When he took the stand, he averred that he found contusions and swellings on the
bodies of the accused for which he prescribed certain medicines. He also stated that it was Atty.
Clemente Soriano, counsel for the accused, who recommended him to relatives of the accused to
examine the latter and that he had personally known Atty. Soriano since 1945 as they were
townmates, being both from Macabebe, Pampanga. In addition, he also said that his practice was
in Angeles, Pampanga, and that he went to Porac and left his clinic just to examine the condition
of the petitioners. The defense did not attempt to explain why they did not avail of the services of
a physician from Porac nor did they show that there was none available.
On the other hand, the prosecution presented as witness the Clerk of Court, Mr. Marcelo
Mendoza, who testified that when the accused were brought before him, they never complained
to him of any maltreatment; that he translated and explained to them each of the questions
propounded and the answers they had given in their statements and that afterwards, the accused
swore to the truth of the contents. of their confessions, and signed them in his presence. This
testimony was corroborated by those of the investigators who took the statements of the accused
and who vehemently denied maltreating them.
In view of the Clerk of Court's credible testimony and the admission of Dr. Benosa during the
trial that the contusions he found may not have been caused by the alleged maltreatment of the
accused, this Court finds that the presumption of voluntariness; has not been satisfactorily
overcome.
More importantly, the statements are replete with details which only the accused could have
known and which the investigators could not have supplied, as follows: that Escolastica Pingol
or "Tecang" was a witch; that although they knew that such could not be believed by courts of
law, they knew for a fact, that she was victimizing certain members of the community; that
Cortez was in fact a victim of her witchery, as was Sampang's mother; and that they went to
Tecang's house only to scare her but when they heard her and her family shouting for help, they
started firing. The confessions also reveal that they utilized Benjamin Villanueva to guide them
to Tecang's house as well as the direction they took in getting there. All these details are
earmarks of voluntariness.
5.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, corpus delicti here has also been proven. As early as
People v. Mones [58 Phil. 5 (1933)], this Court has held that corpus delicti is the fact of specific
loss or injury and that in homicide, the fact of death, whether or not feloniously caused, is the
corpus delicti. This has been sufficiently shown by the death certificates of the victims and the
testimony of Santiago Baltazar. With sufficient proof of the corpus delicti, the extrajudicial
confessions are thus sufficient to convict Cortez and Sampang of homicide and less serious
physical injuries.
46
Nonetheless, even if We were to disregard the extrajudicial confessions, the positive

Identification made by Santiago Baltazar is still ample evidence to establish the guilt of the
accused to a moral certainty.
6
Lastly, we consider the defense raised by petitioners. Cortez claimed that he was in a
neighboring sitio guarding his growing crops against wild pigs while Sampang alleged that he
was at home attending to his sick child.
Alibi is easily fabricated such that courts must accept it only with great caution. For such defense
to prosper, it is not enough that the accused were somewhere else but that it must be clearly
shown that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission [People v. Perante Jr., G.R. Nos. L-63709-10,
July 16, 1986, 143 SCRA 56; People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. L-52017, October 27, 1986, 145
SCRA 178; and People v. Santillan, G.R. No. 68331, January 29, 1988.] In this case, the places
where petitioners were at the time of the incident and the place where the crime was committed
are within walking distance.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi must fail in view of the clear and positive Identification made
by Baltazar. He had known Cortez and Sampang for a considerable period of time. There was no
showing that he had any grudge or improper motive to foist such a serious accusation upon them
and fabricate his testimony.
On the totality of the evidence therefore, the Court finds the guilt of the petitioners to have been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE the petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed, except
the indemnity in the two homicide cases which is hereby raised in each case to P30,000.00.
Issue:
Held:
People v. Dalabajan
Facts: This is an appeal interposed by Hernando, Dominador, and Fernando, all surnamed
Dalabajan.
On May 21, 1986, an information 1 accusing Hernando Dalabajan, Dominador Dalabajan,
Fernando Dalabajan, Napoleon dela Torre, Charlie Paduga and Megdonio Sabinet of the crime of
murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, stating:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1988, at Barangay Cayapas, Municipality of Dumaran,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did
47
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bladed
weapon, strike with a banca paddle and piece of wood one Amado Zabalo Jr., hitting him various
vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him injuries which were the direct and immediate
cause of his instantaneous death. CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength.
Upon arraignment on separate dates, the aforesaid accused, duly assisted by counsel, voluntarily
entered separate pleas of "not guilty'' to the offense charged in the information.
In the course of trial, the charges against Megdonio Sabinet, Napoleon dela Torre and Charlie
Paduga were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence upon recommendation of the provincial
prosecutor.
The facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
Sometime on January 1, 1986 at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning and while the people of
Barangay Cayapas, Dumaran, Palawan were celebrating the New Year's eve with a dance at their
Barangay Hall located near the seashore, Melencio dela Cruz saw Hernando Dalabajan kick and
stab one Amado Zabalo, Jr. as the latter was coming out of the said Barangay Hall. Amado was
kicked on his right thigh and stabbed on his right abdomen. Other residents, mostly relatives of
the Dalabajans, then joined Hernando in mauling Amado. Amado tried to escape by running
towards the nearby seashore and wading into the water. Hernando Dalabajan, together with coaccused Dominador and Fernando Dalabajan and the rest of their relatives, pursued Amado.
Upon reaching the seashore only the three accused-appellants took a banca and chased the latter.
The rest of their relatives stayed by the seashore. When the accused-appellants were finally able
to overtake Amado about 30 to 40 meters away from the shore, they helped one another in hitting
him with bladed instruments, wooden clubs and a boat paddle on different parts of his body.
Thereafter, the three accused left the already unmoving body of the victim which was face down
in the water and proceeded back towards the seashore. At this juncture, Melencio dela Cruz, who
was hiding behind the bushes by the seashore from where he watched the incident happen, then
went to the house of the victim and reported the incident to the latter's relatives.
Melencio dela Cruz also testified that he was able to witness the incident at the sea thirty meters
from his hiding place and saw it clearly since it was full moon on that fateful night. There were
many people who went to the shore and witnessed the incident in question, but most of these
people belonged to the Dalabajan clan. This was the reason why he hid in the bushes, for fear of
being discovered by any member of the Dalabajan clan, a clan reputed in their community for
their clannishness. He also feared for his life because most of the Barangay Tanods were related
to the Dalabajans. He was able to follow the whole incident from the time Amado Zabalo, Jr. was
attacked in front of the Barangay Hall to the time the latter was chased and killed at sea. 2
Amado Zabalo, Sr., the father of the victim, testified that, shortly after the incident, he was
informed about it by some residents of their barangay. He immediately proceeded to the place of
the incident and saw the already dead body of his son. The cadaver of the victim was then
brought to the Barangay Hall. When the policemen arrived at 10:00 o'clock that night, they
conducted an investigation and made a sketch showing the wounds sustained by the victim. No
48
autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver since there was no doctor available. 3 The
prosecution however submitted a death certificate in this connection signed by the victim's father
and the Local Civil Registrar.
Lolito Carceller, a member of the police force of Dumaran, Palawan testified that he was a
member of the police team that investigated the incident in question. He was also the one who
prepared the sketch of the victim's body showing the stab wounds and injuries sustained by the
victim. Upon his examination, he saw that the cadaver of Amado Zabalo, Jr. bore the following
wounds, to wit: one on the upper portion of the head, a stab wound on the left eye, a stab wound
on the left ear, a stab wound on the left portion of the mouth, a stab wound on the right cheek and
a stab wound on the stomach. In addition, the two fingers on the left hand of the victim were
dislocated. 4
On the other hand, one of the herein accused-appellants, Hernando Dalabajan, gave a different
version of the incident. He contends that at around midnight on December 31, 1985, he was at
the barangay hall of Bgy. Cayapas, Dumaran, Palawan. There were many people then at the said
hall celebrating the New Year's eve as there was a dance to be held therein. Amado Zabalo, Jr.,
who was drunk at the time, went inside the Barangay Hall and began to look for a dance partner.
Hernando accosted Amado and told him not to start dancing since the ladies were not yet in the
dancing hall. Without saying a word, Amado left. After a while, the dance started and Hernando
joined the other residents in dancing. Not long after, he went downstairs to answer the call of
nature. From out of nowhere Amado suddenly appeared and hacked him with a bolo hitting him
on his right elbow. Hernando ran away but Amado chased him. When Hernando stumbled to the
ground Amado hacked him again hitting him this time at the left portion of his head. At this
juncture, Hernando was able to get hold of a piece of wood with which he clubbed Amado.
Thereafter, the people around ganged up on the latter as Hernando ran back to the Barangay Hall
to seek the help of their Barangay Captain. He however lost consciousness upon reaching the
Barangay Hall because of loss of blood which was oozing from his head. When he learned of
Amado Zabalo, Jr.'s death the next day, he felt responsible for the victim's death and, thus, he
went to the police and voluntarily surrendered, saying that he had clubbed the victim the night
before.
Hernando Dalabajan further testified that he never saw prosecution witness Melencio dela Cruz
at any time during that fateful night. 5
Barangay Tanod Dominador Dalabajan, testified that he was also at the said Barangay Hall
together with five other Barangay Tanods in the evening of December 31, 1985. They were
requested by their Barangay Captain Eulogio Sabinet, to maintain peace and order there in view
of the dance to be held as part of the New Year's eve celebration. The said dance started at
around 12:00 midnight. It was only the following day that he learned of Amado's death in the
sea. He denies any participation in the killing of the deceased. 6
For his part, Fernando Dalabajan did not even present any evidence, nor did he testify in order to
controvert the prosecution's assertion linking him to the killing.
49
On February 26, 1990, after the case had been submitted for decision but prior to the
promulgation thereof by the trial court, Amado Zabalo, Sr., the victim's father, executed an
Affidavit of Desistance, which stated:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY SA PAGUURONG NG DEMANDA
AKO, si Amado Zabalo, Sr., nasa hustong gulang, may asawa at naninirahan sa Bgy. Cayapas,
Dumaran, Palawan, pagkatapos manumpa alinsunod sa batas, ay nagsasaad ng sumusunod:
1.
Na ako ang ama ni Amado Zabalo, Jr. na namatay sa Cayapas, Dumaran, noong ika-1 ng
Inero, 1986;
2.
Na dahil sa pagkamatay ng aking anak, ako ay dumulog ng hablang "murder" sa
hukuman laban kina Dominador Dalabajan, Hernando Dalabajan at Fernando Dalabajan, at ang
nasabing habla ay kasalukuyang nililitis sa sangay bilang 50 ng RTC-Palawan at may numerong
criminal case No. 6315;
3.
Na nitong mga huling araw pagkatapos kong magsagawa ng sariling pagsisiyasat ay
napag-alaman ko sa aking buong kasiyahan na ang mag amang si Dominador at Fernando
Dalabajan ay wala palang mga kasalanan at anumang kaugnayan sa pagkamatay ng anak kong si
Amado Zabalo Jr., at si Hernando Dalabajan naman ay napilitang magtanggol na lamang ng
kanyang sarili sapagkat siya ay pinagtulungan nina Amado Zabalo Jr., at ng kanyang mga
kasamahan;
4.
Na hindi na ako interesado pang ipagpatuloy ang demanda ko laban sa nasabing magaama kaya't iniuurong ko na ang nasabing demanda laban sa kanila;
5.
Na aking isinagawa ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito ng kusang loob at buong laya, at
ako'y hindi tinakot at inalok ng anumang pabuya o pangako at ginawa ko ang salaysay na ito
upang patutuhan ang lahat ng aking mga isinasaad sa itaas.
KUSANG loob kong nilagdaan ang salaysay na ito nitong ika-26 ng Pebrero, 1990, dito sa
lungsod ng Puerto Princesa.
Sgd.
AMADO ZABALO SR.
May-Salaysay
On July 31, 1990, Melencio Dela Cruz, the sole eyewitness for the prosecution, executed an
affidavit 7 recanting his testimony and instead stating that he did not witness the incident, viz.:
AFFIDAVIT OF RECANTATION
50
I, MELENCIO DE LA CRUZ, Filipino, of legal age, married, and residing at Calero, Puerto
Princesa City, under oath allege:
1.
That I was presented in court as one of prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 6315
entitled "People of the Philippines versus HERNANDO DALABAJAN et al." for "Murder" now
pending in Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princess City.
2.
That the truth of the matter is that I arrived at the scene of the incident only after
AMADO ZABALO, JR., the victim, was brought to the shore and already dead. Hence, I was not
able to witness the actual happenings which led to his death.
3.
That there being no witness at the time the investigation was being conducted by the
police concerning the death of AMADO ZABALO, JR., I was prevailed upon by the victim's
father, AMADO ZABALO, SR., to testify for the prosecution and when I refused to cooperate he
threatened to kill me. Thus, I was forced to sign an affidavit to attest that I saw the actual killing
of AMADO ZABALO, JR., by the accused DOMINADOR DALABAJAN, HERNANDO
DALABAJAN, and FERNANDO DALABAJAN while accused MEGDONIO SABINET,
CHARLIE PADUGA and NAPOLEON DELA TORRE were in the shore holding pieces of
wood and waiting for AMADO ZABALO, JR. to come ashore so that they could block him.
4.
That I am recanting my aforesaid affidavit as well as my testimonies in court because I
am being bothered by my conscience for having testified against the accused without witnessing
the whole incident.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
Sgd.,
MELENCIO DELA CRUZ
Affiant
In addition, the accused-appellants also submitted, along with their Appellants' Brief, a copy of a
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by one Manuela Gabinete-Dacuan, a Barangay Kagawad, on
August 3, 1991, wherein she stated that everything Melencio dela Cruz said during his testimony
is false since the latter was not present at the crime scene at the time of the incident. However,
Gabinete-Dacuan was never presented as a witness for the defense during the trial proper. These
three documents were presented to the trial court as annexes in an Urgent Motion for Release on
Bail 8 filed by the Dalabajans only after the promulgation of the decision convicting them.
The trial court did not find the accused-appellants' defense plausible and accordingly found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Amado Zabalo, Jr. It thus stated in the dispositive
portion of its Decision: 9
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered finding
the 3 accused in the above-entitled case guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
51
as the same is defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, sentencing all the 3 accused
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay the costs. The 3 accused furthermore
are hereby ordered jointly and solidarily to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P50,000.00 as and for the death of the deceased. They are furthermore ordered to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.00 and for actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellants are now before us on appeal with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED REVERSIBLY IN NOT ACCORDING ACCUSED THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND TO AN IMPARTIAL
TRIBUNAL.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED REVERSIBLY IN ACCORDING WEIGHT TO THE UNTRUST
WORTHY AND IN FACT FABRICATED TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE SUPPOSED
EYEWITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED REVERSIBLY IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
The accused-appellants, in denying culpability for the death of Amado Zabalo, Jr., insist that the
latter was killed as a result of a tumultuous affray. They further insist that the testimony of the
sole eyewitness, Melencio dela Cruz, be disregarded for being manifestly fabricated, more so
now that the latter has executed an affidavit of desistance.
We find the appeal unmeritorious.
A recantation does not necessarily cancel an earlier declaration. Like any other testimony, it is
subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and especially the demeanor
of the witness on the stand. Moreover, it should be received with caution as otherwise it could
"make solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous
witnesses." 10 In the case at bar, Dela Cruz's recantation came only after a lapse of almost four
(4) years from the date of his last testimony in open court. The case was submitted for decision
before the trial court as early as January 12, 1990. However, promulgation of judgment had to be
reset a number of times since the accused-appellants successively failed to appear on the dates
set. It was only on July 26, 1991 that the accused-appellants finally appeared and the decision
was promulgated. Thereafter, it was only on August 6, 1991, upon filing of an Urgent Motion for
Release on Bail, that accused-appellants presented the Affidavit of Recantation executed by Dela
Cruz.
52
It is highly doubtful that the eyewitness Dela Cruz, after going through the trouble of being
sworn in, testifying in open court, and being subjected to a rigid cross-examination by the
defense counsel, wherein he unhesitatingly pointed to the accused-appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime, would, after four years, suddenly turn around and reverse himself. We have
previously held that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony if credible. 11 The Court looks with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: Affidavits of retraction can easily
be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration.
Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be
repudiated. 12
A testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside lightly, least of all by a mere
affidavit executed after the lapse of considerable time. In the case at bar, although the Affidavit
of Recantation was executed almost a year prior to the promulgation of the decision, the accusedappellants saw it fit to inform the lower court of its existence only after the said promulgation, by
attaching it as an annex in their Urgent Motion for Release on Bail filed on August 6, 1991. 13
Moreover, the promulgation of the decision was delayed and reset a number of times due to the
failure of the accused-appellants to appear as scheduled. Thus, it is clear that the retraction is an
afterthought and should not be given probative value.
The accused-appellants, in praying that the case at bench be remanded to the lower court for new
trial, insist that the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Dela Cruz constitutes newly discovered
evidence. We hold that it is not. Section 2 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that the
only grounds for new trial are:
(a)
That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused;
(b)
That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which it introduced and
admitted, would probably change the judgment.
Obviously, an affidavit of desistance, even judging from the meaning of this caption itself, can
not be said to be newly discovered evidence.
Anyway, the delay on the part of the accused-appellants in presenting the Affidavit of Desistance
casts serious doubt upon the veracity of the statements made therein.
The case of U.S. vs. Dacir 14 first enunciated the principle regarding affidavits of recantation as
basis for a new trial:
In general, motions for new trial based on affidavits of this kind are entitled to but scant
consideration. The mere fact that after a solemn trial in a court of justice has been terminated,
one of the witnesses, in conversation with friends or under pressure from interested parties, may
tell a different story as to the incidents testified to by him, does not necessarily destroy the
probative testimony when on the witness stand. If new trials were granted in every instance
53
where the interested party or parties succeed in inducing some of the witnesses to vary or modify
their testimony outside of court and after the trial, there would never be an end of criminal
litigation. . . .
The value as evidence of the testimony of a witness given in open court in the course of a trial
had therein is due for the most part to the following considerations: That under such conditions it
is given under the sanction of an oath and of the penalties prescribed for perjury; that the witness'
story is told in the presence of an impartial judge in the course of a solemn trial in open court;
that the witness is subject to cross-examination, with all the facilities afforded thereby to test the
truth and accuracy of his statements and to develop his attitude of mind toward the parties, his
disposition to assist the cause of truth rather than to further some personal end; that the
proceedings are had under the protection of the court and under such conditions as to remover, so
far as is humanly possible, all likelihood that undue or unfair influences will be exercised to
induce the witness to testify falsely; and finally, that under the watchful eye of a trained judge his
manner, his general bearing and demeanor and even the intonation of his voice often
unconsciously disclose the degree of credit to which he is entitled as a witness. Manifestly, loose
statements or even sworn statements of witnesses, made after the trial has closed, varying or
contradicting their testimony given at the trial, will rarely be sufficient in the absence of special
circumstances, to raise such a doubt as to the truth of their testimony given at the trial and
accepted as true by the trial judge, as to justify the granting of a new trial.
The Affidavit of Desistance executed by the victim's father also merits scant consideration, for it
is axiomatic in our jurisdiction that for such desistance to benefit the accused, it must be given
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. 15 Here, the Affidavit of Desistance was filed long
after the trial had concluded. As such, like the Affidavit of Recantation executed by Dela Cruz,
Amado Zabalo, Sr.'s sworn statement cannot serve as basis for the acquittal of the accusedappellants. We cite with approval the argument of the Solicitor General with regard to the said
affidavits:
Even on their merits, the sworn statements are not impressed with faith and credit. Melencio dela
Cruz alleges that he testified for the prosecution because Amado Zabalo, Sr. "threatened to kill
me." If true, why did it take him more than four long years to wean away from the threat and
retract his testimony[?] On the other hand, Amado Zabalo, Sr.'s affirmation of the alleged
innocence of accused-appellants is devoid of any probative value being hearsay and a mere
factual conduction. And Kagawad Manuela Gabinete-Dacuan's narration of the alleged incident
exculpating the accused-appellants is clearly and indubitably a fabricated afterthought.
Neither constituting newly discovered evidence nor of such probative weight as would probably
change the judgment, the sworn statements in question cannot even be a valid ground for new
trial under Rule 121 of the Rules of Court. According to this Honorable Court in People vs.
Bigcas (211 SCRA 630):
As a general rule a motion for new trial will not be granted if based on an affidavit of recantation
of a witness whose effect, is to free the appellant from participation in the commission of the
crime. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice
simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another,
54
for such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such
affidavits as exceedingly unreliable (de Guzman vs. IAC, 184 SCRA [April 4, 1990]) (emphasis
supplied).
The accused-appellants assert that inconsistencies abound in the testimony of Dela Cruz, that it is
uncorroborated, and has no probative value, it being a mere fabrication. Contrary to this
contention, upon close examination of the testimony given by Melencio dela Cruz, we find that
Dela Cruz's testimony is credible, detailed, and was given in a forthright manner. His narration of
what transpired remained unshaken even when he was subjected to rigid cross-examination by
the defense counsel. Moreover, the testimony of Lolito Carceller, who examined the corpse of
the victim as to the location of the wounds corroborates the testimony of Dela Cruz. Most of the
wounds inflicted upon the deceased which were examined and noted by Carceller were located
on the upper part of the body, specially, above the armpits. The site of the wounds lends credence
to Dela Cruz's testimony that the victim was hit and stabbed by the accused-appellants while the
former was in armpit-deep water and the accused were aboard a banca.
The accused-appellants insist that Dela Cruz could not have been able to identify Zabalo's
assailants from a distance of thirty (30) to (40) meters. This contention is incorrect. It had been
established that Dela Cruz witnessed the attack on Amado Zabalo, Jr. by the accused-appellants
from the time of its inception, when Hernando Dalabajan stabbed the victim, to the time when
the victim tried to escape by wading out to sea, and up to its horrible climax when the victim was
mercilessly killed by the three accused who unrelentingly pursued him. Dela Cruz fully
witnessed the attack on the victim.
Hernando Dalabajan insists that Dela Cruz was not present at the time of the incident. However,
upon cross-examination, it can be gleaned that his only basis for such an assertion is that he did
not see Dela Cruz that night, but he did not discount the possibility that Dela Cruz was
somewhere in the vicinity but out of sight. 16
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery in qualifying the
criminal offense to murder:
The Court in assessing the circumstances of the killing of the deceased Amado Zabalo, Jr. by all
the 3 accused who actively helped one another in perpetrating the killing could not but rule that
the killing was attended by treachery to qualify the offense to murder. The above finding was
primarily premised on the fact that at the time the attack was launched at the sea by the 3
accused, the victim was not in a position to defend himself. Thus, at the time of attack the victim
was in the water with a depth up to his armpit. In the situation he found himself, it is quite
obvious his freedom of movement to adequately protect and defend his person was very much
restricted taken in conjunction with the 3 aggressors who were riding in a banca and hitting him
all at the same time.
From the manner of attack employed by the accused, it may reasonably be deduced or inferred
that accused consciously adopted the mode of attack employed by them to insure its success.
55
When they pursued the victim who run towards the seashore and opted to go to the water, it must
be construed when they availed themselves of a banca, they did so with a decided advantage on
their part without risk to their personal safety. It can thus be seen that at the time the fatal blows
were delivered treachery can thus be firmly appreciated against them.
Treachery may not be present at the inception of the attack, but if the attack is continuous and
treachery existed at the time of the consummation of the killing the crime committed is not
homicide but murder. (People vs. Cario, et al., 58 SCRA 516).
We find no merit in the contention of accused-appellants that Amado Zabalo, Jr. died on the
occasion of a tumultuous affray. Pertinent provision of the Revised Penal Code on death caused
in a tumultuous affray reads:
Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel
and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person
or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall
be punished by prision mayor. . . . (Art. 251 of the Revised Penal Code) [Penalties omitted]
Consequently, the following elements must concur:
(1)
That there be several persons;
(2)
That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally;
(3)
That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner;
(4)
That someone was killed in the course of the affray;
(5)
That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased;
(6)
That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence
can be identified.
In the case at bench, there were no groups of persons organized for the common purpose of
assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally. Consequently, there was no affray among
several groups of persons in the course of which Amado Zabalo, Jr. died. The fact is that there
was only one group of persons, the accused themselves, who caused an attack on a single victim,
Amado Zabalo, Jr. This group of persons, motivated as they were, attacked and killed the
aforesaid victim. The persons who assaulted and killed the victim were clearly identified. Since it
was ascertained as to who actually killed the deceased, the death of the victim cannot be said to
have been caused in a tumultuous affray.
56
There is, appreciated herein, as recommended by the Solicitor General, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in the case of Hernando Dalabajan. This mitigating
circumstance is, however, offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength. Treachery has qualified the killing to murder. Consequently, as
correctly found by the trial court, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
Issue:
Held:
People v. Sion
Facts: In its decision 1 in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but promulgated
on 8 February 1993, Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial
Region decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias
Miguel Disu guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Murder pursuant to
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the attendance of the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the two accused are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify jointly the heirs
of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu are ordered to pay
jointly the heirs of the victim the sum of P11,910.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Felipe Sion alias "Junior," whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. 2 (hereafter appellant
Sion), and Federico Disu alias "Miguel" (hereafter appellant Disu), seasonably appealed
therefrom to this Court 3 in view of the penalty imposed. 4
The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint for Murder 5 on
19 November 1991 in Criminal Case No. 2141 (SP-91) before the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto in the Province of Pangasinan. Charged with appellants therein
were Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and "four (4) other John Does."
After appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of said court issued a warrant
for the arrest of the accused with no bail fixed for their temporary liberty. 6 However, the warrant
was served only on appellant Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu's
motion for bail, to which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr., recommended that
bail be fixed at P40,000.00 for said accused only, the court fixed said accused's bail at such
amount; and upon filing and approval of the bail bond, appellant Disu was ordered released. 7
57
Subsequently, one Atty. Fernando Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused, a motion to reduce
the bail from P40,000.00 to
P20,000.00. 8 As Provincial Prosecutor Dumlao agreed to a reduction of P10,000.00, the court
granted the motion and fixed bail at P30,000.00. None of them, however, filed a bail bond.
For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, finding probable cause against all the accused for the crime of murder on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution, ordered the transmittal of the record of the case, including the bail
bond of accused Federico Disu, to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan for
appropriate action. 9
On 21 January 1992, an Information 10 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First
Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny
Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as
John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder committed as follows:
That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando
Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries:
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid axillary area
slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung
stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2, inch in depth
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left
contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow
which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned to Branch 44 thereof.
On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested. 11 Then on 10 June 1992, the RTC annulled and
voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by the MCTC Judge Sergio Garcia for luck of
proper hearing, denied the motion for bail filed by appellant Sion, and ordered their detention in
jail. 12
Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded against them only. Upon
arraignment, both pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial. 13
58
The prosecution's witnesses were Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the wife of the
victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health Officer; Rosendo
Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On the other hand, the
defense presented as its witness appellant Disu; appellant Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of appellant
Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.
The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its witnesses is partly
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee, as follows:
On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay
road in front of his house situated in Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder
brother Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel (p. 6, TSN, August 20, 1992) when all of a sudden,
Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west complaining that he was being chased by Felipe
Sion and Johnny Juguilon (p. 7, TSN, id.). On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived
at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are making trouble again." The latter
answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling
Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me. (p. 8, TSN, id.). Seconds
later, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag
told them to stop throwing stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even
you Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of your mother, you
Abaoag[s]" (pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag
whose nickname is Andong.
Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside
his house lying down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his
brother Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones (14, TSN, id.). When already
near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his brother Fernando already outside his
house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a
big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back
towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his
direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp
double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on the
left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below the jaw (pp. 18-19, TSN, id.).
Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which landed on
his right side below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions saying,
"we will also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping brother (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.). Instead, he ran
to his brother's house and informed Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless condition of Fernando
(pp. 22-23, TSN, id.). Upon being informed, Felicitas accompanied by Carlos Abaoag, went to
the place of the incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only saw her husband lying
prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she inquired what happened,
Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" (pp. 4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992).
Fernando told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Edong Sion, Johnny
Juguilon and Felix Sion (p. 6, TSN, id.)
59
The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead on
arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN, August 20, 1992).
Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian, Pangasinan conducted post
mortem examination (Exh. A) on the body of the victim. The result of his findings showed that
Fernando Abaoag sustained the following injuries, to wit:
1)
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11, ICS, mid axillary area
slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung
2)
stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 inch in depth
3)
stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in depth mid scapular area, left
4)
contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow. 14
Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-pointed instrument,
possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the lower lobe of the left lung causing severe
bleeding and its eventual collapse. He determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds. 15
Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando Gatchalian, on the night of
the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene of
the crime. 16 Cesar Abaoag recognized this weapon as the one used by appellant Sion in
stabbing the
victim. 17 On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she spent more than P11,000.00 for the
wake and burial of her husband whose death saddened her, she being left alone to take care of
their children. 18
In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong 19 Sion and Felix Sion alias
"Ellet," respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in a stone-throwing
incident and "free-for-all rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one
hand, and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he professed his innocence,
claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim. 20 His
version of the incident was summarized by the trial court, thus:
On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny Juguilon went to the house of
Eling Alcantara as he wanted to talk with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel was already there
when they arrived. While at the place, Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel came out and started
fighting with each other. Ronnie and Manuel ran and proceeded to the place of his cousin. He
was pacifying Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Johnny Juguilon threw stones at Ronnie
Manuel. At this point, Fernando Abaoag intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your mother
Johnny, you are too much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon answered "vulva of
your mother Andoy, do not interfere because you are not our enemy." After the verbal exchange,
he took Johnny Juguilon to their (Sion's) house . . . . At about 9:00 p.m., that same evening, they
stoned their house, its sides and the stairs. He and Idong and Johnny Juguilon looked for Cesar
60
Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two (2) other companions. They
were at the place of Marta Soriano. After that, they still threw stones towards them. There was a
free for all rumble between Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, the Abaoags and Idong Sion, and
Johnny Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front of the house of Loly Galdones. He denied the
testimony of Cesar Abaoag that he stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times and before he was
stabbed Johnny Juguilon stoned him (Fernando Abaoag). It was Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon
who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. After Fernando Abaoag was stabbed, they ran away. His group
also ran away. He went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon because he was stabbed. He
brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and Hospital. He did not report the incident to Barangay
Captain Rosendo Imuslan. On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he presented himself to Kagawad Lagman
who brought him to the Police Station . . . . 21
In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no participation in
the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16 October 1991, while the
quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in question were taking place, he was resting and sleeping
in the house of his employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the entire
day. However, before proceeding home from work that afternoon, he went to the store of Oping
Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of appellant Sion where he stayed for about
five minutes. He only learned about the killing the following morning when he was told that he
was one of the suspects. He was arrested about a month after the incident. 22
On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar asserted that neither his
brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at Sion's house; there was no free-for-all fight
between the Sions and the Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion merely threw stones at, but
did not stab, Fernando Abaoag; and it was only appellant Sion who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. 23
After the conclusion of trial, the court granted appellants' motion to file a memorandum within
fifteen days. Despite the extension given, appellants' counsel did not file the memorandum. Thus,
in its order of 11 December 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision. 24
On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision, 25 the dispositive portion quoted in
the introductory paragraph of this ponencia.
As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:
The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve
scant consideration. Cesar Abaoag narrated in detail how his brother Fernando Abaoag was
stoned by accused Johnny Juguilon, Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how accused Felipe Sion
stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar Abaoag saw Johnny Juguilon throw stone hitting
the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother (Fernando Abaoag) turned left,
accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion and Felix Sion simultaneously threw stones
toward him (Fernando Abaoag). Then, at a distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw
accused Felipe Sion stab Fernando Abaoag three times, hitting the left side below the armpit,
then on the left waistline and the right side of the neck below the jaw of the deceased with the
use of a sharp double bladed dagger.
61
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away when
he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the
place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag
identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, the
doctor who conducted the postmortem examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag. Dr.
Manalo stated that "stab wound 1 1/2 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, midaxillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung" is located below the left armpit.
The second stab wound, "stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 1/2 inches in width, 1 1/2 in
depth," is located at the right side of the nec[k] at the back. The doctor stated that the wounds
were caused possibly by a dagger.
Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag in the presence of Felicitas
Abaoag, to wit: "naalaak, which means, I was hit, take note of this because I cannot survive these
injuries of mine". Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion,
Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-12 tsn July 27, 1992). This is a dying declaration
because it was made under a consciousness of impending death (Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of
Court). 26
The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the prosecution, thus:
As stated in the decision, accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone, hitting the left eyebrow of
Fernando Abaoag, and Edong Sion, Felix Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu simultaneously threw
stones upon the deceased, while accused Felipe Sion alias "Junior" stabbed him (victim) three
times, resulting in the latter's death. 27
It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the
"attack was so sudden that the victim had no time to defend himself" and (b) the generic
aggravating circumstance of cruelty because "there were three stab wounds" and the first wound
which "caused severe bleeding and collapse of the lung" and the death of Fernando Abaoag
"was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other wounds which are unnecessary for its
commission." 28 It did not, however, appreciate evident premeditation for lack of "substantial"
evidence; 29 nor give the benefit of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion since his
surrender was merely "forced by circumstances," as he "presented himself to Kagawad Lagman
because he was suspected as one of the persons who stabbed the victim." 30
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. 31
In their eight-page Appellant's Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, 32
appellants plead for their acquittal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in convicting them of
murder; (2) in taking into account the aggravating circumstance of cruelty; (3) in ruling that
conspiracy was established; (4) in not appreciating the presence of voluntary surrender; and (5)
in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who
were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag.
62
In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification made of them by
prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar Abaoag actually saw appellant Sion stab
the victim, then Cesar should have immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victim's wife, of
this fact. Cesar's failure was then unusual and unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's testimony
on her husband's alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as far as the assailant's identities
were concerned because the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without identifying
appellant Sion as the one who stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband identified all the five
(5) accused as the ones who "stabbed" him was "an impossibility." Moreover, the prosecution
witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital witnesses" such as Marta
Soriano, Loly Galdones, or Eling Alcantara should have been presented to corroborate the
"biased" testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.
Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the stabbing of the victim was
not "sudden"; (2) cruelty was not proven because "there is no clear testimony" that the first stab
wound was fatal and the second and third wounds were "unnecessary"; (3) conspiracy cannot be
deduced from the mere fact that all the accused threw stones at the victim before the stabbing;
(4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered even before the police started investigating the case
when he was not yet a suspect; and (5) appellant Sion could not have testified that it was Edong
Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim if such were not true, considering that the
former is his brother and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant Sion bore no grudge against
the victim and did not escape.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the Appellee, supports the
trial court's findings and conclusions, except as to the appreciation of cruelty, which it concedes
to be erroneous.
Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties convinces us that
prosecution witness Cesar Abaoag positively identified appellants as being present during the
incident in question and saw appellant Sion stab the victim thrice. As correctly found by the trial
court:
Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away when
he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light illuminating the
place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly Caldones. Cesar Abaoag
identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing stones at the
victim. He was definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit
the victim at the left eyebrow. The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury at
the left eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon jibed with the post mortem findings of
Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow as "contusion superimposed abrasion
left eyebrow." 33 If Cesar had any ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he could have
declared that it was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar then honestly
narrated what he observed.
63
That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion who stabbed her
husband, was not proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar was absent from the crime when it was
committed. Cesar's presence was admitted by appellant Sion himself on direct examination, thus:
Q
Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when you
said he was stabbed by Johnny Juguilon and Idong Sion?
A
Yes, sir. 34
Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform Felicitas of this fact.
At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the accused who had hit him with a stone.
His pressing concern then was to get someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was
scared of accused Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who was a "notorious" character in their
neighborhood. 35 It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if
sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative
value. 36 In any event, in his sworn statement 37 which was submitted on 22 October 1991
before Judge Sergio Garcia, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion
and Disu as among the perpetrators of the crime.
The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the declaration
made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly characterized this as a
"dying declaration," 38 having been made under the consciousness of impending death. The
victim was already weak his wife saw him and he knew that he would not survive the injuries he
sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the hospital. 39 When Felicitas
saw her husband, he told her what had happened to him, who caused his injuries and that he did
not expect to live, thus:
Q
What happened next after that when you met your husband?
Immediately asked him what happened to him.
And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag?
He said, "naalaak," which means, I was hit.
COURT:
Q
Did you ask him why he said "naalaak"?
He said he was stabbed and he was injured.
What do you mean by word "naalaak"?
I was hit.
COURT:
64
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:
Q
Do you know the reason why he was hit?
A
What I understand is that in the course of his pacifying the trouble between his nephew
and the rest, he was stabbed, sir.
Q
Aside from the statement of your husband Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else did
he say, if you know?
A
He said, take note of this because I know I cannot survive with these injuries of mine.
COURT:
Q
What else did he tell you aside from that?
A
He said, remember that in case I cannot survive with the injuries that I sustained, the men
who stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion, sir.
40 (emphasis supplied)
We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying
declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and
the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration
within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or circumstances
pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he survived. 41 Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the declarant's death renders
impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is no other equally
satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is "made in extremity, when the party
is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is
silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. 42 We
find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to fabricate the declarations of her husband.
We likewise find to be without basis appellants' claim that all the prosecution witnesses were
biased due to their relation to the victim's family. Plainly, witnesses Imuslan (the barangay
captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related to the victim, while the relationship of witnesses Cesar
Abaoag and Felicitas Abaoag to the victim, as brother and wife, respectively, neither disqualified
them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not to be lightly
supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge the
death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be innocent thereof. 43 A
witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render the
same more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the
crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. 44
65
Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as those mentioned by
the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that the decision as whom to
present as witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor
handling the case and the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a
plausible defense. 45 The prosecution is not obliged to present all possible witnesses, especially
if their testimony will only serve to corroborate that of another eyewitness' testimony, in which
case the former may every well be dispensed with considering that the testimony of a single
witness, if credible and positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
would suffice. 46
The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sion's defense that it was not he who stabbed the
victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, both of whom fled after the incident.
Constituting a mere denial of Cesar Abaoag's positive testimony that it was appellant Sion who
stabbed the victim, such must fail in light of the settled rule of evidence that positive testimony is
stronger that negative testimony. 47 Moreover, the claim was made rather late in the day, casting
serious doubt as to its veracity. From the time that appellant Sion presented himself to Kagawad
Lagman and the police authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent incarceration,
he never told anyone nor made any statement that he was not one who stabbed the victim; he did
not even so inform his close relatives, not even his wife who visited him in jail. 48 Also, during
the preliminary investigation, when he had the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and other
evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to dispute the statements of Felicitas and Cesar
Abaoag identifying him and detailing his participation in the crime. 49 He raised this claim for
the first time only during his testimony in court almost one (1) year after the stabbing incident
and his initial surrender, and notably, only after the hope of apprehending Idong Sion and Johnny
Juguilon, together with the other accused, already seemed remote. Such failure to immediately
disclose the information as soon as he was implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a
vital matter hardly inspire belief, being unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of men
and common experience.
That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny Juguilon, neither proved
his innocence. Non-flight unlike flight of an accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt
is simply inaction which may be due to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an
indication of innocence. 50
Appellant Sion's claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando Abaoag was belied and
contradicted by his admission in court that just before the stabbing of the victim, he and his coaccused hurled stones at and fought with the Abaoags, including Fernando, whom he blamed for
allegedly stoning his house. 51 It is also belied by his actuation and utterance made earlier in the
evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando Abaoag interfered in the quarrel between appellant
Sion and Fernando's nephew, Ronnie Manuel, which prompted appellant Sion and Johnny
Juguilon to curse and warn Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you are
interfering, you are siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have also your day . . . . you
Abaoags." 52 Appellant Sion also admitted that he "had an ill-feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel,
the victim's nephew, because "he was making trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the
incident." 53
66
In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disu's alibi must fail.
It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot prevail
over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that an
accused perpetrated the crime. 54 We are unable to discern any plausible reason, and appellant
Disu does not offer any, why he should be falsely implicated by Cesar Abaoag and mentioned in
the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim' assailants, if appellant Disu was not actually
present during the incident and had no participation in the commission of the crime. As to his
motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu claims that he had no misunderstanding with Fernando
Abaoag or his family. 55 However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu was close to the
Sion clan, which explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and joined the Sions and
Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico Disu was Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for five (5)
months, the latter teaching the former how to drive for three (3) months; and when Disu became
a driver himself, they had the same route and saw each other every day at the poblacion. 56 Disu
even admitted that on 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he "dropped by" the house of Felipe
Sion, which he often did before. 57
We now rule on the presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
58 Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the
accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose design, concerted action and community
of interest. 59 Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. 60
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay road of Binday, near
the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when Fernando Abaoag, who was looking for
the persons who just stoned his house several times, and Cesar Abaoag, arrived. Immediately,
Johnny Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting him on the left eyebrow; then, Edong, and
Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones, also at Fernando. As Fernando
turned away from his assailants, appellant Sion "rushed" and stabbed the victim three (3) times,
even as the latter raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag tried to help
his brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone. Appellant Sion then
commanded his companions to also kill Cesar, prompting the latter to run away. Then the
assailants fled, leaving behind a small bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts indubitably
manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take Fernando Abaoag's
life.
We also find to be unsupported by evidence appellant's claim, through the testimony of appellant
Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was a result of a "free-for-all rumble," thereby
possibly tempering their liability to that of causing death in a tumultuous affray under Article 251
of the Revised Penal Code, which carries a penalty lower than that for homicide. 61 In this case,
it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal stab wounds; hence, this
claim must be rejected.
67
Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now rule on the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.
In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, and disregarded the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which was
likewise alleged in the information. We agree as to the latter as the prosecution failed to prove
the essential elements of evident premeditation, viz: (a) the time when appellants determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination; and (c)
a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon
the consequences of their act. 62
We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or
specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. 63 We find no clear and convincing evidence of treachery. Cesar
Abaoag's testimony as to how his brother was attacked lacks sufficient detail showing
conclusively that the mode and manner of the assault rendered the victim entirely defenseless.
He merely testified that when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay road of Binday,
he saw Johnny Juguilon stone his brother and hit him on the left eyebrow. Fernando Abaoag then
turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion, Miguel Disu and the four (4)
other unidentified companions, who then "simultaneously" threw stones at Fernando. "Seconds
later," Cesar saw appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed dagger and stab his brother
three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just standing and said 'I will not fight.'"
64 They were six (6) meters away from Johnny Juguilon when the latter first hurled a stone at
Fernando which signaled the other accused to the same. 65
Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim when the attack
commenced, and the fact the three were two (2) waves of stoning which preceded the stabbing of
the victim, these should have sufficiently forewarned him of the greater danger which loomed
and prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence of clear details showing
conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim was entirely helpless when
stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that the attack was "so sudden and unexpected" as to
render the victim entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder when the
victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the attack was frontal, or the attack
was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased completely unaware. 66 Furthermore, the
evidence does not disclose that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
by appellants.
Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic aggravating
circumstance of cruelty, 67 based solely on the fact that the victim was stabbed thrice, with the
first stab wound hitting the lower left lung causing severe bleeding and its collapse. In fact,
appellee concedes this error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any
68
showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and
painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain; and, the mere fact that
wounds in excess of what was indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body of
the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and with the
intention of deliberately intensifying the victim's suffering. 68 In the instant case, the evidence
only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were delivered in succession, nothing more.
We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered
himself to a person in authority." 69 Its requisites are: (a) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and
(c) the surrender was voluntary. 70 For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and
show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1)
because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and
expense incidental to his search and capture. 71
As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion "presented"
himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered" him to the police
in the poblacion. 72 His admission that he surrendered because he was already suspected as one
of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his surrender "forced by circumstances" as ruled
by the trial court. His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor inevitable. At the time of his
surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been issued, the same having been issued only
on 19 November 1991. 73 In fact, he was released from custody after a few days, and was
ordered committed to jail only sometime in June 1992, after his motion for bail was denied by
the trial court on 10 June 1992 and was thus taken into custody. 74 This subsequent fact should
not diminish nor erase the favorable effect of Felipe Sion Jr.'s voluntary surrender on 17 October
1991. As has been held, whatever the accused's reason for surrendering either the fear of
reprisal from victim's relatives or, in this case, his knowledge that he was already a suspect
"does not gainsay the spontaneity of the surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he
saved the State the time and trouble of searching for him until arrested." 75
We disagree with Appellee's submission that there was no voluntary surrender because appellant
Sion surrender to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay member, and not to the
police authorities, implying that the former is not a person in authority. 76 This ignores Section
388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in part, that "[f]or
purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority
in their jurisdictions . . . ." 77 This law expands the definition of a person in authority under the
Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the barangay captain or
chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as
provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa are now
considered not merely as agents of, but as persons, in authority. 78
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial
Court of the First Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. D-10796 is MODIFIED. As modified,
69
appellants FELIFE SION, alias "JUNIOR" or FELIFE RODRIGUEZ, JR., and FEDERICO
DISU, alias "MIGUEL," are hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of
the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
with the former entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, they are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from eight (8) years of prison mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties therefor, and subject to the provision of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. Except as so modified, the rest of the challenged judgment stands.
Issue:
Held:
People v. Maramara
Facts: The evidence shows that a benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School PTA
of which accused- appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused- appellants house
in Brgy. Calpi, Claveria Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight,
while Ricardo Donato was dancing with certain Rowena Del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend
of the accused- appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened,
Rowena ran away while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito
Donato was about two meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long,
accused- appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at the victim Miguelito
Donato, hitting the latter at the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother
Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about
3 minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of
what happened.
Their father immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital
where the latter died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito expired, Regarder
Donato, the father, asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was accused- appellant.
The autopsy report revealed that aside from gunshot, the body of Miguelito bore lacerated
wounds. That the wounds could have inflicted by more than two persons.
The trial court ruled against the accused-appellant and was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder.
Issue: Whether or not Maramara should be held liable for tumultuous affray instead of
murder
70
Held: No. There is no merit in the accused- appellants position that he should be held liable
only for death caused in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was
in such situation that accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the
protagonists when Miguelito attacked him causing four stab wounds in different parts of his
body- two on the stomach, one on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accusedappellant with his handgun shot Miguelito.
Assuming that a rumble or a free- for- all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witness Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified accused- appellant as Miguelitos killer.
While accused- appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend
verity to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these
wounds, the evidence is adequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the
defenses version stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to
the circumstances surrounding Miguelitos death.
Wherefore, the Court modifies the judgment appealed from. The Court finds Cresenciano
Maramara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
Sison v. People
Facts: Tension and animosity between Cory loyalists and Marcos loyalists broke into violence.
On July 27, 198, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known Coryista.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta
by the Marcos loyalist. They applied a permit to hold a rally but it was denied. Despite this
setback, three thousand gathered at the Rizal Monument led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin
Nuega. No ticket could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres gave them ten minutes to disperse.
Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory
infiltrators. The police pushed the crowds and used tear gas to disperse them.
At about 4:00 pm, a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden. Annie Ferrer was
there and they informed her of the dispersal and Ferrer angrily ordered them gulpihin ninyo ang
mga Cory hecklers! A few minutes later, she was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted
kailangan gumanti tayo ngayon! a commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, cigarette vendor,
saw the loyalists attacking the persons in yellow. The man in yellow t- shirt was Salcedo and his
pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. Thay caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him. He was hit on various parts of his body. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he
could extricate Salcedo from them but the maulers pursued Salcedo. Sumilang was able to tow
Salcedo but Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head.
De Los Santas, Tan boxed Salcedo while Pacadar. Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw, Sision
repeatedly boxed him.
71
Salcedo managed to get away but accused Tan, Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the
process. Salcedo pleadfed for his life. The mauling resumed at the Rizal monument and
continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collap[sed and lost consciousness. Sumilang
with a help of traffic enforcer brought Salcedo to Medical Center Manila but was refused
admission. So they took him to PGH where he died upon arrival.
The trial court rendered decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard De Los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
Ferrer was convicted as an accomplice.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Ferrer but increasing
the penalty of the rest of the accused except for Tamayo. The court convicts Tamayo of
homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the crime committed is murder and not
death caused in a tumultuous affray
Held: No. For Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code to apply; it must be established that: (1)
there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized for the common
purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarreled
and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner;(4) someone was killed in the
course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence be can be
identified.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage
in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded
and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and
one individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but
this confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a
while later after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one
defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and
blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.
As the lower courts found, the victims assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number
and were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior
strength and excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself.
Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost unconsciousness. The
deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing of
murder.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed and modified.
72
People v. Ladjaalam
Facts: Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1)
maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide. The following information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the
house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a
volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was
the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where
they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant
jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently
arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house. Also found
was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded
positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm
and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.
Issue: Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of firearms
after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.
Held: No. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found guilty
only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a
weapon and (2) maintaining a drug den.
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as
it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the
courts].
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While
the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the
accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in
committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of
which are punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the
73
language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception that the
result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no
discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
of the legislature. [The Courts] task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done so in this case.
Dado v. People
Facts: On May 25, 1992, in order to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan
Kudarat, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams, which composed of
petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and
Rufo Alga. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, while
petitioner was armed with a caliber .45 pistol and accused Francisco Eraso was carrying an M16
armalite rifle. The team saw somebody approaching who was half-naked. When he was about 5
meters away from the team, Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash
light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Thereafter, petitioner fired a
single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. Petitioner admitted that when he heard the rapid gun
burst, he did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of
him purposely to demoralize their enemy.
The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not
the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas
and told him that it was not intentionally done and it was merely an accident. Silvestre Balinas
died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Silvestre
Balinas testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on
the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where
she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. She added that the position of the victim
at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the
bullets was upwards.
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments
recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed
bullet. However, on cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other
metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of a copper
jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.
The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Accused Eraso filed a Petition for Review but was denied by CA; on the other hand, petitioner,
filed this petition.
74
Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner
guilty of homicide
Held: Yes. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber
pistol towards the victim. However, it appears that there is no evidence to prove that petitioner
had intent to kill the victim. The prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to
kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of
firearms is dangerous to life. Intent to kill must be established with the same degree of certainty
as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be
drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for
the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person;
and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person
.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of
homicide is set aside and petitioner is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
However, petitioner Geronimo Dado is guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm.
People v. Macagaling
Facts: In connection with the barangay fiesta of Calabasahan, Concepcion, Romblon, a
coronation ball was held in the evening of May 2, 1991 at the public plaza. Present on said
occasion, among others, were Antonieto Fabella, barangay captain of San Pedro, Concepcion,
Romblon; Anita Macagaling, mother of the deceased Dennis Macagaling; Pfc. Roque Fesalbon,
investigator of the local police station; and Roger Lacambra, stepson of Teotimo Fameronag. At
about 10:00 P.M., the aforesaid Antonieto Fabella, who was also the brother-in-law of Dennis
Macagaling, was watching the festivities when all of a sudden he noticed Leonito Macagaling
point and then fire a gun at his own nephew, Dennis Macagaling. The bullet missed Dennis but
wounded Teotimo Fameronag on the right chest causing the latter to collapse in front of Dennis.
Dennis, on his part, tried to escape from Leonito by running away from the scene. At this
juncture, Anita saw that her son Dennis was running in a wobbly manner and she embraced him
to prevent him from falling. Leonito grabbed the hair of Dennis and yanked his head, pulling the
latter away from his mother. Anita pleaded to Leonito saying, "Don't, Leonito," but the latter
pointed the gun at the temple of Dennis and shot him point-blank. Dennis fell down
("sumubasob") on the cement floor. Leonito then shot the prostrate Dennis three times
successively on the neck, uttering the expletive "Putang ina mo," and then tried to leave the
vicinity.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explosives
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Held: No. The Court held that Leonitos version of the incident appeared to be too good to be
true. In a long line of cases, it has been held that where the accused admits the killing of the
victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in legitimate defense of himself. As the burden of proof is shifted
to him, he must consequently rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution. Accordingly, the proverbial bone of contention with respect to a killing
under such circumstances, is whether the accused has presented sufficient evidence to support
him claim of self-defense. appellant's version and concomitant claim of self-defense is belied and
negated precisely by the number of wounds sustained by the deceased and the location thereof.
Appellant maintains that while both he and Dennis were struggling for control of the gun, the
same accidentally fired, hitting the latter.
The Court said that Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the gravamen of the
offense is basically the fact of possession of a firearm without a license, it being assumed that it
was so possessed with animus possidendi. We have heretofore explained that, in view of the text
of said decree, the crime may be denominated as simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from
the aggravated form wherein such firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder. In
fine, since all that can be deduced is that appellant was in possession of the gun only on that
occasion for a transitory purpose and for the short moment coeval therewith, it cannot be
concluded that he had the animus possidendi which is required for the offense charged. The
Court affirmed the trial courts decision convicting the accused for homicide on two criminal
cases but reversed the decision as to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
People v. Comadre
Facts: Comadre et al. were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder through
conspiracy, treachery, and use of an explosive. The accused committed the crime by lobbing a
hand grenade over the roof of the house of the Agbanlogs that eventually exploded, killing
Robert Agbanlog and injuring 6 others. After trial, the court a quo convicted Comadre et al. of
the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder sentencing them to suffer the
penalty of death, hence this automatic review.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be
considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also,
since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant
circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery, which will then be relegated merely
as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294 which also considers
the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary
clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis--vis the qualifying
circumstance of by means of explosion under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code are
concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied in the instant case.
R.A. 8294 was enacted, to lower their penalties (as conspicuously reflected in the reduction of
the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related
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crimes under the amendatory law including the penalties for unlawful possession of explosives)
in order to rationalize them into more acceptable and realistic levels, and this is therefore
favorable to the accused. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to
commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person,
the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an
aggravating circumstance. Congress likewise clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as
aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under
Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to
in committing any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code. The legislative purpose is
to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the
aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the
aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation in paragraph
13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by RA
No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Issue: Whether or not the killing can be qualified by explosion under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code or by the use of an explosive under the provisions of R.A. 8294
Held: No. R.A. 8294 is inapplicable in the instant case. The crime committed is Murder
committed by means of explosion in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code.
The same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly considered as appellant was
sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against him
R.A. No. 8294, even though favorable to the accused, cannot be made applicable in this case
because before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the possession was illegal or
unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This
follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm,
which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain in
the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information, no evidence was also adduced
by the prosecution to show that the possession by Comadre of the explosive was unlawful. What
the law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. What is per se aggravating is the use of
unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.
Sayco v. People
Facts: Sayco a confidential civilian agent of the AFP was found guilty of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions under the provisions of PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294. Sayco
committed the crime by possessing and carrying a 9MM caliber with 14 live ammunitions while
in Bais City visiting and attending to a family emergency. The court found him guilty as charged
on the ground that that the possession and carrying of the aforementioned firearm and
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ammunitions was without proper license and authority. Sayco, without denying possession of
the same, insisted that he had the requisite permits for having been issued a Memorandum
Receipt and a Mission Order by the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army. However, the
court said that Memorandum Receipts and Mission Orders do not constitute the license required
by law for these were not issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit, who is the one
authorized by law to issue the required license. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Saycos
reliance in good faith on the said documents is not a valid defense in the crime of illegal
possession of firearms.
RTC affirmed the conviction but lowered the penalty imposed. CA likewise denied Saycos
petition for review as well as its Motion for Reconsideration, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order constitute sufficient
authority to possess and carry firearms and ammunitions required by PD 1866 as amended by
RA 8294
Held: No. It is a settled jurisprudence that a memorandum receipt and mission order cannot take
the place of a duly issued firearms license and an accused who relies on said documents cannot
invoke good faith as a defense against a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms as this is a
malum prohibitum.
The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused's lack of license or
permit to possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish
the corpus delicti, the prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the
accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess
or carry the same.
Sayco, a mere confidential civilian agent (as defined under Section 6(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866) is not authorized to receive the subject governmentowned firearm and ammunitions. The memorandum receipt he signed to account for said
government properties did not legitimize his possession thereof. Neither was Sayco authorized
to bear the subject firearm and ammunitions outside of his residence. The mission order issued to
petitioner was illegal, given that he is not a regular civilian agent but a mere confidential civilian
agent. Worse, he was not even acting as such confidential civilian agent at the time he was
carrying the subject firearm and ammunitions.
While this Court sustains the conviction for illegal possession of firearms, a further revision of
the penalty is warranted in view of the special provision in the Indeterminate Sentence Law
applicable to crimes penalized by a special law. RA 8294, amending PD 1866, lowered the
penalty to be imposed provided no other crime was committed.
There being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and considering that Sayco
accepted the subject firearm and ammunitions from the government under the erroneous notion
that the memorandum receipt and mission order issued to him legitimized the possession thereof,
Sayco is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one
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(1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one
(21) days of prision correccional as maximum.
Evangelista v. People
Facts: There was an information saying that on January 30, 1996 at NAIA the accused
feloniously have in possession of the firearms without the corresponding permit or license from
competent authority.
RTC's ruling: Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. RTC then found the petitioner
liable still for the offense charged but modified the penalty of imprisonment.
CA's ruling: CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision. It ruled that the
stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not CA gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of the
illegal possession of firearms
Held: No. Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed
in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his
arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject
firearms in the Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present
charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a
situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms.
Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai
in connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending criminal case when he left
Dubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar
rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies.
U.S. v. Jeffrey
Facts: Teodorica Saguinsin was in a shop when a man named D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and
without apparent reason whatever, struck her three times on the hip which caused her to fall to
the ground, and being three months pregnant, she had a miscarriage the following day. D.B.
Jeffrey did not know that she is pregnant and the complaint against him is only for lesiones
menos graves. In the information read to him, it was however stated that miscarriage occured
due to his maltreatment of her.
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Issue: Whether or not Jeffrey may be found guilty of abortion even if the complaint does not
charge him of the same
Held: Yes. In fact, what was committed is abortion, not lesiones. Even though the criminal intent
is not abortion, the fact that without any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Teodorica,
presumably not knowing that she is pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused the
miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the consequences thereof, to
wit, for the abortion.
People v. Genoves
Facts: Soledad Rivera tried to take back by force from Genoves a yoke of a plow she claims she
owned. Genoves however, repeatedly struck Soledad with his fist causing her to fall to the
ground several times. During which time, Soledad was heavy with child. Soledad by such fall
suffered pains in the abdomen. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day
before. From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain, which were symptoms of
premature delivery. Soledad remained in said condition for days until it culminated in the painful
and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way carrying, but the other
baby could not be delivered. Soledad and both babies died. Genoves was then charged and
convicted by CFI Occidental Negros of the complex crime of homicide with abortion.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of the complex crime of homicide with abortion is
proper
Held: No, the abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is generally known that a fall is liable to cause premature delivery, and
the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault to Soledads death. Genoves
must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.
U.S v. Bogel
Doctrine: When a robber stabbed a woman in one eye, and as a result of the wound thus inflicted
she lost the use of the eye, there is no mutilation.
The guilt of the accused of the crime of robbery with which they were charged was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. It was further proven that one of the accused, on the occasion of the
robbery, stabbed a woman named Fabiana in one eye, and that as a result of the wound thus
inflicted she lost the use of the eye.
The trial court imposed the penalty prescribed in paragraph 2 of article 503 of the Penal Code,
but we are of opinion that the penalty which should have been imposed is that prescribed in
paragraph 3 of said article.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 503 are as follows:
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One guilty of robbery with violence or intimidation to the person will be punished:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
With cadena temporal in its medium degree to cadena perpetua when the robbery was
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or when for the purpose of or on occasion of the
robbery any wounds are inflicted which are penalized in paragraph 1 of article 416 of the Penal
Code, or when the person who was robbed was held prisoner for ransom or period longer than
one day.
3.
With cadena temporal when the purpose of or on occasion of the robbery any of the
wounds are inflicted which are penalized in paragraph 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 416 of the Penal Code provide that he wounds, strikes, or maltreats
another will be punished for the crime of grave injuries.
1.
With prision mayor if as a result of the wounds the offended person became an imbecile,
impotent, or blind.
2.
With prision correccional in its medium and maximum degrees if as a result of the
wounds the offended person lost an eye or some principal member, or has been incapacitated or
unfitted for the work in which prior thereto he was habitually engaged.
Unless the putting out of an eye by stabbing is a mutilation in the sense in which this word is
used in the above set out paragraph 2 of article 503, it is manifest that the penalty to be imposed
in this case is that prescribed in paragraph 3 and not paragraph 2 of said article. Viada, in his
commentary on article 415, which penalizes intentional mutilations, points out that by mutilation
(mutilacion) is understood, according to the Diccionario de la lengua, the lopping or clipping off
(cercenamiento) of some part of the body, and it is evident that the putting out of an eye does not
fall under this definition.
The commission of the offense was marked with the aggravating circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 15, 20, and 8 of article 10 of the Penal Code, the robbery having taken place at night
and in the house of the offended party, and the robbers having disguised themselves for the
purpose of committing the crime with greater security to themselves. The penalty which should
be imposed in accordance with the provisions of the above-cited paragraph 3 of article 503 of the
Penal Code is that of cadena temporal in its maximum degree, which was the penalty imposed by
the trial judge, he not having taken into consideration the above-cited aggravating circumstances
and imposed the penalty prescribed in paragraph 2 of article 503 in its medium degree.
The sentence of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed.
Aguirre v. Sec of Justice
Facts:
81
Laureano (Larry) Aguirre was adopted from an orphanage by Pedro Aguirre and Lourdes Aguirre
Developmental milestones were noted to be delayed. He started to walk and speak a single word
at around age 5. He was enrolled in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant
learning difficulties that he had to repeat 1st and 4th grades.
Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental retardation, special education
training was advised and he was transferred to St. John Marie Vianney.
Pedro Aguirre (Larrys guardian) wanted to have him sterilized and approached Dr Agatep to
perform the procedure.
Dr Pascual conducted tests on Larry to ascertain whether he could validly give his consent to the
operation.
The findings concluded that the responsibility of making the decision may be given to his parent
or guardian.
Dr Agatep gave Larry a vasectomy with consent of Pedro Aguirre.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre (common law sister) charged respondents for mutilation.
Gloria Aguirre contended that the bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's brother, Larry
Aguirre, caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's reproductive organs of generation or
conception and that it was performed intentionally and deliberately to deprive Larry forever of
his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate, thus, it amounted to mutilation.
Issue: WON the respondents are liable for the crime of mutilation
Held: No, they are not liable for mutilation.
The vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived Larry of his reproductive organ which is
still very much part of his physical self.
In male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens,
through which the sperm cells are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine
with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied.
The vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male reproductive
organ.
The ordinary usage of the term mutilation is the deprivation of a limb or essential part of the
body.
The bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as
defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Buka
At around noontime on 14 December 1978, a weapons carrier with several passengers on board
was ambushed by armed men in Sitio Samlang, Datal Batong, Malungon, South Cotabato,
causing the deaths of Elena Pamoso and Estelita Imarga and the physical injuries of Felipe
Noquera. As a consequence thereof, three (3) separate informations were filed on 5 March 1980
against Lapnayo Buka, Angel Pral, Pral Ngay, Beren Mandong, and Purong Bilaan with the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of South Cotabato. The first charges them
with the crime of Murder in connection with the death of Elena Pamoso, committed as follows:
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That on or about the 14th day of December, 1978, at 11:00 o'clock in the morning to 12:00
o'clock noon time, at Sitio Samlang, Barangay Datal Batong, Municipality of Malungon,
Province of South Cotabato, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused said to be in company with two John Does, whose identities are still
unknown and who are still at-large armed with assorted high powered weapons such as Surit,
shotgun rifle and garand rifle and with evident premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, attack, assault and shoot with
the use of assorted firearms at the weapon (sic) carrier of Edon Escobillo, boarded by 15
passengers and as a result thereof, inflicting and mortally wounding Elena Pamuso which
resulted to (sic) her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with qualifying circumstances of evident pre-meditation and with
generic aggravating circumstance that the act was committed by a band and with deliberate
disregard of the respect due the offended (sic) party on account of her sex, being a woman. 1
(emphasis supplied)
Said case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1893.
The second 2 charges them with Frustrated Murder in the case of Felipe Noquera on account of
the wounds he suffered which would have "ordinarily cause his death . . ., but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Felipe Noquera which prevented his death." The same
qualifying and aggravating circumstances were alleged in the information except for the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of respect due the offended party on account of her sex.
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1894.
The third, 3 docketed as Criminal Case No. 1895, charges them with the crime of Murder in
connection with the death of Estelita Imarga and alleges the same qualifying and aggravating
circumstances as those alleged in Criminal Case No. 1893.
The foregoing cases were ordered archived by the trial court on 30 September 1980 because all
the accused were still at large; nevertheless, warrants for their arrest were issued. 4
On 30 July 1981, the prosecution filed a motion to revive the cases which asked for the issuance
of an alias warrant of arrest. 5 On 6 November 1981, accused Beren Mandong and Angel Pral
were arrested and brought under the custody of the law. 6 The others remain at large up to the
present.
The three (3) cases were then consolidated for joint trial as against Beren Mandong and Angel
Pral, who pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 19 November 1981. 7
At the joint trial on the merits, the prosecution presented ten (10) witnesses, while the defense
presented eight (8) witnesses, including the appellants themselves. 8 All of the witnesses testified
before then Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas.
83
After joint trial on the merits, the lower court, per Judge Marcelino R. Valdez, rendered a
consolidated decision, 9 promulgated on 20 January 1984, finding the accused Angel Pral and
Beren Mandong each guilty of "two (2) crimes of murder" and of the crime of frustrated murder
and sentencing them as follows:
WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Angel
Pral and Beren Mandong guilty beyond reasonable doubt and hereby convicts each of them of
two crimes of murder and Frustrated Murder.
As no mitigating nor (sic) aggravating circumstances were proven, this Court hereby sentences
each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in Crim. Cases Nos. 1895 and 1893.
However, in Crim. Case No. 1894 accused is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of Prision Mayor as Minimum to fourteen (14) years, ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to pay the following
damages to the heirs of the victims, to wit:
a)
Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) Pesos each by reason of the death of Estelita Imarga and
Elena Pamoso and Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos for the Frustrated death (sic) of Felipe
Noquera;
b)
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos each in concept of actual and moral damages;
c)
cost.
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos each in concept of exemplary damages and to pay the
SO ORDERED.
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the convictions were based is summarized by the
trial court as follows:
On December 14, 1978, the victim with some other companions were bound for General Santos
City from Miasong Malungon, South Cotabato, riding on a weapons carrier. Upon reaching Sitio
Samlang, Brgy Datal Batong, of said Municipality, at around 11:30 A.M. they were ambushed by
the accused resulting to (sic) the death of Estelita Imarga, Elena Pamoso and wounding (sic)
Felipe Noquera. The weapons carrier was driven by Paquito Alvarez. Per Medical report the
cause of death of Estelita Imarga was "gun shot wounds, left chest," Elena Pamoso was "gun shot
wounds, right chest" (Exhibits "D" and "D-1") while Felipe Noquera suffered injuries, to wit:
Wound gunshot with avulsion of outer layer of skin 4 cm. long, one cm. wide left
interscapular area.
Wound gunshot with avulsion of outer layer of skin, 6 cm. long, one cm. wide right,
infrascapular area. (Exhibit "A")
Paquito Alvarez, driver of the weapons carrier which was ambushed declared that he saw the
ambushers with guns and recognized two of them as Beren and Purong, the real name (sic) are
84
Beren Mandong and Purong Bilaan. He recognized these two among the ambushers because he
is acquainted with them long time (sic) before the incident. The others were new to him and
hence did not recognize them.
When they were shot at, he speed (sic) up his truck until they reached Datal Kangil, a place three
kilometers, more or less, from the ambush scene where he asked for help from the Barangay
Captain. They went back to retrieve one of the victims Estelita Imarga who fell from the
weapons carrier and brought her to Datal Kangil (TSN, pp. 7-14, Feb. 1, 1982)
Felipe Noquera, the one who sustained gun shot wounds but escaped death, testified that they
were ambushed at Sitio Samlang, Datal Batong, Malungon, at around 11:00-11:30 o'clock A.M.,
on December 14, 1978, on their way to General Santos City from Brgy. Miasong, of said
Municipality, riding on a weapons Carrier (sic). He saw the ambushers and recognized Angel,
Beren, Pral and Lapnayo whose real names are Angel Pral, Beren Mandong, Ngay Pral, Lapnayo
Buka and Purong Bilaan. The witness was acquainted with these persons long (sic) time before
the incident for he used to see them in Datal Batong. He (Noquera) being a driver himself of a
weapons carrier. He identified Angel Pral and Beren Mandong in court during his open
testimony. (TSN, pp. 25-29, Feb. 2, 1982). He saw each of these two ambushers with long
firearms. In spite of the rigid cross examination on this witness he stood pat on the identity of the
two accused, testifying firmly that he saw them (accused) holding long firearm each, but he did
not know what kind firearms were those. He was investigated by the office of the Provincial
Fiscal and he told the same version re the identity of these two accused. (TSN, pp. 39-40,
Feb. 2, 1982)
Luis Esconde, one of the persons on board the weapon (sic) carrier at the time of the of the time
(sic) of the ambushcade (sic) testified that upon reaching sitio Samlang, he saw the ambushers
more than five, who fired at them and he recognized three of them, Lapnayo, Beren and Angel,
whose real name (sic) are Lapnayo Buka, Beren Mandong, and Angel Pral. He did not
recognized (sic) the others. He readily pointed to the accused Angel Pral and Beren Mandong
when he was made to identify them in Court. He is acquainted with said accused because he
usually see (sic) them in Datal Batong during market days, cockfighting and card games. He saw
the victims of the ambush Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso who died immediately thereafter,
while Felipe Noquera suffered gun shot wounds (TSN, pp. 46-51, Feb. 3, 1982). Upon rigid
cross-examination this witness also stand (sic) pat on the identity of these two accused whom he
saw holding long firearm (sic) each.
Ricardo Salvador, one of the persons on the (sic) board the weapon (sic) carrier at the time and
date of the ambush, stated that he saw the ambushers, but he only recognized Beren, whose real
name is Beren Mandong, also holding a long firearm. He saw the victims Estelita Imarga and
Elena Pamoso who died immediately thereafter while Felipe Noquera suffered gunshot wounds.
(TSN, pp. 61-64, Feb. 3, 1982). On cross (sic), this witness firmly stated that he knew personally
Beren Mandong before the incident because he usually saw him in Datal Batong, while the rest
of the ambushers were not known to him, hence, he could not recognize them (TSN, pp. 64-65,
Feb. 3, 1982).
85
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi presented by both accused, summarizing and
disposing of it as follows:
Conversely, accused Angel Pral took up the defense of Alibi. He denied having participated in
the ambush killing at Sitio Samlang, Brgy. Datal Batong, Malungon, South Cotabato, on
December 14, 1978, for at the time of the alleged ambush he was in General Santos City,
together with his father, Fral Ngay; that on December 13, 1978 he went to General Santos City
with Elisias Pempillo with (sic) whom he sold his corn produce, that they arrive (sic) General
Santos City at around 3:00 o'clock P.M. on that date; that he did not go back to Datal Batong on
December 14, 1978 but slept in Llidos home General Santos City (sic) and went back to Datal
Batong only on December 15, 1978; that Lising Pempillo the buyer of his corn was the only one
who returned to Datal Barong on the 13th of December and went back to General Santos City on
December 14, 1978, arriving thereat at 1:00 o'clock P.M. (TSN, pp. 174-178, July 22, 1982).
On cross (sic), this accused admitted he has not gone to school; that he is an illiterate and does
not know the month of the year; that he knew only that he had been selling his corn produce in
the month of December, 1978, because he was told by the christians (sic) thereat; that he
harvested his corn on December 9, 1978 and finished the same on December 12; that he
remembered very well December 9-12, when he harvested his corn, December 13, when he sold
his corn to Lising Pempillo, December 14, when he slept in General Santos City and December
15, when he went back to Datal Batong. But when he was ask (sic) the date when he testified on
July 22, 1982, he answered "I don't know." Asked further how he remembered those dates,
December 9, 12, 13, 14 and 15, 1978, he answered that he was informed by the christians (sic)
thereat, that those were the dates (TSN, pp. 180-184, July 22, 1982). Then this accused was again
asked the date when he was born and he said he does not know; he does not also know when he
got married, nor does he know the birth date of his child. He does not also know the distance
from Dadiangas to Datal Batong, nor (sic) does he know how to tell the time. (TSN, pp. 185-186,
July 22, 1982).
The version of this accused was corroborated by Elisias Pempillo, the businessman with (sic)
whom accused Angel Pral sold his corn harvest. This witness testified that he knew personally
Angel Pral; that on December 12, Angel Pral informed him that his corn was ready for hauling;
that he had been hauling Angel Pral's corn from December 12-13 when he hauled the corn to
General Santos City on the latter date bringing with him the accused. When this witness return
(sic) to Datal Batong on December 13, 1978, Angel Pral was left in General Santos City. He
(Pempillo) again hauled the corn on December 14, arriving in General Santos City at around 1:00
P.M. where he saw accused Angel Pral. On December 15, 1978, all of them returned to Datal
Batong (TSN, pp. 131-136, July 20, 1982). It took more than a year when Angel Pral was
apprehended and brought to the custody of the law. This witness knew the arrest of Angel Pral by
the police authorities but inspite of his knowledge, he did not care to inform the police
authorities that Angel Pral was innocent of the crime charged against him. He did not also tell
anybody about what he knew about Angel Pral, that this accused was with him since December
13-15, 1978; that Angel Pral was in General Santos City on December 14, the date of the ambush
(TSN, pp. 138-139, July 20, 1982).
86
However, this witness was confronted with his sworn statements before the fiscal's (sic) Office
taken on July 17, 1979, where he stated that on December 12, 1978 they were not able to go back
to General Santos City, but instead they slept in Malungon, South Cotabato in their house at Data
(sic) Batong. Then he was asked.
Q
So what you declared here before the Investigating Fiscal was not true?
A
I cannot remember it correctly but what I can remember is that I delivered corn on
December 13, and 14 (TSN, pp. 143, July 20, 1982).
Asked further how he came to remember the dates of December 13, 14 and 15, 1978, and (sic) he
answered: "Because those were the dates, I delivered corn." However, when he was asked the
date when he testified before the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he could not remember. Then his
credibility was tested. He was asked how many children he has and he answered "Twelve".
When he was asked the date of birth of his tenth child, he answered: "I cannot recall." Of the
seventh child, Charlin, he said, he cannot recall. Of the twelve (sic) child, he said he cannot
remember. Of the eleventh, he could not also remember. Of the sixth child, he said he cannot also
remember. Under the circumstances, there is indeed a doubt as to the credibility of this witness.
The veracity for (sic) truth of his testimony is very doubtful. What he could remember only were
those dates, December 13, 14 and 15, 1978, in comparison with dates of more significant events,
which goes to show, that such line of testimony could be dubbed as coach (sic) testimony.
On the other hand, accused Beren Mandong has the same nature of defense. He is a bilaan (sic),
and an illiterate (sic). He was arrested sixteen months after the complaint was filed. He declared
that at the time and date of the ambush on December 14, 1978, he was farming in the farm of
Serafin Sunio at Datal Batong as a hired laborer; that he knew of this date because Serafin Sunio
told him; that when he was asked the date he testified in Court, he answered: "I don't know"
(TSN, pp. 199-201, Nov. 18, 1982).
The foregoing version was affirmed by Serafin Sunio, that on December 14, 1978, he had his
land at Datal Batong cleared and he employed 24 laborers, out of whom were more than ten
bilaan (sic). These laborers had been working at 7:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M., and one of them was
accused Beren Mandong. They worked the whole day up to 5:00 P.M. under the direct
supervision of Serafin Sunio. This witness learned of the ambush at Sitio Samlang, Datal Batong
which is three kilometers away from his farm. (TSN, pp. 159-161, July 21, 1982). There were of
course clear and distinct descripancies (sic) between the open testimony of this witness in open
court with that of his sworn statement with the Fiscal's Office regarding the number of laborers
he employed on December 14, 1978 from 24 to 33 in number. He also testified in open Court that
there were more christians (sic) than bilaans (sic) while in his sworn statement with the Fiscal's
Office there were more Bilaans than christians (sic); and when asked what were their names he
only know (sic) five, namely: Pilang, Beren, Oro and Ondan, and nothing more. The probative
value of this line of testimony is fatally infirmed by its unreliability.
Alibi is a week defense and cannot prevail over the testimony of truthful witnesses. The reason is
that alibi is easy of (sic) fabrication. (Peop. vs. Bulawin, 29 SCRA 710; Peop. vs. Gomez, 28
SCRA 440). Court should exercise great caution in accepting the defense of alibi because it is
87
easily concocted (Peop. vs. Bagsican, 6 SCRA 400). In order that an (sic) alibi as a defense may
prosper, the evidence to support it must be clear and convincing as to preclude the possibility of
the accused's presence at the scene of the crime, while the evidence as to its identification must
be weak and insufficient. (Peop. vs. Jamero, 24 SCRA 207; Peop. vs. Lumantas, 28 SCRA 764;
Peop. vs. Alcantara 33 SCRA 813). To establish alibi, the accused must show that he was at some
other place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place
where the crime was committed at the time of its commission (Peop. vs. Lumantas, 28 SCRA
754). The claim of the accused that they were far from the scene of the crime is not credible,
where there is probability that they might have spread out in the neighboring towns and barrios
to eliminate their enemies (Peop. vs. Corpuz, 1 SCRA, 33; Peop. vs. Almeriz, 3 SCRA 252). The
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of witnesses (Peop. vs. Baiaga, 1
SCRA 283; Peop. vs. Estrada, 22 SCRA 111).
All the foregoing doctrines play a vital role against the defense of alibi of the accused. It could
not be improbable for the accused to have been at the scene of the ambush from the place where
they allegedly were on the date of December 14, 1978, considering the distance which is
approachable within few (sic) minutes or hours. Were it a fact that the accused were not
definitely identified by witnesses for the prosecution, then the accused (sic) defense of alibi
assumes importance. But such was not the case, for the accused were definitely identified by the
prosecution witnesses to be the companions of the ambushers on that fatal day. Not only were
they definitely identified but that after the commission of the offense, on December 14, 1978
these two accused went into hiding and were only arrested on November 6, 1981 or there about
(sic), after a period of over two years. This (sic) cases were archived on September 30, 1980, for
the accused escaped from their permanent residence, at Datal Batong, Miasong, Malungon South
Cotabato, and up to the present their other co-accused are still at large and could (sic) not be
found. "The wicked fleeth while no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold a (sic) lions,"
goes the saying. There could have been no other to have stage the ambushcade (sic) except the
herein and their gang, for there were no other persons seem (sic) by the prosecution witnesses
except the herein accused and their co-accused who are still at large. On the foregoing scores,
this court arrives at the conclusion that the presumption of innocence of the accused as provided
in the Constitution had been overcome. The denials of the accused to have (sic) participated in
the ambushcade (sic) are ineffective to overcome the evidence of the prosecution, particularly the
positive testimonies of Felipe Noquera and Luis Esconde, passenger (sic) of the weapons carrier
when the ambush was committed. Surprisingly the conduct of these accused right after the
shooting incident has been very suspicious, for immediately thereafter all the accused escaped
and could no longer be found. Compared to the true identification and testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses this court does not doubt their veracity for being disinterested witnesses
and whose impartiality has not been placed in doubt.
As to the testimony of Mayor Felipe Constantino of the Municipality of Malungon that there has
been a confrontation in July, 1980 with some of the rebels responsible of (sic) the ambushcade
(sic) on December 14, 1978, with Col. Bumanglang and a Major from the Army, 3rd Inf. Btn.,
wherein four of the rebels namely: Olding Golac, So Dol, Toy Maliang, and Dano Pandayong
admitted responsibility for the ambush, this court believes that said result of the alleged
confrontation cannot be taken on its face value "hook line and sinker" because of the hearsay of
the said confrontation. The confrontation was allegedly made in July, 1980, after the case had
88
already been filed in court. However, this witness, a Municipal Mayor at that, did not care to give
the complete details of such confrontation to the court for its guidance, especially at that time
when the accused were all still at large and warrants of arrest had been issued against them. Nor
was there an information given to the prosecution arm of the government regarding said
confrontation whereby four of the surrenderees admitted responsibility of (sic) the ambushcade
(sic). And if the accused were not really the perpetrators of the dastard (sic) crime, why is it that
immediately after December 14, 1978, these accused could no longer be found at their respective
residence (sic) and could not be apprehended until November 6, 1981 when two of them brought
to the custody of the law. Besides, the surrenderees were not brought to court before the alleged
amnesty was given to them, so this case should have been resolved pursuant to law. Under the
circumstances, this court cannot exculpate the accused based on a flimsy defense of alibi, against
the clear, convincing testimonies of government witnesses that the accused were indeed the ones
responsible for the murder and frustrated murder or ambush shooting resulting to (sic) the
instantaneous death of Estelita Imarga, Elena Pamoso and wounding Felipe Noquera. 10
In convicting each of the accused for murder as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1893 and 1895
and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1894, the trial court considered the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation since the "ambush or shooting was so
sudden and unexpected assault (sic) perpetrated by all the accused insured the killing of the two
defenseless victim Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso and the frustrated death (sic) of Felipe
Noquera." 11
Unable to accept the verdict, accused Angel Pral and Beren Mandong, hereinafter referred to as
the Appellants, filed their Notice of Appeal 12 on 6 February 1984 wherein they manifested their
intention to appeal to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals). In view of
the penalty imposed, the appeal should have been brought directly before this Court. The
Intermediate Appellate Court, upon receipt of the records of the cases, correctly forwarded the
same to this Court on 15 August 1984; 13 the cases were then docketed as G.R. Nos. 68311-13.
In their Brief, Appellants assign only one (1) error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS OF TWO (2) CRIMES
OF MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 14
and in support thereof, they assert and argue that:
(a)
Their defense of alibi should have been given more credence considering that it is
corroborated by two (2) other people, namely Elisias Pempillo (corroborating the alibi of Angel
Pral) and Serafin Sunio (corroborating the testimony of Beren Mandong); 15
(b)
The testimonies of Mayor Felipe Constantino of Malungon, South Cotabato and
Barangay Captain Venancio Malayon of Barangay Bilaan 16 that the real ambushers had already
surrendered and had been granted amnesty, clearly show their innocence; said testimonies should
have been given more weight by the trial court;
89
(c)
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, heavily relied upon by the trial court in
convicting the Appellants, were full of inconsistencies such that there was a failure to positively
identify the perpetrators of the crime; 17
(d)
On the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial court in the case
at bar are not controlling and should not be given much weight because the judge who rendered
the decision is not the same judge who heard the case; 18 and
(e)
Finally, even assuming arguendo, that the Appellants were among those who staged the
ambush, they cannot be convicted for Frustrated Murder in G.R. No. 68312 (Criminal Case No.
1894 in the court below) because as per the testimony of prosecution witness Dr. Casimiro
Mansilla, the victim, Felipe Noquera, would have lived even without medical attendance
considering that the wound was just a slight physical injury. 19
The People, in its Brief filed by the Solicitor General, disagrees with the Appellants and
maintains that the prosecution was able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It stressed
that at least four (4) eye-witnesses positively identified them as those who ambushed the victims.
20 It further claims that as against the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, the
Appellants' defense of alibi is weak and not plausible. 21
Anent the contention that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are full of inconsistencies,
the People painstakingly contradicted each and every inconsistency mentioned, to wit:
The appellants contend that the testimony of witness Paquito Alvarez is not to be believed
because there is an inconsistency when he admitted having pointed to all the accused during the
preliminary investigation before the fiscal, while in his testimony in court he claimed to have
recognized only accused Beren Mandong and Purong Bilaan.
The contention is without merit. There is no showing in the testimony that when counsel
mentioned the word "accused", he was referring to all the accused, including those at-large, or
that he was referring only to all the accused who had been apprehended. Hence, the alleged
inconsistency is wanting. As to the alleged testimony of the defense witness Barangay Captain
Malayon that when he interviewed Alvarez and the other passengers, no one told him as to who
were the ambushers, suffice it to say that the testimony of said witness cannot be used to
impeach the testimony of eye-witness Alvarez. Besides there is no showing that Barangay
Captain Malayon ever asked Alvarez nor (sic) the passengers as to the identity of the ambushers.
The appellants likewise contends (sic) that eye-witness Felipe Noquera is not credible because
the said witness allegedly declared that when he heard gun reports he immediately took cover by
lying face down on the roof of the weapon (sic) carrier, and that when cross-examined, the said
witness forgot the shirt worn by the accused, their distance from one another and their relative
position from (sic) each other.
90
The contention lacks merit. It is not true that eye-witness Noquera immediately took cover face
down upon hearing the gun reports. What he testified during cross-examination is that he first
looked sidewise from where the gun report came before taking cover. Thus:
Q
And when you dived on the roof of the vehicle on your belly, you did that instantaneously
upon hearing the gunburst?
A
Yes, sir. I looked sidewise from where the gun report came (p. 33, tsn, Feb. 2, 1982).
As regards his failure to remember the shirt worn by the accused, their distance from one another
and their relative position from (sic) each other, suffice it to say that the same is not uncommon,
for under such a situation where they were ambushed, the natural tendency of a witness is only to
focus his vision at the face of the person firing at them in order to see recognize (sic)
malefactors. Hence, he could not have a clear vision of the shirts they were wearing, their
distance from one another and relative position from (sic) each other. Besides, the witness
testified after the lapsed (sic) of about four (4) years. Hence, he could not have possibly
remembered all the minute details which to him are not of great significance.
The appellant further contends that the testimony of eye-witness Ricardo Salvador that he
recognized Beren Mandong as one of the ambushers cannot also be given full credit because
Salvador was seated at the middle of the weapon (sic) carrier and that the said vehicle has a roof
which could have prevented him from seeing the accused who were on top of a hill.
The contention is without merit. In the first place, it is not true that the entire weapon (sic) carrier
was covered by a roof. Only the driver's cabin has a roof, while the portion at the rear thereof
was uncovered. Secondly, the ambushers were standing on the hill and were openly exposed.
There is nothing, therefore, to obstruct the view of eye-witness Salvador when he glanced at the
ambushers who were on top of the hills firing at them. 22
The People further contends that the Appellants were correctly convicted of Frustrated Murder in
Criminal Case No. 1894 (G.R. No. 63811-13, herein) because "all the elements of the crime of
murder, including the intent to kill with the use of deadly weapon, are present" and "it is
inconsequential whether the wound inflicted is serious or less serious or slight." 23
Lastly, the People submits that the indemnity of P12,000.00 each, to be paid to the heirs of the
deceased Estelita Imarga and Elena Pamoso, should be increased to P30,000.00 each, in view of
the ruling in People vs. Dioso. 24
We have meticulously examined and painstakingly scrutinized the records of this case and the
challenged decision and We are convinced that the Appellants have been positively identified as
two (2) of those who staged the ambushcade whose guilt has been established beyond reasonable
doubt by the testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of Paquito Alvarez
(driver of the weapons carrier), Felipe Noquera (the injured victim) and Luis Esconde and
Ricardo Salvador (both passengers of the weapons carrier).
91
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Alvarez and Noquera, which Appellants capitalized on ,
pertain to minor details only and cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony
of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. 25 In fact, these
inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their credibility, for it is
usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see differently some details of a startling
occurrence. 26 Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies on minor
details serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward and spontaneous
testimony. 27 Besides, as earlier stated, the People took extra efforts to explain the alleged
inconsistencies and, in the process, demonstrate the weakness of Appellants' claim.
As to the defense of alibi, We agree with the trial court that it could not prevail over the positive
identification of the Appellants. Alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the testimony of
truthful witnesses because it is easy to fabricate. 28 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, it must be
established by clear evidence that the accused was in another place for such a period of time as to
negate his presence at the scene of the crime when it was committed. 29 In the case at bar, the
trial court found that "it could not be improbable for the accused to have been at the scene of the
ambush from the place where they allegedly were on the date of December 14, 1978, considering
the distance which is approachable within few (sic) minutes or hours." 30 We find no reason to
disagree with the trial court as the Appellants failed to show Us any basis for overturning this
findings.
The testimonies of Mayor Felipe Constantino of the Municipality of Malungon and Barangay
Captain Venancio Malayon of barangay Bilaan do not inspire belief. Firstly, the alleged surrender
and grant of amnesty to the "ambushers" who, as claimed by Mayor Constantino, were not the
appellants, was not corroborated by "Col. Bumanglag", the person who allegedly accepted the
surrender and granted the amnesty. Secondly, Constantino's claim of an ambush is based on what
he allegedly heard during the meeting. There was no specific reference to the ambush in
question. Thirdly, Col. Bumanglag, if he indeed even existed, had no authority to grant amnesty.
Under the Constitution then in force, more particularly Section 13, Article VII of the 1973
Constitution, only the President, with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, had the power
to grant amnesty. Fourthly, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the testimonies of the
Mayor and the barangay captain as to the date of the alleged surrender. The former claims that it
took place in July 1980 31 while the latter alleges that it was in "1979". 32 Worse, while the
Mayor asserts that those who admitted to have staged the ambush were Olding Gola-e, So Dol,
Toy Maliang and Dano Pandayong, 33 witness Malayon claims that the suspects were Toy Golas,
Olding Golas, Lagono Lagayong and So Golaing. 34 This witness also claims that one of the
victims of the ambush who died was Lolita Agupitan. 35 Per prosecution's evidence, only Elena
Pamoso and Estelita Imarga died as a consequence of the ambush. Finally, Appellants exerted no
effort to present as witness any of the ambushers who "surrendered." Their non-availability or
hostility was not shown. The "surrender" and "amnesty" story then is nothing but a crude
fabrication.
On the factual findings of the trial court, the Appellants urge Us not to give weight to said
findings as the judge who rendered the decision did not hear the case himself. 36 As they
correctly pointed out. "Appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of fact of the trial
92
court, 37 except where the judge who rendered the decision is not the judge who heard the case."
38 However, the foregoing rule and its exception do not apply in a case where the trial court's
conclusion are fully substantiated and supported by the evidence on record and warrants the
affirmance of such findings. 39
As held in the case of People vs. Bocatcat: 40
Finally, the Court notes that the lower court's judgment was penned by a judge who did not hear
the evidence. And so, while the rule is settled that the findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal, as they are in better position to examine and observe the
demeanor of witnesses, this rule does not, however, apply in the case at bar, yet, we find no
cogent reason to reverse His Honor's judgment as his conclusions are fully substantiated and
supported by the evidence on record.
In the case at bar, We find that the findings of fact of the trial court are amply supported by the
evidence on record.
We agree, however, with Appellants that they cannot be convicted for the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 1894 because, as testified to by Dr. Casimiro Mansilla, the doctor who
examined the victim, Felipe Noquera, the latter would have lived even without medical
attendance because the "wound was just a slight physical injury." 41 Per the medical certificate,
42 the following were the injuries inflicted on Noquera:
Wound, gunshot with avulsion of outer layer of skin 4 centimeter (sic) long, one centimeter
wide left interscapular area.
Wound, gunshot with avulsion of outer layer of skin 6 centimeter (sic) long, one centimeter
wide right, infrascapular area.
which "require medical attendance for the period of seven (7) to nine (9) days, unless
complications set in or manifestation due to internal injuries which are not apparent at the time of
the examination appear later."
A crime is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. 43 However, if the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance, the crime is only attempted. 44 It is quite obvious that, in respect to
Noquera, the crime never passed the "attempted" stage.
The trial court, in ruling that murder was committed in the case of Elena Pamaso and Estelita
Imarga and frustrated murder in the case of Felipe Noquera, considered the qualifying
circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
We disagree with the trial court on this score.
93
For evident premeditation to be present, the following requisites must concur:

(1)
the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
(2)
an act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and,
(3)
sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act. 45
It must be proved as clearly as the crime itself and cannot be deduced from mere conclusions and
inferences. 46 The evidence presented against the appellants miserably failed to prove the
foregoing requisites.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
47 While treachery was duly proven against appellants because the ambush was so sudden and
unexpected that the victims were unable to defend themselves and, obviously, the means of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted, such circumstance is not, however, alleged
in the three (3) informations.
For treachery to qualify the crime of homicide to murder, it must be alleged in the information,
otherwise it will only be considered a generic aggravating circumstance, if proven. 48 Therefore,
treachery is only a generic aggravating circumstance in these cases. The informations allege that
the aggravating circumstance of band attended the commission of the crimes charged. There is a
band whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense. 49 The accusatory portions of the informations elaborate this
circumstance by stating that the five (5) named accused, two (2) of whom are the Appellants, and
two (2) other John Does "armed with assorted high-powered weapons such as Garand rifle,
shotgun and surit and with evidence premeditation and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush, attack, assault and shoot with assorted high
powered weapons" the weapons carrier of Edon Escobillo thereby causing the death and injuries
described therein. Evidently, the prosecution did not intend to make the aggravating
circumstance of aid of armed men as a qualifying circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Otherwise, it would have expressly alleged it as such as in the case of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation. Accordingly, band absorbed aid of armed
men. 50
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of
sex alleged in Criminal Cases Nos. 1893 and 1895 cannot be appreciated against the Appellants,
there being no proof that they deliberately intended to offend the sex of the victims or show
manifest disrespect towards them. 51
Accordingly, the Appellants are guilty of homicide on two (2) counts and of attempted homicide,
with the generic aggravating circumstances of treachery and band.
94
The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. In
view of the generic aggravating circumstances of treachery and band, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period. They are entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law 52 which authorizes the imposition of an indeterminate penalty the maximum of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of the Revised Penal Code and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty for attempted homicide
(Criminal Case No. 1894) is, pursuant to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, two (2) degrees
lower than that provided for in Article 249, which is prision correccional. Appellants are also
entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In accordance with the policy of this Court, 53 the civil indemnity for each death should be
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby modified. As
modified, Appellants Angel Pral and Beren Mandong are hereby found and declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide on two (2) counts for the death of Elena
Pamoso in Criminal Case No. 1893 and for the death of Estelita Imarga in Criminal Case No.
1895, and of the crime of Attempted Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1894.
People v. Fortich
Accused-appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid were each charged with two counts
of forcible abduction with rape, 1 one count of robbery with frustrated homicide 2 and one count
of robbery. 3
I.
In Criminal Case No. 3809 Forcible Abduction with Rape
That on or about March 31, 1983 in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with violence and
intimidation, and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring, confederating together with
one Rudy Gaid alias Boy Gaid, who is presently at large, and mutually helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct the herein complainant, Marilou
Nobleza by then and there taking and carrying her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and
loading said complainant on board a stolen pick-up, against her will and consent and with lewd
design, and brought her from Alta Tierra, Carment Hill, this city, to Malasag, this city, and while
at Malasag, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge (by
accused Permonette Joy Fortich) of the herein complainant, against her will and consent, to her
great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Article 342 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
II.
95
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with violence and
intimidation and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct the
complainant Maritess Nobleza, by then and there taking and carrying her away with her sister,
Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen pick-up with her sister, against her will and consent and
and (sic) with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra, Carment Hill, this City, to
Malasag, this city, and while at Malasag, this city (sic) did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge (by accused
Permonette Joy Fortich) of the complainant, against her will and consent, to her great damage
and prejudice.
III.
That on or about March 31, 1983, in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named (accused), with violence and
intimidation, and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, and a motor vehicle, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously abduct the complainant Maritess Nobleza, by then and there taking and carrying
her away with her sister, Marilou Nobleza, and loading in a stolen pick-up with her sister, against
her will and consent and with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra, Carmen Hill, this
city, to Malasag, this city, and while at Malasag, this city (sic), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously by means of violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge (by
accused Rudy Gaid alias Boy) of the said complainant, against her will and consent, to her great
damage and prejudice.
IV.
That on or about March 11, 1983 (sic), in the evening, in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
violence and intimidation and with use of an unlicensed firearm, and motor vehicle, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously abduct the complainant Marilou Nobleza, by then and there taking
and carrying her away with her sister, Maritess Nobleza, and loading in a stolen pick-up with her
sister, against her will and consent and with lewd designs, and brought her from Alta Tierra,
Carmen Hill, this city to Malasag, this city (sic), and while at Malasag, this city, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means by violence and intimidation have carnal
knowledge (by accused Rudy Gaid alias "Boy") of the complainant, against her will and consent,
to her great damage and prejudice.
96
V.
In Criminal Case No. 3977 Robbery with Frustrated Homicide
That on or about March 31, 1983, at Carmen Hill, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction on this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with firearms, with
violence and intimidation upon persons, with intent of gain and against the will of the owner
thereof, conspiring, confederating together with one Rudy Gaid alias "Boy Gaid," and mutually
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away a polo shirt, pants while being worn by Luis S. Tumang and a cash worth P160.00, a wrist
watch (Elgin) worth P500.00, valued all in all in the total amount of P660.00, to the damage and
prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum; that on the occasion of the robbery and to
enable them to facilitate the taking and robbing (sic) the offended party, and to carry out with
ease the commission of the offense, accused Permonette Joy Fortich with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked and mauled the said Luis S. Tumang,
struck and hit him with a firearm, thereby inflicting the following injuries, to wit: fracture
depressed type left perietat (sic) bone; contussion (sic) hematoma left temporal area; abrasion
behind left ear; multiple linear abrasion both thigh and leg, which ordinarily would cause the
death of the said offended party, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some
cause independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the
offended party which prevented his death.
Contrary to Article 294 in relation to Article 249 and Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
In Criminal Case No. 4162 Robbery
That on or about March 31, 1983, more or less 10:30 in the evening at Carmen Hill, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain by means of violence and intimidation on
the person take, steal and carry away polo shirt and pants while being worn by one Rolly
(I)mperio and a wallect (sic) contained (sic) P85.00 in cash, who was at the same time attacked
and beaten up by the said accused, inflicting upon him physical injuries, to wit: Laceration of
parietal area, 2 cm. in length, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
Contrary to Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
On November 25, 1983, the six criminal cases, upon agreement of the prosecution and the
defense, were consolidated and tried jointly.
The evidence for the prosecution elicited the following facts:
On March 31, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, after attending mass at St. Augustine
Church, Cagayan de Oro City, sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza, together with their friends
Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang, proceeded to Alta Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill using an Isuzu
97
pick-up owned by latter's mother. After a while the group decided to go home. Suddenly, two
men armed with handguns who were later identified as appellants emerged from the rear end of
the vehicle and fired a single shot which hit the left side of the pick-up. They introduced
themselves as members of the New People's Army (NPA) and ordered the sisters to get inside the
vehicle while Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip.
Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38 caliber revolver causing him to fall down, while
Tumang was hit several times by Fortich in various parts of the body and momentarily lost
consciousness. Tumang was divested of his wallet containing one hundred sixty pesos (P160.00)
in cash, five U.S. dollars (P70.00), six Saudi Arabia Riyals P30.42), one 12K gold wristwatch
worth P500.00, pants valued at P140.00, and shoes worth P125.00. All of these items were not
recovered. 4 Imperio, on the other hand, was stripped of his pants valued at P135.00, a wallet
worth P45.00 containing P85.00 in cash, a pair of shoes, and one t-shirt. 5
Appellants drove the pick-up, with Marilou and Maritess at the back seat, towards Acua Beach
some ten kilometers away from the city, but found it to be closed for the night. While traversing
the highway leading to Barangay Puerto, appellants spotted a military checkpoint along the
highway, made a hasty U-turn, and returned to the city. All the time, the sisters were consistently
threatened with summary execution. Marilou pleaded for their freedom and told them to just take
the pick-up. The plea, however, fell on deaf ears. Appellants detoured and entered a dirt road
leading to Malasag where they parked the vehicle. At his juncture, Gaid had transferred to the
backseat with Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in front with Fortich. Gaid poked his
gun at the right side of Marilou's neck and ordered her to remove her pants under pain of death.
Aware that she was biding her time, he himself removed her pants with the gun still pointed at
her. She implored that she be spared but Gaid, who was obviously much stronger, forced her legs
apart, positioned himself on top of her, kissed and fondled her, and succeeded in consummating
his bestial act. Maritess, on the other hand, was ravaged by Fortich. Appellants switched victims
twice before divesting them of their watches, a handbag containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt, toilet
tissue and toothbrush, and the pick-up's stereo and tools. They then drove down the highway and
left the sisters at a gasoline station some three kilometers from the city. Unable to contact the
police, the victims proceeded to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center (CMC) and submitted
themselves to medical examination.
Meanwhile, soon after appellants left Carmen Hill with the two sisters, Imperio and Tumang ran
to the City Hall and reported the robbery incident. Acting on this report, the police immediately
scoured the city for the suspects but this proved unavailing. The victims proceeded to the
Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City where Imperio's injury
was examined and treated.
Prosecution witness Jaime Rivera testified that appellants went to his house at about 4:00 o'clock
in the morning of April 1, 1983, bringing with them a revolver and a bag containing a car stereo,
watch and wallet. He was apparently asked to sell the revolver for not less than P300.00, with a
promise that he would receive a fifty percent commission. In the course of selling the firearm, he
was apprehended by the police and detained at the City Hall for six days.
98
Police investigator Eulalio Rafesora of the Cagayan de Oro Integrated National Police (INP)
testified that upon Fortich's arrest, the latter was apprised of his constitutional rights which he,
however, expressly waived. Accordingly, on April 4, 1983, an interrogation conducted by the
police ensued and statements elicited therein were reduced to writing and sworn to before
another prosecution witness, Deputy City Clerk of Court Aurelio I. Zaldivar, who also reminded
him of his rights.
Dr. Socrates Sabanal of CMC declared that he examined Marilou Nobleza and found her to be
suffering from the following injuries, viz.: superficial abrasions (R) inner aspect, labia minora,
hematoma, antero-medial aspect P/3 (R) thigh. He stated that the abrasions on the labia minora
were caused by the forceful penetration of a penis into the vagina. As regards Maritess, Dr.
Sabanal revealed the extent of her injuries suffered as "labial skin discoloration," probably
caused by a penis or a finger.
CMC Medical Director Dr. Francisco L. Oh testified that he treated Luis Tumang for the
following injuries, to wit: (1) fracture, depressed type left parietal bone; (2) contusion hematoma
left temporal area; (3) abrasion behind left ear; and (4) multiple linear abrasions on both thighs
and legs. A neuro-surgeon of CMC, a certain Dr. Valmores, advised Tumang to seek further
treatment in another hospital as the head injury could have fatally affected the brain. Tumang
was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, from April 7
to 16, 1983, under the care of Dr. Bienvenido B. Aldanese, incurring a total expense of
P22,603.85.
Contrary to the foregoing facts, the defense relied on the uncorroborated testimonies of
appellants.
Appellant Fortich, a 20-year old driver residing at Buenavista Village, Cagayan de Oro City,
recounted that at about 8:30 in the evening of March 31, 1983, he left Barangay Gusa for the city
and there met Gaid with whom he has applied for a driving job. He was invited to dinner and a
few drinks at Gaid's house. After sometime, they allegedly got drunk and hied off to Carmen Hill
to appreciate its cool and breezy atmosphere. Thereafter, a pick-up arrived from which a group of
two men and two women alighted. They then laid a mat on the grass behind their vehicle.
Appellants were ten meters away from them when suddenly the two men, piqued by their
presence, furiously rushed towards them. Fortich allegedly defended himself by striking one of
them with a flashlight causing the latter to fall down.
To escape the wrath of the two men, appellants drove the pick-up with the two sisters and headed
towards Acua beach which, however, was closed for the night. Fortich alleged that after
conversing with the sisters for some time, the latter alighted at Marcos Bridge while Gaid drove
him to his house in Patag.
Fortich denied, among other things, that he sexually violated Marilou or that he even possessed a
firearm, as alleged by Tumang and Imperio. As regards the affidavit taken during the custodial
investigation, he admitted that the signature appearing therein was his but the same was obtained
through duress.
99
Appellant Gaid had a slightly different version of what transpired on March 31, 1983. He
narrated that after consuming hard liquor, both of them proceeded to Carmen Hill. Upon
reaching said place, they noticed a pick-up with a male and female inside and another couple at
the open rear end of the vehicle. As the two pairs were allegedly caressing and kissing, they
stood watching for almost thirty minutes. Later, the couple inside emerged from the vehicle and
joined the other two at the back. All of them were naked and engaged in sexual congress on a
mat lying on the grassy spot. The women, later identified as sisters Marilou and Maritess, noticed
them and immediately grabbed their clothing and scampered inside the pick-up, while their male
partners confronted the appellants. A scuffle ensued. After throwing several punches, Gaid darted
towards the pick-up and saw Fortich already seated on the driver's seat with the sisters at the
back seat.
Fortich drove towards Acua beach at Baloy. During the trip, Gaid chatted with Maritess who
appeared to be an old acquaintance of his. Apparently, it was Maritess who urged them to
proceed to Acua beach. The sisters even drank bottles of beer and smoked three sticks of
marijuana.
It was past midnight when they reached Acua beach and after having gone through a horrible
night, they decided to park the vehicle to rest. Fortich fell asleep while Maritess vomitted. When
the latter felt better, Gaid drove the sisters to somewhere in Licoan and Fortich, to his house in
Patag. While traversing the Patag-Carmen road, he observed that a police vehicle was following
him. Alarmed, he hurriedly accelerated his speed. When he passed a military check-point, he was
fired upon. Fortunately, only the rear portion of the vehicle was hit.
Gaid reached Kamarok, an interior barangay of Opol, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning and
repaired to the house of his mother-in-law Beatrice Rivera. He told his brother-in-law Jaime
Rivera, a witness for the prosecution, the details of what allegedly transpired in the night. Two
days thereafter, he slipped back into the city by passing through another town and resumed
driving his passenger jeep.
In its decision dated August 15, 1984, 6 the trial court convicted appellants in the following
manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the court(:)
(1)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3977 both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
and RUDY (Boy) GAID, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals, of the crime of simple
ROBBERY as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph five (5) of the Revised Penal
Code, with the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual and not offset by
any aggravating circumstance, and applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, hereby
imposes upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as minimum, to Six (6) Years, One (1) Month and Ten (10) Days,
of PRISION MAYOR, as maximum, and to pay the costs; and to indemnify Luis S. Tumang, the
amounts of One Thousand Twenty-Five (P1,025.42) Pesos and Forty-two Centavos, for the cash
and articles stolen; and the total amount of Twenty Two Thousand Six Hundred Three Pesos and
85/100 (P22,603.85) for plane fare, hospitalization and medical expenses; and the further sum of
100
P5,000.00, for moral damages. Accused shall be credited with the period of their preventive
imprisonment. The home-made revolver .22 cal., (Exh. A) is hereby forfeited in favor of the
Government;
(2)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4162, both accused Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy
(Boy) Gaid, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals of the crime of Simple ROBBERY, as
defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph five (5) of the Revised Penal Code, with the
sole mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual, and not offset by any
aggravating circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby imposes upon
each of them the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL, as minimum, to Six (6) Years, One (1) Month and Ten (10) Days of
PRISION MAYOR, as maximum; and to pay the costs; and to indemnify ROLLY IMPERIO the
amount of Two Hundred Sixty Five (P265.00), value of the cash and articles stolen; and Two
Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for moral damages. Accused shall be credited with the full period of
their preventive imprisonment. The .22 caliber homemade Revolver (Exh. A) is hereby
confiscated in favor of the Government; likewise, the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8.
(3)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3809, both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
and RUDY (Boy) GAID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE, with the use of a deadly weapon as defined and
penalized in Article 342, in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the lone
mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual and with no aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, hereby imposes upon each of them the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; and to indemnify MARILOU NOBLEZA, the amount of Twenty Four (P24,000)
Thousand Pesos; and the costs. The .22 cal. Revolver (Exh. A) is hereby forfeited in favor of the
Government. Accused shall be credited with the period of their preventive imprisonment.
Likewise, the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8 are confiscated in favor of the government.
(4)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NOS. (sic) 3896, that the crime herein charged is already
included in the aforementioned Crim. Case No. 3809, hence the same is dismissed, with costs de
oficio.
(5)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3877, both accused PERMONETTE JOY FORTICH
AND RUDY (Boy) GAID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION, as defined and penalized under Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, with the sole mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, which is not habitual, and with no
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
hereby imposes upon each of them the indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY, of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum; and to pay the costs; and to indemnify MARITESS
NOBLEZA the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) Pesos. The Revolver (Exh. A) is
forfeited in favor of the Government; likewise the ammunitions, Exhs. A-1 to A-8.
(6)
FINDS, in CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3878, that the crime charged herein is already
included in the aforementioned Criminal Case No. 3877, hence the same is hereby DISMISSED,
with costs de oficio.
101
SO ORDERED. 7
From this judgment, appellants interposed the instant appeal, raising the following assignment of
errors:
1.
The trial court erred in admitting the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant
Permonette Joy Fortich despite the fact that it was taken in violation of his constitutional right to
counsel.
2.
The trial court erred in convicting herein accused-appellants despite failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8
We find no reversible error impelling a reversal of the trial court's decision.
We cannot sustain the argument for the defense that the extra-judicial confession of Fortich
obtained without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence.
The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was
first pronounced on April 26, 1983, in Morales v. Enrile 9 reiterated in People v. Galit 10 on
March 20, 1985. While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the
1987 Constitution, it affords no relief to appellants, for the requirements and restrictions outlined
therein have no retroactive effect and do not affect waivers made prior to April 26, 1983.
In the instant case, the extra-judicial confession and waiver were executed on April 4, 1983. The
trial court correctly admitted the same for "there was at that time no pronounced guidelines
requiring that the waiver of counsel by accused can be properly made only with the presence and
assistance of counsel." 11 If indeed Fortich's confession was extracted from him as a result of
coercion by policemen at the police station, he could have informed Deputy Clerk of Court
Zaldivar and his counsel Atty. Leo Roa of the maltreatment he suffered.
Thus, the Court has ruled that where one who has made a confession fails to present any
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person for purposes of extracting a
confession; where he failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths, such as the
fiscal in this case; where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action for
maltreatment against his alleged intimidators; where he did not have himself examined by a
reputable physician to buttress his claim of maltreatment; and where the assailed confession is
replete with details which could not have been known to the police officers if they had merely
concocted the confession, since the statements were inculpatory in character, the extrajudicial
confession may be admitted, with the above circumstances being considered as factors indicative
of voluntariness. 12 Accordingly, the extra-judicial confession and waiver voluntarily and
intelligently made by Fortich are admissible in evidence.
Appellants anchor their defense solely on the denial of the charges imputed to them.
102
It is an established doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused. 13 The court is convinced that Marilou did recognize the physical
features of her tormentors as she was in a supine position when appellants successively mounted
her. "The victim's recognition of appellants as her attacker cannot be doubted for she had ample
opportunity to see the face of the man who ravaged her during the carnal
act." 14 She was as close to the appellants as was physically possible, for a man and a woman
cannot be physically closer to each other than during a sexual act. 15 Marilou had ample
opportunity to observe appellants while she was being terrorized and, subsequently raped. Thus,
there is no reason to doubt the veracity of her statement where she declared that she recognized
appellants as her transgressors. Moreover, the latter failed to show any reason why Marilou
would impute such a serious charge against them. Needless to state, a "straightforward, clear and
positive testimony, coupled with the absence of any motive to fabricate or to falsely implicate the
accused, may be enough to convict the appellant." 16
Aside from being positively identified, the different versions presented by appellants are contrary
to ordinary human experience.
The following declaration of the trial court that the testimonies of appellants are incredulous is
well taken.
The claim of the accused that the departure from Alta Tierra, on the pick-up to Acua beach was
the idea of Maritess Nobleza does not inspire belief. Marilou testified that it was the idea of one
of the two accused. The sisters, Marilou and Maritess, are single, presumably virgins, and absent
contrary proof, (the accused having adduced none) are presumed to be modest and chaste in
keeping with traditional Filipina disposition. The court cannot believe that in a gunshot-filled
atmosphere, almost chameleon-like (-) the girls would transfer their promiscuous desires (if ever
they were) from their erstwhile male companions (Tumang and Imperio) in a brief encounter and
stoically abandon the two companions and in turn seek pleasure somewhere with new partners
who had earlier allegedly come upon them in the act of making love on a mat behind the pick-up.
The court cannot believe that Maritess and Marilou sisters as they are would be so
promiscuous and profiligately (sic) libidinous that they would make love with two male
companions, in the presence, and within sight of each
other. 17
It should be noted that Maritess Nobleza, for unknown reasons, did not testify for the
prosecution. Marilou's assertion that her sister was simultaneously violated, however, supports a
finding of appellants' guilt. Time and again, the Court has declared that "in crimes of rape,
conviction or acquittal virtually depends entirely on the credibility of the victim's testimony
because of the act that usually only the participant can testify to its occurrence." 18 The case at
bar presents an unlikely situation wherein two sisters were simultaneously ravaged in the
presence of, and in plain view, of the other. Accordingly, the failure of one to declare in court her
ordeal may be adequately proved by the other. In light of this factual setting, there is, therefore,
no doubt that Maritess was likewise a victim of multiple rapes.
As regards Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162 for robbery with frustrated homicide and robbery,
respectively, Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
103
Art. 293.
Who are guilty of robbery. Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.
The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime committed as robbery with frustrated
homicide. There is no such crime. 19 There should have been two separate informations: one for
robbery and another for frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge in the
information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of appellants for the crime of
simple robbery.
The asportation by appellants of the personal properties was done by means of violence against
or intimidation upon the persons of Imperio and Tumang. It appears further that Imperio suffered
cranial injury which allegedly required three stitches to repair. Inasmuch as the doctor who
issued the medical certificate did not testify thereon, said certificate is hearsay evidence as to the
nature of the injuries inflicted and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Pesena, 20 it
was ruled that when there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of
the required medical attendance, it is only slight physical injuries.
As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, we subscribe to the finding of the lower court that,
notwithstanding the non-presentation of Dr. Aldanese of the Medical City General Hospital at the
trial, Tumang's credible testimony bolstered by documentary evidence, such as progress
payments and professional fees for neurological management and craniatomy excision of
depressed fracture, proved that the latter suffered less serious physical injuries, as defined in
Article 265 21 of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3977, the trial court
correctly observed that the element of intent to kill was not present. It must be stressed that while
Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never shot Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it.
In Mondragon v. People, 22 it was held that the intent to kill being an essential element of the
offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence and with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of
the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
The physical injuries inflicted upon Imperio and Tumang by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are penalized under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 294.
Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer.
xxx
xxx
xxx
5.
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period in other cases. 23
104
The trial court correctly disregarded the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited
place, and use of a motor vehicle. The mitigating circumstance of intoxication, however, was
erroneously appreciated in favor of both appellants.
Nocturnity is an aggravating circumstance when it is deliberately sought to prevent the accused
from being recognized or to ensure his unmolested
escape. 24 There must be proof that this was intentionally sought to insure the commission of the
crime and that appellants took advantage thereof. In the instant case, there is paucity of evidence
that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by the accused;
"the fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice to sustain nocturnidad." 25
Neither can the use of a motor vehicle be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In the case
at bar, the offenses of robbery and forcible abduction with rape could have been effected even
without the aid of a motor vehicle. In the case of People v. Mil, 26 it was held that use of a motor
vehicle is not aggravating where it was not used to facilitate the crime or that the crime could not
have been committed without it. In People v. Garcia, 27 the use of motor vehicle was deemed
unaggravating if its use was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension
difficult.
As regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, the records do not show that
appellants actually sought an isolated place to better execute their purpose. The evidence needed
to support its application are insufficient. Accordingly, this circumstance should not be
considered against appellants.
The lower court, however, erred in appreciating intoxication as a generic mitigating
circumstance. Under the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or
delinquent, that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. In People v. Apduhan, Jr., 28
it was held that to be mitigating, the accused's state of intoxication must be proved. Once
intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is
presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. In the case at bar, appellants merely alleged that
when the offenses were committed, they were already drunk. "This self-serving statement stands
uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value." 29
The trial court found ample evidence to support a finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. 30 Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy as its existence could be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that the accused had acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. 31 It
is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of
an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. 32
Conviction is proper upon evidence showing that appellants acted in concert, each of them doing
his part in the commission of the offense. In People v. Gundran, 33 it was held that in such a
105
case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.
In the case at bar, the evidence revealed that appellants arrived together at Carmen Hill and, at
gunpoint, forcibly took Imperio and Tumang's personal belongings and fled with the sisters on
board the stolen pick-up. After fleeing, appellants successively abused Marilou and Maritess
inside the vehicle. These acts manifestly disclose their "joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest." 34
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellants' criminal culpability of every charge was
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of People v. Julian, 35 however, it was ruled that when the first act of rape was
committed by appellant, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape was then
consummated. Any subsequent acts of intercourse would be only separate acts of rape and can no
longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. Accordingly, a
modification of trial court's decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated August 15, 1984 is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
In Criminal Case No. 3809: Forcible Abduction with Rape
Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape and, likewise, of three counts of rape as defined and penalized in Article
342, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants shall each
suffer four terms of reclusion perpetua. In line with recent jurisprudence, 36 appellants are
further ordered to indemnify Marilou Nobleza in the amount of P200,000.00 each as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case No. 3877: Forcible Abduction with Rape
Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape and, likewise, of three counts of rape as defined and penalized in Article
342, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, appellants shall each
suffer four terms of reclusion perpetua. In line with recent jurisprudence, appellants are further
ordered to indemnify Maritess Nobleza in the amount of P200,000.00 each as moral damages.
In Criminal Cases No. 3977 and 4162: Robbery
Appellants Permonette Joy Fortich and Rudy Gaid are hereby convicted of the crime of simple
robbery as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
Li v. People
106
Facts: Petitioner Li was charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of homicide for the
death of Christopher Arugay. The prosecution alleged that Arugay was watching television at
home with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes
boyfriend, Tan. They suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they saw Li
and a certain Eduardo Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were facing the house
of the Arugays. Enraged, the deceased shouted something to Li and Sangalang. Then petitioner
Li shouted back. An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by petitioner
carrying a baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran
back to his house. The witnesses Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag
him back to his house when Li re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.
Immediately thereafter, they were able to see Sangalang stab Arugay at least once.
Petitioner Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that he hit first with a baseball bat Christopher
Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right arm which is near the shoulder. The
deceased who is armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Li on the head, causing him to lose his
hold on the baseball bat and fell semi-unconscious or unconscious. In such a condition, it is
highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal.
His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Aggrieved, Li filed a petition for review,
seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of homicide.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be convicted for the crime of slight physical injury
instead of homicide
Held: Yes. The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that
resulted from Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death
from injuries which cannot be attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the
contusion caused by Li are not mortal or at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When
there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the required
medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries.
What transpired during the dawn hours of was an artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any
methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an
appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and
impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of
the circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence
reveals that the criminal culpability of Li in the death of Arugay was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently remains
at large.
Villareal v. People
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FACTS: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity).
The neophytes, including victim, Lenny Villa, were subjected to initiation rites. After the second
day of initiation rites has ended, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep
him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. The
Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10
January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent
proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for
petitioner Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice,
petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the
Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Petitioner Dizon sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio decidendi that served
as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
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lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable
for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their
right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its
disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
ISSUES:
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People: whether or not the death of Villareal extinguished his
criminal liability
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People: whether or not DIzon was deprived of due process
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals: whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused
of the lesser offense of slight physical injuries instead of homicide
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona): whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the
case for violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial
HELD: G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
Criminal Law- how criminal liability is extinguished
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court
took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal
penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties, while the term
"pecuniarypenalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated
on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto). However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.
109
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him
deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
Political Law- The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.
Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel" This constitutional right includes the right to
present evidence in ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person
at every stage of the proceedings.
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25 August
1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the
excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a
last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since
Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned
five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly,
the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial
evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is
called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a
waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned
of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first
explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Political Law- right to speedy trial is violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being
tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial.
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the delay
of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial
has been utterly violated in this case.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the
110
court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the
records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order
requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of
the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995.
Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not
at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in
granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29,
1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the
court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records
that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
Political Law- No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules.
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, a verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of
the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3)
where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.
111
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when
the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused. We have also recognized,
however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration
that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of "the death
of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or
medical attendance required. The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were liable
merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the
court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers
findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the "multiple traumatic injuries" he
suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA found that the "physical punishment
heaped on Lenny Villa was serious in nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the
criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is
found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal
framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that
the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only
logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been
proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The
accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an
allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give due course to the Petition.
People v. Orita
Facts: In the early morning of March 20, 1983, Cristina S. Abayan, a 19-year old freshman
student at the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house from a party. All of a sudden,
112
appellant held her and poked a knife to her neck. Appellant dragged complainant up the stairs
and with the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.
After removing his clothes and ordering her to remove hers, the appellant began to rape the
complainant. However as they were in a position where he continued to poke the knife to her,
appellant could not fully penetrate her.
Upon changing positions, the complainant managed to dash into the next room. However, the
appellant chased her until she jumped out of a window and ran to a nearby municipal building
where two policemen were on duty. Upon being told what happened, the policemen rushed to the
boarding house, however, they failed to apprehend appellant.
The complainant was brought to a hospital where she was examined. The medical Certificate
stated Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude findings: No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over
the vulva, errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;
The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape. The accused contends that there is no
crime of frustrated rape.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was
committed by the accused
Held: Yes. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito
Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. There is no debate that rape can be attempted and consummated. Our concern
now is whether or not the crime of rape can be frustrated. The requisites of a frustrated felony
are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.
In the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense
have been accomplished (consummated). In the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the
labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina
is sufficient to warrant conviction.
In the case of People v. Eria, We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no
conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it
appears that this is a "stray" decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent
decisions. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides, in its penultimate paragraph,
for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this particular provision on
frustrated rape is a dead provision.
There was no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, but neither
was it ruled out. However, the medical certificate stated that the vulva was erythematous (which
113
means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation)
and tender. However, Dr. Zamoras (in place of Dr Abude) testimony is merely corroborative and
is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this case. In a prosecution for rape, the
accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible.
People v. Campuhan
Facts: On 25 April 1996, at around 4p.m., Ma. Corazon Pamintuhan, the mother of four-year-old
Crysthel Pamintuhan, went down to the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate
drinks for her two children.
At the ground floor, she met Primo who was then filling small plastic bags with water to be
frozen into ice in the freezer located at the second floor; Primo was the helper of Corazons
brother.
As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry Ayoko, ayoko!
prompting Corazon to rush upstairs.
Thereupon, she saw Primo inside her childrens room kneeling before Chrysthel whose pajamas
or jogging pants and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees;
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Chrysthels vagina; She cursed and
boxed the accused several times; He evaded and pulled up his pants; he pushed her when she
tried to block his path; Corazon then run out for help.
Her brother, cousin and an uncle chased Primo and eventually held him at the back of their
compound until they decided to turn him over to the barangay officials.
Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results: No evident sign of extra genital
physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer; Chrysthels hymen was intact and her its
orifice was only 0.5cm in diameter.
In Primos defense, he maintained his innocence. He assailed the charge as a mere scheme of
Corazon who allegedly bore an ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand. He says
Chrysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride his back when she suddenly pulled him
down causing both of them fall to the floor. it was in this fallen position when Corazon chance
upon them.
The trial court convicted the accused of statutory rape, sentenced him the penalty of death.
Issue: WON the acts of the accused constitute attempted or consummated rape
Held: Attempted rape. The court ruled that there are only two stages in rape attempted and
consummated; it held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal
114
knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his objective. Penis must have touched the labias
or slid into the female organ, not merely stroked the external surface thereof.
In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that
rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medicolegal finding of discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already
gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. None was shown in this case.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape - and only of
attempted rape - are present in the instant case; hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
People v. Padilla
Doctrines:
Sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does
not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the
victim for conviction.
The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance.
For review in this case is a decision, dated May 8, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLV, at Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant Zaldy P. Padilla guilty of rape and
imposing on him the penalty of death. The trial court also ordered accused-appellant Padilla to
indemnify the offended party, Maria Aurora B. Bautista, in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
the costs.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon on April 27,
1995, Maria Aurora, a 13-year old retardate, was in the citrus farm owned by a neighbor, Jose
Sagun, when accused-appellant accosted her. The latter, who is married with two children, was
then 26 years old and employed by Sagun as a farmhand. Armed with a scythe and a knife,
accused-appellant forced Maria Aurora to undress and lie down on the grass. As she lay on there,
accused-appellant forced himself on her, saying: "Kantot tayo" ("Let's have sexual intercourse").
Maria Aurora resisted accused-appellant's advances, but she proved to be no match for him.
Accused-appellant succeeded in ravishing her.1wphi1.nt
Maria Aurora told her father, Engracio L. Bautista, what happened to her in the evening. She was
taken to the Governor Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Luisa F.
Cayabyab. Afterwards, the matter was reported to the Pozorrubio Police Station. 1
On May 2, 1995, Engracio filed a complaint 2 in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan. After a preliminary investigation, the court found probable cause that the crime had
been committed and that accused-appellant was guilty thereof. Accordingly, the case was
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referred to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan which on May 26,
1995 filed an information 3 for rape in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLV, at Urdaneta City
against accused-appellant, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The undersigned upon previous complaint sworn to by the father of the offended party accuses
ZALDY PADILLA Y PILONGO alias "LABO", of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1995 at Barangay Bobonan East, Municipality of
Pozorrubio, Province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Maria Aurora Bautista, a
minor of about 13 years old, against the latter's will.
CONTRARY to Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, May 26, 1995.
Upon being arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon hearings
were held on December 6, 1995, January 23, January 31, February 22, and March 27, 1996. On
May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered finding accused-appellant Zaldy Padilla guilty of rape and
sentencing him to death:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ZALDY PADILLA Y PILONGO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659, the
offense having been committed with the attendant circumstances of use of a deadly weapon,
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her age, and abuse of superior
strength; and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH, to be executed
pursuant to R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Lethal Injection Law, and to pay the
complainant MA. AURORA BAUTISTA in the amount of P50,000.00 as damages, and to pay
the costs.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant raises this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE LATTER IS INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY DUE TO HER MENTAL HANDICAP.
Accused-appellant's contention is without merit.
First. The basic test of a witness' qualification is of course whether he can perceive and,
perceiving, can make known his perception to others. 4 Negatively put, Rule 130, 21 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
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(a)
Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b)
Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully.
Hence, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, disqualified from testifying in
court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows.
If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court. 5 Thus, we
have in several cases 6 upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in
court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tone of
voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony will
be
given credence. 7 In the instant case, the trial court accorded weight to the testimony of Maria
Aurora. Indeed, the complainant's truthfulness is evident in her testimony:
Prosecutor Emiliano M. Matro:
Now, on April 27, 1995, between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, can you recall where you
were?
A:
I was at the calamansi orchard.
Q:
Who owns that calamansi orchard?
A:
Tiaging.
Q:
What were you doing there at that time?
A:
I was looking for my scythe.
Q:
What happened, did you find your scythe?
A:
I was undressed.
Q:
Who undressed you?
A:
Labo.
Q:
Do you know the real name of Labo?
A:
Zaldy Padilla.
Q:
If Zaldy Padilla alias Labo is now in the courtroom, can you identify him?
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A:
That person.
(The witness pointed at a person who, when asked his name, answered "Zaldy Padilla.")
Q:
You mentioned something about a scythe. Were you able to find it?
A:
It was in the possession of Labo.
Q:
You said that Zaldy Padilla alias Labo undressed you. What did you do after that?
A:
He pulled me.
Judge Costales:
At this point, the public is hereby directed to go outside. Close the door. Even the father and
mother of the complainant should go outside.
Q:
After Labo pulled you, what did you do, if anything?
A:
He brought out a knife and tried to stab me.
xxx
xxx
Q:
You were undressed at that time?
A:
Yes.
Q:
After that, what did you do?
A:
He told me, "Kantot tayo."
Q:
Did he have sexual intercourse with you?
A:
Yes.
Q:
How did he do that with you?
A:
He made me lie down.
xxx
Judge Costales:
How about the knife?
A:
I bled.
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Q:
Where did you bleed?
A:
Here. (The witness pointed at her vagina).
Q:
What did you feel while Labo was having sexual intercourse with you?
A:
It hurt. It was painful.
Q:
How long did Labo had (sic) sexual intercourse with you?
A:
For a short time only.
Q:
After that, what did he do?
A:
Nothing more.
xxx
xxx
Q:
Will you describe the organ of Labo?
A:
It was big. (The witness demonstrated a length of about 4 to 5 inches)
xxx
xxx
Q:
Did you scream when he inserted his penis?
A:
Yes. 8
xxx
xxx
The complainant's testimony is corroborated by the finding of Dr. Luisa F. Cayabyab, who
examined Maria Aurora in the evening of April 27, 1995. Dr. Cayabyab found fresh lacerations
in her hymen, most probably caused by the entrance of a hardened penis. 9 The relevant portions
of the medical
certificate, 10 dated April 28, 1995, which Dr. Cayabyab issued after examining Maria Aurora
read:
Perineum
: no sign of external injury
Hymen: with fresh lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions

Vagina : admits 1 finger
Cervix : close
Uterus : small
Spermatozoa : negative
119
Second. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence tending to show that Maria Aurora
is a mental retardate. 11 Significantly, accused-appellant also admitted this point during his direct
examination. 12 It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate
constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction. 13 However, this fact was
not alleged in the information 14 in this case and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction.
At any rate, there is adequate evidence to show that the accused-appellant used force and
intimidation in committing the crime of rape in this case.
The defense makes much of Maria Aurora's admission that she did not put up a determined
resistance against accused-appellant. For instance, she answered at one point that she did not
fight back when accused-appellant laid her down on the grass. 15 However, the law does not
impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. 16 The fact that the victim did not resist
the accused by struggling or shouting for help does not negate the use of force and intimidation.
17 The use of a knife and the threat of harm may be sufficient to intimidate the victim to
obedience. 18
Maria Aurora, a minor, cannot be expected to react under such circumstances like a mature
woman. Because of her immaturity, she can be easily intimidated, subdued, and terrified by a
strong man like accused-appellant Padilla. 19 There can be no doubt that Maria Aurora was
forced by accused-appellant to have sexual intercourse with him, and that she eventually
submitted to him out of fear from the following answers she gave to the trial court:
Q:
Why did you not fight Labo?
A:
I was afraid, he might maul me.
xxx
xxx
Q:
Where was the knife or the scythe you were mentioning at that time?
A:
It was in his possession, sir.
Q:
He was holding it?
A:
Yes.
Q:
What hand?
A:
Right hand.
Q:
Was it a knife or a scythe?
A:
Scythe. No, he had no scythe in his possession.
xxx
120
Q:
When he was having sexual intercourse with you?
A:
Yes.
Q:
However, he had a knife at that time, only he laid it on the ground when he had sexual
intercourse with you.
A:
Yes.
Q:
And because he had a scythe, you were afraid that he might kill you if you resist?
A:
Yes.
There are minor inconsistencies in the testimony of Maria Aurora, such as her confusion whether
it was a knife or a scythe which accused-appellant placed on the grass above her head after he
had forced her to lie down. However, as we have held in a number of cases, such inconsequential
lapses can be expected of a young girl who was raped, in view of the harrowing experience she is
called upon to recall. 21 Such minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of her
testimony, in fact tend to bolster it.
Third. To rebut the evidence presented against him, accused-appellant claimed that, at the time of
the rape, he was in their hut preparing supper with two other farmhands. 23 One of the
farmhands, Santiago Sagun, corroborated accused-appellant's claim. 24 This claim cannot prevail
over the positive identification of accused-appellant. 25 In the instant case, Maria Aurora pointed
out accused-appellant in open court as the person who had molested her. 26 Furthermore, for the
defense of alibi to be given weight, it must be shown that it was impossible for the accused to
have been present at the place where the crime was perpetrated at the time of its commission. 27
But in this case, the hut where accused-appellant claimed he was in with the two other farmhands
is only a short distance from the scene of the rape. 28 Hence, the trial court correctly rejected his
alibi.
The trial court also correctly found that the rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon
and, therefore, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 29 However, it erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of disregard of the respect due to the victim by
reason of his or her age and abuse of superior strength. Although disregard of the respect due to
the victim by reason of his or her age can be taken into account where the victim is of old age as
well as of tender age, 30 the same can be considered only in cases of crimes against persons and
honor. 31 At the time of the rape on April 27, 1995, rape was classified as a crime against
chastity. R.A. No. 8353 classifying it as a crime against persons took effect only on October 22,
1997 and cannot therefore be given retroactive effect so as to justify the consideration of
disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of his or her age. Even if such aggravating
circumstance could be considered in this case, it nonetheless cannot be appreciated because
nothing appears in the record from which it may be presumed that in the commission of the
crime, accused-appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the offended party.
32 Nor can the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength be appreciated as the trial
court did, since the consideration of the same requires evidence of the relative physical
121
conditions of the assailant and the victim, which the prosecution failed to present. 33 As the
penalty for rape when committed with the use of a deadly weapon is reclusion perpetua to death,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in the absence of any aggravating
circumstances. 34
It is also to be noted that the trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the complainant only
the civil liability arising from the offense in the amount of P50,000,00. This is equivalent to
actual or compensatory damages in civil law. However, in addition to such amount the offended
party is entitled to moral damages, which is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
any proof. Currently, moral damages for rape is fixed P50,000. Hence, the additional sum of
P50,000.00 should be awarded to Maria Aurora B. Bautista.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 8, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLV,
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED.
People v. Mahinay
Facts: Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to
take care of Isips house which was under construction adjacent to the latters residence. The
victim was a 12-year old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The
following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victims body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found in the
septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped
and was strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown
belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victims mother to belong to her
daughter. Also, they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant.
Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather
wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellants
belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime
of Rape and was sentenced to death. The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic
review.
Held: Rape; Evidence; Guiding Principles in Review of Rape Cases.Guided by the three
principles in the review of rape cases, to wit: 1) An accusation for rape can be made with facility;
it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2)
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) The evidence of the
122
prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. The foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of
rape with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659.
Same; Rape; Statutes; Republic Act No. 8353; Under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and
266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.At
the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against chastity,
although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a
crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted even
without a complaint filed by the offended party.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act No. 8353, rape may be committed even by a
woman and the victim may even be a man.The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A.
8353, is sexual congress with a woman by force and without consent. (Under the new law, rape
may be committed even by a woman and the victim may even be a man). If the woman is under
12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not only because force is not
an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is
below such age. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the
woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first
element of sexual intercourse must be proven but also the other element that the perpetrators
evil acts with the offended party was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to
be established. Both elements are present in this case.
Same; Same; The mere touching by the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the
pudendum of the womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.In proving sexual
intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims vagina; rather the slightest
penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the sexual
intercourse. The mere touching by the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the
pudendum of the womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
Same; Same; Where the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could
safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether
before or during the sexual act.From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the
victim, force was indeed employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants
own account, he pushed the victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell
unconscious. It was at that instance that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient
desires. Considering that the victim, at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could
safely be concluded that she had not given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether
before or during the sexual act.
Same; Same; Damages; If the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
123
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00). In
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof. Civil indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary damages.
The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil
Code is dispensed with because it is recognized that the victims injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages. Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of
moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil
indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral
damages.
People v. Fabro
Facts: On April 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals 1 affirmed the conviction of appellant MARIO
FABRO Y ARQUIZA for the rape of private complainant, REBECCA SEGUANCIA. He now
seeks his acquittal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the Information, the prosecution detailed the commission of the rape by appellant, as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of May, 1989, in Tamat, barangay Trenchera, municipality of
Tayug, province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused (appellant herein), by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with Rebecca P. Sequancia against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
At the time of the incident, private complainant was working for Reyval Lopez as one of his five
full-time, live-in maids. Among her co-workers was Janet Fabro, appellant's wife. Appellant
previously worked for Lopez, but was no longer in his employ when the alleged rape took place.
As private complainant 2 related it, her sad story began at around nine o'clock in the evening of
May 14, 1989, when Lopez sent her to buy band-aids at a nearby store. Unable to make the
purchase, she proceeded to the Alicia store located within the premises of the Tayug public
market. 3 On her way, she passed an Ihaw-Ihaw restaurant where she saw appellant. Without
uttering a word, he started to trail her. She asked him to stop following her, but her words fell on
deaf ears. 4
Finding the Alicia store already closed, private complainant headed back home to Lopez's house.
Appellant suggested they go to his cousin to buy
band-aid. She ignored him. Suddenly, he grabbed her left hand and dragged her for about eight
(8) to ten (10) meters to a dark, deserted area. He kissed her on the lips. 5 She struggled, 6
124
somehow managing to bite his hand. She tried to escape, but he was able to grab and pull her
back. He wrapped his hands around her neck, as if to strangle her. It was then that she lost
consciousness. She could not remember how long she passed out. 7
It took a gunshot of unknown origin to rouse private complainant back to consciousness. She
found herself lying on the ground with appellant by her side, zipping up his pants. 8 Her back
and private parts hurt, and she discovered sticky matter on her sexual organ. She also realized
that her pants were no longer on her. She silently located and put them back on. 9 Appellant fled
when a good samaritan, one Jeffrey Cabrales, arrived. 10
Private respondent, accompanied by Cabrales, reached Lopez's residence at around ten o'clock
that same night. 11 Immediately and tearfully, 12 she reported to Lopez her violation by
appellant. 13 That same night, Lopez brought her to the police station, where she filed her
complaint. They proceeded to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital (EPDH) where she
underwent a physical and internal examination conducted by Dr. Leo Gerardo 15 which yielded
the following results:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
May 16, 1989
Date
83853 165
Record Number
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
According to the hospital REBECCA SEGUANCIA of Brgy. Toketec Tayug, Pangasinan was
examined/treated in this hospital on May 15, 1989 with the following findings and/or diagnosis:
=
=
Linear Abrasion, 5 cm. Anterior Aspect of (1) Elbow.

Speculum/I.E. Findings:
Vaginal orifice admits one finger with resistance.
Nulliparous introitus.
Contussions at the lateral aspect (one at each side) of the labia minora.
No fresh hymenal lacerations.
No vaginal lacerations.
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa requested. (see attached result).
REMARKS: patient would need medical attendance and/or incapacitation for . . . . days barring
complications.
(sgd)
LEO GERARDO BAUTISTA, M.D.,
Attending physician
Lic. No. 61044 16
125
The vaginal smear showed private complainant was negative for spermatozoa (Exh. 2). The
following day, she returned to the police station and gave her formal statement and surrendered
the denim pants and orange t-shirt she wore during the attack. 17
The 21-year-old appellant offered a different version of what transpired on that fateful night of
May 14, 1989. According to him, he was visiting his wife at Lopez's store when private
complainant dropped by. She asked him to accompany her to the public market. He was initially
reluctant. Nonetheless, he accommodated the request when his wife told him to go. 18
On their way to the market, appellant and private complainant took the road leading to the Ihawihaw restaurant. When they got to the market, she told him "to go home because we have no
more to buy." 19 Instead, he proposed they go to his Ninong Jesus Divia. She agreed. On their
way, he kissed and started to undress her. She did not stop him, and even responded to his
amorous advances by embracing him. 20 Appellant felt that private complainant was willing to
completely give herself to him. They did not, however, consummate their love-making. They
merely spent the night kissing each other. 21
Appellant affirmed that a gunshot was fired that night while he was lying with private
complainant on the ground. Upon hearing the shot, they stood up, and she looked for her
slippers. It was then that Jeffrey Cabrales appeared and accompanied private complainant home.
Appellant also went home. 22
On cross-examination, appellant admitted that, after he was charged with rape, he sent a letter to
Lopez and his common-law wife, asking for their forgiveness. The letter reads as follows:
Dear Kuyang & Manang,
Una ay hayaan niyo munang batiin ko kayo ng magandang umaga o hapon po sa inyo, at sana'y
datnan kayo ng sulat kong ito na nasa mabuting kalagayan.
Kuyang & Manang, hindi ko po alam kong paano ko sisimulan ang sulat ko sa inyo. Alam ko po
na ako'y nagkasala sa inyo, at alam ko rin pong hindi lang basta-basta kasalanan. Ito'y halos wala
ng kapatawaran. Ngunit nandito po ako ngayon sapagkat tinanggap ko naman ang aking
pagkakasala sa katunayang ito ay hindi ko naman tinalikuran o tinakbuhan bagkos ay hinintay
ko po ang araw ng paghatol o pagkuha nila sa aking at taos puso't walang pagtutol na sumunod
dahil alam kong ito ang nararapat. Sa kasalukuyan ay heto na ako, nagtitiis subalit walang halong
pagdaramdam. At sa totoo lang po Kuyang & Manang, alam nang Diyos kung paano ko
pinagsisisihan ito sa maniwala po kayo o hindi. Talaga pong hindi ko alam. Wala po talaga ako sa
sariling pag-iisip o katauhan kung bakit at pa'no ko nagawa 'yon. Sila o siya pang itinuturing ko
na mga kapatid lalo na sa inyo Kuyang & Manang na kahit noon pa ay nararamdaman ko ng
kayo ang makapagbabago sa akin at heto nga po tinatanggap ko ang parusa. Naririto po ako
nagtitiis alang-alang sa kapatawaran. Nagpapasalamat po ako ng taos sa aking puso sa ginawa
ninyong ito sa akin sapagkat iminulat niyo ako sa aking mga kasalanan at itinuro sa tiyak na
pagbabago. Nagbabago ako nang dahil sa inyo kayat Kuyang & Manang maraming-maraming
salamat po sa inyo. Alam ko pong hindi kayo maniniwala ngunit alam ng Diyos at balang araw
126
ito ay mapapatunayan niyo rin kaya't nagmamalik-tuhod po ako sa inyo na sana po ay patawarin
niyo na po ako sa aking nagawang kasalanan.
Kuyang & Manang bigyan niyo pa po ako ng isa pang pagkakataon upang kami'y magbagong
buhay. Alam ko po Kuyang may pamilya ka rin at mga anak at naranasan niyo na rin po kong
paano ang hirap at sakit ng mawalay sa kanila. Matiis niyo po kaya Kuyang ang ganito lalo na
nga't nasa maselang kalagayan ang asawa mo ? Higit malapit na pong manganak, matiis mo
kayang wala ka sa tabi niya? Nasisiyahan po ba kayong mawasak ang isang pamilya lalo na sa
oras na kailangang-kailangang ka nila kaya't luluhod po ako sa inyong harapan kung iyon ang
paraan upang mapatunayan ang aking pagsisisi at pagbabago. Nasa inyo ang buhay ko. Pati na
rin ang aking kalayaan ay nakasalalay po sa inyo. Kaya't Kuyang & Manang sa ikatatahimik,
ikabubuo at ikabubuti ng isang pamilyang hawak mo, nagsusumamo po ako sa inyo na sana po
ihulog mo na rin po sa amin ang inyong awa at habag alang-alang sa ikakalaya at sa
ikakatiwasay nito. Kaya't maraming-maraming salamat sa inyong mag-asawa alang-alang sa
magiging anak ko at pamilya. Huwag niyo na rin po sanang ipagkait ang isinasamba ko sa inyo
lalung-lalo na ngayon higit nila akong kailangan dahil malapit na pong manganak ang asawa ko.
Alang-alang po sa kanila luluhod at gagapang po ako sa harap ninyo kung iyon ang ibig niyo,
makamit ko lamang ang pagpatawad niyo alang-alang sa pamilya ko. Gagawin ko ang lahat
ipapangako ko po sa inyo dahil alam ko rin pong napamahal na sa inyo ang asawa ko. Kumusta
na rin po yong dalawang bata si Marc at Kim. Sana naman malayo na sila ngayon sa mga sakit.
Sa inyo po ang aking buhay at kalayaang nakasalalay sa aking pamilya. Nagsisisi na po ako
ngayon at naririto isinasamba at hinihingi ang pagpapatawad niyo ng dahil sa inyo nagbago ako.
Kaya't maraming-maraming salamat po sa inyo Kuyang & Manang.
Lubos na Gumagalang at
humihingi ng tawad
Mario A. Fabro
He explained that he wrote the letter to his former employers because he was being charged with
a crime he did not commit. 23 He also denied any romantic relationship between him and private
complainant. Allegedly, they were mere friends. 24
After trial, the RTC of Tayug, Pangasinan, Branch 52, 25 convicted appellant for the crime of
rape, thus:
In resume, the Court hereby finds accused Mario Fabro y Arquiza, GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, and hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum
period, from 17 years, 4 months 1 day to 20 years, but considering the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, hereby imposes the penalty of Prision Mayor 10 years, 1 day to 20 years Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. Finally, accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant Rebecca
Seguancia the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages with cost de oficio.
Accused being detained for failure to post his bail bond at the provincial jail in Lingayen,
Pangasinan from the time of arrest on August 17, 1989 up to the rendition of the decision, is
127
entitled to a preventive imprisonment of 1 year, 4 months and 22 days to be credited to him and
deductible from his principal penalty.
SO ORDERED.
On April 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but modified the trial
court's judgment by imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Held: AFFIRMED. Elements of rape under Art. 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code.To
establish rape under Article 335 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, two elements must be shown:
that the accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party; and that coitus was done through
the use of force or intimidation. This the prosecution was able to do in the case at bench.
Same; Same; It is but to be expected that if the sexual assault was committed against the victim
while the latter was in a state of unconsciousness, she would not be able to testify on the actual
act of sexual intercourse.Appellant, however, argues that the fact of sexual intercourse was
insufficiently established by the prosecution. He pounds on private complainants failure to give
direct testimony on the matter, as well as the result of her physical examination. We are not
persuaded. As we held in the case of People vs. Palapal, 114 SCRA 783 (1982)It is but to be
expected that if the sexual assault was committed against the victim while the latter was in a state
of unconsciousness, she would not be able to testify on the actual act of sexual intercourse. It is
precisely when the sexual intercourse is performed when the victim is unconscious that the act
constitutes the statutory offense of rape (e)specially when, as in the instant case, the loss of
consciousness was the result of appellants act of violence. x x x
Same; Same; Even as a woman raped while unconscious will not be able to narrate to the court
her defloration during that state, her violation may still be proved indirectly by other evidence.
In the same vein, a woman raped while unconscious will not be able to narrate to the court her
defloration during that state. Nonetheless, her violation may be proved indirectly by other
evidence. In the case at bench, private complainant struggled with appellant until she fainted.
When she came to, she was aching, naked from the waist down, and lying next to appellant who
was zipping up his pants. She found her t-shirt soiled, and upon the nest of her maidenhood lay
sticky matter. All these stand as mute testimony to her wicked fate at the hands of appellant while
she was unconscious.
Same; Same; Neither complete penetration nor ejaculation is necessary to constitute rape as what
is essential is that there be penetration of the female organ, no matter how slight.Furthermore,
the results of private complainants physical examination does not negate the commission of
rape. While the doctor found no vaginal or hymenal laceration or spermatozoa in her private
parts, appellants acquittal does not follow. It is settled that neither complete penetration nor
ejaculation is necessary to constitute rape. What is essential is that there be penetration of the
female organ, no matter how slight.
People v. Villanueva
128
Facts: Lea Villanueva, 14, cried of repetitive incestuous rape. For two years she had been
continuously, countlessly abused by her own father who with unmitigated perversity
indoctrinated her into eroticism and libidinal gratifications. "Pinagpaparausan niya ako," she
bewailed.1 She suffered in anguish and isolation. Her revelations were horrid if not sickening.
She turned to her mother who in her timidity and utter helplessness could only mutter,
"Ipinauubaya (ko) na sa Diyos."2 But deliverance must finally come and it did.
Barely three (3) days after her last incestuous encounter with her father her mother died. Lea
seized the opportunity for relief. She ran to her maternal grandmother for solace. It was when she
was under the care of her lola that the latter finally found out that Lea was repeatedly abused by
her father. She was brought to a physician who examined her and found the lacerations on her
private parts. They were too revealing to be ignored. Accordingly her father was charged, at least
with two (2) counts of rape. Confronted with the charges Solomon Villanueva at first denied. He
claimed that at the particular hours mentioned by Lea he was not home. But his alibi was totally
rejected by the trial court which convicted him instead as charged.
He is now before us with a different pretension. As if exculpating, he now says his daughter Lea
consented to their fornications. We are appalled.
Lea's maiden defloration was in their house along Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, around nine
o'clock in the evening of 19 September 1990 when her father roused her from her sleep and
brought her to his room. She was only 12 years and 4 months then. She was at once forewarned
by her father not to tell anybody whatever he would do with her otherwise he would kill her as
well as her mother and only brother. Then he removed her clothes after which he also took his
off. Fear haunted her. He asked her to lie down on her back and placed himself on top of her. He
inserted his organ into hers; she bled. After he was through he told her to go back to sleep.
Her sexual initiation was not meant to be her last. It became routine for almost two (2) years with
her father, happening about four (4) times a week, each varying to maximize sexual euphoria. A
pall of death loomed over every act.
On 14 June 1992 at around nine o'clock in the evening Lea was again ravished. From the living
room where she together with her mother and brother was sleeping she was dragged by her father
to his room. "Gagalawin daw niya ako," she narrated. He removed her T-shirt and short pants; he
stripped, asked her to lie down, placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina,
and pumped for about thirty (30) minutes. He told her that what he was doing was for her own
"good." After his "success," he threatened her again and ordered her to go back to sleep.
Three (3) days later, or on 17 June 1992, Lea's mother died. On 2 July 1992 she ran off to her
grandmother. "Hindi ko na matiis ang ginagawa niya sa akin."3 That same day she was
accompanied by her granduncle to the National Bureau of Investigation where she was examined
by Dr. Ruperto Sombillon, Jr., who found her "hymen, originally thick, wide, with superficial
old-healed laceration at 6:30 o'clock position . . . edges of which (were) rounded and noncooptable . . . vagina walls, moderately lax . . . rugosities shallow."4
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Accordingly, Solomon Villanueva was charged with two (2) separate crimes of rape, one which
occurred "sometime in September 1990," while the other, for the attack "on or about June 14,
1992." The two (2) cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
The accused denied the charges leveled against him and claimed they were trumped up by the
relatives of his deceased wife to avenge the cruelty and neglect she supposedly suffered from
him when she was still alive. He narrated that as a delivery truck driver then, he would normally
leave their house at ten o'clock in the morning and return home past eleven o'clock in the
evening. He rarely saw their daughter Lea as he came home from work late at night, dead-tired
and sleepy. On 19 September 1990 and 14 June 1992 he got home already past eleven o'clock in
the evening.
On 22 January 1993 the RTC of Manila,5 disregarded the alibi of Solomon Villanueva, found
him guilty of rape on two (2) counts, sentenced him in each to reclusion perpetua, and ordered
him to indemnify his daughter Lea in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages in both cases.
Accused-appellant is now before us insisting on his innocence. First, he harps on Lea's failure to
offer resistance considering that he was not armed with any weapon nor did he employ physical
violence. He would thus doubt the allegation of Lea that she reported the incident to her
grandparents because she could no longer take what he was doing to her. For, if this were true, he
said, she should not have waited for two (2) years, and if she did not like what he was doing to
her she should have immediately gone to her grandparents after the first or even the second
incident. Second, accused-appellant quibbles over the testimony of Lea. He claims that her story
that he was on top of her and having sex with her for 20 to 30 minutes is difficult to believe since
"[t]his is too much for a 12-year old girl to bear."6 He likewise submits that her testimony that
her mother knew what he was supposedly doing to her and yet did not do anything is "incredible
and against human nature and not in accord with common knowledge and experience of
mankind."7
Held: The arguments are disgusting at the very least. The trial court found the testimony of Lea
"categorical, positive and convincing."8 Hence we accord full faith and credence to her narration
that she was ravished by her own father. We are convinced that the act complained of indeed
occurred and were perpetrated by accused-appellant as testified to by the victim and confirmed
by the court a quo. Factual findings of the trial court are accorded the highest respect unless it is
shown that certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which if considered could affect
the result of the case.9 But accused-appellant in the case at bench has not presented any
substantial evidence to disturb the conclusions of the court a quo.
For sure Lea would not have publicly disclosed that she had been raped by her own father
and then undergo trial where she had to bare her traumatic and harrowing experience and
be subjected to harassment, embarrassment and humiliation, if not public ridicule, unless
she was really raped and her motive was solely to seek justice. She was barely 12, innocent,
inexperienced, naive, guileless when first abused. It would be highly improbable for her against
whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality had been shown to fabricate charges, much
more against her own father. Her testimony alone, which is credible, is sufficient to sustain the
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conviction of her ravisher.11 In fact it is entitled to greater weight since her accusing words are
directed against a close relative.
That Lea consented to the sexual congress, repeatedly at that, as she did not offer resistance
despite the fact that he was not armed nor did he use physical violence, can only be
conceived by a diseased mind a sex deviant who deserves no place in civilized society. His
threats and intimidation that gripped Lea in fear must be viewed in the light of her perception
and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any hard and fast rule. Physical resistance need
not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed and the victim
submits herself to the embrace of her rapist because of fear. What is more, accused-appellant
is her own father with whom she stayed in the same house and who certainly exercised moral
ascendancy not only over her but likewise over her mother and brother.
Thus Lea's failure to immediately report her repeated debauchment did not by itself diminish her
credibility. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime assaults on their
virtue not only because of shame but largely because of the threats on their lives.
It has been often said that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience. It is not unlikely that Lea could be intimidated
into silence by the slightest threat to her life. A young girl like Lea cannot be expected to have
the courage and intelligence to immediately report the countless sexual attacks committed
against her especially when equally countless death threats hang over her head. To Lea's simple
unsophisticated mind, accused-appellant was not merely fribbling threats.
Accused-appellant belittles his daughter's claim that he was on top of her for 20 to 30 minutes.
This, according to him, is difficult to believe since "[t]his is too much for a 12-year old girl to
bear." We do not see his difficulty nor are we moved by his sudden "concern" for his daughter.
What we find easy to believe, on the contrary, is that a sexual psychopath like him who is
capable of unleashing his biological urges on his own flesh will do everything to satisfy his
venereal delight.
That Lea's mother knew that accused-appellant was repeatedly ravishing Lea and yet did not do
anything, is not at all incredible. For one, Lea's mother appeared to be equally fearful of him who
wielded unabashed dominance over his household. Any opposition or resistance would seem
futile. And while mothers may have the natural impulse to protect their young, not all may have
sufficient fortitude to follow their instincts.
In fine, we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape on two (2) counts.
Turning to the penalties, the trial court sentenced accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua in each
of the two (2) counts and ordered him to indemnify his victim in both cases P50,000.00 for moral
damages. Interestingly, the Solicitor General invokes People v. Lucas 18 and submits that the
penalty should be modified, i.e., accused-appellant should be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua in each of the two (2) cases, and argues
that since accused-appellant was found guilty of rape on two (2) counts he should be ordered to
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pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,600.00 as exemplary damages in each of
the two (2) cases or a grand total of P150,000.00.
Suffice it to say that on 9 January 1995 the Court en banc reconsidered People v. Lucas19 and
modified the decision of 25 May 1994 by "DELETING therefrom the disquisitions on whether
reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and SETTING ASIDE its division into three periods." In
view thereof we revert to the ruling that since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty it has
no minimum, medium or maximum period. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
Anent the civil indemnity, we find the argument of the Solicitor General to be impressed with
merit. Accordingly the indemnity should be P50,000.00 in each of the two (2) cases or a total of
P100,000.00.20 An award of P25,000.00 in each case as exemplary damages to deter other sex
perverts or two-legged beasts from sexually assaulting or molesting hapless and innocent girls,
especially their own kins, is likewise appropriate.21
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant SOLOMON VILLANUEVA y
ODE guilty of rape on two (2) counts and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua in each count is
AFFIRMED. In addition, he is ordered to pay Lea Villanueva P50,000.00 as indemnity and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape or a total of P150,000.00.
People v. Canada
This is rape - where the pain endures, the ordeal lingers, and the stigma clings incessantly with
anguish and humiliation. And when committed against a barrio lass of tender years, the lechery
becomes compounded with apparent heartlessness that must be condemned, the perpetrator
damned and prosecuted to the fullest extent. For this man's insatiable lust and thirst for the flesh
deny this innocent victim forever the joy of discovering the conundrum of her femininity and the
purity of her womanhood.
Santos Caada was found guilty by the trial court of raping 12-year old Loberiza Palaming, i.e.,
having carnal knowledge of her against her will, with lewd designs, by force and intimidation, to
her damage and prejudice, for which he was sentenced to a prison term of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify his victim in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.1
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 December 1990 Loberiza Palaming went
to watch a public dance in La Union, Castilla, Sorsogon, together with Emma Valenzuela, Mary
Villanueva and Daisy Laurio. The dance lasted until midnight. Loberiza sat near the entrance of
the dance hall while her companions "went to a place."2 Suddenly Loberiza was grabbed from
behind and dragged towards a sampaloc tree ten (10) meters away. It was Santos Caada.
Loberiza struggled hard but to no avail. Her hands were held then tied at her back, her mouth
covered with a handkerchief. Santos Caada, armed with a gun, threatened to shoot her if she
made any sound. But she continued to free herself despite the threat on her life. She firmly
closed her legs but was overpowered and eventually overcome by the accused. He removed her
maong pants and then her panty. His fingers felt her legs and then tiptoed to stroke her vagina.
But this was not enough. He craved for more. He placed himself on top of her, intruded into her
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virginity and then unleashed the venom of his desire. He then got off from his quarry, released
her hands and uncovered her mouth. Now freed, complainant boxed her despoiler before he
could run away.
Loberiza narrated the incident to Larry and Tessie Valenzuela who in turn reported the matter to
the barangay captain on 31 December 1990. But Loberiza's mother learned of the incident only
on 1 January 1991 when she arrived from Manila.
The complainant was brought by her aunt Norma Lasarte to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital
where she was examined by Dr. Medy G. Auxillos. The medical examination revealed hymenal
lacerations although there were no signs of spermatozoa or of physical injuries.
The accused, a member of the 8th Sorsogon CAFGU Active Auxiliary Company stationed in La
Union, Castilla, Sorsogon, testified that on the night of the alleged incident he was sleeping at
their house in Milagrosa, Castilla, Sorsogon, approximately two (2) kilometers away from La
Union. He was off duty. He however could not ascribe any ill motive on Loberiza to incriminate
him as her rapist. His father Rogelio Caada nevertheless corroborated the alibi of the accused.
We affirm the conviction of Santos Caada. Complainant was only 12 years 5 months and 4 days
old when raped; yet, her narration of her misfortune was so detailed that it could only have come
from one who experienced such ordeal. She withstood the probing, penetrating, even misleading,
questions of the defense. The alleged inconsistencies referred to by the defense were more
apparent than real.
First. That complainant never mentioned in her sworn statement submitted to the PC/INP
Provincial Headquarters that she was tied and gagged although in her direct examination she said
she was tied and gagged, suffice it to say that "(e)x-parte affidavits are generally incomplete,
hence inconsistencies between declarations of the affiants in their sworn statements and those in
court do not necessarily discredit them and the infirmity of affidavits as an evidence is much a
matter of judicial experience."3 The sworn statement was in question and answer form. In her
naivete a 12-year old girl will, naturally, only respond to questions propounded to her and
nothing more.
Second.
In her sworn statement complainant mentioned that she boxed the accused on the
arms and back when he inserted his penis into her vagina. The defense found this unbelievable
considering that no resistance was allegedly ever mentioned when complainant testified in court.
This is misleading. The records disclose that complainant struggled every inch of the way to
preserve her virtue and hold her attacker at bay. Thus Q.
So it could be easy for you to make counterforce insofar as your two feet are (sic)
concerned?
A.
I kicked him. When he removed my hand I boxed his back.
Q.
So you kicked him and right after that it was followed by a blow with his hand?
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A.
Yes, sir.
Q.
You boxed him on his back? . . . you said?
A.
Arm and back.
Q.
So you fight (sic) out to defend your honor by kicking him and by boxing him?
A.
Yes sir.
Q.
You are very sure of that of course, what you did - kicking and boxing him?
A.
Yes sir.4
Third. The accused would persuade us that complainant was likewise inconsistent in naming her
companions in going to the dance that evening of 26 December 1990. The records however belie
this fact Q.
While there what were you doing in that place?
A.
We were observing or watching the dance.
Q.
You said "we", who were your companions then?
A.
Emma Valenzuela. Mary Villanueva and Daisy Laurio.5
On cross-examination the question propounded was Q.
Who was your companion then in going to the dancing hall?
A.
Mary Ann Valenzuela, Lea Legaspi.6
A scrutiny of the foregoing testimony reveals no inconsistency on the part of complainant.

Loberiza's companions in going to the dance hall, on one hand, and her companions while
watching the dance, on the other, may, and in all probability, be of different sets.
As if in desperation in exculpating himself, the accused advances the idea that complainant must
have mistaken him for somebody else. This is ridiculous, especially after it has been established
that she harbored no ill feeling towards the accused as to induce her to charge him with so grave
a crime as rape.
Full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape victim who has shown no ill motive to testify
against the accused.7 The complainant clearly recognized the accused as her despoiler. The crime
scene was not totally in darkness as there were lighted lamps about 30 meters away.
Significantly, the accused was positively identified in court by the complainant. She was only 12
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when defiled, still unaffected by mundane wiles and affairs of life. Hence "(s)he could not be
expected to fabricate such a complicated tale as sexual defilement unless she experienced the
same.8 We normally lend credence to testimonies of young girls especially where the established
facts indubitably point to their having been sexually assaulted.9 Loberiza testified in a candid
and straightforward manner. Her story was plain and unembellished, not woven out of sheer
imagination. She described her ordeal in vivid details. A woman will not expose herself to the
humiliation of a rape trial, with its attendant publicity and the morbid curiosity it will
arouse, unless she has been truly wronged and seeks atonement for her abuse. 10 When a
woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof. 11 No unmarried woman would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of
her private parts, and therefore permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she was
truly ravished and wants justice to be done. 12
The absence of spermatozoa does not negate conclusively the existence of rape. The absence can
be explained in several ways. Firstly, the sperm may have been washed away. Secondly, the
rapist may have failed to ejaculate. Thirdly, the maximum lifespan of spermatozoa is only 72
hours. 13 The complainant here was only examined five (5) days after the rape.
That there are no signs of external injuries does not belie rape. The medical examination
disclosed lacerations in the hymen of the victim. One may ask - are these lacerations not the best
physical evidence of the child's forcible defloration? Besides, it must be noted that the dastardly
act was committed with complainant's hands tied at her back and her mouth gagged. The accused
was armed with a gun. Expectedly, the 12-year old victim would be overcome and gripped in
fear.
For rape to exist it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of
such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear - fear that if the victim does not
yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. 14 Intimidation would
also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off
her attacker. 15
The defense of alibi raised by the accused is also unavailing. Not only is it weak, it is also totally
unsubstantiated.
First. The allegation remains as a unilateral declaration on the part of the accused; it is a bare
denial. He was never able to support his claim. The alibi was sought to be corroborated by the
testimony of his father who is not a disinterested witness. In order to strengthen his claim the
accused should have presented unbiased witnesses, and his father is not.
Second.
The distance of the accused's house from the scene of the crime is only two (2)
kilometers. Culled from the testimony of the accused's father, the distance can be traversed in
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only thirty (30) minutes. In this regard, the accused miserably failed to establish a strong and
convincing evidence so as to preclude his presence at the crime scene.
Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always received it
with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it is easily
fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established with clear and
convincing evidence. The requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must
convincingly demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. 16 Material to establishing alibi as a valid defense, it
must be shown that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have been present at
the place of the crime at the time it was committed. 17 As it is oft-repeated, alibi is the weakest
of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Where accused was positively
identified by the victim of the rape herself who harbored no ill motive against the accused, the
defense of alibi must fail. 18
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant SANTOS CAADA of
RAPE and imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify LOBERIZA
PALAMING in the amount of P50,000.00, and pay the costs is AFFIRMED.
People v. Caballero
Doctrine: CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY, NOT PROVED. When the offended
party awoke, the crime of rape committed by the appellant was already consummated, having
had carnal knowledge with the offended party while she was unconscious for being asleep. The
offended partys consent to the act was subsequent thereto and it was given on the belief that the
man lying with her was her own husband. It is evident that the offended party would not have
consented to the act, had she known that the man with her was not her husband, as she in fact
expressed her unwillingness to said act as soon as she discovered that the man whom she thought
to be her husband was the appellant.
The appealed judgment sentences the appellant for the crime of rape to the penalty of from eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.
About the 9th of February, 1935, Isabel Magbanua celebrated her birthday in her house within
the Hacienda Socorro in the municipality of Bacolod, Occidental Negros. Her niece, Consorcia
Gonzaga, and the latter's husband, Francisco Vecinan, were present to help her attend to the
party. When the party was over at about 1 o'clock in the morning, and the guests were already
retiring, the appellant who was one of them asked permission of Vecinan to sleep in the house,
stating that it was already too late for him to return to his. As the house had only one room,
everybody slept therein, Consorcia, her aunt and two girls on one mat, and Vecinan and the
appellant on another. The two girls were between Consorcia and her aunt, and the appellant on
Vecinan's side towards the wall, so that Consorcia and the appellant were on the opposite ends of
the room. When all were already asleep, Consorcia awoke and noticed that a man was on top of
her, having carnal intercourse with her. Thinking that this was her husband, Consorcia did
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nothing to oppose the act until it was consummated. Having noticed, however, that the man
trembled, a thing which her husband never did, she thought that he might be another and she
touched his body. Having observed that the shirtsleeves of the man on top of her were long while
those of her husband was short, and convinced that the man who had carnal intercourse with her
was another, she called her husband. As the latter would not wake up, she arose, struck a match
and caught hold of the man with her, who proved to be the appellant. When she had succeeded in
waking up her husband, she informed him of what had happened and her husband assaulted with
his fists the appellant who was asking to excused for what he had done. When Consorcia's aunt
awoke, she also insulted the appellant and later went to report the outrage to the person in charge
of the hacienda, named Manuel Cuison. When Manuel Cuison arrived at the house, he asked the
appellant what had happened but the latter refused to answer him, whereupon he took the
appellant to the municipal building and placed him at the disposal of the authorities.
The appellant, testifying in his favor, denied the facts stated by the witnesses for the prosecution
and alleged in his defense that on the night in question he and Consorcia's husband had been
playing monte and as he had won in the game and latter refused to continuing playing, he was
manhandled, Consorcia's husband assaulting him with his fists. This defense of the appellant has
not been supported by any evidence and his own attorney in this instance does not consider it as
having been established.
It appears from the evidence that when Consorcia, the offended party, awoke, the appellant had
already introduced his organ into her genitals and in fact he was already having sexual
intercourse with her. We mention this fact on account of a certain doubt arising from the
offended party's testimony during the direct examination relative to this detail, but in the attempt
of the attorney for the defense to clarify this point during his cross-examination, the offended
party categorically affirmed that she had been unaware when the appellant introduced his organ
into hers. Furthermore, it so appears affirmatively in the affidavit (Exhibit 1) made by the
offended party before the justice of the peace of Bacolod, which is attached to the record as
evidence for the defense. According to said document, when the offended party awoke, the crime
of rape committed by the appellant was already consummated, having had carnal knowledge
with the offended party while she was unconscious for being asleep. The offered party's consent
to the act was subsequent thereto and it was given on the belief that the man lying with her was
her own husband. It is evident that the offended party would not have consented to the act, had
she known that the man with her was not her husband, as she in fact expressed her unwillingness
to said act as soon as she divorced that the man who she thought to be her husband was the
appellant.
In view of these considerations, the appealed judgment is affirmed.
People v. Conde
Patricia Jaramillo was allegedly raped by accused-appellant Rizaldy Conde y Cortez1 in the
early morning of 31 October 1990. She reported the incident to the police authorities on that
same day and then signed and swore to a complaint2 for rape against the appellant before an
Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City. The complaint was filed with the Regional Trial
137
Court (RTC) of Kalookan City on 2 November 1990, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-36045,
and assigned to Branch 124 of the said court. The accusatory portion of the complaint reads as
follows:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1990 in Kalookan City, MM. and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with one PATRICIA OPEA
DE JARAMILLO, against the latter's will and without her consent.3
Trial on the merits ensued after the appellant entered a plea of innocence upon his arraignment.4
On 17 June 1992, the trial court rendered a decision5 finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the victim, Patricia Jaramillo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to pay the
costs.6
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the judgment of conviction is based is summarized
by the trial court as follows:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 31, 1990, Patricia Jaramillo, a 38 year old
housewife was sleeping on a bed at the ground floor of her house located at 129 San Diego St.,
11th Avenue, Caloocan City. As she was sleeping, Patricia Jaramillo felt something hard
penetrating her private organ. She suddenly woke up and found a man on top of her. She shouted
at the man, "Sino ka?" The man whom she recognized but never saw before this incident, stood
up and hurriedly put on his shorts and tried to flee from the house. Patricia then put on her panty,
which she wore when she slept the night before and which panty she found beside her on the
bed, in order to run after the man. Just as the man was leaving the house by the front door, he
was met by Marilyn Opea, the sister of Patricia, the two daughters of Patricia named Shirley
and Eufemia Jaramillo and Sherwin Baje, a male friend of Shirley and Eufemia. The accused, in
going out of the door managed to touch the thigh of Shirley. At this point, Sherwin Baje
confronted the man and the two fought each other. Shirley, Eufemia and Marilyn shouted for
help. Several neighbors responded and assisted in apprehending the man who identified himself
as Rizaldy Conde. The neighbors as well as her two daughters and Sherwin Baje brought the
accused to the house of Barangay Councilman Ben Silverio who was living nearby. Later on,
Councilman Silverio brought the accused to the Police Station accompanied by Patricia and her
two daughters as well as Sherwin Baje. On their way to the Police Station, the accused
threatened to rape Patricia again and the latter's two daughter; once he was released.
Upon arrival at the Caloocan City Police Station, the case was investigated by Corporal Alberto
David. Patricia executed a sworn statement on this case at about 2:40 A.M. of the same day
October 31, 1990 (Exh. "A"). She had herself physically examined at the NBI Medico-Legal
Office in the afternoon of October 31, 1990.
The testimony of the private complainant was corroborated by her daughter, Shirley Jaramillo,8
who likewise executed a sworn statement on 31 October 1990.9
138
Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, the Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
who physically examined the private complainant, made the following findings and conclusions:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and labia minora, both gaping. Fourchette, lax.
Vestibule, pinkish. Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a tube, 3.5
cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.
CONCLUSIONS:
1.
No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the body of the subject at the
time of examination.
2.
Vaginal orifice wide (3.5 cm. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an
average-sized, adult male organ in full erection without producing new hymenal injury.10
He further testified that it is possible for a woman to be raped while asleep and that if she has
experienced childbirth several times, she may be raped even without being awakened.11
The appellant, the lone witness for the defense, denied the charge of rape. He claimed that the
night before the incident in question he had a drinking session with his brother and cousin at his
home at Fourth Avenue, Kalookan City. He became too drunk that his brother had to hail a
passenger jeepney for him to report to his employer, Major Edilberto Santos, Chief of the
Kalookan City Police Station. During the ride, he lost consciousness and could no longer recall
what transpired thereafter.12
He only regained consciousness when he was being mauled by several persons in front of the
house of the private complainant. The latter accosted and asked him what he was doing in front
of her house. He apologized, but instead the private complainant struck a lighted cigarette on his
face. He was eventually brought to the police station. There, he learned that he was being
accused of raping the private complainant. He then requested that he be allowed to seek the help
of his employer but to no avail.13
The appellant admitted that he had no idea why the private complainant whom he never met
before would contrive the charge of rape. He surmised that his close association with his
employer could be the source of envy of the investigating officer, P/Cpl. Alberto David, who
happened to be a neighbor of the private complainant.14
The trial court rejected the version of the appellant noting that he had admitted to having been
arrested while he was outside the residence of the victim in the early morning of 31 October
1990. It gave weight to the testimony of the private complainant and concluded that the fact that
she immediately pushed the appellant upon waking up, tried to run after him, immediately
reported the incident to the police authorities, and lost no time in having herself physically
examined at the NBI Medico-Legal Office indicate her sincerity and enhance her credibility.15
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In this appeal, the appellant imputes upon the trial court the following errors:
1.
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE IN THE INSTANT CASE;
2.
IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE PARTICULARLY
THE TESTIMONIES OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PATRICIA OPEA DE JARAMILLO
AND SHIRLEY JARAMILLO;
3.
IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION HAD
ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME OF RAPE.16
The appellant asserts that the medico-legal findings negate the alleged rape in that nothing
therein shows that there were manifestations of recent sexual intercourse or any indication that
the private complainant suffered extragenital physical injuries. Considering that she has been
separated from her husband since 1985 and, according to her, she never had any sexual
intercourse with any man thereafter, it was improbable for her not to have been awakened when
the appellant was on top of her or not to have sustained any injury after having fought and
pushed the appellant while the latter's organ was in her private organ. Moreover, if indeed she
was waiting for the arrival of her children, then she could not have been in deep sleep as she so
alleged.
The appellant also points out inconsistencies between the testimonies in court and the sworn
statements of the private complainant and her daughter Shirley. For one, in their testimonies in
court, they declared that when the appellant met Shirley at the door while he was escaping, he
stopped and mashed Shirley's body from the chest downwards to the thigh - that fact was not
mentioned in their sworn statements. For another, Shirley testified that when she was mashed by
the appellant she parried his hand and shouted, and then she, her sister Eufemia, her aunt Marilyn
Opea, and Sherwin Baje pursued him; in her affidavit, however, she stated that while she,
Eufemia, Marilyn, and Sherwin were walking along the alley leading to their house they were
surprised to see a person hurriedly leaving their house and that Sherwin then blocked the man's
path and boxed him.
Finally, the appellant submits that the testimony of the Jaramillos that while they were on their
way to the police station he threatened to kill and rape the private complainant and her daughter
is incredible because after he was mauled, it would be "preposterous and highly contrary to
human behavior and experience" that he "would still have the guts to threaten private
complainant and her family."
In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that the trial court
committed no error in finding the appellant guilty beyond peradventure of doubt of the crime of
rape but recommends that the indemnity be increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00
conformably with the present policy of this Court.
The common denominator of the assigned errors is the credibility of the principal prosecution
witnesses. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this
140
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of
opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which have been overlooked, which if considered would affect the result of the case.
The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a
better position to decide the question of credibility, since he has personally heard the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.17
Our meticulous and dispassionate review of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that, except
as to the amount of indemnity awarded to the private complainant, the trial court committed no
error of fact or of law in its challenged decision.
The rape was consummated even before the private complainant was awakened. According to
her, she was awakened at the time when something hard - the appellant's penis - had penetrated
her private organ. The entry or penetration was thus accomplished while she was still asleep. She
may be considered to be unconscious then, for sleep is the "natural usu. regular suspension of
consciousness during which the powers of the body are restored," 18 or "a natural or artificially
induced state of suspension of sensory and motor activity."19 Under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman who is, inter alia,
unconscious. The said Article provides in part as follows:
Art. 335.
When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and . . .
This Court has held that carnal knowledge with a woman who is asleep constitutes rape.20
We find undeserving of any consideration, for being purely speculative, the appellant's
contention of improbability or impossibility that the private complainant was unable to wake up
before the penetration of a male organ into her private organ since she could not have been sound
asleep for she was expecting her children to arrive home and that she has had no sexual contact
since 1985.
Neither is there any merit in his view that since the private complainant has had no sexual
contact since 1985 it was unlikely that she would not suffer any injury in her private parts or any
other part of her body. The absence of genital injury was satisfactorily explained by the medicolegal officer. The private complainant had already given birth to three children, and her hymenal
opening is quite wide; thus, no new injury on her hymen could be caused by rape. The absence of
any injury can also be explained by the fact that he did not retaliate when the private complainant
pushed him upon waking up. The evidence disclose that when he was pushed by her he just stood
up, hurriedly put on his shorts, and tried to flee. He did not put up a fight.
Nor are we persuaded by the appellant's claim of inconsistencies between the testimonies and the
sworn statements or affidavits of the private complainant and her daughter Shirley. The claim is
141
based on the erroneous theory that whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in court facts
which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists
between the testimony and the affidavit. There can be an inconsistency if what the witness has
disclosed in his affidavit is contrary to that he disclosed in his testimony in court, but not when
what he has stated in open court are but details or additional facts not mentioned in the affidavit.
Being taken ex-parte, affidavits are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes
from partial suggestion or for want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that
belongs to the subject. Their infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience.
They are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.21
Besides, the witnesses were never confronted by the defense counsel on the alleged
inconsistencies. Section 13, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure of
impeaching witnesses by evidence of inconsistent statements. It reads:
Sec. 13.
How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. - Before a
witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown
to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
Finally, even assuming that what the appellant had pointed out are indeed inconsistencies, they
are on trivial or minor matters. It is settled that such inconsistencies do not impair the essential
integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or detract from the witnesses' testimony; on the
contrary, they even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses because they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.22
The appellant's attack on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses regarding the threat he made
while on their way to the police station is entirely irrelevant. In any event, his justification why
he could not have made such threat fails to persuade.
We thus find futile all the attempts of the appellant to raise doubts on the testimonies of the
private complainant and her daughter Shirley. He has not even provided any improper motive
why the said witnesses would falsely impute upon him the commission of rape. All that he could
surmise is that P/Cpl. Alberto David, the police investigator who conducted the investigation in
this case, is a neighbor of the private complainant. Yet, when asked on direct examination what
that has to do with the filing of the charge of rape, the appellant merely answered that he did not
know. Thus:
Q
(ATTY. PACIS)
So if David is a neighbor of the complainant, what is the material connection of his being a
neighbor to this fabricated charge according to you because you are denying this charge?
142
WITNESS
(A)
I do not know, sir.23

The absence of any improper motive on the part of the private complainant is further shown by
other circumstances in this case. She did not know the appellant before the incident. After she
woke up and came to know of the sexual assault, she immediately pushed the appellant and tried
to run after him. She then reported the incident to the police authorities; executed a sworn
statement; submitted herself to physical examination by a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI; and
subscribed and swore to a complaint for rape, which would necessarily result in her exposure to
the ordeal of a public trial. The spontaneity of these acts clearly demonstrate her sincere desire to
bring the appellant to justice.
The appellant's defense of denial, which is inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and
positive testimony of the private complainant.24
We thus affirm the judgment of the trial court, subject to the modification of the indemnity. The
award of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity to the private complainant is insufficient and is not in
accord with the current policy of the Court. It should be increased to P50,000.00 in the light of
the attendant circumstances in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of Branch 124 of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in Criminal Case No. 0-36045 finding accusedappellant RIZALDY CONDE y CORTES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification on the award of civil indemnity to the private complainant,
Patricia Opea de Jaramillo, which is hereby increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.
People v. Andres
Appellant Romy Andres was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte
with the crime of rape in four (4) separate complaints filed by Ruwerose A. Corpuz. These were
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 776-19, 777-19, 778-19 and 779-19. The first offense was
allegedly committed sometime in February 1988,1 the second, also in February 1988,2 the third,
in April 1989,3 and the last on May 10, 1989. 4 These four cases were consolidated and jointly
tried.
Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all the charges during the arraignment on July 12, 1989.5
On September 28, 1993, the trial court rendered its Decision6 acquitting the appellant in
Criminal Cases No. 777-19, 778-19 and 779-19 but convicting him in Criminal Case No. 776-19.
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ACQUITS the accused of the charges against him in Criminal
Cases No. 777, 778 and 779 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
143
However, in Criminal Case No. 776-19, the Court finds him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of rape as defined under paragraph (3) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and hereby imposes on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and further sentences him to pay moral damages to Ruwerose Corpuz in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and to pay the costs.
He shall be credited in the service of his sentence the full time during which he had undergone
preventive imprisonment if he agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited the service thereof with
only four-fifths of the time during which he had undergone preventive imprisonment.7
In this appeal, we shall only review the trial court's ruling in Criminal Case No. 776-19 where he
was convicted. The lone assignment of error made by accused-appellant in his Brief states:
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant Romy Andres guilty beyond a shadow of
doubt of the crime of rape despite the implied consent of Ruwerose A. Corpuz to the sexual act.8
The prosecution's case rests mainly on the testimony of the complainant. She narrated during the
trial that sometime in February 1988, at around seven o'clock in the evening, she went to their
old house located west of their main house in Brgy. Binsang, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte to get some
vegetables. As she was about to step on the first rung of the ladder, appellant, armed with a fiveinch knife, suddenly appeared and pulled her into the house. Complainant struggled to free
herself. She tried to shout but appellant covered her mouth to muffle the sound. Inside the house,
appellant removed her short pants and underwear. Appellant then laid on top of her and inserted
his penis into her genitalia. After satisfying his lust, appellant told complainant: "Agipulong ka,
saan la nga sikat matay no diket dakay amin," thus translated: "You tell this to anybody, it is not
only you who is going to die but all of you. "Thereafter, appellant left. Later that night,
complainant confided to her grandmother, Leonila Agliam, what the appellant had done to her.
Leonila Agliam, however, kept the information to herself for fear that something untoward might
happen.9
This was followed by three more incidents of sexual assault, again perpetrated by the appellant
against the complainant. 10
On May 10, 1989, when complainant's mother, Vicenta Corpuz, learned of her daughter's tragic
fate, she immediately reported the matter to the police and had her daughter examined by a
doctor. On June 22, 1989, complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte four (4) separate complaints for rape against the appellant. 11
Appellant, on the other hand, denied having sexual contact with the complainant in February
1988. He however admitted having sexual intercourse with her on two occasions: the first on
March 22, 1989 and the second on May 10, 1989. But he said that he did not force the
complainant as she voluntarily surrendered herself to him as an expression of her love. He
claimed that he and the complainant were lovers. 12
144
The trial court convicted the appellant for statutory rape under the third paragraph of Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 335.
When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
1.
By using force or intimidation;
2.
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Under the third paragraph, two elements must be established to hold the accused guilty of rape,
namely: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman is below
twelve years of age. 13
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the complainant was only
eleven years old in February 1988, the date when the offense was allegedly committed. 14
Hence, what remains to be resolved is whether or not appellant had sexual intercourse with the
complainant at that time.
We have thoroughly scrutinized the records of this case and we find complainant's testimony to
be credible. She recounted in simple yet detailed manner how she was sexually ravished by the
appellant one evening in February 1988. In fact, even the appellant finds her testimony to be
"sincere, candid, and lack(s) outside suggestion. 15
Complainant's testimony is further supported by the medico-legal
report 16 submitted by Dr. Marie Antoinette Pasion who examined the complainant on May 12,
1990. It shows:
Physical Examination:
General Survey:
Fairly developed,
fairly nourished
conscious, coherent.
Extremities Multiple linear abrasions
with scab formation right
leg, anterior aspect,
medial 1/3.
Breast shape, firm.
fairly developed, conical in
Nipple -
small, pinkish in color.
145
Pelvic Examination:
Pubic hair
absent.
Labia majora length.
coaptated at its entire
Labia minora length.
coaptated at its entire
Vetibulae mucosa
Fourchet
lax.
Vaginal rugusities
Vagina -
pinkish.
prominent.
readily admits 2 fingers.
Hymenwith old laceration between 4

& 5 o'clock involving full
thickness of hymen, with
recent laceration at 9:00
o'clock involving partial
thickness of hymen with
erythematous border.
Spermatozoa smear
negative.
The old laceration in the hymen, the laxity of the fourchet and the admission by the vagina of
two probing fingers without resistance are all evidence of penetration by the male organ into the
complainant's genital tract.17
Complainant positively identified the appellant as the culprit. Complainant's testimony, as
corroborated by the medico-legal report, must prevail over appellant's plain denial of the charges
against him. Complainant was only 13 years old when she took the witness' stand. We have often
repeated that it is very unlikely for such young girl, sexually inexperienced as she is, to fabricate
a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts and permit herself to be the
subject of a public trial if it is not true that she has been raped. Certainly, no decent girl would
expose herself to humiliation and public scandal unless she is motivated by a strong desire to
seek justice. 18
Appellant avers that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the implied consent
of the complainant to the sexual act. 19 He argues that complainant's failure to resist his
advances shows that she consented to the act, thus precluding rape.
146
Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Appellant was convicted under the third
paragraph of Article 339 of the Revised Penal Code which is known in legal parlance as statutory
rape. In this specie of rape, consent is immaterial. The mere fact of having sexual relations with a
girl below twelve years old makes a man guilty of rape. 20 Voluntariness on the part f the girl is
not a defense since the law presumes that a child below twelve years old cannot give an
intelligent consent to the sexual act.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.
People v. Lagrosa
Angelyn dela Cruz, an eleven-year-old lass and a grade five pupil, assisted by her mother,
Araceli V. dela Cruz, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay
in Palawan, a complaint for rape on two counts 1 against her adviser and teacher, Donator
Lagrosa, Jr. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the court which found cause to hold
the accused for trial and forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial
Palawan.
On 6 May 1991, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed separate informations for Rape
against the accused with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan which docketed them as Criminal
Cases Nos. 9345 and 9346. They were subsequently raffled off to Branch 52 of the said court
with seat at Puerto Princesa City.
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9345 reads:
That on or about the 28th day of November, 1990, in the morning, at the residence of Mr. Donato
Lagrosa, Jr. at Barangay Balading, Municipality of Cuyo, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused by lewd design pull ANGELYN
V. DELA CRUZ into his bedroom and immediately closed the door and once inside and by
means of force did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with said Angelyn V. Dela Cruz, a girl of 11 years old and a pupil of the said accused in Grade V
at the Balading Elementary School against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW and committed with aggravating circumstances, the accused have taken
advantage of his public position as teacher of the complainant. 2
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9346 is similarly
worded, 3 except as to the date and place of the commission of the offense, which are 25 January
1991 and the health corner of the Balading Elementary School.
The accused entered a plea of not guilty in each case during his arraignment on 10 June 1991. 4
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented as witnesses the private complainant; her
mother, Araceli; Dr. Alejandro Caia; and Mrs. Ofelia Montojo Fernandez. The defense
147
presented the accused; his son, Donato Lagrosa III; his wife, Eliza; and Roy Villagarcia as its
witnesses.
The evidence for the prosecution, which is presented in detail in the decision, is summarized as
follows:
In school-year 1990-1991, complainant Angelyn dela Cruz, then eleven years old, 5 was a grade
five pupil of the Balading Elementary School in Cuyo, Palawan. The accused was the adviser of
her class and her teacher in all her subjects, except Science and Filipino which were handled by
the head teacher, Mrs. Ofelia Fernandez.
On 28 November 1990 at around 9:45 a.m., the accused instructed Angelyn to get a "radiophono" from his house, which is about ten meters away from the school, so that his students
could practice their dance number for their school's Christmas program. After a short while, she
came back to school with the "radio-phono". However, he sent her back again to his house to get
the cover of the battery receptacle of the "radio-phono." Since she was already aware that
nobody was in his house, she requested Donato Lagrosa III, her classmate and the accused's son,
to accompany her. She was leading the way and all the while she thought it was Donato III who
was following her. When she turned her back while opening the door of the house, she noticed
that it was the accused who had followed her. After they had entered the house, the accused
closed the door, held her right forearm, and dragged her inside his bedroom. He pulled down her
skirt and panty and pushed her down to his bed. She tried to get up but he pressed down on her
stomach with his left hand. Then, with his right hand, he unzipped his pants. He held out his
penis and forcibly inserted it into her vagina at least three times. She felt pain and noticed that
her vagina was bleeding. He "sucked" her lips. Thereafter, he let her stand to put on her panty
and shirt while he zipped his pants. He warned her not to tell her uncle about the sexual assault
because they might kill him; if she did so, he would kill her. Then he gave her P5.00 and told her
to return to school, but she first went behind the banana plantation near the accused's house to
conceal from her classmate the loathsome experience she went through. 6
On 25 January 1991 at about 4:00 p.m., after playing with her classmates, Angelyn went to the
health corner located in her classroom to drink water. The accused saw her and ordered her to
sweep the floor of the health corner which she did so. After she had finished sweeping, the
accused got the broom from her and returned it to the broom box. He then blocked her away as
she was going out and pulled her inside the health corner where he forcibly pulled down her skirt
and panty, tearing them in the process. He held her right shoulder with his left hand and unzipped
his pants with his right hand. She cried but he ignored her. While standing with his feet apart
from each other, he successfully inserted his penis into her vagina four times. After he had left,
she got her school bag and went home. 7
The complainant continued attending school. On the other hand, the accused showed his
fondness towards her by giving her money on several occasions. He also gave her "codigos" or
wrote in her test papers the answer to the questions in Math, English, EPP, and Music, as a
consequence of which she got high grades therein. 8
148
In the meanwhile, Mrs. Ofelia Fernandez, Head Teacher of the Balading Elementary School, had
been receiving repeated reports about the attitude of the accused towards Angelyn. As a result,
Mrs. Fernandez called the teachers to a meeting to make inquiries. Her co-teachers, Mr.
Villagarcia and Ms. Linda Omeda, revealed to her that they saw the accused on two different
occasions intimately conversing with Angelyn. The latter's classmates likewise reported to Mrs.
Fernandez that their teacher, accused Donato Lagrosa, J., gave special attention and favors to
Angelyn.
To verify these reports, Mrs. Fernandez gave a summative test in Science; Angelyn obtained the
lowest grade in this test. When Mrs. Fernandez was asked by one of her pupil why the
complainant got the lowest score in her class but obtained the highest score in the subjects
handled by the accused, she questioned her pupil, Marita Belmonte, on why she got high grades
in the other subjects. Marita divulged to her that in connection with the examinations in Math
and English, she saw the accused writing the answers on a small sheet of paper and giving the
said answers to Angelyn who also passed them to her (Marita). 9 On 29 March 1991, Mrs.
Fernandez advised Angelyn's mother, Araceli, to watch closely her daughter. 10 Araceli
confronted Angelyn about the reports that the accused had been giving unusual attention to her.
Angelyn initially denied these reports. Araceli kept on asking her specially because the accused
had been coming to her house during the months of February and March, 1991. Finally, in the
evening of 30 March 1991, Angelyn confided to her mother that she was sexually abused by the
accused on 28 November 1990 and on 25 January 1991. 11
On 1 April 1991, Angelyn and her mother went to the house of the Barangay Captain of Balading
to report the incidents. The Barangay Captain informed them that he could not solve the matter.
He, however, accompanied them to the District Hospital of Cuyo, Palawan, for the physical
examination of Angelyn. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Municipal Hall to file a complaint
against the accused. 12
Dr. Alejandro Caia, Medical Officer III of the Cuyo District Hospital, examined Angelyn.
Although he found no fresh hymental laceration, he positively declared that Angelyn had
previous sexual intercourse because he found an "old hymental scar and her female organ
admitted to fingers with
ease." 13
The accused denied having raped Angelyn on 28 November 1990. According to him, he did not
send her to his house to get the radio-phonograph or the cover of its battery receptacle. His grade
five students then had not yet started rehearsing their dance number for the Christmas program.
He also declared that he could not have committed the rape on 25 January 1991 because at the
time of its alleged commission, he was with his wife and other co-teachers in the office of Mrs.
Ofelia Fernandez celebrating his birthday. For that, reason, he had earlier dismissed his grade
five students at 3:30 p.m. and instructed them to water the plants and to go home thereafter. At
about 3:45 p.m., he proceeded to the room of Mrs. Fernandez and stayed there until 4:15 p.m.
Then, together with Mr. Villagarcia and Amado Timbancaya, he went to his house. After his
companions left at 4.:45 p.m., he attended to his household chores. He did not return to his office
from the time he went to the office of Mrs. Fernandez until the succeeding school day. He also
denied having given money and "codigos" or prepared answer to Angelyn. 14
149
Finally, he claimed that the cases against him were filed through the instigation of Mrs. Ofelia
Fernandez who hated him because of his unfavorable comments and criticisms against the
official conduct of her husband, the Barangay Captain of Balading. The Fernandezes wanted him
to removed as a teacher of the Balading Elementary School. 15
On 21 May 1992, the court promulgated its joint decision 16 finding the accused guilty in
Criminal Case No. 9345 but acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 9346. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a joint judgment is hereby rendered:
A.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9345 Finding the accused DONATO LAGROSA, JR. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of statutory rape committed against Angelyn
dela Cruz, a female child only 11 years of age, and there being no modifying circumstances
appreciated, and not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to pay the offended party, Angelyn dela Cruz, moral
damages of P50,000.00, and the costs.
B.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9346 On grounds of reasonable doubt, engendered by a
finding that the evidence of commission of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 9346 has
not been impressed with that degree of credence sufficient to prove with moral certainty the guilt
of the accused, he is hereby acquitted of the offense charged.
SO ORDERED. 17
Fro the above adverse decision in Criminal case No. 9345, the accused appealed to us. He seeks
its reversal on the basis of his lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED DESPITE COMPLAINANT'S
MANIFESTLY DOUBTFUL ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE OF 28 NOVEMBER
1990. 18
To convince us, he contends that (a) the complainant's testimony is credible and improbable
because if she was earlier accompanied by her classmate, Donato Lagrosa III, the latter could not
have transmogrified into Mr. Donato Lagrosa, Jr., the accused; 19 (b) certain extrinsic facts, such
as the 4-month delay in reporting the alleged rape, which is unnatural for a girl who was a victim
of an assault on her virtue, 20 and the complainant's unnatural conduct in showing up inside her
classroom in the morning of 28 November 1990 immediately after the alleged rape 21 negate her
account of rape; (c) since he was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 9346 because "the trial court
saw it fit to disbelieve Angelyn's account" of the incident therein, such a disbelief "certainly
argues against her credibility in general as well as specifically concerns her account of the
alleged rape of 28 November 1990." 22
150
The appellee urges us to reject this appeal and to affirm in toto the challenged decision because
the arguments in support of the lone assignment of error are weak and untenable. 23
We find the appeal to be bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that since Angelyn was under 12 years of age, carnal
knowledge alone of her is rape. It is not required that the assailant used force or intimidation, or
that she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. 24
The resolution of this appeal hinges on the credibility of Angelyn. It is a settled rule that this
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of
witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 25 The reason
for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 26
It has the direct opportunity to observe witnesses on the stand and detect if they are telling the
truth or lying through their teeth. 27 There are certain matters that aid the trial court in assessing
the credibility of a witness which are not available to the appellate court such as, the emphasis,
gesture, and the inflection of the voice of the witness. 28 In the instant case, the trial court had
the distinct opportunity to make such observations and to avail of such aids while Angelyn was
on the witness stand. We find no reason to dispute the trial court's judgment on the credibility of
Angelyn.
Our own reading of her testimony discloses a pure and simple barrio lass who, despite her
traumatic experience, weathered the lengthy and rigorous
cross-examination in a unfamiliar, if not unfriendly, courtroom atmosphere. She remained
unshaken and her responsive and concise answers only enhanced the truthfulness of her story of
defloration. This was not the only ordeal she underwent after the assault on her virtue and the
desecration of her chastity; earlier, she allowed her private organ to be thoroughly examined by a
doctor if only to have medical proof that she was indeed raped. Time and again, this Court had
said, that no unmarried woman would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her
private part, and thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she was really
ravished and she wants justice to be done. 29 This is specially true of a female below twelve
years of age, like Angelyn, who is still unaffected by mundane wiles.
Angelyn's delay in reporting the crime does not cast doubt on her credibility. At her tender age,
she could not be expected to react like a mature person. She was in a quandary because her own
assailant was her teacher and adviser who not only had ascendancy and control over her success
or failure in school but also threatened to kill her if she would report what he did to her. Fear,
more than reason, dominated her. It has been held that delay in reporting a rape incident due to
death threats cannot be taken against the victim. 30 It is not uncommon for young girls to
conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue because of the rapists' threat on their lives. 31
The claimed transmogrification of Donato III into Donato Jr. is a play on the imagination. As
explained by Angelyn, although she had requested Donato III to accompany her the second time
the accused directed her to go to his house, she discovered when she opened the door of the
151
house that it was the accused who had followed her. It was not impossible for him to have
followed the victim without her noticing and it was established beyond doubt that he indeed
raped her inside the room of his house.
The accused's allegation that Angelyn showed up inside her classroom that same morning of 28
November 1990 after the rape incident is a misrepresentation of fact. Angelyn testified that after
she was raped on 28 November 1990, she first hid herself behind the banana plantation and cried.
32 She did not immediately return to her classroom because she was not yet ready to face her
classmates. Thus, her conduct conformed to the natural reaction of a bewildered victim of a
sexual assault.
Nor can the accused's acquittal in Criminal Case No. 9346 be a ground for his acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 9345. Such acquittal was based on reasonable doubt. The circumstances in
Criminal Case No. 9346 mentioned by the trial court in its decision are not attendant in Criminal
Case No. 9345 where the accused had the unhampered opportunity to satisfy his bestial lust on
28 November 1990 because only he and the complainant were in his house at the time and
Angelyn was lying down while he was on top of her.
The allegation of the accused that Mrs. Ofelia Fernandez induced Araceli dela Cruz, Angelyn's
mother, to file criminal charges so as to remove him as a teacher of Balading Elementary School
is not convincing. If a mother would not sacrifice a daughter's honor just to give vent to a grudge
as she knows fully well that such an experience would damage her daughter's psyche and taint
her for life, 33 nor initiate a complaint for rape, or subject a daughter to a physical examination
and the humiliation of a public trial unless she was motivated by an honest desire to have the
culprit punished, 34 then with more reason that she would not do so merely upon the instigation
of another. There is no showing at all that Araceli was under the overpowering influence of Mrs.
Fernandez.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Mrs. Fernandez harbored any ill-motive against the accused
which could have moved her to use Araceli to destroy him. He and Mrs. Fernandez were
obviously in good terms. He even held his birthday party on 25 January 1991 in her office. 35
Mrs. Ofelia Fernandez also testified that she did not have any grudge against the accused and
that she and his wife are the best of friends. 36 Finally, the accused could not attribute to
Angelyn and her mother any ulterior or improper motive for charging him with rape. Since no
such motive of Angelyn and her mother was shown, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and
credit. 37
The accused took full advantage of his position as teacher and class adviser of Angelyn. Using
his ascendancy over her, he made her a victim and a captive of his lust. What he did was highly
condemnable. He flouted the public trust character of his office which demanded from him
service with utmost responsibility and integrity; 38 and made a mockery of the solemn duties of
one exercising special parental authority 39 to educate and instruct his ward by
right precept and good example and to provide her with moral and spiritual guidance. 40 He paid
no heed to the precept that as a teacher he was to be paragon of uprightness, morality, and
integrity. The educational system is not the place for beasts like him.
152
WHEREFORE, finding the challenged decision in Criminal Case No. 9345 of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan to be in accord with the law and fully supported by the facts,
this Court hereby AFFIRMS it in toto.
People v. Echegaray
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a
deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the attendant details
pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked
with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to
forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous
lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the
crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by
the fact that the same was commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the
complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA.
No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
C O M PLAI N T
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10
years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW 2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de
oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
153
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on

September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2,
respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter
being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small house located at
No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9,
Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in
their house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the
accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon
as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged
her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately,
removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise
removed his underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently,
appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp.
14-15, ibid). While appellant was pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?"
and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved
futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened
to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be
killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of
appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same
sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother was out
of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her
mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she
suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21,
ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her mother
was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However, when appellant
was detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong" (pp.
39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B.
Preyna, 3 the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the
presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9). 4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE charge
against the accused was only the figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's
complaint was forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of
Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's
greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
154
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to
the accused in order to persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of
desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was substituted with the
crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came to know about the
affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the Barangay Captain.
That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband poured
alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA
and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates
that the property is co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter
sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso
waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the
latter's accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to
conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very
strong motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the
sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project.
That he could not have committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa as his own
daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the crime,
he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Paraaque, Metro Manila
(Exh. 4). The travel time between his work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering
the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a document denominated
"Contract of Services" duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a
big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will
be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the
grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier
and he pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of
conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the
grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's
grandmother in implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become the sole
owner of that piece of property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at
San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted
that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own
daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the
alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry woman
and part time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex
books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot, she saw
Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation took sometime.
155
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last
witness for the defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa
and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to
her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs.
Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house. 5
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower
court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the tenyear old victim to whom no ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant can be
attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accusedappellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's
vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower
court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1.
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF
THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS
CHARGED.
2.
THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED
LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME
CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3.
THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT
ACCUSED WAS IN PARAAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR. 6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a
thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains
guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape
where only two persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales
of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the
rape charge was merely concocted and strongly motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at
the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte,
156
Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the
maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event
that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated
in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado
Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the National Housing
Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was
fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a coowner. So, the live-in partners would have the property for their own. 8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to
instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on
account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where
she has no motive to testify against the accused.
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which
the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not
surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of her father's monstrous acts had made her
cry. 11 Once again, we rule that:
. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the
circumstances of the rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and immature rape
victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of
tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely
by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and
baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-appellant was already naked when he
dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony that the said accusedappellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly,
Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused
was executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in
court wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis from her vagina, the accused
said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her
sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed
on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was
the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. 13
These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt
as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused was naked when he
dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on
Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a
conflicting account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully
inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's
157
evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how the victim's
grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of the witness do
not detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically
believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed as it is not to he expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an
incident with perfect or total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and
concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the
fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In
his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This Court
gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our
ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra, 17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of
distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited
only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female
reprodructive canal being capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no
difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive
organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the fullterm fetus.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he vaginal wall,
though not as extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to
the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 13-14,
emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the
doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape
as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr.
Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa
on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the
victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously
argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of the accused-
158
appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring
so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify
against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other
witnesses, should be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi which is
inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accusedappellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting
job at the house of one Divina Ang in Paraaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4,
1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant at the time of the commission of
the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint,
dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. 24
Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her
account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious
sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable
that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother
Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating,
thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and
immature girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on
its, part to tend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state,
as parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of
their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim
alone. The consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It may reflect a
failure to abide by the announced concern in the fundamental law for such institution There is all
the more reason then for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty for this
offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance in civilization, the
disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of
what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the prospects of
relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
159
xxx
xxx
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the
trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although
he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before
the charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had
provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The Court notes that Rodessa uses the
surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her
grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination
that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in
one house only. 28 At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of
Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes
ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law
under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason
enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the
act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young victim has become all the more
repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy
and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and
bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the
accused-appellant face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision
of the Regional Trial Court.
People v. Atuel
The accused-appellant, caught in flagrante in the act of rape, insists he did not do it and instead,
boldly attributes it to another person, but fails to convince this Court.
Accused-appellant Ernesto Atuel was charged with the crime of rape under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region,
Branch 11, 1 in a Criminal Complaint subscribed by the mother of the complainant and approved
by City Prosecutor Antonio V.A. Tan, which complaint reads as follows: 2
The undersigned, mother of the complainant-FELICITAS SAYON, who is a mental patient, after
having been duly sworn to (sic) in accordance with law, accuses the above-named accused of the
crime of RAPE, under with Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about August 23, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation,
160
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have (sic) carnal knowledge with the complainant-Felicitas
Sayon, who is a mental patient, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Davao City, Philippines, August 28, 1991.
Arraigned on September 13, 1991, the accused, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not
guilty". Trial on the merits ensued.
In a five-page Decision dated March 29, 1992, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged.
The fallo reads as follows: 3
WHEREFORE, finding accused Ernesto Atuel, alias Loloy Bolhog, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, under Nos. 1 and 2, of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua; to indemnify Felicitas Sayon, the complainant, in
the amount of P40,000.00; and to pay the costs."
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
Severo "Berot" Echavez, a porter, had been neighbors with the accused, a stevedore, since 1987.
He knew that the accused and his wife lived with Lydia Atuel, elder sister of the accused, whose
house at V. de Guzman St., Sta. Ana, Davao City was about two (2) arm's lengths away from
Echavez's. 4
Aside from his house at de Guzman Street, Echavez owned a wall-less shanty located behind the
Sta. Ana Wharf seawall, about 60 to 70 meters from wharf, where he would sleep at night
whenever he had a cough. There was no other shanty or dwelling in the vicinity.
At dawn during low tide, fishing boats would dock near the Sta. Ana Wharf seawall to discharge
their catch of fish. Fish merchants and traders would congregate at the seawall to await the
fishing boats with their cargo.
In the evening of August 22, 1991, Echavez, afflicted with a cough, slept in his shanty behind the
seawall as he wanted to bathe in the sea the following morning. He was all alone in his shanty
and he had not seen any other person at or near the seawall.
At about 3 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1991, Echavez was awakened by a woman's
cries for help and entreaties: "Don't, Nong, don't, Nong!" 5 Going toward the place where he
heard the shouts, he saw the accused having carnal intercourse with a woman lying on top of a
table. The place, about 20 to 25 meters from Echavez's shanty, was deserted at that time, as
fishing boats had not yet landed, but the scene was illumined by a half-moon.
161
Echavez immediately ran to the Sta. Ana Police Patrol Station, also known as the Central Patrol
Station, and reported the incident. PO1 Prospero Ondong Sr., requested the Desk Officer to
contract a mobile patrol car for assistance and then accompanied Echavez to the place indicated
by the latter. 6
Approaching the place, they saw the accused still having sexual intercourse with the woman. The
accused, wearing a black jacket and nude below the waist, was standing in front of the woman
and furiously pumping into her with push-and-pull motions of his buttocks. 7 The woman, whose
body was reclining inside an unfinished carved banca placed on top of the table which was about
72 centimeters in height, 8 had her skirt raised up to her stomach and was completely bare below
the waist; her thighs were splayed, her feet dangling downwards. 9 She was crying "Agay!
Tabang!" 10 Officer Ondong arrested the accused, who claimed that the woman was his wife. 11
The woman fell to the ground, touched her knee s and exclaimed to Ondong, "Gi-rape ko, Sir" 12
Ondong brought the accused, together with the woman, to the Sta. Ana Patrol Station. He tried to
interview her, but she gave inconsistent answers. 13 Ondong knew the appellant, who had been
previously apprehended, there having been several warrants pending for his arrest. 14
At around 4:00 in the morning, the complainant was brought by a policeman to the Davao
Medical Center. At that time, she was wearing a crumpled dress, her hair long, disheveled and
loose. When interviewed by Dr. Ma. Lourdes Monteverde, complainant gave her name as Fely
Delgado, 15 and said that she went to Magsaysay Park at 2 o'clock that morning to look for a
prayer book. She was observed to laugh for no reason at all. In accordance with the hospital's
administrative order, she was referred to the Davao City Health Office. 16
Complainant admitted that, at the time of the incident, she was undergoing treatment for severe
headaches. She testified that at about 3 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1991, while at
Magsaysay Park, she was approached by a man whom she did not know who forcibly brought
her to a place near the beach where he boxed, slapped and maltreated her, and thereby rendered
her unconscious. She regained consciousness at the police station. 17
On August 28, 1991, five days after the incident, complainant was examined by Dr. Danilo P.
Ledesma, Medico-Legal Officer of the Davao City Health Office. 18 Dr. Ledesma noticed
complainant was "slightly incoherent". She complained to him that she had been raped. Dr.
Ledesma could not categorically say that the hymenal laceration were caused by a male organ for
they could have also been caused by a finger or the result of masturbation. 19
Dr. Melody Yeto, a doctor assigned at the psychiatry department of the Davao Medical Center,
confirmed the insanity of complainant, who was suffering from inappropriate mental status, that
is, her answers to questions were not congruent with her feelings. Based on the recorded
examination conducted by Dr. Enriquez another psychiatrist who examined the complainant
on August 16, 1990 it was learned that complainant suffered from "sleeplessness" and was
found to have "roamed around aimlessly". Her behavior, based on the observations of Dr. Yeto,
was indicative of the existence of mental disorder. 20 From the medical records at the psychiatry
section of the Davao Medical Center, it was learned that the woman's real name is Felicitas
Sayon, and that she was single, 23 years old and had her residence at New Bataan, Province of
Davao (formerly Davao del Norte). However, at the time of the incident, she was then
162
undergoing psychiatric treatment and check-up as an outpatient at the psychiatric section of the
said center of schizophreniform disorder 21. She was allegedly also being treated by herbolarios.
Although her mental condition improved, her psychosis was not fully cured. 22
Version of the Defense
The defense presented two witnesses, viz., Lydia Atuel, elder sister of the accused, and the
accused himself. Lydia, a self-confessed former prostitute, testified that it was a certain Caloy
Reynoso, a friend and neighbor of long standing, whom she met in the evening of August 22,
1991 with the complainant, who was the one who copulated with the complainant. According to
Lydia, at past 1 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1991, she went to the beach for she thought
she felt labor pains. There she saw people, one on top of the other. Then she heard Caloy saying
to the other persons with him to keep quite because someone was looking at them. According to
Lydia, the charge of rape against her brother was fabricated by Severo Echavez who had an ax to
grind against appellant, who in turn had taken a gangplank owned by the
former. 23
Testifying on his own behalf, accused alleged that, at about 2 o'clock in the morning of August
23, 1991, he was serving as a member of the "ronda" team together with his neighbors, Armando
Tadlas and Boyet Mosqueda. The area covered by their "ronda" was from the second wharf in
Sta. Ana up to Carpenter Street. Thereafter, he went looking for Caloy Reynoso who, according
to his sister Lydia, was at the cottage of Echavez. When he went to the beach to look for him, he
saw Caloy together with a woman and Echavez. Suddenly, someone behind him shouted. It
turned out to be a policeman who ordered him to raise his hands; he was then frisked and
arrested. 24
The Issues
On appeal, accused-appellant assigned the following errors: 25
I
The trial court gravely erred in not finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
substantially insufficient to warrant a conviction.
II
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty as charged despite utter
failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
Appellant contends that the prosecution's evidence "does not measure up the quantum of proof
required by law", aside from being "highly dubious in nature, infirmed (sic) and marred by
163
improbabilities", and conflicting. According to appellant, the testimonies of Severo Echavez and
the victim are in conflict, for the victim herself testified that she was rendered unconscious by
the blows and physical maltreatment inflicted by the rapist, and therefore she could not have
uttered the cries for help allegedly heard by Echavez.
Appellant's contention is devoid of merit. Rape as a harrowing experience is usually not
remembered in detail. Rather, the victim of such an atrocity would normally be inclined to forget
the execrable event and sweep it into the dustbin of her unwanted experiences and memories. For
such an offense is not something which enhances one's life experience and therefore worth
recalling or reliving, but rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a
stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, no matter that it was never her fault that she met
such a fate. A rapist should not expect the hapless object of his lechery to have the memory of an
elephant and the cold precision of a mathematician. 26 In the case at bar, the rule requiring that
minor inconsistencies in testimonies be disregarded should apply with even greater force,
considering that complainant at the time was suffering from insanity as confirmed by the medical
report of August 28, 1991. Complainant was mentally ill at the time of the incident, and
consequently could not be expected to remember in precise detail all that actually happened to
her. Her severe traumatic experience was too much for her unstable mental faculties. In fact, she
was incoherent and violent on the days following the incident. 27 Her testimony as to what had
happened certainly cannot constitute gospel truth, especially since at the time she gave her
testimony she was still undergoing treatment from psychiatrists and herbolarios, and, therefore,
not possessed of completely normal mental faculties. We have said that a rape victim is not and
cannot be expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience. 28 And the
credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by some inconsistencies in her testimony. 29 On the
contrary, it is a recognized axiom in rape cases that inconsistencies in the victim's testimony do
not detract from the vital fact that, in truth, she had been abused. Testimonial discrepancies could
have been caused by the natural fickleness of the memory, which variances tend to strengthen
rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 30
Moreover, it is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is
accorded the highest respect because it is the trial court that has the direct opportunity to observe
the witness's demeanor on the stand and determine if she is telling the truth or not. Such
assessment is binding on this Court except when the same was reached arbitrarily or when the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could have affected the result of the case. But none of such exceptions apply to
this case. 31
At any rate, what is important is whether the sexual congress was indeed consummated. The fact
was proven not by the testimony of complainant but by that of Severo Echavez. The trial court
correctly relied on the testimonies of Echavez, a long time acquaintance and neighbor of
appellant who witnessed the incident, as well as that of Police Officer Ondong, who responded to
Echavez's report. Echavez's testimony is straightforward, credible and sufficient to convict
appellant, as can be gleaned from the excerpt of testimony given below: 32
PROSECUTOR
164
Q
Now, last August 23, 1991, at around 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, can you tell us
where were you?
A
I was sleeping in my cottage at the wharf.
This cottage of yours is located at the Sta. Ana wharf?
Yes, sir.
Q
Now, while you were sleeping at 3:00 o'clock (sic) dawn of August 23, 1991, was there
any unusual incident that took place?
ATTY ZAMORA
Your honor, please, he was sleeping, so, he could not have known any unusual incident because
he was sleeping according to him.
COURT
Witness may answer.
(WITNESS)
A
I was awakened by sounds and I heard someone saying, "Don't, Nong, don't Nong",
asking for help.
COURT
Is "Nong" an abbreviation of the word "Manong"?
xxx
xxx
xxx
INTERPRETER
Yes, Your Honor, it's a contraction of the word "Manong".
COURT
Yes, it's a contraction of the word "Manong" which means older brother. Continue.
PROSECUTOR
Q
When you heard somebody calling "Nong", what did you do?
A
I ran to the police station because the voice was asking for help and I could not go there
and so . . . (interpretation of the answer of the witness not finished)
165
COURT
Q
How far is the police station from where you heard the call for help?
If I am not mistaken it will reach (sic) to 200 meters.
Q
You are referring to the Sta. Ana Patrol Station in front of the Magsaysay Park at Sta.
Ana, Davao City?
A
Yes, sir.
What voice did you hear, a male voice or a female voice?
A female voice.
COURT
Continue.
PROSECUTOR
Q
And did you arrive at the Sta. Ana Patrol Station?
Yes, sir.
What did you do when you reached the Sta. Ana Patrol Station?
I reported to the police.
After you made the report to the police, what was the response of the police?
The policeman went to that place where the voice asking for help was heard.
How many policemen went with you?
One policeman.
And that policeman went to the place where you heard the voice?
Yes, sir.
When you arrived, what did you see?
When we arrived there (were) a man and a woman having sexual intercourse.
166
PROSECUTOR
Q
What was the position of the man when he had intercourse with the woman?
A
The man was standing while the woman's legs were dangling on the table with her head
backward in a lying position.
Q
On what object was the woman lying?
On top of the table.
To discredit Echavez, the defense attributed ill-motive, alleging that he harbored a grudge against
appellant because of a pervious quarrel involving a piece of wood used as a gangplank. 33 The
alleged quarrel, however, was too flimsy a reason, and the object of the quarrel too insignificant
an item, for Echavez to have falsely charged the appellant with so serious a crime. Also, it was
not even Echavez but Officer Ondong who testified as to complainant's utterance to the effect
that she had been raped.
The accused also claims that Echavez's action of first seeking assistance from the authorities
instead of immediately extending help to and thus preventing further violation of the victim was
contrary to human nature and the natural course of things. 34
We disagree. Going for police assistance instead of rushing in to stop a crime is not an abnormal
reaction and may even be deemed the more prudent move. Appellant, caught in flagrante delicto,
could have immediately fled and escaped arrest. On the other hand, he could also have fought it
out with Echavez, who might have been on the losing end. Further, it was not possible to
determine beforehand if appellant was armed or not. It was, therefore, the better course of action
for Severo to first seek the help of the authorities. Likewise, behavioral psychology teaches us
that different people react to similar situations dissimilarly. 35
In any case, it is unrebutted that appellant was caught having sexual intercourse with Felicitas
Sayon, who was proven beyond the shadow of a doubt to be a mental patient, and whose
physical examination yielded findings of hymenal lacerations. Also, appellant was caught with
his pants down, literally, and in the most compromising position vis-a-vis the victim, by no less
than a police officer. Accused himself admitted he had no quarrel or personal differences with
Officer Ondong. Thus, the trial court correctly refused to give credence to the appellant's
accusation that Ondong butt-stroked him with his Armalite rifle on his stomach and back, as
there was no cogent reason for Ondong to "third-degree" the accused.
While the defense tried to discredit the prosecution witnesses, Ondong's testimony was fortress
they could not breach. The police officer arrested appellant while in the very act of committing
the crime, and his testimony is certainly entitled to full faith and credit. For it is well settled that
credence is accorded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers, it being
presumed that they have regularly performed their duty, absent any convincing proof to the
contrary. 36 Likewise, when there is no showing that a witness for the prosecution was actuated
by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled
167
to full faith and credit. 37 The testimony of Officer Ondong is too explicit in its graphic
depiction of the sexual assault and of the reaction of the complainant after the apprehension that,
in comparison, appellant's denials appear lame and unworthy of belief. This is obvious and
unmistakable from the following excerpt of testimony: 38
PROSECUTOR ESPARAGOZA
Q
Specifically, on August 23, 1991, at 3:30 in the morning, can you tell us where you were?
I was on duty at that time.
While on duty, did anything took (sic) place while you were on duty?
A
Well(,) one Severo Echavez appeared in our office and reported that somebody was
asking for help.
Q
And when (sic) after receiving this report from Mr. Echavez that somebody was asking
for help, what did you do?
A
I requested the desk officer to call the mobile patrol to assist Mr. Echavez together with
me (sic).
Q
And where did you proceed after that?
A
help.
Well, we proceeded to Magsaysay Park wherein Severo Echavez reported the call for
xxx
xxx
And what did you find out later?
xxx
WITNESS
A
I saw a man wearing a black jacket (swaying) with a push and pull motion.
COURT
Q
What was he doing, if any?
A
He was half(-)naked. His hands was (sic) on the brace on the makeshift of the brace he
was holding. His buttocks is (sic) moving push and pull.
PROSECUTOR ESPARAGOZA
Q
When you say, "push and pull", can you describe specifically, in the more understandable
language when you said he was making a push and pull?
168
Can I demonstrate.
No, when you said push and pull, what do you mean by making a push and pull position.
COURT
Q
What was he doing actually?
He was swinging, the body was swinging, the buttocks was (sic) swinging.
PROS. ESPARAGOZA
Q
Was he not committing a sexual intercourse?
Yes, sir, he was committing a sexual intercourse.
Q
And when you said he was having a sexual intercourse, was another person around whom
he was conducting a sexual intercourse?
A
Yes, sir, there was a woman in front of him.
Can you tell us, describe to us the woman at that time?
A
The woman was lying in the carved wooden (sic), her feet was dangling and her body
was fitted to the carved wood, her skirt was rolled.
COURT
Q
What is that carved wood?
I described it as unfinished "banca", it was cut this size.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROS. ESPARAGOZA
Q
Before you brought the man and the woman to the Police Station, what happened?
A
When I called him the suspect, he told me "asawa ko ni" (she is my wife). Then he add
another words (sic) "unsa mani police brutality ni" (what is this, police brutality?), he told me
that.
Q
How about the woman were their (sic) comments made by the woman?
169
A
I saw the woman fall to the ground touching her knees and he (sic) uttered "gi rape ko,
sir" (I was raped, sir).
Q
Did you find out later the name of that woman?
A
I found out later on that real name thru her mother and his brother that she was Felicitas
Sayon.
Q
How about the man who allegedly raped her, do you know his name?
He is known to our station as Ernesto Atuel."
Second Issue: Rape Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

Under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1.
2.
3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
In this case, there is no question that the victim was mentally disturbed or insane at the time the
sexual assault was committed. Her inconsistent answers to the queries made by Officer Ondong;
her incongruent reactions as observed by Dr. Monteverde; her tendency to laugh for no reason at
all; and her desire to look for a prayerbook in the wee hours of the morning at the Magsaysay
Park; all these speak of a person not in full control of her senses and mental faculties. She was,
therefore, correctly held by the trial court as being deprived of reason. In the rape of a woman
deprived or reason or otherwise unconscious, the victim has no will. Sexual intercourse with an
insane, deranged, or mentally deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple.
The deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental abnormality or
deficiency is sufficient. 39
Appellant, therefore, was correctly convicted of the crime of rape, for having had sexual
intercourse with complainant, who suffered from mental disorder. It was not even necessary to
prove the element of force or intimidation in order to secure appellant's conviction, but
nonetheless, the trial court also established the fact that appellant utilized force in the sexual
assault, and that the sexual intercourse was effected against the victim's will as she was shown to
have shouted for help. She also alleged physical maltreatment, which though not proven by
physical evidence was not disputed or rebutted by the appellant. In consonance with recent
jurisprudence to the effect that the rape of a woman deprived of reason or having some mental
defect deserves as heavier penalty in the form of increased civil liability, 40 the civil indemnity
awarded should be, as it is hereby, increased to P50,000.00.
170
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit, and the
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of civil indemnify is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
People v. Silvano PDF DIGEST
People v. Nunez
Gist: Accused Demetrio Nunez had carnal knowledge of his 14 yr. old daughter Janeth Nunezin
their own house one evening.
For sheer carelessness of the prosecutors in this case in ensuring that the information contains all
the essential allegations, a man who deserves no less than the supreme penalty of death for
violating his own flesh and blood gets off with the sentence of reclusion perpetua.
Complainant Janeth Nuez was born on August 30, 1981 to Demetrio Nuez and Nelia Ebay.
When her mother took on a job as domestic helper in Guam, Janeth stayed on with her father and
younger brother in Lower Cabantian, Buhangin, Davao City.
On January 17, 1996, at around 10:00 p.m., complainant was roused from her sleep and
discovered that her shorts and panties had been taken off. Her father, whom she found beside her,
touched her nipple and inserted his finger into her vagina. He also sucked her nipple.
Complainant pushed her father away, whereupon he returned to bed and complainant put on her
shorts and panties and went back to sleep. She woke up again later and saw her father on top of
her. He inserted his penis into her vagina. She pushed him aside and felt sticky fluid spill on her
thigh and vagina. When her father left, complainant just sat down and could no longer
sleep.1wphi1.nt
The following day, complainant confided the incident to her classmate and her teacher, Mrs.
Meliana Geradona, who reported the matter to the police. Complainant thereafter submitted
herself to an examination by the Medico-Legal Officer of the Davao City Health Office, Dr.
Danilo Ledesma, who found a superficial laceration on her hymen at 6:00 o'clock position.
The incident made complainant very angry at her father, so she voluntarily instituted a case
which led to the filing of the following Information with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses the above-named persons (sic) of the felony of Rape, under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act 7659, at the instance of Janeth Ebay
Nuez, whose affidavit is hereto attached to form part of this information, committed as follows:
that on or about January 17, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his daughter Janeth E. Nuez, against her will.
171
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Davao City, Philippines, January 22, 1995.
(sgd)
LOLITO O. EVANGELIO
Prosecutor I
When arraigned on January 30, 1996, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. 1 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Dr. Ledesma, 2 PO2 Raul Tonzo, 3 who arrested the accused, and
Social Welfare Assistant Milagros Basmayor 4 who interviewed complainant.
On the second hearing day, November 14, 1996, defense counsel manifested that the accused
was willing to plead guilty. After finding that the accused was making his plea voluntarily, the
court entered his plea of guilt. 5
The prosecution then presented its remaining two witnesses, Meliana D. Heradona, 6 Janeth
Nuez's teacher, and the victim herself, Janeth Nuez. 7
Following the testimony of Janeth, and the offer of its exhibits as evidence, the prosecution
rested its case.
At the hearing for the presentation of evidence for the defense, the accused, through his counsel,
manifested that he would no longer present any evidence, not even his own testimony, but would
merely submit the case for decision based on the evidence, submitted by the prosecution. 8
On January 23, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Accordingly, finding the evidence of the prosecution more than sufficient to prove the guilt of
accused, Demetrio Nuez y Dubduban of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
notwithstanding his plea of guilty of the offense charged pursuant to Rep. Act 7659, Section 11,
sub-par. 7 thereof, accused, Demetrio Nuez y Dubduban, is sentenced to suffer the supreme
penalty of death by lethal injection pursuant to Rep. Act 8176, amending Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
7659 as to the manner therein provided, subject to such method of carrying out his sentence as
may be provided for under said Rep. Act or any regulation under such other means and
procedure therein provided.
Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil
indemnity accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify complainant, Janeth Nuez, his daughter,
172
the amount of P30,000.00, by way of moral damages for all the ignominy and sufferings she
incurred out of accused demonic act of sexually abusing his own daughter.
Finally, in accordance with the automatic review of the Supreme Court of this judgment, it
appearing accused was charged of a capital offense, considered heinous crime, the Branch Clerk
of Court of this court, is ordered to at once after promulgation of this judgment to accused,
elevate the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for
review, evaluation and final appropriate action.
SO ORDERED. 10
In his Appellant's Brief, accused raised a lone assignment of error
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO FULLY DETERMINE WHETHER THE
ACCUSED FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA. 11
The records reveal that in making the plea of guilt, the accused was proceeding under the
mistaken assumption that a plea of guilt would mitigate his liability. Rather than correcting this
misconception, the trial court contributed to the mistaken belief of the accused. The records will
show the infirmity attending such plea
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
For the Prosecution, we are ready.
ATTY. TE:
Respectfully appearing for the accused.
COURT:
How many more witnesses?
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Two witnesses and we shall rest our case.
ATTY. TE:
The accused is not yet around your honor.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
173
Considering the gravity of this case in case of conviction for death in view of the qualifying
circumstance of the relationship as father and daughter.
COURT:
If he pleads guilty of the offense, . .
ATTY. TE:
I have conferred with the accused and he is asking for time.
COURT:
There is no more time.
ATTY. TE:
The accused is willing to plead guilty.
COURT:
If he pleads guilty, it could be mitigating. It is still life imprisonment. And so, whether it is life
imprisonment, we still have the prosecution to present its evidence. If he pleads guilty to
mitigating circumstance, the penalty will depend on the evidence of the prosecution.
ATTY. TE:
For humanitarian reason, we may be allowed that accused could not be sentenced to death?
COURT:
The court cannot determine the sentence. If accused will plead guilty, the court will require the
prosecution to present their evidence to determine the penalty.
ATTY. TE:
I have conferred with the accused, accused confided to this representation that he will enter or
want to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and instead enter a plea of guilty after this
representation explained to accused with regards with his re-arraignment.
COURT:
Re-arraigned the accused upon manifestation of counsel.
(Accused pleaded guilty to the information).
174
Q I will ask you this question. In your plea of guilty, did you understand that you are
pleading guilty to a capital offense?
A
Yes.
Your counsel, Atty. Te explained to you the implication of your plea of guilty?
Yes.
Q And I explain to you that when you plead guilty to a capital offense, it is either life or
death penalty?
A
Yes.
Q I am also explaining to you that consequences, you still continue your plea of guilty of
the capital offense?
A
Yes.
Q Did the court gets (sic) from you that your admission of your plea of guilty is your own
will as stated by you, as explained by the court as well as your counsel?
A
Yes.
Q Your plea of guilty is your own personal and voluntary plea without any existing force
and intimidation from anybody?
A
Yes, it is my own will.
COURT:
Since the plea of guilty of the accused as voluntarily entered with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio as well as explanation given by this court to him, entering the plea of guilty of the accused,
withdrawing his previous plea of not guilty, the court will require the prosecution to present their
evidence as required by the court.
ATTY. TE:
May we moved (sic) that the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty of accused be accepted in
favor of the accused.
COURT:
Make that of record. 12 (emphasis, Ours)
175
Evidently, both the trial court and counsel for the accused led the accused to believe that his plea
of guilt would be a mitigating circumstance in his favor. This was clearly misleading because (1)
a plea of guilty may only be considered as mitigating when seasonably interjected, that is, before
the prosecution presents its evidence; 13 and (2) the penalty of death is indivisible and is not
affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Clearly, too, the accused was not
categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his
sentence, making his re-arraignment flawed. 14
However, even if the plea of guilt of the accused was improvidently made, it does not work to
effectively vacate the finding of guilt made by the trial court. We note that at the onset, the
accused had entered a plea of not guilty but had merely changed this plea to one of guilt midway
during the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. It is a settled rule that a decision based
on an irregular plea may nevertheless be upheld where the judgment is supported by other
adequate evidence on record. 15 And such other evidence supports the finding of guilt in the
instant case.1wphi1.nt
First, We have the direct and straightforward testimony of Janeth recounting the violation of
body and spirit she suffered from her very own father. Her account of the harrowing incident is
as follows
Q
Now, on January 17, 1996, where were you?
At home.
Sometime in the evening of January 17, 1996, can you tell the court what happened?
Yes.
Tell the court what happened.
I was molested by my father.
Can you describe to the Hon. Court, how your father molested you?
Yes, sir.
Please do so.
On that night, January 17, 1996, my father told us to sleep at 10:00 p.m.
What happened next?
I mean, it was about 7:00 to 8:00 p.m., that he told us to sleep.
What happened next?
176
A When I woke up at about 10:00 p.m., on the same night, I have no more short pants
including my panty.
Q
You said, you noticed that you are undress. What else did you notice to your body?
He puddled my nipple. (sic)
Are you referring to your father?
Yes, sir.
What else did you noticed?
He inserted his finger in my vagina.
What else did your father do?
He sucked my nipple.
Aside from sucking your nipple, what else your father do?
I already pushed him aside.
After pushing him, what happened next?
He went back to where he was sleeping.
How about you, where did you go?
I put on again my panty and short.
Did you sleep again?
Yes, sir.
What happened when you sleep again?
When I woke up again, he was already on top of me.
Who was actually on top of you?
My father.
Why did you say that it was actually your father who is on top of you?
Because there was no other person in the house, except my father.
177
When your father was on top of you, what did you feel in your body, if any?
He inserted his penis to my vagina.
What made you say that he inserted his penis to your vagina?
A Because there was a hard thing that penetrate my vagina and I pushed him aside and there
was a sticky thing on my thigh and vagina.
Q
What is this sticky thing are you referring?
It was a white sticky thing.
Q You said that the penis of your father was inserted in your vagina. What is the extent of
the penis that inserted to your vagina?
A
Only a short portion of his penis.
Q When you know it was your father, who was doing that act to you that evening, what did
you do?
A
I was afraid. I was not able to sleep. I sat on the side of the room and never again sleep.
When you mean on top of you, what did you do?
I pushed him.
What was the reaction of your father when you pushed him?
He again sleep.
Because of the incident, did you report the matter to the police authorities?
The following morning, and I confided this to my classmate.
Who else did you confide with?
My teacher.
Are you referring to Mrs. Heradona?
Yes.
Q Now, because of the incident, do you recall if you have submitted for a medical
examination?
178
Yes.
Q Showing to you this medical certificate, is this the same medical certificate which was
your medical certificate issued by Dr. Ledesma?
A
Yes.
Were you interviewed by Dr. Ledesma in connection with this incident?
Yes. 16
We are inclined to give much weight to her testimony since it is a reputable precept that
testimonies of rape victims who are young or of tender age are credible. The revelation of an
innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit. Courts usually lend credence to
the testimony of a young girl especially where the facts point to her having been a victim of
sexual assault. 17 Indeed, "no woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being
subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. 18 More telling, a daughter especially of tender age, would not
accuse her own father of such a heinous crime as rape had she really not been aggrieved. 19
Janeth's credibility is strengthened by the fact that no motive was shown for her to testify falsely
against the accused, who, incidentally and unfortunately, is her own father. 20 That she lost no
time and immediately reported the rape the following day to her teacher further bolsters her
credibility. 21 Indeed, Janeth's testimony alone, which is credible, is sufficient to sustain the
conviction of her ravisher. 22
The charge of rape was adequately established not only by Janeth's straightforward testimony but
likewise by that of Dr. Danilo Ledesma who testified as follows
Q As the attending physician in this case, do you confirm all the entries in this particular
medical report Doctor?
A
Yes, sir.
Q Inviting your attention to the genital examination entry in your report Dr. which you said
among other things, that there was superficial laceration at 6:00 o'clock position, will you
explain the meaning of that findings?
A When I examine the genitals of the patient, I saw that the hymen had laceration
superficial, and healing laceration at 6:00 position, corresponding to the face of the watch.
Meaning to say, if we compare the hymen to the face of the watch, the laceration is 6:00 o'clock.
Q
As an examiner, what would have cause such laceration?
179
A As a general role, the hymen is laceration for the first time during the first sexual
intercourse. (sic)
Q In your conclusion, you said that there was a healing genital laceration, what do you
mean by that?
A
Meaning to say, when I saw the patient, the laceration was already more than 24 hours.
You are referring to the laceration mentioned in your genital examination?
Yes, sir. 23
Against these pieces of evidence, the accused had nothing to offer. He did not even testify in his
own behalf and merely submitted his case on the basis of the prosecution's evidence. The studied
silence of the accused on the evidence for the rape amounts to an admission of the sexual
congress. 24
In light of the foregoing as well as the clear, convincing and competent physical and testimonial
evidence, this Court is convinced that accused has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape.
Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by the
accused, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in criminal procedure that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made
the subject of assignment of errors or not. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent or victim.
2
When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.
When rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.
When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.
When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6.
When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
180
7.
When by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
Applying the aforesaid law, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon the accused, taking
into account the minority of Janeth as she was only fourteen (14) years old at the time of the
incident, as well as the relationship of father and daughter between the accused and the
complainant.
The penalty of death cannot be automatically imposed on the accused merely because of the trial
court's appreciation of both the fact of minority and relationship, no matter how clearly
established. Jurisprudence dictates that these twin facts be alleged in the Information or
Complaint before the death penalty can properly be imposed.
Indeed, this Court has consistently held that the seven attendant circumstances under Section 11
of RA 7659 are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating
circumstances that may be proved even if not alleged, cannot be proved as such unless alleged in
the Information. 26
Although it was established that Janeth was a minor at that time of rape, fourteen (14) years old
and a grade six student, to be exact, this qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the
Information.
In the recent case of People v. Calayca, 27 the accused was also found to have raped his 15-year
old daughter. As in the instant case, only the fact of relationship between the parties was alleged
in the Information, namely that the victim was the daughter of the accused. The fact of minority
of the victim was not. Finding the crime charged as simple rape, this Court ruled as follows
A reading of the Information for rape filed against the appellant in the present case reveals that
he is merely charged with the crime of simple rape which warrants the imposition of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of the minority of the victim is not stated in the
Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offender as the parent of
the victim. Again, as we have emphasized in People v. Ramos, the elements of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the
Information is not in its qualified from so as fall under the special qualifying circumstances
stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . . . . (emphasis copied)
Thus, there being no allegation of minority in the Information under which accused was
arraigned and tried in the case at bench, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape.
Strict application of the rule requiring the allegation of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Section 11 of R.A. 7659 was further enunciated in People v. Dimapilis. 28 While the
Information there alleged that the victim was the stepdaughter of the accused, it was not accepted
as a proper allegation of the qualifying circumstance that the accused was the "common law
spouse of the parent of the victim" and the death penalty imposed by the trial court was once
again reduced to reclusion perpetua.
181
Taking into account the growing number of cases where qualified rape under Section 11 of R.A.
7659, although proven during trial, could still not be properly penalized because of defects in the
Information, We urge the prosecuting fiscals who are charged with the responsibility of preparing
Informations to state with particularity the attendant circumstances provided for under Section 11
of R.A. 7659. More specifically, in qualified rape, both the fact of minority of the victim and the
actual relationship between the parties, as worded in R.A. 7659, must be alleged in the
Information. Otherwise, We shall continue to fail both the law and the victims whom the law
have sought to protect.
We note that the affidavit of complainant Janeth Ebay Nuez was attached to and made part of
the Information in this case. In this connection, we are constrained to lay down the rule that
documentary evidence, such as the affidavits of the witnesses, should not be attached to and
made integral parts of an information. As we have previously held, a criminal indictment should
never be formulated in a melange of accusatory allegations and evidentiary details resulting in
unusual prolixity. 29
In the light of the flaw in the Information in the case at bench, the penalty of death imposed by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. 36, 378-96 is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty which, under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, must he applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime, Thus, while relationship is aggravating in crimes against
chastity such as rape, 30 this circumstance will not affect the imposable penalty 31 since
reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty. 32 Conversely, neither may the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilt affect such single indivisible penalty.
Finally, We note that while the trial court awarded P30,000.00 to Janeth in the form of moral
damages, it failed to impose any civil indemnity for the rape committed. Such civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape and is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of its sound discretion. 33 While the amount for civil indemnity has
been raised in People v. Victor 34 from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 if the rape is committed or is
qualified by any of the circumstances which under the law would justify the imposition of the
death penalty, We are constrained to set the civil indemnity award to P50,000.00 since in this
case, the rape charged and proved is not qualified. 35
Moral damages may, nevertheless, still be awarded in favor of Janeth since it has also been
resolved that in crimes of rape, such form of damages may be additionally awarded to the victim
without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof. 36 It is assumed that the offended party
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to the award of such damages. 37
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated against the accused when a crime is attended by an
aggravating circumstance. 38 Here, such aggravating circumstance justifying an award of
exemplary damages is the relationship between the accused and his victim. 39 We follow the
award of P25,000.00 for exemplary damages set by this Court in People v. Calayca. 40
182
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction of the accused Demetrio Nuez y

Dubduban rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Davao City in Criminal Case No.
36, 378-96 is MODIFIED. The accused is hereby found guilty of simple rape and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant, Janeth E.
Nuez, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
People v. Calayca
A daughter was again allegedly raped by her own father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who
is now facing a death sentence after having been found guilty of said crime in a Decision 1 dated
June 13, 1995, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cagayan de Oro City in
Criminal Case No. 95-129.
Hence, this automatic review.
A rape charge was initiated by Neddy Calayca through a sworn complaint 2 with supporting
affidavits and documents 3 filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosecute the
appellant for the crime of rape. This was the same finding of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Misamis Oriental upon examination of the records of the preliminary investigation
forwarded to it. Consequently, on March 21, 1995, the corresponding Information 4 was filed
with the Regional Trial Court reading as follows:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II, upon sworn complaint of the offended party,
Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or
less, at Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her(sic) own daughter, Neddy Calayca,
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION OF Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, March 6, 1995.
(SGD.) ROBERTO S. CASIO
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor II
183
When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty"
to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on the testimony of 16-year old Neddy
Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of January 29,
1994, she was sound asleep inside their house at Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental
when she was awakened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was
already on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inserted his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull motion. Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his
onslaught by kicking and boxing him, telling him with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You
are a father without good
morals." 5 But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened her with a knife
saying, "I will kill you if you will not agree." 6 After the sexual assault, she picked up her
clothes, dressed up and was left weeping. She was then 15 years old when this incident
happened. 7
Neddy Calayca first thought of immediately filing a case against appellant but was prevented by
his threat to kill her. She, however, reported her awful experience with the appellant to her
relatives in Mambayaan. She informed them that even before the January 29, 1994 incident,
appellant had sexually abused her many times. Her relatives, who were also afraid of appellant,
merely advised her to sue him. She immediately went home in Solo because she feared her
father. When she reached home, her eldest sister Betty Lani Calayca also arrived from Manila.
Informed of the rape incident, Lani and Neddy decided to leave the appellant. The two then
traveled to Don Carlos, Bukidnon and worked as servants of the mayor, thinking their father
could no longer find them there. However, appellant was able to locate them. While in the house
of the mayor, appellant harassed them, so Betty Lani had him arrested by the police. 8 While
appellant was in jail, Neddy reported to the police authorities that he raped her. The police then
took her sworn statement 9 on the rape incident. Thereafter, Neddy filed her complaint for rape
against the appellant.
Betty Lani Calayca was 22 years old when she testified on May 18, 1995. She narrated that she
was the eldest and Neddy was the second among the six (6) children of appellant. Their mother
died when she was 9 and Neddy was 7. At 11, she left Balingasag for Manila where she stayed
for 10 years. While in Manila, her aunt wrote that Neddy was sexually abused by the appellant
and that she should come home. When she arrived home in Solo, she slept in the house of her
father so she could observe him. That night, the appellant came to her and touched her body, but
she quickly managed to get out of the house and stayed outdoors until morning. She then
convinced Neddy to run away from home so they could avoid appellant. They went to Bukidnon
to work, but their whereabouts was discovered by appellant, who then started to harass them.
Undaunted by the appellant's threat, the two sisters reported to the authorities what Neddy
suffered in the hands of appellant. Thus, his arrest.
The last witness for the prosecution was Dr. Angelita A. Enopia, a physician at the Balingasag
Medicare Hospital, Misamis Oriental. She declared that on January 3, 1995 she conducted a
pelvic examination 10 on the private complainant, who informed her that she was raped by her
184
own father even when she was only seven (7) years old, and the last time was in January, 1994.
Dr. Enopia noted that there were healed lacerations in the hymen of Neddy at 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9
o'clock positions. She likewise found that there was a thickening of the hymen which was
indicative of frequent sexual intercourse. 11
Appellant Artemio Calayca, on the other hand, did not deny the imputation of her daughter
Neddy Calayca that he raped her in the early morning of January 29, 1994. All that he testified to
was that he was a widower in 1998 and has six (6) children by his late wife, two of whom he
identified as Neddy, the private complainant, and Betty Lani. He claimed that Neddy was only
nine (9) years old when his wife died. The private complainant stayed with him together with his
five other children, while Betty Lani stayed with his (appellant's) brother at San Juan, Misamis
Oriental. Betty Lani and Neddy left his house on August 19, 1993. They took his savings from
the proceeds of the sale of his pig in the amount of P5,000.00. He then looked for his two
daughters and found them at Bocboc, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. When he asked them why they
took his money, his two daughters did not say a word, forcing him to slap them. 12
The defense did not present any other witness nor any documentary evidence.
A judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty of
death was rendered by the trial court in a Decision dated June 13, 1995, the decretal portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ARTEMIO
CALAYCA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the offense of rape defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
7659. Consequently, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death, the private
offended party being below 18 years of age (as she was 15 years of age at the time of the
incident) and the accused being her parent, the same to be executed by electrocution as the
facilities for gas poisoning is not yet provided by the Bureau of Prisons. In addition, accused is
hereby ordered to pay the private offended party, Neddy Calayca, the sum of P50,000.00.
In view of the penalty imposed, let the whole record of the case be forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court, Manila for automatic review. In addition, let the living body of the accused be
committed to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant now assails the judgment of conviction claiming that
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT DESPITE ITS GLARING INCONSISTENCIES.
II
185
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 13
Appellant hammers on the alleged inconsistencies in private complainant's testimony regarding
the frequency of the commission of rape by appellant against her and the kind of weapon he used
in forcing her to succumb to his bestial lust. More specifically, appellant pointed out that private
complainant, at one instance, testified that he raped her for the first time on January 29, 1994, 14
and yet, she later declared that she was raped by him several times even before that date.
Appellant further claims that private complainant likewise testified that he threatened her with a
bolo when she tried to resist his bestial act on January 29, 1994, 15 but afterward she stated that
it was a knife which appellant used to threaten her. 16
These contradictory declarations by private complainant, appellant argues, "only cast doubts on
her claim that she was raped by her father on January 29, 1994. 17
Appellant's contention fails to persuade us.
We have ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be
expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating
and so painful as rape. 18 Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress, rather
than weaken, her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not contrived. 19
The alleged conflicting statements of private complainant is more imagined than real. Private
complainant has made it clear in her testimony that even before the rape incident on January 29,
1994, appellant had raped her several times. Thus, she testified:
Q Did you inform them (private complainant's relatives) that your father will kill you if you
will inform them?
A
Yes.
What was their reaction?
When I told them that my father raped me several times, they feel bad.
COURT
Before January 29, 1994 your father used to have sexual intercourse with you?
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. FELICIA
What was the comment of your relatives when you told them that you were raped by your father
several times?
186
They commended that my father is a pig. 20 [emphasis supplied]
But whether the rape committed on January 29, 1994 was the first or just one in the series of
rapes is, to our mind, immaterial in the prosecution of appellant for the rape he committed on
said date, although this particular telling circumstance of habitual sexual abuse convincingly
shows the appellant's perversity to commit the crime of rape.
Also, the seeming confusion by private complainant on the kind of weapon used by appellant to
threaten her does not belie the fact of the commission of rape by him against her on January 29,
1994. Moreover, when the trial court clarified with private complainant what exactly was the
weapon used by appellant, she made a definite declaration that it was a knife, not a bolo, thereby
removing any confusion as to this matter, to wit:
FISCAL KHO
Q
After you saw the knife that your father was holding, what did you feel?
I was afraid.
COURT
Q
We will clarify, was it a bolo or a knife?
A knife.
Not a bolo?
No, sir.
FISCAL KHO
Q
How long is that knife?
About this long (witness demonstrated, counsels agreed to a 6 to 8 inches in length).
With that length, does that include the handle?
Yes, including the handle. 21 [emphasis supplied]
The inaccuracy in private complainant's description of the weapon used is insignificant and
understandable. To a young and naive girl, there is not much difference between a bolo and a
knife since both weapons are sharp and deadly. What is important to consider is that the weapon
was effectively used by appellant to intimidate private complainant into submission to his
dastardly act.
187
Notwithstanding these minor flaws in the testimony of private complainant, the latter remained
consistent and firm in her denunciation of appellant, her very own father, as the person who
sexually abused her on January 29, 1994. The records bear this out as she testified as follows:
Private complainant on direct examination:
Q In what specific place at Solo, San Juan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental where you were
situated on January 29, 1994?
A
Inside the house.
At about 1:00 at dawn, more or less, were you still in your house?
I was asleep inside our house.
When you were asleep inside the house, was there any unusual incident?
Yes, sir.
Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what it was all about?
My father placed himself on top of me and made a push and pull motion.
Was he dressed or naked?
He was naked.
How about you at that time?
He undressed me.
What did you do, when your father made sexual intercourse with you?
ATTY. FELICIA
No basis, Your Honor.
FISCAL KHO
I will reform the question, Your Honor.
Q You said that your father undressed you and he placed himself on top of you and made a
push and pull motion, was there anything that happened to you.
A
Yes, there was.
188
And, you please tell the Court what it was all about?
It was painful.
Why is it that you felt a pain?
Because he made a push and pull motion.
What particular part of your body was painful?
My vagina.
Why what happened to your vagina?
It was inserted.
What was inserted?
A penis.
The penis of whom that inserted your vagina?
Of my father.
Is your father around in Court?
Yes, sir.
Will you please point on him?
A Yes, sir, he is there. (witness pointing to a man, and upon asked of his name responded
that he is ARTEMIO CALAYCA).
Q
What did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?
I was lying down.
Did you agree that your father will have a sexual intercourse with you?
I did not agree but I just followed him because he had a bolo with him
What did he do with the bolo?
He would hacked me if I will not agree.
xxx
xxx
xxx
189
COURT
Q
How old have you been at that time?
15 years old. 22
The victim's brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was raped by appellant
bears the earmarks of a credible witness. 23
Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Enopia, the examining physician, corroborated private complainant's
claim that she was sexually abused. Dr. Enopio's declaration that she found healed lacerations on
the victim's hymen at 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 o'clock positions and that there was a thickening of her
hymen, simply indicated a frequent coitus.
In his brief, appellant further made a vain attempt to impute ill-motive on the part of private
complainant to falsely charge him with rape. Appellant suggested that private complainant had
an axe to grind against him for having allegedly slapped her and her an axe sister Betty Lani
when he discovered that they took his savings of P5,000.00 which was the proceeds of the sale of
his pig. This alleged incidents, appellants argues, should have deserved credence as this was not
rebutted by the prosecution.
We do not agree.
This supposed ill-motive of private complainant was not duly established by the defense. Hence,
there was nothing for the prosecution to rebut. The elementary in the rules of evidence is that an
affirmative allegation made by a party must be duly proved to merit acceptance by the court.
Besides, this posture of appellant was correctly rejected by the trial court when it ruled
that
. . . . Although, this allegation was not rebutted as the trial prosecutor did not present again
Neddy Calayca as a rebuttal witness, to the mind of the court, the fact of slapping is not enough
reason on the part of private offended party to file such heinous case as rape against her own
father. If it were true that Neddy Calayca got his money without his permission, she would not be
slighted if slapped knowing that she got it and deserved such punishment. This is in accord with
human experience. 24
We believe that a teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape charge against anybody,
much less her own father, if it were not true. 25 For, it is unnatural for a young and innocent girl
to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private part, and thereafter subject
herself to a public trial if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a
sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. 26 The alleged slapping by apellant
on private complainant over money in the amount of merely P5,000.00 is too frail a reason for a
teenage daughter to falsely charge her own father with the heinous crime of rape that is
punishable by death.
190
It is significant to note that, as likewise emphasized by the trial court, appellant did not deny the
imputation of private complainant that he raped her on January 29, 1994 at his house in Solo,
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. 27 His silence on the evidence of rape against him is a mute but
eloquent admission of the crime charged. 28
We, therefore, affirm the finding of the trial court that the charge of rape against appellant has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
However, while we agree that the penalty of death should be imposed on him, regrettably this is
not in accord with the law and jurisprudence.
Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by the
appellant, nevertheless, it is a well-established rule in criminal procedure that an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of the
appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made
the subject if assignment of errors or not. 29
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellant because of the presence of the
circumstances of minority of the victim she was only 15 years old at the time she was raped on
January 29, 1994) as well as the relationship of the offender (father) and the victim (daughter),
pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 30 which amended Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. 31 Section 11 of R.A. 7659 reads:
Sec. 11.
Article 335 of the crime Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 335.
When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
1.
2.
3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more
persions the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion hereof, the penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion of thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
191
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eighten (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, asendent,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.
When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.
When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or
other relatives within the third degree of consaguinity.
4.
When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.
When the offender know that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) desease.
6.
When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.
When by reason on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation [emphasis supplied].
The above-quoted Section 11 provides, inter alia, that where the victim of the crime of rape is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent of the victim, the death penalty shall
be imposed. This is among the seven (7) circumstances enumerated in Section 11 which, as we
have held in the recent case of People v. Garcia, 32 are considered special circumstances
specifically applicable to the crime of rape. In Garcia, this Court en banc, speaking through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, 33 declared that "although the crime is still denominated as rape,
such (enumerated) circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a
qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death. 34 We reiterated this ruling in
subsequent en banc cases of People v. Ramos, 35 People v. Leopoldo Ilao 36 and People v. Omar
Medina, 37 with further pronouncement that these seven new attendant circumstances introduced
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 "partake of the nature of Qualifying circumstances and not
merely aggravating circumstances," since the said qualifying circumstances are punishable by
the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death. A qualifying
circumstances increases it to a higher while an aggravating circumstance affects only the period
of the penalty but does not increase it to a higher degree. 38
In the aforecited case of People v. Ramos, we explained that:
While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by
any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court
192
has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or
without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of
Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion
perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship
and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstances.
(Emphasis supplied)
A reading of the Information for rape filed against appellant in the present case reveals that he is
merely charged with the crime of simple rape which warrants the imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of the monitory of the victim, is not stated in the
Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offender as the parent of
the victim. Again, as we have emphasized in People v. Ramos, the elements of minority of the
victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. As such, the charge of rape in the
Information is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special qualifying circumstances
stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. Thus, the penalty of death prescribed in R.A. 7659 should not
have been imposed against appellant. In the aforecited case of People v. Garcia, we ruled:
. . ., it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating
circumstances (People v. Collado, 60 Phil. [1934]; People Jovellano, et al., 56 SCRA 156 [1974];
People v. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289 [1994]; People v. Rodico, et al., 249 SCRA 309 [1995], since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded (U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People v.
Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People v. de Guzman, 164 SCRA 215 [1988]). Indeed, it would
be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstances qualifying the
offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he
was arraigned.
Recapitulating, the information filed against the appellant charged only the felony of simple rape
and no attendant qualifying circumstances, specifically that of his being supposedly a guardian of
the victim, was alleged. On this additional consideration, he cannot, therefore, be punished with
the penalty of death even assuming arguendo that he is such a guardian. Neither can that fact be
considered to aggravate his liability as the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63, Revised Penal Code).
. . . . He must, . . . , be further held liable for the corresponding indemnity to the victim, as well
as exemplary damages for each count of rape (People v. Villanueva, 254 SCRA 202 [1996])."
(emphasis supplied)
There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information under which the
appellant was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly
informed that he is being accused of qualified
rape. 39 Appellant's conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. 40 In a criminal prosecution, it is the
193
fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the Information.
The main purpose of this constitutional requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare
his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. 41
Adopting our pronouncement in the aforecited cases of People v. Garcia and People v. Ramos,
the failure to allege the fact of minority of the victim in the Information for rape is fatal and
consequently bars the imposition of the death penalty. Having been informed only of the
elements of simple rape, the appellant can be convicted only of such crime and be punished
accordingly with reclusion perpetua. 42
As regards the P50,000.00 which the trial court ordered the appellant's to pay the private
complainant, the assailed judgment does not specify what this amount is intended for. We
believe, however, that the said amount is for payment of indemnity, which we find to be proper.
In the recent case of People v. Prades, 43 it was ruled that the award of moral damages to the
victim is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as basis therefor. The
circumstances of relationship between the offender and the victim as an aggravating
circumstances becomes necessary in the matter of awarding civil damages. 44 Thus, we find the
appellant liable for P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as axemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant ARTEMIO CALAYCA of
qualified rape is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is declared guilty of simple rape and his
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Neddy Calayca the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
People v. Bonaagua
Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133 convicting him with three (3) counts of Statutory Rape under
Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610) and Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A.
No. 7610.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las
Pias City with four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, as
amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610, for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of
his minor daughter, AAA.2
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0254 against Ireno reads:
That on or about the month of December 1998 in the City of Las Pias and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse of influence and
194
moral ascendancy, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously insert his tongue and finger into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a
minor then eight (8) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority of
the private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8) years of age and relationship of the
said private offended party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y Berce, the latter being the
biological father of the former.3
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-02554 has the same accusatory allegations while the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 03-02565 and Criminal Case Nos. 03-02576 are similarly
worded, except for the date of the commission of the crime and the age of AAA, which are
December 2000 and ten (10) years old, respectively.
The cases were later consolidated7 and upon his arraignment, Ireno pleaded not guilty to the four
(4) counts of rape with which he was charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, AAA; the victims mother;
and Dr. Melissa De Leon. The defense, on the other hand, presented the lone testimony of the
accused as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and her mother left their house in Candelaria,
Quezon to spend the Christmas with accused-appellant in Las Pias City. They stayed in the
house of a certain Lola Jean, the godmother in the wedding of her parents, at Sta. Cecilia
Subdivision, Las Pias City.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while her younger brothers were playing
outside the house and her mother was not home. Accused-appellant entered the room. He
approached her, rolled her shirt upward, and removed her shorts and panty. She tried to resist by
putting her clothes back on, but her fathers strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
touched and caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina then inserted his finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant raped AAA again in the same manner and
under the same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that she was raped because accusedappellant threatened to kill her mother by placing the latters body in a drum and have it
cemented if she would report the incidents. She returned to Quezon with her mother before the
end of the Christmas season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-appellant for the third time when he went to
Candelaria, Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent the Yuletide season with
accused-appellant in Pulanglupa, Las Pias City. In a single day, AAA was raped for the fourth
and fifth time. While spending the afternoon inside her fathers room at the car-wash station, he
removed her shorts and panty then proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina.
195
Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report
these incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and cemented inside a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe abdominal pain which prompted her mother to
take her to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was transferred to the Quezon Memorial
Hospital in Lucena City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her a physical examination.
The results revealed that there was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 oclock position on the
hymen of AAA. This medical finding forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of
rape committed by accused-appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAAs mother took her to the Police Headquarters of
Sariaya, Quezon to file a complaint for rape against accused-appellant. AAAs mother also took
her to the office of the National Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she executed a
sworn statement against accused-appellant.8
Evidence for the Defense
Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of rape hurled against him. He claimed to be
working in Las Pias City while AAA, her mother and siblings where (sic) in Sariaya, Quezon at
the time the alleged rapes occurred. While he admitted that there were times when AAA and her
mother would visit him in Las Pias City, he nonetheless averred that they would leave on the
same day they arrived after he gives them money.
Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges of rape against him were fabricated by AAAs
mother, who suspected him of having an affair with another woman in Las Pias City.9
On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after finding the evidence for the
prosecution overwhelming against the accuseds defense of denial and alibi, rendered a
Decision10 convicting Ireno with four (4) counts of Rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused
IRENO BONAAGUA, has committed four (4) counts of RAPE under par. 2 of Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to R.A. 7610, as charged, the Court hereby
pronounced him GUILTY and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
for each case and to pay private complainant [AAA], the amount of Php50,000 for each case, or
a total of Php200,000, by way of civil indemnity plus Php50,000 for each case or a total of
Php200,000 as moral damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.11
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA, which appeal was later docketed as CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133.
196
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision12 affirming the decision of the RTC with
modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257,
and finding Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, instead
of Rape, in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0255, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254, finding
Ireno Bonaagua y Berce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257 and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in each case, apart from the civil indemnity and moral
damages that have already been awarded by the trial court;
2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with relationship as an aggravating circumstance.
He is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods and ordered to
pay AAA the amount of PhP15,000 as moral damages and a fine of PhP15,000.00.
SO ORDERED.13
In fine, the CA found Irenos defense of denial and alibi inherently weak against the positive
identification of AAA that he was the culprit of the horrid deed. Thus, aside from modifying the
imposable penalty in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC finding Ireno guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, the CA only found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The CA opined that since the prosecution failed to establish the act of
insertion by Ireno of his finger into the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of Acts
of Lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily included in the Information filed against him in
Criminal Case No. 03-0255.
Ireno now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution14 dated December 16, 2009, the Court informed the parties that they may file
their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. In their respective Manifestations,15 the
parties waived the filing of their supplemental briefs and, instead, adopted their respective briefs
filed before the CA.
Hence, Ireno raises the lone error:
I
197
The COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE
HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.16
Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA was replete with inconsistencies and was
extremely unbelievable. Ireno insists that the allegation that he inserted his tongue and finger
into the genital of AAA was manifestly incredible as the deed is physiologically impossible.
Moreover, the medical findings are grossly inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped, since it
only established that there was only one healed superficial laceration.
This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno untenable. To determine the innocence
or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove,
it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.17
After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the prosecution has indubitably established that
Ireno was the one who sexually assaulted her. AAA categorically narrated that Ireno sexually
abused her on several occasions and even threatened AAA that he would kill her mother if she
would report the incidents.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in rape cases, the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose
conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge had the direct
opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the truth or not.
Generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the trial courts assessment in this regard,
absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts of
substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion.18
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the offended parties are young and immature
girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired,
considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which
they would be exposed if the matter about which they testified were not true.19 A young girl
would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished and her
honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble and
inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her.20 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly
held that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction.21
198
Moreover, contrary to Irenos contention, the medical findings of Dr. Melissa De Leon did not
refute AAAs testimony of defilement, but instead bolstered her claim. The RTC correctly
concluded:
It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to the witness stand to substantiate the same
medical certification, did not rule out the possibility that the laceration might have been inflicted
through some other causes and that there could have been only one instance of finger insertion
into the vagina of private complainant. However, it is equally true that Dr. De Leon also did not
rule out the possibility that finger insertion might have been the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12,
TSN, January 31, 2006). Dr. De Leon also clarified that only one laceration may be inflicted
although a finger is inserted into the vagina on separate instances (pp. 19-26, supra). According
to Dr. De Leon, this instance depends on the force exerted into the vagina and on whether or not
the hymen is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated and so
when a force is exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. A thick and
firm hymen is not easily lacerated and so a force exerted into it on several occasions may cause
only one laceration. Private complainant has thick and firm hymen and this may explain why
there is only (sic) laceration on her hymen although she claimed her father inserted into her
vagina his finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra).
This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is nonetheless understandable because Dr. De Leon
has no personal knowledge of what actually happened to private complainant that she
(complainant) suffered hymenal laceration. However, there is one thing very certain though in
the testimony of Dr. De Leon that she medically examined [AAA], herein private complainant,
because of the information that [AAA] was sexually abused by her [AAAs] own father (pp. 5-6,
supra). And indeed, as already discussed lengthily above, there is no reason to doubt the veracity
of AAAs allegation.22
The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to wit:
While the medico-legal findings showed a single healed superficial laceration on the hymen of
AAA, Dr. De Leon clarified that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain only one laceration
despite the fact that a finger had been inserted into the vagina on several accounts. This situation
may arise depending on the force extended into the vagina and on whether or not the hymen of
the victim is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated; thus,
when a force is exerted into it on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. On the other
hand, a thick and firm hymen is not easily lacerated; a force exerted into it on several occasions
may cause only one laceration. According to Dr. De Leon, AAA has thick and firm hymen and
this may explain why it has only one laceration despite her claim that accused-appellant inserted
his finger inside her vagina several times.23
Even Irenos contention that the charges against him were merely fabricated by his wife because
she suspects that he is having an affair with another woman deserves scant consideration. Aside
from the fact that the said allegation was not proved, it must be emphasized that no member of a
rape victims family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor to the
family unless the crime was in fact committed, especially in this case where the victim and the
199
offender are relatives.24 It is unnatural for a mother to use her daughter as an engine of malice,
especially if it will subject her child to embarrassment and lifelong stigma.25
Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of Desistance stating that AAA and her mother
are no longer interested in pursuing the case filed against him.
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against persons.26
Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be prosecuted,
except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party of the
offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offenders criminal liability. Moreover, an
Affidavit of Desistance even when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile "private crime" of
rape is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have already been
instituted. To justify the dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have been made prior to
the institution of the criminal actions.27 As correctly concluded by the CA, the said affidavit was
executed in connection with another accusation of rape which Ireno committed against AAA in
Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape subject of this appeal. In addition, AAAs
mother testified that she executed the said affidavit to regain custody of her children who were
brought to Bicol by Irenos siblings.28
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance. As
cited in People v. Alcazar,29 the rationale for this was extensively discussed in People v.
Junio:30
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon
with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by
the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having the [appellant]
arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in
open court by recounting her anguish, [the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare
that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or
warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given
probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of
justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule [would] make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.31
Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno offered nothing but his bare denial of the
accusations against him and that he was someplace else when the dastardly acts were committed.
No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for
it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.32 It
has been consistently held that denial and alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases.
Denial could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As
200
between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare
denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.33 All said, as found by the CA, the
prosecution has convincingly proved and more than sufficiently established that: (1) Ireno
committed the accusations of Rape Through Sexual Assault against AAA in Criminal Cases Nos.
03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257; (2) that AAA was a minor when Ireno committed the sexual
assault against her;34 and (3) that Ireno was the biological father of AAA.35
Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the
purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case
open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the
judgment appealed from.36 Since the CA found Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 instead of rape, the Court should
thus determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish that
the intentional touching of the victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct and whether the CA
imposed the appropriate penalties.
As aptly found by the CA:
A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, however, shows that accusedappellant cannot be held guilty as charged for the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 03-0255.
The prosecution failed to establish insertion by accused-appellant of his finger into the vagina of
AAA, who testified on direct examination that accused-appellant "touched my private part and
licked it but he did not insert his finger inside my vagina." In fact, even the trial court asked
AAA if accused-appellant inserted his finger inside her vagina. She answered in the negative and
averred that he licked her vagina and touched her breasts. In reply to the prosecutions query if
accused-appellant did anything else aside from licking her organ, she said he also touched it.
During cross-examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant "merely touched her vagina but
did not insert his finger."37
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and penalizes acts of lasciviousness
committed against a child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -- Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.38
201
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation
where a child is abused for profit, but also where one through coercion, intimidation or
influence engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child.39
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse
through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for
sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.40
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.41
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610
must be established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.42
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations43 of R.A. No. 7610 defines "Lascivious
conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.44
202
Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in Criminal Case No. 03-0255. Ireno
committed lascivious acts against AAA by touching her breasts and licking her vagina and the
lascivious or lewd acts were committed against AAA, who was 8 years old at the time as
established by her birth certificate.45 Thus, the CA correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.1avvphi1
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration
of the male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina
already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches
the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime
of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the
victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger
in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it
cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity
with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the
statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.
Penalties and Award of Damages
Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape Through Sexual Assault in Criminal
Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 and Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 030255, We shall proceed to determine the appropriate penalties imposable for each offense.
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by sexual assault is reclusion temporal "if
the rape is committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this
article."46 In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, the aggravating/qualifying
circumstance of minority and relationship are present, considering that the rape was committed
by a parent against his minor child. Reclusion temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall
be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship which have been taken into account to raise the
penalty to reclusion temporal,47 no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven.
Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period,48 or fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.49 Thus, Ireno should be meted the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
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It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning expounded by the Court in the recent case of
People v. Armando Chingh y Parcia,50 for imposing upon the accused the higher penalty
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no application in the case at bar. In
the said case, the Court, acknowledging the fact that to impose the lesser penalty would be unfair
to the child victim, meted upon the accused the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period as provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, instead of the lesser
penalty of prision mayor prescribed by Article 266-B for rape by sexual assault under paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court elucidated:
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under Art. 266-A,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual
Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor,
considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armandos act of
inserting his finger in VVVs private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under
Art. 366 in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual
Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child
victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed
the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of
RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are
children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."
In the present case, the factual milieu was different since the offender, Ireno, is the father of the
minor victim. Hence, the offenses were committed with the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship, attendant circumstances which were not present in
the Chingh case, which in turn, warrants the imposition of the higher penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of the RPC. Considering that the RPC already prescribes
such penalty, the rationale of unfairness to the child victim that Chingh wanted to correct is
absent. Hence, there is no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by R.A. No. 7610.
As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00 and moral damages, also in the amount of P50,000.00, for each count of Rape must
be both reduced to P30,000.00, respectively, in line with current jurisprudence.51 Also, the
amount of exemplary damages awarded in the amount of P25,000.00 must be increased to
P30,000.00 for each count of Rape.52
Criminal Case No. 03-0255
204
It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was committed by Ireno, AAA was only eight (8)
years old. Hence, the provisions of R.A. No. 7610, or The Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, should be applied.
Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. As the crime was
committed by the father of the offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship should
be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating.53 Therefore, Ireno should be meted the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years,
five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages and a fine in the amount of
P15,000.00, is proper in line with current jurisprudence.54 However, civil indemnity ex delicto
in the amount of P20,000.00 should also be awarded.55 In view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages
should likewise be awarded.56
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03133, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for
each count. He is likewise ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of
Qualified Rape Through Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is meted to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he is likewise ordered to pay
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
People v. Jumawan (MARITAL RAPE)
Facts: Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan and his wife, KKK, were married on October 18,
1975. They lived together since then and raised their 4 children6as they put up several businesses
over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2,
Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant
boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
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On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC. The prosecution's theory
was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together
with pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the
laborers. They got married after a year of courtship. When their first child, MMM, was born,
KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store. Later on, they engaged in several other
businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the rice
mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted
employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally
driving one of the trucks to haul goods.
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's
dedication. Even the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents. He would
drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the businesses.
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accusedappellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course,
responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed.
He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her
vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would
resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she
failed to attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a
bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in the house and
only good in bed" She disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of providing a good future
for the children.
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their
nightly routine. The family store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper
was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the
house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the living room. OOO
and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her
to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did
not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "Why are you lying on the cot?", and
to instantaneously order: "You transfer here to our bed."
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to
her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from
the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.
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The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate
with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs
on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting:
"Don 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well." With a concrete wall on one side and a mere
wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom, KKK's pleas were audible in the
children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity
on me," MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room. MMM hurriedly
climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why
is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and shirt,
partly opened the door and said: "Don 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing
it again. Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition,
knocked at the bedroom door again, and then kicked it. A furious accused-appellant opened the
door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because this is
family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly
entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking
her father: "Pa, what happened to Mama, why is it that her underwear is torn?"
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in
order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her torn underwear and covered
herself with a blanket. However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To prevent KKK
from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm towards the knob.
He commanded KKK to "Stay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded:
"Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to
get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way
out.
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.
KKK relayed: "Your father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not
feeling well." The girls then locked the door and let her rest."
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store
on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join
them since, according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a short while,
KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to
spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the
accused-appellant entered.
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"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children?", he asked KKK, who responded that she
preferred to sleep with the children. He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me,
anyway, there are women that could be paid P1,000." She dismissed his comment by turning her
head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.
He returned 15 minutes later and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated.
He lifted her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will
you sleep here? Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short pants
causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama because
we are in front of you."
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven
in front of you, I can have sex of your mother because I'm the head of the family." He then
ordered his daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase
where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled
KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "Don 't do that to me, my body is
still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot
withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her
and forced himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and
briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "Its nice, that is
what you deserve because you are a flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters'
bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but
found the door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the
doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO found their
mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to
you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "Your father is a beast and animal, he again forced me
to have sex with him even if I don't feel well.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not rape may be committed by the husband against the wife
Held: Yes. Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual
violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its accompanying
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
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consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without her
full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their
relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and
not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in
order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step
in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a
husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage
in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
People v. Jalosjos
This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and
unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may
be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on
human dignity. No legal system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic
consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.1
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral
depravity, when committed against a minor.2
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution.3
In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious
evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below
twelve (12) years of age. As narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and
repulsive. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as
a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by
several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most
209
unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted by
the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much that they knowingly reelected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.
Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old
commercial sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words
of accused-appellant, "he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image
transmogrified into that of a dastardly, ogre, out to get his slimy hands on innocent and nave
girls to satiate his lustful desires."4 This Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accusedappellants claim that he suffered "invidiously discriminatory treatment." Regarding the above
allegation, the Court has ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the case did not
result in a mistrial; the records show that the accused had ample and free opportunity to adduce
his defenses.
This is an appeal from the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos of two
(2) counts of statutory rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 961992, and 96-1993, for six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also
known as the Child Abuse Law.
There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 961997, and 96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the charges of acts of
lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for
acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The
accusatory portion of said informations for the crime of statutory rape state:
In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:
210
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of RAPE defined and
penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn
Delantar against her will, with damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
For acts of lasciviousness, the informations8 under which accused-appellant was convicted were
identical except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996; June 15, 1996; June 16,
1996; June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:
The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year old minor
ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the crime of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
committed as follows:
That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati
City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress
and fondle said complainant's face, lips, neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her nipples
and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina, place himself on top of her, then insert
his penis in between her thighs until ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct against her
will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the
different dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00, P5,000.00 and P5,000.00
respectively.
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the
trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution presented eight (8)
main witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as
Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive of submarkings. The defense, on the other hand presented twentysix (26) witnesses. Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of
submarkings. The records of the case are extremely voluminous.
The Peoples version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:
Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and
almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay City under the care
211
of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose ostensible source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting
boarders at his house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.
Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who was
also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and smooth-complexioned
Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along
with Simplicio whenever he delivered prostitutes to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was
offered by Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun
her ordeal as one of the girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.
Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office
located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought there and introduced by a
talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn
become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn, accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio
answered, "10. She is going to be 11 on May 11." Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows
how to sing. Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me."
Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the midthighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant
further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody answered, accused-appellant
cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help
Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and
"Eat Bulaga."
Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyns movie career.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and that the latter would
have to live with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went
home, accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.
The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room
1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio discussed the contract and his
plan to finance Rosilyns studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn,
Shandro and Simplicio left.
The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her
acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyns contract to his lawyer, who
was also present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards
the elevator, accused-appellant approached them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.
On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accusedappellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came out of his bedroom,
Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside.
After a while, accused-appellant entered the bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He
walked towards Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in
and bid her goodbye. Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which
Simplicio replied, "Halik lang naman."
212
Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant
came in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-shirt on which was printed
the word, "Dakak." In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he
wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it
herself, but accused-appellant answered, "Daddy mo naman ako." Accused-appellant then took
off Rosilyns blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, "Huwag
po." Again, accused-appellant told her, "After all, I am your Daddy." Accused-appellant then
removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt.
The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the
lamp and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then raised her shirt,
touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, "Tama
na po." Accused-appellant stopped. He continued to kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later,
accused-appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.
The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over
and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the bathroom. He removed
Rosilyns shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns
body, he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her
body, dried her with a towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and
told her to dress up. Rosilyn put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accusedappellant took a shower.
Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When
accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed her panties and placed her
legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn
P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the
Ritz Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to
Simplicio what accused-appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the
Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not
have sexual intercourse with her.
That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the
Ritz Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed Rosilyns clothes and dressed her
with the same long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat
beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her
breasts, and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own
clothes, placed his penis between Rosilyns thighs and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated
on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her and told her to sleep.
The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he
rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her body and dried her hair.
While accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed
her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate
breakfast. He gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium
213
unit. On their way home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis
into her vagina, she should refuse.
At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They found
accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told Rosilyn to approach accusedappellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with a long
T-shirt on which was printed a picture of accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption,
"Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy." They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay
beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs. He positioned
himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held his penis, and poked and
pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ.
Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to sleep.
When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer
around but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she had felt somebody
touching her private parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath,
then went off to school with Simplicio, who arrived to fetch her.
The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00
oclock in the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant stripped her naked
and again put on her the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while,
accused-appellant knelt beside Rosilyn, raised her shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his
finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting
motions until he ejaculated. Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.
The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her
and fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to sleep. When she woke
up, she found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio
Delantar, when the latter came to pick her up.
On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant
took photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled down thereby exposing
her breasts. He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without
showing her pubis, and finally, while straddled on a chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.
Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and found the P5,000.00 left by
accused-appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody
caressing her breasts and sex organ.
On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to
wait for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He again dressed her with
the long white shirt similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant
kissed her lips and inserted his tongue into her mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted
his finger into her vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to
sleep.
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The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled her
breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and shoved his hand away. After
bathing her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon
as Simplicio arrived, Rosilyn gave her the money and then they left for school.
On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was
waiting in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes, including her panties, and dressed her
with a long T-shirt similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant
kissed Rosilyn on the lips, inserted his tongue in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he
made Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He
inserted his finger in her vagina and mounted himself between her legs with his hands rested on
her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed and pressed his penis against her vagina.
Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accusedappellant told her to sleep.
In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did
not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the table, and she gave this to
Simplicio when he came to fetch her.
On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m.
Accused-appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that evening. The two
did not return.
The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their
boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she executed a sworn
statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against
accused-appellant.
On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The
examination yielded the following results:
EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish
brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and
soft
GENITAL
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic,
fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed
laceration at 8 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the
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introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal
is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.9
During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was
his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at accused-appellants
Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the province
on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have been sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges
against him to a small group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his
political opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined
to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.
More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine
Airlines (PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in Dipolog until June 18,
1996. He submitted in evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,10 showing that he was on board
Flight PR 165; the said flights passengers manifest,11 where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR
appears; and photographs showing accused-appellants constituents welcoming his arrival and
showing accused-appellant talking with former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal
Empainado.
Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from
Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer. Upon arrival and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence
known as "Barangay House" in Taguinon, Dapitan, near Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night
there.
On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in the
house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together with some friends, he visited
the Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the
"Barangay House" in Taguilon.
On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his
political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the afternoon. In the evening, he
went home and slept in the "Barangay House."
On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in the
"Barangay House."
On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The
blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo Laput.
216
On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering District of Dapitan
City. After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon, Dapitan City.
He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an
instance when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a conference called by the
President of the Philippines.
Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL
from Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private plane to Dipolog, where
he stayed until the President of the Philippines arrived.
To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and
not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These occurred once during the
first week of May 1996, at accused-appellants Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio
Delantar were introduced to him by Eduardo Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he
interviewed Rosilyn, and later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of
Rosilyn into the show business.
Dominadors admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to
interviewing her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His testimony made no
mention of any sexual encounter with Rosilyn.
After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in the two (2)
counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He
is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases.
2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.
2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases.
3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y
GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the
Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;
4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:
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4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum;
4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the cases;
5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the
prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO
JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of
reasonable doubt, the accused in these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE WHEN THE
CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.
E.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED
AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.13
In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with
utmost caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no less than moral
218
certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and is not allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the
rape victim herself that is actually put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on
destroying the veracity of private complainants testimony, the errors assigned by accusedappellant, particularly the first three, are focused on the issue of credibility.
Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 961995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness. According to him, the fact that
the trial court sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted
her stories and the rest of her testimony ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accusedappellant urges the application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in part,
false in everything).14
The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law
and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.15 Thus, in People v. Yanson-Dumancas,16
citing People v. Li Bun Juan,17 this Court held that:
... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with
respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G.
No. 7, pp. 3222-3223, the following was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1
Moore on Facts, p. 23:
"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are not bound to
believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject
other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the
truth Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material
particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but
may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief." (p. 945)18
Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's
assignment of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be given credence.
Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the
assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is best made by the trial court because of its untrammeled
opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.
On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:
Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not believe Rosilyn
when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape victims especially those who are young
and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that
"no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).
219
When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate spontaneously in
detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this regard was firm, candid, clear and
straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and rigid cross-examination
made by the defense counsel.19
Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and
lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even idiotic answers of Rosilyn on
cross and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, "Ano
po?", "Parang po," "Medyo po," and "Sa tingin ko po."
Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent on the fact of rape and
lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and
natural words customary of children of her age. The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant
as uttered by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of
child witnesses like her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may
have given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and peripheral details which do
not in any way detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested
and subjected to lascivious conduct by accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind
that even the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times,
far from eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of
veracity.20
Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the
five (5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the interviews and case study
conducted by the representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the
following documents:
(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros A. Carrasco
of the Pasay City Police;
(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI Agents Cynthia
L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;
(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;
(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.
It must be stressed that "rape" is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which
could not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the assistance of a lawyer, who
could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits
and consequently disclose with proficient exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that
under the contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present
case where there was no exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of
220
the victims vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably do, that
there must be the fullest penetration of the victims vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.
In People v. Campuhan,21 we ruled that rape is consummated "by the slightest penetration of
the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis." There need
not be full and complete penetration of the victims vagina for rape to be consummated.
There being no showing that the foregoing technicalities of rape was fully explained to
Rosilyn on all those occasions that she was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and
DSWD social workers, she could not therefore be expected to intelligibly declare that
accused-appellants act of pressing his sex organ against her labia without full entry of the
vaginal canal amounted to rape.
In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the courts
mention of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:
Q:
You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back
was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
A:
He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
(Italics supplied)
Q:
And, after doing that: "Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko"; what else did he do?
A:
After that, "Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
(underscoring supplied)
(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)
It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full penetration
of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is enough that there be proof of the entrance
of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. (People vs. Mangalino,
182 SCRA 329; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393).
"Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant a
conviction." (People vs. Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs.
Abonada, 169 SCRA 530). Hence, with the testimony of Rosilyn that the accused pressed against
("idiniin") and pointed to ("itinutok") Rosilyns vagina his sexual organ on two (2) occasions,
two (2) acts of rape were consummated.22
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyns purpose in executing the affidavits on August
22 and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio Delantar, not accusedappellant. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an
exhaustive narration of the sexual abuse of accused-appellant when he was not the object of the
said complaint.
221
Additionally, Rosilyns statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned
mainly the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her to narrate the details of
her sexual encounter with accused-appellant.
As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings
with Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological repercussions of the
sexual abuse on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a
consequence thereof. Thus, the documents pertaining to said interviews and studies cannot be
relied upon to reveal every minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.
At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyns testimony, if at all they
existed, cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyns declarations on the witness stand. The
consistent ruling of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a
witness and her testimonies given in open court, the latter commands greater weight than the
former.23
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn
gave the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because that was the name given
to her by the person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims,
was merely picked up by Rosilyn from the name plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on
accused-appellants office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador "Jun"
Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt on his culpability. It was Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos who
allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak office. In advancement of this theory,
accused-appellant cites the fact that out of a total of 16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for
identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. In the same vein,
accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial characteristics
given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of Dominador "Jun"
Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state that
he has a mole on his lower right jaw.
Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and
unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such identification during the trial
cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accusedappellant as her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she was
introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellants office. Verily, a persons
identity does not depend solely on his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of a
crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing his name. Similarly, the Court, in
People v. Vasquez,24 ruled that:
It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by face [the
witness] acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries to find out the name that matched
[appellants] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally identified accused-appellant as
their assailant.
Even in the case of People v. Timon,25 relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his
identification, this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court identification of accused-
222
appellant was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it.
In light of the foregoing, Rosilyns failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures
shown to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified identification of accusedappellant in open court. The same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which,
incidentally, resembles accused-appellant. As noted by the trial court, accused-appellant and his
brother Dominador Jalosjos have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch
looks like Dominador, it logically follows that the same drawing would definitely look like
accused-appellant.
Likewise, Rosilyns failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state
that he has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of accused-appellants
identification. At a young age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 yearold person. As to accused-appellants mole, the Solicitor General is correct in contending that
said mole is not so distinctive as to capture Rosilyns attention and memory. When she was asked
to give additional information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a
"prominent belly." This, to our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature that would naturally
catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like Rosilyn.
In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words "idinikit," "itinutok," and
"idiniin-diin," which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to her vagina with his
genitals, do not constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did
not actually see accused-appellants penis in the supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed
that Rosilyn declared that accused-appellants semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex
organ.
Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that,
assuming that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyns external genitals, the same is not enough to
establish the crime of rape.
True, in People v. Campuhan,26 we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge," means that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the
entry of the penis into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons
pubis or the pudendum. We further elucidated that:
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the
perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal
orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the
female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin
skin which does not have any hairs but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape
to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus,
223
a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the
female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.27
In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went
beyond "strafing of the citadel of passion" or "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," as
depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed into "bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is
invasion enough,"28 there being, in a manner of speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition.
When the accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs, unfetteredly
touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be
naturally wide open and ready for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie the
hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant that his penis or that of someone who looked like him,
would under the circumstances merely touch or brush the external genital of Rosilyn. The
inevitable contact between accused-appellants penis, and at the very least, the labia of the
pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin"
part of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.
The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows:
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.
And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he do?
A.
After that, he was lifting my shirt.
Q.
Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell the court?
A.
I was lying, sir.
Q.
Lying on what?
A.
On the bed, sir.
Q.
And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?
A.
He spread my legs sir.
Q.
And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do?
A.
After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.
Q.
And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?
A.
He pressed it in my vagina.
224
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
May we request that the vernacular be used?
A.
Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko.
PROS. ZUNO:
May I respectfully move that the word: "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko," be
incorporated?
Q.
And while he was doing that; according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari mo;"
what did you feel?
A.
I was afraid and then, I cried.
Q.
Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried?
A.
Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina.
Q.
And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which according to you,
"idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"
COURT:
Place the Tagalog words, into the records.
A.
Sandali lang po yon.
Q.
What part of your vagina, or "ari" was being touched by the ari or penis?
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
You said that you felt I withdraw that question. How did you know that Congressman
Jalosjos was doing, "idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari ko?"
A.
Because I could feel it, sir.
Q.
Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina in what part of your vagina
was Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari mo?"
A.
In front of my vagina, sir.
Q.
In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position? Will you describe the
position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing that. "Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?"
225
A.
Ide-demonstrate ko po ba?
FISCAL ZUNO:
Q.
Can you demonstrate?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A.
He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis while his other
hand, or his free hand was on the bed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROS. ZUNO:
Now, according to you, you dont know how to say it; or what was done to you. Now, will you
tell the Court how can you describe what was done to you?
A.
After he "dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito."
Q.
O.K. you said "itinutok niya ito;" what else did he do?
PROS. ZUNO:
She is now trying to describe.
COURT:
Translate.
A.
He seems to be "parang idinidiin po niya."
Q.
Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: "parang idinidiin niya?"
A.
Masakit po.
Q.
And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?
COURT:
Q.
Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?
A.
I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.
PROS. ZUNO:
226
Q.
O.K., clarify. You said "nakaganuon siya" what do you mean by "nakaganuon siya?"
A.
He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa ari ko.
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.
And, when you said "idinidiin po niya;" to which you are referring? What is this "idinidiin
niya?"
A.
Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.
Q.
And what did you feel when you said: he was "idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko?"
A.
Masakit po.
COURT:
The answer is "masakit po."
Proceed.
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.
Where did you feel the pain?
A.
Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
PROS. ZUNO:
Q.
And then, after that, what else did he do
A.
After that, he touched my breast, sir.
Q.
And, after touching your breast, what did he do?
A.
And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with her index finger,
rubbing against her open left palm)
Q.
And after doing that, what else did he do?
A.
After that, he instructed me to go to sleep.
xxx
xxx
xxx
227
A.
I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir.
Q.
Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting down your
clothes?
A.
xxx
Because I felt pity for myself. (Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)

xxx
x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)29
Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the
sketchy visualization of the nave and uninitiated to conclude that there was indeed penile
invasion by accused-appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was
similarly ensconced between the parted legs of Rosilyn, except that, this time, Rosilyn was
conveniently rested on, and elevated with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant was
touching, poking and pressing his penis against her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions
employed by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt
a consequence of consummated rape.
The pertinent portions of Rosilyns account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as follows:
PROS. ZUNO:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q.
The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, what was your
position?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?
FISCAL ZUNO:
Q.
Ipaliwanag mo lang?
A.
My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.
Q.
You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back
was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart, what else did he do?
A.
He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
Q.
And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and I would quote
in Tagalog: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"
228
A.
I was afraid sir.
Q.
And, after doing that: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko," what else did he do?
A.
After that, "itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."
Q.
You said: "Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at idiniin-diin niya
yong ari niya sa ari ko;" Now, while he was doing that act, what was the position of
Congressman Jalosjos?
A.
His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart; he was inbetween them, and doing an upward and downward movement.
(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)
Q.
For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or pumping movement
while his penis, or "ang ari niya ay nakatutok at idinidiin-diin yong ari niya sa ari mo?"
A.
I dont know.
Q.
And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that movement, pushing,
or pumping?
A.
I felt pain and then I cried.
Q.
Where did you feel the pain?
A.
Inside my vagina, sir.
xxx
xxx
x x x.30
The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of "idinikit-dikit niya" was
followed by "itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya." The "idiniin-diin niya" was succeeded by
"Masakit po." Pain inside her "ari" is indicative of consummated penetration.
The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the
appellants room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996 are consistent with the
complainants testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.
In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close
together --- which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not difficult, for the
accused-appellant to attempt penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accusedappellant herein perpetrated the sexual abuse, not to mention the absence of time constraint,
totally distinguishes the instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even
submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then
229
was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting his penis with his one hand, while touching,
poking and pressing the same against Rosilyn's vagina, would surely result in even the slightest
contact between the labia of the pudendum and accused-appellant's sex organ.
Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged
sexual assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and contrary to human
experience that accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from
fully consummating the sexual act when there was in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the
same light, the defense likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accusedappellant contented himself with rubbing his penis clipped between her thighs until he reached
orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to
gratifying ones basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too intricate for the
defense to prescribe certain forms of conduct. Even the word "perverse" is not entirely precise, as
what may be perverse to one may not be to another. Using a child of tender years who could even
pass as ones granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may be
utterly nauseating and repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive celebration of salacious
fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant may have found a distinct and complete
sexual gratification in such kind of libidinous stunts and maneuvers.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn
for fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a minor; or because of his
previous agreement with his "suking bugaw," Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no
penetration, otherwise the latter would demand a higher price. This may be the reason why
Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant
inserts his penis into her sex organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accusedappellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt Simplicio to
demand a higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of
prostitution.
The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her
thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should be noted that this
portion of Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of
lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event, granting that it occurred during the twin
instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not
preclude the fact of rape.
There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accusedappellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the transcripts, Rosilyn
unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And
even if she did not actually see accused-appellants penis go inside her, surely she could have felt
whether it was his penis or just his finger.
230
We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the
time the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of Rosilyn that she was then
eleven years old, the prosecution presented the following documents:
(1) Rosilyns birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;31
(2) Rosilyns baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;32
(3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 to
Librada Telen as the mother;33
(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;34
(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and her parents
(Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number (39-10-71);35
(6) Record of admission showing her parents patient number (39-10-71) and confinement at the
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985.36
It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the
presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birth
certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged from the records by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997.37
However, it appears that the said decision has been annulled and set aside by the Court of
Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of Appeals was
appealed to this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 140305. Pending the final
outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed valid and can be invoked
as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time she was
abused by accused-appellant.
However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample
proof of the complainants age in the records.
Rosilyns Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,38 we
ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence that can help
establish the age of the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents
of similar nature, can be presented.
And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are
inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the Cord Dressing Book of Dr.
Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her
date of birth was May 11, 1985. These documents are considered entries in official records,
admissible as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyns testimony as
to her age.
231
Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:

Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,39 the Court laid down the requisites for the
application of the foregoing rule, thus:
(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not
necessary that it be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature of the office
should render the book indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to
be kept. Thus, official registers, though not required by law, kept as convenient and appropriate
modes of discharging official duties, are admissible.40
Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or
records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof.41 It is not necessary to
show that the person making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order
that the entry may be admissible in evidence, for his being excused from appearing in court in
order that public business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay
rule.42
Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766,43 mandates
hospitals to report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth, among others, of
babies born under their care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00 nor
more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months nor more than six (6)
months, or both, in the discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to
the local civil registrar.
Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of
the Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where the fact of birth, name of
the mother and other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live
Births of the hospital, are considered entries in official record, being indispensable to and
appropriate modes of recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries
with the local civil registrar, in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
232
It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person
who actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante, the records custodian
of the hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the
record itself or by a certified copy or the legal keeper thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the
person who made those entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that
the entries testified to by Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were
accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.
Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are
admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.
The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates
of Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by unbiased and disinterested
persons under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have attended the
preparation of the birth and baptismal certificates. Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are
sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.
Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of
Rosilyn are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of birth, was correctly
disregarded by the trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed by
Rosilyn against him was the direct cause of his incarceration. This raises a possibility that
Simplicio falsely testified in the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.
Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito
Intruzo because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as to the circumstances
of Rosilyns birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that
Rosilyns appearance belie her claim that she was born on May 11, 1985.
In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2,
and July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and 96-1997, respectively),
the trial court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was
able to prove that accused-appellant was not in Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at
the time the lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established
that accused-appellant flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly
committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996, Rosilyn merely testified that
she felt somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing
those lecherous acts as she was too sleepy to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise
acquitted in these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22,
1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as the rape perpetrated on June
18, 1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful
review of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not
give any testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly,
233
therefore, the trial court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which
cannot prevail over his positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.
As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996,
accused-appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed the same because he
flew to Dipolog on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellants flight was at
9:40 a.m. The possibility, therefore, of accused-appellants having performed the lascivious acts
on the victim before he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove the
physical impossibility of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996, when
the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.
Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who for money
or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x .
(Emphasis supplied.)
In People v. Optana,44 the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,45 explained the elements of
the offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, as follows:
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA
7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition."
234
"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast,
inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her thighs, all constitute
lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly
convicted accused-appellant of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging
him with the above-described lascivious acts.
The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the
victim is below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his
finger into the complainants vagina. These insertions took place in 1996. A year later, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it
indicates state policy on rape. The Revised Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies
the crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not necessarily the victim or her
parents, can prosecute the case.
235
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth
and contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also been increased.
Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court
correctly imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of
reclusion temporal medium, pursuant to our ruling in Dulla v. Court of Appeals.46
Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code.47 However, the trial court erroneously fixed the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence at eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,48 we held that the penalty next lower in degree to
reclusion temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Hence, for violation of
Article III, Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate sentence
of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six
(6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.
At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was
penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.
In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates
the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The law presumes
that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent
consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years
old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of
force and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence
of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not
mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.49
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn
was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof
236
of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive submission to the sexual advances of
accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with
eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court
for each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 should be increased
from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.50 On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of statutory rape was correct.
In People v. Lor,51 citing the cases of People v. Victor,52 and People v. Gementiza,53 we held
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto for the offended
party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven
actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil
indemnity is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by
the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion.54 Hence, accused-appellant should be
ordered to pay the offended party another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape
and acts of lasciviousness.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, is AFFIRMED. Likewise, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 961992, and 96-1993, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of
lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the indeterminate
penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accusedappellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the additional amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally,
the award of moral damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness is increased to P50,000.00.
People v. Siao
Facts: On May 27, 1994, at about 3:00PM, accused-appellant Rene Siao, in his residence,
ordered Reylan Gimena, his familys 17-year old houseboy, to pull Estrella Raymundo, their 14year old housemaid, to the womens quarters. Once inside, appellant Siao pushed her to the
wooden bed and asked her to choose one among a pistol, candle or a bottle of sprite. Appellant lit
the candle and dropped the melting candle on her chest. Estrella was made to lie down on her
back on the bed w/ her head hanging over one end.
Appellant then poured sprite into her nostrils as she was made to spread her arms w/ his gun
pointed to her face. Appellant Siao then tied her feet and hands w/ an electric cord or wire as she
237
was made to lie face down on the bed. As Siao pointed his pistol at her, he ordered Estrella to
undress and commanded her to take the initiative on Gimena. Not understanding what he meant,
appellant motioned to her poking the gun at her temple. Gimena was then ordered to remove his
shorts. He did not do so but only let his penis out. Appellant Siao spread the arms of Estrella and
made her lie down spread-eagled. She felt dizzy and shouted for help twice. Siao then ordered
Gimena to rape Estrella. At first, Gimena refused because he has a sister. However, Siao said that
if they would not obey, he would kill both of them.
Both Gimena and Estrella were forced and intimidated at gunpoint by Siao to have carnal
knowledge of each other. They performed the sexual act because they were afraid they would be
killed. Siao commanded Gimena to rape Estrella in 3 diff positions (i.e. missionary position,
side-by-side and dog position as narrated vividly in the case), pointing the handgun at them the
whole time. Thereafter, Siao warned them, If you will tell the police, I will kill your mothers.
Appellant Siao, for his defense, denies the whole event. He asserts that she retaliated through this
accusation because Estrella herself was accused of stealing many of his familys personal effects.
Issue: Whether or not ignominy, as an aggravating circumstance of the crime of rape, is
attendant to justify the award of exemplary damages
Held: Yes. The RTC overlooked and did not take into account the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy and sentenced accused-appellant to the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It has been held that where the accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary
position i.e. male superior, female inferior but also the dog position as dogs do, i.e. entry from
behind, as was proven in the case, the aggravating circumstance of ignominy attended the
commission thereof.
Still, SC respected RTCs finding of facts and found any inconsistencies in the witnesses
testimonies inconsequential considering that they referred to trivial matters w/c have nothing to
do w/ the essential fact of the commission of rape that is carnal knowledge through force and
intimidation. Ergo, even if it was pointed out that in all 3 positions, Gimena ejaculated 3x in a
span of less than 30 mins, w/c does not conform to common experience, rape was still present
from the evidence because rape is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female
genitalia by the male organ. Penetration, however slight, and not ejaculation, is what constitutes
rape. Moreover, even if the house was occupied by many people at the time of the crime, rape
was still committed because lust is no respecter of time and place. And Estrellas and Gimenas
decision not to flee proves only the fear and intimidation that they were under because Siao was
after all their amo or employer who threatened to kill them or their family if they did not
succumb to his demands.
The governing law is Art 335 RPC as amended by RA 7659 w/c imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, if committed w/ the use of a deadly weapon. Siao is further ordered to pay the
offended party moral damages, w/c is automatically granted in rape cases w/o need of any proof,
in the amount of PhP50K. Furthermore, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
238
ignominy justifies the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art 2230 CC. Judgment affirmed
w/ modification of damages awarded.
People v. Crisostomo
"[T]he trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to he highest respect
absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case."2
On appeal is the October 22, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel Crisostomo y Malliar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one count of statutory rape.
In three separate Informations,5 appellant was charged with rape committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-16235 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
That, on or about the 8th day of April, 1999, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the genital orifice of "AAA,"6 a minor who is six (6) years of age,
thereby causing the labia majora of the vagina of said minor to suffer a third degree burn, against
her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (Rape by Sexual Assault)
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there commit an act of sexual assault by using a lighted cigarette as an instrument or object and
[inserting] the same into the anal orifice of "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age, thereby
causing the perianal region of the said anal orifice of said minor to suffer a third degree burn,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (Statutory Rape)
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of] "AAA", a minor who is six (6) years of age; that on the same occasion that
239
the Accused raped said minor, the accused did, then and there burn her buttocks by the use of a
lighted cigarette, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned on January 9, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty.7 Pre-trial conference was
terminated upon agreement of the parties. Trial on the merits ensued.
Factual Antecedents
The facts as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
The victim in these cases[,] "AAA[,]" testified that at noon time of April 8, 1999, she was x x x
playing x x x with her playmates whereupon she wandered by the house of accused which x x x
was just below their house. "AAA" clarified during her cross-examination that there was a
vulcanizing shop owned by her father located in their house x x x and where accused was
employed. While "AAA" was at the house of accused, she claimed that her genitals and buttocks
were burned with a lighted cigarette by the said accused. "AAA" testified further that her clothes
were taken off by the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly placed
himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal knowledge [of] the
then six (6) year old girl. (TSN May 29, 2001, pp. 5-9; TSN Aug. 7, 2001, pp. 10-12.)
"BBB," father of "AAA," presented in court his daughters birth certificate (Exhibit "B") which
stated that she was born on April 4, 1993 (TSN Sept. 25, 2001, p. 4). On the other hand, Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who examined "AAA" identified his Medico-Legal
Report (Exhibit "M") and testified that the victim indeed had two (2) third degree burns in the
perianal region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said burns were caused by a
lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victims skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed that
there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same could have been done 24
hours from the time of his examination which was also on April 8, 1999. (TSN Nov. 7, 2001 pp.
11-17)
"CCC" [aunt of "AAA"] testified that x x x she x x x assisted the mother of "AAA" in bringing
the victim to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp Crame where a doctor also
examined "AAA" and confirmed that the latter was indeed a victim of rape. "CCC" testified that
they then proceeded to the Womens [D]esk to file the instant complaint against the accused.
(TSN August 5, 2003 pp. 4-8)
On the other hand, accused denied the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his
brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin who testified that he was tending the store located at the house of
accused when the latter supposedly arrived from work at 10:00 [a.m.] of April 8, 1999 and slept
until 5:00 [p.m.] of the same day. According to Rogelio that is the usual routine of accused as the
latter worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer in the vulcanizing shop owned by the
victims father. (TSN February 3, 2006 pp. 6-8)
240
When accused testified on November 17, 2006, he essentially confirmed the testimony of his
brother-in-law that it was impossible for him to have raped "AAA" on the date and time stated in
the information as his night shift work schedule just would not permit such an incident to occur.
Accused added that he knew of no reason why the family of the private complainant would pin
the crime against him. (TSN Nov. 17, 2006 pp. 9-11 & 14)
In an effort to explain the burn marks on the delicate parts of "AAAs" body, the defense
presented a supposed playmate of "AAA" in the person of Mary Pabuayan. According to Mary,
she was then 7 years old when she and two other playmates together with "AAA" and Joel "Liit"
the son of accused were burning worms near a santol tree in their neighborhood on a Good
Friday in the year 1999. This Joel "Liit" supposedly lighted a straw which inadvertently burned
the anal portion of "AAAs" body. Marys exact words were to the effect that "napatakan ang
puwit ni "AAA"."8
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 3, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape,
viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Joel Crisostomo y Malliar is found GUILTY of all
offenses stated in the three (3) Criminal Informations and is hereby sentenced to the following:
a) In Criminal Information # 99-16235 and Criminal Information # 99-16236, accused is to
suffer the Indeterminate Penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum and is ordered to pay the victim "AAA" civil indemnity of P30,000.00,
moral damages of P30,000.00 and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 for each of the two
Criminal Informations.
b) In Criminal Information # 99-16237, accused is to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00
and exemplary damages of P30,000.00 with cost [of] suit for all Criminal Informations.
SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal10 which was given due course by the trial court in
its Order11 dated February 2, 2009.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his Brief filed before the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE (ARTICLE 266-A PAR. 1 AND ART. 267-B, PAR. 7 IN
RELATION TO R.A. NO. 7610) DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
241
Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred when it lent full credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses.1awp++i1 In particular, appellant insisted that the trial court erred in
finding "AAAs" testimony credible considering that she was unsure whether a match, rod or a
cigarette stick, was used in burning her private parts.13 Appellant argued that "AAA" never
showed signs of shock, distress, or anxiety despite her alleged traumatic experience.14 Appellant
also alleged that "CCCs" testimony should be disregarded as she was not even present when the
rape incidents happened.15 He opined that "CCC" influenced her niece, "AAA," to file the suit
against him which bespoke of ill-motive on her part. Appellant concluded that these
"inconsistencies and contradictions" are enough to set aside the verdict of conviction imposed
upon by the RTC.16
However, the CA gave short shrift to appellants arguments. The CA rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed July 3, 2008 Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalties imposed, and to be read thus:
"1. For Criminal Case Nos. 99-16235 and 99-16236, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten17 (8) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal,
as maximum, and ordered to pay AAA Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity,
Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifteen Thousand pesos
(P15,000.00) as exemplary damages, all for each count of rape by sexual assault; and
(2) For Criminal Case No. 99-16237, Joel Crisostomo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility of parole, and ordered to pay AAA Seventy-Five
Thousand pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages, and all the costs of
suit."
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, this appeal19 which the CA gave due course in its Resolution20 of January 6, 2011. In a
Resolution21 dated June 15, 2011, this Court required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. In its Manifestation and Motion,22 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) informed this Court that it will no longer file a Supplemental Brief because it had already
exhaustively discussed and refuted all the arguments of the appellant in its brief filed before the
CA. Appellant likewise filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief23 praying that the
case be deemed submitted for decision based on the pleadings submitted.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
242
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly found appellant guilty of two counts of rape by sexual
assault and one count of rape by sexual intercourse. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) provides:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above should be present;
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphases
supplied)
When the offended party is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is "termed statutory rape
as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years."24 In this case, the prosecution
satisfactorily established all the elements of statutory rape. "AAA" testified that on April 8, 1999,
appellant took off her clothes and made her lie down. Appellant also removed his clothes, placed
himself on top of "AAA," inserted his penis into her vagina, and proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of her. At the time of the rape, "AAA" was only six years of age. Her birth certificate
showed that she was born on April 4, 1993. "AAAs" testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes who found "AAA" to have fresh and bleeding hymenal lacerations.
Likewise, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt appellants guilt for two counts of
rape by sexual assault.1wphi1 Records show that appellant inserted a lit cigarette stick into
"AAAs" genital orifice causing her labia majora to suffer a 3rd degree burn. Appellant likewise
inserted a lit cigarette stick into "AAAs" anal orifice causing 3rd degree burns in her perianal
region.
We agree with the CA that "AAAs" "uncertainty" on whether it was a match, rod or a cigarette
stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is
so inconsequential and does not diminish the fact that an instrument or object was inserted into
her private parts. This is the essence of rape by sexual assault. "[T]he gravamen of the crime of
rape by sexual assault x x x is the insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal
243
orifice, or any instrument or object, into another persons genital or anal orifice."25 In any event,
"inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the
inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of
rape."26 We also held in People v. Piosang27 that
"[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not
only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story. x x x "
Moreover, appellants argument that "AAA" did not manifest any stress or anxiety considering
her traumatic experience is purely speculative and bereft of any legal basis. Besides, it is settled
that people react differently when confronted with a startling experience. There is no standard
behavioral response when one is confronted with a traumatic experience. Some may show signs
of stress; but others may act nonchalantly. Nevertheless, "AAAs" reaction does not in any way
prove the innocence of appellant. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, regardless of "AAAs"
reactions, it did not diminish the fact that she was raped by appellant or that a crime was
committed.28
We also agree with the CA that "CCCs" efforts to hale appellant to the court should not be
equated with ill-motive on her part. On the contrary, we find "CCCs" efforts to seek justice for
her niece who was raped more in accord with the norms of society. At any rate, even if we
disregard "CCCs" testimony, appellants conviction would still stand. We agree with the
observation of the OSG that "CCCs" "testimony actually had no great impact on the case. In
truth, her testimony [was] composed mainly of the fact that she was the one who accompanied
the mother of "AAA" in bringing "AAA" to the Pasig General Hospital and thereafter to Camp
Crame and later on to the Womens desk."29
On the other hand, appellants alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when weighed
against "AAAs" positive identification of him as the malefactor. Appellant did not even attempt
to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. In fact, he admitted that he lived just four houses away from the house of "AAA".
His denial is also unsubstantiated hence the same is self-serving and deserves no consideration or
weight. The RTC properly disregarded the testimony of Rogelio Oletin (Oletin), appellants
brother-in-law, who claimed that appellant was at his house at the time of the incident. As
appellant already admitted, his house is near the house of "AAA" hence there was no physical
impossibility for him to be present at the crime scene. Also, the RTC observed that Oletins
testimony did not "prove beneficial to the defense. Suffice it to state that the private prosecutor
correctly noted that the said witness was always smiling and laughing when answering questions
propounded to him as if making a mockery of the proceedings which his own brother-in-law was
facing."30
244
Pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for statutory rape (Criminal Case No. 9916237) is death when the victim is a child below seven years old. There is no dispute that at the
time the rape was committed on April 8, 1999, "AAA" was only six years old, having been born
on April 4, 1993. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346,31 the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed on the appellant but without eligibility for parole.32 The CA thus
correctly imposed the said penalty on appellant.
On the other hand, rape by sexual assault committed against a child below seven years old is
punishable by reclusion temporal.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being
no other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty shall be prision
mayor34 as minimum, to reclusion temporal,35 as maximum. The CA thus correctly imposed the
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count of sexual assault.
As regards damages, the CA correctly awarded the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape). However, the
award of moral damages must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.36 As regards Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236 (rape
by sexual assault), the CA likewise properly awarded the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages, for each count. However, the award of exemplary
damages for each count of rape by sexual assault must be increased to P30,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.37 In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The October 22, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03832 which affirmed with modification the July 3, 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 73 finding appellant Joel
Crisostomo y Malliar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by sexual assault and
one count of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the award of moral
damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16237 (statutory rape) is increased to P75,000.00 and the
award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. 99-16235 and Criminal Case No. 99-16236
(rape by sexual assault) is increased to P30,000.00 for each count. In addition, interest is
imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of judgment
until fully paid.
People v. Gaduyon
This is a case of a father defiling his 12-year old daughter on three separate occasions.
On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02511 that affirmed in toto the January 18 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal Case Nos. 6572-74, finding appellant Doney
Gaduyon y Tapispisan (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape,3 qualified
object rape4 and sexual abuse5 committed against his own daughter "AAA".6
245
Factual Antecedents
Three Informations were filed against appellant, the relevant portions of which read as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 6572 for Qualified Rape
That on or about the 22nd day of August 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
taking advantage of his moral authority and ascendancy and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one "AAA," a
minor, 12 years of age, against her will and without her consent, the said crime having been
attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority, the said accused being the
parent of the said victim, a 12-year old minor daughter of the accused thereby raising the crime
to Qualified Rape which is aggravated by the circumstance of Treachery, Abuse of Superior
Strength, Nighttime and Dwelling.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
In Criminal Case No. 6573 for Sexual Abuse
That on or about the 21st day of August 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
taking advantage of his moral authority and ascendancy being the parent of the victim "AAA",
with lewd design x x x and intent to debase, degrade or demean said victim, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit lascivious conduct on the said "AAA," a minor, 12
years of age, by then and there touching her breast and rubbing her arms, against her will and
without her consent thereby constituting SEXUAL ABUSE which is prejudicial to her normal
growth and development with attendant aggravating circumstance of RELATIONSHIP
increasing the penalty of the offense to its maximum period.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
In Criminal Case No. 6574 for Qualified Object Rape
That on or about the 9th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
taking advantage of his moral authority and ascendancy and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously insert his finger into the genital orifice of
"AAA," a minor, 12 years of age, against her will and without her consent, the said crime having
been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority, the said accused
being the parent of the said victim, a 12-year old minor daughter of the accused thereby raising
the crime to qualified object rape which is aggravated by the circumstance of Treachery, Abuse
of Superior Strength, Nighttime and Dwelling.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
246
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Upon termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three daughters. Their eldest
child is "AAA," who at the time material to this case was only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her auntie in
Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus the only ones left in the family
residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00 p.m. of the said date, "AAA" was lying in her bed
in the family room located at the upper portion of their house when appellant fondled her breasts
and touched her arms.10 Appellant threatened "AAA" not to tell her mother about the incident or
else something bad might happen to the latter.11
At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day, August 22, 2002, and while her mother and sisters
were still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when appellant lowered her shorts and
panty.12 Appellant spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina.13 "AAA" felt pain but
could do nothing but cry.14 Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into "AAAs"
vagina. When he was done, appellant put her shorts and panty back on and again threatened
"AAA."15
After more than a month or on October 9, 2002, at about 10:30 p.m. and while "AAA" was
sleeping in a double-deck bed and her sister was in the lower portion thereof, "AAA" was
suddenly awakened. She noticed that her short pants had been lowered while appellant was
already lying beside her.16 Appellant then inserted his index finger into "AAAs" vagina. "AAA"
only cried upon feeling the pain. After his deplorable act, appellant reiterated his previous threat
to "AAA."17
After a few minutes, "AAAs" mother entered the room where her daughters were sleeping. She
noticed that "AAA" was covered with pillows, except for her head and feet.18 Upon approaching
"AAA," she saw that her legs were spread apart and her panty was slightly lowered and inserted
at the center of her genitals.19 The mother then suspected that her husband did something bad to
"AAA" since only she and her husband were awake at that time. However, she opted to remain
silent and just pray.20
When "AAA" went to school the following day, she was asked by her religion teacher if her
father did something bad to her.21 "AAA" who was teary-eyed did not answer.22 Later, "AAAs"
class adviser called her.23 They ate in the canteen and thereafter proceeded to the adoration
chapel to pray.24 After praying, the teacher asked "AAA" the same question propounded by the
religion teacher.25 This time, "AAA" replied that her father did something bad to her twice but
did not reveal the details surrounding the same.26 "AAAs" mother then came and asked her
daughter if appellant did something bad to her. "AAA" answered "Yes. It happened twice."27
Thus, "AAA" and her mother went to the police station and reported the incidents of her
defilement.28 A physical examination done upon "AAA" revealed that she was in a non-virgin
physical state but that there are no signs of any form of trauma.29 A psychiatric evaluation
247
likewise revealed that "AAA" was suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder with Depressed
Mood.30
Version of the Defense
Appellant denied the accusations against him and instead advanced the following version of
events.
From August 21, 2002 until 9:00 a.m. of August 22, 2002, his wife and their two younger
daughters attended the wake of his wifes sister in Caloocan City.31 While he admitted that only
he and "AAA" were left in their house, he denied mashing her breast.32 He claimed that at the
time of the alleged incident on August 21, 2002, he was overseeing their computer shop.33 He
also denied raping "AAA" the following day since his wife and his youngest daughter were
already home by then and they all slept in their house in the evening of that day.34
Anent what transpired on October 9, 2002, appellant claimed that he closed their computer shop
at around 10:00 p.m.35 He then proceeded upstairs and saw his wife feeding their youngest
daughter.36 She asked him to take over so she could go to the bathroom downstairs.37 At 10:25
p.m., his wife returned.38 Appellant then heard a noise from the outside. After a while, his
kumpare called him to report that his brother threw stones at the house of his kumpares father.39
Appellant immediately went outside.40 There was therefore no truth to the claim of "AAA" that
he inserted his finger inside her vagina that night.41
The defense believed that "AAA" was just induced by appellants wife to make false accusations
against him.42 This was due to his wifes infidelity which was confirmed when his wife
confessed that she went out with another man43 and when their younger daughter saw his wife
kissing another man.44 Despite this, appellant claimed that he already forgave his wife for the
sake of their children.45
Appellants mother corroborated his story. According to her, appellants family was in their
house in the morning of August 22, 2002.46 She even talked to the wife of appellant at around
6:00 p.m. and was told that she went home with her youngest daughter so they could rest since
they have no place to stay in the wake they attended in Caloocan City.47 The next day, "AAA,"
her mother and sister went back to the wake.48
Appellants sister-in-law testified that after "AAA," her mother and sister went to the wake on
August 23, 2002, she, together with her son, mother-in-law, and appellant followed that
evening.49 She observed that there seemed to be nothing wrong with "AAA" since she was
serving food in the wake and playing with her cousins.50
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its January 18, 2006 Decision,51 the RTC gave more weight to "AAAs" positive testimony as
against appellants bare denials since her testimony was candid, straightforward and free from
material contradictions. Her testimony was complemented by the findings of the medico-legal
248
officer who examined "AAA." In fact, "AAA" suffered intense psychological stress and
depression as a result of the abuses.
On the other hand, the RTC found that appellants denials were not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.1wphi1 It also found unacceptable his attempt to malign the reputation of
his wife and daughter in order to exculpate himself. According to the said court, this evasive
attitude of appellant cannot prevail over "AAAs" testimony.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the criminal cases thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) In Criminal Case No. 6572, for the rape committed on August 22, 2002, accused Doney
Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim
"AAA," the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
(b) In Criminal Case No. 6573, for the sexual abuse committed on August 21, 2002, accused
Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of One (1) year
and One (1) month of Prision Correcional as minimum to Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months of
Prision Correccional in its medium period as maximum.
(c) In Criminal Case No. 6574, for the rape committed on October 9, 2002, accused Doney
Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim
"AAA" the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.52
On September 4, 2006, the RTC, however, partially modified the above judgment53 insofar as
the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 6574 is concerned, viz:
The aforesaid judgment is hereby partially modified x x x to read, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) x x x
(b) x x x
(c) In Criminal Case No. 6574, for the rape committed on October 9, 2002, accused Doney
Gaduyon y Tapispisan is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum and to pay the victim "AAA", the amount of P30,000.00, as civil
indemnity, P30,000.00, as moral damages and P15,000.00, as exemplary damages.
249
SO ORDERED."54
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the appellate court sustained appellants conviction. Like the RTC, it stressed that
appellants bare assertions cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. It brushed
aside the inconsistencies on the part of "AAA" as pointed out by appellant and concluded, after a
careful evaluation of the facts and evidence on record, that appellants guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Hence, the dispositive portion of the CAs July 31, 2007 Decision:55
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.56
Assignment of Errors
Still insisting on his innocence, appellant prays for the reversal of the CAs appealed Decision
and adopts the same assignment of errors he advanced before the said court, viz:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACCORDING TO THE ACCUSED THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE TO WHICH HE IS ENTITLED IN CRIMINAL CASES
AND FOR CONVICTING HIM OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT
OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE EVIDENCE SHOWING
THAT
A. THE CLAIM OF THE PROSECUTION THAT THE ACCUSED AND HIS DAUGHTER
WERE ALONE AT THEIR SAN MATEO RESIDENCE IN THE EVENING OF 22 AUGUST
2002, THE DATE WHEN THE ALLEGED PENILE PENETRATION TOOK PLACE IS A
BRAZEN LIE;
B. "AAA" DID NOT MANIFEST OVERT PHYSICAL SIGNS THAT SHE WAS RAPED;
C. "AAA" GAVE FOUR CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS ON HOW SHE WAS RAPED;
D. "AAA" GAVE THREE CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS ON HOW SHE WAS "FINGERED"
BY HER FATHER IN THE EVENING OF 9 OCTOBER 2002;
E. X X X THE MOTHER OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM, CONCOCTED THE 9 OCTOBER
2002 INCIDENT;
F. THERE IS NO SPONTANEOUS DISCLOSURE. "AAA" WAS PRESSURED TO ACCUSE
HER FATHER;
G. "AAA" IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO PRESSURE AND MANIPULATION;
250
H. "AAA" BESTOWED [ON] HER FATHER A WARM SMILE WHEN SHE IDENTIFIED
HIM IN COURT, WHICH IS UNEXPECTED IF SHE HAD IN FACT BEEN RAPED AND
MOLESTED BY HER OWN FATHER;
I. THE DEMEANOR OF "AAA" X X X IN THE COURSE OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS
IS FAR FROM INSPIRING;
J. "AAA" GAVE FOUR CONFLICTING VERSIONS OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AFTER THE
ALLEGED RAPE;
K. "AAA" IS CONSISTENT IN GIVING INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS;
L. THE STATEMENT OF "AAA" THAT HER FATHER DID BAD THINGS TO HER TWICE
CONTRADICTS HER CLAIM THAT SHE WAS SEXUALLY MOLESTED THRICE;
M. "AAA" GAVE CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS ON HOW SHE FINALLY DISCLOSED HER
ORDEAL;
N. THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION GAVE CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF
HOW "AAA" MADE THE DISCLOSURE;
O. X X X THE CLASS ADVISER OF "AAA" AND A WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION,
COULD NOT BE BELIEVED WITH SAFETY;
P. THE CLAIM THAT THE ACCUSED "FINGERED" HIS DAUGHTER IN THE EVENING
OF 9 OCTOBER 2002 IS INCREDIBLE;
Q. FROM HER TESTIMONY, IT APPEARS THAT "AAA" IS SUBCONSCIOUSLY
SENDING SUBTLE HINTS TO THE COURT TO RECEIVE HER TESTIMONY WITH
CAUTION;
R. THE PARENTS OF "AAA" ARE NOT GETTING ALONG WELL;
S. THE CLINICAL FINDING OF THE PSYCHIATRIST IS FAULTY AND INCONCLUSIVE;
AND T. THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF RAPE.57
In fine, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that he committed the crimes attributed to him.58 He argues that his alibi and denial
deserve greater weight in evidence than the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.59
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
The crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
251
The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
reclassified the crime of rape as a crime against persons.60 It also amended Article 335 of the
RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; d. When the offended party is
under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned
above be present;
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through sexual assault. In
rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual intercourse, carnal knowledge is the crucial
element which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.61 This is also referred to as "organ
rape" or "penile rape"62 and must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt that the perpetrators penis touched the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual
intercourse.63
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is commonly known as
rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also
called "instrument or object rape", also "gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape."64
The crime of sexual abuse under Republic Act No. 7610
On the other hand, RA 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act", defines and penalizes child prostitution and
other sexual abuse. "Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
252
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person."65
The Information in Criminal Case No. 6573 against appellant was for violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610, which pertinently provides:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
upon the following:
xxxx
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In paragraph (b), the following requisites must concur: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female is below eighteen
(18) years of age.66 This paragraph "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only
with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child,
through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct."67
Appellant is guilty of the two kinds of rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC and of sexual abuse
under RA 7610.
Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals that there was carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse through force, threat and intimidation on August 22, 2002. Appellant also committed
rape by sexual assault when he inserted his finger into the genitalia of "AAA" on October 9,
2002. He also subjected "AAA," a minor at 12 years of age, to sexual abuse by means of
lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence, when he mashed her breasts and stroked
her arms on August 21, 2002. "AAA" gave detailed accounts of these acts of perversion, viz:
Q: Last August 21, 2002, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening where were you?
253
A: I was in our house, sir.

xxxx
Q: At such time, place and date do you recall any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: I saw my daddy fondling my breasts and holding my arms, sir.
Q: And where were you in the house when your father did that to you?
A: I was in the room, sir.
Q: Where in the room?
xxxx
A: In the bed, sir.
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
Q: What were you doing in bed?
A: I was lying, sir.
Q: And you said that your father, while you were in bed in the room, touched your breasts, would
you please demonstrate to the court how your father touched your breasts?
A: Like this, sir.
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
Witness cupping with her two (2) palms her breasts x x x.
xxxx
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
Q: You also said that your father touched your arms, would you please demonstrate to the court
how your father touched your arms?
A: Like this, sir.
254
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN

Witness demonstrating with her right palm placed on her left shoulder and the left palm placed
on her right shoulder and then moving them downwards.
Q: When your father did that to you, what did you do?
A: I was crying, sir.
Q: And did you say anything to your father?
A: None, sir.
Q: Did your father say anything to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: He told me not to tell anything to my mother because in case I would tell something to my
mother, something will happen to her, sir.
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
May we manifest, your Honor, that the witness, while saying the words she had just said, had
teary eyes and was wiping her tears with her handkerchief.
Q: When that was done to you by your father, who were in the house?
A: Only the two (2) of us, sir.
Q: Where was your mother?
A: She was in the wake of my aunt, sir.
Q: Where was your sister "CCC"?
A: Also at the wake, sir.
Q: How about your sister "DDD"?
A: Also at the wake of my aunt, sir.
Q: What time was that again?
A: 9:00 oclock, sir.
255
Q: Daytime or nighttime?
A: Evening, sir.
xxxx
Q: "AAA," while you are testifying now, what do you feel?
A: I am afraid (natatakot po), sir.
ATTY. SAN JOAQUIN:
May we manifest that while the witness answers "natatakot po" she is crying and wiping her eyes
with her handkerchief.
Q: At about 11 oclock in the evening after August 22, 2002, where were you?
A: I was in the house, sir.
Q: What house?
A: The house of my grandmother, sir.
Q: Where is that?
A: "YYY," San Mateo, Rizal, sir.
Q: At that time, date and place, do you recall an unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: While I was sleeping I was suddenly awakened, sir.
Q: Why were you suddenly awakened from sleep?
A: Because my dad was lowering my shorts, sir.
Q: How did you know that your daddy was lowering your shorts?
A: I saw it, sir.
Q: Was your daddy able to lower your shorts?
256
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did he do after lowering your shorts?
A: He lowered my panty, sir.
Q: Was your daddy able to lower your panty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were you doing when your daddy was lowering your shorts and then panty, what were
you doing?
A: I was crying, sir.
Q: After your daddy has lowered your shorts and panty what happened next?
A: He separated my legs (ibinuka niya po ang hita ko), sir.
Q: After your daddy separated your legs, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: You said he inserted his penis into your vagina, was he able to insert his penis into your
vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When your daddy inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel?
A: It was painful, sir.
xxxx
Q: When the penis of your father was already inserted into your vagina, what happened next?
A: He pulled it out and then inserted it again (hinugot niya tapos ay ipinasok niya uli), sir.
Q: How many times did that happen that your daddy pulled out his penis from you and then
inserted it, how many times?
A: Two (2) times, sir.
Q: Then afterwards what happened?
A: He pulled it out again then he returned my panty, sir.
257
Q: What else?
A: He also returned my shorts, sir.
Q: Did you say anything to your daddy when he did that to you?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about your daddy, did he tell you anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Not to tell anything to my mother because something will happen to her if I tell anything to
her, sir.
Q: Who were in the house when your father did that to you?
A: Only the two (2) of us, sir.
Q: Where was your mother?
A: She was still in the wake of my aunt, sir.
Q: How about your sister "CCC"?
A: She was also in the wake, sir.
xxxx
Q: What time was that when it happened?
A: At 11:00 oclock, sir.
Q: Daytime or nighttime?
A: Nighttime, sir.
xxxx
Q: "AAA," I am asking you this question, at about 10:30 oclock in the evening of October 9,
2002, where were you?
A: I was in the house, sir.
258
Q: What house?
A: "YYY," San Mateo, Rizal, sir.
Q: At such time, date and place, do you recall any unusual incident that happened?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: When I saw my shorts under my feet and my dad was already lying beside me, sir.
Q: How do you know that your daddy was beside you?
A: I saw him, sir.
Q: Where were you at that time, what place in the house?
A: In the room, sir.
Q: Where in the room?
A: x x x my bed, sir.
Q: What are you doing in bed?
A: I was sleeping, sir.
Q: Now, you said that you found out that your shorts was no longer being worn by you, what
happened next?
A: My daddy inserted his finger in my vagina, sir.
Q: Which finger of your daddy was inserted at that time into your vagina?
A: The index finger, sir.
xxxx
Q: "AAA," when your father inserted his finger into your vagina, what did you feel?
A: It was painful, sir.
Q: What did you do when your father inserted his finger into your vagina?
259
A: I just cried, sir.

Q: Did you tell your father anything?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about your father, did he tell you anything?
A: Yes, there was, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: Not to tell anything to my mother, sir.
Q: Now, who were in the house when that happened?
A: My sisters "CCC" and "DDD" and also my mother, sir.
Q: Where was your mother when your father was inserting his finger into your vagina, where
was your mother?
A: I do not know, sir.
Q: How about your sister "CCC"?
A: At the lower portion of the double-deck, sir.
Q: What was "CCC" doing there at the lower portion of your double-deck bed?
A: She was sleeping, sir.
Q: How about "DDD"?
A: She was on the mattress, sir.
Q: What time was that in the evening?
A: At about 10:30, sir.68
We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA" is worthy of
credence. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. She did not waver on the material
points of her testimony and maintained the same even on cross-examination. Indeed, her
statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict appellant for the crimes alleged in the
Informations.69
260
Moreover, "AAAs" testimony is corroborated by the result of her medical examination which
showed the presence of a deep healed laceration in her private part.70 This finding is consistent
with her declaration that appellant inserted his penis and finger into her vagina. "Where a
victims testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient
basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place."71
Appellant seeks to discredit "AAAs" testimony by insisting that he could not have raped the
latter in the evening of August 22, 2002 since the whole family was in their house that day. This
assertion is undeserving of credence due to our constant pronouncement that a bare assertion
cannot prevail over the categorical testimony of a victim.72 Even if corroborated by appellants
mother, the same does not deserve any weight since courts usually frown upon the corroborative
testimony of an immediate member of the family of an accused and treat it with suspicion. The
close filial relationship between the witness and the accused casts a thick cloud of doubt upon the
formers testimony.
Even assuming that appellant was not alone with "AAA" on August 22, 2002, the presence of
other people is not a deterrent to the commission of rape. This observation is apparent from the
rape by sexual assault committed on October 9, 2002 while the entire family was in the
residence. As aptly held by the RTC and the CA, rape indeed does not respect time and place.
Appellant impugns the credibility of "AAA" by emphasizing that she gave conflicting accounts
on the manner she was raped. He also stresses the contradictions in the testimony of "AAA" and
the other prosecution witnesses on the events that transpired after the alleged rape and regarding
the disclosure by "AAA" of her ordeal.
We are not persuaded. Our review of the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveals that these inconsistencies refer to inconsequential matters "that do
not bear upon the elements of the crime of rape. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape is
whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a discrepancy or
inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must refer to the
significant facts indispensable to the guilt or innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. As
the inconsistencies alleged by the appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of
rape, they cannot be used as [grounds] for his acquittal."73
With regard to the inconsistencies on the part of "AAA," it bears stressing that "victims do not
cherish keeping in their memory an accurate account of the manner in which they were sexually
violated. Thus, an errorless recollection of a harrowing experience cannot be expected of a
witness, especially when she is recounting details from an experience as humiliating and painful
as rape. Furthermore, rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the
way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation."74 Verily, in this case, minor
inconsistencies in the testimony of "AAA" are to be expected because (1) she was a minor child
during her defloration; (2) she was to testify on a painful and humiliating experience; (3) she was
sexually assaulted several times; and, (4) she was examined on details and events that happened
almost six months before she testified.75
Anent appellants other assigned errors, we quote the following findings of the CA:
261
The argument that "AAA" did not manifest overt physical signs of having been raped since she
acted and walked normally the following day cannot justify the reversal of appellants
conviction. How a person goes about the day after the happening of a horrid event is not a telltale sign of the truth or falsity of an allegation. The workings of the human mind placed under a
great deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable and different people react
differently. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, overt physical manifestations
cannot be expected since "AAA" did not put up any form of resistance. The threat of harm to be
inflicted on her mother was sufficient intimidation for her to succumb to her fathers lust out of
fear. The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his
victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases. It is through this fear that the perpetrator
hopes to create a climate of extreme psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his
victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. The
relationship of the victim to the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a
person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim.
Appellant would also want to impress upon this Court that the accusation of his daughter was
concocted by his wife because of their marital problems. This contention is preposterous. It is
unnatural for a mother to sacrifice her own daughter, a child of tender years, and subject her to
the rigors and humiliation of a public trial for rape if she was not driven by an honest desire to
have her daughters transgressor punished accordingly.
Neither can it be said that there was no spontaneous disclosure by "AAA" of the
incident.1wphi1 Appellant threatened "AAA." The humiliation caused by the rape by her own
father in addition to the burden of being responsible should her mother be harmed are sufficient
to prevent any child from freely disclosing her ordeal. We must be reminded that the crime of
rape by itself attaches much humiliation and more so if the loss is caused by her father. Delay
and the initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither
unknown [nor] uncommon. That there was no spontaneous disclosure does not mean that
appellant is innocent of the crimes. "AAA" was apparently a terrified young child who was
completely at the mercy of her shameless father. Thus, "AAAs" hesitation may be attributed to
her age, the moral ascendancy of the accused over her, and his threats against her.
On the other hand, neither should the smile of "AAA" while identifying her father in court be
given any malicious significance. While appellant puts much importance to said smile, which
could be a way of concealing her nervousness, he ignored the fact that "AAA" cried while
testifying on the details of the incidents. In fact, during her testimony, she categorically stated
that she was afraid and ashamed. The candid and straightforward narration of how she was
abused and the tears that accompanied her story are earmarks of credibility and must be given
full faith and credit.
With respect to appellants contention that the clinical finding of Dr. Joven Ignacio, the
psychiatrist, is faulty and not conclusive because she appeared to be biased, it is noteworthy that
even without said psychiatric test, the finding of the trial court would still be affirmed
considering that the sole testimony of the victim is sufficient basis for conviction in rape, which
is a crime usually committed in seclusion.
262
Indeed, We are convinced that "AAA" had no reason to falsely incriminate her own father in
view of the fact that the accusation would surely deny her mother the companionship of a
husband and the protection of a father for her younger sisters. It has been consistently held that
the testimony of a rape victim as to who abused her is credible where she has no motive to testify
against the accused.76
On the other hand, what appellant offered for his defense were mere denials which, as aptly
observed by the RTC, are unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the CA correctly affirmed the Decision of the RTC finding
appellant guilty of the crimes charged.
The Proper Penalty
The RTC imposed upon appellant the penalty of death for committing the crime of qualified rape
through sexual intercourse in Criminal Case No. 6572. The Information in this case alleged the
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority. Appellant is the father of "AAA" and he
admitted this filial bond between them during the pre-trial conference77 and trial. "Admission in
open court of relationship has been held to be sufficient and, hence, conclusive to prove
relationship with the victim."78 Also, "AAAs" birth certificate was submitted as proof of her
age. This document suffices as competent evidence of her age.79
"In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the
penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should be
imposed."80 Appellant is thus sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for
the crime of qualified rape committed through sexual intercourse in Criminal Case No. 6572.
With regard to the crime of sexual abuse under RA 7610, the penalty provided for violation of
Section 5, Article III thereof is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua .
"As the crime was committed by the father of ["AAA,"] the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness,
relationship is always aggravating."81 With the presence of this aggravating circumstance and no
mitigating circumstance, the penalty in Criminal Case No. 6573 shall be applied in its maximum
period reclusion perpetua.82
On the other hand, prision mayor is the penalty prescribed for rape by sexual assault under
Article 266-B of the RPC. The penalty is increased to reclusion temporal if the rape is committed
with any of the 10 aggravating/ qualifying circumstances mentioned in said article.83 Just like in
Criminal Case No. 6572, the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are
sufficiently alleged and proven in this case. The penalty therefore is reclusion temporal which
ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor which ranges from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Hence, the trial court and the CA correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum in Criminal Case No. 6574.
263
The Damages
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of damages to "AAA" in Criminal Case No.
6572 must be increased as follows: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.84 She is further awarded civil indemnity of P20,000.00,
moral damages and a fine at P15,000.00 each in Criminal Case No. 6573.85 In Criminal Case
No. 6574, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages at P30,000.00 each are maintained
but the award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.86 "AAA" is also entitled to an
interest on all the amounts of damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.87
WHEREFORE, the July 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02511 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal,
Branch 76 finding appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6572, appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 6573, appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl5,000.00
as moral damages and a fine of 15,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6574, appellant Doney Gaduyon y Tapispisan is ordered to pay AAA
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
"AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
People v. Teodoro
The recantation of her testimony by the victim of rape is to be disregarded if the records show
that it was impelled either by intimidation or by the need for the financial support of the accused.
This rule comes to the forefront once again in our review of the affirmance by the Court of
Appeals (CA) of the conviction for two counts of rape of Tomas Teodoro y Angeles,1 in which
the victim, AAA,2 was the 8-year old daughter of BBB, his common-law wife. The Regional
Trial Court had pronounced Teodoro guilty of two counts of statutory rape on December 10,
2001, and condignly meted him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.3
Antecedents
264
Two informations, both dated March 25, 1998, charged Teodoro with statutory rape committed as
follows:
That on or about the 18th day of December, 1997, at, 10:00 oclock in the evening, more or less,
in Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year
old minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659)4
That on or about the 8th day of February, 1998, at 10:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, in
Sitio Seringan, Poblacion, Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, said accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of AAA, an eight (8) year old
minor.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659)5
With respect to the statutory rape charged in Criminal Case No. 98-02, the records show that on
December 18, 1997 BBB left home in Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte on an errand in Surigao; that
her children, including AAA, were left under the care of Teodoro, her common-law husband; that
late that night, he returned home drunk, and his arrival roused the children from their sleep,
because they had not yet eaten; that they eagerly ate the food he set down for them; that soon
after the dinner, he told the children to go to bed; that the children went to sleep in their
respective places on the floor; that AAA became puzzled when he turned off the lights that were
supposed to be left on; that AAA eventually fell asleep beside her siblings; that at some point
later in the night, he roused AAA, and ordered her to strip naked; that she initially defied him,
but he himself then undressed her; that he took off his pants and drawers down to his knees,
exposing his penis; that he went on top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina, and made push
and pull movements; that she felt a sharp pain inside her vagina; that he stopped his movements
when she protested due to her pain becoming unbearable, because he did not want the other
children to be roused from sleep; that he returned to his own place, but she got up to relieve
herself; that she felt searing pain in her vagina as she was relieving herself; and that she did not
tell her mother upon the latters return from Surigao about what Teodoro had done to her.
Anent the rape committed on February 8, 1998 (Criminal Case No. 98-03), BBB was again away
from the house, having gone to Manila. Teodoro committed the rape in a fashion similar to that
in the first rape. However, AAA could no longer bear her ordeal, and told of the rapes to CCC,
the older brother of BBB: Tay, guihilabtan ko ni Tomas Teodoro (Tay, I was touched by Tomas
Teodoro).6 CCC immediately reported the crimes to the Kitcharao Police Station. The police
quickly arrested Teodoro. Upon BBBs return in the afternoon, CCC informed her about what
265
Teodoro had done to her daughter. BBB and CCC took AAA to the Kitcharao District Hospital
for physical and medical examination.
Dr. Mary Ann D. Abrenillo of the Kitcharao District Hospital examined AAA, and issued a
medical certificate on her findings, as follows:
1. Intact Hymen that admits Right Small Finger of examiner and with slight peripheral erythema.
2. Labia Majora and Minora slightly Gaped Exposing Hymenal Opening, with tenderness.7
Based on the medical certificate, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte
charged Teodoro with two counts of statutory rape through the aforequoted informations.8
At his arraignment on August 17, 1998, Teodoro pleaded not guilty to the informations. Although
he subsequently manifested a willingness to change the pleas to guilty, he balked when he was
re-arraigned on December 23, 1998 by qualifying that he had only "fingered" AAA. Accordingly,
the RTC reinstated his pleas of not guilty.
During the trial, AAA9 and BBB10 testified for the Prosecution, but two years later recanted and
turned hostile towards the Prosecution, now telling the RTC that Teodoro had only touched
AAAs vagina on the nights of December 18, 1997 and February 8, 1998.11
On his part, Teodoro claimed12 that he had only caressed or touched AAAs body on the night of
February 8, 1998; that before going home from work on that day, he had joined his friends in
drinking Kulafu; that he had arrived home late that night, and had gone to bed after serving the
children food to eat; that he had later awakened to find somebody sleeping beside him; that he
had embraced and caressed the different parts of the body of that person, whom he thought was
BBB whom he had earlier sent off to Surigao on an errand; that he had realized that he was
caressing AAA only after she shouted: Cle, Cle, ayaw! (Uncle, stop that!); that he had then
gotten up to go to a different part of the room;13 and that he did not rape AAA on the night of
December 18, 1997,14 although he admitted being at home then.15
Ruling of the RTC
After the trial, on December 10, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting Teodoro on
both counts of statutory rape notwithstanding the recantations by AAA and BBB. The RTC
disposed:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused TOMAS TEODORO
Y ANGELES in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-02 and 98-03 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape committed against AAA, an eight (8)-year old minor. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in each of the cases, with the
accessories provided for by law, to pay the offended party the sum of P100,000.00, P50,000.00
for each case, and to pay the costs.
266
In the service of his sentence, accused is credited with the full time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
The RTC rejected AAAs recantation of her accusation for being inconsistent with the testimony
of Dr. Abrenillo showing that the redness on the edges of the protective structure of her vaginal
opening had been caused by friction from the forceful introduction of an erect penis; and that
such forceful introduction of an erect penis had led to the gaping of the labia minora and labia
majora of AAA.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, Teodoro focused on the RTCs rejection of AAAs recantation. He argued in his
appellants brief17 that no rape was committed considering that the Cebuano-Visayan word
guihilabtan used by AAA in describing what he did to her signified only touching, as contrasted
with lugos, the proper Cebuano-Visayan term for rape that AAA did not use.
Unimpressed, the CA sustained the RTC, and ignored AAAs recantation for being dictated by
her familys financial difficulties. It agreed with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor
General to the effect that AAAs recantation should not be considered because it came about after
she had returned home from the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD). In contrast, it found AAAs court testimony given on November 17, 1998 consistent
with the physical findings of Dr. Abrenillo.
The CA decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident lack of
merit and the assailed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION granting in each
case moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the sum of
P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
1. Were the rapes charged against Teodoro established beyond reasonable doubt?
2. Should the recantation by AAA be accepted?
Ruling of the Court
267
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353,19
define and punish rape as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The crimes charged were two counts of statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape are that: (a)
the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge
of the victim. Considering that the essence of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a female
without her consent, neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the
females deprivation of reason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the
female of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory
rape.20 Full penile penetration of the females genitalia is not likewise required, because carnal
knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.21
Describing the rape committed against her on December 18, 1997, AAA declared thus:
Q: How about your uncle, Tomas Teodoro, do you know what did he do after you have already
eaten and drank water?
A: Yes. My uncle commanded us and he told my elder brother, EEE, to go to sleep and on that
night, I was surprised because he put off the light.
Q: Now, AAA, could you describe how your uncle look like when he arrived in your house?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: How did he look like? Did he look normal?
A: Yes, Maam, but he was drunk.
268
xxxx
Q: What do you mean by he drinks something?
A: It was Kulafu, Maam, because it smelt bad.
xxxx
Q: x x x. After your uncle put off the light, did you immediately fall asleep?
A: Not yet. I first looked at the light because I was surprised why it was put off and I noticed that
it was my uncle who put off the light.
xxxx
Q: So you are telling the Court that you were the last one to sleep that night including your uncle,
of course, among you and your siblings? You were the last one who went to sleep that night
A: Yes maam
Q: Now, when you already fell asleep, was it then the time you were awakened again because
your uncle came near you?
A: Yes maam
xxxx
Q: How did he force you to undress?
A: He was the one who undressed me maam.
Q: After he undressed you, your uncle also undressed his trousers and drawers, correct?
A: He just lowered his pants up to his knee
Q: After lowering his pants up to his knee, he laid on top of you correct?
A: He laid on top of me
Q; After that, x x x what was the next thing that he did?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
xxxx
269
Q: Now, AAA, before this incident happened on December 18, 1997, do you have a good
relationship with your step-father?
A: Yes, maam we have a good relationship.22 (Emphasis supplied)
Concerning the rape committed on February 8, 1998, AAAs testimony ran as follows:
Q: Now, what happened to you while you were sleeping or about to sleep on February 8, 1998 at
your house?
A: He touched "hilabtan" me, Sir.
Q: When you said "he touched you", you are referring to your stepfather, the accused in these
cases?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court how did the accused Tomas Teodoro touch
you?
A: He laid on top of me, Sir.
Q: Before he laid on top of you, what did he do to you?
A: He undressed me.
Q: What kind of clothes did you wear?
A: I was wearing a whole dress, Sir.
Q: When you said "whole dress," it is the same kind of clothes you are wearing now?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Before he laid on top of you, you said that he undressed you. Now, was he able to undress
you?
A: I undressed myself.
Q: You undressed yourself because your father told you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, were you wearing a panty at that time?
A: Yes, Sir, I was wearing a panty.
270
Q: Now, what happened to your panty before your step-father laid on top of you?
A: He lowered my panty up to my thigh.
Q: When your father lowered your panty up to your thigh and you were completely naked, were
you lying down on the floor of the room where you were sleeping?
A: Yes, Sir, I was lying down.
Q: How about your step-father before he laid on top of you, what kind of clothes did he wear?
A: He was wearing a jacket and a t-shirt, Sir.
Q: Did he remove his jacket and t-shirt?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How about his pants, did he remove his pants before he laid on top of you?
A: When he laid on top of me, he just lowered his pants up to his knee.
Q: Did he also lower his drawers?
A: He also lowered his drawers up to his knee, Sir.
Q: Now, when he laid on top of you, what else did he do to you aside from lying on top of you?
A: He touched me, Sir; he inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: After he inserted his penis into your vagina, what else did he do?
A: He made some push and pull movement, Sir.
Q: When he made that push and pull movement, what did you feel?
A: I felt pain, Sir.
Q: Where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: Now, while your father made that push and pull movement, what did you do or say?
A: I begged him to stop because it was really painful and after that I urinated and it was really
very painful.
271
Q: Where did you feel that pain while you were urinating?
A: In my vagina, Sir.23 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court declares that the findings of the RTC and the CA on the commission of the two counts
of statutory rape by Teodoro were well-founded. AAAs recollections given in court when she
was only eight years old disclosed an unbroken and consistent narration of her ordeals at his
hands. She thereby revealed details that no child of her very tender age could have invented or
concocted. The only rational and natural conclusion to be made by any objective arbiter is to
accord the fullest credence to her.
Yet, Teodoro would have us undo his convictions for statutory rape, arguing that AAAs
description of his acts in Cebuano-Visayan, the dialect spoken by AAA, was guihilabtan, not
lugos, the former being the dialect term for touching and the latter for rape.
Teodoros argument is directly belied by the established facts. AAA remained categorical and
steadfast about what Teodoro had done to her all throughout her testimony in court, even during
her delivery of the supposed recantation. She narrated how he had committed the rape in the
evening of December 18, 1997 by undressing her and himself, going on top of her, inserting his
male organ into her vagina, and making push and pull motions, causing her to suffer severe pain
in her vagina, to wit:
Q: Now, do you remember what happened to you while you were inside that room about to sleep
on that evening of December 18, 1997?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you?
A: At that time, he laid beside me and he told me to take off my clothes. After that, he also took
off his clothes then he laid on top of me.24
xxxx
Q: When your father laid on top of you, what did he do aside from lying on top of you?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina and he made some push and pull movement.
Q: You said that your father inserted his penis into your vagina and made a push and pull
movement. Now, when this was happening, what did you feel?
A: I asked him to stop because I felt pain, but he told me to keep quite because others might hear
us.
272
Q: When you told your father or begged your father to stop because you were feeling pain, which
part of your body did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina, Sir.
Q: When you begged your father to stop because there was pain on your vagina, did your father
heed your request to stop?
A: He stopped, Sir.
Q: You mean your father stopped his push and pull movement?
A: Yes, because after that, I told him.
Q: Now, after your father stopped his push and pull movement, what did your father do next?
A: He stopped and after that I urinated and I felt pain.
Q: Now, where did you feel that pain?
A: In my vagina.
Q: When you urinated, did your father go to sleep?
A: He did not go to sleep right away but he just lay down on bed.
Q: You mean to tell this Court that he returned to his place where he was lying down before he
raped you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, before you urinated, did your father tell you about what to do?
A: He told me never to tell the incident that happened because the moment I will tell the truth, he
will reprimand me.25 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Moreover, to believe Teodoros argument is to belie that AAA exhibited at the time of her
physical examination by Dr. Abrenillo a peripheral erythema, or redness, in her hymen, as well
as tenderness and gaping in her labia majora and labia minora. Dr. Abrenillo explained the
significance of her physical findings, to wit:
Q. So, you are telling this Honorable Court that when an erect male penis may contact in this
particular area, that might have caused the discoloration of the reddish in color of that particular
area, is that correct?
273
A. Yes, because the force of the friction might be that adequate to cause the reddish or
inflammation that resulted in the discoloration of the normal tissue or structure.
xxxx
Q. Now, in your second findings, you said that there is a slightly Gaped Exposing Hymenal
Opening of the Labia Majora and Minora, in your expert opinion as medico legal expert, what
might have caused this Gape Opening?
A. Again related to number 1, a friction also mean something can cause the gaping or exposure
of the opening and it can be substantiated also that there was pain that was experienced by the
patient.
Q. Now, you are telling this Honorable Court that when you touched this particular area, the
patient experienced pain?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. As a medico legal expert, could this particular injury be caused by a contact of an erect male
organ?
A. Well, it is sustain and with a force.
Q. In this particular case because there is a gape opening of the lips which you said this medico
legal term, Labia Majora and Minora, could this opening be caused by a contact of an erect male
organ?
A. Yes, Sir, because normally, gape should not be exposing the Hymenal Opening and the
smaller lip should be covered by the bigger one.26
In objective terms, carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape,
does not require full penile penetration of the female. The Court has clarified in People v.
Campuhan27 that the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to
reach the consummated stage of rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the
sexual act to come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the
rape is consummated once the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act
touches either labia of the pudendum. As the Court has explained in People v. Bali-Balita,28 the
touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of
organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victims vagina, or
the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching the labias or sliding into the female genitalia.
Accordingly, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape proceeds from the physical fact that the labias are physically
situated beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of
them is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia. It is
274
required, however, that this manner of touching of the labias must be sufficiently and
convincingly established.
Here, the proof of the penis of Teodoro touching the labias of AAA was sufficient and
convincing. Dr. Abrenillo found the peripheral erythema in the hymen of AAA and the fact that
her labia majora and labia minora were tender and gaping, exposing the hymenal opening. In
other words, the touching by Teodoros penis had gone beyond the mons pubis and had reached
the labias of the victim. Such physical findings, coupled with the narrative of AAA that, one,
Teodoro went on top of her body; two, he inserted his penis into her vagina; three, he made push
and pull motions thereafter; and, four, she felt great pain inside her during his push and pull
movements, rendered the findings of rape against him unassailable as to the rape committed on
February 8, 1998. With respect to the rape committed on December 18, 1997, we concur with the
RTC and CAs conclusion that AAAs testimonial account thereon likewise sufficiently and
convincingly established the commission of rape. She suffered severe pain inside her genitalia
while his penis was penetrating her, which could only be understood in the light of the foregoing
explanation made herein about his penis attaining some degree of penetration beneath the surface
of her genitalia.
Apart from being incompatible with the established facts, Teodoros argument remained a matter
of pure semantics. For sure, rape as defined and used by the Revised Penal Code is a legal term
whose exact nuances and juridical consequences no victim of AAAs tender age and naivete
could already fully know or realize. As such, her usage of the term guihilabtan to describe in the
dialect what he had done to her should not be confined to what he would have us accept as the
entire characterization of his deeds. Indeed, his argument on the distinction between the dialect
terms guihilabtan and lugos reflected nothing better than his self-serving opinion on their
meanings. Such opinion, already by its nature argumentative, should not prevail over the
physical evidence. Worse, it was not even relevant, for what he ought to have done, instead, was
to flesh out his opinion through a credible demonstration during the trial that by her usage of the
dialect term guihilabtan she really meant mere touching of her genitalia that did not amount to
his having carnal knowledge of her.
Teodoros further submission that AAA recanted the accusations against him is bereft of
substance.
The relevant portions of AAAs recantation on November 20, 2000 went as follows:
Q: Now, it appears that during the time that you were made to testify, you testified before this
honorable court that your stepfather had carnal knowledge with you, the question is why did
you make that testimony before?
A: Because I saw him doing that to me, Sir.
Q: Which one?
275
A: Because he undressed me and he touched my private parts. He touched my vagina and I told
him to stop because I felt the need to urinate. When I urinated, it was very painful since the act
has just been done.
xxxx
Q: AAA, why are you crying?
A: Because of my problem, sir.
Q: What is your problem, AAA?
A: When my step-father touched me.
Q. AAA, you pity your step-father or your uncle because he has been in jail for a long time and
nobody can help your mother now?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You want your step-father to come home, is that correct, to help you and your mother?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxxx
COURT
Q: Why are you crying?
A: Because it is against my will, your honor.
Q: Which one is against your will?
A: When my uncle touched me your honor. That is why I cried.
Q: You are no longer with the DSWD in Butuan city?
A: Not any more Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: You informed the Court before when you testified for the prosecution that your uncle removed
your panty, touched your vagina and inserted his penis into your vagina is it not?
A: That is not true, Your Honor.
276
Q: What do you mean that is not true? What is your understanding about that?
A: He was only touching me, Your Honor.
Q: Okay he touched your vagina?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: He did not insert his fingers into your vagina?
A: He did not, Your Honor.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Even during her intended recantation, AAA cried most of the time. Such demeanor reflected how
much she despised what he had done to her twice. As such, her supposed recantation did not
conceal the impelling motive for it being that her mother and her family still needed the material
support of Teodoro. This was confirmed even by BBB, whose own testimony on AAAs
supposed recantation was as follows:
Court:
But despite the fact that your common law husband according to you he is a troublesome person
everytime he gets drank, this case will be dismissed. You want to maintain your relationship
again?
A: Not anymore, Your Honor.
Q. Why?
A. I want him to get out from Jail so that I could have somebody to help me and to assist me in
rearing my children specially so, Your Honor, my children are now growing up.
Q. Okay, now if you want him to rear or help in rearing your children, naturally he used to go
home to your house and sleep together with you, do you want him to sleep in another house?
A. He promised to me, Your Honor, that he will live in the residence of his employer.30
(Emphasis supplied)
BBB was then rearing four young children by Teodoro (the youngest being born when he was
already detained),31 as well as AAA and her five siblings that BBB had from an earlier
relationship.32 She unabashedly needed the material support of Teodoro; hence, she prevailed on
AAA to withdraw her charges against him. But a recantation under such insincere circumstances
was unacceptable.
As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly because the recantation of her testimony by
a vital witness of the State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly because there is
always the possibility that such recantation may later be repudiated.33 Indeed, to disregard
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testimony solemnly given in court simply because the witness recants it ignores the possibility
that intimidation or monetary considerations may have caused the recantation. Court
proceedings, in which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be truthful under all
circumstances, are trivialized by the recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was
given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed at the mercy of an unscrupulous
witness. Before allowing the recantation, therefore, the court must not be too willing to accept it,
but must test its value in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected to crossexamine the recanting witness both upon the substance of the recantation and the
motivations for it.34 The recantation, like any other testimony, is subject to the test of credibility
based on the relevant circumstances, including the demeanor of the recanting witness on the
stand. In that respect, the finding of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons necessitate its re-examination, the reason being that
the trial court is in a better position to hear first-hand and observe the deportment, conduct and
attitude of the witnesses.35
Finally, we rectify the amounts of the civil liability of Teodoro.1wphi1 The RTC had granted to
AAA only the amount of P50,000.00 for each case, or a total of P100,000.00 for both cases,
without stating the character of the award, but the CA modified the award by granting in each
case moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
Both lower courts thereby erred. There is no longer any debate that the victim in statutory rape is
entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral damages of P50,000.00, and exemplary
damages of P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape.36 Similarly, the award of moral damages of P50,000.00 is mandatory,
and made without need of allegation and proof other than that of the fact of rape,37 for it is
logically assumed that the victim suffered moral injuries from her ordeal. In addition, exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 are justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code38 to set an example for
the public good and to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the young.39
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on April 24, 2006, with the
MODIFICATION that TOMAS TEODORO y ANGELES is ordered to pay to AAA for each
count of rape the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
decision.
People v. Laog
For our review is the March 21, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00234 which affirmed appellants conviction for murder in Criminal Case No. 2162-M2000 and rape in Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000.
Appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 11, of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information,2 which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2162-M-2000, alleged:
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That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a lead pipe and with intent to kill one Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said lead pipe the said Jennifer PatawaranRosal, thereby inflicting upon said Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal serious physical injuries which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to law.
He was likewise charged before the same court with the crime of rape of AAA.3 The second
Information,4 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2308-M-2000, alleged:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by attacking
and hitting with a lead pipe one [AAA] which resulted [in] her incurring serious physical injuries
that almost caused her death, and while in such defenseless situation, did then and there have
carnal knowledge of said [AAA] against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The two cases were thereafter tried
jointly because they arose from the same incident.
The prosecution presented as its principal witness AAA, the rape victim who was 19 years old at
the time of the incident. Her testimony was corroborated by her grandfather BBB, Dr. Ivan
Richard Viray, and her neighbor CCC.
AAA testified that at around six oclock in the evening of June 6, 2000, she and her friend,
Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal, were walking along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work at
a canteen near the National Highway in Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan. Suddenly, appellant,
who was holding an ice pick and a lead pipe, waylaid them and forcibly brought them to a grassy
area at the back of a concrete wall. Without warning, appellant struck AAA in the head with the
lead pipe causing her to feel dizzy and to fall down. When Jennifer saw this, she cried out for
help but appellant also hit her on the head with the lead pipe, knocking her down. Appellant
stabbed Jennifer several times with the ice pick and thereafter covered her body with thick
grass.5 Appellant then turned to AAA. He hit AAA in the head several times more with the lead
pipe and stabbed her on the face. While AAA was in such defenseless position, appellant pulled
down her jogging pants, removed her panty, and pulled up her blouse and bra. He then went on
top of her, sucked her breasts and inserted his penis into her vagina. After raping AAA, appellant
also covered her with grass. At that point, AAA passed out.6
When AAA regained consciousness, it was nighttime and raining hard. She crawled until she
reached her uncles farm at daybreak on June 8, 2000.7 When she saw him, she waved at him for
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help. Her uncle, BBB, and a certain Nano then brought her to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag, Bulacan
where she stayed for more than three weeks. She later learned that Jennifer had died.8
During cross-examination, AAA explained that she did not try to run away when appellant
accosted them because she trusted appellant who was her uncle by affinity. She said that she
never thought he would harm them.9
BBB testified that on June 8, 2000, at about six oclock in the morning, he was at his rice field at
Sampaloc, San Rafael, Bulacan when he saw a woman waving a hand and then fell down. The
woman was about 200 meters away from him when he saw her waving to him, and he did not
mind her. However, when she was about 100 meters away from him, he recognized the woman
as AAA, his granddaughter. He immediately approached her and saw that her face was swollen,
with her hair covering her face, and her clothes all wet. He asked AAA what happened to her,
and AAA uttered, "Si Tata Coni" referring to appellant who is his son-in-law.10 With the help of
his neighbor, he brought AAA home.11 AAA was later brought to Carpa Hospital in Baliuag,
Bulacan where she recuperated for three weeks.
CCC, neighbor of AAA and Jennifer, testified that sometime after June 6, 2000, she visited AAA
at the hospital and asked AAA about the whereabouts of Jennifer. AAA told her to look for
Jennifer somewhere at Buenavista. She sought the assistance of Barangay Officials and they
went to Buenavista where they found Jennifers cadaver covered with grass and already
bloated.12
Meanwhile, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray, a medico-legal officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted
the autopsy on the remains of Jennifer. His findings are as follows:
the body is in advanced stage of decomposition[;] eyeballs and to[n]gue were protru[d]ed;
the lips and abdomen are swollen; desquamation and bursting of bullae and denudation of the
epidermis in the head, trunks and on the upper extremities[;] [f]rothy fluid and maggots coming
from the nose, mouth, genital region and at the site of wounds, three (3) lacerations at the
head[;] two (2) stab wounds at the submandibular region[;] four [4] punctured wounds at the
chest of the victim[.]
cause of death of the victim was hemorrhagic shock as result of stab wounds [in] the head and
trunk.13
The prosecution and the defense also stipulated on the testimony of Elizabeth Patawaran,
Jennifers mother, as to the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 2162-M-2000. It was stipulated that
she spent P25,000 for Jennifers funeral and burial.14
Appellant, on the other hand, denied the charges against him. Appellant testified that he was at
home cooking dinner around the time the crimes were committed. With him were his children,
Ronnie, Jay, Oliver and Conrado, Jr. and his nephew, Rey Laog. At around seven oclock, he was
arrested by the police officers of San Rafael, Bulacan. He learned that his wife had reported him
to the police after he "went wild" that same night and struck with a lead pipe a man whom he
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saw talking to his wife inside their house. When he was already incarcerated, he learned that he
was being charged with murder and rape.15
Appellant further testified that AAA and Jennifer frequently went to his nipa hut whenever they
would ask for rice or money. He claimed that in the evening of June 5, 2000, AAA and Jennifer
slept in his nipa hut but they left the following morning at around seven oclock. An hour later,
he left his house to have his scythe repaired. However, he was not able to do so because that was
the time when he "went wild" after seeing his wife with another man. He admitted that his nipa
hut is more or less only 100 meters away from the scene of the crime.16
The defense also presented appellants nephew, Rey Laog, who testified that he went to
appellants house on June 5, 2000, at around three oclock in the afternoon, and saw AAA and
Jennifer there. He recalled seeing AAA and Jennifer before at his uncles house about seven
times because AAA and his uncle had an illicit affair. He further testified that appellant arrived
before midnight on June 5, 2000 and slept with AAA. The following morning, at around six
oclock, AAA and Jennifer went home. He and appellant meanwhile left the house together.
Appellant was going to San Rafael to have his scythe repaired while he proceeded to his house in
Pinakpinakan, San Rafael, Bulacan.17
After trial, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision18 on June 30, 2003 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of both crimes. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2162-M-2000, this court finds the accused Conrado Laog
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Patawaran, the following sums of money:
a. P60,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2308-M-2000, this Court hereby finds the accused Conrado
Laog GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape under Art. 266-A par. (a) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay the private complainant the following sums of money.
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.19
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Appellant appealed his conviction to this Court. But conformably with our pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,20 the case was referred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the trial courts
judgment. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Joint Decision, dated June 30,
2003, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case Nos. 2162M-2000 & 2308-M-2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case [No.]
2162-M-2000, Accused-Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran [an]
additional P25,000.00 as actual damages. The exemplary damages awarded by the Trial Court in
2162-M-2000 & 2308-M-2000 are hereby reduced to P25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.21
Appellant is now before this Court assailing the CAs affirmance of his conviction for both
crimes of rape and murder. In a Resolution22 dated August 22, 2007, we required the parties to
submit their respective Supplemental Briefs, if they so desire. However, the parties submitted
separate Manifestations in lieu of Supplemental Briefs, adopting the arguments in their
respective briefs filed in the CA. Appellant had raised the following errors allegedly committed
by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT
AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS [AAA].
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
killing of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal and the rape of AAA. He assails AAAs credibility, the
prosecutions main witness, and points out alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. Appellant
also contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he carefully planned the execution of
the crimes charged. According to him, AAAs narration that he waylaid them while walking
along the rice paddies on their way to apply for work negates evident premeditation since there
was no evidence that the said path was their usual route.
Appellant further contends that the trial court and CA erred in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. He argues that for abuse of superior strength to be
appreciated in the killing of Jennifer, the physical attributes of both the accused and the victim
should have been shown in order to determine whether the accused had the capacity to overcome
the victim physically or whether the victim was substantially weak and unable to put up a
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defense. Additionally, he attempts to cast doubt upon AAAs testimony, arguing that it lacked
some details on how, after she was raped and stabbed by appellant, she was still able to put on
her clothes and crawl to her grandfathers farm.
Appellant principally attacks the credibility of prosecution witness AAA. Jurisprudence has
decreed that the issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of
the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts"24 and "absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of
the trial courts assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the
formers findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the
case."25 This rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court concurred with the trial
court.26
Here, both the trial and appellate courts gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony
of AAA, the lone eyewitness to Jennifers killing and was herself brutally attacked by appellant
who also raped her. Appellant had not shown any sufficiently weighty reasons for us to disturb
the trial courts evaluation of the prosecution eyewitness credibility. In particular, we defer to the
trial courts firsthand observations on AAAs deportment while testifying and its veritable
assessment of her credibility, to wit:
From the moment [AAA] took the stand, this Court has come to discern in her the trepidations of
a woman outraged who is about to recount the ordeal she had gone through. She took her oath
with trembling hands, her voice low and soft, hardly audible. Face down, her eyes were
constantly fixed on the floor as if avoiding an eye contact with the man she was about to testify
against. After a few questions in direct, the emotion building up inside her came to the fore and
she burst into tears, badly shaken, unfit to continue any further with her testimony. Thus, in
deference to her agitated situation, this Court has to defer her direct-examination. When she
came back, however, to continue with her aborted questioning, this time, composed and
collected, direct and straightforward in her narration, all vestiges of doubt on her credibility
vanished.27
Indeed, records bear out that AAA became so tense and nervous when she took the witness stand
for the first time that the trial court had to cut short her initial direct examination. However,
during the next hearing she was able to narrate her harrowing ordeal in a clear and
straightforward manner, describing in detail how appellant waylaid them and mercilessly hit and
attacked her and Jennifer with a lead pipe and ice pick before raping her. We quote the pertinent
portions of her testimony:
Q: During your previous testimony, Madam Witness, you said that youre not able to reach your
place of work on June 6, 2000, what is the reason why you did not reach your place of work?
A: We were waylaid (hinarang) by Conrado Laog, sir.
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Q: In what manner were you waylaid by Conrado Laog?

A: Conrado Laog hit me with the pipe on my head, sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you when you were hit?
A: We were walking along the rice puddies (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what happened to you when you were hit with the lead pipe by Conrado Laog?
A: I fell down (nabuwal) because I felt dizzy, sir.
Q: Now, what happened next, if any?
A: I heard Jennifer crying, sir.
Q: And you heard Jennifer but did you see her?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was Conrado Laog when you heard Jennifer crying?
A: He was beside me, sir.
Court:
Q: How about Jennifer, where was she when you heard her crying?
A: She was standing on the rice puddies, (sic), Your Honor.
Fiscal:
Q: And what was Conrado Laog doing?
A: He approached Jennifer, sir.
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: He hit Jennifer with the pipe, sir.
Q: And what happened to Jennifer?
284
A: She fell down, sir.

Q: What did Conrado Laog do next?
A: He stabbed Jennifer, sir.
Q: After Conrado Laog stabbed Jennifer, what happened next?
A: He covered Jennifer with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did Conrado Laog do?
A: He came back to me, sir.
Q: When Conrado Laog came back to you, what did you do, if any?
A: He hit me with the pipe several times, sir.
Q: And what happened to you?
A: And he stabbed me on my face, sir.
Q: Then, what happened to you?
A: After that, he pulled down my jogging pants, sir. He removed my panty and my blouse and
my bra.
Q: After that, what did he do next?
A: And then, he went on top of me, sir.
Q: Then, what happened?
A: He sucked my breast, sir.
Q: And after that?
A: He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: Did he suc[c]eed in putting his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: For how long did the accused Conrado Laog insert his penis into your vagina?
285
A: For quite sometime, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?
A: After that, he stood up, sir.
Q: And where did he go?
A: After that, he covered me with grasses, sir.
Q: And after that, what did you do?
A: I fell unconscious, sir.
Q: Now, if Conrado Laog is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point to him?
Interpreter:
Witness is pointing to a man wearing an inmates uniform and when asked his name, answered:
Conrado Laog.
x x x x28
On the other hand, appellant merely interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that at
the time of the incident, he was at his house with his children and nephew cooking dinner. His
defense, however, cannot prevail over the straightforward and credible testimony of AAA who
positively identified him as the perpetrator of the murder and rape. Time and again, we have held
that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and
denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.29
AAA was firm and unrelenting in pointing to appellant as the one who attacked her and Jennifer,
stabbing the latter to death before raping AAA. It should be noted that AAA knew appellant well
since they were relatives by affinity. As correctly held by the CA, with AAAs familiarity and
proximity with the appellant during the commission of the crime, her identification of appellant
could not be doubted or mistaken. In fact, AAA, upon encountering appellant, did not run away
as she never thought her own uncle would harm her and her friend. Moreover, the most natural
reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime
and observe the manner in which the crime is being committed.30 There is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against appellant or to falsely implicate
him in the commission of a crime. Thus, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of
full faith and credence.31
In People v. Nieto,32 we reiterated that -It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support
it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement
286
of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise unavailing. Firstly,
alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is unacceptable when there is a positive
identification of the accused by a credible witness. Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is
not enough to prove that the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the
crime; it must also be shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within
the vicinity of the crime scene.
Appellant does not dispute that he was near the vicinity of the crime on the evening of June 6,
2000. In fact, during his cross-examination, appellant admitted that his house was more or less
only 100 meters from the crime scene. Thus, his defense of alibi is not worthy of any credit for
the added reason that he has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
In view of the credible testimony of AAA, appellants defenses of denial and alibi deserve no
consideration. We stress that these weak defenses cannot stand against the positive identification
and categorical testimony of a rape victim.33
Appellant attempts to discredit AAA's accusation of rape by pointing out that while she testified
on being very weak that she even passed out after she was raped by appellant, she nevertheless
stated that when she crawled her way to her grandfather's farm she was wearing her clothes.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution should have presented the physician who examined
AAA to prove her allegations that she was beaten and raped by appellant.
We are not persuaded.
Based on AAAs account, appellant did not undress her completely -- her blouse and bra were
merely lifted up ("nililis") while her undergarments were just pulled down, which therefore
explains why she still had her clothes on when she crawled to her grandfathers farm.
Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters
-- not to the central fact of the crime -- do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential
credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on
the whole.34 For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis
for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged.35 It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let
alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.36
As to the fact that the physician who examined AAA at the hospital did not testify during the
trial, we find this not fatal to the prosecutions case.
It must be underscored that the foremost consideration in the prosecution of rape is the victims
testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer. In fact, a medical examination of the
victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape; the victims testimony alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict.37 Thus we have ruled that a medical examination of the victim, as well as
287
the medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element
for conviction in rape. What is important is that the testimony of private complainant about the
incident is clear, unequivocal and credible,38 as what we find in this case.
While we concur with the trial courts conclusion that appellant indeed was the one who raped
AAA and killed Jennifer, we find that appellant should not have been convicted of the separate
crimes of murder and rape. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question, including one not raised by the parties.39 The facts alleged and proven clearly show
that the crime committed by appellant is rape with homicide, a special complex crime provided
under Article 266-B, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8353.40
In People v. Larraaga,41 this Court explained the concept of a special complex crime, as
follows:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a
single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1)
robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4)
kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime,
the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision
that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier
mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed;["] and that
this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at bar, particularly Criminal
Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped "on
the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the
occasion thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape. x x x42 (Emphasis supplied.)
A special complex crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special
penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the
case of People v. Barros,43 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis
as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since
they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another
[complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of
aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such
composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."44
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides only a single penalty for the
composite acts of rape and the killing committed by reason or on the occasion of the rape.
288
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering that the prosecution in this case was able to prove both the rape of AAA and the
killing of Jennifer both perpetrated by appellant, he is liable for rape with homicide under the
above provision. There is no doubt that appellant killed Jennifer to prevent her from aiding AAA
or calling for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not
witness the rape of AAA, the original intent of appellant. His carnal desire having been satiated,
appellant purposely covered AAAs body with grass, as he did earlier with Jennifers body, so
that it may not be easily noticed or seen by passersby. Appellant indeed thought that the savage
blows he had inflicted on AAA were enough to cause her death as with Jennifer. But AAA
survived and appellants barbaric deeds were soon enough discovered.
The facts established showed that the constitutive elements of rape with homicide were
consummated, and it is immaterial that the person killed in this case is someone other than the
woman victim of the rape. An analogy may be drawn from our rulings in cases of robbery with
homicide, where the component acts of homicide, physical injuries and other offenses have been
committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery. In People v. De Leon,45 we expounded on
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with
homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide
is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the
homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on
289
the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of
the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the
felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and
indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in
its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on
occasion of the rape.47 Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the
aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales48
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons
and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly
characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel
was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the
attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions
surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition
and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery
with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances
proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify
the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty
to be imposed.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime.50 It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.51
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead
pipe then stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. Clearly, the manner by which appellant had
brutally slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to
render her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that
appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to his unarmed victim. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
290
It has long been established that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an
unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which
his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to
defend herself. Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend
himself or repel the aggression, taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the
victim was completely defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the
aggressors natural strength over that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both
and the employment of means weakening the defense, although not annulling it. By deliberately
employing deadly weapons, an ice pick and a lead pipe, [a]ccused-[a]ppellant clearly took
advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed
victim. The accused-appellants sudden attack caught the victim off-guard rendering her
defenseless.52
Abuse of superior strength in this case therefore is merely a generic aggravating circumstance to
be considered in the imposition of the penalty. The penalty provided in Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is death. However, in view of the passage on June 24, 2006 of
R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines" the Court is mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole.53
The aggravating/qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and use of deadly
weapon have greater relevance insofar as the civil aspect of this case is concerned. While the trial
court and CA were correct in holding that both the victim of the killing (Jennifer) and the rape
victim (AAA) are entitled to the award of exemplary damages, the basis for such award needs
further clarification.
Articles 2229 and 2230 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
In view of the presence of abuse of superior strength in the killing of Jennifer, her heirs are
entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to Article 2230. With respect to the rape committed
against AAA, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that a man who
shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat or intimidation under Article 266A (a), whenever such rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Since the use of a deadly weapon raises
the penalty for the rape, this circumstance would justify the award of exemplary damages to the
offended party (AAA) also in accordance with Article 2230.
291
Article 266-B likewise provides for the imposition of death penalty if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the aggravating/qualifying circumstances enumerated therein. Among
these circumstances is minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphasis supplied.)
AAAs relationship to appellant, who is his uncle by affinity, was not alleged in the information
but admitted by appellant when he testified in court:
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF
CONRADO LAOG By:
Atty. Roque:
xxxx
Q Do you know a person by the name of [AAA]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know her?
A Because she is our neighbor. Her house is just adjacent to ours, sir.
Q How are you related to [AAA]?
A Her mother and my wife are sisters.
Q So she is your niece-in-law?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x54 (Emphasis supplied.)
The failure of the prosecution to allege in the information AAAs relationship to appellant will
not bar the consideration of the said circumstance in the determination of his civil liability. In
any case, even without the attendance of aggravating circumstances, exemplary damages may
still be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the "highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender." Citing our earlier ruling in the case of People v. Catubig,55
this Court clarified in People v. Dalisay56:
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded
exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
292
qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was
not alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However,
with the promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the aggravating
circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of
damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts
will not award exemplary damages. Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts may still award exemplary
damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not
been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted before the effectivity of
the Revised Rules which remained pending thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive
application of the Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private
offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving rape,
dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but was consequently proven in
the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating
circumstance has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules. Among those in the
first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor, People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v.
Magbanua, People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the Philippines v.
Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are
People v. Llave, People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the Philippines
v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two sets rests on when the criminal case was
instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary
damagestaking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are
awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there
is preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that
has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation
for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendantassociated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression,
insult or fraud or gross fraudthat intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive
damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
293
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in
good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article
2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main
provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court
imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual
behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court
awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of
the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter
from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than Article
2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales
words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, "[t]he
application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one,
defeats the underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damagesto set a public
example or correction for the public good."57 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
In this case, the brutal manner by which appellant carried out his lustful design against his niecein-law who never had an inkling that her own uncle would do any harm to her and her friend,
justified the award of exemplary damages. Appellants sudden and fierce attack on AAA -hitting her several times on the head with a lead pipe before stabbing her face until she fell down,
hurriedly lifting her bra and blouse and pulling down her undergarments, raping her while she
was in such a defenseless position, covering her body with grasses and abandoning her to die in a
grassy field -- was truly despicable and outrageous. Such vicious assault was made even more
reprehensible as it also victimized Jennifer, who sustained more stab wounds and beatings,
causing her violent death. Article 2229 of the Civil Code allows the award of exemplary damages
in order to deter the commission of similar acts and to allow the courts to forestall behavior that
would pose grave and deleterious consequences to society.58 In line with current jurisprudence,
the amount of P30,000 each for AAA and the heirs of Jennifer as exemplary damages was
correctly awarded by the trial court.
We also affirm the trial court and CA in ordering appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Patawaran-Rosal the amounts of P50,000 as moral damages. In cases of murder and homicide,
the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim.59 Anent the award of civil indemnity, the same is increased to P75,000 to
conform with recent jurisprudence.60 As to expenses incurred for the funeral and burial of
Jennifer, the CA correctly awarded her heirs the amount of P25,000 as actual damages, said
amount having been stipulated by the parties during the trial.
294
Lastly, we affirm the award of P50,000 to AAA as civil indemnity for the crime of rape, as well
as the award of P50,000 as moral damages. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape while moral damages are awarded upon such finding without need of
further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling the victim to such award.61
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The March 21, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00234 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
Accused-appellant Conrado Laog y Ramin is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape With Homicide under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole.
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Jennifer Patawaran-Rosal P75,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages, P25,000 as actual damages and P30,000
as exemplary damages. He is further ordered to pay to the victim AAA the sums of P50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000 as moral damages and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
People v. Barranco
Doctrine: Rape is a crime which is not normally committed in the presence of witnesses, hence,
courts merely rely on the credibility of the complainants testimony as weighed against the
credibility of accused.
Ang isang karaniwang kasabihan ay "ang karangalan ng isang tao ay katumbas ng kanyang
buhay," lalo na at kung ang pag-uusapan ay ang karangalan, dangal o puri ng isang babae. Kaya
nga sa batas, ang pagsira ng puri ng isang babae ay mabigat na kasalanan at kung ito ay ginawa
ng sapilitan ang parusang katumbas ay mabilanggo habang buhay. Ano pa at kung ang paggahasa ay ginamitan ng sandatang nakamamatay o ginawa ng dalawa o higit pang kalalakihan, o
ang pinagsamantalahan ay namatay o nasiraan ng bait, ang pataw na parusa sa batas ay bitay. 1
Ganoon pa man sa ating saligang batas ay ipinagbabawal na ilapat ang parusang ito. 2
Ito ang paksa ng paghahabol na ito. Si Rosalia Barranco ay isang dalagang labing-siyam na taong
gulang lamang. Siya ang panganay sa pitong anak ng magasawang Jaime at Aurora Barranco.
Tuwing araw ng Sabado, ang magkakapatid maliban kay Rosalia ay tumutulong sa kanilang mga
magulang sa pagsasaka sa kanilang bukid sa Abanay, may layong tatlong kilometro sa kanilang
tirahan sa Madong, Janiuay, Iloilo. Naiiwang mag-isa si Rosalia sa bahay upang siya ay tumingin
sa alagang baboy at magsilbing bantay ng kanilang tahanan.
Si Bartolome Barranco ay may-asawa at limang anak. Siya ay pinsang makalawa ng ama ni
Rosalia at pinakamalapit na kapitbahay ng pamilyang Barranco sa Baranggay Madong. Ang
pagitan ng dalawang tirahan ay humigit kumulang lamang sa isang daang (100) metro. Si Rosalia
ay kumare ng asawa ni Bartolome. Nang katanghalian ng ika-10 ng Pebrero, 1980, habang si
Rosalia ay mag-isang natutulog sa kanilang bahay, bigla na lamang niyang naramdaman na may
taong nakadagan sa kanya. Nang imulat ni Rosalia ang kanyang mga mata, nakita niya si
295
Bartolome na hubot hubad sa kanyang ibabaw. Kung sa papaanong paraan nakapasok sa kanilang
bahay ang nasabing tao ay hindi niya mawari. Nang makita niya ang mukha ni Bartolome akala
niya na ang mga pangyayari ay isang masamang panaginip lamang subalit siya ay nagitla nang
itinutok ni Bartolome ang isang patalim (butcher's knife) sa kanyang leeg. Binalaan siya nito na
kung siya ay magtatangkang gumalaw o sumigaw ay papatayin siya nito. Hindi makagalaw sa
sindak si Rosalia. Itinaas ni Bartolome ang kanyang palda at biglang binatak ang kanyang panti.
Sapagkat magkadikit ang mga hita ni Rosalia, iniutos ni Bartolome na ibuka niya ang mga ito.
Hindi siya sumunod kaya siya ay binantaang muli na papatayin ni Bartolome kapag hindi niya
ibinuka ang kanyang mga hita. Lalong nanigas sa takot si Rosalia. Hinawi ni Bartolome ang mga
hita ni Rosalia, at tinangka nitong ipasok ang kanyang ari sa ari ng dalaga. Matapos ang
dalawang ulit na sapilitang pagtatangka ay nagtagumpay si Bartolome na maipasok ang kanyang
ari at tuluyang hinalay si Rosalia. Naramdaman ni Rosalia ang matinding hapdi sa bungad ng
kanyang ari. Pagkatapos nito, nagpahinga si Bartolome ng mga limang minuto habang ang
kanyang ari ay nakababad sa ari ni Rosalia. Ipinagpatuloy niya ang kanyang makamundong
pagnanasa. At habang ginagahasa ni Bartolome si Rosalia hawak niya ang patalim na nakatutok
sa leeg ni Rosalia.
Bago tuluyang umalis si Bartolome, binalaan niya ang dalaga na huwag magsusumbong sa
kanyang mga magulang kung ayaw niyang mamatay. Sumusulak ang kalooban ni Rosalia sa tindi
ng galit bunga ng pagkalugso ng kaniyang puri, subalit hindi siya makakibo dahil sa malaking
takot na baka siya ay patayin ni Bartolome oras na isiwalat niya ang nangyari. Kaya't minabuti
na lamang niya na itikom ang kanyang bibig at tiisin ang masaklap na kapalaran.
Noon ika-19 ng Marso, 1980, ika-siyam ng umaga noon, habang si Rosalia ay abalang
naghahanda ng pagkain ng alagang baboy, bigla na lamang siyang sinakmal ng buhat sa likod ni
Bartolome upang pagsamantalahang muli. Ang kanyang ina ay nagkataon na wala sa bahay noon
sapagkat dumalo sa pagtatapos ng isa sa kanyang mga kapatid na babae. Sa kanyang pagkabigla,
dinampot ni Rosalia ang isang pirasong kahoy at ipinalo niya ito sa ulo ni Bartolome. Binitiwan
siya ni Bartolome. Agad siyang lumabas ng bahay at sinabing sisigaw ng saklolo kung hindi
titigil si Bartolome. Dahil dito, agad-agad umalis si Bartolome.
Pagdating ng kanyang ina, nuong mga ikalabing-isa ng umaga, nakita nito si Rosalia na umiiyak.
Itinanong nito ang dahilan. Hindi na nakatiis si Rosalia at napilitang ipagtapat sa kanyang ina
ang naganap noong ika-10 ng Pebrero. Kinabukasan, si Rosalia kasama ang kanyang ina ay
nagsumbong sa puno ng pulisya sa Janiuay, Iloilo. Pinayuhan sila na ipasuri muna ang dalaga sa
manggagamot ng NBI sa Iloilo City. Sa nasabing tanggapan, sinuri siya ni Dr. Ricardo H.
Jaboneta. Tiningnan pa kung siya ay buntis (pregnancy test) at napagalaman na siya nga ay
nagdadalang tao.
Noong ika-16 ng Abril, 1980, nagharap ng habla si Rosalia sa salang panggagahasa laban kay
Bartolome sa mababang hukuman (municipal circuit court) ng Janiuay-Badiangan, Iloilo.
Matapos madakip si Bartolome at ang paunang pagsisiyasat, ang nauukol na habla ay isinampa
ng punong taga-usig ng lalawigan sa hukuman. Nang itanong kay Bartolome kung inaamin niya
ang paratang laban sa kaniya sa hukuman, tinanggihan niya ito kayat pinasimulan ang paglilitis
hanggang sa ito ay matapos.
296
Noong ika-3 ng Abril, 1981 naglabas ng hatol ang hukuman. Napatunayan na si Bartolome ay
nagkasala ng panggagahasa sa pamamagitan ng sandatang nakamamatay. Ipinataw sa kanya ang
parusang pagkabilanggo ng habang-buhay kasama ang iba pang mga parusa ayon sa batas at
ipinagbabayad pa siya ng halaga ng usapin. Iniutos din ng hukuman na kilalanin niyang anak ang
bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. At sa dahilang siya ay nakapiit mula pa ng ika-3 ng Hulyo,1980,
iniutos din na ang kanyang pansamantalang pagkabilanggo ay bibilangin na kasama sa parusang
ipinataw sapagkat siya ay lumagda sa isang kasunduan na tutupad sa lahat ng pinag-uutos sa mga
naparusahang nakapiit.
Naghahabol ngayon ang nasasakdal sa Hukumang ito at sinasabing: (1) hindi dapat pinaniwalaan
ang pahayag ng nagreklamo sa dahilang walang ibang nagpatotoo dito; (2) na hindi siya dapat
parusahan sa salang panggagahasa; at (3) hindi siya dapat utusan na kilalaning anak niya ang
naging supling ni Rosalia.
Matapos na suriin ang mga katibayang iniharap, walang makitang sapat na dahilan ang
Hukumang ito upang baguhin ang pasiya ng mababang hukuman.
Ang kasalanang panggagahasa ay totoong mahirap patunayan sapagkat ang karaniwang
nakakaalam lamang nito ay ang pinagsamantalahan at ang nagsamantala. Samakatuwid, hindi
maaasahan na mayroon pang ibang makapagpapahayag ng pangyayari. Hindi pangkaraniwan na
ang salang ito ay nagaganap na may saksi. Sa ganitong dahilan ang hukuman ay umaasa sa
katapatan ng pahayag ng nagsusumbong at tinitimbang ito laban sa pagtanggi o
pagpapasinungaling ng inuusig.
Sinasabi ng nasasakdal na hindi dapat paniwalaan ang mga pahayag ng nagsasakdal dahil sa
hindi pagkakatugma nito.
Una, di-umano ay nagpahayag ang nagsasakdal na siya ay natakot kaya siya ay sumunod sa utos
ng nasasakdal na ibuka ang kanyang mga hita. Subalit nang tanungin siyang muli ng
manananggol ng nasasakdal ang naging kasagutan niya ay ang nasasakdal ang siyang humawi ng
kanyang mga hita. Walang saliwa sa mga pahayag na ito. Malinaw na dahil sa tindi ng takot ni
Rosalia, ibinuka niya ang kanyang mga hita at hinayaang mahawi ng nasasakdal ang kanyang
mga hita.
Ikalawa, sinabi raw ng naghahabla na binunot ng nahahabla ang kanyang ari pagkatapos siyang
gamitin nito at ipinasok lamang ito nang muli siyang inabuso. Noong siya ay tanungin ng
manananggol ng nasasakdal ukol sa bagay na ito, ng sabi niya ay nagpahinga ang nahahabla na
ang kanyang ari ay nakababad sa loob ng kanyang ari.
Dapat alalahanin na ang naghahabla ay isang dalaga na noon lamang nakaranas ng bagay na ito.
Nakaramdam siya ng matinding sakit sa kanyang ari at bukod pa rito ay ang malaking takot na
sumagila sa kanya. Hindi maaasahan na malaman pa niya kung binunot nga o hindi ng
nasasakdal ang kanyang ari. Maaaring sinabi niyang nakababad pa rin ang ari ng inuusig sa
kanya kung pagkatapos ng paggalaw nito ang nasasakdal ay hindi umalis sa pagkakadagan sa
kanya habang ito ay sandaling nagpahinga.
297
Ikatlo, di-umano, tiwali ang pahayag ng naghahabla na noong ika-19 ng Marso nang tinangkang
halayin siyang muli ng nasasakdal ay pinalo niya ito ng kahoy sa ulo, at sinabi rin niya na kung
ang nahahabla ay lalapit, siya ay lalabas at hihingi ng saklolo. Walang lisya dito. Maliwanag na
sinabi ng nagsasakdal na pinalo niya sa ulo ang nasasakdal kaya nabitawan siya nito. At malinaw
rin na ang nagsasakdal ay lumabas at sinabing hihiyaw siya kapag nagpatuloy sa masamang
tangka ang nasasakdal.
Ganoon pa man, kung mayroon mang hindi pagkakatugma ang pahayag ng naghahabla, ito ay sa
mga maliliit na bahagi lamang at ito ay hindi sapat na dahilan upang hindi paniwalaan ng
hukuman ang kabuuan ng kanyang ipinahayag. Ang totoo nito, dahil sa napakasaklap na
naranasan ng nagsasakdal hindi maaasahan na matatandaan pa niya ang pinakamaliliit na bahagi
ng pangyayari. Ang isang saksi na ang pahayag ay mayroong kaunting pagkakamali ang
karaniwang nagsasabi ng katotohanan.
Sa kabilang dako, hindi kapani-paniwala ang pahayag ng nasasakdal na hindi niya pinilit ang
nagsasakdal noong ika-10 ng Pebrero. Kusang-loob daw ang kanilang pagtatalik at may isang
taon nang may pagkakaugnayan sila bago pa man dumating ang nasabing araw. Ito ay
napasinungalingan ng kinalabasan ng pagsusuri ng manggagamot ng NBI sa ari ni Rosalia, gaya
ng sumusunod:
labia majora and minora coaptated. Fourchette tense vestibular moncoss vilacious. Hymen
fleshy, presence of superficial laceration at 9 o'clock position according to face of a watch. Edges
fairly coaptable and congested. Hymenal orifice originally angular and adnidts glass tube three
cms. diameter with moderate resistance.
Ito ang karaniwang kalagayan ng ari ng babaeng donselya matapos ang kanyang unang
karanasan. Samakatuwid, walang katotohanan ang salaysay ng nahahabla na may isang taon na
silang nagtatabi ng nagsasakdal bago pa noong ika-10 ng Pebrero.
Sinabi rin ng nasasakdal na ang nagsasakdal ang tumukso sa kanya kaya sila nagkaroon ng
kaugnayan. Pinangalawahan ito ng kaniyang asawa na si Salvacion Sarno na nagpahayag na ang
nagsasakdal ang hayagang umakit sa kanyang asawa at sa harap niya ay ikinaskas pa ang suso
nito sa asawa niya. Nang sinaway niya ito, ang sagot di-umano sa kanya ay "wala kang pakialam
sapagkat ako ay puta!.
Hindi kapanipaniwala! Walang anumang katibayan na iniharap ang nasasakdal na ang
nagsasakdal ay malandi at malaswang babae. Kahit na ang isang masamang babae ay hindi
ipagsisiksikan ang kanyang katawan sa isang lalaki laluna't kung nakaharap ang asawa nito. At
lalo nang mahirap paniwalaan kung magkumare sila. At kung totoo man na ginawa ito ng
nagsasakdal sa harapan ng asawa ng nasasakdal, bakit hindi man lamang nagalit ito?
Na ang nasasakdal ay naglulubid lamang ng buhangin ay napansin din ng mababang hukuman
samantalang siya ay nagpapahayag dito. Nang sinasabi niyang sila ng nagsasakdal ay mayroong
kaugnayan, napansin ng hukom na matagal at atubili siya sa pagsagot sa mga tanong. Nang
usisain ng hukom kung bakit hindi siya agad makapagsalita ang sagot niya ay siya ay natatakot,
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subalit hindi niya masabi kung ano ang kaniyang kinatatakutan. 3 Maliwanag na ang
kinatatakutan niya ay ang malaking kasinungalingan na hinahabi niya upang makaligtas siya sa
kaniyang mabigat na sala.
Ipinagdidiinan ng nasasakdal na ang sumbong laban sa kanya ay pagbabangong-puri lamang ng
nagsasakdal sa dahilang ito ay nagdadalang-tao. Bakit kinakailangan pang ipaghayagan ang
kapalaran ng nagsasakdal sa hukuman kung hindi ito ang katotohanan? Kung sila man ay
nagkaroon ng pinagdaanan hindi kaya higit na mamarapatin pa ng nagsasakdal ang tiisin na
lamang ang kanyang sinapit na kalagayan sa halip na magdala ng malaking kahihiyan sa kanyang
angkan? Ang nakikitang dahilan ng Hukuman ay sapagkat nais ng nagsasakdal na maibangon
ang kanyang nilugsong puri at maipataw ang kaukulang parusa sa nasasakdal.
Ipinagtatalo ng nahahabla kung bakit hindi agad nagsumbong ang naghahabla sa kanyang mga
magulang; na hindi agad siya nagpasuri sa manggagamot; na hindi siya humingi ng saklolo nang
siya ay ginagahasa; na walang anumang sugat o gasgas sa kaniyang katawan; na hindi napunit
ang kanyang panti o damit; at bakit inireklamo sa ina ang tangka noong ika-19 ng Marso subalit
hindi naman inireklamo ang pagkagahasa noong ika-10 ng Pebrero.
Ang sagot ay simple lamang. Malaki ang naging takot ng naghahabla. Tiniis niya ang mapait na
karanasan at ito ang dahilan kaya hindi siya agad nagsumbong sa kaniyang mga magulang, hindi
siya kaagad nagpunta sa manggagamot, at hindi siya nakasigaw ng saklolo. Dahil sa kanyang
takot, nahubaran siya ng malaya at napagsamantalahan ng nasasakdal. Kaya wala siyang gasgas
sa katawan. Wala siyang napunit na damit o panti. Subalit matapos ang higit sa isang buwang
pagtitiis, at dahil sa muling pagtatangka sa kanyang purl, nagputok na ang kalooban ng
nagsasakdal. Labis na ito. Sobra na. Dapat ng kalusin. Dinampot niya ang isang putol ng kahoy
at ipinukpok sa ulo ang nasasakdal. At nang tangkaing ituloy ang masamang hangarin, sinabi ng
nagsasakdal na lalabas siya at hihiyaw ng saklolo. Ang kanyang matinding galit ay nangibabaw
sa kanyang takot. Saka lamang natigil ang maitim na hangarin ng nasasakdal.
Sapat na ito. Ang salang ginawa ng nahahabla ay malinaw. Hinalay niya ang karangalan ng isang
dalaga na naiwang nagusa sa kanilang bahay. Naturingan pa namang kamag-anak ang nahahabla
ng nag- uusig at pinakamalapit na kapitbahay na dapat asahan na magmamalasakit ngunit siya pa
ang nagsamantala dito. Dapat siyang managot sa kanyang nakaririmarim na ginawa. Ang purl ng
isang dilag ay kanyang buhay. Wasto ang parusa na mabilanggo ng panghabang-buhay ang
nasasakdal.
Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin ng
nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-asawa. Hindi
maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang may-asawa. 4 Subalit may
katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas. 5 Bukod pa dito dapat pagbayarin ang
nahahabla ang malaking pinsala na ginawa niya kay Rosalia Barranco ng halagang P 30,000. 00.
DAHIL DITO, ang paghahabol ni Bartolome Barranco ay pinawawalang bisa at ang hatol ng
mababang hukuman ay pinagtitibay ng walang anumang pagbabago maliban na siya ay
inuutusan na sustentohan ang naging bunga ng kanyang kasalanan sa halaga at panahon na
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papasiyahan ng mababang hukuman sa pagbasa ng hatol na ito at babayaran niya ang

nagsasakdal ng P 30,000.00.
People v Mangalino
Doctrine: The victim being of a tender age, the penetration could only go as deep asthe labia.
For rape to be committed, full penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of
entrance of the male organ within the labia or the pudendum of the female organ.
Facts: Semion Mangalino inserted his finger and later on forcibly introducedhis sexual organ
into Marichelles, six yr old, undeveloped genitalia. Physicalexam in NBI concluded that bruises
on Marichelles vagina: caused by a hardobject like an erected penis and an indication of an
unsuccessful penetration.
They discounted the probability of an accident since there was no contusionon the labia. Semion
denied the charges and argued that bruises may beself-inflicted. She was constantly running and
might have bumped her pelvisagainst a chair which explained the absence of contusions on the
labia.
Held: He is guilty of statutory rape. For rape to be committed, fullpenetration is not required. It
is enough that there is proof of entrance of themale organ within the labia or pudendum of the
female organ. Even theslightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.
Accordingto the NBI report, rape could have been perpetrated. Dr. Garcia certified theexistence
of indications of recent genital trauma. Vestibular mucosa was darkred and normally, it was
supposed to be pinkish. The forcible attempt of anerected penis caused the 3.5 cm contusion
prior to the hymen. The penile-vaginal contact without penetration was due to 1 cm diameter
opening of Marichelles hymen. The victim being young, the penetration could only go asdeep as
the labia. Offender and victim being neighbors explain the absenceof visible signs of physical
injuries. The reason why Marichelle did not crywas that she did not feel any pain during the
attempted sexual intercourse.
People v. Balbuena PDF DIGEST
People v. Castro
This is an appeal interposed by the accused, Delfin Castro y Lozada, from the decision* of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 110, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for statutory rape defined under Art. 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
On the witness stand, six (6) year old Diana Rose Castro narrated how, while playing with a
neighbor sometime on 4 October 1986, she was pulled by the accused inside a bathroom,
prevented from going out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused is a first cousin of
Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin, as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up her
clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the wall and, despite her efforts to pull away he
inserted his private part into her causing pain. Then she was told by the accused to go home. At
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home, she refused to have her private part washed by her Auntie Alice because it was hurting and
painful. 1
Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother, testified that on 6 October 1986, in her house at No.
1692, F. Muoz, Tramo, Pasay City, she was asked by her husband to find out why Diana was
crying. Her testimony follows. 2
COURT:
Q
Was there anything unusual that happened on Oct. 6 particularly in your house?
On Oct. 6 I was downstairs and there was a call by my husband.
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FISCAL:
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Q
Now, what was the reason why your husband called you?
A
He asked me to fine out why my granddaughter does not want to eat and just keeps on
crying.
Q
And what did you do wen (sic) your husband told you to see your granddaughter?
I went upstairs and found out what was wring (sic) with her whether she has fever.
And what did you find out
A
At first she said she was complaining that her private property was painful and when I
investigated I discovered that it swollen (sic).
Q
Then what happened after you found out that the private property of your granddaughter
was swollen?
A
I asked her why.
(sic). And what did your granddaughter tell you?
At first she told me that "nasabit sa hiyero."
And what did you do after that?
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A
What I did was to examine her carefully her private part; I lifted her two (2) legs and I
discovered that her private property was reddened as swollen.
Q
Did you ask her again what happened to her private property?
Yes, sir, she told me that she was invited by her Kuya Delfin to the bathroom.
And what else did she tell you?
A
She told me that she was asked by her Kuya to stand on top of the toilet bowl and he
removed her panty and his (sic) Kuya Delfin also removed his pants.
Q
What else did she tell you?
She told me that his (sic) Kuya Delfin had sexual intercourse with her.
COURT:
Q
Did you ask Diane Castro how Delfin allegedly had sexual intercourse with her?
Yes, Your Honor.
What did she answer?
She was standing and she was made to lean on the wall, Your Honor. . .
Because of Diana's revelation, the grandmother brought her to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination on 8 October 1986. 3
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the NBI medico-legal, had this explanation:
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A
Under the single heading of "genital examination" the more insignificant findings will be
the contused or bruised vetibular (sic) meaning the area inside the genital organ of the subject
person; the hymen of the subject person was noted to be bruised or contused . . .
Q
Now what do you mean when you say that the genital parts you mentioned were contused
or bruised?
A
The area was noted to be purplish or red darker than the normal appearance of the said
portion being bruised or contused it would mean that this particular portion was subject to some
amount of force or it could have come in contact with a hard object, the contract must have been
done with a certain amount of force.
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Q
Under No. 2 of the conclusion of this report it reads"signs of recent genital trauma,
present, consistent with the alleged date of infliction."
Would you explain this?
This witness meant that the appearance of the genital or prior of those mentioned was seen by
this witness which brought about the trauma and that it has to be recent, meaning it could have
been sustained by the subject person in a matter of days prior to the date of the examination.
A
Now, was the hymen of the subject lacerated?
No, sir.
Q
Now this genital trauma which you said to have been suffered by the subject from what
could this injury or trauman (sic), what was the cause?
A
Any hard object would have produced this bruise or contusion.
Q
Now, this is a case of rape, Doctor, would you venture to state from what object this
could have been inflicted?
A
Under the normal course of events injuries of this nature involving this particular portion
of the body of a female or woman is produced by the insertion of a male organ. 4
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A sworn complaint for rape was filed against Delfin Castro y Lozada. It charged as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of October, 1986 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of tills Honorable Court, the above named accused, Delfin Castro y Lozada, with
lewd designs and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over the undersigned complainant
who is his niece, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with or carnal knowledge of the undersigned. 5
Accused pleaded not guilty and posted bail for his provisional liberty.
Delfin's alibi begins on 3 October 1986 in 1692 Muoz, Pasay City, where he lives two (2)
houses away from complainant's.1wphi1 At about 12:00 P.M., Diana went to his house while he
was taking a bath. She was crying and went inside the bathroom. When asked by the accused
why, she replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose two (2) hind legs were limping,
chased her and so she tripped. The accused told Diana to go out because their dog might bite her.
He proceeded to dress up and saw the victim playing outside.
In the morning of 4 October 1986, he woke up at about quarter to seven, 6 left the house at 7:30
7 took a jeep plying the Pasay-Taft- Luneta route, arrived in school (Adamson University) at
8:15 in the morning. He proceeded to see Dolores Rivera, a godsister who worked in the
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treasurer's office of the university to ask the latter to type a term paper which was due that day.
After submitting the term paper, he treated his godsister to lunch. Around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he went home.
Mrs. Teresita Castro's testimony dovetails with her son Delfin's saying that at around 12:30 P.M.
on 4 October 1986, he arrived and ate lunch at home. 8 Mother and son talked of enmity between
Mrs. Jacinta Castro, Diana's grandmother and their family. This rape case against Delfin is a
result allegedly of the envy of Diana's said grandmother over his (Delfin's) fine scholastic
performance. 9
Delfin further narrated that on or about 8 October 1986, he was invited to the Pasay Police
Headquarters for questioning.1wphi1 While there, he was asked to undress, was blindfolded and
beaten by around 7 to 10 policemen for about half an hour and made to admit that he raped
Diana. Since he could no longer stand the torture, he told them that he used his small finger to
touch her private part. 10 After the incident, Delfin left their house in order to avoid trouble;
occasionally he would visit his parents. 11
Finding the testimony of Diana positive, clear and credible, the Regional Trial Court disregarded
the alibi of the accused and convicted him. The trial court, inter alia, stated:
. . . The accused's claim that he was, in the morning of October 4, 1986, at Adamson University
waiting for his term paper engenders disbelief. By his evidence, he was enrolled at the Adamson
University for the second semester of school 1986-1987 classes for which usually start in
October. Term papers are usually submitted at the end of the semester, not at the beginning of the
semester. In any event, Delfin was not shown that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the place of the incident on October 4, 1986 as, by his evidence, he returned to his house after
noontime, rested for a while, then left and returned again in the afternoon. His suggestion that
Diana's genital bruises could have resulted from trippling down the stairs when she was chased
by a limping dog is ridiculous. A dog whose two hind legs are limping chasing her (where did the
dog come from?) while she was going down the stairs? Granted that were possible or that
actually happened, the fall would cause abrasions, not hymenal contusions. Finally the defense's
insinuation that Diana's grandmother Jacinta who was pictured to be supercilious and envious
was behind the filing of this case is difficult to believe, there being no concrete proof thereof.
Besides, it would be unthinkable for Jacinta to alienate her relations with all her in-laws, the
Castros, who are staying in different houses of the same compound, by fabricating a charge
against the accused.
Finally, the accused's flight from his house after the filing of the present case is not consistent
with his professed innocence. He did not, according to him, have any good relationship with
Diana's grandmother even before October 4, 1986. So what was he fleeing from? His answer,
that he wanted to avoid trouble, tells it all . . .
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304
From the said decision sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnify
the victim in the amount of P20,000.00 by way of damages, the accused appealed to this Court
pointing out the following alleged errors:
1.
there is no rape because
a.
the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b.
the victim was allegedly standing while the crime was being committed.
c.
the victim is still a virgin.
2.
reliance on the conflicting testimony of the victim and not that of the accused.
A recent decision of this Court in a case of statutory rape observed that, usually, the average
adult's hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter, making it compatible with, or easily
penetrable by an average size penis. The victim being of tender age, the penetration of the male
organ could go only as deep as the labia. In any case, for rape to be committed, full penetration is
not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or
pudendum of the female organ. Even the slightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the
crime of rape. 12
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina are not essential for the
offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is
sufficient. 13 Diana's remaining a virgin does not negate rape.
Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable. The
RTC decision explained:
. . . For her account that she was made to stand on the toilet bowl made it easy for the accused to
do the act as she was too small and their private parts would not align unless she was elevated to
a higher position. The suggestion of the defense counsel that a finger could have been used is
absurd. For if it were only a finger there would have been no need to let Diana stand on the toilet
bowl.. . . 14
The Solicitor General's brief, in turn, asserts that the position Diana was forced to take, made it
easier for appellant to accomplish insertion of his organ than if Diana had been made to lie down.
15
Experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape have frequently been proffered by women
actuated by some sinister, ulterior or undisclosed motive. Convictions in such cases should not
be sustained without clear and convincing proof of guilt, 16 considering the gravity of the
offense and the penalty it carries.
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On the alleged sinister motive of Diana's grandmother engendered by envy, we find this
incredulous. For, what grandmother would exact vengeance on her enemies at the perpetual
humiliation and disrepute of her six (6) year old granddaughter?
Finally, the issue of credibility. Who among the contending parties is telling the truth? The
prosecution's evidence is simple and straightforward. Appellant's alibi must fall. Claims of his
scholastic achievements, assuming they are relevant, were unsubstantiated. His counsel did not
even formally offer the exhibits attesting to his enrollment at Adamson University where he was
supposed to have submitted in the morning of 4 October 1986 a term paper. His credibility is
dubious; he was not able to even identify the topic of his alleged term paper. To discredit the
victim he testified on her alleged propensity to tell lies. 17 The trial court, however, categorically
held:
While Diana's testimony was in some instances flawed, the flaw was minor and only with respect
to dates.1wphi1 She is a young girl. She sat at the witness stand four times, yet she survived the
rigors of testifying, unwavering in her claim that she was raped. 18
Accused-appellant claims he was coerced and tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape,
showing to the trial court bodily signs of said abuse. 19 Aside from his self-serving assertion, the
truth of such allegation was not proven. Besides, this allegedly coerced admission of guilt cannot
affect the prosecution's case which has been established by other positive evidence pointing to
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Finding no reversible error in the decision subject of this appeal, we affirm the same in its
entirety.
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim, Diana Rose Castro in the amount of
P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
People v. Atento
Asked how she felt while she was being raped, the complainant replied: "Masarap." The trial
judge believed her but just the same convicted the accused-appellant. The case is now before us.
The complainant is Glenda Aringo, who was sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense.
She is the neighbor of Cesar Atento, the herein accused-appellant, a 39-year old store-keeper
with a wife and eight children. Her claim is that Atento raped her five separate times, the first
sometime in April 1986.
She says that on that first occasion she went to Atento's store in Barangay 18, Minoro, Cabagan,
in Legazpi City to buy bread. Her parents were at work and Atento was alone in his house except
for his three-year old daughter. Glenda claims Atento cajoled her into coming inside the house
and then took her downstairs, where he succeeded in deflowering her. She says her maiden head
ached and bled. Afterwards, he gave her P5.00.
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Glenda speaks of four other times when he raped her. It was later (presumably because her
hymen had healed) that she felt tickled by his manhood and described the act of coitus as
"masarap."1
The girl says she never told anybody about Atento's attacks on her because he had threatened her
life. But she could not conceal her condition for long and after five months had to admit she was
pregnant. She revealed the accused-appellant as the father of the foetus in her womb. The child
was delivered on December 27, 1987, and christened Hubert Buendia Aringo.
Atento denies the charge against him, saying it was pure harassment concocted by a relative of
the girl who wanted to eject him from the land where his house was erected. Insisting that
Glenda was a girl of loose morals, he says he had twice seen her in sexual congress with a man
and that she had once offered her body to his thirteen year old son for a fee of P5.00.
Glenda's description of the act of coitus as pleasurable would have destroyed the whole case
against Atento but for one singular significant fact. The girl is a mental retardate.
Ascendo Belmonte, a clinical psychologist at Don Susano Rodriguez Memorial Mental Hospital,
subjected the girl to a series of intelligence tests, to wit, the Wecslar adult intelligence scale,
revised beta exam, standard progressive matrices, and the Bender visual motor gestalt test, with
the following findings:
Glenda B. Aringo, who was born on June 18, 1970, is INTER ALIA with an intellectual capacity
between the ages of nine (9) and twelve (12) years. As such, her intellectual functioning is within
the mentally defective level. Her fund of information is inadequate, her judgment is unsound, her
thinking and working capacity is poor. She is unable to distinguish essential from non-essential
details. Her vocabulary is limited. Her capacity for her perceptual processes is unsatisfactory.
She lacks the capacity for abstracting and synthesizing concepts. However, in the midst of all
these, Glenda was found capable of telling the truth.2
Benita Aringo, Glenda's mother, testified that her daughter reached only third grade and did not
like to continue studying, preferring to play with children younger than she, even when she was
already pregnant. After delivering her child, she would often leave its care to Benita, and play
marbles with the children rather than feed her baby. Another relative, Caridad Aringo, testified
that Glenda had the mentality of a 12-year old and was fond of rubber bands and playing cards.
The Court finds this to be the reason why, while a rape victim with normal intelligence, would
have said that the attack on her caused her much physical pain and mental agony, Glenda naively
declared that Atento's sexual organ in hers gave her much pleasure.
It is worth observing that Glenda's child was born on December, nine months after her rape in
April, and that, according to the trial judge, there was a remarkable resemblance between Atento
and the boy.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
307
Art. 335.
When and how rape committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
1.
2.
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and
3.
When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
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It has not been clearly established that Atento employed force or threat against Glenda to make
her submit to his lust. Nevertheless, there is no question that Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda
under paragraph 2, because the girl was deprived of reason. Alternatively, he is liable under
paragraph 3, because his victim had the mentality of a girl less than twelve years old at the time
she was raped.
In People v. Atutubo,3 this Court held:
It is not necessary under Article 335 for the culprit to actually deprive the victim of reason prior
to the rape, as by the administration of drugs or by some other illicit method. Ms provision also
applies to cases where the woman has been earlier deprived of reason by other causes, as when
she is congenitally retarded or has previously suffered some traumatic experience that has
lowered her mental capacity. In such situations, the victim is in the same category as a child
below 12 years of age for lacking the necessary will to object to the attacker's lewd intentions.
In People v. Palma,4 where a 14-year old mental retardate was another rape victim, we held that:
The crime committed by Palma is rape under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code.1wphi1
Copulation with a woman known to be mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent is
rape. Physical intimidation need not precede sexual intercourse considering the age, mental
abnormality and deficiency of the complainant.
So also in People v. Sunga,5 where the offended party was 23 years old with the mentality of a
child about 8 to 9 years of age:
Because of her mental condition, complainant is incapable of giving consent to the sexual
intercourse. She is in the same class as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
Appellant therefore committed rape in having sexual intercourse with her.
In his authoritative work on Criminal Law, Chief Justice Aquino explains Paragraph 2 as
follows.6
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. . . in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The
absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when
the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some
mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she
should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of
a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the
offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is
rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of
giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feeble-minded, idiotic woman is rape.
The trial court, however, held Atento guilty of rape under Paragraph 3, citing People v. Asturias,7
where it was held:
Assuming that complainant Vilma Ortega voluntarily submitted herself to the bestial desire of
appellant still the crime committed is rape under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. This is so even if the circumstances of force and intimidation, or of the victim being
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious are absent. The victim has the mentality of a child
below seven years old. If sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, then
it should follow that carnal knowledge with a seventeen-year old girl whose mental capacity is
that of a seven year old child would constitute rape.
In coming to his conclusion, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta declared:
. . . Given the low I.Q. of Glenda, it is impossible to believe that she could have fabricated her
charges against the accused. She lacks the gift of articulation and inventiveness. She could not
even explain with ease the meaning of rape, a term which she learned in the community. Even
with intensive coaching, assuming that happened, on the witness stand where she was alone, it
would show with her testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But that did not happen. She
proceeded, though with much difficulty, with childlike innocence. A smart and perspicacious
person would hesitate to describe to the Court her sexual experiences as "tickling" and "masarap"
for that would only elicit disdain and laughter. Only a simple-minded artless child would do it.
And Glenda falls within the level of a 9-12 year old child. And Glenda was telling the truth!
There is no doubt that when she submitted herself to the accused later for subsequent
intercourses, she was dominated more by fear and ignorance than by reason.
In any event, whether under paragraph 2 or under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused-appellant deserves to be punished for the rape of Glenda Azingo.
The trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of rape as charged, meaning that he raped the
victim five times, but we do not agree that the other four rapes have been conclusively proven.
Otherwise, he would have to be punished for five separate rapes. Except for this and the civil
indemnity, which is increased from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00, we agree with the sentence
309
imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the obligation to acknowledge and support
Hubert Buendia Aringo as his own spurious child, and to pay the costs.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified.
People v. Gallo
The penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 68, of Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed by this Court in its decision promulgated on 22
January 1998.
On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a "Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court)"
seeking a modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers
that the reduction sought by him would be in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate
that the seven attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659
partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be pleaded in the indictment in order
to warrant the imposition of the penalty.
The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia, 1 speaking through then, Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, ratiocinated that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659
should be considered as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of
rape and, if not pleaded as such, could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
2
The information filed against accused-appellant reads:
That on or sometime the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with
lewd designs and by means of force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13 year old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia. 3
The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victim's father;
accordingly, accused-appellant's relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial,
cannot be considered to be a qualifying circumstance. 4
The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to
the conviction of accused-appellant.
The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains
control over a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established
legal processes. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a
modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. 5
310
The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration in People vs. Ramos, 6 People vs.
Ilao, 7 and People vs. Medina, 8 came only after almost a year from the promulgation of the
instant case.
The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24th August
1999 motion of accused-appellant, had this to state:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and
effect of law, forms part of our penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is,
favorable to an accused who is not a habitual criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence
has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of
Medina. Accordingly, the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellant's prayer for
reduction of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees merit
in its stand to join accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death to
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the decision sought to be
reconsidered is MODIFIED by imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua
in lieu of the death penalty and ordering him to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.
People v. Berana
In this sordid tale of defloration, a man is saved from the gallows for failure of the prosecution to
adduce clear and positive proof of his relationship with the complainant.
Before us on automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
Branch 25, imposing the supreme penalty of death on herein accused-appellant, Raul Berana y
Guevarra for the crime of rape. 1
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 2, 1994 at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, 14-year old Maria Elena Jarcia was
sleeping with her four-year old niece in one of the two rooms in a house her family was renting
at Bayawas Street, Naga City when she was awakened by her brother-in-law, herein accusedappellant, Raul Berana. Complainant recognized him because light was filtering in from a nearby
window. Berana pointed a "buntot page" at her neck and warned her not to make any noise,
otherwise she would be killed.1wphi1.nt
The terrified girl was made to lie down while accused-appellant raised her duster and proceeded
to remove her shorts and her underwear, after which he mashed her breasts and lay on top of her.
311
The hapless girl was again threatened not to make any noise otherwise he would kill her.
Complainant tried to cover her breasts with her arms but accused-appellant pushed her arms
aside. As he inserted his organ into her womanhood, Elena felt excruciating pain. He began
kissing her and made several push and pull movements, after which, the victim felt something
liquid in her organ. Accused-appellant sat down and warned her not to talk to anyone about the
incident.
His bestial lust not having been satisfied, accused-appellant lay on top of her for the second time,
fondled her breasts and made push and pull movements. At around 2:30 o'clock in the morning,
accused-appellant left after warning her that only the two of them must know about the incident.
During the entire time that the accused-appellant was raping her, the poor girl was weeping and
trembling with fear because he repeated his threats to kill her should she make any noise.
Complainant, before having identified in court Exhibit A as the "buntot page" used by accusedappellant, described it as "long with some protruding parts and with long and pointed tip." 2
After the accused-appellant left, Elena put on her clothes and went to the adjacent room to report
the incident to her sister, Ma. Ana. When Ana heard the grim story, she lost no time in hurrying
to Camaligan, Camarines Sur where their parents, having been invited to a birthday party of a
relative, had stayed overnight. On the same day, their mother fetched Elena and accompanied her
to the Provincial Hospital for medical examination. The medical examination conducted revealed
the following findings:
P.E.
Vagina admits one finger
(+) Hymenal Laceration at 6:00 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions
Gram Staining Result:
gram (+) bacilli = many
pus cells = few
epithelial cells = many
NOTE:Gram stains smear shows presence of spermatozoa 3
After having been examined, Elena and her mother proceeded to the Sabang Police station in
Naga City to report the incident. Thereafter, accused-appellant apprehended by the police.
On June 3, 1994, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch
25, against accused-appellant for the crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about June 2, 1994, in the city of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused by means of force, did then and there willfully,
312
unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with the herein complaining witness,
MARIA ELENA JARCIA Y DELOS MARTINEZ, a minor, 14 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 6, 1994, an amended information was filed against accused-appellant which reads:
That on or about June 2, 1994, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a relative of the offended party within the third civil
degree, by means of force and intimidation, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with herein complaining witness MARIA ELENA JARCIA
Y DE LOS MARTINEZ, a minor, 14 years of age, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 12, 1994, the prosecution again sought the amendment of the information filed in
accordance with the mandate of Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
relating to de oficio offenses which require the offended party's express conformity to the filing
of the information.
On October 17, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the re-amended
information.
Accused-appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with the complainant but, however,
maintains that Elena consented to it. According to accused-appellant, at around 1:30 o'clock in
the morning of June 2, 1994, he had difficulty sleeping, so he took a walk and decided to visit his
daughter at the house in Bayawas Street. When he arrived at the said place, he sat on the stairs at
the rear of the house. While seated, he heard someone calling, "Mama." He recognized the voice
as Elena's so he answered, "This is not your mama, this is your manoy," 4 On hearing these
words, complainant opened the door and approached accused-appellant to ask him where her
mother was, whereupon, accused-appellant told her that her parents might not return home
because her father got drunk at a birthday party of a relative in Camaligan. He then asked Elena
if his daughter was already asleep. Upon having been informed that his daughter had just fallen
asleep, accused-appellant bade Elena goodbye but the girl, invited him to stay for the night so
that he could keep watch over her and his daughter. Accused-appellant accepted her invitation
since he was very tired. When he entered the room, Elena followed him and locked the door.
Seeing his daughter sleeping soundly on a mat, he picked her up and moved her away from the
middle to the left side so as not to disturb her. Elena turned off the light from the gas lamp and
lifted the mosquito net to prepare for bed.
At this point, she reminded the accused-appellant of the sum of money which she had been
asking him some time. When told that he had no money, complainant allegedly started to caress
and embrace accused-appellant while at the same time insisting that he give her the money.
When he reiterated that he had no money, complainant took hold of his hand and placed it on her
313
breast. Complainant allegedly was wearing only an undershirt and panty at the time. Accusedappellant, feeling "hot", decided, and succeeded in having sex with her. During the sexual
intercourse, Elena told him, "It is painful, manoy." but accused-appellant tried to assuage the
pain, saying that it is painful only during the first time. 5 Afterwards, accused-appellant sat
beside Elena and engaged her in conversation. Elena allegedly asked him to help her when she
completes high school. When accused-appellant promised to help her on condition that she will
be serious in her studies, Elena rose from her lying position and embraced him. He kissed her on
the lips, touched her breasts and asked her again for sex. Complainant allegedly smiled and told
him, "To my sister, you could do it only one (sic) but to me you will make it two," 6 They had
sex for the second time in the early morning of June 2, 1994. Accused-appellant left the room at
around 2:30 o'clock in the morning. While answering a call of nature near a santol tree outside
the house, he heard Ma. Ana ask Elena, "What did your manoy do to you?", to which the latter
answered, "None, none." Accused-appellant heard nothing more as he decided to go on his way.
7
Accused-appellant narrated that prior to the incident, or specifically on December 1993, he was
alone in the same room, reading an adult magazine when Elena arrived. She saw what he was
reading and remarked that she had read the same magazine also. Embarassed, accused-appellant
turned away and went near the window to continue his reading. Complainant, in the meantime,
removed her school uniform leaving only her "sando" and her panty on. She approached
accused-appellant and told him of the interesting parts in the magazine. When he told her that he
had already seen them and was just reviewing the magazine, she told him, "Manoy, there are
parts there which are beautiful." He then showed her the adult magazine and asked her to point
out where these were. Elena placed her arms on his shoulders as she obliged him. When she
embraced him, accused-appellant responded by embracing her back. He felt "hot" and placed his
hand on her cheek then began touching her breast also. However, she turned her lips away so he
ended kissing her cheek instead. Elena responded by kissing his cheek in turn. Accusedappellant, this time, kissed her lips and touched her breasts. They moved away from the window
to avoid unwitting voyeurs. Somebody soon arrived and interrupted them so Elena became
flustered and accused-appellant left. They maintained no relationship after the incident.
The trial court did not give credence to the testimony of accused-appellant and on November 27,
1995, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape defined and punishable under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed when the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following circumstances:
1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a . . . relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree.
The accused being the husband of the victim's sister, is related by affinity to his victim within the
third civil degree, the court hereby imposes upon Raul Berana Guevarra to suffer DEATH
314
PENALTY, to pay Ma. Elena M. Jarcia, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of damages and to pay
the costs.
In this automatic review of the decision rendered by the trial court, accused-appellant raises the
following issues:
I.
The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite the absence of
any clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the alleged use of force.
II.
The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite serious lapses
and material inconsistencies in the testimony of the private complainant.
III.
The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant despite the prosecution's
failure to adduce clear proof of all the attendant qualifying circumstances of the crime charged.
IV.
The trial court erred when it convicted herein accused-appellant based on a misplaced
conclusion that herein accused-appellant allegedly admitted committing the offense charged.
We shall deal with the issues raised seriatim.
Regarding the first issue, accused-appellant contends that the trial court's finding that he had
forcible sexual intercourse with the complainant was based solely on the results of the medical
examination conducted by the prosecution's witness, Dr. Humilde Janaban on Elena. In support
of his contention, appellant cites the following excerpt from the trial court's decision:
A careful perusal of the evidence adduced during the trials conducted in this case, show that the
medical certificate of June 2, 1994 which was identified by Dra. Ma. Humilde B. Janaban,
showing that the victim, private complainant Ma. Elena M. Jarcia suffered "Hymenal laceration
at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions in her private part which could have been caused by
sexual intercourse and/or by the intervention of a blunt object by thrusting and then pulling then
thrusting again of a hard blunt object and the presence of spermatozoa confirms the testimony of
Ma. Elena Jarcia that she was sexually molested makes such testimony credible. To the mind of
the court this [sic] findings are significant to the effect that sexual intercourse was involuntary or
through threat and duress. The absence of any kind of external injury in the body of the victim
other than those found in her organ is of no consequence.
Accused-appellant alleges that Elena encouraged his advances and the sexual intercourse was
consensual. He asserts that while the hymenal laceration and the presence of spermatozoa prove
the fact of sexual intercourse, they do not ipso facto prove that such act was committed by means
of force, in line with our pronouncement in People vs. Godoy 8 that, "Even granting ex gratia
argumenti that the medical report and the laceration corroborated the complainant's assertion that
there was sexual intercourse, of course the same cannot be said as to the alleged use of force. It
has been held that such corroborative evidence is not considered sufficient, since proof of facts
constituting one element of the crime is not corroborative proof of facts necessary to constitute
another equally important element of the crime.
315
Accused-appellant's contention is misplaced. The trial court's finding of rape in the case at bar,
was not based solely on the medical findings showing hymenal laceration and the presence of
spermatozoa in the victim's organ. While the excerpt quoted by the accused-appellant from the
questioned decision gives the impression that the trial court considered the hymenal laceration
and the presence of spermatozoa in the victim's organ as proof of forcible sexual intercourse, the
decision read in its entirety shows otherwise. The trial court merely considered the medical
findings as corroborative evidence for the complainant's testimony that accused-appellant had
sexual intercourse with her. Complainant was forced to accede to accused-appellant's advances
because he poked a "buntot page" at her neck and threatened to kill her should she make any
noise. With such repeated threats, the hapless girl eventually broke down and cried.
Accused-appellant maintains, however, that complainant's testimony is too full of material
inconsistencies to deserve belief. For instance, although complainant alleged that she bled after
the coitus, the medical examination revealed otherwise; complainant's testimony in court that
accused-appellant asked her for sex a second time belies her allegation that accused-appellant
forced himself on her; complainant' s statement in her affidavit that accused-appellant was armed
with a blunt instrument is materially different from her testimony in court that accused-appellant
carried with him a "buntot page".
Accused-appellant's assertion that the medical record is bereft of any proof/corroborating
complainant's testimony that she bled after she was raped hardly merits consideration. The
underwear of the complainant which was presented and admitted in court as evidence bore traces
of blood. 9 Moreover, the absence of any sign of physical bleeding on the part of the complainant
does not necessarily mean there was no forcible sexual intercourse. For one thing, complainant
was threatened with a "buntot page" poked at her neck at that time. Then too, accused-appellant's
threat was sufficient enough to intimidate a young girl of 14 to force her to submit to his baser
instincts. It must be noted that proof of external injuries inflicted on the complainant is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape committed with force or violence. The law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be
established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against
her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for life and personal safety. 10 When a woman testifies
that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that said crime has been
committed.
Accused-appellant, however, would have us believe that the sexual intercourse was consensual
since complainant herself testified during trial that he asked her for sex a second time during the
night in question. While complainant did state during trial that, "After the first incident, he sat
down and he again asked me to give him for the second time," 11 complainant also stated that
she was then crying and trembling with fear. Considering the continuing threat on her life if she
makes an outcry, complainant had no choice but to accede to the desire of accused-appellant.
That he asked her for sex does not necessarily imply that she gave her consent when he
succeeded in ravishing her again. It is indeed preposterous that a young woman, untrained in the
ways of the world and of men would initiate and encourage his advances, as accused-appellant
claims, considering especially that he is the husband of her older sister.
316
Accused-appellant nevertheless insists that complainant's testimony does not merit credence
because of inconsistencies in her statement regarding the weapon used by the accused-appellant
to threaten her on the night of the incident. We are not unaware that complainant stated in her
affidavit that accused-appellant was armed with a blunt instrument in contrast with her testimony
in court that accused-appellant was armed with a "buntot page." It must be borne in mind,
however, that discrepancies between an affidavit and testimony in court occur more often than
not since an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant herself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statement. It might not be amiss to note, at this point, that the
instrument which was submitted by complainant to the police and later identified in court as the
"buntot page" used by the accused-appellant was described by the Chief of Police in his letter to
the prosecutor as "one (1) blunt instrument with black handle. 12 In the case of People vs.
Empleo 13, we had occasion to state that, "the contradiction between the affidavit and the
testimony of the witness may be explained by the fact that an affidavit will not always disclose
all the facts and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe, without the deponent
detecting it, some of the occurrences narrated."
We find merit, however, in accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to adduce
clear and positive proof of the qualifying circumstance of relationship between accused-appellant
and complainant. It should be noted that the relationship between accused-appellant and the
complainant qualifies the crime from rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable
by death under Republic Act No. 7659. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
xxx
xxx
xxx
1.
When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives
of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married
persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim
that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his
wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa. 14
Consequently, to effectively prosecute accuse-appellant for the crime of rape committed by a
relative by affinity within the third civil degree, it must be established that a) he is legally
married to complainant's sister and b) complainant and accused-appellant's wife are full or half
blood siblings.
The prosecution tried to established the relationship of accused-appellant to the complainant by
asking her the following during trial:
xxx
xxx
xxx
317
Q:
By the way, do you know the accused in this case by the name of Raul?
A:
Yes, I know him, sir.
Q:
Why do you know him?
A:
He is the husband of my sister. 15
Complainant' s mother also testified:

xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
Do you know the accused in this case, Raul Berana y Guevarra?
A:
Yes, I know him, sir.
Q:
Why do you know him?
A:
Because he is the husband of my daughter.
Q:
Whose name is that?
A:
Rosa Jarcia, sir. 16
Based on abovementioned testimonies, as well as accused-appellant's letter to the complainant's

parent's addressing them as "mama at papa" and his use of phrase, "ang inyong manugang, Raul"
17 the trial court convicted him of the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinity within
the third civil degree, under the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act. No. 7659.
Considering that the relationship of accused-appellant to complainant qualifies the crime of rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua to rape punishable by death, it is but proper that a more
stringent proof of relationship between the offender and the offended party must be established
by the prosecution. Corollarily, a clearer proof of relationship between the complainant and the
spouse of accused-appellant must be presented. The relationship of accused-appellant and the
complainant is not adequately substantiated since it is merely based on testimony of the
complainant, her mother's testimony and the accused-appellant's use of the words, "mama at
papa" in his letters. Needless to say, the evidence presented are not sufficient to dispel doubts
about the true relationship of accused-appellant and the complainant, to the benefit of which the
accused is entitled. Where the life of an accused-appellant hangs in the balance, a more exacting
proof must be adduced.
Accused-appellant, in his last submission, insists that the trial court erred in convicting him
based solely on a misplaced conclusion that he admitted the offense charged based on the four
(4) letters he sent to the parents of the complainant, one of which states:
318
Ma, Pa, patawarin niyo na ako, alam ko na hindi niyo basta-basta mapapatawad ang nagawa ko
pero paano naman po ang kinabukasan nang mga apo at anak ko. 18
Accused-appellant asserts that the letters, in no way, indicate an admission of guilt on his part. In
support of his contention, accused-appellant cites the case of United States vs. Maqui 19 where it
was held that an accused may show that an offer of compromise on his part was not made under
a consciousness of guilt but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some
other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that an offer to compromise was not in
truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily therefrom.
We are not convinced. The tenor of the letters sent by the accused-appellant to the parents of the
complainant, while not explicitly admitting the forcible sexual intercourse, could hardly be
considered an admission made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment. Consider the
following excerpts:
Mama at Papa,
Masakit man sa inyo ang nagawa ko. Pero nagsasabi ako sa inyo ng totoo. Nang maganap ang
insidenteng iyon. Wala ako sa sarili kong pagkatao. At wala akong matandaan sa nangyari (sic)
20
And
xxx
xxx
xxx
Ma, pa, hindi ko kayo sinusumbatan. Dahil wala naman po akong dapat isumbat sa inyo.
Napakabait niyo sa kain. Ewan ko nga lang kung bakit ko nagawa iyon. Kung totoo talagang ako
nasa sarili kong pagkatao. 21
Despite his claim that complainant initiated and consented to the sexual intercourse, accusedappellant in his letters never made mention of this fact but has, instead, unceasingly asked for
forgiveness from the parents of the complainant, short of admitting categorically the offense
charged. Clearly, the unsolicited letters of the accused-appellant cannot be construed as an offer
of compromise to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment but a plea of mercy to save him from
the gallows.
In view of the fact that relationship between accused-appellant and the complainant was not
properly established, we are constrained to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower court from
death to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is, however, ordered to pay civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of P50,000 and the P50,000 imposed by the lower court shall constitute
moral damages. The fact that the complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological suffering which constitutes the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still
require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim since the court itself assumes and even
acknowledges such agony on her part as gauge of her credibility. 22
319
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 25, finding
accused-appellant Raul Berana y Guevarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Ma. Elena M. Jarcia the
sum of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
People v. Optana
4 information for the violation of the sec. 5 RA7610 (Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse) and 4 informations for rape were filed against the accused.
HELD: The SC affirms the decision of the trial court convicting the accused for one incident of
rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and one charge violating RA 7610, sentencing him to
suffer 8yrs and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 17 yrs. and 4mos of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The other informations failed to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Likewise,
charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date
against the same victim is erroneous and illegal except where the law itself so allows. This is not
allowed by RA7610. It specifically provides that in instances where the victim is under 12, the
case should fall under art. 335 of the RPC, thus only cases where the victim is over 12 but under
18 can fall under this law. In the case at bar, where the accused was charged for several occasions
of rape and abuse the conviction or acquittal on the informations was based on the age of the
child, the concept of non-multiplicity of suits, and the evidence presented. Thus, only one rape
case prospered (incident when the child was below 12) and one violation of RA7610 (when the
child was above 12 but below 18).
Original: Upon a sworn complaint filed by Maria Rizalina Onciano on November 28, 1995, four
(4) Informations for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, or known as the Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse and four (4) Informations for Rape were filed against
herein accused-appellant Deolito Optana committed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 482-95 for rape:
That on or about the 28th day of October, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsul, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and
threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with his
stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 13 years old and ten (10) months, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about and during the month of October 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan
Vaca, in the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force,
intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
320
knowledge with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 11 years old and ten (10)
months, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
That on or about the month of September, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsul, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force, intimidation and
threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with his
stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 13 years old and nine (9) months, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Criminal Case No.485-95 for rape:
That on or about and during the month of September 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan
Vaca, in the Municipality of Subic. Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, actuated by lust and by means of force,
intimidation and threats, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a girl of 11 years old and nine (9)
months, against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
5. Criminal Case No. 486-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b) ART. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about and during the month of September, 1993, at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy.
Mangan Vaca, in the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales. Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of
intimidation, coercion, influence and other consideration (sic), did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano,
a minor of 11 years old and nine (9) months, to the damage and prejudice of said Rizalina
Onsiano.
6. Criminal Case No. 487-95 for Viol. Of Sec. 5(b) Art. III of Republic Act 7610 (Child Abuse):
That on or about the 28th day of October, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion,
influence and other consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a minor of 13 years old and ten
(10) months, to the damage and prejudice of said Rizalina Onsiano.
That on or about the month of September, 1995 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy. Mangan Vaca, in
the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of intimidation, coercion,
321
influence and other consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano.
That on or about and during the month of October, 1993 at Sitio Daan Naugsol, Brgy . Mangan
Vaca, in the Municipality of Subic, Province (sic) of Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design, and by means of
intimidation, coercion, influence and other consideration, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter one Rizalina Onsiano, a minor of
11 years old and ten (10) months, to the damage and prejudice of said Rizalina Onsiano.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to each of the above informations.
The facts are as follows:
Maria Rizalina Onciano is the daughter of Nida A. Onciano who was born on December 13,
1981 at Tondo General Hospital. The father. Rau1 Gomez left Nida Onciano even before Maria
Rizalina was born.2
Nida Onciano met the accused-appellant. Deolito Optana in 1985 at Doris Restaurant in
Olongapo City where they were both working.3 They decided to live together in 1986 without
the benefit of marriage even if accused-appellant knew that Nida Onciano already had a
daughter. Out of this common-law relationship, the couple had seven children, the eldest being
born in 1988 and the youngest, less than a month when the accused-appellant testified in court in
June, 1997.4
In 1990, the couple moved to Subic and established residence at Sitio Daan Naugsol,
Manganvaca, Subic, Zambales with Maria Rizalina and three born children in tow. Maria
Rizalina started to go to school at Manggahan Elementary School, Subic, Zambales.
Sometime in September, 1993, Maria Rizalina was playing in the yard with her brothers and
sisters when her stepfather called for her to come up to the room. Her mother was out of the
house at that time. Upon entering the room, Maria Rizalina was ordered to undress but she
refused. The accused-appellant slapped her face twice on her cheeks and threatened to box her.5
He finally succeeded in removing her clothes. The accused-appellant kissed Maria Rizalina on
the mouth, on her breast, and on her private parts. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed his
shorts, held both hands of Maria Rizalina and went on top of her while she was lying on the
wooden bed.
Accused-appellant inserted his penis into the vagina of Maria Rizalina. The latter felt pain in her
private part and shouted "masakit po." Accused-appellant stayed on top of Maria Rizalina for
about ten (10) minutes making "downward and upward movement" or "pumping." Accusedappellant stood up, took a piece of cloth from the bed (pamunas) and wiped the blood in his sex
organ. Afterwhich, he gave the rag to Maria Rizalina and told her to wipe her private part
because there was blood on it. He told her to dress up quickly since Maria Rizalina' s mother
322
would arrive shortly. Maria Rizalina did not tell her mother what happened to her because she
was afraid of the accused-appellant. She was threatened to be killed once she reports the
incident. Maria Rizalina was twelve (12) years old at that time of this fateful day.
On several occasions, whenever Nida Onciano was out of the house since she was busy selling
wares in the market, accused-appellant raped Maria Rizalina. The victim could no longer
remember how many times she was raped but she particularly recalled that on October 28, 1995,
the accused-appellant raped her inside the room where she and her brothers and sisters were
sleeping. This was the last time that accused-appellant touched her.6
It was on November 24, 1995 when Nida Onciano noticed that Maria Rizalina's tummy was
quite protruding while the latter was sleeping on the floor. Maria Rizalina at first refused to
answer her mother's inquisitions but finally revealed that the accused-appellant raped her. The
next day, Nida Onciano asked her sister, Evelyn Nallos to accompany Maria Rizalina to the
doctor to have her examined. At the Olongapo City General Hospital, Dr. Laila Patricio of the
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months pregnant. Maria
Rizalina told her that her stepfather repeatedly raped her. The Medical Report revealed the
following:
Medical Certification
November 27, 1995
TO WHOM IT MA Y CONCERN:
This is to certify that RIZALINA ONSIANO 14 y/o, of Daangbakal, Daan Naugsog Subic,
Zambales was examined and treated/confined in this hospital on/from November 25, 1995 xxx
with the following findings and/or diagnosis:
BREAST - Enlarged, areola 3.5 x 3.5 cm, no fissures nor hematoma.
ABDOMEN - FH 21. cm, FHT -/36/ min. RLQ
Hymen not intact, vagina admits 2 fingers with ease, Cervix closed, uneffaced, floating
cephalic.
Pregnancy uterine 6-7 months by size, not in labor.
(SGD.) LAILA S. PATRICIO, M.D.
Attending Physician7
After Maria Rizalina's statement was taken at the police station, a formal complaint was filed
against the accused-appellant on November 27, 1995. Considering Maria Rizalina ' s minor age,
she was referred to the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office for assistance. Initial
interviews revealed that Maria Rizalina was so confused considering that her mother was
pressuring her to withdraw the complaint against the stepfather. It was then recommended that
323
Maria Rizalina be committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development for
protective custody and placed under the care of the Substitute Home for Women in Especially
Difficult Circumstances - Saup Lugud Center, San Ignacio Subdivision, Pandan, Angeles City.8
On February 23, 1996, Maria Rizalina delivered a baby boy at the "Hospital Ning Angeles" in
Angeles City whom she named Richard Onciano. The name of the father was not indicated.
At the Saup Lugud Center, Maria Rizalina manifested signs of depression and violence to the
extent of killing herself. She was committed to the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment and rehabilitation.
The accused, on the other hand, denied having raped his stepdaughter. He testified that his
stepdaughter was always out of the house with her barkadas. In fact, her mother, Nida Was
always complaining that she spent so much time looking for her. He testified further that Maria
Rizalina was always absent from school. He only learned about the complaint for rape filed
against him when he was apprehended by the police.
Deolito Optana testified that he met Nida Onciano in 1985 in a restaurant in Olongapo City .He
knew that Nida had a daughter but he still courted her and promised to take care of both of them
and help support in the education of Maria Rizalina.
Nida Onciano corroborated the accused-appellant's testimony. She did not believe that her
common-law husband would rape her daughter because she considered her sexual relationship
with him as very satisfactory. She averred that it was her sister, Evelyn Nallos who insisted on
pursuing the case against Optana because of an old grudge against them. Evelyn Nallos took care
of two of the children of Nida Onciano and Deolito Optana but who died of pneumonia and
drowning during a flood. Since the death of the children, her relationship with her sister had been
estranged. Evelyn Nallos still wanted to take her other children including Maria Rizalina but she
refused.
On March 5, 1998, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Deolito Optana guilty beyond reasonable doubt by direct
participation of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code and for violation of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 7610, judgment is rendered in the
following manner:
1. In Criminal Case No.485-95 for rape, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties attached thereto and to indemnify the minor
Ma. Rizalina Onciano the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
and exemplary damages of P100,000.00.
2. In Criminal Case No. 487-95, for violation of Section 5 (b) R.A. 7610, the said accused is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum with all the accessory penalties attached thereto and to indemnify Ma. Rizalina
324
Onciano the amount of P50,000.00, plus moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
3. The accused shall support Ma. Rizalina Onciano's child Richard Onciano.
4. The accused is acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95,
486-95, 488-95, 489-95, for insufficiency of evidence.
5. The accused shall be entitled in full of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed in writing to
abide by all the disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.
6. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.9
Accused-appellant now comes to this Court with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT IS GROUNDED ON FACTS
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE INCONSISTENT AND
IMPROBABLE TO HAPPEN, AND THE ACTS CHARGED ARE NOT CLEAR, POSITIVE
AND CONVINCING, AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE
(SIC) NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND APPRECIATE THE ILL-MOTIVE AND
CONSUMING HATRED OF APPELLANT'S IN-LAWS WHO ORCHESTRATED THE
FILING OF THIS CASE, AND WHO WITH UNCUNNY MEASURES PREVENTED THE
DEFENSE THE MUCH NEEDED CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER AND APPRECIATE THAT THE
ACTUATIONS AND CONDUCT OF THE COMPLAINT AFTER THE INCIDENTS AND
DURING THE TRIAL WHEN INTER TWINED WITH OTHER FACTS DOES NOT
CONFORM TO THE NORM OF CONDUCT OF PEOPLE WHO ARE INJURED AND
RAVAGED;
IV
THE COURT A QUO OVERLOOKED, MISUNDERSTOOD, MISAPPRECIATED AND
MISINTERPRETED MATERIAL FACTS OF IMPORTANCE AND SUBSTANCE WHICH IF
CONSIDERED AND GIVEN WEIGHT AND PROBATIVE VALUE WILL TILT THE SCALE
OF "LADY JUSTICE" IN FAVOR OF ACQUITTAL.10
325
We agree with the trial court's decision. 1wphi1.nt

The victim, Maria Rizalina, first took the witness stand on August 7, 1996. She was, however,
observed to be psychologically and emotionally unprepared to testify at that time so the trial
court decided to postpone her testimony to a later date after her complete rehabilitation at the
National Center for Mental Health.11 On January 22, 1997, Maria Rizalina was called back to
the witness stand. Now very much calm and composed, she gave a recount of her ordeal under
her stepfather. She testified as follows:
q
Now, Ms. Onsiano, did you go to school sometime in September 1993?
Yes, sir.
xxx
q
What school were you enrolled in 1993?
Manggahan Elementary School, sir.
School in 1993?
Grade IV, sir.
And who was supporting your education?
My mother, sir.
q
And aside from your mother, who else, if any, was helping your mother in providing your
educational expenses?
a
Deolito Optana, sir, my stepfather.
If Deolito Optana is inside the courtroom, will you be able to point him out to the court?
Yes, sir.
COURT
Point him out.
xxx
a. That's him, sir.
xxx
326
q
Now, how long have you been living with your mother together with your stepfather
Deolito Optana at Barangay Mangavaca, Subic, Zambales, prior to September 1993?
a
Since I was in Grade 1, sir.
q
Now, in September 1993, do you recall if Deolito Optana was still living with your mother
in your house at Mangavaca, Subic, Zambales?
a
Yes, sir.
q
Now, do you recall sometime in the afternoon or noontime of September 1993 while you
were in your house at Manganvaca, Subic, Zambales, if any unusual incident that happened to
you?
xxx
a
Yes, sir.
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Could you please tell this Honorable Court what is that unusual incident that happened in
your house at Subic sometime in September 1993?
a
I was raped, sir.
By whom?
By my stepfather, sir.
COURT
q
And who is your stepfather?
Deolito Optana, sir.
Is Deolito Optana married to your mother?
No, sir.
So, he is a live-in partner of your mother?
Yes, sir.
xxx
327
PROS FLORESTA
q
And how did Deolito Optana raped (sic) you?
He was forcing me, sir.
Do you still recall what dress were you wearing at that time?
No, sir.
But you have clothes on your body?
Yes, sir.
And do you know what did the accused Deolito Optana do with your clothes?
He was forcing me to undress or to remove my clothes, sir.
And was he able to make you undress?
No, sir.
And when Deolito Optana failed to force you to undress, what did he do, if any?
He was hurting me, sir.
COURT
q
How was he hurting you?
a
He was slapping me on my face, and sometimes he would threaten me that he would box
me, sir.
xxx
PROS FLORESTA
q
And what did you do when Deolito Optana was hurting you by slapping you on your face?
I was scared, sir.
COURT
q
How many times were you slapped on the face?
Twice, sir.
328
And what happened to you wen you were slapped on the face?
My cheeks were painful, sir.
xxx
PROS FLORESTA
q
And after you were slapped by the accused, what else happened, if any?
He was forcing me to undress and then, he repeatedly kissed me, sir.
What part of your body was kissed by the accused?
My mouth, my breast and my private part, sir.
And after the accused kissed your private part, what did the accused do, if any?
And afterwards, he was forcing to insert his penis into my vagina, sir .
And do you still recall what the accused was wearing at that time?
Yes, sir.
Could you please tell us what was he wearing at that time?
Yes, sir, shorts.
And what did he do with his shorts?
He removed his shorts, sir.
And then after removing his shorts, what did the accused do, if any?
a
After removing his shorts and underwear, he held both of my hands and went on top of me,
sir.
q
And after he was able to move on top of you, what else did he do?
He repeatedly kissed me and then, he was forcing to insert his penis into my vagina, sir.
COURT
q
Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
329
Yes, sir.
What did you feel?
It was painful, sir.
COURT
Continue.
PROS FLORESTA
q
And what did you do when (sic) felt pain in your body after the accused had inserted his
penis?
a
I shouted, sir.
COURT
q
What did you shout?
I said MASAKIT PO, sir.
To whom did you address that?
To the accused, sir.
You are referring to the accused Deolito Optana?
Yes, sir.
Were you alone at that time?
My brother and sister were there, sir.
And how many brothers do you have?
Two, sir.
Where were they?
Downstairs, sir.
How many sisters do you have?
One, sir.
330
Where was she at that time?
Downstairs, also, sir.
How about your mother?
She was not around sir.
Where was she?
She left the house at that time, and I do not know where she went, sir.
How long did the accused stayed on top of you?
More or less, ten minutes, sir.
What did you do during that period when he was on top of you?
He was making a downward and upward movement, sir. He was pumping.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Now, after making those downward and forward movement, what happened?
At first, he was trembling, sir.
And then after that, what did the accused do?
He stood up and he got a PAMUNAS, sir.
COURT
q
Why would he have to take a wipe?
It was because there was blood on his sex, sir.
How about in your private part?
Yes, sir, I was having blood in my private part.
What else did you found (sic) out in your private Part?
It was painful, sir.
331
Why was it painful?
Because of his private part, I sustained a wound in my private part, sir.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Now, after the accused stood up, and got a piece of cloth and. . .
COURT
q
Was he able to get this piece of cloth?
Yes, sir.
Where?
On the HIGAAN, sir.
What did he do with this?
He used it in wiping his face, sir.
What else did he do?
a
After wiping his face, and gave the piece of cloth to me in order to wipe my vagina, and he
told me to do it faster, sir.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
And why did the accused in this case told (sic) you to act faster?
Because my mother was about to arrive, sir.
So what did you do when the accused told you to wipe your private part fast?
I followed him because I was afraid of him, sir.
q
And what else did the accused do after you wiped your private part with the cloth he gave
to you?
a
He instructed me to dress up quickly because my mother would arrive, sir.
332
And did you follow him?
Yes; sir.
And did your mother arrive home?
Yes, sir.
And when your mother arrived home, what did you do?
a
I did not do anything because I was instructed not to tell my mother. So I did not do
anything because I was afraid, sir.
COURT
q
Why were you afraid (sic) of your stepfather?
Because he would kill me if I report the incident, sir.
How did you know?
Because he told me, sir.
When was it when he told you that?
After he raped me, sir.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Now, after the accused raped you sometime in September 1993, do you know if this
incident was repeated by the accused?
COURT
q
Before you go to that This incident that you have described, where in the house did this
happen?
a
Upstairs, sir.
In what room?
In their room, sir.
333
When you said THEY, to whom do you refer?
My mother, sir.
You were lying down?
Yes, sir.
On what?
On the bed, sir.
What kind of bed?
Wooden bed, sir.
How many rooms were there upstairs?
Two, sir.
The other room is for whom?
For us, sir, my brothers and sisters.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
After this incident, was there any other incident that happened to you?
Yes, sir.
When was that?
a
I could no longer recall when but everytime my mother was out, he would do the same
thing to me, sir.
q
Could you still recall how many weeks or days have passed from the first incident in
September 1993 when the last incident happened?
a
I could no longer count because it happened several times, sir.
And how many times, more (or) less does this incident happened to your?
Several times, sir.
334
Now, in the month of September 1993, do you recall how many times?
I cannot, sir.
q
Now, you said that everytime that your mother is out, out of the house, your stepfather used
to rape you, could you please tell us what is the reason why your mother is always out of your
house?
a
Sometimes she would go to the market and sometimes she would sell some things, sir.
Do you know the occupation of your stepfather Deolito Optana in 1993?
He was a waiter, sir.
xxx
q
And in what grade were you at the time this first incident happened?
Grade IV, sir.
How old were you then?
12 years old, sir.
What is your birth day?
13 December 1981, sir.
How did you know that your birth is 13 December 1981?
From my mother, sir.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Now, in 1995, do you still recall if the accused is still living in your house in Manganvaca,
Subic, Zambales with you and your mother?
a
No more, sir.
q
Now, do you know the reason why he was no longer residing in the house of your mother
in 1995?
a
He was already detained at that time, sir.
335
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
When was the last incident?
WITNESS
a
28 October 1995, sir.
PROS. FLORESTA
q
And where did this 28 October 1995 rape happened?
In our house, sir.
In the same room upstairs?
In our room, sir.
COURT
q
You mean in the room where your brothers and sisters were sleeping?
Yes, sir.
x x x12
q
During the last hearing, you testified that after you were first raped by the accused in
September, 1993, the accused repeated the act of having raped you. Now could you please tell
this honorable court how did the accused raped (sic) you after September, 1993?
a
He was forcing me, sir.
And how did the accused forced (sic) you . . . to have raped you?
COURT
q
He was forcing you to what?
He was forcing me to undress, sir.
Where?
In our house, sir.
336
Where in your house?
In the room, sir.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Is that the room, the same room, where the first incident took place?
It happens sometime in our room and sometimes in their room, sir.
q
Could you still recall the month after the first incident that happened to you when the
accused forced you to undress inside his room?
a
The incident started in September 1993, but he would always rape me when my mother was
out, sir. (GINAGALAW NIYA AKO TUWING WALA ANG MAMA KO.)
q
So, when you say that since September 1993 up to October 28, 1995, the accused had been
GINAGALAW you, is that correct, Ms. Onsiano?
a
Yes, sir.
What do you mean by GINAGALAW?
He was using me, sir.
COURT
q
How did he use you?
He was forcing his penis into my vagina, sir.
xxx
q
Why did you not report this or why did you report your stepfather, the accused in this case,
to anyone of what he did to you?
a
I was afraid because he threatened me that he would kill me if I report the matter to anyone,
sir.
q
But do you remember having reported this incident to your mother?
a
Yes, sir, on 24 November 1995. That was the time when I told my mother about the
incident.
337
And what did your mother do when you reported the matter to her?
a
She summoned my Aunt in order to accompany me to the municipal hall to report the
matter, sir.
After that, I was investigated by the policeman and then, my stepfather was apprehended, sir.
xxx
q
What happened to you when you were raped by your stepfather?
I was hurt and I got pregnant, sir.
When did you get pregnant?
I cannot say what month, sir.
But what happened to your pregnancy?
I gave birth to a child, sir.
When?
23 February 1996. Sir.
Where?
At a hospital in Angeles, sir.
xxx
q
And what name did you give your child?
Richard Onsiano, sir.
COURT
Who is the father as appearing in the document?
PROS. FLORESTA
Unknown because this is out of wedlock, your Honor.
q
You made the registration of the child with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Angeles City?
338
The Social Worker, sir.
q
Now, you mentioned awhile ago that when you reported this incident to your mother
sometime in November 1995, your mother called for your Aunt Evelyn Nallos?
a
Yes, sir.
For what purpose?
In order to accompany me to the Municipal Hall, sir.
And were you and your Aunt Evelyn Nallos able to go to the Municipal Hall?
Yes, sir.
COURT
q
What is the name of the aunt? Evelyn Nallos?
Yes, your Honor.
And what did you do at the Municipal Hall?
A complaint was filed against my stepfather, sir.
And to whom did you complain?
Police officer, sir.
And what did the police officer do when you complained to him?.
Deolito Optana, my stepfather, was apprehended.
xxx
PROS. FLORESTA
q
Could you still recall what month in 1995, prior to 28 October 1995 when you were raped
by the accused in this case?
a
I could no longer recall the exact date because he has been using me several times, sir.
q
Could you still recall how many times in a month the accused has been using you since
September 1993 up to 28 October 1995?
339
a
Several times, sir. I could no longer count because he would always use me each time my
mother was out, sir.
xxx
q
Did you have any sexual intercourse with any other men before you gave birth to your
child?
a
Yes, sir, my stepfather.
You are referring to the accused?
Yes, sir.
q
Aside from the accused, was there any other men who had sexual intercourse with you
prior to October 1995?
a
None, sir, he was the only one.
q
Prior to the birth of your child, it was only your stepfather who had sexual intercourse with
you?
a
Yes, sir.
xxx
q
Do you have any boyfriend?
None, sir.
x x x13
Mindful of the well-settled rule that findings of facts of the trial court are accorded great respect
considering that the trial judge has observed the demeanor of the witnesses, the Court does not
find any cogent reason to depart from such rule. The trial judge had these observations about the
witness:
Rizalina was already 14 years old when she testified in Court. At the time she testified she was
succinct in her declaration and appeared to the Court to be truthful. She had no reason to
fabricate a story against the accused who supported her in her daily needs and spent for her
education until she finished Grade 6. Ingratitude is not a trait common to a provincial child still
innocent of the vicissitudes of life.14
A witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent is a credible witness.15 Since the trial court found Maria Rizalina' s testimony
to be credible and trustworthy, it was More than sufficient to sustain the accused-appellant's
340
conviction.16 The fact that the accused-appellant bad carnal knowledge with the young victim is
corroborated by the findings of Dr. Laila Patricio, who upon examination on November, 1995
found Maria Rizalina to be 6-7 months pregnant already. Maria Rizalina confided to her that her
stepfather raped her.17 This accusation was repeated when she was investigated by SPO3 Cesar
Antolin at the Subic Police Station, Subic, Zambales,18 and when she was interviewed by Social
Welfare Officer II, Ana Ecle of the DSWD, Iba, Zambales.19
When the accused-appellant was courting Nida Onciano, he was very aware that she had a
daughter. Before they agreed to live together, he was made to understand that he had to accept
and treat Maria Rizalina as his own daughter, too-caring for her and providing for her
education.20 Since Maria Rizalina did not have a father, she regarded the accused-appellant as
such. Even at her young age, she recognized the parental authority the accused-appellant had
over her and in return, she gave the reverence and respect due him as a father. Undeniably, there
was moral ascendancy on the part of the accused-appellant over the victim.21
In a rape committed by a father against the daughter, the former's moral ascendancy and
influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The experience has certainly
caused great trauma on Maria Rizalina that she had to be committed to the National Center for
Mental Health, Mandaluyong City to undergo psychological and medical treatment for severe
depression.22 The testimony of Dr. Dijamco, a psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental
Health is quite revealing:
A
After having gathered all the informations we have conceded and collated the data and we
have agreed to come up with an impression as stated m the protocol or major depression, sir, and
that it was advised that the patient be given medication and to undergo regular psycho therapy,
Sir.
xxx23
Q
Now, in your honest opinion, what could have been the cause of your findings that the
patient Rizalina Onsiano suffered from major depressive (sic) disorder?
A
After having a thorough study of the patient's case. We could only conclude that it was the
abuser and the trauma that she underwent which led to her deppression (sic), her major and
severe deppression (sic), sir.
q
By the way, was she able to disclose to you on your initial interview with the patient
Rizalina Onciano regarding the sexual abuse committed in her person?
A
Initially, sir, she had difficulty, she would cry, she would request that we change the topic,
however, she was consistent in identifying the perpetrator of the crime, sir, or the accused.
Q
Now, in your honest opinion as a psychiatrist, is it normal for a child not to tell or recall
the sexual abuse committed on her person?
341
A
An abuse is a trauma in itself. So, for a child not to remember is quite impossible. So,
abuse especially if these abuses have taken quite a number of times or it happened several times,
sir.
Q
But is it normal for a child not to tell the details of the abuse committed in her person?
A
There is a possibility, sir, especially when a threat comes along or for several reasons, sir,
but it is possible does not disclose immediately that she has been sexually abused by some other
people, sir.
Q
Would you be able to give an example of what other factors that would prevent the child
from disclosing or tell the abuse committed on her person?
A
Sir, based on my observations and the cases I have handled for one it would be shame and
the guilt since the patient underwent such trauma they feel that they are to be blamed that's why
they don't tell, they feel that they have a part in the crime that's why they don't tell. For another
reason, an important reason for not disclosing is the threat the perpetrator imposes on the victim.
The threat to life, the threat to property, the threat to steal. Basically, those are the major reasons
why a child or adolescent would not disclose immediately that she has been sexually molested.
Q
Would you say the influence of the mother for being uncooperative with her in her fighting
for her right, is one of the factor that would prevent the child from disclosing?
A
There is a possibility, sir, since whenever a child is abused, it is not the child or the victim
which is just affected. It is the entire family, the brothers, the sisters, the mother, the father, the
entire family. Since their child is affected, so, the mother and the other relatives may have stayed
in the child not disclosing about the attempts or the abuse, sir.
Q
Now, in the case of Rizalina Onsiano, while she was presented by this representation,
when this representation was about to ask her of the actual abuse committed on her person, she
broke down and refused to talk. Is it normal, is that a normal behavior of Rizalina Onsiano?
A
Basically, prior to the commission of the crime, Rizalina was an up-grown child. Having
undergone abuse for quite sometime, it is not easy for one to fully disclose what she underwent.
There are times when the patient will be able to identify him just about that. Now, in Rizalina's
case, I don't think it was normal. Basically, it is a normal part wherein she would not
automatically disclosed what happened. It would take time prior to full disclosure of such
trauma, sir.
Q
Now, later on, after she was discharged from the National Center for Mental Health
specifally (sic) on January 23, 1997, when Rizalina Onsiano was presented again to testify on the
abuse committed against her by the accused, her own stepfather, she was able to narrate the
details of what happened to her, is that also normal?
A
That proved, sir, that the therapy, the medication she took or that she underwent at the
Center helped her in gradually dealing with the situation as such, sir, whenever she has to testify
342
against her stepfather. The course she is undergoing right now is the effect of the treatment she
has undergone at our Center.
xxx24
Accused-appellant denies having raped his stepdaughter alleging that it was quite impossible for
him to have committed the crime "in broad daylight, in a small house, abundant with open
windows and doors, peopled by six or seven mischievous and open-eyed curious souls keen with
every unusual scenarios of members involving kins and idols like their fathers."25
The Court sees no impossibility for the commission of this abominable act on the victim under
the alleged circumstances. Many cases attest to the unfortunate fact that rape can be committed
even in places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and
even inside a house where there are occupants. Lust is no respecter of time or place.26
Furthermore, accused-appellant points to his sister-in-law, Evelyn Nallos as the person who
allegedly pressured his stepdaughter to file the charges of rape against him considering an old
grudge existing between the two of them. It can be recalled that. Evelyn Nallos took care of two
of their children who, unfortunately, died under her care, one died of meningitis and pneumonia
and the other by drowning in a flood. To the defense, the deaths were plainly due to Evelyn's
negligence.27 Since then, their relationship was estranged.
This contention deserves scant consideration. Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime.
It becomes inconsequential in a case where there are affirmative, nay, categorical declarations
towards the accused-appellant's accountability for the felony.28 Maria Rizalina's straightforward
and consistent testimony belies any claim of being pressured by her aunt to concoct a story of
defloration against the stepfather. Upon cross examination, she was quick to deny that her Tita
Evelyn prompted her to report to the authorities about her physical condition and the person
responsible thereof.29
To the accused-appellant, it strains credulity why the victim never said anything about the
incidents until the discovery by the mother on November 24, 1994 when she revealed that it was
her stepfather who was responsible for her pregnancy.
Delay in reporting the crime is understandable. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for
some time the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist's threat on their lives.30 The case at
bar is no exception to these well-founded rule. Maria Rizalina never said anything to her mother
of the many times the accused-appellant had sexually abused her for fear of her life. She was
definitely afraid of her stepfather who threatened to kill her once she reports the matter to her
mother.31
Neither was there any medical impossibility to the commission of the crime as accused-appellant
argues:
Granting "en gratia arguendo" that accused-appellant did the act complained of in September
1993, or the last act on October 28, 1995, it is medically impossible and contrary to the natural
343
laws and religious belief And, the medical books and hospital records is in dearth or paucity of
four (4) months premature births.
xxx
xxx the turning point when the pregnancy became apparent and noticeable was a clear span or
intereggnum (sic) of one (1) year and five (5) months from the month and year subject matter of
this review (November 24, 1995) which logically coincides with the months that complainant
gallivanted with the "barkada", but is off-tangent and is irreconcilable and medically and
naturally impossible with the alleged commission of rape of September 1993.32
This defense is unavailing.
Maria Rizalina gave birth on February 23, 1996. She testified that she was raped several times by
her stepfather. While she could hardly remember the exact dates of these instances, she only
remembered the first time she was raped which was in September, 1993 when she was only 12
years old and was in Grade IV33 and the last time was on October 28, 1995. Obviously, she
could not have conceived in September, 1993 because as she testified, she was not yet
menstruating at that time. She started to have her menstruation when she was in Grade V34 or in
1994. She denies going home late after school and is not fond of being out with friends.35 Since
she maintained that her stepfather raped her several times, the child was definitely conceived as a
result of the rape between September, 1993 and October 28, 1995.
Given all these facts and circumstances, we rule with moral certainty that the accused-appellant
is indeed guilty of the crimes.
Accused-appellant was charged for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 and Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code for rape which read as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
upon the following:
"xxx
"(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse:
Provided, that when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
344
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its mediumperiod;"36
xxx
ART. 335 When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
"1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of - reason or otherwise unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion Perpetua."
xxx
Anent the numerous informations filed, the trial court corrected the erroneous filing of these
informations as it explained:
It will be noted, however, that for the same act committed on the same date by the accused on the
same offended party, the accused stands charged with two offenses: for violation of Section 5,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act 7610 and for rape committed through force and intimidation.
Thus: (1) in Criminal Case Nos. 482-95 and 487-95, the accused was charged with rape and
violation of Section 5 paragraph (b) of Republic Act 7610, respectively, committed on the same
date, October 1995, when the victim was 13 years old and 9 months; (2) in Criminal Case Nos.
484-95 and 488-95, the Informations charged rape and violation of the same special law,
respectively, committed on the same date, "September 1995, when the victim was 13 years and 9
months old; (3) in Criminal Case Nos. 483-95 and 489-95, the accused was charged with rape
and violation of the same special law, respectively, committed in October 1995 when the child
was 11 years and 10 months old; and (4) in Criminal Case Nos. 485-95 and 486-95, the accused
was charged with rape and violation of the same special law, respectively, committed in
September 1993 when the victim was 11 years and 9 months old.
Charging the accused with two different offenses for the same act committed on the same date
against the said victim is erroneous as it is illegal, except where the law itself so allows. Section
5 (b) Republic Act 7610, however, does not so allow. The said law in fact provides that if the
child is below 12 years old, the accused must be prosecuted under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code. Conversely, if the child is above 12 years old but below 18 years old, then the
accused must be prosecuted under Republic Act 7610 for the so called "child abuse.37
The trial court correctly convicted the accused for Rape under Article 335 of the RPC in
Criminal Case No. 485-95 for it was clearly proven that the accused had carnal knowledge with
the victim through force and intimidation on that fateful day in September, 1993. This was the
345
first time the accused raped Maria Rizalina who was able to give a detailed account of this
traumatic experience. She was below 12 years old at that time. While Maria Rizalina also
testified that she was raped several times after September, 1993, the prosecution, however, failed
to establish the material details as to the time, place, and manner by which these offenses were
committed. There is still a need for proof beyond reasonable doubt that the offenses alleged in
the informations were indeed committed.38 Thus, the trial court acquitted the accused under
Criminal Case Nos. 482-95, 483-95, 484-95, 486-95, 488-95, 489-95 for want of sufficient
evidence.
Aside from the first incident of rape, all what Maria Rizalina could say was that she was
molested by the accused for the last time on October 28, 1995. Whether there was force and
intimidation to qualify this incident as rape was, unfortunately, not proven. Nonetheless, there is
no dispute that Maria Rizalina was sexually abused by the accused on this occasion. Hence, the
trial court convicted the accused under Criminal Case No. 487-95 for violation of Sec. 5(b) of
R.A. 7610 or the Child Abuse Law.
In the case of People v. Larin,39 the Court has explained that the elements of the offense
penalized under this provision are as follows;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA
7610, children are "persons below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition."
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but
also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious conduct.
Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution, the essence of which is
profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. This is clear from the deliberations of the
Senate.
From the above disquisition, the accused is certainly guilty for sexual abuse committed on his
stepdaughter, using his moral ascendancy in intimidating the victim to engage in sexual
intercourse with him.
The amount of damages must, however, be modified. In each of the cases, the trial court awarded
the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. P100,000 for moral damages and another P100,000 as
exemplary damages. In line with recent jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity is
346
in order regardless of proof In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages may, likewise, be
awarded without the need for proving the same in the amount not exceeding P50,000.40 The
award of exemplary damages must be deleted for lack of legal basis.41
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75,
Olongapo City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is ordered to
pay the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.000) as civil indemnify,
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages in Crim. Case No. 485-95 and
Crim. Case No. 487-95, the award of exemplary damages is deleted in the above criminal cases.
People v. Abello
Facts: Appellant Abello was convicted of one count of rape by sexual assault and two counts of
sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law committed against his step daughter, AAA. The
following information for rape was filed against the appellant: (note there are three Informations
filed, one for rape and two for sexual assault).
1. That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being a stepfather (sic) of victim
AAA,4 with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside the mouth of said AAA, against her will and
without her consent
The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months. On June 30,
1998 at around 4:00 oclock morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas with her
sisterinlaw and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when Abello mashed her breast. Come July
2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under the same situation
while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because
of the light coming from outside. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello placed his
soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim on the same date reported the incident to her
sisterinlaw and mother.
The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Informations. The CA affirmed Abellos conviction
on appeal and increased the penalties imposed. Abello now appeals his conviction for rape on the
ground that the mode of commission provided for in the information is different from that proven
during the trial. He also questions his conviction for sexual abuse since AAA does not fall under
those protected by RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law).
Issues:
1. WoN the appellant shall be acquitted due to the difference between the modes of
commission provided for in the Information for rape and that proven at the trial.
2. WoN appellant is guilty of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. If hes not, if he can
be liable for an offense other than that stated in the information.
3. WoN the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship should be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
347
4. WoN aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the Information can be considered to

increase the penalty.
Held:
1. NO, variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he
fails to object to evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner
than what was alleged. The Information alleges force and intimidation as the mode of
commission. However, AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it
happened and only awoke to find Abellos male organ inside her mouth. This variance is
not fatal to Abellos conviction for rape by sexual assault. A variance in the mode of
commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence
showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In
the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation of evidence showing that the
crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the
Information. Thus, the variance is not a bar to Abellos conviction of the crime charged in
the Information.
2. NO, appellant cannot be held guilty under the Child Abuse Law but he can be held for
Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA cannot be considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7610 which states that Children refers to person below 18 years of age or those over
but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition. AAA was neither below 18 nor was she fully unable to take care of herself.
Though Abello cannot be held liable under RA 7610, he is still liable for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The character of the crime is not determined
by the caption or preamble of the information or from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. In the present case,
although the two Informations wrongly designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated; the
allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of the RPC
whose elements are:
a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
b. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
c. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
i. By using force or intimidation; or
ii. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or
iii. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
3. NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Though
the three Informations all alleged the stepfatherstepdaughter relationship between AAA
and Abello, this modifying circumstance, was not duly proven in the present case. The
prosecution failed to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAAs mother. If
the fact of marriage came out in the evidence at all, it was only via an admission by
Abello of his marriage to AAAs mother. This admission is inconclusive. The court is
348
strict on considering relationship as an aggravating circumstance because it increases the

imposable penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
4. NO, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and knowledge of disability cannot be
considered. Although not alleged in the information, the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling was proven during the trial. Additionally, Article 266B (penalties for rape) of
the RPC recognizes knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of
the crime as a qualifying circumstance. This knowledge by Abello of AAAs polio was
also proven during the trial but not alleged in the Information. Though these aggravating
and qualifying circumstances of dwelling and Abellos knowledge of AAAs physical
disability were not considered in imposing the penalty, they may be appreciated in
awarding exemplary damages.
Therefore, appellant is found guilty of rape by sexual assault and acts of lasciviousness.
1) For the crime of rape, he is sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as
maximum. He is ordered to pay P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2) For each count of acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of
prision correccional, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA the amounts of
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages, in each case.
Malto v People
Facts: Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA,
a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident, petitioner
and AAA had a mutual understanding and became sweethearts. Pressured and afraid of the
petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, BBB, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
The petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned. Hence, the trial court entered for him a plea
of not guilty. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain
petitioners conviction. The trail court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty and sentenced
him to reclusion temporal and to pay an indemnity of Php. 75,000 and damages of Php. 50,000.
Petitioner questioned the trial courts decision in the CA. The CA modified the decision of the
trial court. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and ruled that the trial court erred in
awarding Php. 75,000 civil indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for
rape committed under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law.
349
Issue: Whether the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds that there was
no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of their sweetheart
relationship
Held: No. The sweetheart theory cannot be invoked for purposes of sexual intercourse and
lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610. Consent is immaterial because the mere
act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is subjected
to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. Moreover, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of
giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
Aquino v. Acosta
Facts: On November 21, 2000, she reported for work after her vacation in the U.S., bringing
gifts for the three judges of the CTA, including respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, he
entered her room and greeted her by shaking her hand. Suddenly, he pulled her towards him and
kissed her on her cheek.
On December 28, 2000, while respondent was on official leave, he called complainant by phone,
saying he will get something in her office. Shortly thereafter, he entered her room, shook her
hand and greeted her, "Merry Christmas." Thereupon, he embraced her and kissed her. She was
able to free herself by slightly pushing him away.
On the first working day in January, 2001, respondent phoned complainant, asking if she could
see him in his chambers in order to discuss some matters. When complainant arrived there,
respondent tried to kiss her but she was able to evade his sexual attempt.
Weeks later, after the Senate approved the proposed bill expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
while complainant and her companions were congratulating and kissing each other, respondent
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her.
In the morning of February 14, 2001, respondent called complainant, requesting her to go to his
office. She then asked Ruby Lanuza, a clerk in the Records Section, to accompany her.
Fortunately, when they reached his chambers, respondent had left.
The last incident happened the next day. At around 8:30 a.m., respondent called complainant and
asked her to see him in his office to discuss the Senate bill on the CTA. She again requested
Ruby to accompany her. The latter agreed but suggested that they should act as if they met by
accident in respondents office. Ruby then approached the secretarys table which was separated
from respondents office by a transparent glass. For her part, complainant sat in front of
respondent's table and asked him what he wanted to know about the Senate bill. Respondent
seemed to be at a loss for words and kept glancing at Ruby who was searching for something at
the secretary's desk. Forthwith, respondent approached Ruby, asked her what she was looking for
and stepped out of the office. When he returned, Ruby said she found what she was looking for
and left. Respondent then approached complainant saying, me gusto akong gawin sa iyo kahapon
350
pa. Thereupon, he tried to grab her. Complainant instinctively raised her hands to protect herself
but respondent held her arms tightly, pulled her towards him and kissed her. She pushed him
away, then slumped on a chair trembling. Meantime, respondent sat on his chair and covered his
face with his hands. Thereafter, complainant left crying and locked herself inside a comfort
room. After that incident, respondent went to her office and tossed a note stating, sorry, it wont
happen again.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Acosta is guilty of sexually harassment
Held: No, Judge Acosta is not guilty of sexual harassment. He is exonerated of the charges
against him and is advised to be more circumspect in his deportment.
A mere casual buss on the cheek is not a sexual conduct or favor and does not fall within the
purview of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. Section 3 (a) thereof provides, to wit:
'Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training - related Sexual Harassment Defined. - Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor,
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who,
having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless
of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
a)
In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
1)
The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions or privileges; or the refusal to grant sexual favor
results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in anyway would discriminate,
deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employees;
2) The above acts would impair the employee's right or privileges under existing labor laws; or
3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee.'
"Clearly, under the foregoing provisions, the elements of sexual harassment are as follows:
1)
The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another;
2)
The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a working environment;
351
3)
The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, or any other person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
Indeed, from the records on hand, there is no showing that respondent judge demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges specified under Section 3 of R.A. 7877.
Nor did he, by his actuations, violate the Canons of Judicial Ethics or the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
US v. Ancheta
Late in the night of May 26 of last year when Juana Martires was sleeping in her home in the
confines of the pueblo of Amulung, she was awakened by the voice of her husband, Ventura
Quinto, who called her to come to the door of the house with a light because certain individuals
were there who had arrested him. But when Juana appeared at said door with a light one of the
men ordered her to extinguish it or the Americans with them would kill her. She then noticed that
her husband had been bound and heard one of the strangers say to him that by order of the
American garrison at Alcala they were to conduct him to Pea Blanca in connection with some
affair concerning one Badajo. She recognized Nicolas Ancheta as one of the three men who
kidnapped her husband the very one who threatened her by his voice, height, and walk.
They had their faces covered with their handkerchiefs. Some were armed with daggers and bolos.
Terrified, she fled from the house and hid herself at some distance away. Upon her return the
following morning she did not find her husband at home and at once reported the occurrence to
the authorities.
When the municipal president, who was also justice of the peace of that township, made the
necessary investigation, the seven defendants were taken into custody and before the justice of
the peace, his secretary, the commanding military officer of Alcala, and other persons, they
confessed that they had conducted the kidnapped man, Ventura Quinto, to a place called Radap,
within the confines of the same township, and that there, by order of Nicolas Ancheta and
Sebastian Dayag, he was killed by Faustino Pascual, Daniel Verson, and Aniceto Javier. The
latter held an end of the cord with which Ventura was bound and secured, while Nicolas Ancheta,
Sebastian Dayag, Claro Ancheta, and Maximo Verson posted themselves at some distance to
watch for the approach of anyone, in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. The local
authorities found the body of the deceased in a hole some 2 meters deep, near Radap, at the place
designated by the accused. The body was in a state of complete decomposition and hence the
practitioner who made the examination was unable to determine the number of the wounds,
although he noted that both elbows were tied from behind with strips of rattan and that the
abdomen had been ripped open. In addition to this the dagger and bolo were discovered in the
place pointed out by the defendants Nicolas and Faustino. All these facts were confirmed by the
defendants in their testimony.
A complaint having been filed by the public prosecutor and the defendants arraigned they
pleaded "not guilty." At the trial the municipal president testified that in his opinion Ventura
352
Quinto was killed as an act of vengeance on the part of Dayag, who had been ill treated the year
before by the deceased. Furthermore he believed that the defendants bore resentment against the
deceased because the latter, by order of the witness, had arrested the bandit Jose Badajo, who
was suspected of belonging to the defendants' band. Two expert armorers testified that they were
unable to ascertain if the spots noted on the dagger and bolo were or were not of blood; and that
the dagger was of a kind whose use was prohibited, but not the bolo.
The foregoing facts, fully proved at the trial by ocular inspection, expert testimony, the
declarations of credible witnesses, and by grave and conclusive circumstantial evidence,
constitute the crime of murder, prohibited and penalized in article 403 of the Penal Code. The
execution of the crime was attended with the qualificative circumstance of treachery (alevosia),
in that the defendants, in killing Ventura Quinto while he was bound elbow to elbow, employed
means tending directly and particularly to insure the consummation of the crime without risk to
the aggressors, inasmuch as thus bound and disarmed the victim could not defend himself in any
manner against the seven men who kidnapped him or even against the three who actively
participated in his killing.
The criminal responsibility of the defendants as perpetrators of the murder which is here
prosecuted is beyond question, inasmuch as all of them by previously concerted action met
together and witnessed the capture and later the violent killing of Ventura Quinto. Some took a
direct part in the actual commission of the crime, others were the determined instigators who
induced the former to commit it, while the remainder cooperated in the same by their presence
and by means of acts without which the crime would not have been perpetrated. It must be taken
into account that this murder was committed by a gang (cuadrilla) of seven persons, the greater
part of whom were armed, and it does not appear that any of those present who were not active
participants in the crime made any effort to prevent it. This latter conclusion is not affected by
the unfounded allegations made by the defendants, since they inculpate each other mutually in
confessing their participation and cooperation in the said murder and since it is proven that all of
the four who were not the actual perpetrators thereof witnessed the commission of the crime,
lending to the murderers their moral support, all are thus directly responsible for the
consequences and incidents of the same.
In the commission of this murder there is to be considered, according to the facts adduced at the
trial, the presence of the fifteenth aggravating circumstance of article 10 of the Code, affecting
all seven of the defendants in that they committed the crime at night, in an uninhabited place, and
in a band (en cuadrilla). These three incidents are considered, according to the decisions of the
courts, as one single circumstance for the purpose of increasing the penalty for the crime.
Likewise there is to be considered the presence of the seventh circumstance of the same article
10 as applicable to the defendants Nicolas Ancheta and Sebastian Dayag for the reason that these
two conceived the idea and premeditated the killing of Quinto, induced the others to kidnap him
in order that he might be put to death, and ordered the three to kill him. In addition, we must
consider the presence of the eighth aggravating circumstance of said article of the Code as
applicable to Faustino Pascual, Daniel Verson, Aniceto Javier, and said Nicolas Ancheta for the
reason that they employed both disguise and fraud, covering their faces with handkerchiefs while
effecting the capture of their victim to avoid being recognized and making him believe by deceit
that they would conduct him to another place at the order of the commander of the American
353
detachment at Alcala. With respect to all the defendants the only mitigating circumstance in their
favor which can be applied to offset the first aggravating circumstance is that especially
established in article 11 of the Penal Code, which, in view of the class to which the defendants
belong, may be applied in their favor for the reduction of the penalty. It follows that even
regarding the fifteenth aggravating circumstance as compensated by the mitigating circumstance
of article 11, still circumstances 7 and 8 of article 10 of the Code must be applied, and to them
we must add the twenty-fourth of the same article, because the murderers made use of a dagger
a weapon prohibited by the regulations.
The crime here prosecuted being thus defined by the circumstances already enumerated, it is
apparent that the penalty prescribed in article 403 of the Penal Code should be imposed upon the
five defendants, Nicolas Ancheta, Sebastian Dayag, Faustino Pascual, Daniel Verson, and
Aniceto Javier in its maximum grade, and upon the remaining two, Claro Ancheta and Maximo
Verson, in its medium grade, with the corresponding accessory penalties.
Furthermore, in view of the nature and circumstances of the murder for which this cause is
prosecuted it is evident that the fact that the deceased was captured in his house and taken by the
defendants to an uninhabited place selected by them for the purpose of killing him there, does
not constitute the crime of illegal detention, since it does not appear that it was the purpose of the
accused to commit this offense. On the contrary they seized the unfortunate Quinto in his house
with the sole object of carrying him away to a suitable place, which they subsequently pointed
out to the authorities, and of there murdering him.
Concerning the petition for the annulment of the judgment reviewed presented on appeal by the
Solicitor-General, and based on the ground that the same was made by a judge who should have
retire on June 16, 1901, this question has been previously determined by the court, upon a similar
motion of the Solicitor-General, in its decision dated November 16, 1901, in a case of grave
assault (lesiones graves) from Ilocos Sur, register No. 412, and reported elsewhere. In that
opinion the validity of the proceedings and of the judgment was sustained and the court's
decision upon this point is referred to and applied in this cause.
Therefore, for the reasons above stated, it is meet in justice and in accordance with the provisions
of the penal law that the defendants Nicolas Ancheta, Sebastian Dayag, Faustino Pascual,
Aniceto Javier, and Daniel Verson, be condemned to the death penalty, to be executed in the
township of Amulung, Cagayan, Island of Luzon, and if they should be pardoned from such
penalty it shall likewise be understood that they are condemned to absolute and perpetual
disqualification and subjection to the vigilance of the authorities for the lifetime of each one of
the defendants unless the said accessory penalties be especially remitted in such pardon. The
remaining defendants, Maximo Verson and Claro Ancheta, shall be sentenced to the penalty of
life imprisonment (cadena perpetua) and to the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
subjection to the vigilance of the authorities during the respective lives of the culprits and in case
the said defendants should obtain a pardon of the principal penalty they shall suffer those of
absolute and perpetual disqualification and subjection to the vigilance of the authorities during
the lifetime of each one of the defendants unless the same shall be expressly remitted in the
pardon of the principal penalty. All of the seven defendants shall be sentenced to pay pro rata and
in solidum an indemnity of 1,000 pesos, Mexican currency, to the widow and heirs of the
354
deceased and to pay a seventh part of the costs of both instances. The arms seized are declared
forfeited. The judgment reviewed is therefore confirmed in so far as it agrees with the foregoing
decision.
People v. PArulan, 8 Phil 615
People v. Kamad akiran et al, 18 SCRA 239
People v. Lumiwan, 295 SCRA 215
People v. Mittu 331 SCRA 159
People v Silongan 40 SCRA 459
People v. Santiano, 299 SCRA 583
People v. Trestiza, 660 SCRA 407
People v. Dionaldo 731 SCRA 68
People v. Enriquez, 465 SCRA 407
People v. Bringas, 619 SCRA 481
People v. Siongco, 623 SCRA 501
People v. Mirandilla 654 SCRA 761
People v. Roxas, 628 SCRA 378
People v Cua, 232 SCRA 507
People v. Villamar, 298 SCRA 398
People v Sinoc, 275 SCRA 357
People v. Mamantak 560 SCRA 298
People v. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124
People v Rolluna, 231 SCRA 446
People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 293
355

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People v.

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Issue: Whether or not treachery was present

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. Evidence shows

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Contrarily, ONCE A GUN IS DRAWN AGAINST A PERSON, THE MEANS, METHODS

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

PROOF THAT the MODE OF ATTACK WAS CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

ALREADY HIT AND WOUNDED, HE WAS STILL SUBJECTED TO SUCCESSIVE

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Issue: Whether or not there was treachery

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Probing direction of the wound upward, 3 1/2 inches in length.

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Who are these persons you referred to?

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

That four days and one hour is equivalent to 97 hours?

According to you, paraffin residue may disappear at approximately in 72 hours?

No gunpowder may be found anymore.

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Nonetheless, even if We were to disregard the extrajudicial confessions, the positive

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto

Prepared by: Sarah Rose T. Ganto