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ARTICLE VI, SECTION 17.

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
CHAVEZ v
COMELEC

of all contests relating to the


election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective
Members

Pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, VicePresident, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.
* Pre-proclamation controversy = any question pertaining to or affecting
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or
by any political party or coalition of parties, before the board or directly with the
Commission.
Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives,
no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election
returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon
written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
* Manifest errors must appear on certificates of canvass or election returns
sought to be corrected; and/or objections thereto must have been made before
the board of canvassers; and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.
FOR RECOUNT and RE-APPRECIATION: It is established by the law as well as
jurisprudence that
1. Errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are
proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of ballots.
2. Appreciation of ballots cast in the precincts is not part of the
proceedings of board of canvassers.
3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy (only instances where preproclamation recount may be resorted to) is limited to the ff issues:
a. Election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material
defects
b. Tampered with falsified, or prepared under duress
c.
Contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate
that the difference of which affects the results of the election.
The appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers; it is performed by the BEI at the precinct level.

PIMENTEL v
HRET
to restructure the
CA and HRET
respectively to
include party-list

ABAYON
PALPARAN v
THE HRET
(2010)
A quo warranto
case was filed
before the HRET
assailing the
jusridiction of
HRET over the
Party list..

and the remaining six shall be


Members of the Senate or the
HOR, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional
representation...
Sec. 8, Art VI: Confers on
Senate and HOR the authority
to elect among their members
those who would fill the 12 seats
for Senators and 12 seats for
House members in the CA.
shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the
election, returns, and
qualifications of their
respective Members.

These provisions show that party-list reps must first show that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to the seats.
RA 7941, Sec 11
Rule 3, Rules of HRET: HRET Composition xxx 6 shall be Members of
HOR who shall be chosen on the bases of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein.
Rule 4, Rules of HRET: Organization Upon the designation of the
Justices of SC and the election of the Members of HOR who are to
compose the HRET
Rule 1, Rules of CA: CA Composition It shall be composed of 12
Senators and 12 HOR Members, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from their political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system.
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is
not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of
Representatives.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the members of that
House are representatives of districts and party list
Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list
representatives are treated in
like manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as
members of the House of Representatives, a party -list representative is in
every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.
Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote,
in the end, would be a vote
for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of
Representatives.

Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and
grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941,
echoing the Constitution.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a
nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative
of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd Bantay,
respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
REYES v
COMELEC (2013)
to cancel
petitioners COC
for the position of
Rep of the lone
district of
Marinduque on the
grounds (among
others):
1. Petitioner is a
permanent
resident or an
immigrant of
the US
2. She is an
American
citizen

shall be the sole judge of all


contests
qualifications of their
respective Members.

HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member
*WHEN is a candidate considered a Member of HOR:
1. Been proclaimed
*Doctrinal Pronouncement made in the context of a proclaimed
candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also
assumed office.
2. Taken his oath
Sec. 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of HOR: Members shall take
their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the
Speaker in open session.
3. Assumed office
(Sec 7, Art VI), Term of office of Members of HOR begins on 30th day
of June next following their election.
*RA 9225: Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must show that he
chose to establish his domicile in PH through positive acts and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in USA.

SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission
shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
DAZA V. SINGSON
(1989)
HOR revised its
representation by
withdrawing the seat
occupied by petitioner
Daza, giving this to the
newly-formed LDP
(Singson was placed)
after LDP reorganized
resulting to political
realignment in the HOR

On the basis of
proportional
representation of
political parties
therein.

The changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its


membership do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions
not involving severance of political loyalties of formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts if allegiance from one political party to another.

COSETENG v MITRA
(1990)

On the basis of
proportional
representation of
political parties
therein.

The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments


was based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House.
There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the
House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%)
of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two
seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next
largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as
the principal opposition party in the House.

Petitioner
Coseteng
then wrote a letter to
Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting
that
as
representative of KAIBA,
she be appointed as a
member
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments and House
Electoral Tribunal.
GUINGONA v
GONZALES (1992)
To
suffice
the
requirement that each
house must have 12

There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the


Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties therein.
twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the
House of
Representatives, elected
by each House on the

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12


senators be elected to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its
functions;
and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA.
The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a

representatives in the
CoA, the parties agreed
to use the traditional
formula: (No. of Senators
of a political party) x 12
seats) Total No. of
Senators elected.

basis of proportional
representation

proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of


the CA;
and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is
merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution.

SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and
the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses
incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

BENGZON v SENATE
BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE
Petitioners and Ricardo
Lopa were subpoenaed
by the SBRC to appear
before it and testify on
what they know
regarding the sale of 36
corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez.But
refused.
Standard Chartered
Bank v Senate
Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions
and Currencies
Whether the Senate
Committee on Banks can
conduct investigation
against SCB despite
criminal and civil cases
against the latter pending
in courts?

its respective
committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of
legislation

The power to conduct formal inquiries refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation.

The rights of persons


appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be
respected

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or


quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative
investigation.
The power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish
contempt is based on the principles of self-preservation.

It appears that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not


really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out
whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation includes the power to


compel the attendance of witnesses
Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of witnesses is the power to
ensure that said witnesses would be available to testify in the legislative
investigation considering that the people involved in this case are mostly nonFilipinos
Respect to Right Privacy
NOT ABSOLUTE
While it is true that Sec. 21, Art VI of the Constitution guarantees respect for
the rights of persons affected by legislative investigation, not every invocation of
right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
Self-Incrimination
The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy
determination, which may or may not be enacted into law

ARNAULT v
NAZARENO (1950)
Petitioner
was
summoned
by
the
Senate to its hearings.
In the course of the
investigation,
the
petitioner refused to
divulge the name of
the person to whom
he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00.

may conduct inquiries


in aid of legislation The
rights of persons
appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be
respected

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt.
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt
for a term beyond its period of legislative session.
no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body
the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to
time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

Arnault was therefore


cited in contempt by
the Senate and was
committed
to
the
custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he
answers
the
questions.
He
thereafter
filed
a
petition for habeas
corpus questioning the
validity
of
his
detention.

The power of the House of Congress to make investigations and


exact testimony is incidental to the legislative functions as to be
implied.
The power of inquiry with the process to enforce it is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power
in it vested by the Constitution materiality of a question
must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the
inquiry
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that it be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change
For experiences have shown that mere requests for such information
are often unavailing; and those that are voluntarily given are not
always accurate or complete. Hence, means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed.

ARNAULT v
BALAGTAS (1955)
This was a petition for
habeas corpus filed by
Jean Arnault against
the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas.

may conduct inquiries


in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly
published rules of
procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

SENATE v ERMITA
(2006)
On
2005, the President

EO 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information
that is crucial to law-making.
The power of inquiry

CFI has no right to review the findings of the Senate.


The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke
are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or
when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a
punitive rather than as a coercive measure.
The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as
a punitive measure.
This power is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise
of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant
and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to
judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional limitations.

issued EO 464,
mandated that all
heads of departments
of the Executive
Branch of the
government shall
secure the consent of
the President prior to
appearing before
either House of
Congress. Pursuant to
this Order, Executive
Sec. Ermita
communicated to the
Senate that the
executive and AFP
officials would not be
able to attend the
meeting since the
President has not yet
given her consent.

is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.

XXX

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power
of inquiry, which exemptions falls under the rubric of executive privilege.

may conduct inquiries in


aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly
published rules of
procedure. The rights of
person appearing in or
affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The


heads of
departments may
upon their own
initiative, with the
consent of the
President, or upon the
request of either House,
as the rules of each
House shall provide,
appear before and be
heard by such House
on any matter
pertaining to their
departments. Written
questions shall be
submitted to the
President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the
House of
Representatives at least
three days before their
scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not
be limited to written
questions, but may
cover matters related
thereto. When the
security of the State or
the public interest so
requires and the
President so states in
writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in
executive session.

xxx the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of the
information in the legislative process.
The power of inquiry is subject to judicial review
xxx the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible
to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to
the Courts certiorari powers under Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
Sec. 21, Art. VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses
duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry
conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Sec. 21 also mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates
Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
Exemption to power of inquiry

Executive privilege, defined


as the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the
Congress. It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.
Kinds of executive privilege
One variety of the privilege...is the state secrets privilege...on the ground that the information is
of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another
variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity
of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
The principle of executive privilege
is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads.
Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance
of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head
to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sec. 2 and 3, EO 464
EO 464 unlawfully delegated authority to the heads of offices in Sec. 2(b) to determine certain
information as privileged
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary

to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power.
How executive privilege should be applied in the case of an official
xxx when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment,
might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, afer the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and
may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Right to Information
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to
information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive assistance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation,
is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to
information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress
opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other governmental
officials through various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression xxx
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of EO 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of
inquiry.
GUDANI v SENGA
(2006)

SABIO v GORDON
(2006)
Chairman Sabio
declined the invitation
because of prior
commitment, and at
the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO
No. 1: No member or
staff of the
Commission shall be
required to testify or
produce evidence in
any judicial, legislative
or administrative
proceeding concerning
matters within its
official cognizance.

the President can prevent military officers from testifying at a legislative


inquiry
by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Remedy is judicial relief
the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one
of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power
as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries.

Art VI, Sec 12: Power


of investigation
conferred not just to
Congress but also of
any of its
committee. This
constitutes a direct
conferral of
investigatory power
upon the committees.

The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses


everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.
It extends to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
It is also inconsistent with Art XI, Sec 1, Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Limitations of the Bill of Rights:
Right to privacy: NOT ABSOLUTE where there is an overriding
compelling state interest.
Right against self-incrimination: ONLY when a question tends to
elicit an answer that will incriminate him

NERI v SENATE
COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS and
INVESTIGATIONS
(2008)

Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-inchief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and nondelegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Ermita sent a letter to


the senate averring that
the communications
between GMA and Neri
are privileged and that
the jurisprudence laid
down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He
was cited in contempt
of respondent
committees and an
order for his arrest and
detention until such
time that he would
appear and give his
testimony.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

GARCILLANO vs. THE


HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(2008)

The respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the


Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure."

Hello Garci.

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
DAVID v MACAPAGALARROYO (2006)
President Arroyo issued
PP No. 1017 declaring a
state of emergency. On
the same day, issued
G.O. No. 5 implementing
PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and
PNP "to immediately
carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions
and measures to
suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."

Congress, by a vote of
two-thirds of both
Houses shall have the
sole power to declare the
existence of a state of
war.
Congress may, by law,
authorize the President,
for a limited period and
subject to such
restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and
proper to carry out a
declared national policy.
Section 18. The Pres
shall be the Commanderin-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.. The
Congress, voting jointly,
by a vote of at least a
majority of all its
Members in regular or
special session, may
revoke such proclamation
or suspension

PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President


Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.
Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of
Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution
deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
TOLENTINO v

Sec. 24 Bills shall

It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to

SECRETARY OF
FINANCE (1994)
One contention is that RA
7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House
of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec.
24 of the Constitution,
because it is in fact the
result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct
bills, H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No.
1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by
the Constitution.

originate exclusively in
the House of
Representatives
Art VI, Sec 26, No bill
passed by either House
shall become a law unless
it has passed 3 readings
on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in
its final form except
when the President
certifies to the necessity
of its immediate
enactment.

originate exclusively in the HOR


And since a bill originating from the House may undergo extensive changes in
the Senate that may result to rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may
inevitably be produced.
TO insist that a revenue bill must be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments.
Such consequently violates the coequality of legislative power of the two
houses of Congress and make the House superior to the Senate.
Senate No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days
Was because the President certified it as urgent.
Art VI, Sec 26, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc. qualifies 2 stated conditions before a bill can become
a law:
1. Bill has passed 3 readings on separate days
2. Has been printed in its final form and distributed 3 days before it is
finally approved
Upon the certification of the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the wright of a legislative practice.

7716 is the bill which the


Conference Committee
prepared by consolidating
HN 11197 and SN 1630
and that report included
provisions not found in
either House or Senate
Bill; and that these
provisions were
surreptitiously inserted
by the Conference
Committee (Committee
med behind closed
doors).

ALVAREZ v
GUINGONA, JR. (1996)
validity of RA 7720
mainly because the Act
allegedly did not
originate exclusively in
the HOR

New Bill Possibly Emerging Out of a Conference Committee:


a. Court held that it is within the power of a conference committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is neither found in
either HB or SB.
b. If the committee can propose an amendment, no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions so long as such amendment is germane to
the subject of the bills before the committee.
c.
After all, its report is not final and still subject to the approval of both
houses of Congress to become valid
Conference Committee Can Only Act on the Differing Provisions and Cannot
Insert Provisions Not Found in the Bills:
a. Rules of Senate XII, Sec 26: the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within 10 days
after their composition.
b. Rule XIV, Sec 85: In the event that the House does not agree with the
Senate on amendments to any bills or joint resolutions, the differences
may be settled by conference committee of both Chambers.
Committees Report Must Have Undergone 3 Readings in Each of the 2 Houses:
a. If that would be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since
each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill.
b. take it or leave it bases if not approved by both houses, another
conference committee must be appointed.
c.
Art VI, Sec 26 (2) must be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the
conference committee report.
All appropriations, xxx
and private bills shall
originate exclusively in
the HOR, but the Senate
may propose or concur
with amendments.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of
local application should originate in the HOR, for as long as the Senate does not
act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

SECTION 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in
the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

GARCIA v MATA
(1975)
Garcia was a reserve
officer
claims that his reversion
to inactive status is
violation of RA 1600

DEMETRIA v ALBA
(1987)
Petitioners assail the
constitutionality of the
Sec 44(1), PD 1177 as a
conflict with Sec 16[5]
Art VI of the 1973
Constitution, The Pres
shall have the authority
to transfer any fund
to any program, project
or activity of any
department, bureau, or
office included in the
General Appropriations
Act or approved after its
enactment.

Sec 25 (2), Art VI: No


provision or enactment
shall be embraced unless
it relates specifically to
some particular
appropriation therein.
Any such provision or
enactment shall be
limited in its operation to
the appropriation to
which it relates.

RA 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the fiscal
year 1956-1957
has no relevance to the budget in question or to any appropriation item
contained therein.

Sec. 25[5]. No law shall


be passed authorizing
any transfer of
appropriations,
however, the
President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the
heads of constitutional
commissions may by law
be authorized to augment
any item in the general
appropriations law for
their respective offices
from savings in other
items of their respective
appropriations.

Unconstitutional

It was a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in


general appropriation act, thereby violates Sec 25 (2), Art VI.
This is intended to prevent riders, or irrelevant provisions included in the bill to
ensure its approval.

Transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
NO TRANSFERS FROM ONE GOVERNMENT AGENCY TO ANOTHER CAN BE MADE
as it empowers the president to indiscriminately transfer funds from one govt
agency to another without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken,
or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made.
It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public
moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the
President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.

PHILCONSA v
ENRIQUEZ (1994)

Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is


constitutional and valid?

Petitioners assail the


special provision allowing
a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for
operational expenses to
any other expense
category claiming that it
violates Sec. 25, Art 7
of the Constitution.
Issues of constitutionality
were raised before the
Supreme Court.

The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption
of validity of a veto.
Where the Presidential veto is claimed to have been made in excess of authority,
the issue of impermissible intrusion by the Executive into the domain of the
Legislature arises. To the extent that the power of Congress is impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof. An act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury
which can be questioned by any member of Congress.

PhilConsA prayed for a


writ of prohibition to
declare unconstitutional
and void a.) Art 16 on
the Countrywide
Development Fund and
b.) The veto of the
President of the Special
provision of Art XLVIII of
the GAA of 1994.
BELGICA V.
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY (2013)
SEE DIGEST
Congressional Pork Barrel
Presidential Pork Barrel
ARAULLO v AQUINO

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,


the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
PHILCONSA vs
GIMENEZ (1965)
assails the validity of RA
3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity
and commutation of
vacation and sick leave to
Senators and
Representatives, and to
the elective officials of
both Houses.

TIO v VIDEOGRAM
REGULATORY BOARD
(1987)

PHILIPPINE JUDGES
ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
vs. PETE PRADO
(1993)
RA 7354 was passed into
law stirring commotions
from the Judiciary.
Sec 35: Franking
privelege of the Supreme
Court, COA, RTCs, MTC,
MTCC, and other
government offices were
withdrawn from them.
Petitioners assails the
constitutionality of RA
No. 7354 on the
grounds: (1) its title
embraces more than one
subject and does not
express its purposes
TOLENTINO v
SECRETARY OF
FINANCE (1994)
(Same in SEC 24)

Section 14, Article VI,


The senators and the
Members of the House of
Representatives shall,
unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven
thousand two hundred
pesos each, including per
diems and OTHER
EMOLUMENTS or
allowances, and exclusive
only of travelling
expenses to and from
their respective districts
in the case of Members of
the House of
Representative and to
and from their places of
residence in the case of
Senators, when attending
sessions of the Congress.

No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which
is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of
an office, as salary, fees and perquisites. It is evident that retirement benefit is a
form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.
Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to
the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore
unconstitutional.

every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar,
the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation
of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision
is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
THE withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation
of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
(Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted)
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection
clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

Senate No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days (2nd and 4rd readings
were done on the same day) as required by the Constitution
Was because the President certified it as urgent.
Art VI, Sec 26, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc. qualifies 2 stated conditions before a bill can become
a law:
Bill has passed 3 readings on separate days
Has been printed in its final form and distributed 3 days before it is finally
approved
Upon the certification of the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
supported by the wright of a legislative practice.

TAN V. DEL ROSARIO


JR. (1994)

Section 26(1) (every bill passedone subject..) was envisioned to:


Prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the legislators any one of

unrelated subjects in support of the whole act


To prevent surprises or even fraud upon legislation
To fairly apprise the people, through such publications of its publications which
are usually made, of the subjects of legislation
The provision does not constitute imbalance because it met the following
requirements:
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely
requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not forfend
classification as long as:
The standards that are used therefore are and not arbitrary;
The categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose;
The law applies, all things being equal, to all present and future laws; and
Classification applies equally well to those belonging to same class
Abakada Guro Party
List vs Exec. Sec.
Ermita (2005)

legislative power which can never be delegated is the authority to make a


complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the
nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise
which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent.

SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the
same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall
enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
GONZALES vs
MACARAIG (1990)

BENGZON VS. DRILON


(1992)

President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriation Bill does not
grant the authority to veto a part of item and to approve the remaining portion of
the same item. But assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, we are of the opinion that sec 55 and sec 16 are not provisions in
the budgetary sense of the term. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in
the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some particular
appropriations therein. The challenged provisions fall short of this requirement.
Section 3, Article VIII of
the Constitution provides
for the Fiscal Autonomy
of the Judiciary
Section 25(5), Article VI:
Chief Justice must be
given a free hand on how
to augment
appropriations where
augmentation is needed

The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a


constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it
also provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the
entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the
Constitution has wisely provided the item veto power to avoid inexpedient
riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and
not an item.
The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the
utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary,
including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law. It knows its
priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be
given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is

needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.


The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom
in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.

PHILCONSA v
ENRIQUEZ (1994)

[SAME IN SEC 25]