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Author(s): W. H. WALSH
Source: CrossCurrents, Vol. 11, No. 3 (SUMMER 1961), pp. 269-282
Published by: Wiley
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24456868
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270
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ment which led from Russell and the ger, first put forward by Carnap and
early Wittgenstein to Carnap and Ayer somewhat oddly repeated by Ayer, who
was thus entirely natural: it was (or made play with the concept of "The
seemed at the time) only a short step Nothing," and is said to have got away
from saying that the generalities pro- with it only because the logical grammar
pounded by the major philosophers of of the word "nothing" is in certain re
the past are untested to saying that they spects like that of a proper name,
are untestable, or again from describing Moore's case of the confusion inherent
their work as having an appeal only to in the Ontological Argument, as a result
the imagination to maintaining that they of which a statement like "Tigers exist"
tive side of their work seriously. must stand condemned. But it is one
What I shall call the official view of thing to say this and another to believe
metaphysics, the view which is still, I that logical equivocation is all there is
think, most widely accepted among to metaphysics. I find it very implausible
English-speaking philosophers, has two to suppose that any such thesis could be
main points to it. First, that metaphysi- true when I think of the analytic powers
cians seek to give us information about and sensitivity to logical distinctions dis
the reality which, they say, underlies ap- played by so many of the great meta
pearances, or about what they hold to physical writers; by Aristotle, for exam
be the "true" nature of things. This pie, or by Leibniz. Similarly with the
amounts, as Kant saw long ago, to a view that the object of metaphysics is
project to penetrate beyond what can to bring up news from nowhere, to put
be known by empirical methods to its us in touch with the Beyond. There
that their project is feasible, and even the Absolute, to say nothing of God and
that they have succeeded in carrying it the immortal soul. But here again ap
out, by making a series of logical mis- pearances, especially first appearances,
takes. Examples of such mistakes are may be misleading. It may well be that
perhaps not so freely offered by support- this reading of the metaphysical enter
ers of the official account as we should prise, on which it would indeed stand
expect, but the idea can be illustrated condemned, is not compulsory; that
from the celebrated instance of Heideg- Kant's celebrated description of meta
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W.
H.
WALSH
271
physics as the supposed science o things hoping to decide will be best approached
One powerful reason for thinking that such a system should be expressed,
there might be more to metaphysics than Will it do to say that a materialist is
bad logic and a futile striving after the a man committed to a thesis about what
unknowable is to be found in the effect there is, the thesis namely that nothing
which unprejudiced reading of metaphy- exists except matter and its modifica
sical treatises continues to produce. De- tions? It is certainly in this way that
spite all that has been said about the many people think of the subject, so
empty character of metaphysical con- far as they think of it at all. But this
totally unaltered by the experience. And things, for example thoughts and feel
the alteration that occurs is not that one ings, which are not material in this sense,
is, per impossible, put in touch with But if the materialist in consequence
things supersensible, as if by some sort shifts his ground and tells us that the
of intellectual spiritualism; it is rather matter of which he speaks is not the
that, after appreciating the author's genus of which wood and stone are spe
point of view and grasping his system of cies, but is something totally distinct
ideas, one as it were sees familiar things from anything we know immediately
with fresh eyes. Whatever the explana- which lies beyond and explains whatever
tion, we have to admit that people find falls within experience, he saves his the
metaphysical works illuminating and sis from falsity only at the cost of render
revealing. To claim that they reveal what ing it unverifiable. The Matter of which
In answering this question I should count either for or against its existence,
like to concentrate on a particular meta- whose postulation is therefore entirely
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put crudely, is rather whether natural his opponents are ignorant; what he has
scientists do not have the answers to all to claim is ability to get into perspective,
the important questions, with the result or understand, things with which every
of nature. Here what concerns me is the with it the denial of certain existence
pected to pronounce, and I find that suppose any special insight into the
on many topics what they say has an Beyond; he makes it because he is con
air of finality about it; the possibility vinced that the facts do not warrant any
I now face is whether they may not such assumption, in the same way as most
have the last word to say on all im- of us deny the existence of fairies be
portant issues. If they have, then the cause we see that the facts do not justify
scientific way of taking things must be our assuming it. He could, if he chose,
allowed to hold the field against all al- stop short of absolute denial of a claim
ternative ways including those which like Aristotle's, and say only that there
see men as independent rational agents. was nothing to be said for it; to counter
The thesis that it does is the thesis of him, an opponent would have to point
materialism, which I should according- to phenomena which materialism leaves
ly formulate as holding that there is unexplained.
nothing that cannot be satisfactorily ex- Materialism as I am understanding it
plained in scientific or natural terms. is not itself a scientific thesis; it is a doc
There are many points in this formula trine which asserts the omnicompetence
which call for further comment. To be- of science. A materialist makes a pro
gin with something relatively unimpor- nouncement about science, but does not
tant, I may be told that there is no such necessarily engage in any form of scien
thing as a single scientific way of taking tific activity himself. The results which
things. Contrary to what was once sup- scientists establish are of vital concern
posed, the sciences are a confederation when we come to make up our minds
of independent states, not a centrally about materialism, yet it would be quite
controlled empire dominated by physics. wrong to suppose that materialists sim
I accept the possibility, but remark that ply repeat those results. What they add
it would, if correct, require me either can be brought out if we say that, where
to define the term "materialism" more as scientists assert their conclusions as
closely or allow that it was generic; it true, materialists want to say that these
would not rule out the kind of definition conclusions embody the truth on the sub
I have given. In fact the formula sup- ject in question. The point can perhaps
plied is sufficiently specific for several be elucidated further if we pay attention
found in the world, still less out of it. tific explanation (I am assuming here
A materialist does not have to claim to that we can thus speak in the singular)
know anyexistence propositions of which of a situation or happening the convinc
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W.
H.
WALSH
273
he may then be ready to assert that, ings ask themselves what they are to
from his special point of view, thinking make of the scheme of things entire, in
can be explained in terms of such what terms they are to take or seek to
changes. But if you ask him if his pro- comprehend it. This is not a question
nouncement is to be taken as ruling out, which arises inside any particular disci
or diminishing the importance of, other pline or form of activity; its origin is
sorts of approach to thinking, for in- to be found in the puzzlement which
stance that we make when we grade thoughtful people experience when they
arguments as valid or invalid, he will reflect on the implications of what par
probably reply that this question falls ticular disciplines establish and the pre
outside his competence: his is a depart- suppositions with which particular ac
mental enquiry, concerned to investigate tivities are conducted. There is prima
metaphysician shows no such caution or gion at its face value and accepting any
modesty, nor for that matter do his meta- thing like a Freudian account of the
physical rivals. They start from the con- subject; and though we can, if we choose,
elusions the physiologist has established, shut our eyes to one or the other, to do
consider these in the light of other ways so leaves a feeling of acute intellectual
the ability of scientists to say something of seeing the world and human experi
striking and pertinent on a wide variety ence as a whole. And the enlightenment
of unexpected and unconnected topics. which results viten people are convinced
It is when we take what physiology es- by their arguments is similar to the en
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274
situations.3
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27S
W. H. WALSH
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276
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177
W. H. WALSH
interpretation of Aristotelianism is ac
cordingly not inappropriate, and to this
above.7
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276
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W.
H.
WALSH
279
guage to describe this as a metaphysical The procedures may change, even change
point of view and say that it offers a radically, over a period of years, but the
framework inside which sense can be change is all the same a piecemeal one,
made of all sides of human experience. in the sense that not everything is al
But that Kant thought of it in this way tered at once. As a result individual
seems hard to deny. Nor could it be ar- students of these subjects know what
gued that the general scheme was pecu- their colleagues are up to, and have rela
liar to his narrow and unsympathetic tively little difficulty in deciding when
mind; on the contrary, it gave expres- they are right.
sion, as no other philosphy has done, to The contrast between science and his
important elements in Protestantism. tory is instructive in this connection.
point of view of the speculatively claimed scientific status for their results,
minded, it may nonetheless contain as and their main ground for doing so
many concessions to speculation as can would seem to be their conviction that
work of rules which are not themselves in morals' here> o course> we are
thought to be open to question. Not not concerned with assertions but with
only do science and mathematics have decisions. As modern philosophers are
clearly defined tasks; in both there are never tired of telling us, morals are a
agreed procedures for dealing with them. matter of practice, and this means that
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moral questions arise in a context where offer an explanation of all the facts? If
people are constantly making what are there are obvious facts which a meta
generally agreed to be right or wrong physical system fails to cover, it is so far
moves. Morals could not be the working deficient.
system it is if the thing to do in a moral Unhappily this test looks more prom
quandary could never be properly sped- ising in theory than it turns out to be in
fied. But though the case for a general practice. To see this we have only to
moral skepticism has been much exagge- consider its application to materialism,
rated, it certainly seems to make better Many people reject materialism on the
sense at some times than at others. It has ground that there are more things in
a relatively high plausibility in conditons heaven and earth than are dreamt of in
where there is much disagreement about this philosophy, but would a materialist
fundamental moral rules, a relatively agree that his philosophy left anything
low one in societies where people are out? Suppose it were said that he failed
generally satisfied with established ways to take account of, say, the phenomena
of going on. In the latter case people are of religious experience or the compelling
apt to confuse moral judgments with character of the feeling of moral obli
judgments of fact, since the rules are gation. His comment would surely be
clear and the only question is whether that he not only mentioned these phe
the case under judgment comes under nomena but explained them, and ex
All this suggests that the comparison could make them intelligible. In the case
commonly made between scientific and f religion, for example, he showed how
metaphysical theories in respect to their ^ was> ke in what physical, psychologi
claims to truth is at best seriously mis- cal and perhaps social conditions, people
leading. Clear decisions about whether came to have what are commonly called
to accept or reject a scientific proposition religious experiences and why they were
are possible because science is an activity disposed to put a certain construction
which proceeds under agreed rules, rules on those experiences. And if it were
which, among other things, specify what suggested to him that this explanation
is to count as evidence for or against. In simply omits what is the essence of the
metaphysics, by contrast, we are not so matter, in so far as it says nothing about
much working under rules as advocating tbe cognitive content of such experiences,
them, with the result that objective ke woldd reply that it is an illusion to
proof, proof that is to say which any suppose that they have any such content,
right-thinking person would acknowl- Having a religious experience is perhaps
edge, is impossible. In this context the like beinS vividlY aware of the presence
dispute turns on what is meant by the anodier person, with the difference
all, we can choose rationally between that we can see how the illusion devel
different sets of rules if we are clear PS and wbat purpose it serves,
about the requirements which a good The trouble about testing a theory
set of rules must fulfill. Might it not be like that of materialism by its capacity
claimed that everybody acknowledges at to cover all the facts is that there is no
least one such requirement in a set of general agreement about what"the facts"
metaphysical rules, namely that it should are. Facts exist, or perhaps we should
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W.
H.
WALSH
281
say obtain, only from particular points who puts forward such an interpreta
of view, and here points of view are in tion would certainly claim that there
dispute. The consequence of this is that are considerations which make his own
the metaphysician is necessarily judge theory superior to those of his rivals; he
in his own case, for though he must is convinced, that is to say, that his is
admit to an obligation to take account a reasoned case. But he might very well,
of all the facts as he sees them, it is in if he were sensible, allow that there
the last resort for him to say what is fact could be no knock-down demonstration
and what not. His office confers on him of the correctness of his point of view,
the duty of giving an overall interprta- To the skeptic who persisted in finding
tion, but simultaneously allows him a his views implausible he could give only
veto on accepting anything which can- one piece of advice: to go back to the
not be fitted into his scheme. text, make an honest effort to see it in
For these reasons I am altogether less the way recommended, and then see
confident than I once was that there whether fresh enlightenment did not
can be objective tests of the truth or result. He could have no answer to a
falsity of metaphysical structures. Yet I critic unwilling to make that experiment,
also feel that it would be absurd to treat What is true of literary appreciation
acceptance or rejection of a metaphysical here is also true of metaphysics. Much
view as something which is wholly arbi- metaphysical, like much literary, discus
trary, a matter of personal taste or par- sion turns on whether or not a theory
ticular liking. Such an account is just avoids inconsistency, and this, of course,
not true of actual metaphysical think- is a matter that can be definitively de
ing, as anyone who has tried to make cided, once we can be certain that the
up his mind about materialism will wit- concepts of the theory have been proper
ness. In such a case there certainly are ly grasped by its critics. But there is
considerations which will strengthen or another species of objection which peo
weaken confidence in either sort of con- pie bring against metaphysicians, to the
elusion, considerations whose relevance effect that their views are not sufficiently
further developments, he for his part that the metaphysician criticized will be
must acknowledge it to be true or false. insensitive to objections of this sort, at
I suggest that in thinking about con- least when they are put forward by crit
viction and proof in metaphysics we ics who have made a real effort to see
ought to have in mind, not the relatively the world as he sees it; he will try to
tight arguments of natural scientists, but show that he can meet the points made,
the altogether looser procedures fol- or will try to adjust his system to meet
lowed by critics of literature and the them. And if he can do neither he may
arts. We are all familiar with the situ- even abandon it.
ation where there exists a plurality of In the last resort the only test of truth
conflicting interpretations of a major which can be applied in metaphysics is
work of literature like Hamlet. A critic a personal test: we have to try, by an
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its lowest, and then finally to pronounce described as the queen of the sciences:
for ourselves on its adequacy. The argu- it is not a science at all, but belongs to
ments which others, including the meta- the humanities.
FILOSOFIA
an international philosophical quarterly edited by Augusto Guzzo
In presenting the first issue of FILOSOFIA in January 1950, A. Guzzo,
its founder and editor, stressed the need of understanding, sympathetically
yet critically, the manifold activities of the human spirit, and warned
against "the arteriosclerosis of dogmatism." In a time when even some of
the better philosophical quarterlies have tended to promote partisan ideo
logical attitudes, it is refreshing to see the wide range of philosophical
interests which Filosofia has served in the first decade of its existence.
Despite the relative ignorance of contemporary Italian philosophical
writing in the U.S., it is noteworthy that R. Carnap has praised F. Barone
for his excellent study of Logical Positivism, substantial parts of which
first appeared in Filosofia. Another indication of the consistent high level
of the journal, is the statement of the pre-eminent Kantian scholar, H.
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