Running Head: ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS AS A POLITICAL MATTER

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

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HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

Introduction
Cultural knowledge and war are two inseparable aspects. Unveiling the tactics of the
enemy is one of the key elements towards sharpening military skills. Studying the enemy does
not only entail having their geographical understanding, rather it requires full information on
their beliefs, general social organizations, traditions, interests as well as their political system.
The Human Terrain Teams in the United States were developed to assist the military in gaining
the cultural knowledge of their enemies. What seemed like a structured presentation of the
logistical function of the Human Terrain Teams turned out negatively upon adoption of the
system. The Teams activities aggravated political debates which involved different associations
and concerned parties which collectively led to the closure of the entire program.
Overview of the Human Terrain Teams
The United States Army recorded negative outcomes during the previous wars in
Vietnam, Afghan, India, Iraq and Iran. Reviews showed that the Army had competent technical
intelligence but lacked a clear understanding of their adversaries. During that time, the
Department of Defense lacked the interest in equipping their military with cultural knowledge,
but this became a requirement following the increasing insurgency in Iraq (McFate, 2005. p.43).
The Human Terrain Teams was established in the year 2006 under the management of US Army
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Team consisted of three to four members who
joined the military troops and played a role in interpreting the social events as well as the general
cultural practices of the areas they were deployed. HTTs were comprised of professional from
social science field which includes sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists as well as
linguistics (Lamb et al., 2013, p.22). Their main responsibility was to develop field research

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

designs which provided relevant information to assist in the planning, preparation, execution of
the military operations. Besides the field research report was still utilized for the purposes of
assessment to determine the points for adjustment to ensure that the target population is
maneuvered by the military (Galloti and Lotz, 2016, p.46). If the HTTs would not serve their
purpose or when the commanders neglect them, then the military will end up alienating their
target populations making their success unachievable. Therefore, understanding opponents
social, political, economic, cultural and to the extent of their decision-making process was the
major step towards success in operations in counter-insurgency (Erickson and Murphy, 2013,
p.545). The first exercise done by the HTTs was the deployment to Afghanistan in the year
2007. According to Lamb et al., (2013, p.22), the team was not conforming to its initial tasks but
eventually gained endorsement from the then brigades. As much as the team became useful and
were accredited by the commanders, they had few setbacks like; minimal number, slow in
providing value to their responsibilities as well inconsistent performance. Due to this, the HTTs
failed to improve the cross-cultural pressure that existed between the US militia and the
Afghanistan hence losing on counter-insurgency operations (Metz, 2015, p.2). This then led to
consequent reviews about the Human Terrain Teams.
Performance Evaluation and Political Influence
Human Terrain Team had three key features in its mission. First is the social science
research where the research design developed determined the expertise required in order to
accomplish a specific mission in the targeted population. Depending on the human terrain
information required by the military, the HTTs used both qualitative and quantitative
methodologies to reach its target. Some of the methods employed included questionnaires, text
analysis, subjects observation, structured and open-ended interview as well as surveys (Finney,

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

2008, p.4). Secondly was ensuring that relevant information to the current operation is provided
as a result of the field research conducted. The information gathered was then analyzed to
determine whether sampling was equally distributed among the target population. The analysis
stage done by the research manager and the team leader ascertains whether the human terrain
information is significant to the military operations and the problem which is ought to solve.
Finally, as much as the Team provides relevant information to the military operations, the
information will be significant if it is incorporated into the military planning and decisionmaking processes. It was, therefore, the responsibility of the team leaders of the HTTs to liaise
with the commanders to ensure execution. If this is not introduced then, the whole research
process becomes irrelevant (Finney, 2008, p.5). According to the original HTTs guidelines, the
Human Terrain Teams were not to be carrying out intelligence research and that the information
they were to gather would not be used directly to attack the enemy. However, the social scientist
that joined the program engaged unconsciously in research and concentrated fully in gathering
information on the communities values and needs while neglecting what bound them in the
military contract. Still, the information they gathered assisted the military in accomplishing the
goals but not in directly eradicating the enemy but by establishing good relations between the
military and the local community (Erickson and Murphy, 2013, p.548). During the period,
military reputation improved to the point that they could easily engage in the community affairs
which helped in gaining trust to the local villagers who then provided the military with relevant
information that contributes to eliminating the insurgent and by extent reducing the number of
civilians killed. Commanders involved in the Human Terrain System viewed the program quite
different than the others. They found the team of experts to be quite useful and assisted in the
accomplishment of their efforts in counterinsurgency (Kelly et al., 2010, p.301). This led to

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

increased demands in the number of teams to be deployed. In an analysis of the programs certain
activities which the Human Terrain Teams conducted brought about political issues among
different associations involved and this led to the halt of the system.
Despite the fact that the Human Terrain Teams served the purpose intended by the
military, most of their activities violated their code of conduct. Most of the Teams expectations
of the program were not met, and this brought dissatisfaction of the Team member. This is
evident from testimony by John Allison, a social scientist in Afghanistan written by Price, 2011.
According to John Allison, most scientists joined the program due to its strategy of combining
ethnography with military education to reduce violence but that was different in reality, and so
anthropologists worked against their ethical standards. Experiences of the scientists and
journalists visiting the Teams spread out the reality behind the HTTs. This became a political
issue attracting different associations and concerned parties. The Anthropologists were strongly
opposed to the program with the reason that it will bring harm to both Iraq and Afghan civilians.
Besides, the program will derail the career of the future social scientist as they will be accused of
being spies when they will be conducting their research in abroad (Gonzalez, 2015, p.2). The
Executive Board of the American Anthropology in the year 2007 issued a declaration of its
opposition towards the HTS program indicating that the program is making wrong use of the
anthropological methodologies, and also, the anthropologists involved are violating the code of
ethics of AAA (American Anthropology Association). The reason behind the declaration of
opposition includes; Anthropologists under the Human Terrain System were working as military
contractors, and so it would be difficult for them to differentiate themselves as militants, yet they
are anthropologists. Due to this reason, they would not be able to define to their audience who
they are truly and what they intend to do (AAA report, 2007, p.1).

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

The main purpose of the information to the military was to enable them to subdue their
counterparts this mostly lead to danger or even harm to the studied population. This act violated
the code of ethics in AAA of do no harm. Besides, the fact that the anthropologist wore
military attires it was difficult to acquire informed consent from their subjects. Furthermore, the
data collected by the researchers was not adequately secured, thus making the whole process
flawed and this posed risks to the participants. The expectations which the Military had towards
the contracted anthropologists therefore clearly violated the codes of ethics by the American
Anthropologist Association. This led to the opposition. The report stated that The Executive
Board views the HTTS project as the unacceptable application of anthropological expertise
(AAA report, 2007, p.2). To emphasize more on the opposition to the HTT program, the
American Anthropology Association formed a commission to give a report on the proof of
concept of the program. This was because even after the opposition, the HTT program still
continued and furthermore recruiting fresh and talented graduates into the program (Gonzalez,
2015, p.1). The Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and
Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) report was intended to be used by the AAA to develop
the position of its members once they join the program. Primary findings by the commission
explained that the stipulated role of the HTTs reflected the members as data and intelligence
sources which helped the military in conducting tactful function with the aim of winning over the
insurgency. Therefore, any member of the Association ready to join the program will be
experiencing difficulty in operating under the code of ethics (CEAUSSIC Report, 2009, p.3).
Also, the social scientist collected information in a dangerous environment and this probably
affected the outcomes of their studies. The HTT also lacked a predefined ethical framework for
the program. The Commission report clearly explained in detail how the military was misusing

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

anthropological expertise and still recommended that dialogues between the AAA and the
Department of Defense setting a working framework that observes ethical standards while at the
same time serving the military purpose would be helpful. This is because cultural knowledge of
the enemy is a priority to the national security.
In response to the critics, the secretary of the Department of Defense explained the
setbacks as growing pains. During this time, the Human Terrain System expanded rapidly with
the program recruiting, training and deploying large numbers of team members. There was high
demand of more professional into the system and so due to massive recruitment questionable
staff was being introduced into the system without proper screening (Sims, 2016, p.1). According
to Price, 2011, John Allison (Social scientist at Afghanistan) stated in an email that Though they
want to contract anthropologists as the HTT social scientists, they are happy to recruit anyone
with just an advanced degree in social science. As a result historians and industrial
psychologists were recruited to the program who reviewed people as objects, a different
approach from that of anthropology. Apart from that Allison reported that new HTT members
were given lessons on research ethics including ethical principles as stated by the AAA but they
were not aware of how to negotiate ethical research in a military context. Fawcet's, (2009, p.30)
study agrees with Price, 2011 in that as the numbers of team members recruited into the system
increased, more of the old members left the HTS with the complainant that there was not
adequate training simply because there was no significant relationship between the training
offered and what was actually in the field. Logistical challenges that the HTS faced together with
the complaints that the professional quitting the program placed, aggravated political pressures to
close down the program. In the year 2008, the Nature magazine gave a positive rapport about the
program citing that it educated the US army about the culture and social environment of their

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

target population and in addition the program resulted in reduced number of attacks to the
military and other staffs (Ellison et a.l, 2013, p.1). The same magazine published a contradicting
report following the criticism stating their opposition to the program. The statement declared the
program as effective but was poorly managed and hence its failure and insisted on the need for
its closure. The statement listed reasons for ending the program as there was the inadequate
training of the team members. This was evident due to the complaints placed by the trainees as
well as the increasing demand for professional which made extensive training impossible.
Secondly, the HTS management was not thorough in their recruitment process, and so personnel
was introduced into the program without exhaustive screening. Besides, there were high rates of
personnel resigning for the workforce so experienced personnel were not available for guiding
the incoming staff (Ellison et a.l, 2013, p.1).
HTTs Interactions in Iraq and Afghanstan
The United States army invaded Iraq in the year 2003 with the intension of disarming
Iraq from weapons of mass destruction and freeing its residents from danger ahead of
destruction. The war was ended the same year in May and despite the defeat of military forces in
Iraq, insurgency continued, and this led to multiple deaths of the military as well as the civilians
(Forte & Mcloughlin, 2013, p.164). Invasion of Iraq by the US Army was not based on adequate
knowledge in social, economic and political attributes in Iraq. This was pointed out as the major
pitfalls for the war and it was the responsibility of the military to establish mechanism for
implementation of the post-war stability as well reconstruction of the military operations (Kipp,
2006, p.9). Due to the increasing insurgency, it was the duty of the military to combat the
insurgency by reducing the number of supporters and at the same time increase the number of
supporters for the Iraq government. The military realized that in order to accomplish the mission

HOW FAR THE ROLE OF HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS A POLITICAL MATTER?

there was a need to engage the local community so as to gain their trust and find their way
through manipulation against the insurgent population.
Interactions of the HTTs with populations in Iraq and Afghanistan are clearly narrated by
(Edwards, 2010 and Gezari, 2013). David Edwards, an anthropologist and an author of
counterinsurgency as a cultural system conducted research on the Human Terrain System. He
spent most of the time with the team members together with the military officers in order to
study their interactions with the public. Edwards (2010, p.550) reports that the HTTs were not
allowed to visit the locals frequently, and the military commandant only allowed them to leave
when the task was up to the current mission plan. He observed that most of the time locals could
come at the military base either to seek for jobs or to seek an audience with the commandants.
This was the opportunity where the social scientist engaged the local in talks and proved to be of
help to the military. In his research, (Edwards, 2010, p.560), concluded that indeed the HTTs
were of importance to the military given the fact that they changed their attitudes towards the
locals. Initially, locals who came by the base were treated like terrorists, but this changed as they
realized that they could use them to achieve their goals. Vanessa Gezari was a journalist in
Afghanistan and narrated her whole stay in her Tender Soldier book. According to her report,
she totally disagrees with Edwardss research in that she clearly finds the entire program to be a
failure. In reference to Price, 2011 on John Allison report, Gezari (2013, p.192) confirms that
some of the Team members recruited did not have full knowledge of the Afghan culture and
could not even speak the local language.
Apart from evaluations by Gezari and Edwards, Human Terrain Team members as well
testified to encounter several challenges which some of them led to their resignation from the
program. The scientists complained about the fact that they could not access the local

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communities freely and conducting a survey for instance through interviews, was quite
impossible as they were shielded by the military in case of intense fights. Besides that, the
military unpredictable and opaque operations made the anthropologists unable to prepare their
research materials, and random interviews conducted become intolerable by the army. And as
much as the survey conducted provided some results which the military ought to use it was
impossible for the academics to influence planning process due to the abrupt operations (Gezari,
2013, p.120). This became an issue where there was no impact of the HTTs to the military.
Besides, due to the protection offered by the military whenever they went out for field research,
most of the Afghan locals were not comfortable sharing out their views to the social scientists
accompanied by soldiers. This, therefore, posed to be a hindrance towards positive interactions
with the locals. To worsen the situation, John Allison wrote that the military started off lessons
on firearms to the HTTs with the reason that they needed to equip themselves during their
research as so fight back in case of attacks. This drew their subjects even further (Price, 2011).
Due to the divided expectations between the scientists and the military, the social scientists
instead of studying the culture and social setting of the Iraqi and Afghan communities they had to
meet the military expectations. In this case, they only played a role in explaining the reason why
the military should carry out certain actions instead of their primary role in influencing their
orders based on the information gathered. This meant that the HTTs taught the Army basic
knowledge of cultural awareness and not to the level where the militants to could clearly
understand the in-depth knowledge of the cultures to the extent of gaining their trust hence
gaining the support against the insurgency from the community (Erickson and Murphy, 2013,
p.547). The HTT program was intended to be a pilot program in the Afghan and Iraq war but
due to the unexpected experiences by the team members attracted debates over its credibility and

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relevance not only to the military but the scientists hence turning the whole program into a
political argument.
Fall of the HTTs
After the release of the report by the US Army investigations, Fondacaro, and McFate,
who were actively involved in the program resigned. Their posts were taken up by other strong
supporters of the program; Colonel Sharon Hamilton, who took the position as the program
manager previously held by Fondacaro while Christopher King replaced McFate as the social
scientists (Sims, 2016). The HTT management systems during this time started planning on a
measure to sustain the program following the scheduling of the US government to withdraw
military troops from Iraq and Afghan. The US intended to withdraw their army by the year 2014.
The Terrain system initiated the phase zero campaign where several personnel would be sent to
gather human terrain information in a local community and advise the army whether to send a
large or small number of military force. Unfortunately, the military did not have an interest in the
program and was not willing to fund the program in the 2014 financial year (Metz, 2015, p.3).
This was mainly attributed to its previous management and reputation. In the year 2013, a new
form of criticism against the HTT program rose again. Apart from the Anthropology Association,
Journalist Vanessa Gezari who got an experience at the HTT program in Afghanistan declared his
stand against the program. Gezari, (2013, p.192), explained that the Human Terrain System
deceived all the involved members which included; the professional experts, public as well as
own employees about their role in Afghanistan. This is evident from the challenges that the
social scientists felt as well as the issues pointed out by the AAA report.

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Other people who joined in the critics were the US Representative, Duncan Hunter
(House Armed Services Committee Republican member). He started off a campaign against the
program for the reason that it was an entity which utilized government funds inappropriately and
that there was no need of expanding the program through the year 2014 (Gonzalez, 2015). Due to
the mounting pressure and the changing of the strategy of the HTT from providing cultural
knowledge to geospatial intelligence which involved the study of physical features and activities
of a particular area, led to the halt of the program in the year 2014. The program became a
political issue at a wider scope due to both internal and external factors that faced the program.
According to the study of the program, most of the commanders of the Human Terrain System
commended the efforts by the HTTs towards ensuring that the military was equipped with the
cultural knowledge necessary to win over their target population. The role of the HTTs was not
fully achieved, an issue which is attributed to the response by the military towards the Teams
which eventually resulted in a general lack of adequate cultural knowledge of their population
hence limiting HTTs contribution towards the embedding program (Foster, 2014, p.348).
Conclusion
The initial intent of the development of HTT was not comprehensively accomplished
until the military adopted the counterinsurgency by using the information gathered by the social
scientists to eliminate the insurgents through killing leaving more risks to the local community.
Alteration of the HTT logistical functions affected the team members contribution and made
them violate ethical standards guiding them. This was the core problem which attracted debates
turning it to a political matter which eventually led to its closure. Despite its end remains an
important entity in an army. As much as the program can be reviewed as a good motive
theoretically which in reality flopped, lessons have been learned from the Iraq and Afghan wars

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which will serve as blueprints for future operations. Into the future, the Human Terrain Teams
will require developing a practical strategic plan which will be able to meet rising demand while
at the same time withstand political pressures without closure. The system will require wide
consultation with associations whose expertise will be required to ensure ethical standards are
maintained.

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