TORTS and DAMAGES - TSN 2016 - Short 3 PDF

TORTS AND DAMAGES | 1
Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

3 Manresa 2015-2016 TSN | From the lectures of Atty. Jess Zachael B. Espejo, LLM
NOV 20 2015
SABALORIO
So the subject Torts & Damages is a prescribed subject, meaning it is
a BAR subject under Civil Law. It discusses (1) Quasi-Delict (2)
Damages (3) Human Relations (4) Nuisance. These are 4 very
familiar subjects to you. You may not know it, but you actually have
encountered the topics previously in law school.
Being taught in 3rd year, I would like to tell you that a lot of cross
references will be made to different subjects in order to have an
understanding of the topics at hand. So your stock knowledge in
your other subjects where torts may relate to would be very
important. Therefore, we will be reviewing these topics and
concepts to aid in a full understanding of the course.
Lex Stalionis a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye

This is the principle or the law of retaliation. To be more exact of its
definition or significance, it is actually means a principle of exact
reciprocity. I give what I was given; I take whatever I was taken. So
if somebody strikes you sa imong mata, you have the right, under
the principle of exact reciprocity, to also exact the same injury upon
the person who injured you. Every civilization in the world has a
counterpart to this law. Youll even be surprised reading the Bible in
the books of the Old Testament. So a person who has injured
another person returns the offending action to the originator of
the ___ (39).
So what does it require?
Penalty for punishment identical to the offense.
Again, it is the principle of exact reciprocity. For example, a person

who caused death to another person, the killer would be put to
death. That is one of the oldest code of laws, The Code of
Hamurabi. As I said, it is also a recurring theme even in the Old
Testament, particularly in Leviticus, Exodus and Deuteronomy. It is
even said there that : A person who has injured the eye of
another, is instructed to give the value of his or her own eye So
this is biblically connected.
Despite this, the rule of course has no place in this day and age.
Why? Because of the word Civilization. We are advanced already as
human beings that we no longer follow this rule of exact
reciprocity. It might lead therefore, to immoral or barbaric results.
Illustration:
For example, if we follow the principle of exact reciprocity. What
happens if: Mar commits a lascivious act upon Grace by touching
her private parts. So under this principle, the punishment ought to
be Mar being touched also in his private parts. That is absurd!
Because an act that is lascivious, will be returned to an act that is
pleasurable.
So if the law of retaliation would still be applied today, how do you
carry out punishment? In that situation? Should Grace, therefore, be
allowed to touch Mars private parts by way of returning (?) the
offense? It should not be. A molested woman, for example, would

not obtain relief or justice if the punishment is that she be allowed
to molest her molester. It is not like that! You raped and the
punishment is the rapist gets raped by you? That is already
condonation.
If it cannot be justice to make the offended party perform the same
offense against the offender, should it be the State, therefore, that
would carry out the reciprocal justice? As demanded by the
principle of lex stalionis?
No. Because remember, the State is concerned only about the
protection of public interests. Should it interest the public that the
molester is molested? That the robber is robbed? That the murder is
murdered? It doesnt interest the State. What interests the State is,
for example, if the act committed is a criminal act would be of
course: prosecution. First, it would be apprehension, prosecution
then incarceration and finally if circumstances permit the goal of
course is reformation. Atong irehabilitate ang offender so that he
can still be a useful member of society.
So it is not a correct postion: Na kung unsa ang injury that was
caused should be the same injury caused upon the offender. That is
wrong. So if the opposite were true, which agent of the State
should carry out the retribution? If the offended party does not
exact vengeance, which among the agents of the State may do it?
Is the policeman who will molest, rob or murder?
Now, Roman law moved towards Monetary Compensation as a
substitute for vengeance. Instead of retaliation, the developed a
system whereby an injury will now be recompensed by money. So,
in cases of assault, there are fixed penalties set for various injuries.
Although talio or the act of vengeance was still permitted if one
person broke (?) another slave.
Even the Roman Model is something we cannot apply right now, or
at least since the 1900s. Because no matter how you look at it,
retaliation is not lawful. The only time that retaliation is lawful is
recognized, for example, in Philippine Law, is when you catch your
spouse in an act of carnal knowledge with a man who is not you
(Death under Exceptional Circumstances). You are actually allowed
to take vengeance, since it is considered a justifying circumstance
under the law.
How about Self-Defense? No. It is not an act of retaliation, it is an
act of defense. An act of self-preservation.
Retaliation is willfully seeking your vengeance upon a person who
injured you. Take note, if retaliation is allowed it would invariably
lead to chaotic circumstances. Have you heard the term vendetta?
Vendetta is of course an act of retaliation, a blood feud. [Discussion
about how Sicily is the most violent place on earth, sigeg balsanay,
family vs family, etc]
In the Philippines, among Maranaos, there is this term rido(?) or
retaliatory violence between families, ethnic groups as well as
between communities. According to government statistics, for the
last 80 years, this has led to around 6000 deaths.
The State must regulate vengeance, by instead, dispensing justice.

For criminal acts, there is prosecution, incarceration and

rehabilitation of the offender. That takes the place of talio. Even in
the PH for criminal acts, we no longer impose death penalty.
performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but

such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. (1103)
Q: But for purely private offenses, how should the law treat that?
Remember the state is only concerned about public interest in
general. But what if the injury occasioned by a private individual
upon another private individual? What is the measure of justice?
Without you knowing it you are learning a little bit about Torts &
Damages.
There is one case that Ive read, there is this doctor who operated
upon a woman, but while doing so, gidala niya iyang amigo to
observe. So the woman felt privacy was violated. There is an injury
there to her privacy. How do you regulate that? Those type of
cases?
Dati, it is retaliation. Then the Romans had a mixture of both talio
and monetary compensation. Then in the 6th centuries, the Saxons.
There is this word weregild, which literally means blood money.
Nakapatay ka, naa na siyay equivalent na amount in silver. So, that
is what is paid to the family of the person who was killed.
Q: Is there an equivalent of weregild in PH law?
Say for example, because of your acts a person wasnt able to
sleep, serious anxiety at night, besmirched reputation. Im talking
about claims for moral damages. The law will give you recompense
in the form of moral damages.
Despite these changes, the basic formula, up to this day, remains
the same. For a wrong or injury there must be a commensurate
compensation. That is the goal of the law, to regulate vengeance
by dispensing justice. In private cases (in dispensing justice) by
providing for commensurate compensation.
Without you knowing it, you are actually going to study something
that you already know.
In Obligations & Contracts, I believe you are familiar with Art 1157.
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1)
(2)
Law
Contracts
(3)
(4)
(5)
Quasi-contracts
Acts or omissions punished by law; and
Quasi-delicts
Also Article 1170, as you may recall.

Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations
are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
So two concepts has been introduced to you there:
(1) Negligence - as a legal concept; and
(2) Damages - as a measure of compensation.
Then you have Article 1172
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
Lets go to Persons and Family Relations. The most memorable,

Article 19.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
What is that principle embodied in Article 19? The Principle of Abuse
of Rights.
An Abuse of Right is a tort. You know it now. Of course, Article 20
and Article 21.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
I think mas memorable sa inyo ang Article 21, because this is when
Atty. Galas discussed the cases to like Wassmer, Fe vs Fe. Instances
when breach of promise to marry is actionable.
Also, in Property Article 694.
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1)
Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
or
(2)
Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3)
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4)
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5)
Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Also under the RPC Article 365. Remember that a crime can be
committed either willfully or negligently. A crime can be tried under
Artice 365 as a quasi-offense.
Damages. In transportation law, damages are recoverable from the
common carrier. Practically every subject in the study of law would
devote certain provisions in providing for the recovery of damages.
In criminal law you have that as well. Because, a civil action is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. So if you commit a
crime, diba there is civil liability? In the form of damages.
So in transporation, there is general averages. That is form of
damages, without you knowing it. There is also particular or specific

damages. Whats the difference between the two?

General average shouldered by both the shipowner and the
owners of the cargo.
Particular average it is either shipowner lang o owner of the
cargo.
So more or less you know already. What do you not know? What
have you not read in a great length? Only Quasi-Delicts. Article 2176
of the Civil Code.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Youve discussed this Article in passing before. Like in Art 1157.
To give you a better understanding of Quasi-Delicts and by
necessary implication, torts (because torts and quasi-delicts are
sometimes interchangeably used even if there are minute specific
differences between them) we have to go back the most basic
principle that you have learned in lawschool.
DEFINITION OF AN OBLIGATION
Art. 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not
to do.
Q: Why is there such a term as juridical necessity? Why a juridical
necessity?
A: Because a violation of such obligation would lead to juridical or
legal sanctions.
Kung di nimu buhaton imung obligation adunay silot. There is
punishment, there is penalty and there is damage.
But let me just tell you how I look at obligations, especially civil
obligations.
An obligation is simply a promise or oath coupled with an oath or a
curse (silot).
[Discussion about taking an oath after passing the CPA Board
Exam]
Q: How does an oath end?
A: So help me God.
Q: Why?
A: In anticipation of the legal sanctions ___
Precisely, but that oath does not necessarily tell you what the curse
is about or what is the penalty if you do not comply with these
obligations. Because the curse there is implied. You dont have to
state what it is.
What are examples of oaths na ingana?
I swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth so help
me God.
That is the penalty, what is the curse?

Walay nakabutang, but under the law we know that you can be
prosecuted for perjury if you violate your oath to tell the truth.
Or oath of office of the President.
I, do solemnly swear, to faithfully and contentiously fulfill
my duties as President of the Philippines. To preserve and
defend its Constitution and execution its laws and justice
to everyman and consecrate myself to the Filipinos. So
help me God.
Why are you asking for Gods help? Wala man nakabutang na
penalty. Whats the penalty? Impeachment. It need not be stated
but the juridical sanction of the oath exists.
Long ago, having an obligation, where failure to perform the
obligation has a corresponding penalty or curse.
Lets go back to the time of Adam and Eve. Genesis 2:16-17.
Remember that in the book of Genesis, you are told that man is
given dominion over Gods creation. You know that is basic. Now,
after God gave man dominion, naa siyay command. Actually, God
gave man privileges.
16
And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every
tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:
17
But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou
shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof
thou shalt surely die.
So if you believe that story in Genesis, man was desired to be
immortal. But because they ate from the tree of knowledge and
good and evil, the wages - sanctions, the curse - is death. So it led to
punishment. They were cursed to die.
[Discussion of Obamas oath]
So help me God, it isnt even in the Constitution of the US but it is
expected. Because we are all God-fearing people. The fear of the
curse.
Lets go back to the sources of obligations.
SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
(1)
Law
(2)
Contracts
(3)
Quasi-contracts
(4)
Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5)
Quasi-delicts
CONTRACTS
Q: Whats the definition of a contract?
Contract is a meeting of the minds. That is the shortest definition.
But really it is where one binds himself, with respect to the other,
to give something or to render some service. (Article 1305, NCC)
So, when it comes to contracts, the obligation created by contracts
could either be:

(1) Personal obligation obligation to do or not to do.

(2) Real obligation obligation to give or not to give.
Remember, in Articles 1170 that in case of breach delay, negligence
or fraud will be liable for damages.
QUASI-CONTRACTS
There is no need to discuss law as a source of contract [I think
obligation iyang ginamean] kay mahutdan ta ug oras.
Q: Can you recall the definition?
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)
Im sure you know of the major quasi-contracts in the law. Dalawa
lang man yan.
(1) Negotiorum Gestio officious management
(2) Solutio Indebiti payment by mistake
Lets illustrate what Negotiorum Gestio is.
Illustration:
You have a neighbor who went abroad. Suddenly, there is a
typhoon and so his animals were in danger of being drowned. So
what you did, is you took all of his livestock and stored it in a safe
place to avoid being drowned.
Did anybody tell you that, that is what you should do? Nobody did.
That is voluntary, unilateral. But that is lawful. That is a quasicontract.
Q: The question is, in that factual background, what is the
obligation involved in a quasi-contract? If there is no obligation to
rescue, then what is the obligation?
A: The obligation is not on the person who saved the animals, the
obligation arises if you already saved the animals.
Q: Is it Personal or Real?
A: A Real obligation.
Q: Unsay ihatag nimu?
A: Bayaran nimu ang iyahang kahago sa iyang pagsalbar sa mga
hayop. So that in the end, no person is unjustly enriched at the
expense of another.
ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW
Q: What is that?
A: Crimes. When the law actually provides for crimes, it tells you to
do something or not do something. Mostly, not to do. Mao na
siyang obligation.
What did you violate? The law and further obligations ensue in the
form of personal obligations. What is that? You serve your
sentence. Or you pay a fine or the civil liability damages. It can be
an obligation not do like destierro.
QUASI-DELICT
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Whoever by his act or omission meaning it can be willful or it can
be by failure to act. Like for example, you are driving your car
negligently (texting while driving), remember there should be fault
or negligence. Then suddenly you failed to notice there was
somebody crossing the street and you hit him. You were negligent.
Q: Why? Do you as a human being and as a citizen of this great
nation, have an obligation to be careful? Is that the obligation
involved in Art 2176? To be careful?
A: NO. Although, it is of course your duty as human beings to be
careful.
Q: Assuming that you were not careful, but nobody got injured.
Whats your obligation?
A: Wala. Because there is no victim. No plaintiff.
Like, nagpabuto kag baril pero walay naigo. You did not commit a
tort, but you may have committed illegal discharge of firearm
which is a criminal offense. But, you did not commit a tort.
It is only when injury occurs that quasi-delict arises.
Q: What is the obligation involved in a quasi-delict?
A: One that arises only when there is injury. When there is damage.
The obligation involved, therefor, is for you to compensate for the
damage, to pay for the damage done. That is the obligation
involved in a quasi-delict.
Although others would tell you that, first and foremost, your
obligation is to not to commit any injury upon another person.
NOVEMBER 27, 2015

KRCHING
Let us continue with the some Basic Principles we need to know in
Torts and Damages. Last meeting we were able to discuss some
introductory concepts relating to Torts and Damages.
What is Tort?
- By way of etymology, the term Tort comes from the
Latin torquere meaning to twists. When you hear the
photomechanical term tort, eto yung nakikita twist.
- So later on it became quiet evolve such as the term tort
developed into the term TORTUOUM.
S`o that is the etymology of the word. Meaning, diha gikan ang
term or word na tort.

According to Blacks Law Dictionary,

A Tort is a private or a civil wrong or injury including
actions for breaches of contract in bad faith for which the court will
provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.
Now, that definition is quite simple and easy enough to
understand. So from that definition, we can conclude the following:
A tort is a private wrong, which involves private acts and

parties.
It is a civil wrong. Therefore the remedies are lodged in
the form of civil actions in court. It includes breaches of
contracts in bad faith.
Finally, the remedy is in the form of an action for
damages.
That is clearly apparent in the definition fore worded by Blacks law.
So lets try to examine that definition in the context of Philippine
Law.
FIRST CHARACTERISTIC: The First Characteristic that can be found
in that definition is Tort Law in the Philippines limited to private acts
and parties. To my mind, NO, atleast not in its strict sense and here
the reasons why:
The law on human relations. Human relations if your in
initial discussions is part and parcel of tort law in the Philippines.
The state and its agents are not in immune to the provisions of the
law on Human Relations. It applies equally well to both private and
public entities.
Such as what was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of:
Republic v. Lacap GR NO 158253 March 2, 2007.
Where the Supreme Court ruled that rules thereon
apply equally well to the government. The Government is therefore
not immune for torts. One of the provisions in the title on quasi
delicts is Article 2189, provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of or injury suffered by any person
by reason of a defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control and
supervision.
With those two provisions alone is tort purely a private
act? Is tort purely a private or personal act?
Add to that is Article 2180 regarding the vicarious liability or
imputed liability where one can be held responsible for the tort or
quasi-delict of another, the state is responsible in like manner when
it acts through its special agents but not when the damage has
been caused by official who the task done properly pertains. In
which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
So conclusion, Tort Actions is available to private individual against
the state.
Now, can tort action be available to the state against a private
individual? So if a private individual can sue the state for a tort, and
as committed through its agents, can the state file an action for
tort against a private individual? The answer of course is, YES.
Once again, we borrow a provision from Human Relations which is
part and parcel of the Philippine Tort law.
ARTICLE 24: In all contractual property or other relations, when
one of the parties is at disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age
or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
So it is a mandate upon the court to favor certain individual in
terms on human relations. The next provision on Human Relation, is
ARTICLE 25: Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or
display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government
or private charitable institution.
So a government institution can actually file a case against
somebody who is violating Article 25 which is known in Philippine
Law as Sumptuary Legislation. So what is Sumptuary Legislation?
It is a law or a provision of law that actually interferes with the use
of property so as not to effect or offend the sensibilities of the
other.
In Article 25, where thoughtless extravagance is actually
being curtailed that it might stop. So nagkatyphoon nalang and all
and you have and then you have a thoughtless display of
extravagance and wealth. The government can actually file a case
in court to stop whatever it is.
So, the state can file an action for tort against an
individual, an individual can file a tort action against the state.
So is it purely a private act that would require private remedies? In
that sense, would the definition be accurate? The Answer is NO. So
in that sense, that definition is Busted.
SECOND CHARACTERISTIC:
The Second characteristic based on the definition of
Black is Tort in the Philippines a purely a civil wrong? And the
remedies are therefore lodged in the form of civil action in court?
Because according to Blacks Law definition is a private civil wrong
or is it something that is similar? NO.
For example we recall that nuisance is part and parcel of
the Philippine Tort law. And under the provisions of civil code of
nuisance particularly Article 699 of the Civil Code
relating to
a public nuisance the remedies are: prosecution under the penal
code, or any local ordinance, or a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings.
So from that provision alone, you can actually see that
the remedies for tortious conduct is not limited to civil actions.
There can be prosecution under the RPC. So is the definition
accurate in the sense of it? Busted gihapon. It is not an accurate
definition atleast in so far as Philippine Law is concern.
Plus Philippine Tort Law includes breaches of contract

because the definition that was fore worded by Blacks Law says
that it includes breaches of contract in bad faith. Lets try to
examine the codal provisions and it would tell you, NO!. It should
not cover breaches of contract, precisely because Article 2176 our
main law on Torts, says:
Article 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such failure or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
So that is the only time that you can call it a tort or a quasi-delict
when there is no pre-existing contractual relationships. In that
sense or totally atleast, it says that Tort law in the Philippines ought
not to include breaches of Contract. And therefore when there is a
pre-existing contractual relation, the remedy should be limited to
those provided for Culpa Contractual or breaches of contract such
as rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil Code or Specific
Performance with an action for damages within the case.
If it is a breach of contract, apply contractual remedies. If it is a
quasi-delict, if it is a tort, if it is a culpa aquiliana, lahi pud imong
remedies.
Busted? Does it mean that the definition of Blacks law does not
apply in Philippine law? Actually, no it is cover, or the very least, it is
a plausible definition. Why? In several cases, one of the most recent
of which is the case of:
Loadmasters vs. Glodel Brokerage Corporation:
The Supreme Court reiterated that the act that breaks
the contract may also be a Tort. In fine, liability for tort may arise
even under the contract where tort is that which breaches the
contract.
Can you recall from your previous subject the acts, something to
this event where the act that breaches a contract may likewise be
classified as tort? And therefore liability for damages therefore
would not be limited therefore to Culpa contractual but can only so
extend to cases of Culpa Aquilana or tort? For that we have the
case of:
AIR FRANCE v. CARASCOSO
The facts are very easy. The plaintiff here was one of the
pilgrims going to Lourdes on a pilgrimage of course. And they
secure, Eng. Carascoso secure a first class accommodation on
board in Air France who took its ticket through its Philippine agent,
Philippine Airlines. So, Manila to Bangkok, then Bangkok to Rome.
No problem with the Manila to Bangkok trip. He was able to ride
first class, quiet a short trip. During the Bangkok to Rome flight,
what happened was the manager of Air France, while he was
already seated in his first class seat, forced him to vacate it,
because in the words of the witness, THERE WAS A WHITE MAN
WHO THE MANAGER ALLEGED HAD THE BETTER A RIGHT TO THE
SEAT. Just imagine the racial discrimination and profiling. Just
because you are a Filipino, you are not a Caucasian, you are not
entitled to a first class seat. When asked to vacate his first class
seat, the plaintiff as what was expected, refused. Syempre,
gibayran ko na pahawaon ko nimo. But his companions to avoid
further commotions, just vacate the seat. Sige ihatag nalang na
para walay nay gubot. So the Plaintiff, reluctantly gave up his first
class seat.
The pertinent issue is: Liability of Air France. Based on
the facts do you think that AIR FRANCE should be held liable
against Engineer Carascoso? OF COURSE. The most obvious one is
that there is liability for breach of contract. Remember that Air
France is a common carrier. And when the common carrier does
not deliver you into your destination, in the manner with which you
contracted with it, there is Liability. THERE IS BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
Nipalit kag pinaypay, ang gihatag sa imoha kay turon.
Simple as that. THEREFORE, THERE IS BREACH. THERE IS CULPA
CONTRACTUAL.
And the Supreme Court awarded damages to
Carascoso. There is contract of carriage between Air France and
Carascoso. The contract that was furnished by Carascoso was a first
class passage. That contract was breach when Air France fail to
furnish a first class transportation at Bangkok and there was bad
faith when Air Frances employee compelled Carascoso to leave his
first class accommodation after he was already seated and to take a
seat in the tourist class by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassment and humiliation. Thereby causing
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation resulting in moral damages. No problem there because
it is very clearly there is a breach of contract of carriage.
But this is more telling, CULPA AQUILIANA, QUASIDELICT OR TORT. Even though there is a contract of carriage, there
is also a tortuous acts based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
contract merely for transportation, they have the right to be
treated with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected from personnel misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and such abuses of the employees.
The stress of Carascoso action is based on upon its wrongful
exposure. This is a violation of the public duty by Air France, a case
of quasi-delict. And the SC has doctrinally stated that although the
relation of the passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin
and nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.
Let us go back to the definition of Article 2176. That liability for
TORT is proper when there is no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties. As early as Air France v. Carascoso, that is only
the General Rule subject to this exception. And therefore, tort
liability, under Philippine Law, can exist within the context of a
contract. So it is no longer any defense that there is no Tort Liability
because there is a contract between the Parties. And therefore the
remedies that are exclusively that are available to the parties would
be remedies that are of course geared towards breaches of
contract; Rescission, specific performance with damages.
Supreme Court here said that NO. When the act that
breaks the contract is itself tortuous, liability under quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana is proper. So in that sense, the definition is correct.
The definition of Blacks Law is Correct.
Finally, does the remedy consist of purely an action for damages.
Yes, BUT, it is only one of the remedies. Example under Article 26,

ARTICLE 26: Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,

privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect or other personal condition.
So remedies are not exclusively for damages, naa pay lain remedy.
Depende on the class of rules. Of course with discuss this Article
699 remedies against a public nuisance.
ARTICLE 699: The Remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1.)
(2.)
(3.)
A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local

ordinance; or
A Civil action; or
Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
So it is not strictly within the definition of Blacks law.

And to my mind, Tort is not capable of an exact definition. The lines
are often blurred and the lines often overlap. Let me try to explain
that in this manner. With respect to contract and Tort, the lines are
also blurred. There is some overlapping. Because an act that
breaches the contract makes a Tort. Air France v. Carascoso,
Loadmaster v. Glodel, these are cases that consistently hold this
doctrine.
And In the same name, the tortuous act may also be
classified as a CRIME. That might be something new. Because I do
not think that you discuss something to this event when you were
in your lower years and lower subjects. Let us try to look at it. Take
note, that Torts, Quasi-delict or Culpa Aquiliana are supposed to be
different classes of Torts. One is different from the other. The tort
for example, is against a private person. Whereas, the Crime is
against the Public itself irrespective of whether or not there is a
private victim or a private complainant. So if there is a private
person, it is by a private person versus a private person. If its public,
then People of the Philippines versus private person. So Tort is
prosecuted by the person themselves, by a crime, is prosecuted by
the state. A tort covers negligent acts in general and we will learn
later on intentional acts by this section. Crimes on the other hand,
cover intentional acts in general and negligent acts. The exception
to one is the general rule for the other. For Tort it is punitive and
injunctive in nature. Punitive meaning, penalty in what form?
Pecuniary compensation. Whereas, in crimes reliefs are mainly and
mostly prosecutory. Iprosecute ka para mapriso ka thats a relied
provided in the crime or in the commission of a felony.
And more importantly, the Quantum of Proof with
respect to Tort would simply be preponderance of evidence. Why?
Because this is just a civil case. But crime on the other hand, the
quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. And

remember that crime is committed when two elements of tort. We
discuss this in criminal law.
(1) Actus Reus coupled with:
What is Actus Reus? Its the physical manifestation of a
crime. Its the act of punching, its the act of Stabbing, its the act of
killing somebody. The physical act, the overt act. The physical
element ba kamo.
(2) Mens Rea.
Mens Rea on the other hand, the guilty or the criminal
mind is the psychological aspect. The intent, the motive, so on and
so forth.
And we do have remember a very important maxim that we learn in
criminal law:
ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA
The act is not criminal when the mind itself is not
criminal.
Tort in general meaning, that Tort which you can see
from somebody na nagdinanghag ug drive sa iyang sakyanan,
nakabangga ug tao, and then sorry. The person suffers
damage/injury. Is there mens rea? There can be an act that causes
damage to the other, actus reus, but generally, there is No mens
rea. There is no criminal intent. Because what he did was simply a
negligent act not necessarily a criminal act. But as I previously
noted, sometimes, the lines are blurred. Sometimes the lines
actually overlap. Such as act that constitute both a Tort and a crime.
For example, Noynoy was driving his car, above the speed limit
while texting with Mar. Textmate man sila di ba. Without seeing
Jejomar crossing the street, Noynoys defense that with Jejomars
complexion can be seen at night. Now, what are your remedies?
We know from criminal law that that is reckless
imprudence resulting to physical injuries. And therefore, there can
be liability on the party Article 65 of the Revised penal code, Quasi(effects?/defects?).
But it can also mean a relief that can be taken from
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. An action for damages, culpa
Aquiliana, Quasi-delict, Tort. So overlap. For one act, or one
commission, there can be two possible remedies. One is criminal,
One is civil.
What else? In the heated public quarrel, Noynoy called Jejomar,
Nognog. Dili lang kaitom ang gitira sa iyaha, pati iyang kagamay. So
what are your remedies? Pwede man prosecution under Article
2058, Oral defamation because he is now imputing a vice of defect
upon a person. Thats criminal prosecution. But at the same time
you have a remedy in Tort under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
(1.) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

(2.) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family

(3.) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4.) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious
Again, remedies are two-pronged. Criminal ang isa, tortuous ang
isa. Culpa criminal and Culpa Aquiliana. Lines are blurred.
A lot of authors have tried to define what a Tort is. And
no one has been able to come up with a very good definition. The
best definition that I could find would be one that was given by:
DEAN WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, an American legal luminary
particularly in tort law. And says that:
A tort is a term applied to a miscellaneous and more or less
unconnected group of civil case other than breach of contract for
which a court of law will afford a remedy in the form an action for
damages. The law on torts is concerned with the compensation of
losses suffered by private individual in their legally protected
interests through conduct of others which is regarded as socially
unreasonable.
What catches me would be the last part, conduct of others which
are regarded as socially unreasonable. It may not be necessary be
a crime, it may not be conduct that is abhorred by stipulation of
parties but it is wrong in the sense that it is socially unreasonable.
Ordinary reasonable man of ordinary prudence would may consider
your conduct be reasonable or unreasonable? If it is unreasonable
and causes injury to another person, that is TORT. That is how you
define tort. In terms of nature and effect.
Nature: Its conduct that is socially unreasonable.
Effect: In the sense that it causes injury to another.
Remember: that even if it is socially unreasonable conduct is
committed by one person, but it causes no damage to another
person, it is in the nature of DAMNUN ABSQUE INJURIA (Damage
without any legal injury) therefore, walay liability and therefore,
walay Tort.
And take note that I have been interchangeably for now atleast,
using the word Tort, Culpa Aquiliana from Quasi-delict. For now
lang. Because in Philippine Law, a Quasi-Delict is a Tort. But not all
torts are Quasi-delict. By (nature)**** of Human Relation is a Tort
but its not necessarily a Quasi-Delict. The maintenance of a
nuisance is a tort but its not necessarily a Quasi-Delict. Later on
when go to Article 2176, in discussing the elements of 2176, we will
try to make a distinction between a Term Tort and Quasi-Delict.
Let us now go to the coverage of Tort Law. When were going to
discuss Tort law in the entire semester, what will it cover? What will
we be discussing?
1ST: Tort Law covers both intentional acts and accidents as well as
acts deemed tortuous by law. Intentional acts, or sometimes there
can be an overlap in criminal law, accidents (meaning there is
negligence) and acts that are deemed tortuous by law.

And from that coverage, you have the different classes of Torts that
we will be discussing in the entire semester.
(1) Negligent Torts
(2) Intentional Torts
(3) Strict Liability Torts
Lets discuss these classes torts in reverse order. To my mind, its
easier to discuss it that way. Torts it seems written is Article 2176:
ARTICLE 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Definition of Quasi-delict, what is the cornerstone of liability in
2176? Negligence. No problem here.
1.) INTENTIONAL TORTS:
The Example would be Article 26.
friends;
When you do not respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of your neighbor or another persons you
cannot do that unintentionally. You do not do that negligently.
When you pry to the privacy of another residence, and you say that
you did not do it intentionally, when you meddle with or disturb the
private life or family relations of another, can you say that you did
not do that intentionally? Or intriguing to cause another to be
alienated by his friends? Unsa ni siya sa US? Unsa ni xa sa revised
penal code? In the US, Its alienation of affection. And finally, can
you say that it is not intentional when you vexed or humiliate
another on the account of his religious beliefs and etc, you cannot
do that by negligence. Therefore, intentional torts. So sa mga
kantyawero, this is the action.
2.) STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
Ang tort na dili kaayo mo familiar with. Lets put us this
way, crimes are either mala in se or mala prohibita.
When you say mala in se, what does it mean? It is a crime because it
is a crime. It is wrong inherently.

Mala Probihita is wrong only because it is made wrong by the

statute. The example would be gambling. Theres nothing wrong
with gambling, theres nothing wrong with it. Sugarol ka pero
pasabot ana, parlor games ra na. When I look at game of chance
which I occasionally partaking, but only in the home setting. I dont
do it outside of my house. Parlor games ra jud na para sa amoa.
Nothing is inherently wrong with it but because it is prohibited by
statute, you cannot do it. Thats mala prohibita. Same thing applies
to Tort law with respect to the different classes of torts.
STRICT LIABILITY TORTSwhere the law has
determined that some activities are so dangerous that an individual
engaging in those activities is liable for damages regardless of
intent or negligence resulting therefrom.
Lets look at an example, is having a dilapidated house wrong in the
sense? Karaan na imong balay, ang materials na gigamit kay karaan
na jud kaayo. Do you know that under R.A. 9514, that can be
considered a fire hazard. And therefore, its wrong. If somebody is
injured, you can be held liable for damages. By its very nature noh,
kaluoy pud sa mga tao na walay ikapaayo ug balay.
And also Article 2183, which is very interesting.
ARTICLE 2183: The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Is the possession of the animal, especially domesticated animals, is
that a crime? Is it inherently wrong? Its not. But Article 2183, makes
some aspect of it punishable as a Tort. If the animal makes injury or
causes injury or damage to another person, that is a strict liability
tort because the possession of the animal per se is not inherently
wrong, its just that you have to be a responsible pet owner or
possessor.
AFIALDA vs. HISOLDE
Where a caretaker of a Carabao was gored,
gisungay siya sa Carabao na iyang gialagaan, patay. The
wife sued the owner of the Carabao for damages. The SC
said that is just a veritable accident. It comes within the
territory. Therefore, No liability is attached if the owner or
the possessor of the animal should be able to prove that
the damage came from force majeure or from fault of the
person who suffer the damage. Will go to that when we
reach Article 21.
What else other than Article 2183? We have Article 2187.
ARTICLE 2187: Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,
toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
Now you buy Coke, mahilig kuno mo ug softdrinks, palit
kag coke and then it turned out that the Coke was poisonous,
theres something in it that makes it toxic, and then you got sick for
food poisoning.
First question: Where did you buy your coke? Direkta from Cocacola? NO. The probability is gipalit nimo sa Sari sari store. Gipalit
nimo sa canteen. But the law makes the manufacturer of coke
liable to you because of the injury. Take note that under Article
2187, does it mention anything about bad faith on the part of the
manufacturer or processor? The law doesnt have it stated. Its
enough that the person who consumed the food stuff or drinks
suffered death or injury for liability to attached. That is Strict
Liability Tort.
The law is presuming that if therefore is injury occurs by
the consumption, that there is negligence.
ARTICLE 2193: The Head of a Family that lives in a
building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown or falling the same.
Nahulugan ka ug paso coming from the 2 nd floor, does it
make the it a fault on the part of the people inside the 2 nd floor, that
room in the 2nd floor na nakahulog ug paso sa imo? No. Does it
mention any bad faith, intent or negligence? NO. Its enough na nay
nahulog. You are already liable if you are the head of the family.
That the price of modern living. Kadtong sa unang panahona,
bungalow tanan, first floor tanan tao. But when the Romans
invented multi-tiered lodgings. They were the first who used multitiered or multi story lodging. Some earlier civilizations may have
been build bigger structures compared to the Romans, Romans and
nag una una ug buhat ug condominium type nga habitation. And its
no surprise that Article 2193 is lifted almost directly from Roman
Law kay sila ang tag-iya and nagregulate ana. No need to prove any
fault or negligence, bad faith, theres liability. Strict liability. So for
strict liability torts, the law imposes absolute liability without
regard to fault or negligence. And therefore obviates the need to
prove fault or negligence in court. It is enough that the factual
antecedent required by the provision is satisfied. No need to prove
any factors such as fault, negligence or bad faith. That is strict
liability.
Intentional Torts
At onset remember that when a wrongful act is
committed intentionally what results is not a civil wrong but a
criminal wrong. If you do harm a person, and there is intent on your
part to harm that person, thats a crime, thats NOT a Tort. You
should be prosecuted for it because there is criminal intent, an
intent to harm. So unsa jud diay ning Intentional Tort? So how could
a Tort be intentional?
Ill give you an example. Hypothetical lang. Im not
saying that this happened. What if Duterte says, Nagkatambok
lang ng agi nimo Leyla Delima, bugo naka, bigaon pajud!. You
know that Duterte and Delima are used to be classmates, but
because of politics perhaps, nag away na ning duha. So lets say
nag-away sila. So what would Dutertes liability for intentionally
calling Delima, fat and dumb? Unsa man? Can you recall what will
you do if you were Delima? What would you file against Duterte? It
depends. Depende sa circumstances. Example, if the statement
was printed, or published, liability would be Article 353 of the RPC

for libel. What if it is not printed? What if it is uttered publicly? The

crime committed would be slander or oral defamation under Article
358 of the RPC. Take note that Article 353 and Article 358 there is
this requirement of publicity. There has to be somebody who heard
it and therefore publicly causing the humiliation, injury to the
reputation of the person in public. And somebody therefore has
witnessed the imputation. That malicious imputation against the
other.
But what if the statements were uttered, let us suppose
it was only Delima and Duterte, in a restaurant, and he told that to
Delima. You cannot prosecute for libel, it does not satisfy the
requirement of publicity. If it is just between the two of them there
can be no slander or defamation. Once again, the element of
publicity is not satisfied. So, liability here is purely civil. An
intentional tort under Article 26 number 4 of the Civil Code.
friends;
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect
or other personal condition.
Look at the phraseology of Article 26, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, which was precisely what we
discussed, cannot be considered libel, theres no publicity. It cannot
be considered oral defamation or slander, theres no publicity. The
statements were uttered privately. But it doesnt mean that the
tortfeasor escapes liability because it falls under the intentional tort
in article 26. You cannot prosecute for a crime, but you can use
article 26. That is an example of an intentional tort. Mao ni ang
atong ginatawag nato na INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL
DISTRESS.
In intentional torts under Article 26, the offensive
statements may not be published or broadcasted but merely heard
by the offended party. In intentional infliction of mental distress,
the gravamen of the Tort is not the injury to the plaintiffs
reputation but the heart of plaintiffs mental and emotional state.
Reputation has again that element of publicity. And so, it should
not be the reputation that is addressed by Article 26. It is the effect
upon the plaintiffs mental and emotional state. Libel, the gist of
the action, is the injury to the plaintiffs reputation.
In intentional infliction of mental distress, the opinion of
the community is immaterial to the existence of the action of the
tort to be considered in awarding damages. What is material is the
disturbance on the mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is
entitled to this awards. You can see act or statement did not
identify specifically the plaintiff as the object of the humiliation.
What is important is the plaintiff actually suffers mental or
emotional distress because he saw the act or he actually read the
statement and it alludes to an identified group to which he clearly
belongs. The requirements of libel have no application in

intentional torts under Article 26 where the impression on the
public is immaterial. While the impact on the mind or emotion of
the offended party is more important. That is why, in American
Jurisprudence, the Tort on Intentional infliction of mental or
emotional distress is completely separate and distinct from libel
and slander.
So what is a perfect example of Intentional Tort under
faith? You can read more on that in the case of MVRs Publications
vs. Islamic Dawaah Council of Philippines January 28, 2003. But if
you want a scholarly discussion of what constitutes an emotional
infliction of emotional distress, ang kinahanglan nimo basahon kay
ang dissenting opinion by Justice Antonio Carpio. This is a very
interesting case because the SC here treated of a libelous article
that offended Islamic sensibilities. You have to read this whether
you are Islam or not. Focus on the dissent of Justice Carpio.
Kini and pinakacommon sa Tort.
(3) NEGLIGENCE TORT
- The most prevalent type of Tort. Negligent Torts are not
deliberate actions. Rather, they occur when an individual fails to act
as a reasonable person to someone whom he or she owes a duty
to.
The Elements of a negligent tort are as follows:
1.)
A person must owe a duty or service to the plaintiff in

question.
-It maybe a simple as a mere duty to exercise due care. An
individual who owes a duty must violate the promise of
obligation, an injury then must arise because of that
specific violation, and cause of the injury must have been
a reasonable foreseeable as a result of the personal
negligent action.
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)
In short, 4 Elements of Torts are:

Duty
Breach
Causation
Damages
Lets discuss all the elements one by one.

1ST Element: DUTY
-Everyone has the duty to exercise due care all the time.
Pero kung nagdinanghag ka, wala kay nainjure na anybody, who
cares. You dont owe anybody, anything.
What is DUE CARE?
Is the amount of care that a reasonable person would
exercise under the circumstances. But in Philippine law, due care is
codal, its a technical term under Article 1173. Due care is that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation, and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place.
Article 1173 also provides that If the law or contract does not state

the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that

which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
ARTICLE 1173: The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances
of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence
shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph
2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required. (1104a)
So kadtong gimention gaina na reasonable person, unsa
to xa? Is that a real person? Or the law says or the decision of the SC
says, reasonable person or a reasonably prudent man. Who is that?
Is that a real person? NO. Its not even an average person. But an
imaginary prudent person who takes the precaution to avoid
harming other person or their property.
In the Philippines, a reasonable person is equated to a
good father of a family. Default degree of care. Whether or not a
person acts reasonably and therefore exercises his due care in his
dealings, depends on the nature of the obligation, and corresponds
to the circumstances of the person, time and place.
For example, what is the standard of care required of a
bus driver? What is the nature of the obligation? There is a contract,
contractual obligation, in fact, its a contract of common carriage.
And knowing it to be a contact of transportation, towards his
passengers, Article 1733 provides he is bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
transported by him. So that requirement or that circumstance of
passengers, and a circumstance of the nature of the obligation that
of being a contract of common carriage.
What is the degree of care required of a common carrier suppose
who are not his passengers? Is it the same? Extraordinary diligence
ba gihapon? Or and extraordinary diligence ay para lang sa imong
pasahero? Para sa kargamento na dala nimo? Or to the passengers
of the other motorist? Which is also a circumstance of person and
at the same time corresponds to the nature of the obligation, he
owes them only ordinary care, diligence of a good father of a family
or ordinary diligence lang. they are not your passengers. Why
exercise extraordinary diligence?
Circumstance of time? A public utility company such as an electric
company, Davao light, Meralco, what is the degree of care required
in its day to day dealings with its consumers? Only ordinary care in
its ordinary dealings. Because it is ordinary times. BUT,
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
November 6, 1989
The SC ruled that in times of calamities, extraordinary
diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil, to
prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life. So,
reasonableness is changed by the circumstance of time. If it is an
ordinary time, then ordinary diligence is required. But in times of
calamities, extraordinary diligence is required. Due care in those
situations also change.

Circumstances of PLACE?
This case came out in the bar examinations.
HEIRS OF COMPLETO vs. ABLAYDA July 6,2010
The SC in essence ruled that a motorist can operate a
vehicle at a higher speed at the straight portions of the road but
slows down when he approaches and intersection. The defense of
the driver of the motor vehicle here was and nabanggaan man gud
niya kay bike. While he was approaching, turning in the
intersection, nakabangga siya ug bike. And he said that bike lang
mana dapat mas magbantay siya. Because ang bike, has no place
in the road.
So here in this case, SC said that a bicycle has as much
right to be in the road as any other motor vehicle. In fact, if there is
a bicycle, dapat mas tagaan pa nimo siya ug kanang lugway. You
should be more careful because lets face it, and bisikleta and actual
state ana niya kay tumba. Di ba? Its only man that is keeping it
upright when he operates the bike. Thats what the SC said. Equal
rights, you have to be more careful, circumstances of the place.
Kintahay in a public road.
2nd Element: BREACH
Next element is the same quest as of the same
elements. So easy. Why? Because once you determine the standard
of care applicable under the circumstances, you only ask, did the
defendant follow that standard of care? If the defendant did not
follow the standard of care, then he violated his duty. Theres
breach, for example, the standard of care requires the owner of an
aggressive dog to keep the dog on a leash, and the owner does not
so, then theres breach. If you are a motorist, you owe only
ordinary care. But if youre a common carrier, you owe
extraordinary diligence. If you did comply with that standard of
care, then theres breach. You can be held liable for tort, a
negligent tort.
3RD Element: CAUSATION
Which to my mind is more complex one. Its Cause and
effect relationship. Its the causal relationship between conducts
and end result of the conduct.
There are two types of causation:
1.) Causation in fact, which is simpler
2.) Proximate causation, which is more complex.
Causation in Fact
- Simply BUT FOR position. The question is but for the
defendants actions ,the injury have occurred?
- For example, Manny hits Jinkees face with a basketball
bat, Jinkees face would not have injured if Manny had not hit her in
the face with the basketball bat. Jinkees face would not have been
injured BUT FOR Manny hitting her with a basketball bat. So that is
simply CAUSATION AND FACT.
Proximate Cause
- Is a bit more complex. Were not preempting here any
discussion on proximate cause because we will probably devote

one full hour just proximate cause in the future. This is a very
important doctrine. What say here in:
way to the ladder causing signal guy to fall and thereby breaking his
arms so result to harm. So there is causation in fact and proximate
causation.
BATACLAN vs. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181

-Proximate cause is that which in the natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury and without which, the result would not have
occurred.
Pay attention to this definition. This one of the most
important principles. Proximate cause is that which in the natural
and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury and without which, the result would not
have occurred. In other words, if even if the act is the cause in fact,
it may not be the cause. Lets look at the examples.
Hypothetical case. Practice makes perfect. We will look at the facts
and the slight variation of the facts and we will try to answer few
questions based on the facts.
In order to put up a credible showing in the PBA, in the 2014 PBA
Cup, Manny keeps practicing his dribbling skills in his living room. Di
ba naa siyay balay sa Forbes Park? There sige siya ug dribble dribble
didto sa iyahang sala. One time, the ball slips from his hands and
then hits Jinkees sister, Janet in the face, causing here a black eye.
Question: Was there causation in fact? Was there proximate
causation? Balik ta sa question sa causation in fact ha, BUT FOR
position. Would injury occur BUT FOR the act that cause the injury?
What cause injury to the eye of Janet? Its the ball slipping from his
fingers. Is there proximate causation? Is that the cause that his
dribbling inside the living room, is that the cause in the natural and
continuous sequence uninterrupted by efficient intervening cause
that cause the injury?
Yes to both questions. Janets eye would not have been
injured BUT FOR Mannys ball hitting her face. Therefore, there was
causation in fact. As the proximate cause, the ball in the natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any determining efficient cause
founds its way to Janets face. Thereby producing the injury and
without which, the result would have ***. So in that situation,
there is proximate cause.
Lets change the facts a little bit. Lets see if you can
answer. More practice di ba make perfect. And so the week after
the incident, Manny once again practice dribbling in his living room.
The ball again slips from his hand, through the window this time,
hitting the ladder set up by the Signal TV guy who was installing a
satellite dish causing the latter to fall from the ladder and break his
arms just because Manny was dribbling the ball inside his living
room. Was there causation in fact? Was there proximate cause?
Mahulog ba siya kung wala nilapos ang bola sa iyang kamot naigo
ang hagdanan and then nahulog siya. Is there BUT FOR situation.
And for that matter was there a proximate causation?
Yes to both questions once again. The signal guys arms
would not have been broken had Mannys ball not hit the latter was
using causing him to fall. And therefore there is causation of fact.
The circumstance is that the ball in the natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause found its
Finally, practice pa more. The next day, undeterred,

Manny Pacquiao gud na. Practice his dribbling some more. This
time, the ball slips form his fingers. It hits his neighbor in the head
just as his neighbor was pouring gasoline in his grill kay magsugba
daw siya ug karne. He pours too much gasoline, as a result of being
hit by the ball, which causes an explosion. In addition to the head
injuries, he suffers burns from the explosion and theres some kind
of damage. Was there causation in fact? Was there proximate
causation? Lets assume further that theres wind and causes that
fire to spread to other houses and burn down one block of Forbes
park. Just because he wants to play basketball.
Was there causation of Fact? OF COURSE, di ba klaro man. Kung
wala to nahitabo ang dribbling dribbling niya wala to nahitabo.
However, proximate causation may make it more difficult, why?
Because nagkadaghan ang factors. Di ba? Perhaps there was
something wrong with the grill, or the gasoline that cause the fire,
basi jet fuel diay to dili gasoline lang. And why is the neighbor using
gasoline in the first place pwede man siya mag gamit ug uling lang?
So why gasoline para magsugba? Unsa man imong sugbahon
Dinosaur?
While perhaps to foresee the neighbor burning himself
to the grill, what took the fire damage to the house be foresee? So
there is that element of foreseeability. You may contend, that in
the previous example of signal guy and the ladder, he fall from the
ladder because the ball hit the ladder, could Manny have foreseen
that naay ladder didto, is it common for having a ladder in your
window where the ball would go out? You can argue that. But here,
daghan na extraneous factors. What about the winds spreading
the fire to the other house, is that not an efficient intervening
cause? Di ba? So should Manny be held liable just because entire
block burn down. Is the wind enough for him to become a defense?
But its not the proximate. Causation and fact it will always be there.
If youre part of it, if youre the instrumentality to which a
connection could be made, between the conduct and the result
theres causation in fact. Proximate cause on the other hand is an
entirely legal proposition. Which requires a legal process. Of course
we will go to that and we will understand that more when I
assigned to you the cases relating to proximate cause. So many
questions di ba when it comes to proximate causation. So the
resolution would depend on the evidence, arguments of councils
and etc; but remember that there is no policy under the law
curtailing a person from dribbling a ball inside his house.
4th Element: DAMAGE
DAMNUN ABSQUE INJURIA. Even if there is duty that was breach
and there was causation, and nobody is injured, that is damage
without legal injury. So why would there be any liability? If there is
no injury there to be compensated. Basically, the idea of damages
in Torts and Damages is quite simple. All injuries can be reduced to
a monetary amount. The difficulty is with respect to calculating
damages. For in the example of Pacquiao, its easy to figure out how
much a burned down house is worth. But it is not easy to figure out
how much eyesight costs. There is no quantifier in terms of money.

You can only approximate.

Humana na ta atong strict liability torts, intentional torts, negligent
torts.
Now tort law covers:
1.) Actual
2.) Potential
3.) Foreseeable Injuries.
This the general understanding of Tort law. Because normally in
Philippine law, in order for you to maintain a cause of action, there
has to be actual damage. Right, violation, damage is important.
Walay damage, that would be DAMNUN ABSQUE INJURIA.
Tortuous conduct can be had, for being actual injuries suffered by
the person such as when by reason of another acts, his body is
injured. He may claim damages in the form of his medical bills, to
cite an example in the Philippine Tort Law, liability does not
necessarily arise if there is no actual injury.
Conversely, Tort law, in other nations like the UK, Rome
covers mere potential injuries. To cite with the Roman law
concepts of Tort DEJECTUM EFFESUMVE ALIQUID
Unsa ning DEJECTUM EFFESUMVE ALIQUID?
in a dangerous position, that it might foreseeably or potentially

injured a passerby is enough for you to be held liable in Roman Law.
Enough nana, naa ba diay nabukol? Wala. Naay nasakitan? Wala. The
fact that it was placed in dangerous position and it can potentially
cause injury is enough for liability to attached. Mao ning strict
liability gyud. Wala gud injury, walay nahulugan, walay nasakitan,
thankfully, this priniciple did not find its way to Philippines. Because
Philippine Tort Law would only cover actual injuries as a General
Rule. Tort law in general means, potential injuries included.
Tort law covers both:
1.) Physical Injuries
2.) Non-physical Injuries
Physical Injuries
-Article 2176 nakabangga ka ug tao. Accidental bumping
of the persons due to your negligence that is physical injury
naputlan ug kamot, naputlan ug tiil, physical injury.
Non-Physical Injuries
-Example is invasion of privacy. Do feel pain out of it?
NO, not that kind of pain. It is heartache. Or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Just like what happened between Duterte and
Delima in our example. Hypothetical example. So physical injuries
and Non-physical injuries.
- I lovingly refer this a Dolphy Doctrine. Why the Dolphy

doctrine? I always tell this to my students, not because its
something thats act that accurately describe the doctrine or the
principle but I always imagine Dolphy doing this.
AIMS or Theory Of Tort Law
Have you seen movies of Dolphy before? Have you? Or wala njud
ninyo naabtan si Dolphy? I always see this in his movies noh, kana
bang magmata siya ug sayo sa buntag, pagkahuman,
magtootbrush, actually dili magtoothbrush, maghimogmog ra, and
somebody catches his attention, just as he is spitting out kadtong
iyang gimumog. Then naay niagi, Si Panchito or si Babalu, maoy
maigo. I dont know why but this doctrine or this principle of law
reminds me of that. Why unsa diay ni?
According to Glanville Williams, there are four possible bases on

which different torts rested:
DEJECTUM EFFESUMVE ALIQUID-imposes liability against the

person occupying the house for injury for anything thrown or
poured from the house regardless of whether he is the owner of
the house or not. That is actual injury di ba. Actual, Nahulugan gud
ang tao. So that is actual injury. In Philippine Tort Law, that is
reposed in Article 2193, almost lifted entirely from Roman Law.
Article 2133: The Head of a Family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling the same.
There is NO problem in this provision because it fits
squarely with Philippine Law but there is actual injury.
What about potential or foreseeable injury?
For that we have DEL POSITIS VEL SUSPENSIS
-On the other hand, this doctrine, provides that the
mere placing or suspension of an object in a dangerous position, is
already a ground for liability and its not necessarily that anyone
should be hurt or injured. The mere fact that you place something
Unsa may reason why do we have do develop Tort law? Why do we

need to implement Tort Law in the Philippines?
1.)
Appeasement - to restore the claimant to hi spiritual not

necessarily the physical status quo ante. Spiritual lang dili
physical. Because compensation under tort law, would
not erase the fact na naputlan ka no, but by the award of
damages in tort law, possible na malimtan nimo na wala
nakay kamot. Di ba unsa man purpose sa damages? To
provide means, diversions, amusements, for you to forget
your misery. Hala naa koy 1M pero nawad an nakog
kamot, appeasement na or spiritual restoration.
2.) Justice or Vindication to bring relief to the stress or

disturbance or damage suffered y claimant caused by the
wrong committed by the tortfeasor. Nabanggaan ko
nimo, the remedy again is not bangaan pud ko nimo. That
would be the law of retaliation or exact reciprocity which
cannot be made anymore in Philippine law.
3.) Deterrence lets say for example for the public good, so
that is similar to tortuous conduct. If tortuous conduct is
not punished, If it is not assessed monetary liability, then
practically everybody would be careless because there
would not be any consequence for me to carry for not
exercising the duty of care and;
4.) Compensation to compensate the plaintiff for
unreasonable harms they have sustained. Remember that
Torts
only deals with socially unacceptable or

unreasonable conduct. There can be harm that is

reasonable. Would you agree with me that there is
reasonable and socially acceptable wrong? Is there?
a.
b.
Acts done in the act of necessity. Isnt that

socially acceptable and socially reasonable
manner? You use your property because for the
purpose of saving someone else.
Self defense is another one. Its socially
acceptable. And many more.
the law does not provide for compensation to a private

individual who has been injured or suffers damage by
reason of an act that is contrary to law. The human
relations will supply. The law on human relations will
apply. So if you commit something contrary to law, and
the law does not provide for a remedy for damages,
Article 2021 will tell you that you have a recourse or cause
of action for damages.
Tort is concerned only about conduct that is socially unacceptable.

So mao nix ang aim ug theory of tort law.
January 8, 2016
KVTAN
BUT, I wont stop there, I will add my own. Siya ra kabalo?
So we will continue on where we left off last year. And I hope you
already got a copy of the case list for this semester. But please take
note of certain cases because I included in my lecture certain cases
of recent xxx which may still not yet included in your case list.
5.) For me, this is more of being of tort law, EFFICIENT

DISTRIBUTION OF RISK.
What do I mean with efficient distribution of risk? To
reflect as closely as possible liability for transaction
causes could be minimize. Now remember that when
you run at a high speed, you operate your vehicle in a
very high speed because you need to get
somewhere, because you need to go somewhere
quick, because you dont want to miss it, a meeting,
an appointment, notaryo kuntahay, giapas jud nimo
kay makakwarta ka, dapat makauna ka didto kay
mailogan ka ni Atty. Tampolano sa imong silingan.
But you run the risk of bumping into a somebody. So
would you run fast and be negligent at the risk of
bumping somebody because you stand to earn
something? Or you earn something but ibayad lang
nimo panghospital sa imong nabangga? Di ba ? What
would you choose? So that distribution of risk.
- Or Labor- Saving devices - in a hazardous
occupation, would you rather hire many laborers because
its cheaper or buy an expensive machine to undertake the
hazardous work? Would your savings in not buying the
expensive machine compensate for the injury of your
laborers? Thats efficient distribution of risk. Papilion ka,
be negligent and pay this much and earned this much or
be safe and not earn this much? Thats efficient
distribution of risk.
6.) Regulation of Vengeance - By legally recognizing a class
of wrongs not otherwise defined or regulated by other
statute theres less possibility of individuals putting the
law in their hands. Remember, Tort Law, or what we call
torts, this somehow unconnected, uncodified body of
laws or rules of conduct, you do not see them with
definite tort law unlike the RPC, Labor code. Unrelated ni.
And so it gives you the impression that if I commit
something like this, because its not stated in the RPC, its
not necessarily reflected in the Civil Code on what it is. For
if its done to me, what is my remedy? The law doesnt
say. For example, you violated a law, a law that does not
provide for damages in case you violate it, Unsa imo
buhaton? As a private individual, you dont get anything.
Theres no civil liability. The answer is No. Because even if
So Article 2176 is the main provision of law relating to quasi-delicts.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter. (1902a)
Now, to first year law students, for example, it is difficult to
ascertain unsa bay meaning anang term nga quasi-delicts. So let's
try to look at its literal meaning in the etymology.
It is actually a combination of two Latin words. First is quasi
which means as if or almost. And delictum which is a latin
word for fault or quite literally a crime. Therefore, when
translated, quasi-delict means almost a crime.
But my problem with that kind of definition is the fact that it
actually leads to a misnomer, considering that quasi-delicts in the
Philippines are not almost crimes. Mura bitawg you have
committed a crime but not all the elements are present; and
therefore it becomes quasi-crime. This is a wrong way of going
about it.
What makes an act or omission as a quasi-delict under Article 2176 is
actually the presence of fault or negligence. Take note that the
same modality for the commission of a quasi-delict, fault or
negligence, can also be found in Article 3 of the Revised Penal code,
which defines felonies and also tells you the modalities by which a
felony is committedit can be committed not only by means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of culpa.
And we have previously learned and discussed that sometimes
there is an overlap between the law's definition of quasi-delicts and
felonies on one hand, because there are certain types of felonies
which can also be prosecuted as a civil case for damages under
Article 2176 and be will be discussing a little bit of that later on.
What are the characteristics of a quasi-delict?

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

First, it is a civil wrong. When I say that it is a civil wrong, it means
that it is defined by civil law. Enforcement is also made thru civil
cases. You cannot enforce a quasi-delict under Article 2176 by
means of filing a criminal case. And in civil cases also, the awards or
the redress which the law allows is civil indemnity only. There
cannot be any imprisonment for quasi-delict for purely as a quasidelict.
Take note, however, that some acts that would normally constitute
quasi-delicts may also be prosecuted as criminal offenses as I have
already stated earlier on. For example, a person who is negligent in
driving and he injures another in a vehicular accident may be
prosecuted under Artcile 365 of the Revised Penal code. Similarly,
when you talk about a tort, a person who slanders another may
also be liable for tort may be prosecuted as well under Article 358
of the RPC for slander or defamation. So again, there is that
overlap.
Now, the law therefore allows multiple remedies against a tortious
conduct. Which means that if he commit an act or omission that
causes damage to another, you have actually prefora of redress,
including but not limited to a criminal prosecution under the RPC or
a pure action for damages which can of course be found under the
Civil Code of the Philippines under Article 2176.
But if you look at the next provision from 2176, 2177, we were told
that one's responsibility for fault or negligence under 2176 is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the penal code. But the plaintiff, however, cannot
recover damages twice from the same acts or omission of the
defendant.
In other words, what the law allows you to do when it comes to the
acts or ommissions that would fall under 2176 is, for example, you
proceed against a tortfeasor or the defendant or the accused by
means of a civil case under 365 of the RPC. Let's say, reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property. You are very much
allowed to do that. But remember, you are also allowed to file a
separate and distinct civil action and an independent civil action for
the same act or omission complained of in the criminal case.
However, while the law allows multiple redress, it disallows
multiple recovery.
Sa ato pa, you file ug duha. You can only claim damages once for
the same act or omission of the defendant. That much is clear
under our tort law.
Second. Anothe characteristic of a quasi-delict is it is one of the
sources of obligations under Article 1157. Remember?
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
And under Article 1162:

Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, and by special laws. (1093a)
Meaning quasi-delicts, and later on damages, and also by special
laws.
Now, knowing already what a quasi-delict meanshaving at least a
background of what a quasi-delict meanscan you think of any
special law (meaning, not the civil code) that governs quasi-delicts?
Examples of that would be under Land Transportation of the
Philippines RA 4136, which also mentions quasi-delicts and tell you
what constitutes negligent operation of the vehicle, for example,
and traffic laws and regulations.
So it is there. A special law.
As well as the Family Code of the Philippines EO 209, which under
Article 94 talks about how a liability for quasi-delict is to be made.
When a quasi-delict is committed by one of the spouses, should
that be paid out of the personal property of the offending spouse
or shoould that be paid using the absolute community of the
spouses? So it will actually tell you that as well.
Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable
for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common
children, and legitimate children of either spouse;
however, the support of illegitimate children shall
be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse
for the benefit of the community, or by both
spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the
other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses,
including major or minor repairs, upon the
community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation
made during marriage upon the separate property
of either spouse used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to
commence or complete a professional or
vocational course, or other activity for selfimprovement;

(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as

they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by
both spouses in favor of their common legitimate
children for the exclusive purpose of commencing
or completing a professional or vocational course
or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Antenuptial debts of either spouse other than
those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article,
the support of illegitimate children of either
spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property
of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall
be considered as advances to be deducted from
the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of
the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses
unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the
foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph
(9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties. (161a, 162a, 163a,
202a-205a)
As well as Article 129 of the Family code which tells you that a
person who exercises parental authority over another person
would of course be liable for their quasi-delicts.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each
spouse.
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal
partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to
the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof.
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use
of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of
property or for the value of his or her exclusive
property, the ownership of which has been
vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal
partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2)
of Article 121.
(5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties
of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.
(6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from

whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family,
belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse
from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the
profits, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion
or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in
this Code.
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon the partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9) In the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise.
In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children. (181a, 182a, 183a, 184a,
185a)
Okay? So these are just some examples of special laws that govern
quasi-delicts. Although if you look at the Family Code, it is not really
that special because it is a codification.
But in terms of quasi-delicts, what governs it? Primarily provisions
of the law on quasi-delicts under the Civil Code. BUT it can also be
governed by certain special laws relating to quasi-delicts.
Okay. Daghan pa na. The Fire Code of the Philippines, for example,
have also provisions relating to Fire safetythat if you negligently
maintain something that would constitute a fire hazard, then you
will be liable quasi-delictually.
Now, let's talk about quasi-delict as a source of obligation beccause
we have previously noted that under article 1157, it is one of the
sources of obligations. But the question that I want to post is: What
would be the obligation to a quasi-delict?
According to Paras and another commentator, the obligation daw
involved in a quasi-delict is the obligation to be careful.
And so you know, you are walking around and buying something,
and you have the obligation to be careful.
What if you are not careful? Does it necessarily mean that you have
liability under article 2176 simply because you are a careless person?

Based on article 2176, the obligation actually is quite clear. Because

it says that whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage to
another. In other words, what the obligation that arises under
article 2176 is not really an obligation to be careful or not an
obligation to be diligent or not to be negligent; rather, it is an
obligation to pay. A real obligation under your obligations and
contracts.
Now, when does an obligation to pay arise? It arises only when
there is damage or injury caused by fault or negligence that gives
rise to an obligation. So kung wala gani kay daage nga gi-cause
even if you are negligent, then you are not liable. Right? When
there is no act or omission that causes damage, there is really no
obligation to speak of. The obligation involved is a real obligation or
an obligation to givewhich is, to pay for the damage done.
Same thing applies to quasi-contracts because this has always been
a source of confusion. But just stating, article 2142, it provides that:
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise
to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one
shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
(n)
For example, during a storm, a farm lot owned by Maja was flooded
while she was away on vacation with her lover. Her neighbor,
bangs, sees that her animals are about to perish because of the
flood. Just a very simple fact pattern.
Naay animals. Abandoned. There's a neighbor who sees that they
are about to perish. Very simple. Does Bangs have an obligation to
Maja with repsect to the animals? It is akin to asking: Does bangs
have the obligation to safe or rescue the animals? Naa ba syay
obligation to rescue?
Let us try to magnify the example. You see somebody being mauled
by a group of persons. Kita kaayo nimo. Do you have an obligation
to rescue? As a human being and as a Filipino citizen, you have an
obligation to rescue. Answer: NO! But if you rescue, the law
rewards you.
What is the reward of the law? In case you have inflicted injury
upon the person who you attacked to protect that person, then
you are exempt or not criminally liable because that is a justifying
circumstancedefense of strangers. Naa tay ana nga rewards sa
atong balaud.
Same thing with quasi-contracts. There is really no obligation under
the law to rescue. Why? Because it actually takes into account the
first law of nature: SELF-PRESERVATION. Why would I risk my ass in
saving somebody else? Okay.
But if Bangs acts as a good neighbor and rescues the animals of
Maja, Maja is ultiately benefitted. So now, it gives rise to a situation
where somebody is benefitted because of the efforts of another
person. And Bangs, therefore in that situation, performed a lawful,
unilateral and voluntary act that benefitted Maja. To avoid unjust
enrichment, the law therefore creates a juridical relation of quasi-
contract. Maja must compensate Bangs for the trouble of saving

the animals.
That's how the way it works in both quasi-delicts and quasicontracts. If you injure no one in quasi-delicts, even if you are the
most reckless and negligent person in the whole world, you are not
supposed to be liable. You have no obligation to be carefulnot at
least a legal obligation. Probably, a moral obligationyes. But not a
legal obligation.
In quasi-contracts, there is no obligation to rescue; but an
obligation to pay for the effort arises if another person is
benefitted. There is no such thing as free beer.
Let us apply this in this case. Now, Alma Moreno was driving her car
recklessly while driving home from her interview with Karen Davila.
What's her liability for driving recklessly? Nothing. If no one catches
her doing her driving recklessly or violating trafic rules, it does not
matter. For she incurs no liability whatsoever. But if she injures no
one by her reckless driving, she incurs a quasi-delictual
responsibility. No victim, no fault. No injury, no victim.
But if Alma Moreno was driving recklessly while driving home and
she accidentally hits Karen Davila, who was then crossing the
street, this time because there is negligence and there is iinjury
occassioned upon another person, then there is liability for quasidelict and that is when the liability or obligation to pay for the
damage done arises.
That is the only time that you can be held liable for a quasi-delict. So
what is the moral lesson? It is okay to be careless. YOLO~
Now, how do we distinguish between a quasi-delict and tort?
Because, if you recall in our first two meetings, what we were
talking about strictly is the concept of tort which is actually a
broader concept when it comes to torts and damages, kumpara
didto sa quasi-delict.
Now, quasi-delicts are limited to those under Article 2176 2194 of
the civil code; whereas torts includes quasi-delicts, violations on law
on human relations and nuisances at least in Philippine Tort Law.
A quasi-delict is strictly a concept of civil lawit is defined by the
civil code. Culpa Aquiliana comes from the spanish civil code;
whereas tort is originally a common law concept. In other words,
gikan na sya sa common law tradition or system in UK and in US. So
it actually came from a case law or a decision of a tribunal and not
from any law or ordinance. That is how you distinguish between a
civil law and common law.
Quasi-delict, as defined and originally conceived under Article 2176,
arises only when there is fault or negligence. There is a caveat there
as defined and originally conceived. Because later on, we will
elarn that that is not strictly what 2176 is all aboutna limited lang
sya sa negligent acts. Tort, on the otherhand, is broader than quasidelict because it includes not only negligence but also intentional
criminal acts as well.
Like the tort on battery in the US. Naa kay gikulata sa US, then that
can be a tort. That is simply a tort and not a crime. Breaking in can

be a tort but not necessarily a crime in certain states of xxx.

Now, here's an important thing that you need to remember. What
are the elements of a quasi delict? The most recent case that
tackles the requisites of a quasi-delict is UNKNOWN OWNER VS
ASIAN TERMINALS (Gr. No. 195661 March 11, 2015).
Unknown owner of a vessel ni siya. I want you to take note of the
title or citation of this case because we will be using this case also
when we'll illustrate the concepts relating to res ipsa loquitorthe
thing speaks for itself. Basaha lang ninyo na. It is a very simple case.
It's just that the terms are too technical that I found it very difficult
to digest the case in a way that we will all understand.
To understand a plaintiff's right for recovery in a quasi-delict, three
elements must exist, to wit:
(a) damages to the plaintiff;
(b) negligence by act or omission, by which defendant,
personally or some person for whose acts it must
respond, was guilty; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
We have no problem with the term of damage here because we are
simply talking about the term damages in a concept of actual injury.
In other words, sa imoha bang act naka-injure ba ka ug laing tao?
Kanang injured ba na, is it measurable and quantifiable? That's all
we need to know with respect to damages for now. It's not
damages in the sense that it is the amount or type of a recovery
that the law allows for the tortuous act of another. Like, actual
damages, moral damages, etceteraNO! It's damages in its generic
sense.
through a special agent; but not when the damage has

been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article
2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
And connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage. And that is the requirement of PROXIMATE POSITION.
The causal relationship between the act or omission of the
defendant and the injury caused upon the plaintiff.
So mao ni ang pinkasimple nga requisites that you need to
remember.
Let's discuss this case: DELA LLANA VS BIONG (December 4, 2013).
what happened here?
Negligence, which can be by act or by omission. Meaning, the doing

or failing to do an act of which the defendant, personally or done
by somebody over whom the defendant is responsibleor
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the civil code.
On March 13, 2000, at around 11 pm, one Dela Llana was driving a
1997 Toyota Corolla along North Ave., Quezon City. His sister, Dra.
Dela Llana, was seated at the frnt passenger's seat while a certail
Calimlim was at the back seat. One stop at the Veteran's Memorial
Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after, a
dump truch containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car's
rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the
car's rear collapsed and it's windshield was shattered. Glass flew,
puncturing Dra. Dela Llana. Apart from her minor wounds, Dra. Dela
Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is

demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
So it is a simple bump from behind case. They were riding there and
suddenly something bumped them. So what will happen to you?
Malabay jud ka especially wala kay seatbelt.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the

mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
The truck driver revealed that his employer was Rebecca Biong. A
month and a half after the accident, Dra. Dela Llana began to feel
moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. Her health
deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move around.
She consulted with Dr. Milla to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told
her that probably she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury
caused by the compression of a nerve running to her left arm and
hand.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or

incapacitated persons who are under their authority and
live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by
their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
Clearly, there is a quanitifiable damage or injury upon Dra. Dela

Llana.
The issue in this case is clearly liability under Article 2176. And I will
use this case to explain to you what do you need to prove a case for
quasi-delict.
So damages to the plaintiff, negligence, and the causal connection
between the negligence done by the defendant and the injury

suffered by the plaintiff. So those 3 are what you need to

remember.
Now, based on the requisites, therefore and taking into
consideration of what we know from evidence, what is the duty of
the plaintiff in order to win the case? What is the duty of the
plaintiff? Because this is is a civil case for damages is to establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of the quasi-delict.
Okay? This is a civil case so you only need preponderance of
evidence compared to when you do a criminal case in court where
you need to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt. Of course,
that is the quantum of proof required in criminal cases. For
administrative cases, it is merely substantial evidence. And if you
were under Fr. Nazareno, I'm sure you have read the case of ANG
TIBAY VS CIR, which mentions the 7 cardinal requirements of an
administrative case.
Now, elements in this case (Dela Llana vs Biong). Let us try to apply
in this case.
Was there damage on Dra. Dela Llana? YES! She suffered

whiplash injury to the extent that she could no longer
move her left arm. That is clear damage or injurt upon the
person of the plaintiff.
Negligence: The driver of the dumptruck was driving

negligenly. That was established in the case.
And relation of the cause and effect between whiplash

injury and the act of driving negligently. So let's check the
chain of relation between the reckless driving and her
whiplash injury.
So you need to prove that by a preponderance of evidence.

Now, did the plaintiff in this instant case? NO! According to the
Supreme Court she failed to discharge the burden of proving the
third element of quasi-delict. She failed to establish by
preponderance of evidence that the driver's negligence in its
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury; and whithout
wich, her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Why so? Let us look at the evidence of Dra. Dela Llana.
Wouldn't the pictures of her damaged car prove the causal
connection between the fault or negligence and the damage
sustained? According to the Supreme Court, it only proves impact,
but it cannot be used to infer any whiplash injury. That's all she
presented.
So, what would you probaby do if you are in that position? How will
you prove that you have a whiplash injury? Of course, the medical
certificate. Because she had herself checked by a different doctor
despite the fact that that she, herself, is a doctor. So what about
that? According to the Supreme Court, that is hearsay evidence.
That is not evidence based on her personal knowledge because the
doctor who issued her medical certificate did not testify in court
and subjected herself to cross-examination. So, inadmissible
evidence to prove her whiplash injury.

But she also testified. Being herself as a ddoctor that collisions can
cause whiplash injury. According to the Supreme Court, dili gihapon
pwede because that is mere opinion evidence. And because she
was just an ordinary witness, she was not presented as an expert
witness. Her opinion on what caused her injury is not admissible to
court.
You failed to prove by preponderance of evidence the elements of
a quasi-delict.
Let's go to the element of negligence.
Now, take note that fault from the civil code must be distinguished
from the law. If the act or omission causing the damage is
committed with intent to cause such damage, the act becomes a
crime which is governed by the RPC. So therefore, when intent is
absent, it is simply fault or culpa. Wala man nimo gituyo. This
distinction between the two concepts depends on the will of the
actor whether gituyo ba niya or dili rather than on his pure
negligence.
What is negligence? For that, we'll go to the classic definition under
article 1173 of the civil code:
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in
the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
xxx
In SMITHBELL VS BORJA (June 10, 2001), the Supreme Court
defined negligence as simply a conduct that creates an undue risk
of a harm to another person.
But more recently, by way of reiteraton of other decided cases, the
Supreme Court defined negligence in SOLIDUM VS PEOPLE (March
10, 2014) as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest
of another person that the degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand whereby the other
person suffers injury.
To my mind, that is a bar examination question. This, to my mind, is
the best jurisprudential definition of negligence. But, nothing will
substitute for the codal definition. This is the best: required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the persons of the time and of the place.
Never forget that definition.
Now, there are two types of fault.
1. Substantive and independentwhich on account of its
origin gives rise to an obligation between two persons,
not similarly bound by any other obligation.
When you say fault, substantive and independent, what is it
independent of? Independent of any ther obligation. Independent
of contract. And therefore this is culpa extra-contractual.

And remember the definition of a quasi-delict under article 2176, it

states there that: there being no pre-existing contractual obligations
between the parties. So this is what we are talking aboutculpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual.
What is the origin of this term culpa aquiliana? It is the Lex Aquilia
of Roman Law. This was concerned with damnum injuria datum
(damage unlawfully inflicted) and this is the precise transaltion of
what appears in Roman Law: If anyone wrongfully place another
male or female slave or four-footed herd animal, let him be ordered
to the owner whatever its highest value was in the xxx.
Don't you find this weird? [Comments of sir about why it is weird
for him.] The recourse of what is given to you, if you were the slaveowner, despite the fact that it might involve an unlawful killing of a
human being, is a mere civil action. Not even a criminal action. The
killing of a slave, therefore, was not treated as a crime. It was
merely a tort. Mura ra syag tort. Wlay criminal prosecution.
2.
Fault as an incident in a performance of an obligation.
Which we have previously said that which cannot be presumed to

exist without the other and which increases the liability arising
from an already existing obligation.
This means that the fault or negligence arises out of a pre-existing
obligation. There can be no liability if there was no contract
between the parties in the first place. And that is known as a culpa
contractual.
The best example there would be a contract of carriage. Meaning,
you are obliged to bring the passengers safely and securely to their
destinations. If you drive the bus or a PUV negligently, that they
failed to arrive at their desitination safely and securely, then you are
liable for fault as an incident to a performance of an obligation or
culpa contractual.
Another example there would be article 1163.
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also
obliged to take care of it with theThat's proper diligence of
a good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation
of the parties requires another standard of care. (1094a)
Now, Mr. Lao, can you give me an example of a contract where the
obligation of a party is an obligation to give?
Sir: So for the seller: to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a

determinate thing; and for the buyer: to pay therefore a price
certain in money or its equivalent.
Now, let us assume that I am the buyer and you are the seller. And I
already paid you my obligation. You are to deliver the subject
matter of the sale within 1 week from the time I paid you. What is
your oblgation with respect to the subject matter?
Lao: To preserve while in possession.
Sir: That is correct. [But if you are taking the bar, you must answer
it codally. Read article 1163.]
Article 1163. Every person obliged to give something is also
obliged to take care of it with the proper diligence of a
good father of a family, unless the law or the stipulation of
the parties requires another standard of care. (1094a)
That's what Article 1163 is. Article 1163 applies to fault as an incident
to the performance of an obligation, diba? There's a contract.
What's the contract? Sale. In the meantime, pending the deluvery, I
have to take care of it. What's the diligence that you're supposed
to use? The diligence of a good father of a family.
Another example would be a contract of commodatum. You know
of course that in order for a commodatum is..ahh...Can I borrow a
pen? *Gives pen.* O that's a contract of commodatum. I borrowed
a pen.
Now, would article 1163 apply to me now? That while the pen is
with me, I have to take care of it with the diligence of a good father
of a family? Right? What if akoa rang gilabay-labay unya naguba ang
pen? That would already be a fault as an incident to a performance
of an obligation.
The bailor in commodatum, what would be his obligations? WALA.
Sya ang nagpahulam. Ako ang gipahulam, diba? Ako na nanghulam,
what's my obligation? To return.
Okay so, I am obliged to take care of the pen pending its return. In
case it gets lost due to my negligence, I will be liable for damages.
That's fault as an incident to the performance of an obligation.
It will be culpa contractual. If he sues me for losing the pen, it will
be a culpa contractual because I failed to perform my obligations
under the contractspecifically, to preserve the thing pending its
return.
Lao: Sale.
Sir: Meaning buyer and seller, both have obligations? What is the
obligation of the buyer?
Lao: Under 1458 of the Civil Code. To pay, therefore in a price
certain or its equivalent.
Sir: What about the seller?
Lao: To deliver agreed upon by the parties.
Now, what is fault under 2176? is it substantive and independent or

is it an incident to the performance of an obligation? It is fault that
is substantive and independent. Which means that article 2176 is an
independent source of obligation.
Fault under 2167 cannot be an incident in the performance of an
obligation precisely because article 2176 provides that there should
be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
But we will learn later on that this requirement under 2176 is not
really that strict of a requirement. Because even if there is a pre-

existing contractual obligation between the parties, if the act that

breaks the contract is tortuous article 2176 can be a viable source
of obligation or liability.
street, ordinary diligence is required, right? Why? Because there's

less risk of bumping someone. But if it is crowded, of course you'd
be more careful.
Can you recall in transportation law the case of AIR FRANCE VS

CARRASCOSO? The person was xxx off in favor of a European
passenger who, according to the airline, had a better right to the
seat? Unya kay gibastos pa jud niya ang Filipino passener. Same
thing with the case of LOPEZ VS PALMA.
Now, if you're transporting an infant compared to transporting ang

adult, again mas grabe angc are na required in carrying an infant
than carrying an adult. But I'm not saying that if your passenger is
an adult then it is okay to be reckless because anyway he can take
care of himself. What I'm saying is ang greater degree of care is
required.
There is a pre-existing contractual obligationthe contract of

carriage. But because the manner on which the contract was
violated, i.e. tortuous as well, libaility can be had under article 2176.
And finally, carrying a loaded gun compared to carrying an empty

one. Anybody here ang kanang ga-shoot? Wala? I don't. I have guns
as a matter of principle.
Let's revisit article 1173 or the definition of fault or negligence.

Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
xxx
Now, what do you mean when you say diligence required by the
nature of the obligation? What is an example of diligence required
by the nature of the obligation? Kay diba dili tanan diligence under
the law is also just diligence of a good father of a family. Naa pud
tay ginatawag nga extraordinary diligence.
So what's an examle of obligation that requires a certain type of
diligence? Common carriers lang gihapon, diba? Extraordinary
diligence is required of common carriers over the vigilants, goods
transported, or their passengers. That is an example of diligence
required by the nature of the obligation.
What about diligence that corresponds of the person of the time
and of the place? Imagine Manny Pacquiao again. Dribbling his ball
in his sala at Forbes Park. And then, naa didto ang iyahang newborn
baby. Is it okay to dribble inside your house? Of Course! Pero naa
may bata. So you have to be more careful kay naa may bata. So
circumstances of person of the time and of place.
Now, is there a uniform rule to determine on whether a person is
whether or not negligent? No. In this old case of CORLISS VS
MANILA RAILROAD CO., the Supreme Court ruled that negligence
is want of care required by the circumstances. It is relative or
comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends on
the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance
which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is
great, a high degree of care is necessary. And the failure to observe
it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
So, sa kataas nga giingon sa Supreme Court, what is it tryng to drive
at? Lack of diligence or negligence is actually a relative term. You
weigh it according to the demannds of the circumstances. What
circumstances are we talking about? The persons, the time, and the
place.
Example, would you be more careful in a car in a street during the
business hours or when drivng in an empty street? Kung empty ang
Take note that in these situations, the relative positions and

physical situations of the parties must also be considered. Tanawon nimo. Crowded or empty. Look relative positions and physical
situations. This brings me to a case that was asked in the bar
examinations. That is the case of HEIRS OF COMPLETO VS
ALBAYDA (July 6, 2010). What happened here?
Alabayda was on his way to the office to report for duty, riding a
bicylcle. The taxi driven by Completo bumped and sideswiped him,
causing physical injuries. Completo asserted that he was an
experienced driver in accordance with traffic rules and regulations.
And common courtesy to his fellow motorists had already reduced
his speed to 20kmph even before reaching the intersection. At
least, that's what he said.
Iyahang idea. Naa bay nag-measure ato nga time kung nag slow
down ba sya o wala? No one.
In contrast, Albayda kuno in his bicycle rode at a very high speed,
causing him to lose control of his bicycle and hit the rear door of
the right side of the taxi. Soo according to him, kinsay naay sala?
Sala sa bisikleta.
How did the Supreme Court rule? The Supreme Court found that
the driver of the motor vehicle was libale. But that's not what I'm
more concerned of. I am more concerned of the relative positions
of a bicycle on one hand and a motrized vehicle on the otherhand.
Who among you here can tell me that a bicycle should not be on a
highway? Who among you here agrees with me that tricycles
should also not be allowed to be in the highway?
According to the Supreme Court, it was proven by a preponderance
of evidence that Completo failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
driving the taxicab because he was overspeeding and hit a bicycle
ridden by a biker. Such negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the serious physical injuries sustained by him. Completo
did not slow own even when he approached the intersection of the
8th and 11th streets of VAB. It was also proven that Ablayda had the
right of way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead of
Completo.
You are looking at a situation where, again, it is just a bike. And that
is a motor vehicle. In other countries, they have bike lanes. But here
in the Philippines, we don't have bike lanes.

2.
According to the Supreme Court, the bicycle occupies a legal
position that is at least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on
the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be
required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of
care to the other because of the physical advantages the
automobile has over the bicycle.
At a slow speed of ten miles per hour, a bicyclist travels amost 15 ft
per hour, while a car traveling at only 25miph covers almost 37ft per
second, and a split-second acton may be insufficient to avoid an
accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger
of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa. Accordingly, while the duty of
using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to
the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required
from the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the
bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical advantages that the motor
vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist
than vice versa.
So what is the Supreme Court saying? Between a motor vehicle and
a bicycle, kinsay lamang? Motor Vehicle.
Another diligence that is required by law is extraordinary

diligence.
Question: Under the law, what is extraordinary diligence? What

situations, contracts, etcetera require extraordinary diligence?
Of course, in common carriers. We know that for a fact. Whether
for transporation of goods or transfer of passengers, the degree of
care is the same. Extraordinary diligenceor, the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person.
Did you remember katong what we spoke about the law calls a
person an ordinary prudent man. Who is that guy? And for that
matter, who is a very cautious person? Again, there is no exact
definition but it is actually a measure, for example ang kaning
ordinary cautious man or ordinary prudent person, it actually
represents you and me under usual situations. What will we do if
placed in that situation?
So, can you give me a situation or an example under the law that
requires extraordinary diligence in addition to common carriers?
I'd give you an example and then tell me if it is correct or not.
Now, because of the advantage of a car compared to a bicycle,

greater degree of diligence is required to a motorist than a bicyclist.
Stands to reason diba? But what the Supreme Court is actually
saying is that with more power comes great responsibility.
Okay. By way of review, what are the types of diligence required
under the civil code?
1.
Under article 1163, diligence of a good father of a family.

This is one type of diligence or a degree of care required
by law.
Actually, if you look at article 1163 and corollary provisions, there is

first, diligence agreed upon by the parties. Or diligence set by
stipulations of the partiesor contractual obligations.
It is perfectly legal for the parties to contract to agree to a greater
standard of care. Or even lesser standard of care if allowed by law.
That is diligence agreed upon by the parties. Unless, the law or the
stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care.
But, there's also diligence set by the law itself. So either set by law
or set by stipulations of the parties.
An example of a diligence required by law is the ordinary diligence
or diligence of a good father of a family which is the default
standard of care equaal to the diligence of a reasonably prudent
man as mentioned in the case of PICART VS SMITH (37 PHIL 809).
can you recall this case of Picart vs Smith? Horse. Bridge. And then
there's this kalesa. Na-startle ang horse. Nag-bangga sila. Who is at
fault?
According to the Supreme Court, whoever had the last clear chance
to avoid the impending injury who did not take it will be liable for
the consequences. And this is the case imported to the Philippine
jurisdiction: the doctrine of last clear chance.
You are a doctor. You are performing a surgery. Is it required for

the doctor to exercise extraordinary diligence in performing the
surgery? Required ba? What do you think?
You will be surprised to find out that under the law, only ordinary
diligence is required of doctors even when performing a surgery.
But it is not to say that it is the same diligence required of a law
school professor while teaching class or a driver driving his vehicle
in a contract of private carriage.
Why? Because the ordinary diligence in a medical profession is
already very very stringent. And so, therefore, the diligence of a
good father of a family when it comes to medical profession, is not
just an ordinary prudent person but an ordinary prudent medical
practitioner.
That is the explanation of the Supreme Court. But it does not take
away the fact that although the law does not require extraordinary
diligence then the degree of diligencethe ordinary diligence
there is already very very high. So no need to say extraordinary
diligence.
What if public utility companies? Unsa na sya? Extraordinary
diligence.
Remember that the fault or negligence of an obligor consists in the
degree of care required in an obligation in response with the
circumstances of the time, the persons, and the place. Again,
circumstances of time, persons, and the place.
So let us take a look at this case of ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE VS CA (Nov. 6, 1989). What happened?
In the evening of June 28 th, a strong typhoon buffeted the province
of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and constant flooding on its
way. When the flood waters began to recede, the deceased, Isabela

Juan, ventured out on her house and proceeded towards the

directors of the Five Sisters na negosyo. That is their business. So as
any traditional Filipino-Chinese, naay negosyo. And of course, very
worried sya sa iyahang stocks.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed AY! and quickly sank into the
water. She was electricuted by an electric wire dangling from a
post, moving in a snake-like fashion in the water.
Di niya makita kay tungod baha, she was electricuted. So dead.
Circmstances of TIME: What time was it? Night time.
Circumstance of PLACE: The place was flooded.
Circumstance of PERSON: Owner of Five Sisters na negosyo.
An action for damages in the amount of Php 250,000 was instituted
by the heirs of the deceased against Ilocos Norte Electric
Cooperative.
INELCO claimed that the death was due to force majeure. Unsa may
sala namo? Kami bay nagputol sa wire? DILI. Kami ba ang
nagpabagyo o nagpabaha? DILI. Kami bay nagsugo kay Isabel nga
muadto sa iyahang negosyso during the time na naga-ulan ug
nagabaha, unya namatay sya? DILI gihapon. So that's their defense.
So, whether or not the petitioner may be held liable for the death
of Isabela Juan?
According to the Supreme Court, quoting the Court of Appeals, in
times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of
electricity to be in constant vigil of the death to avoid and probable
incident that might imperil life or limb.
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
place where persons have a right to be".
So the Supreme Court is saying nga kato nga time nga niadto sya sa
iyahang negosyo, she has the right to be there kay tungod naa man
syay negosyo didto.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was
solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or
concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury,
the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for
his own negligent conduct or omission".
So, again, the degree of diligence required is relative depending on
the circumstance of time and place for example. Kung walay bagyo,
kinahanglan bag extraordinary diligence from public utility
companies? The answer is NO. pero kung naay bagyo, in times of
calamities, the Supreme Court says that you are required to
exercise extraordinary diligence because that is what the
circumstance of time and place would require.

Now, here's this term: Volenti non fit injuria. What is it?
It is short for the latin maxim which tells us that: To the consenting,
no injury is done. Meaning, if you voluntarily assumed the risk, you
cannot find a claim. Di ka pwede mag-kaso kaso kung ikaw mismo
kay ning-agree sa risk.
Example, again we'll go back to Manny Pacquiao. He boxes against
people bigger than him. What if he dies? People die in the boxing
ring.
Can he sue the promoter because the boxer died? You can't!
Because you voluntarily assumed the risk by entering into a
dangerous competition. You assumed the risk. Ordinarily, you
cannot sue. You consented to the injury. And therefore, you cannot
file a case. That is the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Now, can it not be contended by INELCO that, You know, Isabela,
just actually assumed the risk. She did not have to go there, and
yet, niadto man sya. Can they not apply the doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria?
According to the Supreme Court, actually that does not apply. For it
has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule,
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide
by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life
or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
Again, Isabela had the right to be there. She had the right to rescue
her property. And so, the doctrine of assumption of risk or volenti
non fit injuria does not apply.
Another instance for extraordinary diligence is BIR and Customs
Examiners under RA 9335, Section 8:
Section 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees
of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners, and
employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Bureau of Customs who violate this Act or who are guilty
of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or
misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in
the performance of their duties shall be held liable for any
loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or
taxpayer as a result of such violation, negligence, abuse,
malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
So dapat naay extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties and they are libable for any loss or injury suffered by any
business establishment or a taxpayer as a result of such negligence,
violence, and etcetera.
Now, I remember kana bitaw sa BIR katong Oplan Kandado. What if
nagkamali sila? They thought that this establishment was violating
Tax law. But it turned out nga wala diay violation. Extraordinary
diligence is needed in determining that. Kana bitaw whether or not
ang tax payer kay wala nagbayad ug tarong nga tax. The BIR and

Customs examiners are supposed to pay for the damage done.

That's what this provision is saying.
Now, banks.
Banks in certain cases are required to exercise extraordinary
diligence. Here's what I always say about banks. What is the nature
of a bank deposit gani? Irregular deposit which is goverened by the
civil code on the law of simple deposit or Mutuum.
Who is doing whom a favor? You are the one doing the bank a
favor. Why? Because without that, wala silay mapautang sa tao
kung asa nila ginakuha ang interest na kita nila.
When you deposit money in a bank, what ddo you actually do? You
trust that the bank will actually not run away with your money.
What do you call that type of relationship in the law? You just trust
a person to do the right thing on your person or your propertya
fiduciary relationships. And what you need to remember, thereore,
with respect to banks is that when it acts in a fiduciary capacity
with respect to their depositors, then they are required to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
What I'm saying is kung niadto lang ka sa bangko and you are not a
depositor, nagpakambyo ka sa imong Php 1,000.00, that is not
fiduciary capacity. You are not acting pursuant to a creditor-debtor
relationship or a depositor-depositary relationship. You are simply
having a money change.
But what if you have a checking account. And then, one of you
checks or encash at the bank. And the bank, as a matter of course,
encashed the check not knowing that your check had been stolen
and been encashed by an estafadora/impostor. That would
constitute fiduciary capacity/relationship as in the case of
SAMSUNG CONSTRUCTION VS FAR EAST BANK (August 13, 2004).
Ingon ato ang nahitabo. Naay cheke that had been encashed by an
impostor. Apparently, katong cheke has been signed in blank by
the holder of the checking account.. gikawat sa laing tao unya
gibutangan ug amount and encashed in an amount of almost Php
1M. According to the bank, we should not be held liable for that
encashment by an impostor because in the encashment, we were
actually satisfied that the siignature in the check belonged to the
depositor. We compared it with the specimen signatures. And
when we asked for identification of the payee, nakapakita man
syag tulo ka ID. So why would we be held liable when we exercised
proper diligence in that type of situation.
According to the Supreme Court, NO. Because banks are engaged
in the business impressed with public interest and so on and so
forth. They have the obligation to treat their client's account
meticulously and with the highest degree of care, considering that
the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of
banks, therefore, is more than that of a good father of a family.
Given the cirucmstances, extraordinary diligence dictates that
FEBTC should have ascertainied from Jong personally that the
signature in the questionable check was his.
So what is the effect of this ruling? There was a change in the policy
of Far East bankBPI. So the policy is if a check exceeds a
particular amount, they will call the owner of the account to know
whether or not sya ba jud ang nag-issue sa cheke.

REYES VS CA (Aug. 15, 2001) More or less the same ruling, relating
to the degree of diligence required of banks which is more than the
diligence of a good father of a family. But the Supreme Court said
that that only applies where banks act in their fiduciary capacity
that is, as depositary to their depositors. But the same higher
degree of diligence is not expected to be asserted by banks in
commercial transactions that do not involve their fiduciary
relationship with their depositors.
So kung dili deposit transaction, regarding their depositors, only
ordinary diligence is required.
Unsa pa? Kani mejo obscure: Board of canvassers during election.
Why obscure? To my mind, no longer applicable kay PICOS machine
na man tanan. So dili na ka kinahanglan nga mag-require ug
extraordinary diligence sa pag-ihap sa boto. PICOS na tanan. So to
my mind, basin dili na kaayo applicable ning GARCIA VS CA.
Okay. Officers of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
RA 8799.
Respondent officers in writ of amparo cases this one is kinda
important. The burden of proof and standard of diligence required
under the rule on writ of amparo, Section 17. Take note of the
distinction between respondent who is a private individual and a
respondent who is a public officer.
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. The parties shall establish their claims by
substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must
prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must
prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade responsibility or liability.
If you are a private individual, the diligence requirede is simply
ordinary diligence. But if you are a public officer, then the
requirement is extraordinary diligence. And there is even n
application of the presumption of regularity of official functions.
What usually happens in the writ of amparo cases? Somebody
disappears. They believe that it is a forced disappearance. So you
file for a wrrit of amparo before the CA, for example, that would
direct the Army or AFP, or Police to explain the disappearance. And
then they have to exert extraordinary diligence in performing their
duty. So there is a difference ha between an ordinary private
respondent and a public officer respondent in writ of amparo
cases.

Just take note of this case REYES VS CA (February 4, 2014). The

case of enforced disappearance belongs to public officers who are
respondents in writ of amparo cases.
Does the term quasi-delict apply to intentional acts? Fault or
negligence is required in quasi-delicts. And the fact that an act is
intentional actually negates negligence. The case there is the old
case of DULAY VS CA (243 scra 220). Unsay gibuhat diri?
This is actually not a case of somebody bumping another. It is
somebody wilfully shooting another. What happened? There's a
heated argument before between a security guard, Consuela, and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Patay si Atty. Dulay. The widow of the
deceased filed an action for damages against Consuela for wanton
and reckless discharge of the firearm and the security agency as
employers for having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee to
avoid the injury.
What were the contentions of the security agency? The act of
shooting of Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties and was
committed with deliberate intent. Deliberate intentmeaning, it's
a crime! It is not a tort or quasi-delict. And therefore, civil liability is
governed by Artile 100 of the RPC and not article 2176 in relation
with article 2180.
Now, what is the significance of that? In article 100 of the RPC, an
employer is merely subsidiarily liable. What is meant by subsidiary
liability? You only pay in case the other person does not pay. And so
an employer may only be held liable for the crime of an employee if
and when dili kabayad ang employeean employee becomes
insolvent.
But in article 2176 in relation with article 2180 on vicarious liability
would actually entail direct and primary responsibilty. Such that
kintahay an employee is sued for a quasi-delict, and it is alleged and
proven that there is lack of diligence in selection and supervision by
the employer of the employee, then more or less there is joint and
solidary liability. You can go ahead directly against the employer
instead of filing a case against the employee.
And so, if it is article 100 that would apply, it would not be
automatic for the security agency to be held liable. Kinahanglan
pag finding ug subsidiary civil liabiility. But if it is under 2176 in
relation to 2180, it can be sued directly. It can be held liable directly.
So, the ruling of the Supreme Court is that there is no justification
for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
What?! As a torts professor, it is very hard for me to accept a ruling
like Dulay vs CA. Because what differentiates a crime from a tort is
the fact that in a crime, there is intent. In tort, wala. Or ideally,
under article 2176, wala.
But this is the ruling of the Supreme Court and it is still a good law
ha. Balik-balik ning Dulay vs CA.
Now, a situation for example: Maja files a criminal case against

Sarah, with prayer for damages. She was also allowed to file an
independdent action for damages under Article 2176. wouldn't that
lead to unjust enrichment if Maja wins in these two cases? She will
be awarded damages twice? How did the Supreme Court address
the decision in Dulay.
I think you know the answer already because we have already
discussed article 2177. Diba walay multiple recovery. Isa ra gyud ka.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.(n)
But the question is, let's say in the one case the award was Php
500,000 and in a civil case which proceeded independently and
distinctly from the criminal case and awarded let's say Php 1M. Pila
imong kuhaon?
The Supreme Court answered that in Dulay. The plaintiff is entitled
in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary.
So the bigger award. So sa Php 500,000 or Php 1M, Php 1M imong
makuha.
STANDARD INSURANCE VS CUARESMA (September 10, 2014) in
relaion to Dulay vs CA and Article 2177 and your civil procedure.
Now, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and the other
owned by Arnold and driven by Jerry Cuaresma figured in an
accident in Quezon, City. In 2004, Arnold filed a criminal complaint
against Jefferson for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property.
Jefferson, on the otherhand, filed a civil action in 2008 an action for
damages against Arnold Cuaresma. Does this constitute forum
shopping?
One case was fileda criminal caseby A against B based on a
vehicular accident. Now, based on the same vehicular accident, B
filed a civil case against A. Dili ba na forum shopping? Allowed ba
ang accused to file a separate civil action against the private
complainant based on the same accident which lead to the same
injury? That's the question.
But before answering this, remember that the offended party is
allowed to file a separate civil action under article 2176 despite the
filing of a criminal case under article 265. The rules expressly allow
the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed indepently
from the ciminal action. The case there to my mind is very doctrinal:
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA (4 Phil 582).
And that is not considered as forum shopping as this is specifically
allowed under article 2177. the law itself tells you that it is not
forum shopping because you are allowed to file an independent
civil action based on the same set of acts, same transaction or

occurrence.
What about the accused in the case of Standand? Take note that
the accused here filed a civil action while the criminal case was still
pending. That is why the private complainant here is saying nga dili
man siguro ka pwede mu-file ana because otherwise that would be
a forum shopping.
Can you recall the requisites for forum shopping?
Identity of the parties, or at least such parties as those

representing the same interests in both actions;
identity of rights asserted and reliefs praed for, the reliefs

being founded on the same facts; and
identity with respect to the two precedding particulars in

the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case regardless of which party is
successful , would amount to res judicata in the other
case.
And finally, although these two actions arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is
based on culpa criminal while the civilc case was based on culpa
aquiliana, actionable under articles 2176 and 2177 of the civil code.
I love this case of Standard.
Now, based on what we already know so far, there are three types
of culpa:
1. culpa aquiliana
2. culpa contractual
3. culpa criminal
What are the disctinctions?
I do not want to discuss that anymore. If you look at your books,
daghan kaayog distinctions. So just take note of those. I want you
to master those distinctions.
According to the Supreme Court, NO. Paragraph 6, Section 1, of

Rule 111 provides that no counterclaim, crossed-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which would have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action.
And then, you have this necessity of proving negligence.
You call this provision in the Criminal procedure? And do you recall
also the provision prior to the 2000 Rules of Crim Pro, nga naa tay
case nga Cabaero vs Cantos? Can you recall Cabaero? That tackled
the propriety of filing a counterclaim in a criminal case where the
judge there said that actually silent man ang laws. And so maybe
you can file a counterclaim. If it is silent, then it is allowed and
maybe it is allowed.
However, since negligence in some cases is hard to prove, we apply

the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturthe thing speaks for itself. I think
you know my favorite case in the whole worldthe case of
REPUBLIC VS LUZON STEVEDORING.
When it reached the Supreme Court, it said nga actually tama man.
Pero what you are actually doing is that you are convoluting
everything. Ginasamok nato kay imbes nga ang i-determine lang
nato kay ang criminal liability lang, naa pay counterclaim even
though it arises from the same subject matter from the main
complaint.
So, here, there is no forum shopping.
Reasons:
-The accused cannot file a counterclaim precisely because of the
prohibition under Rule 111. So whatever claim he has against the
other party can only be ventilated in a separate civil action. So, dili
pwede.
And according to the Supreme Court, quoting the case of
Casupanan, either the private complainant or the accused can file a
separate civil action under article 2177. Because in all occasion is if
you are the complainant, ikaw tong plaintiiff, you are the only one
who can file a separate civil action because that is under article
2177.
But actually, the Supreme Court said, wala may prohibition. The
accused can do it. The accused can also file an independent or
separate civil action.
Remember that in a quasi-delict case, negligence must be proved.

And the plaintiff must establish negligence by preponderance of
evidence.
Unsa man ning res ipsa loquitur? In certain instances, the presence
of facts and circumstances surrounding the injury woud not
indicate the negligence on the part of the defendant. The maxim
applies when it is so improbable that such accident will have
happened without the fault of the defendant and a reasonable man
to find, without further evidence, that it was so caused. He maxim
calls for the defendant the burden of disproving the negligence.
Maski wala pa mo nigikan sa evidence, you of course know that
when you allege something, you have to prove it. It is not enough
that you allege and put it out there. You have to substantiate it.
So, for example, you are the plaintiff. You are alleging that the
defendant is negligent and his negligence is the reason for your
injury, then you have to prove it that he was certainly negligent.
But there are certain instances where you don't have to prove
negligence. In fact, the burden is shifted to the defendant to
disprove that he was negligent.
Let's say for example, na-opera ka. Appendectomy. What would
you want to happen? A-there are forecepts left B- hysterectomy or
C-testicles were removed instead? In either way, if anything
happens, you need to prove that the medical institution or the
doctor was negligent. Naay nabilin nga foreign object sa imong
tiyan, who put it there? Alangan ikaw? So do you need to prove that
there was negligence? The answer is NO. The thing speaks for itself
res ipsa loquitur.
Now, read this case: REPUBLIC VS LUZON STEVEDORING

(September 29, 1967) including that case that I have told you about
the UNKNOWN OWNER (2015)because the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine there is important.
AFRICA VS CALTEX (March 31, 1966)
The requisites can be found in the case of MALAYAN VS ALBERTO,
which is also stated in HARCIA VS PEOPLE.
contract is a separate source of obligation under article 1157 of the

civil code, therefore culpa acquiliana is different from culpa
contractual, there is a separate body of remedies provided for
contracts, rescission of contracts or specific performance with a
remedy for damages in either case. We learned that from article
1191. But again may I just remind you, please pay particular
attention to the distinctions between the different types of culpa.
Culpa contractual, culpa acquiliana and, culpa criminal. Its there in
every book that you might have.
SOLIDOM VS PEOPLE (March 10, 2014)

More or less, gina-reiterate lang ang mga ruling sa Supreme Court
relating to res ipsa loquitur. But I think that it is enough for you to
know na what it is or kung unsa man ang res ipsa loquitur.
Like katong case ni REPUBLIC VS LUZON STEVEDORING, bridge na
naay mga poste. Gibanggaan sa barko. Kinsang sala? Sa bridge? It
cannot be the bridge's fault. It's the ship's. Res ipsa loquiturthe
thing speaks for itself.
January 15, 2016

RMONDAY
So during the last meeting we discussed 2176-2178 and we
discussed also the different elements of quasi delict and we noted
that in the recent decisions of the SC harkening back to how it was
worded previously in olden times siguro, there are only 3 requisites
bit traditionally speaking under article 2176 there could be 5
elements:
1. There must be an act or omission;
2. There must be fault or negligence attendant in the
same act or omission;
3. There must be damage caused to another person;
4. There must be a causal connection between the fault or
negligence and
damage; and
5. There must have been no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.
How do we understand the word damage when we speak about
the tort law? Damage comes from the latin word, damnum, which is
also derived from the word demo which means to take away. But in
legal contemplation damages could mean:
-
Example of the liability that might arise in culpa acquiliana

compared to liability that might also arise in culpa contractual:
1.
If a common carrier leaves a passenger stranded
in the middle of nowhere, there is a breach of contract of
carriage because di ba dapat in a contract of
transportation the passenger who contract with a
common carrier must arrive at his destination securely. It
does not matter how the contract is breached or whether
in the breach of contract the common carrier is negligent.
The fact that the contract was entered into and was not
fulfilled is enough for culpa contractual can be a source of
liability.
2.
X rode a bus operated by Y Bus Company. The
driver of the bus was negligent and bumped a lamp post
and therefore because of that X did not arrive at his
destination safely and securely and he also suffered
damage. Remember that there is also a contract of
carriage here. Theres culpa contractual considering that
the contract was breached by the bus company and there
is also a finding negligence and if you recall 2176 which is a
cornerstone of liability for quasi delicts so what happens
when there is contract and there is also negligence? So
what would be the basis for liability of a common carrier?
What type of culpa therefore is a source of liability here,
of course culpa contractual is the source of liability
because there is a breach of contract of carriage. But take
note that there is still negligence, can X therefore sue the
Bus Company for culpa acquiliana? As a general rule under
2176, no. Take note that under 2176 there must be no pre
existing contractual relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant. All I am saying is that is a mere general
rule and there is a very broad exception based on
jurisprudence. It has been held that the manner of
breaching a contract is in itself tortious there can be a
viable cause of action for culpa acquiliana even if there is
a pre existing contractual relationship between the
parties. And for that purpose let us discuss the case of AIR
FRANCE VS. CARASCOSO.
The sum of money which the law awards or imposes

as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or
satisfaction from any injury done or wrong sustained;
as in the case of actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
exemplary and liquidated damages, of course we will
learn that when we go to Articles 2195-2235; or
AIR FRANCE VS. CARASCOSO
The injury or loss caused to another by the violation

of vehicle rights.
What was the contract entered here between Air France and
the passenger Carascoso? Contract of carriage.
Now take note of the requirement that as a general rule there has
to be a no pre existing contractual relations between the parties in
order for liability to attach under article 2176. This is so because
Can you recall 2176 relating to contracts? Who ever by act or

omission causes damage to another there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done, such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre existing contractual relation

between the parties is called quasi delict and is covered by the

provisions of this chapter.
Which means that? In order for negligence to be actionable
under 2176 there should be no existing contractual
relationship between the parties.
Did Caroscoso in this case gave up his seat or he refused? He
did not voluntarily gave up his seat. There was a heated
discussion before he gave up his seat.
What was his claim before the trial court? He filed a claim for
damages.
How did the lower court dispose on the claim of Carascoso?
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (Caroscoso).
What was the contention of Air France after being adjudged
by the trial court to pay damages? According to Airfrance
there is no need to confirm the ticket before the passenger
can claim the first class. Remember in transportation law a
common carrier or any an award of damages can be made,
exemplary, moral damages can be made when there is a
finding of bad faith. There is no categorical finding of bad faith
here, So damages as the one claimed by the plaintiff here
would not be normally awarded unless there is a clear
showing of bad faith which must be stated in the judgment of
trial court and therefore since this is a breach of contract of
carriage according to Air France, in order for an award of
moral damages can be made by the trial court there should at
least be averment of fraud or bad faith and there was none
here. So how did the SC dispose of that contention by Air
France?
According to the SC when a passenger contracts with a
common carrier for transportation, are there other things that
he contracts on? The SC said that passengers when they
come into contract with common carriers, do not only
contract for transportation, they also expect to be treated by
the carriers employees with courtesy, respect and kindness
and due consideration and the SC said that when there is
personal misconduct, injurious language or abuse coming
from the carriers employees that would give rise to cause of
action on the part of the passenger to claim damages on the
common carrier.
What about the contention of Air France that there should
have been no award of damages here considering that its a
culpa contractual, there is a breach of contract of carriage and
it seems that the court is anchoring its decision or award of
damages for a violation of the tort duty or this is supposed to
be tort liability. How did the SC disposed of that issue, which is
the very lis mota of this case. How did the court dispose on
the issue if whether or not there is a tort liability if there is pre
existing contractual relation. According to the SC what did Air
France commit here? Tort or quasi delict? The SC said that Air
France committed quasi delict, according to the SC, because
there is a wrongful expulsion, being a violation of a private
duty by common carrier, Air France is actually liable for quasi
delict. And a quasi delict is the one defined in 2176.
Was the award of damages here predicated on 2176 such that

it will become accurate for the SC to say that it is a quasi delict
committed by Air France, was it the provision that the SC is
basing, its award of damages, upon? Is it an action for
damages based on provision of the law relating to common
carriers or is it a case filed under 2176? In this case the SC is
using the provision 2176 in basing its award or damages.
Actually the SC said that of course tama to atoa gi hisgutan
that when the act which breaks the contract is itself a tort
there can be award of damages based on the provisions of
the law on quasi delict. In fact the SC even termed wrongful
expulsion is a quasi delict which of course is a reference to
2176 but we have to take note that this case was actually filed
not under 2176 but 21 of the Civil Code relating to law on
human relations, which provides that Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage. Here lies the rub, I have to
criticize it for purely academic reasons because article 21 does
not make out a quasi delict but rather its supposed to be
called a tort. When you talk about quasi delict mao na ang
naka butang sa 2176. So when you are taking about quasi
delicts 2176 na siya. But when you are talking about the
entirity tort law which involves 2176 in its allied provisions,
tort na ang tawag, including the law on human relations, law
on nuisance. Thats the proper classification.
Remember under 2176 there must be fault or negligence, in
Air france v Carascoso the supposed quasi delict ariing from
wrongful expulsion was not attended by negligence rather it
was an act committed with intent. Diba the employee said
get out the seat there is a white man who has a better right
to it. Thats willful, thats not negligent. Remember the
cornerstone for liability for quasi delict strictly under 2176 is
negligence. Remember the distinction between tort and
quasi delict. General rule ang tort can be committed
negligent or with intent ang quasi delict on the other hand
dapat negligence. So to my mind the SC here, the SCs usage
of the term quasi delict to describe wrongful expulsion from
the seat was wrong. Technically its tort (?), but its only for
purely academic purposes because its been used
interchangeably although technically speaking dili gyud na
sila pareho. Theyre just interchangeably used.
Coca-cola v CA
The soft drinks were found to contain fiber like substance as a
result the proprietress selling the soft drink lost sales. AS a
result she filed an action for damages from the manufacturer
Coca-cola.
What is the contention of the plaintiff here? Why is she entitled
to damages? She contended that because of the said product
she suffered loss and damages and as result she lost her job
and she became jobless so she is claiming damages against
Coca-cola.

So what is the contention now of Coca-cola? Cocca-cola filed a

motion to dismiss alleging that her cause of action is based on
breach of warranty against hidden defects and the action has
already prescribed because under 1561 the actions must be filed
6 months from the defect. So the Coca-cola is saying that you
cannot file an action against me because what you are trying to
file is an action for damages for breach of warranty under the
law on sales and according to the law on sales you should have
filed that within 6 months from the time of the breach.
So how did the plaintiff counter that? She alleged that her
cause of action is under 1146 of the Civil Code and is one based
on quasi delict and the action should prescribe 4 years from the
tie the cause of action accrue.
So there is a pre existing contract, the contract of sale, so how
did the SC dispose on that? The SC said that although there is a
pre existing contract between the parties and as a general
rule it would have barred the action for quasi delict, that is
just a general rule, by way of exception that if the act itself
that breaks the contract is tortious pwede gihapon ka mg file
under 2176.
What was the case filed here, was it a quasi delict or a tort? The
action here is Quasi delict, which means 2176.
Did the SC describe that correctly? Or is this tort rather than a
quasi delict?
The term actually used by the SC to describe the act or
omission in this case is quasi delict. Negligent manufacture.
Again when you talk about negligence, it is 2176. If it is done
with intent that is supposed to be tort in general. Just be
careful on the distinction between tort and quasi delict.
Regino v Pangasinan Colleges

What was the ticket for? A dance rave concert.
The plaintiff here is a first year student in college. The school is
forcing them to buy a ticket for a rave party.
In this case the student has no money and is prohibited by their
religion to attend such party.
Was there an enticement on the part of the school that there
students pay the tickets? Yes. The condition was if they pay the
ticket tyou have plus points in the exam. But for those who
refuse to pay, they will not be able to tae the final exams in
statistics and logic. The student was denied to take the exam in
the said subject so she stopped her studies.
The student filed for damages in the RTC for the damages
caused by the school. The RTC ruled in favor of the school due
to failiure to exhaust administrative remedies.
SC ruling:
There are 3 isssues tackled by the SC here:

1st: exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The action is purely for damages so the determination of the
actions is within the jurisdiction of RTC (not the CHED).
According to the SC ngano kinahanglan man mag exhaustion. Is
it an administrative remedy in the first place? What was she
asking for? She is not asking to be reinstated by the school
because at that time she was already enrolled in another
school. What she is asking for is damages, the power which the
CHED does not possess.
2nd: WON the award of damages is proper considering that
there is a contract between the parties, meaning the school has
enrollment contract with the student.
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code is applicable in this case.
So despite the presence of contract the enrollment contract
between the school and the student there can still be liability
for tort or quasi delict. Now contract issue, again the liability for
tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by
contract. An academic institution may be liable however even if
it has an existing contract with its students since the act that
violates the contract may also be tort (?), thats tortious. Thats
contrary to the law on human relations. Thats what the SC is
saying.
What was committed here? Tort or quasi delict? Tort because
there was an intentional act.
According to present jurisprudence academic freedom
encompasses the independence of academic institution to
determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught and
how it shall teach and who may be admitted to study. After
accepting them upon enrolment the school cannot renege on
its contractual obligation other than grounds that may be
known to and accepted by the students at the start of the
school year it is not therefore part of the undertaking of the
student upon enrolment to pay for the tickets. That is what the
SC is saying, Wala nay labot say requirement na atoang
gisabutan therefore the school here was made liable by the SC
and they are correct in saying that its torts. It is used to
describe the willful acts of the school teachers. So atleast in the
case of Regino v Pangasinan Colleges the SC described it
accurately.
3rd: The issue of academic freedom.
Loadmasters v Glodel
R&B Insurance issued many policy in favor of Columbia to
insure the shipments of cargo. Columbia engaged the services
of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargos and
Glodel engaged the services if loadmasters for the use of its
delivery trucks. The cargos were to be transported to
Columbias warehouses in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The
cargos arrived safely in Bulacan but one of the trucks to going

to Valenzuela did not arrive because it was hijacked.
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and

proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But
if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of
due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n
Was there an action for damages? Yes.

Can Loadmasters be held liable with Glodel when the former
was not in contractual privity with Columbia. Why is
Loadmasters sought to be liable here by Columbia as well? The
SC held that Loadmasters can be liable with Glodel. The SC
applied 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two
or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
What about Loadmasters claim that it was never privy to the
contract entered into by Glodel? The SC held that it may not
have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable
for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.
So it is not a fact that Loadmasters and Glodel common
carriers? Yes.
What is the standard of care required of common carriers?
Extra ordinary diligence.
Was that the standard of care that the SC applied here in
assessing the liability of Glodel and Loadmasters? The SC held
that Loadmasters did not exercise the required diligence. It
should be held liable for the damages because of its employees
who were instrumental for the hijacking of the cargos. So it
was actually an inside job.
What I am trying to drive at here is for Loadmasters that the
contractual privity is not necessarily a defense. What removes
that defense from claim is because of 2194, if you are both
responsible for a tort your liability is solidary. Contractual
privity, the fact that you never signed a contract with another
party does not necessarily mean that you can escape already
from liability. Now take note that in this case the SC actually
used the standard of extra ordinary diligence. It is the standard
of care because Glodel and Loadmasters are common carriers.
That will be proper in a culpa contractual but ultimately the SC
here awarded damages on the basis of culpa acquiliana.
Nothing wrong there, but just take note that even if it applies
to extra ordinary diligence which of course pertains to
common carriers pwede lang gihapon na nay tort liability.
Lets go to 2177. We already take care of this previously, but for
purposes of review, responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the penal code but the
plaintiff cannot recover twice under the same act or omission of
the defendant.
We also discussed 2178, the provisions of 1172 1174 are also
applicable to a quasi delict. We will be discussing 1172 later because
we are talking about fortuitous events.
For now lets discuss 2179 which is a very important provision.
What is the law trying to tell us here? That the defendant in a case
filed under 2176 can defend against the cause of action by stating
that:
If it is the plaintiffs negligence that was the cause of the loss

the defendant has the right to say that he is not liable because
dili niya sala.
If both of the parties are negligent, meaning the defendant is

negligent and the defendant is also negligent but it is merely
contributory and it is really the defendants act or omission
that is the cause of the injury what is the mandate upon the
court? The mandate is to mitigate the damages to be
recovered.
So what 2179 is actually telling us is nay defenses against

the imputation quasi delict. Of course the main defense there, a
defense of denial was that the defendant was not negligent, that
he exercised the proper care that is required under the
circumstances. So if the defendant is able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he exercised the required degree
of care he will not be held liable under 2176.
Another defense would be in the concept of damnum
absque injuria or damage without injury loss without wrong, In the
Philippine jurisdiction ams accurate na siya when you talk about
damage without legal injury. Let s just check a few examples that
we previously discussed on damage without injury. Briefly they
appeared in article 11 of the RPC (Self defense, defense of relative,
defense of stranger, state of necessity, fulfillment of a duty or
exercise of a right to office and obedience of lawful purpose). Now
under article 11, justifying circumstances, you undoubtedly injured
another person but the law considers this to be justified and
therefore despite damage being done to another person the
private complainant in a criminal case, the law still considers it not a
legal injury for which it will provide *inaudible*. Another example
would be an act which would otherwise be considered a crime is
not liable for damages as the civil aspect of it a crime if the
justifying circumstances are present, a persons act however
injurious it may be the victim or the victims family is justified it
could not be deemed to have violated any right or breach or
injury.
Another example par 4, Article 12, RPC Any person who,
while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it not civilly
liable for damages as well. So what are we trying to drive at here?
When you talk about damage under legal contemplation
specifically under the provisions of the law on quasi delicts, 2 things
must coincide:
1. There must be damage
2. That damages must be something that the

law considers to be legal injury that is

compensable. Kung dili sya compesable under
the law because it is not considered to be an
actionable legal injury wala kay mabuhat kung
ikaw ang biktima.
Marasigan was embarrassed. He filed a case against BPI Express

for suspending his credit card.
Another example under that is another instance

is under 429 of the Civil Code
BPI defended that Atty Marasigan was already blacklisted. It

intentionally did not encash Atty. Marasigans post dated check
in due time. (Take note that payment through a check is not
actually produce the effect of payment until and unless
encashed)
Article 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the

right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. (n)
Assume for example you are a land owner and there are
people that are about to establish an illegal structure. Do you have
the right to prevent? Yes under 429.
Although the best
manifestation of 429 is an owner under fencing his property that is
the best self defense against usurpers of the property but if the
situation if naa nay nag squat sa imong yuta and gaamition nimo
ang 429 to destroy what has been erected in your property that is
already violation of the law. Because even if you are the lawful
owner but the law tells you that you cannot use 429 in that
situation, You will be held liable for coercion which is a criminal
offense if you forcibly eject squaters. Now take note that not all
exercise of property rights is damnum absque injuria. A property
owner is limited by the 2 following legal prociples:
1. Article 19 of the Civil Code
2. Another one is the latin maxim sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas or use your own property in
such a way that it does not harm your
neighbors. (Sic Utere Principle), the principle
that we will discuss more about when we
discuss no nuissance.
I propose this formula, liability only arises if there is an
invasion of a right that corresponds with a breach of duty. Lets
assume that you have a duty to be a good neighbor, dili ka dapat
mag samok2 sa isig ka tawo. But if you do not invade a right,
nobody is offended, that is damnum absque injuria or if you
invaded a right but there is no breach of duty on your part only a
legal obligation to do so that is also damnum absque injuria. You
see a family member being assaulted and you come to defend and
beat the stranger. When a homicide case is filed against you, you
claim self defense, there is no breach of legal duty in lawful self
defense despite the fact that you killed somebody. That is the
principle of damnum absque injuria as far as I am concerned.
BPI Express Credit Card vs. CA
One of the clients of BPI here is atty. Marasigan. He has a credit
lineup to 300,000/ However he would always exceed his limit so
BPI Express ask him to deposit 15,000 otherwise his credit line
will be suspended. He deposited the said amount and assumed
that by depositing the said amount the suspension of his credit
card will e lifted. During a dinner atty. Marasigan used the credit
card, however the suspension was still effective. Atty.
The RTC ruled against BPI, holding that while it has a right to
suspend the defalting credit card, it abused the right.
Is this a damnum absque injuria? There was injury on the part of

atty.
Marasigan,
such
as
besmirched
reputation,
embarrassment and moral damages however there was no
injury in this part because atty. Marasigan failed to prove that
there was bad faith on the part of BPI, hence BPI did not
commit any injury in this case. The SC in this case distinguished
damages from injury. Injury is the illegal invasion oa a legal right
while damages os the loss or harm which results from the injury
ad damage are recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered, thus there can be damage without injury as in
the case here where BPI Express did not do anything that
constitutes illegal invasion of the legal right of atty Marasigan.
So to simplify so that everybody will determine whether there
is damnum absque injuria or not, was there an injury? Yes
because he as embarassed.
But did that injury coincide with the breach of duty on the part
of BPI? Or was it correct in acting so? Yes it was correct in
acting so in suspending the credit card because the payment
through check did not produce the effect of payment,
therefore you call that damnum absque injuria.
SC: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, is SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is DIRECTED to pay his outstanding
obligation with the petitioner in the amount of P14,439.41.
C. S. GILCHRIST vs. E. A. CUDDY ET AL., JOSE FERNANDEZ

ESPEJO and MARIANO ZALDARRIAGA
So the SC said here that there is damnum absque injuria, the
fact that they are exercising your rights or you are just trying to
compete does not necessarily mean that there is liability under
the law you can consider it damnum absque injuria, unless
according to the SC some superior right by contract or
otherwise is interfered with. So there was no malice according
to the SC beyond the desire to make a profit by exhibiting a film.
CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D.

ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T.
LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B. SALA v. RICARDO F.
ELIZAGAQUE

When you say non-proprietary membership what does it mean?

How is it differentiated from proprietary membership? So when
you day proprietary membership naa kay share sa Cebu
Country Club, kung non-proprietary meaning member ka
pwede ka mu avail sa facilities but you cannot claim any stock
or dividends.
So here Elizagaque had nonproprietary shares, he wanted to
have proprietary membership so he applied for such. However
his application was not approved. An application for
reconsideration was submitted to which Cebu Country Club did
not answer. After such another letter for reconsideration was
submitted but Cebu Country Club did not answer.
The rule here is you can be denied membership by majority vote
of one person. Such rule is by virtue an amendment and it was
not disclosed to Elizagaque. In fact the said amendment was
not printed in the certificate of ownership wherein the
guidelines are indicated.
Why is it not printed? According to the Country Club, it is due to
budget deficiency.
Elizagaque filed an action for damages.
Cebu Country Club is liable. The SC discussed that while the
Country club has the right under its articles of incorporation to
approve or disapprove applications for membership in the said
club, said right not be exercised arbitrarily. In this case indeed
the directors of he Country Club exercised undue prejudice to
Elizagaque. 1st of the sad circumstances is the non printing of
newly amended requirement for approval. 2 nd is when they
ignored the letters of reconsideration filed by Misa and
Eliagaque in this case. According to the SC the term used is he
was literally kept in the dark or groping in the dark as to the
status of his application and according to the SC while it is
inherent in any organization the right to reject anyone who
applies for membership and normally if you reject somebody
for membership it is damnum absque injuria, the same does not
apply if there is abuse of rights, kung imoha pud gi abuse ang
imong right is selecting membership. There cannot be damnum
absque injuria of there is abuse of rights the way it is state in
the law on human relations.
Another defense would be under 2179 when the plaintiffs own

negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover for damages. Remember that, that is a complete
defense. You might be confused as to the wording of 2179 na nay
mitigation of the damages, it shall lessen he damages to be
awarded thats what the provision is saying That only applies when
there is contributory negligence, not when the plaintiff himself that
is the cause of the loss or injury. Now we are all familiar with the
scientific law of cause and effect. Similar na diri. What we are trying
to say is that here ang cause n quasi delicts, the cause is the fault or
negligence and the effect is the damage or injury cause thereof.
Furthermore it is required that the negligence is the proximate
cause of the injury. Now very important for us to know the
meaning of proximate cause. Lets take note of this case of

Bataclan v Medina 102 P 101.
Bataclan v Medina 102 P 101

Its a case of rescuers making the case worse. Bataclan was one
of the passengers driven by Conrado and operated by Medina.
On its way to Pasay the front tire of the vehicle burst and it fell.
Now some passengers were able to escape but there were 4
who were left, one of them was Bataclan. Their cries for help
was heard in the neighborhood and there were 10 mean men
who came, one of them was carrying torch. As they approached
the bus it caught fire and the passengers died. So its the
rescuers actually caused the death. But the accident was not
caused by the rescuers. The fire was due to gasoline leak and
torch.
The heirs of Bataclan sough to claim damages from the Bus
Company, take note again that the death was not due to the
accident, he died because of the fore that was caused of the
torch of of one of the rescuers. According to the SC it defined
the proximate cause. (There is no substitute to this definition so
when you are asked what is proximate cause, this is the
definition, you are not allowed toyoure your own words.).
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
So unsa na siya? Unsa man ang proximate cause? Mao na siya
ang cause that interrupted by no other cause would be
sufficient to produce an injury. What is absent? An efficient
intervening cause. Now I always think of it as dominos. When
you flip one the expectation is all will fall, so domino effect.
Now you have the right to expect that when you flip the 1 st
domino it will fall to the extent to the extent that the last one
will fall. Thats proximate cause despite the fact that it is already
remote from the act that cause injury or the result the damages
is remote already but without you flipping the 1 st domino it will
not cause the last domino to fall.
So what would be an efficient intervening cause therefore? It is
one which destroys the causal connection between the
negligent act and injury and thereby negatives liability. It is also
known as pre-emptive cause which causes or breaks the
continuity of causal connection between the original act or
omission and the injury so that the former cannot be said to
have been the efficient cause of the act. Imagine the same

dominos and you flip the 1st so the expectation is the last one
will also fall. But what if someone pitik the 5 th domino what
will now cause the last domino to fall? Dili na katong pag pitik
nimo sa una na domino, its now the other person pitiking or
flipping the 5th domino. So its the simple illustration of what
constitutes proximate cause and efficient intervening cause.
But actually in legal practice unless its really clear that mao
gyud na siya ang proximate cause na wala jud efficient
intervening cause and sometimes its very hard to determine.
Example is RODRIGUEZA, ET AL. v. THE MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY
RODRIGUEZA, ET AL. v. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
The house of the plaintiff here was razed by fire emitted
because of the train of Manila Railroad Company. The fire
started from one house until it reached the plaintiffs house.
The defendant MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY contended that
the fire could not have spread to the house of the plaintiff
where it not for the wind which is connected to be the efficient
intervening cause. Dili man masunog ang ika napulo na balay
kung wla gi dala sa hangin ang kalayo gikan sa una nga balay. So
ang nay sala ana ang hangin. Thats the defense of MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY. According to them thats an efficient
intervening cause. According to the SC how did it rule here?
According to the SC, you cannot call it an efficient intervening
cause if it is already in operation at the time the negligent act
was committed. What was the negligent act? The failure to
ensure that the train will not emit fire when it runs. Ang wind
naa na ba at the time that you failed to repair? Yes naa man
hangin all the time. So the wind cannot be deemed to be an
efficient and intervening cause because it was already in
operation at the time of the negligence of the defendant. Even
if the wind was not in operation then it cannot be considered an
effective intervening cause because the wind did not break the
chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant
and the resulting damage.
Mckee v AIC
Kho was driving along the highway, he swerved his car to the
left and encroached upon the opposite lane. Nag counter flow
siya to avoid 2 children. His car was hit by a speeding truck
coming from the opposite direction, so Kho sued the driver. The
efficient intervening cause is the negligence of the defendant.
The plaintiff may have been negligent but the defendants
negligence pre empted the effect of negligence in the said case.
Although it may be said that Khos act was negligent and was
the initial act in the chain of events because clearly kung wala
siya ni swerve dili siya ma bangaan, it cannot be said that the
same cause the injuries and deaths because of the occurence of
the efficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver. The driver did not heed the warning to slow down
instead of swerving to his right which is the proper
precautionary measure under the given circumstances. So again
you go back to that mental *** of dominos. The 1 st domino can
be seen kato pag swerve ni Kho and here comes the truck that
is speeding, instead of slowing down or avoiding the swerving
vehicle, gi maintain nuon niya ang iyahang speed. Without

which the injury would not have ** that is proximate cause. And
efficient interving cause.
Take note the 1st cause is not necessarily the proximate cause, in
Bataclan the overspeeding of the Bus driver was the proximate
cause. In Mckee the 1s cause was not considered the proximate
cause, not that in Mckee the SC also applied the so called
emergency rule as as follows "one who suddenly finds himself
in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to
adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he
finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." So Kho
here, he was just driving in his own lane and suddenly nay 2 ka
bata, Gusto niya na I avoid, now at the time of na emergency
like that what is the best thing to do? The best thing probably is
to apply break rather that maintain your speed and swerve.
Pwede ingon ana nimo na I treat ang gina tawag nato na
emergency rule, you can think of alot of things if you are not in
emergency but if you are required to think instantaneously,
what ever comes 1st when your adrenaline kicks in thats what
you usually do. So the SC with knowledge or understanding of
human nature if you are placed in an emergency you might not
necessarily think clearly na when it is only upon reflection that
you can think clearly. If it is upon reflection dili di i na siya tama
ang imong gibuhat, *inaudible* that is the emergency rule,
unless you find yourself in an emergency situation, because
negligent ka, thats the only time you do not apply emergency
rule.
From FT: Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence.
BJDC Construction vs. Lanuso
Again it talks about proximate cause, nay us aka tao naga
motor2 lang padulong sa trabaho and there is this reblocking.
At the time he met the accident, wala siya nag helmet and he
was driving at a high speed, he did not take note of the fact
that despite the fact na adlaw2 niya gi agihan ang dalan wa siya
ka bantay na nay reblocking na nahitabo. The SC said you
cannot blame the construction company for making that kind
of interference. Because the deceased here was also negligent
Calalas vs. CA
This talks about an extension seat placed sa jeepney. The
jeepney was bumped at the left side causing an injury to the
person seated at the extension seat So the passenger here sued
the operator of the jeepney for breach of contract of carriage.
According to the operator, ang proximate kuno of the accident

is the negligence of the truck driver na nibangga sa jeepney

rather thatn the negligence of the jeepney itself and because of
that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier
would be to make the passenger the insurer of the safety of its
passenger.
The SC said, it immaterial if the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck is the negligence of the
truck driver, the doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only
in actions for quasi delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. So you dont apply this doctrine of proximate cause
when you talk about culpa contractual. You only apply it for
quasi delict. But the SC also found negligence, ngano mag
butang2 pa man ka ug extension seat.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the
duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers. And the fact that the
victim was made to sit on an extension seat means that it did
not observe extraordinary diligence.
Contributory negligence once again in the case of 2nd sentence of
2179, if negligence was only contributory the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury meaning the defendants lack of due
care the plaintiff may recover the damages but the court shall
mitigate the damages to be awarded. Take note that that is a new
provision in the Civil Code. What does this mean, the fact that this
is a new provision? It means that prior to the enactment of the
new civil code in 1950, wala tay rule relating to contributory
negligence, at least not one that appears to codally. Wala tay
statutory or codal provision relating to contributory negligence. In
other words ang atong rule before comes from common law
tradition, decisions imported to the Philippine jurisdiction and
what is that rule? The rule before was that contributory
negligence was an absolute bar to recovery. Let us suppose that
you were riding motor vehicle without wearing helmet that is
already negligent. There is this truck driver who was texting while
driving and swerving left and right and bumps the motor vehicle.
Both are negligent but of them is more negligent. According to
the law in force before, the judicial decisions relating to the
matter, that mere or slight contributory negligence is enough to
bar and claim for recovery of damages. Thats how harsh our
doctrine on contributory negligence. But because of the harshness
of that rule, the framers of the civil code decided to make it more
equitable by providing for a rule relating to contributory
negligence. It is only when the plaintiffs own negligence is the
proximate cause of his loss that is an absolute bar to recovery.
When there is no need to compare negligence because clearly only
one party is negligent despite the fact that mao na siya mismo ang
plaintiff dili jud sya ka recover, that is when it is absolute bar to
recovery. But when negligence is only contributory the courts are
simply mandate to mitigate the damages to be recovered. Now
take note contributory negligence under 2179 is a mere partial
defense as courts are mandated to merely mandated to mitigate
the damages, the defendant because of his lack of due care is still
the immediate and proximate cause of injury is still ultimately
liable with a modification that his liability to indemnify plaintiff is
*inaudible*.
JANUARY 22, 2016

AAGOPO
Were already in that portion of Torts and Damages which allows us
to examine the types of defenses you might raise against an
imputation that you committed something that would amount to a
quasi-delict. So defenses na ta. I think weve discussed quite a lot of
defenses already. So right now, we will continue that. And Im
assuming that you have read the cases as well.
(A new list of cases is already provided for you for use during the next
meeting.)
We will begin discussing Article 2180 tonight but I will handle the
cases myself.
Just take note of the meaning of the term PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Weve discussed the case of Bataclan v Medina. Its a case of a
rescue that made things worse for the victims. And the Supreme
Court defined Proximate Cause as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.'
And then, what is EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE?
It is one which destroys the causal connection between the
negligent act and injury, and thereby negatives liability. It is also
known as preemptive cause which breaks the continuity and causal
connection between the original negligent act or omission and the
injury so that the former can be said to have been the efficient
cause of the damage.
We have discussed Rodrigueza v Manila Railroad where the
defendant contended that the wind, which actually spread the fire
to the other houses, can be considered an efficient intervening
cause. The Supreme Court ruled that if the cause is already in
operation, then dili na siya pwede ma-treat as an efficient
intervening cause.
Take note that the first cause may not necessarily be the
proximate cause. You really have to consider, given the facts of a
particular case, that mao gyud sya ang nag-cause that there is no
efficient intervening cause. It is therefore quite possible that the
cause, although later in time, compared to the first cause, can be
considered as the proximate cause.
Take note of the EMERGENCY RULE. We have already discussed
this. Also the case BGC Construction v Lalungsod . This is the case
na nag-motor. So you know that case already.
Calalas is the extension seat case.
Now lets go to Article 2179 on Contributory Negligence.
Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only

contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the

injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Okay, lets discuss that first sentence first.
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
It looks at a situation where it is quite possible that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were negligent. But, in the ultimate
analysis, it is the negligence of the plaintiff that causes the injury.
And therefore, kay tungod siya ang sad-an, there could not be any
claim for damages, despite the fact that the defendant might have
contributed.
A different rule is stated in the later part of this provision. Which
provides, that But if his negligence (meaning the plaintiffs
negligence) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, (take note of the last phrase here:) but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Its therefore a mandate to the courts of justice to apportion as
much as it could damages (Note: not sure if damages, naay niubo).
And in the cases that I assigned to you, there are cases there where
the Supreme Court made an apportionment. So we will go to those
cases later on.
Take note that this is an entirely new provision in the Civil Code.
Which means that prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code, we
did not have this rule in our statute books. Rather, what we used
would be the common law rule that contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, no matter how slight, would be a bar to
his recovery for damages. Therefore, contributory negligence, prior
to Article 2179, very harsh sya. It is an absolute bar to recovery.
Right now, our present rule provides that if the negligence of the
plaintiff was the proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. If his negligence was merely contributory, theres a mere
mitigation of damages.
Take note that under Article 2179, contributory negligence is not a
complete defense. It is a mere partial defense, as the mandate
upon the courts is simply to mitigate the damages to be awarded to
the plaintiff. The defendant, because of his lack of due care, is still
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury, is still ultimately
liable with the modification that his liability to indemnify the
plaintiff is lessened.
I think Article 2179 to that extent is quite self-explanatory. You just
have to look at how contributory negligence affects the liability of
the actor. If it contributory lang gyud meaning, it is still not the
proximate cause of the loss or injury then, only a mitigation of
damages will be ruled by the court. But if it is the proximate cause
of the loss, even if you contend that there is also negligence on the
part of the other party, then you cannot recover damages.
Lets discuss this case of Jarco Marketing Corporation v CA.
Recit: Reyes
Q: So what happened in this case?

A: The mother here, Criselda, went to the counter with her
daughter. Thereafter, when the mother was about to pay through
her credit card, she saw that the counter already fell on her
daughter. As a consequence, her daughter died.
What Criselda did was to file an action for damages against Jarco
Marketing, the owner of the mall.
The trial court here ruled against the supervisor and Jarco
Marketing, but held that there was a contributory negligence on
the part of the daughter. Because what the daughter did was climb
up the counter causing it to fall on her, and leading to her death.
Thereafter, the CA reversed the decision on the ground that there
was a presumption on the part of the child, who was then only
seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, that she was
absolutely incapable of [contributory] negligence.
The issue in this case is whether or not the death of the child was
accidental or attributable to negligence. Second is in case of a
finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private
respondents for maintaining a defective counter, or to the mother
and the child for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while
inside the store premises.
Q: So in other words, what Jarco Marketing is saying is, alright,
assuming that we are liable, is it not a fact that there is also a
contributory negligence on the part of the victim in this case? Now,
what was the ruling of the Supreme Court regarding that issue on
Contributory Negligence?
A: Regarding the issue on contributory negligence, the SC said that
the rule therefore is that a child under nine (9) years of age must
be conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence.
Q: Whats the basis of the SC in ruling that?
A: The basis here is the conclusive presumption in favor of children
below 9 years old that they are incapable of contributory
negligence.
Q: Yeah, thats the ruling the presumption. But where does that
presumption come from? What is the basis of the presumption. Can
you not draw from elsewhere in trying to establish how the
conclusive presumption came to be?
By the way, what is the meaning of a conclusive presumption?
A: A Conclusive Presumption is not rebuttable.
A conclusive presumption, for the benefit of all who were not able
to take Evidence, is one that is one that is already equivalent to
truth. When a conclusive presumption applies, you cannot
introduce anything else in court that seems to contradict the
premise of the conclusive presumption.
And so when the law says that a child below 9 years of age is
conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence,
it means that you cannot prove otherwise that the child was

negligent in what she was doing.
presumption.
Q: So where does that come from? Because there is no law saying

that the laws on Evidence does not say that; the Family Code does
not say that.
A: It comes from the rule under the Revised Penal Code diba,
under the Revised Penal Code, under exempting circumstances,
kung minor ang offender, it does not necessarily mean that the
child is exempt. It would depend on the age.
Please remember that, especially sa mga wala pa nag-Evidence.
If you are below 9 years of age that is considered to be an age of

complete criminal irresponsibility. Meaning, regardless of what you
do, your actions, you are still exempt, because the law conclusively
presumes you to be incapable of discernment. Maskig unsa pa na kabright nang bataa na, di gyud na muingon ang balaod na gituyo na
niya iyang gibuhat. Thats what the law is saying here. So it comes
from Criminal Law; we are just borrowing now.
Q: Now, let me test your understanding. Clearly, that conclusive
presumption comes from Criminal Law, borrowing from the
principle that a child below 9 years of age is conclusively presumed
to be incapable of discernment. But why is it that we are now
applying this to Article 2176 cases?
A: This presumption also applies to quasi-delict cases, sir, because
since it applies to criminal cases, it might as well apply to a lesser
crime which is a quasi-delict.
Q: So meaning to say, in the absence of any other explanation,
because a civil case is, you know, a little bit beneath a criminal case,
i-apply nalang nato. Thats what youre saying?
A: Yes, sir.
Okay, sit down. Actually, its as easy as looking at what is required
in making an implication of liability in quasi-delicts: its negligence.
What is negligence? Failure to exercise the proper diligence
required under the circumstances, which means that it would
require discernment! Unsaon nimo pag sabot kung unsa ang
standard of care to be applied or to be exercised under a particular
situation, when in fact, in the first place, you are incapable of
understanding it. You do not discern the duty of care.
Thats how you should understand it because its so easy to just say
that, you know, because that is applicable under the Revised Penal
Code it stands to reason that the same presumption should also
apply in mere quasi-delict cases. You need to look at how the law
evolves. Because the same need of discernment is present in quasidelict cases in determining the proper standards of care, in
determing what degree of diligence should be observed under the
circumstances. Diba? Unsa mana sya? That is the degree of care
required by the nature of the obligation in response with the
circumstances of the person, the time and the place. A child will not
be able to appreciate that. And therefore, thats the reason why we
apply it to quasi-delict cases.
So thats something that is both substantive and remedial in
nature. It is substantive in the sense that it is the law on the matter.
It is remedial in the sense that you are guided accordingly in a
particular case that where a child is imputed to have been negligent
or to have been contributorily negligent dili ka pwede
mupresent ug any proof to the contrary. That is a conclusive
Take note that the plaintiffs contributory negligence is duly

proven, the matter of whether or not to mitigate the damages is
not a matter of discretion. The courts are absolutely required to
lessen the damages to be awarded.
The extent of the mitigation is, however, within the sound
discretion of the court with particular reference to the degree of
negligence exhibited by the plaintiff.
Take note that when the enactment is Civil Code, particularly
including the provisions of Article 2179, it operates as a statutory
rejection of the rules on contributory negligence in common law.
Ibalik lang nako ha? Unsa manang contributory negligence in
common law? Its an absolute bar to recovery. Masking gamay ra
kaayo imong pagka danghag, pero ang sad-an gyud kay ang
defendant, thats only contributory. Lets say for example,
naglakaw-lakaw lang ko. Naga-text ko habang nagalakaw. And then
suddenly, here comes this car that bumps me. Ang driver kay
nakainom. Hubog. And he is violating traffic rules and regulations.
Just because nag-text ko habang nagalakaw, which by itself is not
necessarily negligent but if the court finds that it is contributory
negligence, I cannot recover anything anymore. The law, therefore,
on that regard was quite harsh, when we were following common
law rule on contributory negligence.
Kasabot ba ta unsa ang difference between common law and civil
law? First year man ni!
Common law, meaning it is a law that evolves. Its not law that is
taken from the statute books. Rather, it is law that evolves out of
cases decided by tribunals. Ang common law tradition, unsa man
ang products ana? You have Great Britain. Diha nagsugod ang
atuang common law. And then we have the United States of
America, which started as a common law country. Although, right
now, there are states in the union, especially those who have been
influenced by the Spanish Civil Code, na Civil law.
What is Civil law? A Civil law jurisdiction is one which stems from
Roman law. The Roman law was adopted by France, and then later
on by Spain, and then everywhere else which Spain colonized, or
France colonized, became Civil law countries such as the
Philippines. Thats the reason why we have the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Because rules that normally would be attributed to the
Spanish Civil Code were adopted in the Philippines, only with
modifications.
Okay, remember: this is an entirely new provision. Kaniadto wala
pay rules relating to contributory negligence. Except that, if you
followed before, at the instance probably of the Americans, the
common law rule of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery.
Lets go to Phoenix Construction v IAC.
Recit: Logramante

Q: What happened in the case of Phoenix v IAC?

A: In the early morning of November 15, 1975, while Dionisio was
driving on his way home - he was from a dinner meeting with his
boss, and he admitted that he took a shot or two of liquor.
Q: So did I hear you right? That he was driving home pero nakainom
sya?
A: Yes, sir. During the dinner meeting that he earlier attended.
Q: So is that negligence? Would you drink and drive?
A: I dont drink, sir. (Crowd goes wild, char. Spotlight kay Atty E: I
dont drink as well, not anymore. Ive been sober for 2 years. So
thats good for you. Dont drink, not even water.)
Q: Anyway, so he was drinking? Dont you think that is a ___
behavior?
A: In my opinion, sir, yes.
Q: Okay, so what happened? He was on his way home
A: When He passed the interaction of General Lacuna and General
Santos St. in Makati, sir, his headlight suddenly failed. When he
tried to switch it on, he then found that he was already 2 meters
away from the truck, sir, which was parked askew.
Q: Was there any early warning device?
A: None, sir. There was no warning devices that could have warned
him as to the parked truck, sir.
Q: So what did he do when he saw that there was a truck that was
parked askew the road he was traversing?
A: The car driven by Dionisio, sir, smashed into the parked dump
truck, sir. So he commenced an action for damages, claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of the accident was the badly parked
dump truck, sir.
Q: So it reached the SC? And I would assume that because it was
Phoenix Construction here that was filing the case before the SC,
that it lost?
A: Yes, sir. It was the contention of Phoenix, sir, that the truck was
in a passive and static condition and then that it was Dionisios
negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident, sir.
Q: So how did the SC dispense with that issue?
A: The SC ruled in this case that Dionisios negligence was only
contributory and that the immediate and the proximate cause of
the accident or the injury was the drivers lack of due care, sir, it
having been established that there was no warning sign that could
have warned Dionisio of the parked truck.
Q: But Dionisio here was, you know, lets say, tipsy, probably. He had
something to drink, right? And yet the SC still made a finding that it
was the fault of the truck for not being properly parked?
A: Yes, sir. The SC ruled that the truck drivers negligence was the
indispensable and efficient cause, and that Dionisios negligence
was not an of independent and overpowering nature as to cut the
chain of events.
Q: In other words, if the dump trucked were parked properly, no
accident would have happened. Regardless of unsa man kahubog
ning si Dionisio. Am I correct in saying that?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay, now whats a passive static condition?
A: The SC here had the occasion of discussing the Cause and the
Condition test, sir. The SC said that if the defendant has created a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
defendant is not liable.
Q: Okay you remember us talking about the case of Republic v Luzon
Stevedoring? How would you differentiate this case with that case.
A: In Luzon Stevedoring, the doctrine that was enunciated there
was the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.
Q: Yes, but factually. In this case, we have a truck that is clearly not
moving. And then there is a car that bumped it. Stationary and
moving. Republic v Stevedoring, the same thing: something thats
not moving, and then something thats moving.
A: In this case, sir, I think the condition that was created by the
dump truck when it was parked askew caused the injury, sir.
Q: Is it usual for a motorist, for example, to see a vehicle parked
askew, at a highway, for example?
A: No, sir.
Q: But would it be normal, lets say, for example, a seafarer who
operates a motorboat to see, for example, bridges?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Thats the difference, factually. Now, how do you find the case of
Phoenix Construction v IAC? Is it a fair judgment?
A: In my opinion, sir, I dont believe that the liability should
absolutely fall on the dump truck, sir, with Phoenix.
Q: Did the SC not apportion damages in this case?
A: It apportioned it to 20-80%, sir.
Uhuh. So it is not a harsh decision in the sense that it did not totally
find the driver to be without fault. Meaning, naa man pud kay sala.
So you should shoulder a portion of the damages. But most of the
damages should be shouldered of Phoenix Construction. Thats
what the SC is saying. Its fair in that sense. Because you cannot
forget the fact that that guy was driving while nakainom sya. Thats
the first question that I asked you: is it right for somebody to drink
and then drive? Masking unsa pa na ka-gamay it is, to my mind,
negligent.
So the SC here, allocated the responsibility in a ration of 20-80. 20%
percent shall be borne by the plaintiff. Only the balance of 80% is to
be paid the petitioners solidarily. Thats a fair case.
But what actually impels me every year to discuss this case of
Phoenix is the other argument made here by Phoenix Construction,
and that is that Dionisio, the driver, had the last clear chance of
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio,
having failed to pay that last clear chance must bear his own
injuries.
Now, kana bang last clear chance na term, is that the first time
youre hearing about it? Or have you not read about it when you
were in first year, in Obligations and Contracts? Because I do

remember my professor in Obligations and Contracts before

discussing this case of Picart v Smith.
sought by, another if the latter, who had the last clear chance,
could have avoided impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
Recit: Agantal
Q: What happened in the case of Picart v Smith?
A: The plaintiff was riding on a pony. And then he crossed the
bridge. And then the defendant was riding his automobile.
Defendant approached the foot bridge and saw the plaintiff on the
wrong side of the lane. He (inaudible), thinking that the driver of
the pony will go to the other lane. Upon approaching at 10-20 miles
per hour, he startled the house and the horse when to his lane. As a
result, he hit the horse resulting to its death.
The issue in this case is WON the defendant is liablee for damages.
The Court here said that YES.
Firstly, the person riding on the pony was negligent because, in the
first place, he was on the wrong side of the road. So the court said
that he was negligent. But, the defendant should have been aware
that this horse would be startled by some - for example,
automobiles because this is foreign to them. When he
approached the horse, he should have at least stopped the car or
slowed it down.
Q: So 10 kph imong speed, I think the better thing to do would have
been to stop.
A: Yes, sir. Instead, he assumed that the horse would go to the
other side of the lane. But what happened was the other way
around.
Q: So what is this doctrine of last clear chance that became very
famous because of Picart v Smith? Or is it the other way around: did
the case of Picart v Smith become famous because of this doctrine
[of last clear chance]?
A: In this case, although the person riding the pony was negligent,
the defendant here had the last clear chance of avoiding the
incident, since he was riding an automobile only him had the
ability to evade the incident but he instead hit the horse
negligently. (end of recit)
What he said was correct. The law is that the person who has the
last clear chance of avoiding impending harm, and fails to do so, is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
And here, the Supreme Court described the so-called doctrine of
last clear chance, also known as the doctrine of supervening
negligence or the doctrine of (inaudible). It is the event that where
both parties are negligent, but the negligent of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the
incident, the one who has the last clear opportunity to avoid
impending harm, and failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences thereof.
Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages
for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against the liability
Now, it looks at the comparative negligence of both parties both

the defendant and the plaintiff; both the actor and the victim.
Ginatan-aw karon, under the doctrine of last clear chance kung
kinsa ang naay ulahi nga higayon nga mulikay. Kung wala ka milikay,
unya ikaw ang naay last chance na mulikay, then you are liable
without looking at the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
Thats as simple as I could tell you about the doctrine of last clear
chance. But my advice to you would be, if you can, try to memorize
how the Supreme Court characterizes this doctrine of last clear
chance from the case of Picart v Smith. Because the SC, if you saw
in all the cases that I assigned to you, assuming that youve read
them, always harkens back to the case of Picart v Smith in trying to
describe what is the doctrine of last clear chance. So try to
memorize it, there is no other substitute to explaining it than
knowing how the SC has explained it in this case.
Its quite possible that it will be asked in the form of a problem.
Alright? Whether it is applicable or not. And how will you answer?
How will you address that type of problem in the Bar examination?
By answering according to the language of the SC. Or it can be a
simple question: what is the doctrine of last clear chance? And then
youre supposed to define it, or describe it. Please take my advice:
try to memorize that.
Now, take note: remember again what we discussed relating to
contributory negligence. The rule prior to Article 2179 of the Civil
Code - meaning before 1950 - was that contributory negligence is an
absolute bar to recovery. Despite the fact that imohang negligence,
lets say, 1% lang 99% is actually caused by the defendant. You are
not allowed to recover. Diba, thats very harsh! Napiang ka nalang,
naputlan nalang kag tiil, pero tungod kay naa kay gamay nga
pagkadanghag you are not allowed to recover from the defendant
who is clearly very negligent.
And so when the SC realized that our rule prior to the Civil Code
was very harsh, we need to mitigate this harshness. And so, we
imported as well, into our jurisdiction, by virtue of Picart v Smith,
kining doctrine of last clear chance which is to mitigate the
harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. And
therefore, the doctrine of last clear chance is present only in our
jurisprudence books in the Philippine legal system. Because before,
ang atong rule on contributory negligence was very harsh. Without
that rule on contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery,
there would not be any need to import and apply in our jurisdiction
the doctrine of last clear chance.
So its cause and effect. The cause is the harshness of the law.
Effect: we need to mitigate it. How to mitigate? Bring in the
doctrine of last clear chance.
But is it not a fact that in the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950,
and the adoption formally of the Article 2179 or the rule on
contributory negligence not being an absolute bar to recovery,
wouldnt that also operate as a rejection of any other corollary rule
that maybe appended to the former doctrine of contributory

negligence? Dili ba na mag-stand to reason that if our rule on

contributory negligence is not an absolute bar to recovery, na ang
last clear chance should also be not applied in the Philippine
jurisdiction? Theres no use for it! Look at how this is treated
internationally, this last clear chance. Many states have already
abandoned the doctrine of last clear chance kay ang ilaha mang rule
on contributory negligence, dili man absolute bar. Okay? Then there
should have been no more cases decided using the doctrine of last
clear chance after almost 39 years. Rejected na eh, ang contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery.
But in the case of Phoenix v IAC, although this is just a Division case
its one of the treaties-like rulings of the SC. Just look at how the
SC dealt with the passive static condition issue. Taas kaayo iyang
kuan its very encyclopedic in its approach to explaining that!
And with regard to the doctrine of last clear chance on whether
or not it is applicable, when it was invoked by Phoenix v IAC to
Picart v Smith SC said the last clear chance doctrine of common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart v Smith. But it is a
matter of debate as to whether, or to what extent, it has found its
way to the Civil Code of the Philippines. By historical function, that
doctrine in common law was to mitigate the harshness of another
common law or doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence.
The common law rule on contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all where plaintiff was also negligent even if the
plaintiffs negligence was relatively minor as compared to the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law
notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant the recovery
to a plaintiff who had also been negligent, provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoide the casualty and
failing to do so. Accordingly, the SC said, it is difficult to see what
role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as a bar to an absolute recovery by the plaintiff has
itself been rejected as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
So to my mind, the SC here in Phoenix is already saying that we
should not apply this anymore! We should not apply this because
the reason for applicability has already ceased as early as August of
1950. And so, I was satisfied upon reading the case of Phoenix v
IAC. I learned later on that it was repeated almost verbatim in the
case of Tiu v Arisgado [which I will not be asking you for recitation].
What Im saying is it is good doctrine. It stands to reason, it is
logical, it is legal not to apply the doctrine of last clear chance
anymore.
Further, in the case of Phoenix v IAC, naa bay general concept of
last clear chance from common law that can still apply in a civil law
jurisdiction such as ours? The SC said, NO, we dont believe so.
Under Article 2179, the task of the court, in technical terms, is to
determine whose negligence the plaintiffs or the defendants
was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not
simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology and physics, as
the petitioners seemed to imply.
And so in the case of Phoenix, it rejected the contention na ang
driver had the last clear chance of avoiding injury. So, with this case
of Phoenix v IAC, it settled that the last clear chance doctrine is no

longer applicable in our jurisdiction. No. Why? Because despite that
ruling in 1989, it seems like its ruling in the case of Phoenix became
invisible to the SC itself because soon after, in the case of Glan
Peoples Lumber v NLRC , a 1989 case as well, the SC still applied
the doctrine of last clear chance. I dont know why! Gi-apply lang
gihapon niya despite a very recent ruling in Phoenix that it is not
applicable, its no longer proper to apply it in our jurisdiction. Mao
nang giingon in the case of Phoenix. And in the case of Pantranco v
Paeza, same thing! Also a 1989 case. SC once again applied the
doctrine of last clear chance. And several cases that succeeded.
But in the case of PBC v CA, a 1997 case, the SC even went further
by applying the doctrine of last clear chance, seemingly oblivious to
the doctrines enunciated in Phoenix v IAC, to a non-accident case.
The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable at common law only
where there is collision, where there are physical injuries! But what
did the SC do? It applied it to a banking case! For whatever reason
na niabot sa iyang utok!
And then, the SC in 2004 went back to its ruling in Phoenix v IAC in
Tiu v Arisgado where the SC ruled again in Division that we have
already rejected this doctrine as early as the 1980s in the case of
Phoenix.
But again, in the case of PNR v SOMETHING, the SC applied this
doctrine.
Lapanday v Angala, which is a Davao City case, once again the SC
applied the doctrine.
And then here comes the case of Solidbank v Sps. Tan, April 2007,
where the SC itself understood that the doctrine of last clear
chance is actually used in transportation cases involving common
carriers. Mao gyud nang gisugdan niya! It may also be applied,
according to the Supreme Court, in banking transaction where the
bank may be adjudged responsible for the encashment of a forged
check. There it enunciated that the degree of diligence required of
banks, which is more than that of a good father of a family, in
keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care in
handling clients.
Its a situation where, if you are applying the doctrine of last clear
chance, negligence is (inaudible). In other words, the bank and its
depositor or some other person may have been negligent in
dealing with the fiduciary functions given to it by law in handling
the accounts of its depositors. So mao na sya ang factual na
backdrop in cases where you have to apply the doctrine of last
clear chance in non-accident cases, especially in banking cases.
The most recent there would be the case of Allied Bank v BPI.
*Recit: Salazar
FACTS: In this case, sir, in 2002, a check in the amount of P1M was
issued, payable to MMIG (?) This check was presented for deposit.
The respondent bank (BPI) in this case cleared the check. So after
the clearing, petitioner bank (Allied) then honored the check. So
the amount of P1M was transferred to MMIG*. This check was
brought from the account of Mr. Silva. This check was a postdated

check. So after a month, Mr. Silva checked discovered that he has a

debt in his bank account. So he filed a complaint.
here?
A: 60-40.
Q: So what are you saying, he did not authorize the P1M check?
A: Yes, sir. After he discovered that he has a debt of P1M, he filed a
complaint against the ALLIED.
Now, remember the previous case that we discussed. 20-80

[Phoenix Construction v IAC] Karon 60-40. So we really dont know,
there is no mathematical formula. If the SC feels that you know,
you are only 10% liable, and therefore 10% of the damages will be
shouldered by you. And the other party will shoulder 90%. It all
depends on the facts of the case, how the SC apportions liability.
Q: What was the defense of Allied Bank here?

A: Allied Bank said that BPI should shoulder the loss because BPI
was negligent in clearing the check.
Q: What is this check diay? Why was there a P1M check that
apparently the account holder had no knowledge of? Nganong
murag wala may alam ang account holder nga ni-issue diay syag
cheke nga P1M?
A: In this case, sir, there was a forgery. So now BPI answered that
ALLIED should bear the loss because it accepted a check which was
postdated. From that moment, sir, there was a pasa-pasa ang
check, sir (kwela si Dem lol).
Atty. E: So it should not have been cleared. That is the contention. It
should not have been cleared without following the proper
procedure in clearing, which would have discovered that the check
was fraudulently issued.
Kinsay nagtrabahog bangko diri? (asks Tin Bonifacio) If you encash
checks of big amounts, what do you do? (inaudible answer) Okay,
naay approval. And then? More than a hundred thousand you need
to call.
What theyre saying here is, you shouldnt have cleared it! You
should have exercised precautionary measures to determine
whether or not gi-issue ba gyud ni sa account-holder.
Q: So how did the SC rule here? But limit your discussion to the
doctrine of last clear chance.
A: In this case the SC ruled that the two banks are negligent, sir. The
SC said that BPI could have returned the check and the check
should have been dishonored. So BPI had the last clear chance.
(end of recit)
So here, duha ka bangko nag-away. Duh aka bangko ang nagatudluanay nga kini imong sala. Thats what theyre saying. So the SC
said that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of
the check was the negligence of BPI, who cleared a postdated
check and sent it to the PCHC clearing facility without observing its
own validation procedure.
Notwithstanding, however, the antecedent negligence of Allied
Bank in accepting the postdated check for deposit, it can seek
reimbursement from BPI the amount credited to the payees
account. Then the SC harkened back to its ruling in the 1997 case of
PBC v CA, where the SC ruled that the bank is liable under the
doctrine of last clear chance since it had, thru its teller, the last
opportunity to avert the injury suffered by its client simply by
faithfully observing its own validation procedure. It nevertheless
ruled that the plaintiff depositor must share in the loss on account
of its contributory negligence.
Q: One last question, Mr. Salazar. How did the SC apportion liability
Although daghan pa kog nakita na mga kaso where it is 60-40. What

is 60-40? Meaning, it could go either way. 40% is not a small
amount, when youre talking about millions.
Now, notwithstanding the ruling of the court in Allied, Solidbank, or
this case of PBC v CA which is the first case decided which
applies the doctrine of last clear chance in banking cases. Para
saakua, its not proper. Being a theorist, its not proper. You dont
apply it to commerce! You apply it to collision cases! Accidents!
Thats how you apply it. And so, therefore, in this case of PBC, the
SC not only forgot its ruling in Phoenix; it also forgot why the
doctrine of last clear chance applies, and in what cases it should
apply to.
Now, I always tell my students that practically nothing in the PH is a
Filipino invention including law. Sa mga studyante nako before,
you always hear me complain about the fact that we are not very
original here. Name a law that is original ng Pilipinas. Something
that is so monumental that you can be proud that in the Philippines
we have this law! Name one!
Some students would say that Ah, sir! The rules on environmental
procedure where you have the Writ of Kalikasan, the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus. And I always tell my students, youre
wrong! Why? What is this Writ of Continuing Mandamus? Where
do you discuss this? Envi law or Civil Procedure? Wherever you
discuss it! Anyway, do you know that this Continuing Writ of
Mandamus is not a Filipino initiative? Its not! Its taken from India
of all places! India! The Writ of Continuing Mandamus!
What about this Writ of Kalikasan? It seems like a Filipino invention
but its not! Unsa maning Writ of Kalikasan? It implements the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in a court
(inaudible). Where did we get that? Kanang intergenerational
responsibility? From the case of Oposa v Factoran in Political Law!
But even that case of Oposa v Factoran is borrowed from
International Law precedence! One International Law precedent
that I read is the case of (inaudible) : cross-boundary environmental
issues. Its not a Filipino invention! Of course not!
Judicial Affidavits no! Labaw nang dili!
But our treatment of the doctrine of last clear chance seems to be
indigenous to Filipinos! Lahi man atong treatment! Gina-expand pa
nato! But thats not necessarily a bad thing. Assume, for the sake of
argument, that I file a case in the SC just so it would reject Phoenix
or affirm it, Im sure that the SC is just going to say that. The case of
Phoenix, and the later case of Arisgado [Editors Note: rejecting
application of the doctrine] are cases decided in Division. However,
the case of Picart v Smith [Editors Note: applying the doctirn e], for

example, is an En Banc case! And you cannot overturn doctrine that

is laid down in an En Banc case! Ana lang ang tubag! But it still does
not answer the question of kinahanglan pa ba nato ug doctrine of
last clear chance?
There are no cases on last clear chance as of 2015 so I cannot
update with you on that regard. But in thecases decided by the SC
in 2013 or I think in 2014, as well it still applies the doctrine of
last clear chance.
I have written extensively about it; Ive asked my students to write
extensively about it. Because I cannot understand why! Dira
nagsugod akong practice that every year, for Torts and Damages, I
always ask my students to write a paper. Will I make you write a
peper? Why not! Thats one examination that you will clearly pass!
(Sir chikkas about his Evidence class, which I shall not include here,
because only warm, fuzzy feelings are allowed.)
So, again, 60-40 ang apportionment sa SC in this case which, to
my mind, is a correct apportionment based on the facts.
PRESCRIPTION
Another defense would be the defense of prescription.
The question simply is: What is the prescriptive period for
filing an action based on Quasi-Delicts?
In Article 1146, if it is upon a quasi-delict, 4 years.
(1)
(2)
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four

years:
Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
Upon a quasi-delict;
However, when the action arises from or out of any act,
activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law
including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
(As amended by PD No. 1755, Dec. 24, 1980.)
4 years lang gyud na sya. And therefore, if a case for quasi-delict

filed against you, and ni-lapas na syag 4 years from the time of the
accident, then you can of course file a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that it has already
exceeded the Statute of Limitations, or that it has already
prescribed. So that is a complete defense.
unsa bay sources of rights? Daghan! Contract, Law, Quasi-Contract

[delict, quasi-delict] Remember, that for example, when your
right that is violated is based on a contract, you have to determine
unsang klaseng contract na sya; if it is a written contract, or if it is an
oral contract:
If it is a written contract, it is 10 years;

if it is an oral contract, its 6 years
If I remember correctly my prescription.

Is there an exception na ang contract can be ___ despite the lapse
of 10 or 6 years? If the contract is tainted with fraud, or it is void,
because the defense of fraud or the void nature of a contract does
not prescribe. Imprescriptible.
So thats the difference. If its a right that is based on a contract,
dili 4 years ang prescription. If its a right based on quasi-delict, its
not considered as an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. So how
distinguish between number 1 and 2?
In Valencia v Cebu Portland Cement Corporation, the plaintiff here
was separated from employment for allegedly unjustifiable causes.
The SC said that the action is one for injury to the rights of the
plaintiff. So mao lang ni sya ang only example that I saw, na nagaingon nga injury na sya to the rights of the plaintiff.
But if you look at it, it was decided in 1959, remember that later on,
we actually contributed the Labor Code of the PH where the same
factual antecedents would no longer be considered simply an injury
to the rights of the plaintiff, but it becomes illegal termination or
dismissal. So it will now be the Labor Code that will be applicable
beginning 1974. And during that time, labor complaints were
cognizable by the judiciary. Its just that gibalhin na karon sa Labor
Arbiter. So its no longer the Civil Code that applies; its the Labor
Code that applies.
So, under the Labor Code, the act complained of in Valencia is
already cognizable as illegal dismissal. So unsa ang required
prescriptive period? Thats the question.
Kinsay under diri kay Father Nazareno, Labor Standards. Walay
mutug-an nga under kay Father Nazareno? Its a mark of honor!
(fanboys over Father Gus)
Question: how do you now distinguish between Number 1 in Article

1146 upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff which prescribes in
4 years AND upon a quasi-delict which also prescribes in 4 years?
I always remember Father Nazareno telling you one thing: why do

you think that illegal dismissal is actionable? Why does the law
make a big fuss about the fact that you should follow both
substantive and procedural due process in termination cases? Why?
Because of the due process clause of the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. And according to Father
Nazareno, the right of a person to his labor is a property right! So
it cannot be taken away without due process of law. And,
therefore, in proper legal contemplation, a right to labor when
violated is still considered number 1 upon an injury to the rights
of the plaintiff. Therefore, 4 years gihapon ang atuang
prescriptive period.
Now, remember upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff
Okay, Valencia still applies, according to the recent case of TK
According to the case of Paula v Lovakia (June 31,1958), an old case

cited by Dean Iigo, the period begins from the day of the
commission or from the date of the act or omission, since the
action is based on a quasi-delict.

Shipping v Concha.
Just to give you a perspective I know wala na niy labot sa courts
its not with the courts if illegally dismissed ka. But just so you know
unsay difference sa number 1 and number 2 sa Article 1146.
accident occurred such that the brace of the trench was destroyed
and he was buried up to his waist. When they tried to rescue him,
he has already died. An action for damages was filed by his mother.
The issue here, sir, is WON the company where he worked (Atlantic
Gulf) was liable for damages.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Next, Assumption of Risk. I know youve heard about this. Weve
discussed about this when we were talking about the case of Ilocos
Norte Electric Cooperative. Diba?
What is this doctrine of Assumption of Risk? It bars a claim for
negligence when it can be shown that the plaintiff, by his or her
conduct, voluntarily chose to encounter a known and specific
danger and either fully appreciated or should have fully appreciated
the risks posed by that conduct.
The applicable latin maxim here is volenti non fit injuria meaning,
he who voluntarily assumes a risk does not suffer damage
thereby. Or simply, to a willing person no injury is done.
This doctrine holds that a person who knowingly and willingly puts
himself in a dangerous situation cannot sue for any resulting
injuries. Again, this is a common law doctrine of Anglo-American
origin which serves as a bar to recovery for damages in negligence
cases.
The example I always give to my students here would be Manny
Pacquiao. But this time, Manny Pacquiao being a boxer. Or any
boxer, for that matter. So nag-boxing ka. Gikulata ka. Can you now
sue the promoted of the boxing match that you got hurt? Can you
sue your opponent for beating you up? No. Why? Volenti non fit
injuria. To the willing, no injury is done.
Medical tests. Diri sa Pilipinas wala kaayoy ing-ana. Pero medical
tests, for example, became quite prominent right now because in
France, theres a guy who became brain dead after being subjected
to medical trials for medication. So he became brain dead. Of
course, he is dead already. And a lot of people develop symptoms
also after testing drugs against (inaudible). But they voluntarily
assumed the risk and, in all probability, they were made to sign
waivers. Diba? So that is volenti non fit injuria. Kung mag tuga-tuga
ka, ayawg reklamo kung mapandol ka. Mao nay ginaingon sa volenti
non fit injuria.
Now, this doctrine was first alluded to in our jurisdiction in the case
of Cerezo v Atlantic Gulf.
*Recit: Monday
Q: What happened here?
A: In this case, _____ was an employee of Atlantic Gulf.
The Court here first determined whether the company is liable

under the Employers Liability Act. The employer cannot be held
liable under the said law.
Also, the mother cannot recover liability under the Civil Code
because what is applicable here is the doctrine of assumed risk, sir.
Under Article 1105 no one shall be held liable for events which
cannot be foreseen or which, having foreseen, were inevitable.
With the exception of the cases expressly mentioned.
Q: You mentioned Article 1105. So what provision of the Civil Code
mana karon?
A: ARTICLE 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) (Atty E: Article
1174 regarding fortuitous events)
Q: What about the fact that, you know, heres the employee of an
employer who made him perform certain work. And while on the
job, he was injured. He died. How did the SC dispose of that
situation?
A: In this case, sir, the court referred to several defenses that the
employer can have.
First, sir, the recklessness of his co-employees, such that the
employee here cannot be held liable for the recklessness of his coemployees.
Second is the contractual assumption of risks.
Third will be the contributory negligence.
Q: Okay, lets forget about the other two. Lets focus on assumed
risk. So what did the SC here say about the fact that, you know, this
was a labor-related incident? With respect to assumed risk. It took
place while he was at work.
Ateneo is my employer, right? What if, habang naga-lecture ko diri,
mahulugan ko anang electric fan, hasta baya gyung dakua! Nabukol
ko! And then, nagka-amnesia ko. So my wife sues Ateneo because it
took place on the occasion of my performance of my functions as a
teacher. Is Ateneo liable?
A: Ateneo is liable, sir.
Q: What were they doing?

A: They working on a trench (construction). However, there was
still no instruction from their superior to enter the trench.
Q: Yes, in that situation [different from Cerezo]. Why would Ateneo

be liable? Because it would not normally be in the nature of things
nga mahulugan ko ana. Unless negligent ang Ateneo sa pagprepare
ani.
Q: Did he enter the trench?

A: Yes, sir. To answer the call of nature (#1 LOL). After that, sir, an
Okay, now, lets change my work. For example, one that is a little bit
more exotic: mangatkatay ug tuba. Or meaning, mukatkat ug lubi.

Okay, mao nang gipabuhat saako sa Ateneo. And then nahulog ko.
A: Ateneo would not be liable, sir. Because under the doctrine of
assumed risk (end of recit)
Mao na ron ang assumption of risk! Meaning, Ateneo and even in
this case of Cerezo, Atlantic Gulf cannot insure against all risks.
These are simply veritable risks of labor. Dili na pwede mainsure
nimo! I think this will be a little bit more appreciated in the next
case.
*Recit: Bungabong
Q: What happened in the case of Afialda v Hisole
A: In this case, Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of carabaos owned
by Hisole. Then, on March 21, 1947, without any fault on the part of
Afialda, or any force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him
(gisungag) thereby causing his death.
If there are risks inherent to a particular trade or occupation that

you are engaged in, then if you do not want those risks, then do not
engage in the occupation. But if you do engage, in that occupation,
you have voluntarily assumed the risk. Okay? (end of recit)
We will discuss this Afialda v Hisole later on, after Article 2180, the
provision is still applicable under a different number.
Remember Hidaligo? The case of Isabel Lao Juan? The one who
went to her store only to die? The SC said that actually, dili
applicable ang doctrine of assumption of risk to escape liability in
that situation because she had the right to be there. She had the
right to rescue her property from being inundated.
How about this case: Nikko Hotel v Reyes
*Recit: Mungcal
Now, Afialdas sister sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code
(ARTICLE 1905):
Q: First question, do you know who the respondent in this case is?
A: No, I dont, sir. (cue the age jokes)
The possessor of animals or the one who uses the same is liable for
any damages it may cause, even such animal should escape from him
or stray away.
Q: What is his alias?

A: Amay Bisaya
The liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from
force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered
it.
Q: Who was the owner of the animal again? Was it the caretaker?
A: No, sir. It was owned by Hisole.
So the issue in this case, sir, is WON Hisole should be liable for the
death of Mr. Afialda.
Q: How did the SC deal with that issue? What did it say, how did it
rule?
A: In this case, sir, the SC had the opportunity to emphasize the
term possessor and user of animal.
In this case, Afialda was only the caretaker of the carabaos of Mr.
Hisole. And he was tasked and paid to tend for the carabaos. He, at
the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of the carabao.
And therefore, hes the one who had custody of the animal and was
in a position to prevent the animal from causing the damage.
Atty. E: including himself, right?
It would be a defense, sir, if Afialda was not the one who was
taking care of that carabao. So in this case, sir, it was Afialdas
business to prevent the animal from causing the injuries or damage
to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under
those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which
he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
Atty. E: One of the risks of the occupation... Same thing that you can
apply in the case of Cerezo! Si Cerezo, okay, worked in that time of
day, digging a trench hole. That the company cant assure that
nothing bad will happen to you, the same thing in any occupations.
Q: You dont know Amay Bisaya? (Sir gives background on Amay

Bisaya)
A: The facts of the case are as follows: Roberto Reyes here was
having coffee at the lobby of the Hotel Nikko when he was
approached by Dr. Filart, who invited him to attend a celebration of
the hotels manager.
Q: Was it Filart who was having a party?
A: No, sir. It was the manager.
Q: Was this guy who invited Amay Bisaya invited to the party?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Yeah? So? Giimbita ka, nangimbita pud kag lain! Did Amay Bisaya
go there?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Of course! He was hungry (LOL) Its free food! Cmon! Okay, what
do you call that in common parlance? If you go to a party where you
are uninvited. (Gatecrasher) Okay, gatecrasher. Whats that term
you use now, you young ones? (Asay) Asay? Why? (Asay kaon tua) Ah
okay! Thats nice! (LOL) What did he do when he got in?
A: He lined up for the buffet. And then he was stopped by Lim, the
executive secretary of the Hotel Nikko.
Q: Was he already eating? What was he doing?
A: Not yet, sir. He was lining up at the buffet.
Q: Okay, lining up at the buffet! Can you just imagine what he was
doing? (LOL SAVAGE) And then suddenly theres this officer of the
hotel, what did she tell him?
A: Wag ka nang kumain. Hindi ka imbitado. Bumaba ka nalang.
Q: Gipahawa siya, in other words. And so, what did Reyes do?

A: Reyes (inaudible) since he was embarrassed.

Q: Okay, so he was humiliated! Hes a well-known person he was
an actor, a former senatorial candidate in the PH under KBL. And
thats the reason why he is asking for damages. Now was there an
invocation in this case of volenti non fit injuria?
A: Yes, sir. Ruby Lims contention was that pursuant to the doctrine,
they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent assumed
the risk of being asked to leave since he was not invited to the said
party.
Q: Now, did the SC believe in that argument?
A: No, sir. The SC said that the doctrine is inapplicable in the case at
bar, since even if respondent here assumed the risk of being asked
to leave the party since he was not invited, the executive secretary
and the personnel of Hotel Nikko were still under obligation, under
Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Q: Okay, by the way, did he win the case?
A: No, sir. (end of recit)
Okay, but anyway, the SC is saying that if youre going to ask
somebody to leave despite the fact that he has no right to be there,
you still have to do it correctly. Its not enough to say that youre a
gatecrasher, you run the risk of being humiliated and being asked
to leave. You still have to do it properly.
Okay, so lets try to recap.
The doctrine of assumption of risk simply says: to whoever
consents, no injury is done. If you take a known risk, an then suffer
damage, but you knew fully well the risks that you run, then you
cannot recover.
But it is not applicable,
1.
for example, in the case of Nikko Hotel v Reyes, in the
sense that its still limited by the law on human relations. Okay?
The law on (inaudible talaga).
2.
It does not apply in the cases in the situation provided for
in the case of INELCO (Ilocos Norte Electric Cooperative) [v CA].
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria does not apply in cases where
the victim had every right to be there had every right to assume
the risk.
3.
It also does not apply to the so-called risks of labor- risks
inherent in an occupation.
Mao na na dira. Thats how we try to summarize the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
Next is ARTICLE 1174.
You can defend against quasi-delict by saying that it was not my
fault it was a fortuitous event; it was an act of God. And that is a

complete defense against quasi-delict. Under Article 1174:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
(1105a)
Actus dei nemini facit injuriam an act of God prejudices no one.
Remember these requisites. This is very important. If you have not
memorized these requisites yet when you were asked to do so in
first year, you have to memorize it now.
1.
The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence,
or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must
be independent of the human will. For example, a building was
destroyed by an earthquake. That is independent of the human will,
in that Nobody can stop an earthquake form hitting a place.
But if you had some participation, meaning human will is present in
the injury that was suffered, in the damage that was done for
example, in maintaining a building which is already in danger of
collapse, nga ang gibuhat lang sa earthquake is giuyog lang sya
kadali ni-collapse na dayon, injuring other people then force
majeure does not apply.
Or a typhoon destroys a ship and its cargo in a voyage. But if you
knew nga naay grabe kaayo nga typhoon, nga dili na dapat mutravel
ang barko, unya nitravel lang gihapon ka, thats no llonger
independent of the human will.
2.
It must be impossible to foresee the event or, if it could
be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. The force must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
which means that in quasi-delicts, the occurrence or the
fortuitous event would be one that would render you incapable of
taking the usual precautions or of exercising the usual degree of
care required under the circumstances.
3.
Finally, the obligor must be free form any participation in
the aggravation of the injury resulting therein.
RCPI v Verchez
*Recit: Bonifacio
A: In the case of RCPI v Verchez, the facts are as follows:
On January 21, 1991, Verchez here was confined here at a hospital.
On the same day, her daughter Grace immediately went to the
branch of the radio station (RCPI). She sought to send a telegram
to her sister Zenaida, who was residing in QC. She said: Send check
money Mommy hospital.
Three (3) days thereafter, no response was received from Zenaida.

Grace then sent a letter to Zenaida, thru JRS Delivery Service,

reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid. Thereafter,
Zenaida received Graces letter. Now, Zenaida, along with her
husband Fortunato, upon their arrival in Sorsogon, disclaimed
having received any telegram.
Now the telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida twenty-five (25)
days later.
Q: What was the reason for the delay according to RCPI?
A: The defendant here, in their answer, alleged that the reason for
the delay was actually force majeure, sir.
Q: In what way?
A: Specifically, but not limited to, the radio noise and interferences
which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the
telegraphic message
Q: In other words, naay problema sa signal. Its the same thing right
now, Sky Cable naa gihapoy problema sa signal. Sa mga
cellphone, naa gihapoy problema ang signal. Ing-ana gyud na sya!
Almost all the time. Sometimes, its really due to causes we have no
control of. When did this happen, by the way?
A: In 1991, sir. (Sir talks about how the times have changed, naks)
Q: Anyway, thats their answer: it was due to signal. How was this
case resolved?
A: RCPIs excuse was not appreciated since the defense of force
majeure can only be appreciated if there was no accompanying
negligence on the part of the radio station, sir.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
So in this case, the SC said that assuming that there was really a
problem in the transmission of RCPI, which led to the belated
transmission of the telegram, they should have informed Grace
right away of such event. (end of recit)
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the

persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
Okay, theres still negligence. Despite their claim that it was an act
of God. But if there is an intervention of negligence, or failure to
perform an act which is incumbent upon the contracting party, the
whole force is humanized. Thats the term used by the Supreme
Court: humanized, and is removed from the rules applicable in
acts of God.
*sir reads first paragraph* We go to this provision, of course, but

what it says is that *reads last paragraph*.
You can still apply these rules to Quasi-Delicts because it is not all
that different. Lets say, for example, you are driving a car. And
then, suddenly, nagka-tire blow up ka. You dont have any control
as to whether or no imohang car magkabuang! And then you hit
somebody. If it can be proven that it was due to the fact that you
did not maintain your vehicle in a proper condition na wala nimo
gipulihan ang naupaw na nga ligid, then you are liable despite the
fact that you never really intended na mubuto imong ligid. Similar
gihapon na sya sa Quasi-delicts.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
And, finally, a partial defense is found in Article 2180 with respect
to the vicarious liability principle.
Now, if you have your codals with you, kindly take a look at Article
2180 and observe Im not asking you to memorize it or anything,
but I just want you to observe look at Article 2180: who are those
persons who are responsible for the acts or omissions of another?
And from the paragraphs you see there *reads paragraphs*
(Editors note: enumeration here supplied; summary)
1.
Father, or mother;
2.
Guardians;
3.
Owners and managers of an establishment;
4.
Employers;
The phraseology of that you may find a bit peculiar,
considering that naa na dayon syay murag caveat ba:
eventhough the former (employer) are not engaged in
any business or industry. It seems like its just mentioning
it from out of the blue. Actually, not from out of the blue.
Remember the requirement in the Revised Penal Code,
that even (inaudible) kinahanglan engaed in business or
industry ang usa ka employer for subsidiary liability to

attach. Well discuss that later on.

5.
6.
The State;
Teachers or heads of establishments
In all of the provisions of the law regarding Quasi-Delicts, kani ang

pinaka-dynamic. Article 2180 is the most dynamic. Why? Because
daghan kaayog possible defendants and then daghan pud kaayog
mga possible plaintiffs. A lot of cases are filed under Article 2180.
Apart from the fact that in reality gyud for example, theres this
guy who clearly has no means of livelihood. Nakahiram karon ug
motor. Then nabanggaan ang imong sakyanan nga milyun-milyon
imong palit! Unya, pagkabangga, nagdinanghag, nakainom.
Mabanggaan ka, ma-damage imong sakyanan, di man lang ka makarecover sa iyaha. Kay ngano? Mangayo lang man nag pasaylo! How
many times has that happened? All my vehicles, ing-ana gyud ang
mahitabo: mabanggaan ug motor! Pagkahuman, inig paninglan na
nimo, sorry gyud kaayo, sir! Di na gyud nako usabon. Mao nalang
nay ikaso nimo? Wala man kay makuha niya!
But the whole game actually changes a little bit if that person, lets
say, is employed, and at the time of the incident, is performing
functions, for example, for his employer. The law therefore gives
you a different recourse not only against that particular employee,
but against his employer, under conditions specified in Article 2180.
Bata, anak, commits a tort. Unsa may ikabayad ana? Wala manay
kaugalingon niya nga property! But you can, of course, go after the
parents.
Now, the common theme that runs through the instances
enumerated in Article 2180 is the so-called vicarious liability. A
person a substitute answers for the act of another. Vicarious,
coming from the term vicar. Kasabot mog vicar? Kinsa may Katoliko
diri? Kinsa kuno nang vicar of Christ? (The Pope) In fact, the entire
clergy is considered vicars. Meaning, representatives. Substitute.
You may not see God but you can see the face of Fr. Nazareno
(LOL) Because he is a priest! Vicar of Christ! So a person who
answers for another. Thats the meaning of the term vicar.
The defense, of course, is the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. Kani nga defense would change, depending on
the type of person. Okay? Say, for example, an employer. An
employer will avoid liability by saying that he exercised due
diligence in selection and supervision. Wala sya nagpataka ug hire
ug empleyado. Wala pud sya nagdinanghag sa pagbantay sa iyang
trabaho, in giving them proper instructions.
This is very, very dynamic! This is the part of Torts and Damages
that I am busy with (?) the most. Because daghan kaayog gwapo na
mga kaso. Because youll see really how jurisprudence has evolved,
how the rules relating to vicarious liability have evolved!
January 29, 2016

SABALORIO
Last topic that we discussed was the defense under 2180

diligence to prevent the damage. But we have to consider first,
what we are talking about. What should be the applicable rule with
respect to that valid defense. For that, we have 2180. Take note
that under 2180,
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
So who are they?
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Pay particular attention to how this paragraph is phrased, for the
simple reason that they were phrased, a little bit later on, how the
rule evolved and changed throughout the years.
their company.
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
No need to memorize Art. 2180, it is a very long provision. And you

will not be asked what is stated in Art. 2180?. But rather, you
need to know paragraph by paragraph, and how every specific
provision applies. And what are the cases of jurisprudence that we
need to take note of in completing your understanding of the
provision.
Q: So what is vicarious liability in general?
A: Vicarious means, acting for another. Or as a substitute for
another.
So literally, what you are talking about is somebody else, being

responsible for another. Standing for another person. So vicarious

liability in court law is the imposition of responsibility for a failure of
another, with whom a person has a special relationship. If you look
at Art 2180, there is really that relationship. (i.e: parentage,
employer-employee relationship). There goes the justification: the
relationship the person who answers and the person who commits
the damage to another.
Take note of this very important characteristic of vicarious liability.
It is a strict liability.
Q: What do you mean of strict liability?
A: In court law, strict liability means that under Art 2180, there is no
need to prove fault or negligence upon the person sought to be
responsible.
Example:
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees.
Q: What does this mean?
A: There is no need to prove that the owner of manager was
negligent. What the plaintiff proves in that case is only the
negligence of an employee, and the latters relationship with the
owner or manager. The plaintiff doesnt have to prove specific acts
of negligence on the part of the owner or manager. All you have to
prove is that: (1) there is that relationship and (2) the damage
committed by the employee.
Another illustrations on strict liability can be found on Art 2183,
which we discussed when we were taking up the case of Afialda vs
Hisole.
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
Try to compare Art 2180 to Art 2183. Remember, both provisions do
not require proof or negligence. It is enough that there is damage
caused by a person or instrumentality subject to the control of
another.
Q: In Art. 2180, who causes damage here?
A: The children, the employees, the students and so on.
Q: In Art. 2183, what causes damage?
A: it is the animal.
They know that the responsibility is passed upon the person
responsible for another, is the one made liable under Art 2180.
In Article 2183, it is the possessor or user.
In both instances, if you look at both Articles, walay necessity to
prove. That the possessor or user of the animal was negligent. In
the same way that there is no need to prove negligence on the part
of the persons stated in Art 2180.
In both provisions, also, is that negligence is imputed on both the

vicars on 2180 and the possessor or user are deemed negligent and
liable, subject to the defenses to be later on proved during the trial.
Look at this parallelism as well:
2180
2183
The responsibility treated in

2180 shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent
damage.
This responsibility shall cease

only in case the damage
should come from force
majeure or from the fault of
the person who has suffered
damage.
So there is an imputation of negligence. Negligence therefore, in

the cases provided in Art 2180 & 2183, would be presumed.
Kining mga provisions nani, relating to when responsibility shall
cease, happens only later. So you have to rebut the presumption of
negligence or the imputation of negligence upon you, if you are
covered by either one of these provisions.
Q: Once again, what is strict liability?
A: It is liability despite lack of finding of fault. Baskin walay fault,
bisan walay negligence, the law ___ (20.50) that you are still liable.
Again, kaning nasa 2180 is the doctrine of imputed negligence.
Because the doctrine of imputed negligence is simply : a person is
not only liable for torts committed by himself but also for torts
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and
for whom he is responsible.
Q: What are other examples of strict liable torts? Or liability despite
the absence of fault, walay finding of fault.
A:
Vicarious liability under Art 2180
Animals under Art 2183
Article 2193 relating to falling objects such as the doctrine
of dejectum effesumve aliquid
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part
thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or
falling from the same. (1910)
We will discuss Art 2193 when we reach that. But if you look at 2193,
is there a need to prove that the head of the family is negligent?
There is no need to prove that he is negligent. The law, therefore,
imputes negligence upon him, by the mere fact that something was
thrown and somebody was hurt.
Under Art 1711

Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged

to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers,
workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event
may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous
cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. The employer is also liable for
compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease
caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the
employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own
notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the
employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the
employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury,
the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
It imposes an obligation on owners of enterprises and other
employers who pay for the death or injury of their employees.
Q: The question is, why is it a strict liability?
A: because even if the injury or death happened to the employee is
by pure accident, there is still liability on the part of the owners of
enterprises or other employers.
Nuisance
There is strict liability on the part of the owner or possessor of

property where nuisance is found when he is obliged to abate the
same, is irrespective of the absence or presence of the fault of
negligence. Specifically under Art. 696:
Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who
fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a
former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner
as the one who created it.
Product Liability
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,

toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries
caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no
contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n)
Lets say I am a manufacturer of soft drinks, like CocaCola. What
happens if the product causes injury to another person? Makes a
person sick? Is there any need to prove that CocaCola is negligent?
The answer is NO. The mere fact that a person is injured that is
enough for you to impute negligence/liability on the part of the
manufacturer.
Whats the common theme? There is no need to prove negligence,
because negligence is imputed.
TAMARGO vs CA June 3, 1992
What I want you to be particular about this case is, What is the
rationale? Why do we have this doctrine of imputed negligence?
The Supreme Court said: our Legislature has so elected to limit
such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for
reasons of public policy. to extend that liability, without regard to
the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable,
by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an

absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted
our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with
certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This
moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due
care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of
persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct. Citing Cangco vs Manila Railroad
So there is that moral responsibility, and the words position of
dependency, a child of course would have that position with respect
to his parents. An employee would also have that position with
respect to his employer. And so on and so forth.
Now, what is the type of liability imposed in Art 2180? Remember,
the act here that causes damage is not your own act. If 2180 is
invoked, it is not your own act but of somebody else.
The liability is direct and primary but subject to reimbursement
under Art 2181.
Q: Why is it direct?
A: a person mentioned in 2180, you can be sued immediately
without waiting for the person katong nag commit ug damage
to be sued. Direct ang recourse.
Q: Why primary?
A: precisely because, Art 2180 is trying to punish, not the act , but it
is the presumed lack of diligence on the part of those persons (the
vicars) in regulating or checking the affairs of those persons over
whom they are responsible.
So what the law punishes is not the act itself, but the presumed
lack of vigilance over these persons.
This highlights one of the distinctions of culpa aquiliana and culpacriminal.
In criminal cases, recourse must first be had against an employee
before an employer will be held liable.
In quasi delict, recourse may be made directly against the employer
without the need of suing the employee.
That is the main distinction. But remember, in criminal cases, if
there is already a finding of guilt upon the employee, the employer
would automatically be liable if the employee is not able to pay.
The basis of liability is presumed negligence in supervision (under
quasi delict).
Example:
For instance my daughter caused damage to his classmate, I
correspond ___. Because, even if I am, a type of father who is
better safe than sorry, pero accidents happen. Even if accidents
happen, naa gihapon presumed negligence on my part in
supervising the child.
There traditional basis of vicarious liability scattered in the law.

For example,
1. Respondeat Superior
Command responsibility, or that to which will hold the superior
officer jointly and severally accountable for damages with his
subordinates who committed such transgressions.
2. Principle of Pater Familias.
Father of a Family. This purely bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not of that of his servant.
TIU vs ARRIESGADO (Sept 1, 2004)
The Supreme Court had the occasion to determine, unsa ba gyud
ang basis sa liability when it comes to quasi-delicts.
Q: What is the distinction of respondeat superior and pater familias,
as taken from the case of Tiu vs Arriesgado? (Recit)
Take notes ha, that in the case of Tiu, the SC did not call it Pater
Familias but noted it is imputed negligence gihapon.
A: In pater familias, it is disputable. Meaning the presumption of
negligence on the part of the actor can be disputed.
Q: How?
A: By showing that they exercised due diligence of good father of a
family.
Q: Now what about, respondeat superior?
A: It is conclusive. Meaning, immediately after there is an act causes
damages to another by someone for whom another is responsible,
ang iyang superior/amo/boss is already conclusively presumed
negligent.
But if you really look at it, himayhimayon nimu ang ruling sa SC, dili
nimu makita. Pater familias is the basis of liability in Civil Law.
Respondeat Superior, on the other hand, is the basis of liability in
Anglo-American court common law. Therefore, diha pa lang sa PH,
being a Civil Law country, we do not have Respondeat Superior as a
general rule, but Pater Familias. In Pater Familias, the presumption
of negligence is disputable. However, negligence of an employee is
conclusively presumed in the case of Respondeat Superior.
Remember, one of the important distinction: In Pater Familias,
defense here is diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage (last par of 2180). Whereas, in Respondeat Superior that is
not a proper defense.
But it doesnt mean, that being a Civil Law country there are no
instances of Respondeat Superior is applicable. For example, there
is Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code relating to the subsidiary
civil liability of employers.
Article 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. - The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.

Therefore, the employees criminal guilt is automatically the
employers civil guilt. That is precisely one of the distinctions
between culpa criminal and culpa aquiliana.
Another instance is, Article 1822
Art. 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner
acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership
or with the authority of co-partners, loss or injury is caused to
any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty
is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent
as the partner so acting or omitting to act. (n)
You cannot supervise a partner. So what happens in Article 1822 is
actually Respondeat Superior. The partnership is liable for the act
of a partner without anything finding of negligence or fraud on the
part of the partners who are made to correspond.
So those are the two instances Respondeat Superior is applicable.
Under the Civil Law, the basis of liability is not Respondeat Superior
but the relationship of Pater Familias which purely basis the liability
of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not that of his
___. (37.10)
Q: What Negligence are we talking about?
A: Negligence in selection and supervision of employees.
Now lets go to Article 2180 proper.
Q: Who are the persons vicariously liable?
Let us divide vicarious liability as follows:
(1.)
Parental and Pseudo Parental Vicarious Liabiltity
Why do we say Pseudo Parental? Murag Parental Liability.
Because we are talking here about, not only parents, but
also persons in loco parentis or with substitute or special
parental authority. We are talking here about parents,
teachers, guardians and heads of establishments of arts
and trades.
(2.)
Employment-Based Vicarious Liability

Such as the case of owners, managers, employers and
even the State when it acts through its special agent.
(3.)
Other Vicarious Liability

Those not found in Article 2180. With that, Article 2180 is
not an exclusive enumeration of vicarious liability under
the law. So you take note what are these instances not
found in Article 2180 that is vicarious liability.
a.
Inkeepers and hotelkeepers under Article 102 of
the RPC they are civilly liable for crimes committed in
their establishments in cases of violations of statues in
default of persons criminally liable.
Article 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers,
tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. - In

default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,

tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution
of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
But criminal liability cannot be imputed, it cannot be
considered vicarious. Only civil liability.
b.
Also in the partnership.
The same provision that we discussed. Every partner is

liable for torts committed by one of the parties acting
within the scope of the business, although they did not
participate in, ratified or had knowledge of such tort. The
partners are liable as joint-feasors.
As we previously noted, vicarious liability in Art 1822 is
similar to the common law rule on Respondeat Superior.
The liability here is entirely imputed, and the partnership
cannot obviously invoke diligence in the selection and
supervision.
c.
Spouses.
If my wife commits a tort, will I be liable? Yes, to a certain

degree. The liability here of the other spouse would
depend on the applicable matrimonial property regime.
In Philippine Law, it would be absolute community
property and conjugal partnership of gains.
Under the absolute community property, the ACP shall be
liable for liabilities incurred by spouses by reason of quasidelict, in case of absence or sufficiency of the exclusive
property of that spouse. (under Art 94 of the FC).
Payments here shall be considered advances to be
deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation.
For conjugal partnership of gains, pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon the husband or wife are not chargeable
against the conjugal partnership but against the separate
property of the wrongdoer. By way of exception, the
conjugal partnership should be made liable when profits

have inured to the benefit of the partnership, or when of
the spouses committed a tort by performing a business or
if the act was supposed to benefit the conjugal
partnership.
PARENTAL or PSEUDO PARENTAL VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The provision is, and again I want you to remember the provision
and how it is worded:
Whats the basis? This can be found in the case of FUELLAS vs
CADANO
Q: What is the basis for liability here, as found in the case? Why is
there vicarious liability upon parents? (Recit)
A; That case cited Excode vs Capuno (sir: uhuh thats correct)
From case: The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty
of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating
them in proportion to their means", while on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts.
134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code).
Q: So in short what is the basis of vicarious liability under the first
paragraph?
A: Parental authority.
Q: Do you know what parental authority is?
A: Parental authority is the authority exercised by the parents over
their children until they are emancipated.
Q: Yes, with what you said. Emancipation takes place when, under
the FC?
A: When the child reaches the age of 18 years old.
Q: What parental authority covers the ability to punish children in
moderation?
A: ....
Sir: Let us assume you are my child and I am your father. I want you
to act in a certain way that is acceptable towards the rest of
mankind. Therefore my parental authority would allow me to keep
you in shape. That is the consequence of parental authority. That is
also the reason why naay vicarious liability.
Q: What happens if I fail to discipline as my child, and you
committed a tort?
A: Based on Art 2180, you (father) will be held liable.

Based on the case of Fuellas vs Cadanas, ang vicarious liability is but

a necessary consequence of parental authority. Why? Parental
authority is a power that I can exercise over my child. I can give
instructions to my child with the expectation na sundon ko. I can
discipline him. Therefore, if I do not wield that power judiciously,
what could happen? Negligent ko.
The presumption is, a good father of a family would be able to
prevent damage committed by his minor children. So kung naay na
commit na damage akong minor na anak, it is simply means that I
am responsible. Kulang akong vigilance.
Now according to Manresa: Since children and wards do not yet
have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the
parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over
the acts of their children and wards in order that damages to third
persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of
such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and
guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the
consequences of their abandonment or negligence by repairing the
damage caused.
Q: Who is liable here?
A: The father is liable; the mother becomes liable only in cases of
death or incapacity of the father. Thus, the liability is alternative not
concurrent/simultaneous.
So if you look at the wordings of 2180, diba kana man? That is the
expression. Ang papa lang and in case of death or incapacity the
mother.
Q: Is that still the rule? (Recit)
A: No. The rule now is both the father and the mother are liable as
to the liability.
Q: Okay, lets go back to what we discussed. What is the basis of
liability here?
A: Parental authority.
Q: So what changed in the law/rule, that you now say and 2180 di na
mao ang rule. Dli na alternative.
A: Under the Family Code. Under Article 221 of the FC: Parents and
other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.
Sir: Which means, under that provision, walay giingon na father or
mother.
Q: What is the treatment of the FC with respect to parental
authority? Under the NCCC, it is primarily lodged with the father.
A: Both the mother and the father are under the obligation of
parental authority to their common children.
Q: So what is the nature of parental authority under the FC?
A: Joint. Joint parental authority.
Yes, Joint na karon under Article 211.
Article 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
So karon, wala nay alternative qualification. But in case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is
judicial order to the contrary.
Now, under Art 221. What are these appropriate defenses? Mubalik
gihapon ta sa 2180. Which is, diligence in disciplining and rearing the
children in preventing the damage.
Under Article 211, liability for tort under vicarious liability is without
alternative qualification. This was the categorical ruling of the SC En
Banc in the case of LIBI vs IAC, where the SC was very poetic. It
said: One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow
is sometimes a touchstone of love. Beautiful language!
Relating to the torts of minor children, under Article 58 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code:
Article 58. Torts. - Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the Civil Code.
So, pareha ang rule, more or less, with respect to torts. Parents
no alternative qualification.
In the rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law (Feb 28, 2002)
Section 33. xxxx The parents and other persons exercising
parental authority over the juvenile shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
juvenile living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
More or less the same.
Take note that the liability here is solidary (direct/primary).
However, there are instances under the law when parents are
nearly made subsidiarily liable. What are these instances?
Instances parents are subsidiarily liable:
(5.)
Article 218 of the Family Code
Article. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
The school, its administrators and teachers have special parental
authority over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody.
And under Article 219, if the tort is committed by children within the
custody of the school, the parents/guardians/persons exercising
the subsidiary parental authority over the minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.

Article. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under

the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.
Q: What is subsidiary liability?

A: You only answer in default or insolvency of the person primarily
liable.
Q: Why is this like this? Why is it that a child, when he commits a
tort while in school, ngano man subsidiary lang man ang liability sa
parents?
A: When the child is in school your (parent) parental authority is
suspended(?), the school authorities would now stand in loco
parentis for your children.
In the case of AMADORA vs CA, the parent cannot interfere with
how the school enforces discipline, for as long as it is not ___
(prohibited?).
(6.)
Here is this case of ELCANO vs HILL (1977):
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).
Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but he was acquitted
for lack of intent coupled with mistake. It was an accident. Elcano
filed a civil action against Reginald. Hill argued here that the civil
action is barred by his sons acquittal under the case. If ever the civil
liability as parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is
already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
Thats another instance wherein the parents liability is only

subsidiary not primary and direct.
But take note, the case of Elcano vs Hill is no longer applicable. The
age of majority and marrying age already coincides.
Take note as to children, the law makes no distinction of children.
Hence, the children could be legitimate, illegitimate or legally
adopted.
TAMARGO vs CA
(Recit)
Q; What happened first?
A: Decree of adoption then the incident happened. So technically
speaking, at the time that it happened, adopted na ang minor.
Q: Would that matter?
A: Even if the decree of adoption has been approved, it is still the
natural parents who are liable. This so because, the law says that
the parents who are liable for the acts of their children, should be
those who are in actual custody of the minor.
Q: How many sets of adoptive parents are here? Because I am also
of the impression that katong naigo is an adopted child. What does
it tell you?
Sir: That as an adoptive parent, you have the cause of action to sue
for your adopted child. It also tells you that you can be sued for the
acts of your adopted child.
Q: Was there an issue here concerning the Retroactive effect of
adoption?
A: Yes. But the SC said that considering that the adoptive parents
here are in the US and they do not have actual custody of the child,
it would be unfair to give retroactive effect.
Issue: Would that emancipation by marriage, create a situation

where 2180 does not apply anymore? Wala nay vicarious liability ang
parents?
Q: Can a decree of adoption never be given a retroactive effect?

A: It can. The SC said that the granting of the petition for adoption
may be given retroactive effect if it could be beneficial to the child.
Ruling: From case: While it is true that parental authority is

terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage
of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Sir: Because here, giving retroactive effect would actually impose a

burden upon the adoptive parents. At the time the tort was
committed, who had actually exercise parental authority? The
natural parents, so they should be held liable under Art 2180.
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Reginald Hill. However, since

at the time of decision, Reginald was already of age, Marvins
(father of Reginald) liability is subsidiary only.
From case (read by sir): to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them
with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen
and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the
tort was committed.

So the basis of vicarious liability of parents for the torts committed

by their children is the actual exercise of parental authority. That is
the lesson you can learn in the case of Tamargo.
What if the parents are dead?
The FC is telling you naa lang gihapon tao mu-succeed sa parental
authority. In the absence of parents or adoptive parents in certain
cases, a guardian appointed by the court would then exercise
parental authority. But even in default of parents and guardians,
parental authority shall be exercised by the ff order:
Article 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
Because these persons exercise parental authority, they are civilly
liable in cases when their parents are dead or absent or
incapacitated to perform their duty. Even if you succeeded only in
parental authority, naa jud kay vicarious liability.
Since the legal age of marriage and age of majority is 18 years old,
no child can ever be emancipated by marriage anymore. By legal
contemplation, vicarious liability ceases.
So mao na imung basehan. So if ang parents walay parental
authority over the child, under the FC it happens at the age of 18,
therefore whala na silay vicarious liability.
Q: What happens if iextend nato ni tanan? Can you still be held
liable to a child aged 30 years old? Or during my time while still
studying law school I was still living with my mom. What if I
committed a tort? I did not have any property.
A: No. There is no parental authority. Kung dili ko niya pwede
disciplinahon kay wala na siyay parental authority over me, it stands
to reason that she cannot be vicariously liable. With parental
authority comes vicarious liability.
Illustration:
Maja is 19 years old, she still lives with her mother, committed a tort
against Angel. Can her parents be held vicariously liable?
We go back to the rule. Kung walay parental authority, walay
vicarious liability ang parents. Yan ang basis ng vicarious liablity. So
can Majas parents be held vicariously liable? Considering they dont
have parental authority anymore.
YES. Which makes it so weird! Why? Because under Article 236,
talking about emancipation and so on and so forth. In the last par it
says:
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the

duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
Whats this saying? Naa gihapon vicarious liability by a child below
21 years of age. So you are talking about 18-21. If a child commits a
tort between those ages, there is still vicarious liability for the
parents.
Make no mistake, this is a prevailing rule. Even if you are
emancipated by age (18 years old), for as long as you are below 21
years old, your parents can still be held liable. That is unfair! There is
liability but no authority to discipline children of majority age.
When you reach 18 years old, there is already wisdom. You are
already able to govern your own affairs (sign contracts, enter
marriage etc). So, naa gihapon ang vicarious liability. Unfortunately,
that is the rule. So Ive been criticizing this ever since I knew there
was such a rule. Walay tie ba.
If the reason for vicarious liability is parental authority, why did you
vicarious liability when there is no parental authority? That is a
weird rule.
Take note, sometimes there can be culpa-criminal or culpa-aquiliana
at the same time. Especially in cases where criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the RPC. You can sue twice but cannot recover
twice. Now, take note that under the RPC every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable. But there are instances where the law,
that even if there is no criminal liability, on the ground that there is
an exemption from criminal liability, dili mawala ang civil liability.
That happens under the exempting circumstance. Under Article 101
of the RPC:
A person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment. Who pays
the civil liability? The parents Shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control. That is to be read as
parental authority. Unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part. They can actually defend: walay may fault
or negligence on my part, so why must I be made civilly liable for a
crime committed by an exempt minor?
Take note also that under Article 101 of the RPC, only 2 situations
are governed:
(1)
An offender below nine because nine and below is
the age of complete criminal responsibility.
(2)
Someone over nine but under 15 but without
discernment.
Q:What happens if the child is over 9 but below 15 with
discernment? Or 15 to18, minor parin yan. Who corresponds civilly?
Or because of the Article 236 of the FC, where a parent would still
be civilly liable for the tort of a child, basta below 21 years, what
does the law say about it?
A: Article 101 of the RPC is silent.

So, who will take care of the civil liability?

(Recit)
Q: Diba this is the case of SALEN vs BALCE? What did the SC say?
First state to me the problem. What is the problem here? What was
the absurd situation why there was a need to make a
pronouncement here by the SC?
A: The SC stated that while it is true that under Article 101, as you
have mentioned earlier sir, a father is made civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane,
under 9 years of age, over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act
without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or
negligence on his part. But in this case, Gomercito here, although
minor, was convicted. In this case, the RPC is silent as to the civil
liability of the person or child over 9 years but over 15 years of age
who acted with discernment. So the SC held that a a minor over 15
who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for
which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his
parents should he stand convicted.
Q: So what law would apply? What would we supply the deficiency?
A: In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our
Civil Code. Article 2180 which shall be direct and primary liability.
Q: What is the liability under Article 101 of the RPC?
Sir: Subsidiary only. 9-15 without discernment, is still subsidiary
liability. But this time, 9-15 with discernment and 15-18 (regardless
of discernment), it is direct and primary.
So there is a promotion of the type of liability. Diba? Dont you find
that strange? Dont you think it is burdensome upon the parents
that their liability is direct and primary? (Im just asking your
opinion.)
Student: Because it is in this stage the age bracket itself, it is when
a minor has certain phases they try things beyond the norms in
society. Therefore, it is expected more from the parents to guide
them through it.
Sir: That is correct.
Look at the ages, 9 to 15 acting with discernment meaning ang
bata mas mature, mangihanglan ug greater supervision from the
parent.
What about 15 to 18, mas kinghanglan greater
supervision. That is the reason, or at least that is the way I make
sense of it.
Summary:
(1)
Over 9 but below 15 with discernment Article 2180
of NCC direct and primary liability of the parents vicariously
liable.
(2)
15 to 18 same thing apply Article 2180
(3)
18 to 21- Article 2180 applies because of Article 236
of the FC
GUARDIANS

their company.
Take note of the conjunction and. In other words, guardians will
be held vicariously liable only if the minors or incapacitated persons
are (1) under their authority; and (2) they live in their company.
Pero if naglahi sila ug puyo, wala na silay responsibility. If you
follow Article 2180. But once again, we follow the Family Code.
Substitute parental authority, you are liable for the same way a
person originally possesses parental authority should be held liable.
Nothing much about guardianship.
TEACHERS or HEAD OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF ARTS & TRADES
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody
The rationale here is very simple. Because while the children are in
these establishments, they stand in loco parentis. They substitute
parental authority.
Applying reddendo singular singulis. This is a rule on construction,
right? You attribute one to the proper subject.
This is the Illustration:
(4) If you are a teacher, you answer to the torts of pupils and
students. When you talk about pupils and students you
talk about academic institution.
(5) If you are a head of establishment of arts and trades, you
only correspond to the torts of apprentices. Because
there is no teacher in apprentice. You talk about
vocational courses.
The important qualification here is that the pupils and students and
the apprentices must remain in the custody of their respective
teachers and heads of establishments of arts and trades.
Remember that the NCCC took effect during the time when naa pa
tay apprenticiable occupations. If you are sculptor, you board with
the master. Sa iyaha ka magpuyo. So there is a close tutelage in
observation made by the heads of arts and trades. Mao na ang
reason ngano naay requirement of custody. Right now, a student
living with his professor is so weird. It is actually inconceivable.
So these heads of establishments of arts and sciences, like the
Ateneo, is exempt from liability, codally, based on Art 2180. That is
the implication. Let us survey jurisprudence.
EXCONDE vs. CAPUNONG
Construing Article 2180, if a school is not one of arts and trades,
there is no liability to be imposed on the head of the establishment.
It has to be therefore a non-academic school, in order to held the
establishment liable.
MERCADO vs CA
Affirming Exconde, it said that the school cannot be held liable

because it was not one of arts and trades. Moreover, the SC

defined what custody means.
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the

head thereof who shall be answerable.
Contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the
teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents.
Ngano ingana ang ruling sa SC? Because of the principle of

reddendo singulo singulis. [From case: Following the canon
ofreddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words
"pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and
trades" to the word "apprentices."]
So there is a supplanting of parental authority, kay nipuyo naman

ka sa iyang pwesto.
PALISOC vs BRILLANTES
The defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute
are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for
the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon
at the school's laboratory room.
Nag away sila sa school laboratory. The school itself cannot be held
liable since it was not properly impleaded as party defendant. But
the implication of that is you can hold the school liable if you
implead the school itself.
Lets go back to the provision, Art 2180. Is there something that
mentions that the school itself will be held liable? No. Its the
personal liability of the teachers and heads of the establishments of
arts and trades. Walay mention na pwede nimu file-an ug kaso ang
school, only the teachers and the heads of establishment.
For the first time in the case of Palisoc vs Brilliantes, ingon sa SC na
pwede diay ka mufile ug kaso sa school, for as long as you implead
them. In fact, the SC said: The school itself, likewise, has to respond
for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the
same cited article.
You ought to remember that Article 2180, diba employers are
responsible for the torts committed by their employees? Therefore,
a tort committed by a student is the tort of the teacher, under Art
2180. And the tort of the teacher is the tort of the school in proper
cases. That is the necessary implication there.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school diba mao man ning nakabutang sa
provision? , as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
So since Palisoc, there is no more requirement in living and
boarding with the teacher or head of establishment.
AMADORA vs CA
The doctrine evolved, such that, ang application dili lang maapply
karon sa non-academic schools but also academic schools as well.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he,
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and

the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the
teacher over the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching.
So you dont distinguish. SC said that to their belief, walay
distinction dapat. Although article 2180 clearly states there should
be a distinction, dapat established na arts and trades ka. Vocational
school ka, thats the implication.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. The teacher certainly should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic
school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the
school were non-academic.
So the SC erased the distinction. It doesnt matter whether it is
academic or non-academic. There is vicarious liability upon the
person involved. Ang tao na adunay exercise of guidance or
supervision over the student or apprentice.
Q: So what is the meaning of custody?
A: The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as
he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already
ended.
So similar to the case of Palisoc, na ang custody dili lang bitaw
boarding with or living with. It is simply protective or coercive
custody. Under the influence ba, so coercive.
SALVOSA vs. IAC
For as long as the student is within the premises of the school and
remains within the call of the teachers, the custody requirement is
satisfied.
Dili pa man kagawas, dili pa man kauli. So your still under the
custody of the school. Because of that, you are considered in
attendance in the school. This includes, recess (not the recess where
you eat) or temporary adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted
to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school
activity is conducted. That is the meaning of in attendance in
school.
However if the student is outside the school premises, or has
already been dismissed, vicarious liability does not apply. Wala
namay control ang teacher sa imuha, wala namay control ang
school kung naka uli naka. Kung gipauli naka, naan aka sa gawas sa

skwelahan. Thats what the SC is saying in the case of Salvosa.

Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being
in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
So dili ka in attendance in school, if you are not really under the
coercive control or influence of the school It is not enough that you
are enrolled, according to the SC.
ST. FRANCIS HIGHSCHOOL vs CA
(Recit)
Q: What was the activity here?
A: Picnic.
Q: Was this picnic planned by the teachers? Or by the students
themselves?
A: Teachers.
Q: Did the school know about it?
A: Yes.
Q; How did the ruling in this case affect the rule on vicarious liability
of teachers?
A: In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual
performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not
within the school premises, not on a school day and most
importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely
private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the
incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St.
Francis High School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This
picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin
Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity
neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.
Sir: The SC even said and noted that, yeah, it might be true that the
principal knew about it but that knowledge does not amount to
acquiescence to render the school liable.
Student: The incident happened outside the school premises, not
on a school day and most importantly the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair.
Sir: Yes. It was not a sanctioned activity of the school. Mere
knowledge of school authorities does not necessarily mean that
would sanction the activity.
PSBA vs CA
(Recit)
[Stabbing incident inside school premises]
Q: Who stabbed?
A: An outsider.
Q: Can a school be held liable for quasi-delict, under Article 2180
A: Yes if the tort was committed by a student also. However, that
was not the case here in PSBA.
Q: If they cannot be held liable under QD under Article 2180, in

relation to Article 2176, can they be held liable in another way?
A: Yes, contractually. The contract between the student and the
school.
Q: Which happens when?
A: when, the student enrolls in the school.
Q: What would be one of the obligations of the school there, in
relation to the case ha, that the school wouldve failed on here?
A: When they failed to provide proper security.
Sir: SC is saying that, how could you learn from the school if you are
always in fear of your safety.
Q: According to the SC, naa bay liability on the part of the PSBA in
terms of contract?
A: (inaudible). The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Q: The SC here likened a school with what other type of ___?
A: A school, much like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks.
If ikaw ang school, wala kay control kinsay mucommit ug anything
preconceivable damage that people inside might cause.
Now, with all the cases weve discussed, naa tay present ruling.
Now it changed.
Here, under Art 218 (FC): the school, its administrators and teachers
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.
As a consequence of the parental authority, under Article 219, there
is liability for damages upon those persons: the school, teachers,
administrators without any qualifications as to whether or not it is
academic or non-academic. For as long as it is sanctioned activity.
Article. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)
So dapat naa kay due diligence and safeguards against injury. So
this is the apparent rule. So this is the particular diligence required

in particular circumstances.
As a consequence of substitute parental authority, the school, its
administrators and teachers, are principally and solidary liable for
damages caused by their pupil or students.
Parents are not exempt from liability, there is subsidiary liablity as
we mentioned. The FC now makes no distinction between
academic and non-academic institutions.
If the school is being sued together with its administrators and
teachers, the liability is joint and solidary in keeping with Article
2194 which provides that the liability of joint tort feasors is joint and
solidary.
Responsibility and authority shall apply to authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school. Unlike Art
2180, where the child should be in the school premises, custody
under Art 218 extends to acts committed inside or outside provided
the activity was an authorized activity.
Q: What happens if the student is not a minor?
A: Remember under the Family Code a non-minor, lets say 18-21,
applies only to parental authority. In that situation you still apply
Art 2180.
Q: In 2180, kinsa ang liable?
A: teachers and heads of establishments for the acts of students
and apprentices who are not minors anymore. But the teacher-incharge is liable for the acts of the non-minor student. The school
and administrators are not to be held liable. However, in the case of
the teachers liability will attach whether the school is academic or
non-academic.
By exception, it is the head of the school, not the teacher, who is
held liable where the injury is caused in school of arts and trades.
Custody means also protective custody. Which means, the student
must be under the authority of the school, and within it premises
whether the semester has not yet begun or has to end.
Please remember these rules.
February 19, 2016

ZMONTEFOLCA & ASADSAD
Lets just finish Torts and then well continue to discuss other
topics.
The last thing that we discussed was vicarious liability but that was
related to parental and pseudo-parental relations. In other words,
we talked about responsibility of parents over their minor children,
schools who are in loco parentis of minor children who are in their
custody, guardians with respect to their wards.
This time, we will talk about employment- based vicarious liability.
Therefore, whats important to consider here is employeremployee relationship.
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
Why is there such a clause even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry? That is to distinguish the rule
in Article 2180 with what is stated in Article 103 of the RPC.
In Article 103, the employer must be engaged in an industry in order
for subsidiary liability to attach.
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
So we will go over these three.
What is the defense? Diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
But this time since we are talking about ER-EE relationship, what is
the diligence required? When will the responsibility cease? It ceases
upon proof that there is exercise of proper diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees.
Three kinds of Employment-Based Vicarious Liability:
The first two you can find in Article 2180
Artcile 103 RPC Its only subsidiary civil liability. There is a need to
find that the employee was guilty of the offense charged and that
he is insolvent. Meaning, he is unable to pay for the civil liability

that is impliedly instituted in a criminal action.

What do you mean by the term manager in relation to Art 2180?
In this old case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs Philippine
American General Insurance March 25, 1975 the SC was able to
enunciate that the term manager is used in the same sense as
employer Therefore when we discuss this species of vicarious
liability more or less the same ang doctrines applicable to par 41and
par 52 (of Article 2180).
Remember no liability for tort can arise when the defendant can
himself be regarded as an employee. So if you are a manager of a
particular enterprise but you yourself is an employee, dili ikaw ang
manager or owner or employer that is stated in Art 2180. That is the
ruling in this case.
In order to hold the defendant vicariously liable under Art 2180, the
plaintiff must prove ER-EE relationship by preponderance of
evidence. You need to know the elements of ER-EE relationship:
Power of selection
Payment of wages
Power to dismiss/suspend
Power of control the method of doing the work
The most important in all of these would be the power of
control. Remember the different cases that Fr. Nazareno
always tells you to read
Now, take note, without ER-EE relationship, the 5 th and 6th
paragraphs of Art 2180 cannot be applied as basis for liability.
There are also cases where the ER-EE relationship is created
NOT by the four-fold test but by the law itself. Example: Under
Art 106 of the Labor Code.
Xxx In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to
pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code,
the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner
and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by
him. xxx
If you look at the context of Art 106, ER-EE relationship is created
and supplied by law for what purpose? To ensure payment of
wages. But the wording of the law is responsible in the same
manner and extent that he is is liable to employees directly
employed by him With that wording, wages lang ba gina ensure
ani? Lets read further.
In such cases (referring to labor-only contracting), the person
1The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions
2Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the

employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same
manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by
him.
Soi it doe When can there be labor-only contracting? When the
supposed job contractor has no sufficient and substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises etc. Meaning himuon ra kang middle man or intermediary
in supplying workers in a particular enterprise.
Art. 138. Classification of certain women workers. Any woman
who is permitted or suffered to work, with or without
compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, massage clinic,
bar or similar establishments under the effective control or
supervision of the employer for a substantial period of time as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, shall be
considered as an employee of such establishment for purposes
of labor and social legislation.
Unlike the wording of Art 106 Art 107 3, in Art 138 it is allencompassing. The ER-EE relationship is created for the purpose of
labor and social legislation.
Ramos v CA, this is the case where the SC had the occasion to rule
that for purposes of taking responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an ER-EE relationship in effect exists between the hospitals
and their attending physicians. We will discuss this when we go to
medical malpractice cases which is a separate class of torts.
What are the requisites of liability under Art 2180 ( Sps Jaime v
Apostol)?
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees
the following requisites must be established:
That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another;
That the service to be rendered in accordance with
orders which the employer has authority to give at all
times
That the illicit act of the employee was on occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him
Significantly to make the employer liable under par 5 or 6 of
Art 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous
act was committed at the time employee was performing his
functions.
1. That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another;
In Roque v Torres, what happens if the torts is committed by
lets say a security guard. A security guard is of course supplied
by a security agency. But you need to remember that when it
comes to supplying security services, if you are the principal
3Art. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding

article shall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or
corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent
contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

(ER), you can actually give instructions. Di ba? Pwede man ka

muhatag ug instructions which the security guards must
follow. So would that come under the purview of Art 2180? No
because the employee is not chosen by the employer mismo or
through another one. He is chosen by the security agency. In
other words, the enterprise has no opportunity to select kung
kinsa mahimong security guard nila. Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employment agency and not the the clients or customers of
said agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a
security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool
of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall
be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose
premises or property are protected by the security guards.
2. Service service to be rendered in accordance with orders which
the employer has authority to give at all times
Let us suppose for example in the case of Sps. Jaime v Apostol.
Theres a driver who is employed by the municipality. It so
happened na katong mga driver na gina-employ sa
municipality will be assigned to local government officials such
as the Mayor. In this case it was Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel of
Koronadal. Now, isnt it a fact that if the local government unit
assigns a driver to a local govt official, who directs him? It is
the official to whom the EE is assigned. But the SC said, The
fact that a client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render
the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency.
In this case, nakabangga ang driver while he is assigned to the
Mayor. So would the mayor be held liable? Accdg to SC, mere
giving of instructions or directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Neither does it render one the employer of the driver.
The injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the
employee was performing his functions. This means that any
act done by the EE in furtherance of the interest of the ER or
for the account of the ER at the time of the infliction of injury
or damages. It is not necessary that the task performed by the
employee is his regukar job or that which was expressly given
to him by the employer. It is enough that the task is
indispensable to the business of the ER.
What about strikes?
UNIVERSAL
AQUARIUS,
INC
vs.
Q.C. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION Sept 12,
2007 is very instructive because technically speaking kung nagstrike ka, employee lang gihapon ka.
An employer incurs no liability when an employees conduct, act or
omission is beyond the range of employment. Unquestionably,
when Resources' employees staged a strike, they were acting on
their own, beyond the range of their employment. Thus, Resources
cannot be held liable for damages caused by the strike staged by its
employees.
What about working scholars?
FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, Aug 17, 1992
Here, there is a working student and janitor of Filamer. He has a
student drivers permit and so the son of the schools owner Allan
Masa, gipa-drive siya para makatuon siya. While driving,
nakabangga. Of course there was damage. So the first thing we
need to ask is this, He is a student and at the same time an
employee, what therefore would govern liability? Would it be 2180
under pseudo-parental vicarious liability or should it be ER-EE
relationship as a basis for vicarious liability? In this case, it is the
employment relationship. Accdg to the SC: any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage would give rise to the presumption na ang iyang gibuhat
was within the scope of his assigned tasks.
What about labor-only contracting?
In NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.
August 14, 1998
COURT OF APPEALS
PHESCO here supplied employees to NAPOCOR, a dumptruck

owned by NAPOCOR was driven by one of these employees. There
were 17 people injured.
Can NAPOCOR be held liable considering dili niya empleyado?
The SC said PHESCO is a labor-only contractor. The person acting as
contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the
principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and
to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship
between the principal employer and the employees of the "laboronly" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is
responsible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal
employer.
If you go back to labor jurisprudence relating to Art 107, you will
come into the conclusion nga Art 107 creates ER-EE relationship for
the purpose of maintaining labor standards provisions. In other
words, pagbayad sa wages, pag-enusre sa hours of work etc. But
here we are talking about torts. Would 107 therefore be extended
to mean liability of a principal over the acts of employees where
and ni-furnish sa ilaha ug manpower is a labor-only contractor?
That was what precisely NAPOCOR said. Its contention is that its
liability is limited to compliance of labor standards provisions. Is
NAPOCOR correct? The SC said NO. t bears stressing that the action
was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict
against both NPC and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not
the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case. t is
apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code

will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages

instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the
employees of the "labor only" contractor. This is consistent with
the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a "labor-only"
contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and
the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
with? What would be the effect if the orders are not complied with?
Naa bay punishment? It is incumbent upon the ER to show that
upon recruiting the erring EE, the policies were followed.
Can the ER be liable for acts of the EE done after office hours?
General rule: NO.
Now I have a problem with this ruling. What law provides for ER-EE
relationship? It is the Labor Code. So you make reference to the
Labor Code that is the foundation of liability. And yet the SC is
saying that for purposes of allocating responsibility for damages,
we do not apply anymore the Labor Code but Art 2180 of the NCC.
To my mind, this is aberrant. SC is saying we apply labor-only
contracting provisions to make a finding of ER-EE relationship even
if there is no power of control. And yet when it comes to liability,
we do not apply the Labor Code anymore because ang application
sa Labor Code is limited. It does not include liability for damages.
On that score, we have to apply Art 2180. But then again, thats just
my opinion.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, the
employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in
the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
When you make a finding of ER-EE relationship for the purpose of
complying with labor standards provisions, what is the quantum of
proof? SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE because it is an administrative
tribunal. It is a little bit lower than PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
which is what is needed to prove that there is ER-EE relationship in
a quasi-delict case grounded on Art 2176 in relation to 2180.
That make the ruling in NAPOCOR aberrant.
How do you prove diligence to negate liability?
When there is power of control, meaning the employer has the

right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means
to effect such end, then there is ER-EE relationship. There could
not be any power of control exercised after office hours.
Exception: Even beyond office hours, an EE may hold the ER
vicariously liable in Valenzuela v CA.
Kinsa sa inyuha ang nakatrabaho nag medrep?
If you are a medrep, are you not jealous by the fact that your
medrep friends kay naay auto. Is that a benefit? For whose benefit
will a car plan redound? Let us suppose that during non-office hours
ang medrep nakabangga. Can you hold the pharma company liable
for the tort committed by the medrep? Clearly there is EE-ER
relationship. This was answered in:
MA.
LOURDES
vs.COURT OF APPEALS Feb 7, 1996
VALENZUELA,
The SC said naa ray duha ka rason ngano tagaan kag car plan:
1. As a facility so that EE can meet his clients; and
2. Goodwill
The company actually owns and maintains the car up to the point
of turnover of ownership to the employee; in the second example,
the car is really owned and maintained by the employee himself. In
furnishing vehicles to such employees, are companies totally
absolved of responsibility when an accident involving a companyissued car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
As the law imposes as a standard the diligence of a good father of a

family, no particular acts are required for the ER to establish that he
exercised proper diligence. Supervision depends on the
circumstances of employment. It has been observed however that
the exercise of diligence may include promulgation of proper rules
and regulations and formulation of proper instructions for the EEs
guidance in case where such rules, regulations and instructions are
necessary. So there is no hard and fast rule to determine kung naa
bay proper selection or supervision. Diligence will be on a case-tocase basis.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company employees are

given the privilege of using a company-issued car.
Diligence may require the submission of documents like NBI

clearance or licenses or the EE may be required to undergo tests.
Nevertheless, the mere issuance of rules and regulations without
showing that they are being complied with are not sufficient to
exempt an employer for liability arising from the negligence of the
EE. What the law is trying to say is that true there are orders but are
you doing something to make sure that these orders are complied
So sa mga ana na sitwasyon, para kang kinsa ang benefit sa car? Is it

for the EE or ER? Accdg to the SC: No matter how you look at it, the
company benefits. As such, in providing for a company car for
business use and/or for the purpose of furthering the company's
image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it
that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts
virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the
For large companies other than those cited in the example of the
preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important business
purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to
present to its clients and to the public in general, or - for practical
and utilitarian reasons - to enable its managerial and other
employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently.
In most cases, providing a company car serves both purposes.

company issue capably and responsibly.

Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car
to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the
injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Its not actually the end of the world for you if you are the
company. You still can present proof to rebut the presumption of
negligence in the selection of employees. If you are able to prove
that you exercised the diligence of a good father of a family by
giving instructions on how and when you use a company vehicle,
you can still be absolved of liability. Therefore in that situation, the
general rule applies. The general rule being laible ka lang pag office
hours.
Common Carriers
A common carrier can be a ER. So the question is if it is the driver of
a common carrier who commits a tort, would 2180 be applicable? It
depends on the cause of action filed by the plaintiff.
If it is culpa aquiliana, meaning the plaintiff is a non-passenger
YES.
If it is culpa contractual NO. You apply provisions in common
carrier.
Is there a difference between the liability of a common carrier ER
compared to an ordinary ER?
Parehas sila naay driver. Lets go to the codal provision first:
he cannot recover. But if the proximate cause is the negligence of

the defendant and the plaintiff negligence is contributory, what is
the rule? Apportion the liability. With respect to this aspect, pareha
ang effect sa contributory negligence when it comes to common
carrier ERs and ordinary ERs.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
So lets summarize the distinctions.
Ordinary ER
Acts covered in
order for there to
be
vicarious
liability
Acts performed on
the occasion or by
reason
of
the
functions entrusted
to him
Effect of violation
of orders
The EEs violation of

orders is a defense.
The fact that orders
were given for the
proper diligence to
be observed, it
proves that there is
supervision. And so
it is therefore a
defense.
It is a valid defense.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or

injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of
the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
Recall what 2180 states. Rememeber that it has to be on the
occasion of their functions. What they are doing must benefit the
ER. Otherwise there is no vicarious liability.
Under 1759, even if the EE acted beyond the scope of his authority
(driver sa bus, gisundo iyang uyab kay magjoyride in EDSA),
common carrier is still liable.
Remember 2180, resposnsibility shall cease if the defendant ER
proves that naay diligence in selection and supervision. So this
diligence therefore is not a defense with respect to common
carriers as ERs made liable for acts made by EEs.
Article 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does
not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the
proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common
carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
Recall what we know about contributory negligence in Article 2179
which must be related to 2180. What is the rule with respect to
contributory negligence in this jurisdiction? If the proximate cause
of the injury is the contributory negligence of the plaintiff himself,
Availability
of
defense in the
selection
and
supervision of EEs
Contributory
negligence
Apply 2179
Common Carrier
ER
All
acts
negligent man o
willful.
Even
though the EE
acted outside the
scope of authority
or
even
in
violation of the
ERs orders.
Not a defense.
Common carrier
would still be held
liable.
It is NOT a valid
defense.
Contributory
negligence
of
passenger
does
not bar recovery
for damages if the
proximate cause is
the negligence of
the carrier but the
amt of damages
shall be equitably
reduced.
Vicarious liability under the Revised Penal Code

Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall
also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations

engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their

servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
I know that youve discussed this in your criminal procedure xxx
about article 103 and how do you enforce subsidiary liability, here,
the liability again is subsidiary. Just remember the requisites :
-
That the employer is engaged in any kind of industry

which is not present in article 2180. Remember. It
doesnt matter whether the employer is engaged in
any kind of industry. For example I have a family
driver. Under article 2180 can I be held vicariously
liable even if technically speaking Im not engaged in
some form of industry? Under article 2180 yes
because it does not matter. but under article 103 I
cannot be held subsidiarily liable because I am not
engaged in an industry. Thats the difference.
But the employee is convicted of the offense
committed in the discharge of his duties
The employee is insolvent.
The State
This is difficult to understand therefore we need to understand
what is a special agent? Why is that the law mentions article 2176
when we are talking about 2180? R4emember there are two
aspects to the functions of the state and its liability :
Public or Governmental aspect where the state is liable

for tortuous acts of special agents only.
Private or business aspect, when the state engages in
business not performing governmental functions the
state is liable as an ordinary employer regardless of
whether it acts through a special agent.
A special agent is a government employee who commits a tort

while performing an act foreign to his usual use. For example you
are a clerk but because of lack of manpower in your department
you became a security guard. That is foreign to your usual position
and therefore in that regard can that be considered as special
agent? Yes. In the lose sense of the word because in Ople vs Paracio
May 29 1968 the state is liable only for torts committed by its
special agents specially commissioned. Meaning wala ka nag buot
kung unsa imong buhatun, you were told by your superiors in the
government that this is what you should do right now and what he
is going to do is foreign to his usual tasks. You are a clerk then the
secretary of the department told you that you are the manager
unya ikaw sugot pud ka kay libre kape. And which acts is outside
the regular duties of the special agent.
If the tort is committed by someone to whom the task properly
pertains. Lets say for example you are a driver of the government
and you committed a torts as a driver of the government. Can the

plaintiff hold the state liable? Once again you make a distinction. Is
it a public aspect or is it a private aspect? If it is PRIVATE, you apply
article 2180 ordinary employer ang state. But if it is a governmental
aspect performed by the state na naka commit ug tort ang iyang
driver, again you have to distinguish. If the driver was performing
his tasks as an ordinary agent or as a special agent. If special agent
state can be held liable. If ordinary lang ang agent meaning he is
performing a task which is usually being performed by him, you
apply 2176.
If the function performed is governmental acting through an
ordinary agent, no spe4cial commissions or special orders, he is
performing a task which pertains to him normally, can there be
vicarious liability? No apply article 2176. What does that mean? It
means you cannot sue the state for vicarious liability. If youre
plaintiff kinsa imong kasuhan? Only the public officer, not the state
that is the meaning of 2176.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
But if the functions performed by the government is for business or
private aspect and the agent who committed the tort is an ordinary
agent, again he performs his usual tasks, will there be vicarious
liability? Remember because it is business aspect, private interest of
the state Yes under 2180 but not under the second to the last
paragraph. You apply katung employer not katung sa state.
If the function performed is governmental acting through a special
agent, yes there is vicarious liability under article 2180 but under the
paragraph pertaining to the state. but if the function performed is
business the agent who committed the tort is a special agent you
cannot apply that paragraph pertaining to the state, you apply that
pertaining to the state as an ordinary employer. In other words the
general rule under article 2180 is applicable. As simple as that.
If the tort is committed by a public officer to whom the task
properly pertains the state is not liable vicariously. We apply 2176
which means that the public officer alone is liable.
Registered owner rule
If you are a registered owner of the motor vehicle, and the car met
an accident causing damage to another even if dili ikaw ang driver
sa sakaynan you can be held liable. Why? Because you are the
registered owner of the vehicle. I sold 3 cars. If I buy a brand new
car I sell it after 3 years and then I buy a new one. When I sell my car
to another person, automatic ba a na pag baligya nimo dili na ikaw
ang tag-iya sa car? Of course under civil law ang bag-ong nakapalit
ang tag-iya sa car. Because it is delivery that transfers ownership
but for purposes of regulation pa gang rehistro sa sakyanan wa pa
na balhin sa nag palit what happens, if it meets an accident ikaw
gihapon ang ma file-an ug kaso. Thats the registered owner rule.
So as much as possible what I dow hen I sell is to ensure na
nabalhin ang rehistro sa nakapalit because if something happens I

can be made liable masking wa koy sala.

MMTC vs Cuevas June 15 2015
Here the MMTC owns a lot of buses in metro manila area. In
entered into a MOA (agreement to sell) with Minas Transit where
the latter bought several buss units. Gipalit niya ang mga daan.
They agreed that MMTC shall retain ownership of the buses until
some conditions are met. But in the meantime Mina will operate
the buses. So for all intents and purposes kinsay tag-iya? MMTC pa.
But one of the buses met an accident. The passenger sued MMTC
and Minas Transit for damages. The contention of MMTC is that it
is unfair. While it retain ownership of the buses the actual operator
and employer of the bus driver was MInas transit and that a
provision in the MOA mandated Minas transit to hold it free from
liability arising from the operation and use of the buses. In other
words bawal ang mandamay. One cannot be prejudiced by the act
declaration or commission of another.
Did the SC believe MMTC? No. MMTC admitted ako gihapon ang
registered owner of the bus at the time of the incident. But
because of that it could not escape liability for the personal injuries
and property damage. This is because of the registered owner rule
where the registered owner of vehicle involved in a vehicular
accident is made liable for the consequences. The main aim of this
rule is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens or any
damage of injuries caused by the vehicle in public highways
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual the
registered owner.
The SC said that x x x It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle
mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered
as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily
liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in
relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
Summarize: Remember er-ee relationship created and supplied by
law. This is one of them. This registered owner rule. Technically
speaking, ang nakabangga ba imong employee? But because you
are the registered owner of the vehicle it is as if empleyado nimo
ang nakabangga. The vicarious liability of woners and managers
while technically speaking dili na nimo empleyado. So it is an er-ee
relationship somehow created by fiction of law.
Just because it is unfair doesnt mean it is the end of the world.
Why? Because you have a remedy. MMTC has a rememdy. File a
crossclaim against minas transit. xxx MMTC could recover from
Mina's Transit, the actual employer of the negligent driver, under
the principle of unjust enrichment, by means of a cross-claim
seeking reimbursement of all the amounts that it could be required
to pay as damages arising from the driver's negligence. while you
are the made liable you can ask reimbursement from the person
actually responsible or the actual employer.
A cross-claim is a claim by one party against a co-party arising out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein, and may include a
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant
Apparently you will be paid back but it is not a guarantee that you
will not be sued.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
dependents or employees may recover from the latter
what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
(1904)
Youre held vicariously liable but remember as well that because
liability here is direct derivative joint and solidary, you can be sued
directly being the employer. Pwede na ikaw ang pabayron directly
because you are the employer. The basis of liability under 2810 is
not really your negligence as if you were the one who did the tort.
No. it is because of the imputed negligence on the employer etc
because of their own lack of due care in the selection, supervision,
in preventing the damage or injury. Under the general provisions of
liabilities direct and primary, under the vicarious liability provision
liability is direct and derivative to a certain degree. If the defendant
is made liable under 2176, it therefore correspondent to his own
property if liability is based on 2180 the parent, employer, etc will
be proceeded directly against. Pwede direct sa ilaha. Take note of
article 2181 regarding the rights of one who pays for the damage
caused by another. What is the remedy? You have the right to
recover from the person over whom you are responsible like minor
child, employee, ward or special agent, what he has paid in
satisfaction of the claim. So that is statutory recognition of the
right of reimbursement because while the basis of liability is
presumed negligence in selection and supervision it is ultimately
the acts of the minor, employee or ward that causes damage.
PHILTRANCO vs. CA june 17 1997
The SC said that the liability of the employer for damages arising of
the tortuous acts of its employee is primary, direct, join, several or
solidary with the latter. ART. 219. the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the
employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse
if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it
has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence
which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict under article
2181.
Pwede nimo ma recover but it is not a guarantee that you will not
be made to pay. Mubayad gihapon ka under article 2181. Maka
recover ka. How much can you recover? Look at 2181. The law does
not qualify. In other words, full reimbursement. Although that
would not usually happen especially minor children. Ikaw mubayad
independent pa man na sa imo.
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
Nothing much here except to note that the provision has its
counterpart in the RPC in cases of civil liability of ex delicto and
enunciated in the case of Libi vs IAC where the SC noted that
pareha lang ang atoang rules na gina follow. The minor shall be
answerable or shall respond with his own property only In case of
insolvency of the former meaning parents. So thats the ruling. We

discussed that already.

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damage should come from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905)
First thing you need to remember, the word here is POSSESSOR not
OWNER of the animal. So whoever possesses the animal it can be
the caretaker, the owner or a blind person who has a dog. Anybody
who possesses an animal. Qwnership is not required. Next the
word, ANIMAL. The law does not distinguish therefore we shall not
distinguish. The law does not distinguish whether the animal is
domesticated or not. Wild ba or tamed ban a animal like a dog. (sir
is scared of dogs because they bite daw) Cats have never been
domesticated. Thats a scientific fact. They live with humans
because of convenience, but they hunt during nighttime. Monkeys,
I have a neighbor who owns a monkey. Snakes kay swerte. The only
pet I can have is fish because Im allergic to fur. LOL
For example you have a tiger like mike Tyson. It escaped. It has
committed an injury. You are liable. Whats the basis? Presumed
lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing
damage so it is based on the natural equity or principle of social
interest that he who possesses animals for his utility pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal caused.
Vestil vs IAC November 6, 1989
So ownership is not required in order for liability to attach, the law
does not speak of a vicious animal only but also covers tamed ones
as long as they cause injury. Actual control is not required. The
article says the possessor or user shall be liable even if the animal
should escape or be lost and so removed from his control.
There are two defenses available under this provision
(1) Force majeure. For example there is a horse driven
carriage and there is a sudden gunshot so the driver of
the carriage will not be held liable if the horse became
aggitate4d and then kicked people. Force majeuere na
because it is not your fault.
(2) from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
For example my sister, mahilig ug iro. Kumut-kumuton
bitaw sa iro napaakan bitaw na. nanggigil siya. sa ato pa
sala niya.
Remember the Afialda vs, Hisole we discussed that already. Red
vestil vs IAC November 6 1989 read it on your own.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable
with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could
have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune.
It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had
been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
Article 2180 are applicable. (n)
What does this provision require? You in effect the owner of the
vehicle, you are there with your driver you are supposed to get
intelligent back seat driver. So kung naa kay makita na reckless
imong driver its your responsibility as owner or employer to stop
the act of negligence. Should that apply to me? I am driven by
somebody whom I pay to drive me around but should that apply to
me? Can I be an intelligent backseat driver? Obviously I know
nothing about traffic rules and regulations. it applies to me
regardless of WON I have actual knowledge of the proper rules and
regulations. its part of your responsibility if you buy a vehicle. Take
not under article 2184 covers 3 situations.
(1.)
The owner if he could have, while he was in the vehicle,

by use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune but
fails to do so, then the owner is solidarily liable with the
driver.
By solidarity, it means that the obligation is demandable
from anyone of those who are jointly and solidarily liable.
How much shall he demand? The entire thing from one
person subject to the paying solidary debtors right to
reimbursement.
(2.)
If the driver had been found guilty of reckless driving or

violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months, the driver is disputably
presumed negligent and the owner is solidarily liable
with the driver
(3.)
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle you apply 2180
regarding employers, owners, managers liability.
Basis here would be ultimately the negligence of the servant if

known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by the
master reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
Cases you need to read:
(1) Corpus vs Paje July 31 1969
(2) Serra vs. muma march 14, 2012
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
(n)
Now whats the difference between 2184 and 2185? While both
presumed negligence the facts that would give rise to such
negligence are different, in 2184, clearly the driver is not the owner
himself because the owner there is required to be an intelligent
backseat driver. Passenger lang siya. In 2185 the driver may be the
owner or xxx. In 2184 when does the presumption arise? If the
driver has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice in the next preceding two months. In 2185
it is presumed that the person driving the motor vehicle is negligent
if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
Therefore in 2184 there is that element of frequency (twice within
the next preceding months) if that is the case there is liability.
There is a presumption. In 2185, only once is enough.

I dont know what this is.

Ramos vs col realty corpo august 28 2009 what was the violation
here? An MMDA provision not to cross an area of katipunan xxx.
In Guillang vs Bendia a truck while making a U turn failed to signal
Mendoza vs. Soriano Section 55 article 5 of the RA 4136 otherwise
known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code states that No
driver of a motor vehicle concerned in a vehicular accident shall
leave the scene of the accident without aiding the victim, except
under any of the following circumstances:
1. If he is in imminent danger of being seriously harmed by any
person or persons by reason of the accident;
2. If he reports the accident to the nearest officer of the law; or
3. If he has to summon a physician or nurse to aid the victim.
Take note of this rule because of this case. (Sir talked about
armored cars wherein drivers are instructed never to get out of the
vehicle)
Lapanday vs Angala june 21 2007 but this case happened during the
1990s not in 2007 because tot hose who knew my wife used to
work for lapanday only to stop last 2013. During the time this came
out my wife was still employed by lapanday. Where both drivers
were ruled for being negligent one for making a U-turn while at the
outer lane and the other for failing to slow down. So the law
applied is doctrine of last clear chance. Thats another example of
violating traffic regulations during accidents
Pleyto vs. phil rabbit bus lines june 16 2004 overtaking a tricycle
despite the presence of an incoming car in another lane. If there is a
very slow moving car in front of you in a highway its actually a
double edged sword. If you do not overtake it will take you forever
to reach where you would want to be. But you have to be very
careful when overtaking. So the SC applied here 2185.
RCJ buslines vs standard insurance company august 172011
exceeding the speed limit, thats a violation. 2185 is applied.
Crossing a bridge exceeding 30km/h
Ticson vs. pomasin august 24 2011 driving without a license.
However take note of the case of Anonuevo vs CA October 20
2004. What is involved here? Bicycle. Would art 2084 and 2085
apply to a quasi delict case where one of the xxx is a bicycle?
Subject ban a sa 2185? Is there a speed limit applied to bicycle? I
leave it to you to read.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the
proper government office a bond executed by a governmentcontrolled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third
persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed
by the competent public official. (n)
2186 theres nothing much there except perhaps to say that the
requirement of the law would be to file a bond executed by a
government controlled corporation or office to answer for
damages to third persons. You know compulsory third party liability
insurance. But that is not the same one that is refered to by 2186 so
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks,

toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or
injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers. (n)
We discussed this under strict liability but take note what 2187 says.
Even if there is no contractual privity between the consumer and
the manufacturer there is strict liability imposed for what type of
injury? Only death or injury. If there is no death or injury caused by
the substance would there be liability under 2187? No. there is no
liability. The provision only applies when there is death or injury. If
there is no death or injury not actionable only actual and not
potential injuries are actionable.
What is the proper remedy when the consumer discovers
something noxious in the product but is not injured thereby, you
apply this 1103 food and drugs act. Just take note of the remedy. So
you file a petition before the DOH which will determine whether a
product is substandard or materially defective, it shall so notify the
manufacturer distributor or seller thereof xxx such finding and
order such manufacturer distributor or seller to give notice to the
public or give notice to each distributor or retailer. (Sir told a story
about a seller of coca-cola who sued coca-cola bottlers because of
a noxious substance inside the bottle)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his
possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as
firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
So you dont really have to prove that the defendant when the
injury was caused was negligent and his possession of of dangerous
weapons or substance. There is a presumption which arises that he
was negligent if injury results. When would the exception apply?
indispensable in his occupation or business. Daghan. If he is a
policeman or a security guard. Or a competitive shooter. What
about dangerous substances such as poison that are exempt under
2188. A pharmacy. Who drinks aspirin? I cannot drink aspirin
because if I do I would die. Thats my poison. One mans medicine
can be another mans poison. Another example is a rat
exterminator.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision. (n)
Remember ownership over roads streets bridges etc is not required
all that is required is possession control or supervision of the roads.
Take note of the following cases:
(1.) City of Manila vs Teotico January 29 1968
Remember that it only applies to injury to persons. Problem is

under 2189 injury to property is not covered, for example you

are traversing a road and then nahulog imong sakyanan sa
manhole, naguba imong sakyanan xxx. Can you recover under
2189? No you cannot. To my mind it should be covered.
Because injury if you can recall the case of cinco vs canonoy for
quasi delict is not limited to physical or bodily injury. It also
covers injury to property.
(2.) Guilatco vs city of dagupan march 29 1989.
No need for ownership. The only thing needed is control
or supervision
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible
for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Just read it. There is nothing much under 2190.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care
of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive
substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate
place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or
property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes,
if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of
infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to
the place. (1908)
Again, just read it.
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles
should be the result of any defect in the construction
mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or
contractor in accordance with said article, within the period
therein fixed. (1909)
Just read it but cross reference it with article 1723
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within
fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice
falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished
by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall
be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply
waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect
mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
The action must be brought within ten years following the
collapse of the building. (n)

There is solidary liability on the part of engineer and architect that
supervises the construction together with the contractor na
iyahang gi tindog na building kay nag collapse by reason of the
defect of the plants or its specifications or to the defects of the
ground. Minor cracks of the building is not a problem for as long as
it is not structural thats okay. Acceptance of the building, after
completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by
reason of any defect but the action must be brought within 10 years
following the collapse of the building.
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a
part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same. (1910)
We have discussed this already under strict liability based on roman
law. We also discussed del positis vel suspensis which means the
mere placing of an object in a dangerous position that if it falls will
surely cause injury or damage is enough to make whoever
maintains that instrumentality liable. Even if nobody is injured. The
mere placing lang. actually a tort based on a potential injury rather
than an actual injury but it is not recognized in the Philippines.
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
Q:Kinsa ang di kasabot ug solidary? Is this the same solidary that we
find in civil law?
A: solidary means that any of the obligors can be made liable for
the full amount subject to reimbursement of the proportionate
share of the other obligors.
Sir: lets say Im the er and youre the ee and you committed a tort
and the liability is solidary. In other words the plaintiff can go
against me and I paid the full amount. How much can I get from
you? Our liability here for quasi delict is solidary. How much can I
get from you?
A: you can get full reimbursement and not merely a share.
Sir: So it is not solidary in its traditional sense because when you
talk about solidarity there is a right of proportionate
reimbursement and not full reimbursement.
Februuary 26, 2016

RMONDAY
The practice of medicine is so intertwined with the way that we live
our lives right now that it has to be regulated and there are certain
injury, damage that might occur to a person because of negligence
or want of care of medical practitioners.
So what is medical malpractice? In the case of Garcia-Rueda vs.
Pascasio, the Supreme Court had the occasion to define medical

malpractice or medical negligence is that type of claim which a

victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by
a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. And there
are elements to it of course because we are talking here about a
possible cause of action by a patient against a medical professional
and you have of course to comply with certain elements:
1st is the duty owed by the physician as created by the
physician-patient relationship to act in accordance with a
specific norms or standards established by this
profession. In other words there is no medical malpractice
suit if there is no physician-patient relationship.
2nd The breach of the duty by the physicians failing to act
in accordance to physicians failing to act in accordance
with the applicable standard of care which we will be of
course discussing later on in the light of the cases decided
by the SC.
3rd Causation or there must be a reasonably close and
causal connection between the negligent act or omission
and the resulting injury, you can relate this with what we
discussed on the general elements of a quasi delict under
2176 that the act or omission of the defendant must be
the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff
4th The damages suffered by the plaintiff. Remember that
even if there is duty on the part of a physician which he
has breached either by failing to observe the proper
medical standards or by deviating from the standard of
care that is normally associated to a particular procedure
or treatment to a medical field, if there is no damage or
injury upon the person of the patient that is considered a
non actionable thing. Dapat naay damage, it becomes
damnum absque injuria or loss which the law does not
consider a legal injury.
In short the elements are simply: duty, breach, proximate causation
and injury or damage. We will go over all of these elements of
medical malpractice cases.
1st would be duty. In the case of SPOUSES FLORES vs. SPOUSES
PINEDA, duty arises when the plaintiff employs the service of a
physician, thus creating a physician-patient relationship between
them. Acceptance by the physician of a patient for treatment in
effect creates a representation on the part of the former that he
has the needed training and skill possessed by those in the same
field and that they will employ the said training, care and skill in
treating the patient. For example you go to the doctor when you
feeling something at the right side of your abdomen so what could
it be possibly appendicitis. So you to a physician to contract or
engage his services to determine whether or not you have an
inflamed appendix. Now what is the duty of a physician the
moment that you consult him? First to examine you with the proper
care, why the proper care because a physician needs to come up
with a proper diagnosis. If you have appendicitis, a physician who
diagnoses it, lets say with pregnancy is problematic because that
would portray that the physician was not properly diagnosing and
after proper diagnosis the physician would also have the duty to
prescribe the proper treatment or medication to treat the ailment.
Nobody goes to the doctor for the sake of going to the doctor. You
go to the doctor because there is something that ails you. What is
the standard of care required? Remember in quasi delict cases in
2176 the standard of care required is simply the diligence of a good
father of the family. Contrast that with the case of common carriers
where the law itself under 1755 of the Civil Code creates that
standard of more than ordinary diligence because what the law
requires is the standard of extra ordinary diligence.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Now isnt the requirement of diligence in 1755 appropriate also to
be required in the medical profession? What else in the case of
Compania Maritima v CA 164 S 285, according to the SC ang extra
ordinary diligence kuno amounts to rendering service with the
greatest skill and foresight. Which begs a question, what type of
skill is required in driving you. So it also tells you that isnt skill
something that could be best attributed to a profession where a
skill is really required. Theres a skill that is required in conducting
surgeries. In medical treatment only ordinary diligence is required
the law does not make any requirement that when it comes to
medical treatment whether it is a simple diagnosis or surgery,
whether it is minor or major surgery, it should be extra ordinary
diligence. The Philippine Medical Act doesnt say that. The canons
of the medical profession did not explicitly require extra ordinary
diligence. Once again it posses a question, if you contract for
medical care will you not expect that you will be treated as far as
care human foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard to all the circumstances?
Furthermore will you not expect your doctor to render the medical
service with the greatest skill and foresight? The law requires
ordinary diligence when in fact standards apply to mere common
carriers is less stringent compared to the ones that are employed to
medical field? Why is it like that? Wouldnt that promote laziness on
the part of the doctors? There has to be skill and foresight in the
industry.
Lets go to the case of Reyes v The Sisters of Mercy, according to
the SC the medical profession is one which like the business of a
common carrier is affected with public interest, which again
justifies the comparison that I am trying to make. In the contract of
common carrier its extra ordinary diligence impressed with public
interest. Medical field according to the SC, also affected with public
interest, but the degree of care required is simply ordinary
diligence. Why is there a variance in the required diligence?
Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy
Why is there a variance in the required diligence when the SC
itself said that the diligence in the medical profession is one like
a common carrier and affected by public interest?
The practice of medicine is already envisioned with one with the
highest degree of diligence. The standard contemplated for
doctors is simply the reasonable average merit among ordinarily
good physicians.

The question is you said stringent na siya daan, how so? How
stringent or high? In the medical profession the doctor takes the
medical school, medical board, residency, specialization and
practice the medical profession and there is a need to
continuously educate yourself and your conduct is subject to
stringent guidelines and regulations by the government itself,
so why is there a need to call it extra ordinary diligence. What
the SC here is saying that its just a matter of nonmenclature
that we do not call it extra ordinary diligence because the
degree of care is already within the system. Built na siya eh. No
need to call it extra ordinary diligence to differentiate it from
other professions or activities, it is in itself very strict. Thats
what the SC is saying, Its not saying that the degree of care
require is only ordinary, ordinary in the sense that it is lower
than extra ordinary diligence. The degree of diligence should
depend the nature of the obligation and corresponds to the
circumstances of persons, of time and of place. Lahi ang
circumstances sa medical profession compared to selling
profession.
So to compare for common carriers rarely there is no pre
qualification process. The only pre qualification process is you
get a student permit, take and exam and you are issued a
license, thats it. While you are already in possession of a license
all you need to do is to follow traffic rules and regulations. Now
the practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by
qualified individuals. It is acquired through years of education,
training and by first obtaining a license from the state through
professional board examinations. Such license may at any time
and for a cause be revoked by the government in addition to
state regulation the conduct of medical profession is governed
by the hypocratic oath. Whats a hypocratic oath? 1 st an ancient
code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed
upon themselves in recognition and acceptance of their great
responsibility to society, given these safeguards there is no
need to expressly require doctors the observance the extra
ordinary diligence. Its saying no need to call it extra ordinary
because it already is extra ordinary.
For contracts of carriage there is in effect a guarantee for
passengers or goods will arrive at their destinations safely and
securely. Although you are familiar with the doctrine that
common carriers are not insurers against all risks. Now is it not
in fact that when you contract for transportation you have that
reasonable expectation that you will reach your destination
safely and securely, failing to do hat the common carrier is
automatically liable. Kung di ka ma hatod kung as aka mag pa
hatod, according to the degree of care stated in the civil code it
simply means one thing the common carrier is already in breach
regardless of how limited or how slight the negligence there is a
guarantee. But in the medical profession naa bay gurantee? It is
of such nature that no guarantee of results can be made. A
doctor cannot warrant that the patient after treatment will be
cure of his disease, walay in ana na guarantee in the same way
that in the legal profession you should not make any
guarantees.
So that is the difference between a medical contract and the
contract of carriage.
In addition in the case of Reyes v Sisters of Mercy the practice

conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence as we already
noted the standard contemplated for doctors is simply he
reasonable average merit among ordinarily good physicians that
is reasonable diligence for doctors, as the CA call it, the
reasonable skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same
or similar locality . . . should apply.
Therefore wala ta gina ingon na dapat tanan doctor should be
pareha sa pinaka kuyaw na doctor in the history of the world,
no. There is no such requirement, what is the requirement is
you look at the degree of care that is regularly employed by
other practitioners in that field of the profession. Thats what
is required. That is ordinary care under the circumstances. It
means that a physician is expected to use the same level of
care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use
under the same circumstances.
Lets go to breach, what is breach in the context of medical

malpractice? This would be breach of these professional duties of
skill and care and their improper performance by a physician or
surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health
constitutes actionable malpractice. Whether or not a physician has
committed an inexcusable lack of precaution in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care
observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or at the present state of
medical science. So breach of duty therefore occurs under 2
situations:
1st When the physician fails to comply with
2nd If he deviates from these professional standards.
If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach the
physician is answerable for negligence.
So remember mao ni ang importante nato na timan an for you to
determine whether or not there is a breach, it is either there is a
failiure to meet the standards demanded by the medical profession
which of course an omission, kay failure man, or a deviation from
the said standards which we know to be positive act, ikaw jud
mismo nag deviate, nag imbento ka ug kaugalingon nimo na
treatment, that is deviation.
So how do you prove breach? Kini siya mejo evidentiary so perhaps
my students before in evidence might be able to appreciate this. To
establish breach there must be evidence as to the recognized
standards of the medical community in the particular case and a
showing that the physician in question negligently departed from
standard that is needed. You need to remember those things,
evidence of the standards, unsa ba usually gina buhat pag in ani na
sakit or procedure and a showing that that there is that deviation,
na wala niya gi follow and standard that is recognized by the
medical community in that particular case.
So lets go to the first one, evidence as to the medical standards. 1st
thing that you have to remember, medical standards of treatment
cannot be the subject of mandatory judicial notice. Judicial notice is

something where you do not have to present any proof to convince

the judge that it exists because it is of common knowledge. Its so
known already. An example of would be laws of nature. It would be
absurd if the judge would not take judicial notice of the laws of
nature. So judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges properly take and act on without proof because they already
know them. Judicial notice allows a fact to be introduced into
evidence if the truth of that fact is so notorious or well known that
it cannot be refuted. It is the cognizance of certain facts by the
court with out proof because they are facts which by common
experience are of universal knowledge among intelligent persons
within a country or community. Now why cant you apply judicial
notice? The court is simply saying you dont have to prove it, you
dont have to present any evidence because I am taking judicial
notice. I am accepting it as a fact. Mao na ang gina ingon sa judicial
notice. Nagano man? You need to remember that medical field is
specialized. Judges do not know the medical field. Medicine,
remember is a highly scientific and technical field, judges are not
expected to know about medicine. Medical knowledge cannot be
gained by mere common experience. Judicial notice is of common
experience and not personal experience. Judicial knowledge is not
the same with judicial notice. So there are 2 which evidence of
medical standards can be introduced:
1st By expert testimony
2nd By the use of learned medical treatises
By expert testimony
Lets go 1st to By expert testimony. According to the SC
because pa balik-balik lang siya. Because ours are courts of law and
not tribunals of medicine, a judge is not expected to be well versed
in the medical field, generally therefore expert medical testimony is
relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a
negligent act or has deviated from the standard medical procedure.
Only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent
to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated
upon with a reasonable degree of skill. So the doctrine to
remember here is, to prove medical malpractice in medical
maltreatment you need the opinion of an expert witness. Its one
of those cases under the law where expert testimony is absolutely
required.
In Cruz v CA, Lydia was admitted in a perpetual health
clinic general hospital for hysterectomy. Her daughter Rowena
noticed that the clinic was untidy, that she persuaded Lydia not to
proceed with the operation. So she was there waiting upon her
mom, noticed that her window is dusty so she had to call
somebody to wipe the window. So they were convinced after the
operation to buy blood from the blood bank. There after a person
arrived to donated blood, Rowena noticed her mother was
attached attached to an oxygen tank grasping for breath,
apparently the oxygen supply of the clinic ran out. They had to rush
to San Pablo Hospital to procure an oxygen tank. When they
arrived with the oxygen tank, at 10 oclock, she went into shock and
her blood pressure dropped. Lydias unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to San Pablo Hospital so she could be
connected to a respirator and further examined. The family did not
even know that Lydia transferred to San Pablo Medical Hospital.
They only learned na niabot na ang ambulance to take Lydia and
they had no recourse but to follow the ambulance in a tricycle.
Lydia died due to shock and disseminated intravascular
coagulation. The cause of death disseminated intravascular

coagulation is due to blood transfer reactions. When the blood
transfused with the patient. Isnt it the duty of the hospital to
determine compatibility issues between the donor and the
hospital? The attending physician was prosecuted for reckless
imprudence. The prosecutions expert witnesses in the persons of
Dra. Rizala and Dr Salvador of the NBI only testified as to the
possible cause of death but not venture as to the standard of care
that the attending physician should have exercised. So nay expert
witnesses but the threshold issue is what should an expert witness
testify on? When He testify that the cause of death would be
katong disseminated intravascular coagulation is that enough tot
have causation or could it be actionable. According to the SC in as
much the causes of injury involved in the transactions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support
the conclusion as to position In the immediate review of the
records is the absence of expert testimony on the matter of
standard of care employed by the other physicians of good
standing in the conduct of similar case. So its essential you have to
testify unsa man ang standard of care because without testimony
as to the proper standard of care you wouldnt be able to
determine what duty is involved and 2 nd whether or not there is
negligence (?).For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the
requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is,
in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.[30] The
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians
stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical
skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating.[31] Expert testimony should have been offered to prove
that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of
conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other
physicians in good standing when performing the same operation.
It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician
are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established.[32] This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. You have to testify to
a medical certainty as to the fact that there was a breach and there
is a duty to and you may only be able to do that if there is expert
testimony to the effect that there is a particular standard of care
that was not followed. Nobody else can tell you that. Only an
expert because only an expert can tell you what usually is the
procedure in particular types of cases. Now you have to remember
the human body is universal. Wherever you go your body will be the
same. It is not subject to laws or jurisdiction. Bisan asa ka mag pa
opera ang operasyon pareha ra. So it is therefore susceptible of
expert testimony. Unlike the law, daghan kaau expert sa law
because the law is subject to several interpretations. Ang lawas sa
usa ka tao pareha ra na.
The probability that Lydias death was caused by DIC was
unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this
Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her
acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are
bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold
inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until

proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. So that was treated as a

reasonable doubt. But the SC held the dra Cruz liable for damages.
Why? According to the SC masking naay reasonable doubt,
remember that the quantum of proof required in civil cases is
simply preponderance of evidence. SO the SC awarded 400,000 to
the family of Lydia.
Now purpose of expert testimony, in the case of LUCAS
vs. TUANO, it seems basic that what constitutes proper medical
treatment is a medical question that should have been presented
to experts. If no standard is established through expert medical
witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the
basic issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon. The (RTC
and Court of Appeals, and even this Court,) courts could not be
expected to determine on its own what medical technique should
have been utilized for a certain disease or injury. Absent expert
medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in
speculations.
Learned Medical Treatises
Now what about the learned medical treatises, under
Rule 130, Section 46 of the Rules of Court, they are exceptions to
the hearsay rule. So a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on
a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to
prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice (Remember that what the court takes judicial notice would
be the treatise, the court here does not take judicial notice of a
fact, only the applicability of certain principles in that treatise), or a
witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in
his profession or calling as expert in the subject. Remember that
what the court takes judicial notice would be the treatise. What is
contained in the treatise? The court here is not taking judicial notice
of the contents of a fact, only the applicability of certain principles
in that treatise or a witness that is expert to a certain subject
testifies that the writer of a statement in the treatise, periodical or
pamphlet, is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the
subject.
Who is an expert? Because there is a need for an expert
opinion or expert testimony. In the context of medical malpractice
cases, an expert witness is one who belongs to the profession or
calling, meaning in the field of medicine to which the subject
matter of inquiry the medical malpractice or medical negligence
relates and who possesses the special knowledge on questions on
which he proposes to express an opinion. So there can be expert in
any particular technical issue in court. Dili lang kay kanang sa
medical, example expert in hand writing. So mao na siya ang
definition sa expert in People v Abriol. Question, is there a definite
standard in determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a
witness must possess in order to testify as an expert. Lets say for
example its a medical malpractice case dapat ba nay certain
qualifications ang usa ka witness in order for him to be qualified as
an expert witness. In general no, Im talking about expertise in
general. It is sufficient that the following factors are present:
1, Training and education. Take note that it is training and
education. Why? Because some people might be educated
but they are not trained and some people might be

trained but they are not necessarily educated.
2. Particularity or first hand familiarity with the facts of
the case. In order for you to properly present an opinion
in a medical negligence case it is enough that the expert
witness must have at least studied the case, not
necessarily studied the plaintiff because the plaintiff could
be dead.
3. Presentation authorities or standards upon which his
opinion is based.
In general no need for education actually training is sufficient. So
how do you acquire expertise? In general there is no precise
requirement as to the most in which skill or experience shall have
been acquired. Scientific study and training are not always
essential to the competency of a witness as an expert, knowledge
acquired by doing is no less valuable than that acquired by study.
So in that case the standard in determining whether or not the
person is a witness and therefore this guy is a henyo. However in
medical malpractice cases because it is required that the
recognized standards of the medical community in the particular
kind of case be proven expertise must be both scholastic and
experiential. So dili lang enough na educated ka. Dili lang enough
na trained ka. Dapat educated and trained ka in the medical
profession and if that is the case therefore this woman is an expert.
Expert testimony, however, is no longer needed when the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor applies. The thing speaks for itself. For example
an x ray showing an apparatus inside the stomach of a person who
has recently underwent an operation. So it leads to a conclusion
that it must have ben left there by the surgeon. So the thing speaks
for itself. What is the effect of res ipsa loquitor? It shifts the
burden, instead of a plaintiff proving by a preponderance of
evidence that the physician was negligent because the thing
speaks for itself its the duty of the physician to present proof that
he was not negligent. Although expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that the physician to present
proof that he was not negligent. Although generally expert medical
testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the
standard of medical procedure when the docrine of res ipsa
loquitor is availed by the plaintiff the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides for
the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the
necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly
within the domain of medical science and not to matter that are
within common knowledge to mankind which may be testified to
by anyone familiar to the facts. Diba kung nabinlan ka karon ug
medical equipment inside of your body that is something of course
that speaks for itself. Anybody can testify that that is something
that is negligent. Dili nimo kinahanglan ug expert. Now testimony
as to absolute necessity of physicians and surgeons, external
appearance s, manifest conditions which are observable by anyone
may be given by non expert witnesses, So actually what tells you
that there is something wrong? Only common knowledge and
experience. No need for scientific training or experience. When the
doctrine is appropriate, the patient must prove a nexus between a
particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained
while under the management and custody of the defendant

without need to procure expert medical testimony to establish the

standard of care. Example there is the case of Ramos v CA,
remember the enumeration of the SC in this case: leaving a foreign
object in the body of the patient after an operation, injury
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under or in
the area of treatment removal of the wrong part of the body when
another part was intended, knocking out of tooth while the
patients jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils
and loss of an eye while the patient was under the influence of
anesthetic during or after the operation for appendicitis among
others. So mao ni ang mga gi gather sa SC na example from the
jurisprudence what are examples of res ipsa loquitor. Res ipsa
loquitor is the origin or the ordinary doctrine to the perfunctory use
of the rule to be cautious to be applied depending upon the
circumstances of each case. A distinction must be made between a
failure to secure results and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
followed the usual procedure or skill in that particular practice. It
must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can have no
application is a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves
the diagnosis or scientific study. The mere fact na niadto ka ug
doctor, wla ka nangayo, that does not necessarilyequate to the
application of res ipsa loquitor. It must be necessarily something
more, Remember medical practitioners are not insurers or gurantor
of success in treatment. Res ipsa loquitor is not available in a
malpractice suit if the only showing is tht the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished. Requisites for the
application of the doctrine:
1. The accident was of a crime that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent.
2. The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged.
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
At point here would be the case of Solidom v Pp, what
happened here was Gerald was born with an imperforate anus. So
when he was 2 years old he had a colostomy operation. When he
was 3 years old a pull through operation was conducted. Meaning
katong gi realign na intestine ibalik na unya butangan ug bangag.
However after the operation he became comatose and after 2
months he regained consciousness but he could no longer hear, see
or move. His mother filed a case against the anesthesiologist,
question before the operation, except for the fact that they had an
imperforate anus, was he normal? Wala man siyay lain medical
conrcern. So except for the operation, he was normal. Wouldnt
that be something to call for the application of res ipsa loquitor?
Lets look at the information first. did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect to use the care and
diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said
circumstance, by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels
of anesthesia administered to said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and
using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications, causing as a
consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD
ALBERT GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect
called hypoxic encephalopathy meaning insufficient oxygen supply in
the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO incapable
of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and
prejudice. Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor apply? No accrding
to the SC Although it should be conceded without difficulty that
the second and third elements were present, considering that the
anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the
control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then
unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of
contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably
wanting. The 1st element here is lacking the finding of negligence.
Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that
caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as
bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pullthrough operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to
the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence
of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists,
had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to
him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex,
prompting them to administer atropine to the patient. So vagovagal reflex is a reaction, although dili kayo siya common na
reaction, its a reaction that can happen when anesthesia is
administered. So according to the SC kani in anin na injury, its rare
but it can happen. Under the circumstances, it cannot be
reasonable to infer that the physician was negligent, there was no
palpably medical act. There was no expert medical testimony to
create the inference that negligence caused the injuries.
The 3rd element, the definition of medical negligence in
both Garcia v Pascasio and Flores v Pineda, contemplate only bodily
harm or death of a patient. Can you consider psychological or
emotional harm? Like when the doctor molested the patient, ang
emotional harm ba ana be considered medical malpractice? For all
intents and purposes that will be considered bodily harm, not
emotional or psychological harm. What about if the doctor violated
confidentiality? In other words pag treat sa imoha and found out
you have 3 testicles and the doctor shared that information in
violation of the duty owed by a physician to his patient, what harm
will result? Definitely not bodily harm, would that be covered?
Based on the definition of medical malpractice, no. It might
constitute a different actionable wrong but not under medical
malpractice. How about Hayden Kho, according to them his act of
taking videos *scandal* is immorality. Immorality according to the
medical board constitutes malpractice. Thats the reason why his
license was revoked, because of immorality and according to them
is conduct of unbecoming a physician. When you say conduct
unbecoming a physician, that constitutes malpractice. Thats the
reason for revocation of his license. How about Maricar Reyes? She
was not the author of the video so her license was not revoked.
Take note in the recent case of Casumpang v Cortejo,
March 11, 2015 the SC did not change the definition of what
constitutes medical malpractice, still bodily harm or death of a
patient. So short of bodily harm, there cannot be any medical
malpractice. Maskin unsa pa na siya, if it does not amount to bodily
harm, it is technically speaking not medical malpractice.
Lets go to causation. There must be reasonably close and
causal connection between the negligent act or ommission and the
resulting injury. The critical factor in medical negligence case is
proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the
evidence established and the plaintiffs injuries. The plaintiff must
plead and prove not only that he had been injured and defendant
has been at fault but also that the defendants fault cause the

injury. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical

probability based upon competent expert witness. So actually
when you talk about causation in medical malpractice suits, its the
same as causation in general court law. Thus the same defenses for
causation including the concept of an efficient intervening cause
applies in medical malpractice case. Example there would be
CAYAO-LASAM vs. RAMOLETE, December 18, 2008.
threshold issue therefore is whether a doctor can be

considered an employee of the hospital. If he is, 2180 applies.
For that read Ramos v CA, December 29, 1999.
CAYAO-LASAM vs. RAMOLETE

According to their complaint or cause of action, what is the
proximate cause of their injury? The negligence of the doctor.
The patient here was advised, after the discharge, by the
doctor to return for follow up check ups. However the patient
failed to comply.
SC: The proximate cause was not the doctors negligence but
the patients failure to return for the follow up check up. It was
an injury that was easily treatable. So all that the plaintiff has
to do is to go back, but she did not do that. So if we assume
that the negligence of the medical professional here was the
proximate cause, remember that the failure to come back for a
follow up check can be considered an efficient intervening
cause. So same doctrines that we discussed when we were
talking about proximate causation under 2176. So whats the
extent of liability here? If ever the physician committed
actionable malpractice as a solo practitioner and in the course
of treatment in his own clinic, liability would be based under
2176. It stands to reason, siya ang nay sala, siya ra dapat ang
nay sala. Remember when it is direct liability apply 2176. But if
a physician is a mere employee remember that a vicarious
liability is proper under 2180, under paragraph that owners and
managers of establishment, for damages caused by employees
for damages that are caused but what we do remember in
2180 is that for employment based vicarious liability it is
essential to prove employer-employee relationship in
accordance with law and in accordance with labor law di ba
nay 4 fold test in trying to determine whether or not
emplotyer-employee exists. Take note in the case of nursing
aids they are actually employees of the hospital. Its the
hospital that selects them, engages them and pays their wages
and fires them. The employers reserve the right under the law
not only the end to be achieved and the means to be
employed to achieve such end.
In the cause of Spouses Jaime, to sustain claims against
employers specially in the case of the hospital employees, the
following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally
or through another;
(2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or
by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Now what about doctors? Take note that many of them are
independent contractors. If you recall your labor law what do
you do to negate employer-employee relationship? The
common defense would be, specially to skilled professionals,
would be that they are independent contractors. So the
March 4, 2016
MMUNGCAL
DAMAGES
This will be the second to the last major topic that we are going to
be discussing because as I have told you already I am not going to
discuss nuisance anymore, what I am going to discuss is human
relations after we talk about damages.
How do you react when you see the word DAMAGES? Lahi ang
reaction sa usa katao nga dili law student or a non-lawyer when he
hears about the term damages because when we talk about
damages in law, naa nah siyay particular signification. Take note
that the term damages came from the Latin word damnum or
demo which means to take away and in the Civil Code, damages
could mean either two things:
Actual injury or loss caused to
another by a violation of his legal rights; or
The sum of money which the law
awards or imposes as pecuniary
compensation
to
recompense
or
satisfaction for injury done or wrong
sustained as a consequence of either a
breach of contractual obligation or a
tortious act.
Now, what are we going to discuss beginning from Article 2195
would be the second signification of the term damages. Meaning,
kadtong recompense, the sum of money which the law awards
because of a particular injury.
Let us go to Article 2195. Nothing much there.
Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively
applicable to all obligations mentioned in article 1157.
Also keep in mind what we learned in Obligations and Contracts
that damages can be due for any source of obligation, whether it
be an obligation that arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts,
acts or omissions punished by law or quasi-delicts, damages will be
awarded.
Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to
special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code.
Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death,
injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Rules governing
damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they
are not in conflict with this Code.

Nothing much about Article 2196. What I want you to remember

would be Article 2197, what are the different forms of damages:
Kung pila ang gasto sa paayo, mao nah siya ang danyos nga ihatag
sa plaintiff.
Article 2197. Damages may be:
Now, remember the requisites for the award of actual damages.

Remember that actual damages must be pleaded in the complaint
or in certain cases, a counterclaim. So it must be pleaded in the
complaint form. The general rule is if you do not plead actual
damages, or if you are not able to plead actual damages in court,
even if you are able to prove it, then dili nah siya iallow. Actual
damages, remember, must be proved and it requires evidentiary
proof. And what evidence may be introduced to prove the amount
of actual damages? Well of course, receipts. In the form of receipts.
For death indemnity later on that we will be discussing, the plaintiff
should also present the death certificate because death indemnity
is a form of actual damages.
(1) Actual or compensatory;

(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.
In reviewers, ang ilahang Mnemonics nila ana is simply MENTAL.
Makes it easier to remember, but if you want to impress the bar
examiner, you have to give it in the proper order that they appear
in Article 2197.
Article 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are
hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code.
Meaning, the provisions of the Civil Code on damages should be
read together with the other provisions of the Civil Code and the
principles of the general law would also be read together with the
provisions of the Civil Code on damages. An example there would
be under this old case of: Receiver for North Negros Sugar Company
Inc. vs. Ibaez:
Damages due to the deceased person may be paid to
his next of kin based on the general law on
succession.
You do not find that in the provisions of law on Damages. You
might find that on the principles that govern succession. Diba? So
you have to read that together with the provisions of law on
damages.
So let us go straight to Article 2199 now. We are talking here of
Actual or Compensatory Damages.
Article 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Now, what immediately strikes us when we look at Article 2199 is
the fact that you are to be given compensation if you are able to
prove it. That is the nature of actual or compensatory damages.
They indicate that if the law says 2191 are those that you actually
sustained or damages that are susceptible of measurement in
terms of money. Now, the purpose of actual damages is to
compensate actual injury and to put the injured party in the
position in which he was before he was injured.
A typical example would be damage to property. Let us say, naay
sakyanan, he was driving recklessly, nabanggaan mismo imong
sakyanan. And of course, you are not at fault, you are not doing
anything. That person who was negligent should suffer the loss.
Now, what was the position of the motor vehicle prior to the
bumping? It was in resting condition. And therefore, actual
damages should be given in order to put the injured party in the
position in which he was prior to the injury. So, irestore, ipaayo.
Now, what happens if you are able to prove it, but you were not
able to claim it? What is the effect if actual damages were not
pleaded or prayed for in the complaint or answer or in the
counterclaim? Let us recall what we know from Civil Procedure.
Remember that a court cannot consider anything that is not
pleaded. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over that issue.
Diba? So the question is what if you are still able to prove it in court
despite the fact that you were not able to plead it?
In the case of Heirs of Justiva vs. Court of Appeals, January 31, 1963:
As a general rule, actual damages will not be
awarded, but even if they are not pleaded, but if they
are proven during trial, actual damages can be
awarded based on the general prayer in the
complaint, such other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises are also prayed for. Except in those
cases where the law authorizes the imposition of
punitive or exemplary damages, a party claiming
damages must establish by competent evidence the
amount of such damages and courts cannot give
judgment for a greater amount than that actually
proven.
That is the rule, whatever you are able to prove, you are entitled to
it. If you fail in proving these damages, then, it will not be given to
you. It is as simple as that. So, a court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or he cannot resort as to the fact of amount of
damages, but must depend on actual proof that damages have
been suffered and the evidence of the amount of actual damages.
Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be
duly proved. Take note, in the case of DBP vs Court of Appeals and
Spouses Mangubat, October 16, 2005 (Note: 1995 pag isearch), the
Supreme Court ruled that:
The list of damages extra-judicially prepared by the
plaintiff without supporting receipts is inadmissible
in evidence as factum probans or evidentiary proof
or evidentiary fact. Hence, in order that damages
maybe recovered, the best evidence obtainable by
the injured party must be presented.
Let us go to Article 2200.

Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not

only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits
which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)
Duha kaklase nah siya under Article 2200.
So, when you talk about the value of the loss suffered, that is actual
damages or otherwise known as danno emergente or damnum
emergens or damno vitando. Why I am trying to tell you about all
these alternate things? So that dili mo maliba pag.abot sa bar
examinations with respect to Shock and Awe questions. Shock and
Awe questions, once again, are those questions which tests what a
student does not know rather than what he actually knows. So, as
much as possible, try to be familiar with the different terms that
you will encounter when you read your books and the
compensatory damages or profits which the obligee failed to claim
or lucrocessante or lucrocessans.
Article 2201 is a very, very important provision as far as I am
concerned.
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for
which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those
that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
xxx
When you act in good faith, it does not mean that you are not
liable, there will still be liability, but your liability is limited
compared to an obligor in bad faith. Because if you are an obligor in
bad faith, what will be your liability? According to the second
paragraph.
xxx
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)
So if you acted in bad faith, the damages are not limited only to
those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach, but rather, anything that might be reasonably attributed to
the non-performance of the obligation can be assessed against the
debtor. So that is a very, very big distinction as far as I am
concerned.
Example that being the case of Lopez vs. PanAm which I know that
you have read already when we were discussing quasi-delicts.
In an ordinary breach of contract of carriage, a
passenger who does not reach his destination safely
and securely is entitled to actual damages.
So bayaran imong fare or the difference between the fare,
hospitalization expenses, if there be some injury.
However, if the contract is breach in bad faith, such
as in the case of Lopez vs. PanAm, then other forms
of damages might be due; thus, the airline
fraudulently confirmed first class bookings noting
that there were not any available, moral damages
imposed as well.
So, dako. Rather than imong liability is simply pay the difference
between the fare, but if there is bad faith, mudako imohang liability
other forms of damages might be warranted already. That is with
respect only to contracts and quasi-contracts.
What about for crimes and quasi-delicts?
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
So there is no requirement anymore of foreseeability. What is
required here is simply probability, natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. So, your
obligation in Article 2202 is similar to an obligor in bad faith. Mas
grabe pa actually when we talk of 2202.
Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
resulting from the act or omission in question.
So if you are a victim, if you are the plaintiff, you have that
obligation. You have that obligation to also do everything in your
power to also minimize your own damages or injury. Let us say for
example, gidunggab ka, Ah, dili na lang ko magpaayo, any way
mahospital bitaw ko, ang mubayad ang defendant bitaw. You do
not do that. You also have to do something to vindicate the injury.
An important case to remember here which clearly illustrates 2203
is the case of Lasam vs. Smith 45 Phil 657.
Here, the defendant Smith owned a public garage
undertook to take plaintiffs from San Fernando to
Currimao, Ilocos Norte. On leaving San Fernando, the
automobile was operated by a licensed chauffer, but
later the chauffer allowed his assistant, who had no
driving license, but who had some experience in
driving to drive. So, gipadrive niya ang lain, an
unauthorized driver. After crossing the Abra River,
the car zigzagged for about half a kilometer, left the
road and went down, the car overturned and the
plaintiffs were pinned down under it. Lasam escaped
with a few concussions but his wife received serious
injuries among which was a compound fracture of
one of the bones of her left wrist. In other words, to
give you a picture, there is a decaying bone beneath
her skin, sa may left wrist niya. But, she refused any
treatment, dili siya gusto magpaopera. You do not
know how many people are like that? Dili ganahan
magpaopera, whether for religious or personal
reasons.
The lower court granted the plaintiff P1,254.10 as
damages. Imagine, this is 45 Philippine Reports, so
this is long time ago and P1,250.10 damages is
actually a big amount. From this decision, plaintiffs
appealed claiming that they are entitled to P7,832.80

as damages, a difference of around P6,600.

So the question simply is unsa ba ang tama nga award for damages,
would it be P1,254.10 or P7,832.80? If everything that the plaintiff is
complaining about is attributable to the defendant; therefore, taas
ang amount of damages that should be given. But, if part of the
injury or part of the blame for the injury, the status of the plaintiff
at the present when she sued can also be attributed to her, then,
what happens? She is entitled only to a lower amount. Now, how
did the Supreme Court ruled in this case? According to the Supreme
Court in its well-reasoned and well-considered decision:
by far the greater part of the damages claimed by
the plaintiffs resulted from the fracture of a bone in
the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and from her
objections to having a decaying splitter of the bone
removed by a surgical operation. As a consequence,
a series of infections ensued and which required
constant and expensive medical treatment for
several years, and so, we cannot charge that to the
defendant, why? Because of Article 2203: The party
suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of
a good father of a family to minimize the damages
Article 2205. Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or
commercial credit.
Number 1 is easy to prove. If you look at it, loss or impairment of
earning capacity, it is easy to prove. Why? Because you can prove,
by definite facts, pila ang imohang earning capacity. It is not a
problem.
But for number 2, for injury to plaintiffs business standing or
commercial credit, how do you quantify that? Let us say, an act or
omission of the defendant caused your reputation to be
besmirched and as a result of that, your business standing or
commercial credit went down. The law provides that damages can
be recovered for that. So the question is how do you quantify that?
Can you quantify your actual business standing, your standing in
the community of the business people? What about your
commercial credit? Probably, that is easier to quantify if you are not
allowed to take exempted credits because of the act or omission of
the defendant. But, business standing, that is very difficult to
measure in terms of money.
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. xxx
You kill somebody, you pay P3,000. We know already that it is no
longer P3,000 because of jurisprudence. But it tells, you in 1950 or
thereabouts when the Civil Code was promulgated, that is the value
of human life, P3,000, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances.
xxx In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
Nakapatay ka ug tao or you were driving recklessly your car then,
that person died. Number 1 tells you that you are liable to indemnify
his heirs for the loss of his earning capacity. That amount of money
which he may have earned and therefore used to comply with his
obligations of support under the Family Code were it not for the
fact that you killed him.
xxx
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court; xxx
Although I have not seen any decision of the Supreme Court that
applies or interprets number 2. But theoretically speaking, let us
suppose that nabangga ka of somebody who is obliged to give
support, pwede ikaw ang pangayuan ug allowance sa iyang mga
nabilin sa kinabuhi. That is number 2.
xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
So that is the ground for the award of moral damages. But, we
have to tackle first the first paragraph, the opening paragraph of
Article 2206 by examining jurisprudence on that matter because we
cannot believe right now that our lives are just worth P3,000. It has
to be a little bit more.
What is this death indemnity that we are talking about? Death
indemnity is payable in cases of wrongful death either due to
crimes and quasi-delicts. There can even be also wrongful death as
a result of a contract.
Let us suppose there is a contract of carriage and because the
common carriers employee, the driver did no operate the vehicle
with due care, naay namatay na pasahero, that will also be a
ground for the award of death indemnity.
Now, suppose the death occurred in a contract of carriage, does it
mean that the family of the deceased passenger can no longer
recover? Again, as I told you, NO because if you look at Article 1764
relating to common carriers.
Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be
awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Same point is the case of Sulpicio Lines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
July 14, 1994.
Deducing alone from Article 2206, one can conclude
that damages arising from culpa contractual are not
compensable without proof of special damages
sustained by the heirs of the plaintiff. However, the
Civil Code, in Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes
Article 2206 applicable to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common
carrier.
So it is clear. It can be a crime, quasi-delict, or even a breach of
contract of carriage.
So, to just look at it from an academic standpoint, what are the
damages that may be awarded in case somebody dies wrongfully,
whether by reason of crime, a quasi-delict or by reason of or in the
occasion of the performance of the carriers obligation?
In People vs. Domingo, March 2, 2009:
For crimes, the following damages may be awarded:
(1) Civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim;
(2) Actual or compensatory damages;
(3) Moral damages;
(4) Exemplary damages; and
(5) In certain cases, temperate damages.
However, as a general rule, when actual damages may be awarded,
temperate damages must be deleted.
Now, what is this temperate damages? Temperate or moderate
damages. Actual damages, we have no problem because we know
that it is supposed to compensate for pecuniary loss. And you are
supposed to prove the pecuniary loss because you are entitled to
such adequate compensation as you have duly proved.
What about temperate damages? Temperate damage is a close
cousin, a younger cousin of actual damages. In the sense that the
law clearly sees that he suffered pecuniary loss but he cannot prove
it with certainty and as a way of paconsuelo, you are given
temperate damages.
Perfect example, namatay, unsay buhaton? Ihaya. Ipalubong. So
there is funeral expense, there is also burial expense. But when that
happens to somebody, will it be the main concern of the family of
the deceased to think about the receipts? Because, in the future, I
will file a case, I have to keep it because according to Atty. Espejo, I
have to substantiate my claim for damages with receipts. To give
item for actual damages. What if nalimtan jud, nawala? Number 1
question is kung wala kay resibo, does it mean nga wala ka
nagpahaya, nga wala ka nagpalubong? Of course, it cannot mean
that. So the court can actually take notice of the fact that naay
namatay, ilahang gipalubong, that definitely nigasto jud sila. So,
what will the court award? Not actual damages because you are not
able to prove it, you are awarded temperate damages. We will go
to that when we discuss temperate damages. But that is the
difference between actual and temperate.
Actual, you have to substantiate it with receipts. Temperate, you
suffered a loss, but the problem is you were not able to prove it
with certainty. So they are mutually exclusive in that both may not
be awarded at the same time as a general rule. We will go to
temperate damages later on and I will tell you the exceptions to the
general rule nga mutually exclusive sila. In other words, they
cannot be awarded in the same cause of action. Hence, no
temperate damages may be awarded if actual damages had already
been granted.
Take note as well that interests may be recovered in a proper case.
In the 2005 case of Nueva Espaa vs. People:
The Court may impose legal interest at the rate of 12%
per annum until the monetary award is actually paid
by the convict.
But this is actually 2005. Because beginning 2013, there is a change
already in the amount of interest that can be charged as to the
interest. We will go to that later on.
Eastern Shipping Lines, before man gud, when there was still a
dichotomy between loans or forbearance of money and non-loans
or forbearance of money, you have to remember the 6% interest
and the 12% interest and the main case there that you need to read
is the case of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. vs. Court of Appeals where
the Supreme Court had the occasion to list down the rules for the
imposition of legal interest. We will discuss that later on, pero
suffice it to state for now that that is no longer the applicable.
In People vs. Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013, the
In conformity with current policy, we impose interest
at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
So right now, it is only 6% per annum.
So what is the proof required in order for the Court to award civil
indemnity for death or kanang ginatawag nato nga death
indemnity?
In People vs. Gutierrez, February 4, 2010:
P50,000 requires no proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the fight.
All you have to do will be the fact of death. Death certificate would
suffice. Now, question is how much? Again, in 2206, P3,000, that is
the value of human life. In time however, the Supreme Court has
increased the civil indemnity from P3,000 to higher amounts based
on several cases that succeeded the passage of the Civil Code.
What is the prevailing amount? P50,000. When death results from a
crime or quasi-delict, the amount of civil indemnity is P50,000.
There is no need to amend the Civil Code for that, why? Because
what the law provides is at least P3,000. So it is really up to the
Court to impose on the passage of time, progressive amounts. So,
ang P3,000 kaniadto nahimong P10,000. Ang P10,000 nahimong
P25,000, nahimong P30,000, nahimong P50,000 and so on. So,
progressively the court can make its own standards when it comes
to award of civil indemnity.
Take note of the following cases, because in these cases, the award
of the Supreme Court in these cases is not P50,000.

First, the case of People vs. Obligado, April 16, 2009. No need to list
down the cases, it is not important. What is important would be
what SC say.
With respect to the award of damages, to conform
with the recent jurisprudence, the appellant is
ordered to pay P75,000 as civil indemnity ex-delicto.
What was the crime committed here? The crime committed was the
crime of murder.
For ordinary rape, P50,000. If it is qualified in form, and then it is

supposed to be P75,000. So again, if you link that up to the real life,
P50,000, that is an ordinary rape lang, wala siyay qualifying
circumstance.
But, in the later case, the case of People vs. Gutierrez, February 4,
2010, ang gihatag diri is P50,000 as civil indemnity. And the crime is
also murder. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity, which has been
fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000 requires no proof other than the
fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accuseds
responsibility therefor. This is 2010. Obligado, 2009. P75,000 in
Obligado. In Gutierrez, P50,000. Same crime of murder.
People vs. Ibaez, May 11, 2007.

P75,000 ang civil indemnity for each conviction of
rape which is qualified by circumstances warranting
the imposition of death penalty and therefore, in this
case of Ibaez, because there were 2 counts of rape,
pila ang gibayad? P75,000, at least there is a fixed
rate in other words.
When is P75,000 awarded? This is the law that we need to

remember. In the case of People vs. Villanueva, 593 SCRA 523, the
P75,000 would be awarded as civil indemnity and not
only P50,000 if the crime committed would
otherwise be punishable by death were it not for
Republic Act No. 9346 which took effect June 24,
2006 which is an act prohibiting the imposition of
death penalty in the Philippines.
So when you go out and rape somebody, that is the fixed rate that
you are going to pay, multiplied by the number of times that you
raped that person.
So, instead of imposing death penalty, dugangan na lang ang civil

indemnity. That is what the law says and to my mind that law is a
shit.
So let us go to this other case, People vs. Darilay, January 26, 2004
which preceded of course Republic Act No. 9346. In Darilay, the
Supreme Court here said:
In a crime rape with homicide, what was the civil
indemnity? P100,000 as civil indemnity.
So even as early as 2004, when this case of Darilay was decided, the
Supreme Court was already awarding amounts other than P50,000,
other than P75,000. So, with regard to the civil indemnity, the Court
rules that the victim of rape with homicide should be awarded the
amount of P100,000 prevailing judicial policy as authorized, the
mandatory award of P50,000 in case of death, and P50,000 upon
the finding of the fact of rape. So what did the Supreme Court do?
Gicombine.
Also, under the cases, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of P75,000 if the crime of rape committed is
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable rules. That is how you
can explain the P100,000 award in the case of Darilay.
Does it change any rules? No, it does not change any rules. The rule
is still either P50,000 or P75,000.
What about in rape lang? People vs. Rebato, May 24, 2011 (note:
2001 siya pag.isearch)
Here, the civil indemnity ex-delicto which award is
mandatory from the finding of the fact of rape and is
independent of the award of moral damages and
according to current jurisprudence, this civil
indemnity should be imposed for rapes qualified by

any of the circumstances for which the death penalty
is authorized under Republic Act No. 7659.
Madsali vs. People, February 4, 2010. P75,000 lang gihapon.

It is not dependent upon the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. So, P75,000, that is for rape.
People vs. Abella.
Statutory rape or simple rape committed with the
use of a deadly weapon shall be in the amount of
P75,000 as civil indemnity.
So kung rape lang per se, that is P50,000. But rape with something
else, then that should be P75,000. Mas mumahal.
In the recent jurisprudence on that matter, let us see if the
Supreme Court has been consistent with what we have already
discussed previously.
In the June 2014, People vs. Warriner, Murder here was qualified by
treachery, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the Supreme
Court awarded P75,000, that is correct. There is no misleading
there by the Supreme Court.
People vs. Obogne, March 24, 2014, on the other hand, it was a case
of simple rape, which means that the award would only be
P50,000.
People vs. Castillo, February 19, 2014, what is in the information
here?
Sometime during the period here, the accused, with
grave abuse of authority, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously committed sexual assault
upon his own daughter, a minor, then only six (6)
years of age, by rubbing his penis on the labia of the
vagina of the said complainant, licking her vagina and
breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina. (Mao
ning kinahanglan silutan ug kamatayon).

Castillo was found guilty of qualified rape or sexual assault, but the
civil indemnity awarded was only P30,000, punishable by prision
mayor to reclusion temporal. So it is not P75,000 because it is not
qualified. Again, you will look at the penalty. The penalty being only
prision mayor to reclusion temporal, that is it.
Now, what you need to look at here, in the case of People vs.
Castillo is the fact that dili nah mao ang doctrine. The mere
touching of the male organ sa female labia is supposed to
consummate the rape already. Here, walay penetration, it is a
different form of rape that was employed, by means of a finger or
an object. P30,000 lang, barato lang kaayo ang bayad.
People vs Sato, November 2014. Statutory rape. Penalty- reclusion
perpetua. Civil indemnity awarded is P75,000. That is correct. No
problem there.
People vs. Dilla, January 21, 2015. Crime committed was murder.
Penalty is reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity awarded was P75,000
which is also correct because of the penalty to be imposed.
People vs. Tabayan. Crime was rape committed against his minor
granddaughter. Penalty was reclusion perpetua in lieu of death. The
Supreme Court awarded P100,000 as civil indemnity, P100,000 as
moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary damages. Why? Anyare? If
you look at the case, wala man. It is just a simple case where
reclusion perpetua was imposed without possibility of parole
instead of a death penalty and based on prevailing jurisprudence,
that is P75,000. But in this case of Tabayan, P100,000.
People vs. Gambao, 2013 case. The crime committed was kidnapping
for ransom. The proper penalty is death, but because of Republic
Act No. 9346, the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua without
possibility of parole. Question: How much should be the indemnity
here, if at all there is an indemnity? According to the Supreme
Court:
The penalty where the crime committed is death,
which however cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9346, P100,000 as the
civil indemnity.
So does it change already? Is it now not P75,000, but already
P100,000? Is that the prevailing amount? If you look at this case of
Gambao, the 2013 case, P100,000. In the case of Sato, November
2014, only P75,000. In Dilla, only P75,000. This is a 2015 case. Diba
makalibog? The Supreme Court should come up with the prim and
proper guidelines or better yet, the Congress should come up with
a law that amends the Civil Code, because it now creates a wrong
impression that in the Philippines, the value of human life is only at
least P3,000. There should be a clarification coming from the
Congress as well.
I guess that is the best way to look at it, rather than reading all
those cases. Remember this rule. When you take the bar
examinations, I would bet that that would still be the rule.
Paragraph 1 (Article 2206)
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death;
What is the purpose of the award?
In the case Da Jose vs. Angeles, October 23, 2013:
Compensation of this nature is not awarded for loss
of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.
The indemnification for loss of earning capacity
partakes of the nature of actual damages which must
be duly proven by competent proof and the best
obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity.
Is this the first time that you heard of the term indemnity for loss of
earning capacity because I do remember that when I was in law
school, I did not learn this for the first time in Torts and Damages, I
have learned this is Transportation Law. Damages recoverable from
common carriers. In the case here is the case of Cariaga vs. Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, a medical student who died because of an
accident for the negligence of the common carrier. That is the first
time that I have earned about it.
By way of an effect, as a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. So how much do you earn on a monthly basis? On a daily
basis? On a weekly basis? And finally, how much do you earn per
year. You need to be able to prove that, and how do you do that?
You can present your payslips or payrolls providing that you earn
this much or may be a tax return. That would be a good proof as
well.
In People vs. Ibaez, September 25, 2013. The Supreme Court said
that:
The bare testimony of the deceaseds mother or
spouse as to the income or earning capacity of the
deceased must be supported by competent evidence
like income tax returns or receipts.
But there are exceptions:
So, to summarize, civil indemnity, it is still P50,000, whether for

death, homicide, death because of a quasi-delict or a rape, or a
simple rape plus homicide. Exceptions: It will be of lower amount if
the imposable penalty is lower than reclusion perpetua. The higher
amount, P75,000, if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
and based on those cases that we have read, higher amount of
P100,000 if the imposable penalty should be death but is reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of Republic Act No. 9346.
In Da Jose vs. Angeles, October 23, 2013, the Supreme Court said
that:
Damages for loss of earning capacity maybe awarded
despite the absence of documentary evidence in
these 2 instances:
(1.)
When the deceased is self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current

labor laws. So, below minimum wage, no need for

the court to require documentary evidence; or
(2.)
The deceased is employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than minimum wage under
current labor laws.
So those are only the instances where there can be damages for
loss of earning capacity without presenting any proof of your
income, for example.
People vs. Vergara, July 3, 2013.
It must be duly proven by documentary evidence not
merely by a self-serving testimony of the victim.
What is the formula? How do you come up with the loss of earning
capacity?
Villa Rey Transit Inc. vs. Court of Appeals to the case of Heirs of Poe
vs. Malayan Insurance Company Inc. and recently the case of People
vs. Alawig, September 18, 2013, the formula is:
NET EARNING CAPACITY = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income
Living Expenses)
Have you not died, how long would you have survived for? That is
your life expectancy.
Gross annual income, meaning period of 12 months and how much
do you need to spend for those entire 12 months so that you can
continue to earn money.
Life expectancy according to American Mortality Table, is (2/3 x [80age of the victim at the time of his death]).
LIFE EXPECTANCY = (2/3 x [80- age of the victim at the time of his
death]).
And therefore, if the victim is aged 40 years old at the time of the
accident, so:
= 2/3 [80-40]
If there is no proof of living expenses, the net income is deemed
equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income. Kung wala kay
mapresent na proof relating to your living expenses.
For age to be deducted, a birth certificate would suffice, but the
best evidence is the death certificate. Because the death certificate,
if you have seen one, will also place there the exact age of the
victim at the time of death.
Heirs of Poe vs. Malayan, April 7, 2009, remember the formula again
according to American Table of Mortality or Combined Experience
Table of Mortality.
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life expectancy
by the net earnings of the deceased which is total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and
less living and other incidental expenses.
By way of illustration, A was killed in a vehicular accident due to the
negligence of X Bus Company, the operator of the bus he was
riding at the time of his death. He was 20 years old. According to his
payroll, he was earning a net salary of P10,000 a month, receipts

presented during trial to prove that he spends P9,000 a month as
living expenses. So with that, how do we now compute the life
expectancy and the net earning capacity of the deceased so that
we will determine damages for loss of earning capacity.
So remember again, what is the formula?
LIFE EXPECTANCY = 2/3 X [80- age at the time of death]
=2/3 x [80-20]
=2/3 x [60]
=40
What about net earning capacity?
NET EARNING CAPACITY = 40 x [gross annual income living
expenses for the same period]
= 120 - P108,000 (which is P9,000 x
12, making it P12,000 per year
earnings)
=40 x P12,000
=P480,000.
For how many years? 40 years or something to that effect.
P1,000 per month na savings. Gamay kaayo.
But let me illustrate to you an instance where based on the same
facts but there is no proof of living expenses. So, if there is no
proof of living expenses, it is 50% of annual income.
So what happens? Based on the same numbers, 40 x [P120,000 ]
50% of P120,000 is P60,000, multiplied by 40 =P2.4 Million,
compared to P480,000.
People vs Fieldad, October 1, 2014. Crime of homicide of jail guards
and carnapping. The trial court used the same formula, but used
gross monthly income instead of gross annual income. So the
Supreme Court simply multiplied it by 12. It said that the
computation was already correct.
Bar question of 2003 related to actual damages.
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion
following the vehicular accident due to the gross negligence of the
bus driver. May she and her husband claim damages from the bus
company for the death of their unborn child? Explain.
What would be your basis for the award of damages? Ang spouses
ba can recover actual damages for death indemnity? Were they the
ones who died? No. But what Article 2206 provides? That the heirs
would be entitled to the damages. Fetus pa lang. The question
simply is what is the status of the fetus for the purpose of applying
the formula and the guidelines in Article 2206?
This is actually taken from the case of Geluz vs. Court of Appeals, a
1961 case where the Supreme Court said that the spouses can
recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of the
life of the unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet
considered as a person and the law allows indemnity only for the
loss of life of a person. The mother may however, recover damages
for the bodily injuries she suffered from the loss of the fetus which
is considered the part of her internal organs. That is what the

Supreme Court is saying. Buntis ka, nakuhaan ka, and then you are
suing the person responsible why the fetus was aborted, you know,
based on prevailing jurisprudence, you can sue for damages as if
the fetus is what? A liver. Pareha lang nah sa imong atay, mao nah
ang status sa fetus according pa sa Supreme Court. That is the case
of Geluz vs. CA.
The parents can also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted
directly upon them such as moral damages, or mental anguish that
attended the loss of the unborn child. Since there is gross
negligence, exemplary damages can also be recovered.
Article 2207, subrogatory right of the insurer. I just want you to
read that. It will not be asked in your bar examinations, but what
you need to remember is what 2207 provides is only damage to
property. Okay?
Let us say for example, nabanggaan kag sakayanan, the car was
insured, so the insurance company took care of repairing the car.
And the insurance company will now be subrogated to the rights of
the plaintiff. They will now become the real party in interest. Kining
insurance company to go against the defendant because the
insurance company has the right to go after that defendant who
caused the loss to the plaintiff. So ing.ani ang mahitabo, there is
subrogation.
But what if the person who is insured by a life insurance was hit by
a car and then died. The insurance company paid the insurance. Is it
subrogated in the cause of action to go against the accused or the
defendant for the wrongful death? The answer is NO. Why?
Because there is no subrogatory right to the insurance company in
the case of injury to persons. Only, damage to property. That was
the ruling in the case of Catuiza vs. People, March 31, 1965.
So the provision is inapplicable to damages sustained by natural
persons, only damage to property. You cannot ask for subrogation
if you are the insurance company.
Article 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or
loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of,
the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the
insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the
contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not
fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled
to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or
injury.
Also read this case, the case of Pan Malayan Insurance Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, April 3, 1990. Kanus.a walay right of
subrogation ang insurance company. I will not discuss this, so
please try to take note of the case. All you need to do is read what
are these instances where the subrogatory right under 2207 is not
applicable.
So what happens here? This pro tanto subrogation. When you say
pro tanto, this means that for however much the insurance
company had paid, there could be that subrogation, only to the
extent of what the insurer paid. However, there may be an instance
where the insurer can recover more than what it paid to the
insured, it is when legal interest is also due.
Let us go to Article 2208. This is a very long provision, we have to
highlight the very important provisions.
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just
and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising
from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
It is not automatic. You need to remember that the award of
attorneys fees is not automatic. Why? Because the law does not
impose upon a party a premium on the right to it. That is the
reason. Because if mapildi ka sa kaso, and at all times, bayaran toh
nimo dapat ang other party ug attorneys fees, then it means that it
is like automatic na nga mubayad dayon ka ug attorneys fees. Mura
na siya nahimo nga multa kay nagtuga tuga ka ug file ug kaso. It is
not like that. So you need to be very familiar on what is stated in
Article 2208. What are these instances when there could be an
award of attorneys fees.
Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
Article 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the
damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of
the court.
Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon
this point. (1109a)

From Article 2209 until 2213, what you need to remember would be
2209 because that is the provision that allows for imposition of
legal interest. Now, what rules would govern the imposition of
interests? First would be what is the stipulation between the
parties? If there is that stipulation between the parties as to the
amount of interest, that means that the stipulation will prevail. But
in the absence of stipulation, then legal interests may actually be
imposed.
Article 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated
claims or damages, except when the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.
We will discuss that later on when we will talk about the other
forms of unliquidated damages. But in credit transactions, I hope
you do recall that there would be no obligation to pay interest
unless stipulation to pay the interest will be in writing. If that
stipulation is not in writing then, no interest will be due.
Damages in the form of interest:
Article 1956. No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly
stipulated in writing. (1755a)
Two types of interests:
(1) Contractual interest;
(2) Legal interest.
Contractual interest means interest as per the stipulation between
the parties or the contract. That can be any rate. You need to
remember, considering that the Usury Law has been repealed by
Central Bank Circular No. 905, there is no more maximum rate of
interest and the rate will just depend on the mutual agreement of
the parties. Liam Lao vs. Philippine Sawmill Company (1984) which
we discussed in credit transactions.
However, there is nothing in Central Bank Circular No. 905 that
grants lenders carte blanche to raise interest rates to lender which
can either enslave their borrowers or otherwise lead to a
haemorrhaging of their assets. Although there is, technically
speaking, no usury, but if it is already exorbitant, iniquitous,
unconscionable, it will of course be struck down.
And then Legal Interest. I know that before, there is this dichotomy
once again, 6% under Article 2209 and 12% under certain situations
under Central Bank Circular No. 416 where you need to distinguish
between voluntary obligation that can be considered a loan or
forbearance of money and a different monetary obligation that
does not consists in loan or forbearance of money. What is the
prevailing rate? Only 6%. At least you know that from Credit
Transactions. Wala na tay 12% interest regardless if that is a loan or a
forbearance of money, so on and so forth.
For example, in the case of Reformina vs Tomol, 139 SCRA 260, dili
na nah siya importante kay dili na man ka kinahanglan
magdistinguish sa 6% ug 12%.
What else? The case of Eastern Shipping, that is no longer
important because we do not distinguish anymore as to what
constitutes a loan or forbearance and a non-loan or forbearance of
money. Because otherwise, if it is a loan or forbearance of money,

that is when you apply the 12% per annum interest.
Kaning mga rules na ni, in other words, where you pay interest as
actual and compensatory damages is no longer required. But, in the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest, if it is a loan or
forbearance of money, it should be 12%, not applicable anymore.
When an obligation not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money is breached, interest may be imposed at a rate of 6% per
annum because it is not a loan or forbearance of money. But there
is no distinction any way. Everything is 6%.
Kani before, it is important, you need to determine what
constitutes a loan or forbearance of money and when it is not
considered a loan or forbearance of money because of the
difference of the rate. Still 6%. What is the reason why? Because
that is scrappy. So you cannot impose 12% interest per annum
according to the Central Bank.
So you foresee that when you take the bar examinations eventually
that, you know, it will improve.
No need to distinguish between loan or forbearance of money and
non-loan or forbearance of money right now.
But this is kinda interesting, the case of Estores vs. Supangan, April
18, 2012. Because for the first time, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to really distinguish between a loan on the one hand and a
forbearance of money on the other hand. Because previous cases
decided by the Supreme Court equates or distinguishes a loan from
a forbearance of money in very unclear terms such that when you
read the distinctions made by the Supreme Court, you will end up
thinking that a forbearance of money is similar to a loan. But there
is a difference now according to the Supreme Court between a loan
and a forbearance of money. Read it on your own. Why? Because it
is not applicable anymore. Very recent jurisprudence that is not
applicable.
Forbearance was defined as a contractual obligation of lender or
creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from requiring the
borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable.
So what is it? It is a loan lang gihapon. So what distinguishes it?
Wala. But this case of Supangan said that it is supposed to have a
separate meaning from loan.
Unwarranted withholding of the money which ____ that is a
forbearance of money which can be considered an involuntary
loan. So, once again, we need to remember that it is moot and
academic, kung unsa ang distinctions between a loan and a
forbearance of money because based on Circular No. 799 of the
Monetary Board, promulgated June 21, 2013. The rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments shall be 6% per annum lang gihapon.
Everything is 6% per annum.
Let us go to 2203 and 2204 relating to mitigation and reduction of
damages.

Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.
Now my question is, in 2204, it allows mitigation, it allows for
increasing as well of the amount of damages to be awarded.
Let us suppose, somebody stole your money. You were bringing
along P100,000 and then somebody stole it and then gifilan nimo
siya ug theft or robbery. In court, he was able to prove that he
acted under mitigating circumstances. Naa siyay mga mitigating
circumstances that he was able to prove. And so the question is,
will the responsibility to pay back the P100,000 which is part of the
civil liability which is actual damages, will that be affected by the
presence of mitigating circumstances? Oh sige, kay tungod naay
mitigating circumstance, naa kay discount. Is that what the law is
saying under Article 2204?
Or let us look at it in a different way. What if the crime was
committed with aggravating circumstances? Gikawat, unya grabe
gyd ang pagkakawat kay naay aggravating. Does it mean that the
Court is allowed to impose a greater amount of actual damages
because of the aggravating circumstance?
What 2204 does not tell you is the fact that it is not supposed to be
applicable to actual damages. Why? What is the rule in actual
damages? The rule is you are entitled to such compensation as you
have duly proved. However much you are able to prove, you are
supposed to get, regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. And so, 2204, with respect to crimes
and the effect of mitigating and aggravating circumstances would
actually not be applicable to actual damages, but only to the other
forms of damages. Pwede ang moral damages, pwede mamitigate,
pwede pud maincrease based on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, but never actual damages. If the offense for
example was committed by aggravating circumstance of ignominy,
the Court may impose a greater amount of damages, either moral
or exemplary. Or kung naa pa gyd passion and obfuscation, the
Court may impose a lesser amount of damages, but not actual
damages, only the other forms of damages.
Example, People vs. Ruiz, December 14, 1981. So here, moral
damages was actually reduced from P50,000 to P20,000 there
being no aggravating circumstance, but there being 3 mitigating
circumstances. That is correct, because here, we are talking about
moral damages, not actual damages.
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
This 2214 might be applicable to actual damages. Remember the
cases that we discussed when we were talking about contributory
negligence. What happened there? The Supreme Court actually
apportions 70-30, 60-40, diba? So it can apply to actual damages
when you are talking about 2214, but not 2204.
2215 is an important provision.

Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the
court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances
other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the
following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms
of the contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result
of the contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be
awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of
counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has
done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.
Now, #5, this is actually a recognition of another form of Good
Samaritan Rule in Philippine Law. Remember in evidence, there is
such thing as Good Samaritan Rule. An offer to pay medical
expenses is not taken as an implied admission of guilt because in
criminal cases for example, when you offer compromise, that is
already taken as an implied admission of guilt. So bantay bantay ka
when you commit criminal acts.
But when it comes to payment of hospital or medical expenses,
that is not taken as an implied admission of guilt. And so, the law in
effect rewards a Good Samaritan. Same thing as number 5 here.
Since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to
lessen the plaintiffs loss or injury. And therefore the law, if you
take the rule on Good Samaritan in evidence together with number
5, it seems to favor voluntary acts of assistance from the
defendant.
With that, we are done with actual damages.
What is next? We will go to MORAL DAMAGES.
The main provision there is Article 2217. I always say this and I quote
Maam Lydia Galas, that 2217 is actually a reflection of your life in
Law School. Why? Physical suffering, you suffer physically in law
school. Mental anguish, of course. Fright, kinsa bay dili mahadlok?
Serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Alright, that is life in law
school in a nutshell, ang definition sa moral damages.
Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act for omission.
2217 is in effect, based on the law is in effect a recognition that not
every injury is physical. Gikulata ko, nabanggaan ko, that is physical
injury. What damages can be awarded? Primarily, actual. If I have to
be hospitalized, then you pay for my hospitalization. But the law
actually tells you that it recognizes other forms of suffering. That
suffering is not limited to the physical. It can also be spiritual, it can
also be emotional suffering. Now, remember that moral damages,

what is the purpose of that? It is not for the purpose of enriching

the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant because he has
committed a wrong against the plaintiff.
What is the goal of moral damages? In the words of the Supreme
Court, its purpose is to alleviate the suffering, to restore you not to
your physical status quo ante, but to your spiritual status quo ante.
And what is meant by spiritual status quo ante? Say for example,
naglakaw lakaw ko sa dalan, nabanggaan ko, and I lost my foot. I
cannot walk anymore. I sue and I am given moral damages. It may
not allow me to recover my leg because my leg is lost forever, but
at least it gives me means, diversions, and amusements and makes
me forget that I have lost my leg. That is what the law is. Nawalaan
ka ug tiil, pero tungod kay bayran kag danyos, basig malimtan diay
nimo nga wala na kay tiil. That is moral damages or Danyos
paconsuelo. Paconsuelo nang moral damages.
That is the purpose of moral damages: Restoration within the limits
of the possible of the spiritual status quo ante. Indemnity or
reparation, to provide means of diversions or amusements, but
never intended to enrich. So a corollary ruling of the Supreme Court
is, and has been repeated in several cases that moral damages is
not a bonanza. Kung tagaan kag danyos, in the form of moral
damages, it is not like you won the lotto, does not mean like nidaog
kag last two, sweepstakes or whatever. What is it? Not a bonanza,
but it is indemnity or reparation.
With that, you need to remember that with moral damages, it is not
supposed to be so high that it becomes that a bonanza, but it
should not be so low so as to rub salt to the injury that was already
suffered. Dili pud makainsulto ang ginahatag nga danyos sa
Supreme Court. That is Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals, March 13, 1997.
Moral damages are designed to compensate and alleviate, in some
way, the physical suffering, mental anguish, etc. unjustly caused a
person although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of the award
bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or the needs of the
defendant.
A recent case is the case of Villanueva vs. Rosqueta, January 19,
2010 (read this). It is kinda boring and weird, so just read this case.
So what I told you earlier, California Clothing vs Quinones, October
23, 2013.
Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to
ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of
hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
Can moral damages be awarded in breaches of contract? What do
you recall? I do recall this in Obligations and Contracts and
Transportation Law. Can you award moral damages in cases of
breach of contract? YOU CAN, as a general rule. However, subject
to the following exceptions:
(1.) That the defendant acted fraudulently or with bad faith;
or
(2.) When the breach of contract results in the death of the
plaintiff especially in breaches of contract of carriage.
Requisites in the award of moral damages (Expert Travel and Tours

vs. CA, June 25, 1999).
The later cases here relating to the requisites of moral damages,
but this is the most complete in terms of the requisites.
1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental
or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
First requisite is there must be an injury, masking unsa pa nah
kagamay, it is still an injury. As a general rule, the physical suffering
must be suffered by the person instituting the action. If the basis of
the claim is physical suffering, only the one who suffered, and not
his/her spouse may recover. So fact that you sympathize does not
mean that you should be awarded moral damages. It must be
personal to some degree, but subject to these exceptions:
(1)
Parents of the female seduced, abducted,
raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article,
may also recover moral damages. (Article 2219).
(2)
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and
brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned
in No. 9 of this article, in the order named. (Article
2219).
What is this article in 2219? We will discuss that later, that is Article
309 Disrespect to the dead. We will go to that later on. (New Civil
Code).
In the same manner, the person who sympathizes an injured
relative is not entitled to recover for the physical suffering of the
other.
So what is this 309 in Article 2219, #9?
Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or
wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of
the deceased for damages, material and moral.
It is an obscure provision that is why we need to discuss that.
2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually
established;
In other words, there has to be testimony. That is why in court,
later on you will learn when you become lawyers, as we discussed
in evidence or will discuss in evidence, when you claim moral
damages, you need to testify, something that is quite repetitive and
clearly scripted as to why you are entitled to moral damages.
So what I usually do would be to ask my client before when there is
still no judicial affidavit what other claims you want the court to
award? That is my question usually because remember, you are not
allowed to ask leading questions.
It would be as simple as asking unta if leading questions are
allowed. How much do you want the court to award in the form of
moral damages? Pwede na nah siya objectional because that is
leading. Or do you want the court to award you moral damages?
Diba, that is leading question and that is not allowed.

And so the witness, after hearing my question will answer: Because

I suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, besmirched reputation
and things like that which you can only read in the Civil Code.
To my mind, moral damages, because of the requirement that you
need to have clear testimony on the anguish and the other forms of
mental suffering, it becomes kinda formulated. Why? In the judicial
affidavits right now, they simply copy from the provisions of the
law for their entitlement to moral damages.
But, in the case of People vs. Gutierrez, the Supreme Court ruled
that sometimes, there is even no proof that is required for the
award of moral damages. Here, it is murder, violent death. So moral
damages on the other hand are awarded in view of the violent
death of the victim. Just because the death of the victim, there is
no need for any allegation or proof of emotional suffering. The
court in effect took judicial notice that kung ang tao mamatay,
adunay suffering. Kung ang tao gipatay, adunay suffering. Ordinary
human experience, they take that the wounds inflicted to the
surviving victims would also naturally cause physical suffering,
fright, serious anxiety, moral shock and similar injuries.
In Madsali vs. People, February 4, 2010.
There is entitlement to moral damages without
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than
the fact of rape.
So, the moment that a person is raped, moral damages is applicable
or already to be awarded.
3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and
Proximate cause, this means that physical, mental, and
psychological injury suffered by the claimant must have been the
direct result of the acts or omissions of the defendant.
4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219.
What are these cases?
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
What is Article 21? We will discuss that later on when we go to
Human Relations. Remember that 19, 20, 21 relating to abuse of
rights, they are all connected.
Moral damages can be recovered in case of wrongful act or
omission causing as a proximate result thereof, physical suffering
and Article 2209 is not an exclusive enumeration because it
provides that the following and analogous cases. Pwede nah siya
nga similar lang.
For example, in the same case I told you about, Expert Travel vs.
Court of Appeals, June 25, 1999. Can moral damages be awarded in a
clearly unfounded suit? Kana kunong harassment suits bah nga
ginatawag nato. Because what 2219 tells you is that moral damages
may be awarded in the case of #8, malicious prosecution. Malicious
prosecution, remember you have to file a criminal case and then
there is bad faith and then no finding of a probable cause.
So what about filing an unfounded civil action? A suit intended to
harass or vex the defendant. Will that be considered as an
analogous case under Article 2219? Can moral damages be awarded
for negligence or quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to
the offended party? That is the issue there in Expert Travel. So the
Supreme Court said that similar.
Although the institution of action is clearly
unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal
justification for an award of attorneys fees, such
filing however is almost invariably been held not to
be a ground for an award of moral damages. The
rationale for the rule is that the law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
Expert Travel vs. Court of Appeals, June 25, 1999.
So the Supreme Court rationalized to a certain extent that if the
rule were otherwise, every time na lang nga mapildi ka sa kaso,
mubayad ka ug moral damages. So ang timan.on pag pildi,
pabayron. That is the rationale there by the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Court said that they cannot be sued, there is no penalty of
the right to litigate.
What about the second issue? If it is a quasi-delict or a breach of
contract, can moral damages be recovered when there is no injury?
In culpa acquiliana or quasi-delict, an act or omission
causes physical injuries or where the defendant is
guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may also be
recovered. This rule also applies to contracts when
breached by tort. Expert Travel vs. Court of Appeals,
June 25, 1999.
So, no need for physical injuries where you can prove that the tort
is intentional. That is the answer to the question. And there must
be a private offended party. Take note that the damages that can
be recovered in cases where crime is committed and there is a
private offended party. For example, in the case of treason,
remember, there is no offended party so there is no civil liability.
There is no award of moral damages when the victim is the State. In

such and similar crimes, there is no award of civil liability.

Crimes and quasi-delicts resulting to physical injuries. Can you recall
this years ago with Vhong Navarro and Denise Cornejo? Note that
physical injuries here refer to physical injuries in their generic sense.
It does not necessarily mean nga tungod namatay, you do not apply
Article 2219 anymore. Generic sense, meaning it includes death,
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts, although I am
concentrating more on the seduction part here.
Take note that these are crimes against chastity. The fact that the
crime of rape was in effect realigned from crime against chastity
into a crime against person does not remove it from the
enumeration under Article 2219. There can still be moral damages
with all the more reason.
Adultery and concubinage, it is also stated in 2219. Crimes against
chastity but the offended party here required the spouse of a
person guilty of adultery or concubinage. Moral damages are
recoverable both from the accused spouse and the mistress or
paramour.
I remember a case before, they were trying to prosecute a guy for
concubinage. Remember, it is very difficult to prosecute for
concubinage. Why? Because ang iyahang evidentiary requirements
are ____. For example, how do you prove sexual intercourse or
sexual relationship in scandalous circumstances? How do you
prove? You have to see him in Peoples Park doing something? It is
very difficult. But at that time, what was our proof? There is a video
of him doing it with his mistress. The wife happened to find out
about the video. So that was our proof. And so, during pre-trial, it
was kinda weird, I had to travel to Cebu to attend pre-trial and then
to have our documents and evidence marked. Dili pa man toh uso
sauna ang usb usb lang. Sa una, wala pa sad cd, VHS pa. So during
pre-trial, VHS pa man toh, we went to court, we have to find a TV,
we have to find a VHS so that the judge and the prosecutors can
look at the video. So, there we were looking at a porn inside the
court room. (LOL)
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, remember that illegal and
arbitrary are both covered under this provision which means that
damages are recoverable not only from private individual, but also
from a public officer who can be guilty of arbitrary detention or
arrest.
Illegal search, nothing much there except that the justification is
Article 26.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,

physical defect, or other personal condition.
Then, malicious prosecution, remember the two elements required
here:
(1) Malice;
(2) Absence of probable cause.
Labor cases can also be ground for the award of moral damages
when the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or
fraud or constitute an act oppressing to labor, or was done in any
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Let us go to 2218.
Article 2218. In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental
value of property, real or personal, may be considered.
This is actually a reiteration of a certain degree of Article 106 of the
Revised Penal Code relating to civil indemnity and reparation. Diba,
when you determine the amount of damage by way of reparation,
the court shall consider the price of the thing and its special
sentimental value to injured party and then reparation shall be
made. So, pareha lang siya more or less.
Now, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the
proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount to be
awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as
to indicate that it was a result of passion, prejudice, or corruption
on the part of the trial judge, neither should it be so little nor so
paltry that will rub salt to the injury already inflicted on the
plaintiffs.
A case that I guess was also discussed is the case of Valenzuela vs.
Court of Appeals, February 7, 1996. Here, the leg of the plaintiff had
to be amputated and the Supreme Court awarded the amount of P1
Million by way of moral damages.
What is the explanation here of the Supreme Court here why P1
Millon?
She will require to undergo adjustments in her
prosthetic device due to the shrinkage of the stump
from the process of healing apart from the fact that
amputation has taken place and it will entail pain
whenever you have your prosthetics adjusted.
(Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, February 7, 1996)
The Supreme Court is not only looking at moral damages for the
loss, but for future because clearly there was pain involved, and
there will be more pain involved in the future. To my mind, this is a
very fair ruling. Do not limit it for now, but you have to apply it for
the future as well. So the sensory functions are forever lost, the
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and
physical pain are inestimable.
Another big amount that is being awarded is in the case that we
have also discussed, Ramos vs. Court of Appeals where the court
awarded P2 Million by way of moral damages. And this is the
justification by the Supreme Court:

The husband and the children will have to live with

the day-to-day uncertainty of the patients illness,
knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They
have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing
care of petitioner, altering their long term goals to
take into account their life with a comatose patient.
They, not the respondents, are charged with the
moral responsibility of the care of the victim. The
familys moral injury and suffering in this case is
clearly a real one. So, the Court awarded P2 Million
by way of damages.
Social standing. Does it have a bearing on the amount of moral
damages to be awarded? Should a rich person be given more in
terms of damages compared to a poor person. Should a movie star
get more damages simply because he is famous or beautiful or
popular compared to my neighbour who is a panday? Mas dako ba?
Well, if you look at the cases decided by the Supreme Court, official,
political, social, and financial standing of the offended party affect
the amount of damages. So the Supreme Court is saying na kung
kaning tawhana ni ultimo and you caused him damage, you caused
injury, you have to pay more which to my mind is discriminatory.
Ang kinabuhi diay sa usa kadato ug sa usa ka hitsuraan kay mas
entitled diay ag ing.ana nga klase nga tao compared to somebody
who is less fortunate, which to my mind is wrong, but that is the
ruling of the Supreme Court. It has a bearing.
In other cases for example, the age of the claimant is
material in the determination of the amount of moral
damages due to the plaintiffs as well.
March 11, 2016

DJGOLO
So we continue with Moral Damages. We already discussed cases.
Now, remember that in law, there are two types of persons:
Natural and Juridical Persons.
Are juridical persons entitled to moral damages? We dont have
problem with natural persons because they are capable of injury,
physical, emotional and psychological. So what about corporations?
In the case of Mambulao Lumber vs. Philippine National Bank, the
SC had the occasion to state that an artificial person, like a
corporation, cannot experience physical suffering, mental anguish,
etc. which are the basis of moral damages. But the SC also said that
the corporation has a reputation which if besmirched, may also be a
ground for an award of moral damages. The same cannot be
considered under the facts of this case, however, not only because
it is admitted that the corporation here had already ceased in its
business operation at the time. So this actually opened the doors
for the application of that doctrine that a good reputation can be
besmirched even if it belongs to an artificial person like a
corporation.
In People vs. Manero, January 29, 1993. Here, a hapless foreign
minister, Father Tulio Favali shot by the group of Manero. They
danced and sang around the dead body of Favali and it was stated
that Manero picked up a piece of the brain from Favalis open head.
This gave him the name Cannibal Priest Killer. He was a very
notorious killer. Now the question here is that, can there be an
award of damages to the religious denomination to which Father
Tulio Favali belonged?
The SC stated here that the award of moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical Institute of
Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on
record which indicates that the deceased effectively severed his
civil relations with his family, or that he disinherited any member
thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. Besides, as we
already held, a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages
because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical
suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a juridical person has
a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation,
that moral damages may be awarded.
These two cases would now bring forth the question na kung
corporation ba ka, pwede diay ka mukuha ug moral damages?
Lets say for example here is a particular corporation, say ABS-CBN,
which is always bombarded with criticisms left or right. Ako ang
gina-besmirch nako all the time is ang PLDT. If I slander the good
reputation of PLDT, would that allow it to recover damages?
Now, according to ABS-CBN vs. CA, January 21, 1999, the SC
repeated what it stated in Manero and Mambulao, that a
corporation cannot experience physical suffering and mental
anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous
system. It stated that the rulings in People v. Manero and
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, that a corporation may recover
moral damages if it has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation is an obiter dictum. Wala siya. It is
not something that we should rely on.
To my mind, this is a correct ruling precisely because moral
damages alleviates suffering. It restores spiritual status. And you
cannot do that to something that does not have a spirit, emotions
or a nervous system.
Now, according to Crystal vs. BPI, November 28, 2008, the SC said
there may be a chance to award moral damages to a corporation
but it is not automatic. There must be proof of factual basis of
damage and its causal relation to the offense.
So pwede na pud diay because of the Crystal case!
Article 2220.Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies
to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith.
Take note that the first sentence talks about injury to property. So
it clarifies that injury to property may also be a ground for an award
for moral damages. Remember what we learned previously that

moral damages will not be awarded in breaches of contract

because naay limited grounds. 2220 tells you that if there is fraud or
bad faith, there can be an award for moral damages.
An interesting case here is Tongson vs. Emergency Pawnshop
January 15, 2010. the issuance of a worthless check as a
consideration for a sale. According to the SC, since it amounts to
fraud, then Article 2220 is applicable.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
When you hear the word nominal what comes to mind? Maybe
something insignificant or something that is not substantial. But is
that why we call nominal damages, nominal?
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right
of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
What is the purpose? To recognize, to vindicate.
In Francisco vs. CFI, October 1978, the SC said nominal damages are
recoverable where some injury has been done, the amount of
which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being
left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of
the case. It is true that nominal damages by their very nature, are
small sums fixed by the court without regard on the harm that
takes place on the plaintiff. Now, in truth, nominal damages are
damages in name only and not allowed as an equivalent of the
wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.
Technical injury means that clearly there was a right violated and
the law does not tell you what recompense you are allowed. Kabalo
ko nga nasakitan ka, pero wala ko kabalo pilay ibayad nimo o kung
unsay akong ibayad nimo? So in those situations, the law will step in
and provide nominal damages. Thats the purpose.
When you say nominal, it means existing in name only, not actual or
real. What makes it nominal is not the amount, it is the reason
behind its award, which is to recognize a right. It comes from a
Latin word nomen which means name. Nomen is the root word
of nomenclature, right? The name.
In case of Almeda vs. Carino January 13, 2003. When granted by the
courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of the wrong inflicted
but simply recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A
violation of the plaintiffs right, even if only technical, is sufficient to
support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as there
is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of
nominal damages is proper.
Why award nominal when you can award actual, moral or
exemplary damages? Nominal damages being one that vindicates
an injury suffered, it serves as a recognition of such right violated.
Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in
every case where any property right has been invaded.
So, the source for the award for nominal damages is quite broad.
In LABOR CASES:
Remember this very important ruling in Agabon vs. NLRCG.R.
158693 November 17, 2004. The SC pronounced that if the employer
fails to comply with the due process, nominal damages may be
awarded. Here, the SC found that there was a proper just cause,
but there was non-compliance of the notice and hearing
requirements. Hence, violation in the procedural due process in the
termination and so nominal damages was awarded. You technically
did not violate a right but there is that technical injury: you did not
give him proper due process. Here the nominal damages awarded
was P30k, would this be followed in the subsequent cases with
similar factual backgrounds?
In the case of Uniliver vs. Rivera 2013, January 3, 2013. There was a
violation to right to due process in the procedure for termination
for a just cause. The Sc here modified the award from 20k from
NLRC increased to 30k.
So from the time of Agabon(2004) to time of Uniliver(2013), it is still
30k.
In another case Garza vs. Coca Cola, January 2014. The award was
still 30k.
Case of JAKA Food Processing vs. PACOT, 454 SCRA 119, Here the
ground for termination was retrenchment, an authorized cause.
The question is how much would be the award? Lets analyze.
In just causes, you have to give notice to employee, giving him an
opportunity to be heard. And the second notice comes in the form
of your decision as to W/N to terminate. Mao na siya ang twonotice requirement. In authorized causes, three-notice. The
addition is the notice as well to the DOLE. Now, what if you fail to
give notice to your employees? How much should be awarded?
According to the SC, it should be 50k.
The SC said the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal
process was initiated by the employers exercise of his
management prerogative. Walay sala ang empleyado. In Agabon
and similar cases, naay sala ang empleyado. This explains why it
should be greater.
In the case of De Jesus vs. Aquino, January 18, 2013. The award was
also 50k for the violation of due process for termination for a JUST
cause. The SC cited the case of Culili vs. Eastern Telecom, the
amount of 50k by way of nominal damages for failure to observe
due process.
So I ask the SC, pagklaro ra gud, pila man gyud 50k or 30k? Why do
you think there is no harmony in the decisions? Because they are
decided in division not en banc.
So remember that nominal damages are always awarded in illegal
dismissal cases because if you remember Father. Nazareno, one of
the fundamental facts is that labor is a property right, and being a
property right it is safeguarded by the due process clause in the
constitution.

Nominal Damages in Contractual Relations

The case of Francisco vs. Ferrer February 28, 2001, a wedding cake
baker failed to deliver the same despite being already paid for. The
lame excuse was that it was delivered late because of the traffic.
However, in truth, the baker did not actually bake the cake (as
shown in the order slip?) so the Sc said there was deceit in
complying with contractual obligation which makes them liable for
nominal damages of 10k in addition to actual damages in the
amount of the price paid for the cake.
In the case of Lentfer vs. Wolff, November 10, 2004, nominal
damages in the amount of 50k since the respondents property
rights have been invaded through defraudation
Almeda vs. Carino January 13, 2003, the right of the vendor to
receive unpaid balance of the lots sold was violated by the
petitioners and this entitles the respondents at least to nominal
damages. There was refusal to pay remaining balance despite
repeated demands. So unlawfully withheld the money.
In CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE:
China Airlines vs CA, July 14, 2003, China airlines confirmed
reservations for the respondents and they relied upon that
confirmation. When they went to the airport, they were refused
boarding because their reservations have been canceled. The SC
awarded 5,000 as reasonable award for nominal damages to each
of the private respondents.
because NAIA was closed. So, JAL re-booked them on flights on

June 16, two days laters, and paid for their unexpected overnight
stay. Unfortunately, the June 16 flight was also cancelled. JAL
informed the stranded passengers that it will no longer shoulder
their expenses. That is under the Magna Carta on passengers
rights. Now, the passengers were forced to pay for their meals and
accommodations from their personal funds. Passengers filed an
action for damages against Japan Airlines claiming that it failed to
live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded
passengers when it refused to pay for accommodation expenses.
The SC said that Japan Airlines is not liable since the reason why
Japan Airlines was prevented from pursuing its flight to Manila was
due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. However, it is not absolved
completely from liability. While JAL was no longer required to
defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in
Japan on account of the fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make
the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on
the first available connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL
reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it declassified them from
"transit passengers" to "new passengers".
An award of 100k nominal damages in favor of each passenger was
awarded by the SC. Compare that to Cathat Pacific case(2013)
wherein for all of them 25k unya kani 100k each passenger, a 1998
case. Unsa diay ang diperensya sa duha ka cases? I cant make sense
of it.
In the case of Cathay Pacific vs Reyes, June 26, 2013. Here you have
a trip to Australia. Its supposed to be Manila-Hongkong-AdelaideHongkong-Manila. The father here re-confirmed the flight and they
were advised that their reservation was still okay as scheduled. On
the day of their scheduled departure from Adelaide, Wilfredo and
his family arrived at the airport on time. When the airport check-in
counter opened, they were informed by a staff from Cathay Pacific
that the Reyeses did not have confirmed reservations, and only one
of them has flight booking confirmed. Nevertheless, they were
allowed to board the flight to HongKong due to adamant pleas
from Wilfredo. When they arrived in HongKong, they were again
informed of the same problem. Unfortunately this time, the
Reyeses were not allowed to board because the flight to Manila
was fully booked. Only Sixta was allowed to proceed to Manila
from HongKong. On the following day, the Reyeses were finally
allowed to board the next flight bound for Manila. Upon arriving in
the Philippines, Wilfredo went to Sampaguita Travel to report the
incident. He was informed by Sampaguita Travel that it was actually
Cathay Pacific which canceled their bookings.
In USURPATION OF TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISE:

Cogeo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Association vs CA, March 18,
1992. You usurp a transpo franchise. At the act of usurpation by the
defendants which constituted an invasion of the property rights
should be awarded nominal damages in the amount of 10,000.
Here the SC said that considering that the three respondents were
denied boarding their return flight from HongKong to Manila and
that they had to wait in the airport overnight for their return flight,
they are deemed to have technically suffered injury. Nonetheless,
they failed to present proof of actual damages. Consequently, they
should be compensated in the form of nominal damages. What was
the award here? 25k to all of them.
According to SC, there should be nominal damages awarded. When

plaintiff suffers some species of injury not enough to warrant an
award of actual damages, the court may award nominal
damages.We find that the award of nominal damages to Rufina in
the amount of 50k is reasonable, warranted and justified.
Japan Airlines vs CA, August 7, 1998. Here they were not able to
board their flight as scheduled because of the eruption of Mt.
Pinatubo and all flights to Manila were cancelled indefinitely
Twin Ace Holdings Corporation vs. Rufina and Company, June 8,

2006. Twin Ace is a private domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of Tanduay Rum. This is popular because Tanduay has
a bottle which you can use, butangan bag suka, toyo. You throw
the bottle or recycle or sell it to the bote, dyaryo, bakal. Rufina is
famous for patis. Such that ang Rufina Patis, since they do not
have their own bottling plant, namalit sila sa bote, dyaryo, bakal.
Mao ilang gi-gamit, gibutangan nila ug patis ug gibaligya nila. Nakitan karon sa Twinace, wala kunu pananghid ang Rufina and filed an
action for replevin. It was successful in taking possession of bottles
(26, 241) that were supposed to be used by Rufina for their patis.
According to Rufina, they paid for the bottles and therefore it is
their property already.
This one is sad. The case of Saludo vs CA, March 23, 1992. Namatay
ang loved one in another country. So e-ship. The remains of a loved
one was lost in transit. Nawala! So the SC said airlines should be
more careful. So the SC awarded 40,000 as nominal damages
because the petitioners right to be treated with due courtesy in

accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to be

exercised by common carriers, was violated.
SHORT KIDNAPPING
In the case of People vs Bernardo, March 11, 2002. Here the
accused took the 15 day old baby away from the yaya but was able
to abscond with the child only for a few minutes before she was
stopped. The baby was recovered immediately thereafter. Kadali
lang kaayo pero it is already kidnapping. It is not necessarily be for
ransom. Can you award moral damages? Naa ba diay sleepless
nights or something? None. The SC said that since it was for a short
duration, the award of nominal damages was 50k, which was later
reduced to 10k.
City Trust vs IAC, Guerrero issued several postdated checks from
her account with City Trust. She deposited cash in order to cover
the checks. However, in filling up the deposit slip, she omitted a
zero and wrote 2900823 instead of 29000823. Her checks were
dishonored. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against City
Trust. The TC dismissed the complaint. The CA reversed and
awarded nominal and temperate damages and attys fees.
According to the SC, nominal damages should be awarded to
vindicate the wrongdoing.
NEGLIGENCE IN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Ventanilla vs Centeno, January 28, 1961. The lawyer here failed to
deposit on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal
within the extension period granted by the court. So the SC
awarded nominal damages in the amount of 200! But remember
that this is 1961.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns.
So, there is an effect of preclusion. If you award nominal damages
to vindicate a right, it should not lead to further awards of moral or
other damages. It is already res adjudicata on the issue of violation
of the right. Automatically precludes the award of other forms of
damages. Verily, all forms of damages are recognitions that indeed
a right has been violated. However, it must be noted that
exemplary damages being for correction for public good not to
recognize a right violated can coexist with nominal damages.
For example, LRTA v. Navidad, February 2003. The award of
nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. So it
is an established rule that nominal damages cannot coexist with
compensatory damages.
City Trust vs IAC. It is wrong to award, along with nominal
damages, temperate or moderate damages. The two awards are
incompatible and cannot be granted concurrently. Dili gyud pwede
edungan.
However there are cases decided by the SC that nominal damages
are awarded together with other forms of damages and the rulings,
appear to be inconsistent.
Lets examine. Francisco vs Ferrer, remember kadtong wedding

cake na case, in addition to nominal damages was payment of
actual damages which is the value of the cake.
Sumalpong vs CA. Nominal damages and moral damages were
awarded in the same case. In Sumalpong, the SC ruled that the
award of moral damages in the amount of P10k was justified under
the circumstances whenever there has been a violation of an
ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted or
none are shown, the award of nominal damages is proper. There is
no room to doubt that some species of injury was caused to the
complainant because of the medical expenses he incurred in having
his wounds treated, and the loss of income due to his failure to
work during his hospitalization. However, in the absence of
competent proof of the amount of actual damages, the
complainant is entitled only to nominal damages.
Now do not take that on face value. Why? Because later on we will
be discussing Temperate Damages and you will once again be
befuddled by the fact that actually when the SC is awarding
nominal damages, its not talling about nominal damages, its
talking about temperate damages. In temperate damages, cleraly
you suffered some pecuniary loss, the problem is you are not able
to prove it. So the court cannot award actual damages but it will
instead award temperate damages.
Article 2223 is supposed to have the effect of preclusion. The award
nominaldamage precludes the award of anything else because such
award is already recognition or vindication of the violation. So lets
try to make sense of these.
In Sumalpong, nominal damages were awarded because some
species of injury was caused to the complainant because of the
medical expenses he incurred in having his wounds treated and
because of loss of income to work during his hospitalization. Moral
damages were awarded because of the physical suffering and the
scarification of the complainants body. Did the SC award the two
damages on the same right or upon two different sources? One is
incurring medical expenses, the other is pysical suffering and
scarification of the body. So lahi ang source.
In Francisco, nominal damages was awarded because of the
insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their customers
anxiety and need of the hour. What is the right vindicated there?
The right to be treated fairly by cake maker Actual or compensatory
damages was awarded as indemnification for the value of the cake
which was already paid by the wedding party and the cake never
arrived. So two different sources. When you pay actual damages
for the cost of the cake, it does not address the fact that they were
subjected to deceit.
Nominate damages diay, despite 2223, can be awarded together
with other forms of damages if it can be predicated on an injury or
a source of obligation other than the one that justifies the award of
the other forms of damages.
It is not complete preclusion. So kung lahi ang source, if it is a
different right that is indemnified, then go ahead. Thats the way
we should understand 2223.

Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more

than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
provided with certainty.
Clearly you suffered pecuniary loss but cannot prove it. Still, the
court can take notice of the fact that clearly you have suffered.
How do you define it?
In Araneta vs. Bank of America, 40 SCRA 144, Temperate damages
are awards allowed in certain classes of cases, without proof of
actual or special damages, where the wrong done must in fact have
caused actual damage to the plaintiff, though from the nature of
the case, he cannot furnish independent, distinct proof thereof.
Temperate damages are more than nominal damages, and, rather,
are such as would be a reasonable compensation for the injury
sustained.
When you talk about pecuniary loss, you either go to actual
damages if you can prove it, or temperate damages if it cannot be
proven.
Requirements for the award:
1. Definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced by the
aggrieved party;
2. The court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered
some pecuniary loss; (Premier Development Bank vs. CA)
3. The temperate damages awarded must be reasonable
under the circumstances. (Art. 2225)
4. There is pecuniary loss but the uncertainty lies in the
amount of such pecuniary loss.
Reasonableness of temperate damages means that the amount
awarded as temperate damages must be less than actual or
compensatory damages and also greater than mere nominal
damages. Among the classes of damages in the civil code, only
actual or compensatory damages require that ones entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as is duly proved.
For the other classes of damages, no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages may be adjudicated. Te same is true with
respect to temperate damages. While the law does not require
proof of the exact amount suffered as pecuniary loss, it still
requires the plaintiff to establish factual basis to justify its award.
Because they are both geared towwards compensating pecuniary
loss, actual and temperate damages are closely related, cousins.
However, they differ on proof required.
Temperate damages are often awarded because plaintiff has clearly
suffered pecuniary loss or incurred expenses but the plaintiff was
not able to prove actual damages. It is therefore awarded in lieu of
actual damages that cannot be proven to a certainty. This is
however subject to the limitation that while it is more than nominal
damages, it ought to be less than actual or compensatory damages
claimed.
People vs. De la Tongga. G.R. No. 133246. July 31, 2000. To recover
actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case, there was no
such proof to sustain the trial courts award of actual damages. In
lieu of actual damages, the court awarded the amount of
P15,000.00 as temperate damages.
Premium Development Bank vs. CA. April 14, 2004. To justify an
award for actual damages, there must be competent proof of the
actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims, which
are duly supported by receipts. In other words, damages cannot be
presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific
facts that can afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
or actual damages are borne.
Because of failure of Premiere to adduce proof of actual
expenditure consequently, Panacor may still be awarded damages
in the concept of temperate or moderate damages. When the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,
temperate damages may be recovered. Here the SC awarded 200k.
Now this is important. Because of the ruling in People vs.
Villanueva, August 11, 2003, naa na tay ginatawag nga P25,000 or
Actual Rule.
This was first mentioned in the case of People vs. Abrazaldo, but it
wa in the instant case that it became a rule. For example, let us
suppose your claim for actual damages clearly amounts to 100k but
your receipts are only ike 15k. Wouldnt that be unfair? Yes, because
the problem is that you cannot prove it. The answer to that is the
case of People vs. Villanueva, the P25,000 or Actual Rule. If you
clearly incurred funeral or burial expenses, but what you actually
prove is less than P25,000, the SC ruled that the award of 25k is
justified in lieu of actual damages.
But this rule is only applicable if clearly your pecuniary loss is more
than 25k. It cannot be awarded in a case where clearly actual
damages kay naa lang sa 5k. There has to be a bona fide attempt to
claim more than 25k but failed to substantiate. Whichever is higher:
25k or actual.
Adriano vs. Lasala. October 9, 2013. The owners of the buildings
unilaterally terminated their services. Indisputably, respondents in
this case suffered pecuniary loss because of the untimely
termination of their services for no cause at all. According to the
SC, the amount of P200,000.00 by way of temperate damages as
just and reasonable.
Gonzales vs. CASURECO. March 6, 2013. In this case the SC said that
even if the pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant is capable of
proof, an award of temperate damages is not precluded. The grant
of temperate damages is drawn from equity to provide relief to
those definitely injured. Therefore, it may be allowed so long as the
court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss. In this case there was an award of 3k.
Bacolod vs. People, July 15, 2013 Arson case. The accused was
found guilty and was ordered to pay the value of the house.

However, nobody quite knows the value of a house. Consequently,

the SC awarded the amount of P500,000.00 in the form of
temperate damages which is reasonable considering that the
dwelling had been completely burned down.
NOMINAL AND TEMPERATE DAMAGES
There appears to be confusion with nominal damages.
People vs. Hammer, December 17, 2002. Here the court said that
the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the amount
of actual damages, other than the self-serving testimony of the
widow. For lack of evidentiary basis, the Court is correct in not
awarding the same. It being clear, however, that the heirs of
Castillo really incurred funeral expenses, they are hereby awarded
the amount of P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages. This award
is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be
recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of
indemnification. The basis? That there was no ample evidentiary
basis that exist to award actual damages.
The conclusion in that case is that the same is nominal damages
when as we discussed, this should have been temperate damages.
Sumalpong vs. CA. G.R. No. 123404. February 26, 1997. Remember?
There was loss of income. The SC said that in the absence of
competent proof of the amount of actual damages, the
complainant is entitled only to nominal damages. What is the basis
of the award? Pecuniary loss. Supposed to be dapat temperate,
right?
Soliven Realty vs. Ong. Nominal damages are recoverable where
the plaintiff has suffered some injury the amount of which the
evidence fails to show. What is more appropriate her? Temperate!
Not nominal!
Manila Banking Corp. vs. IAC. Mas grabe ni. Temperate or
moderate damages are proper not for indemnification of loss
suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded. Its defining temperate in the sense that its now nominal!
In this case, P5,000 as temperate damages was awarded for
attorneys fees.
So what do we get out of it? Even the SC is confused. My
advise? Codal. Codal. Codal.
March 21, 2016

RDATUKON
Continuation of our lesson about TEMPERATE DAMAGES.
From the last meeting, what do you remember relating to
temperate damages and its relationship with actual damages?
Temperate damages and actual damages are actually based on
practically the same set of circumstances and that would be (of
course) pecuniary loss.
When it comes to pecuniary loss, that one is entitled to such
adequate compensation as he adduce proof. But when it comes to
temperate damages or an attempt to prove actual damages but

which fails to prove the entire amount, naa tay ginatawag na
25,000 php (or?) actual rule, whichever is higher between the
amount of damages proved and the 25,000 peso threshold when it
comes to temperate damages that would be awarded by the court.
(People vs Villanueva)
Remember the rule also that in several cases decided by the SC,
that temperate damages and actual damages are mutually
exclusive which means that they cannot be awarded in the same
case together based on the same facts. Precisely, because the basis
is pecuniary loss so by nature this classes of damages cannot be
awarded together in one case.
If there is pecuniary loss and it can be proven, the court awards
actual damages as can be proven by the plaintiff. If there is
pecuniary loss but it is of such nature that it cannot be proven with
certainty by material evidence, the court awards temperate
damages. So it is either/or.
The SC in previous cases we have discussed has categorically
concluded that you cannot award one on top of the other.
However, there is an exception and it is a very, very important
exception.
Exception: (Ramos case)
Ramos vs CA, December 29, 1999
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.
As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best
interests of the administration of justice for the victim in
such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke
their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages
previously awarded temperate damages are appropriate.
The amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper
care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only
home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised
our award for compensatory damages on the amount
provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be
now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value
awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to
provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which
generally specializes in such care. They should not be
compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care
at home without the aid of professionals, for anything less
would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an
award of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would
therefore be reasonable.

So what the SC is saying is you can never really achieve res judicata.
No judgment can ever be final because the plaintiff will always go
back to court and then ask for further compensatory damages in as
much as ilahang injuries still continues. Wala pa siya naayo.
Mugasto pa siya para sa iyahang pagpaayo.
Remember this case. We discussed this under medical negligence.
Whats the important thing that you need to remember here by
way of summary? Since the basis of the award of actual and
temperate damages are practically the same and that is pecuniary
loss, they cannot be awarded together in the same case because
they are incompatible. But by way of exception, in the case of
Ramos vs CA, when the damages awarded refer to two different
phases. Actual expenses or expenses already incurred for
hospitalization and Prospective expenses for Rehabilitation. When
proper, both actual and temperate damages may be awarded. (It
leads to another question because the SC ventured on the
speculative on whether or not the damages awarded will be
enough).
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
So a contract is broken, you present a proof of breach then the
parties previously had already set a particular amount by way of
damages to cover everything that the (unaduible). These are
damages that somehow its the parties that designate during the
formulation of the contract for the injured party to collect as
compensation upon specific breach.
Its from the latin word LIQUIDAT or to make clear, to
elucidate. As used in the Civil Code, liquidated damages means
ascertained or predetermined damages or made clear in advance.
When you say a claim is unliquidated, it means that it still subject to
proof and contestation. When you say liquidated, there is no longer
any contestation of the entitlement. What you need to prove
therefore, in a case is the breach was the one stipulated upon by
the parties at the time that they entered into a contract.
Whats the purpose of liquidated damages? Why can we set
predetermined amounts by way of liquidated damages? Because it
make things easier. If we have already agreed that in case you do
not deliver on your obligation based on the contract, you will pay
me this much then, it already dispenses (for me) the need to prove
or present specific proof as to the amount of damages.
By way of nature, it is also referred to as a penalty clause. It is an
accessory undertaking to assume greater liability on the part of an
obligor in case of breach of an obligation.
The function of a liquidated damage clause is doubled in that it is
used to provide in liquidated damages and to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach because you do not anymore
present any evidence as to the amount of damages suffered by one
of the parties. All that you need to prove is the fact that there is
delay or breach in the contract.
Effects of Stipulation The amount agreed upon already answers
for the damages suffered by a party due to the breach of obligation
by the debtor. Proof of pecuniary loss is dispensed with; the obligor
would be bound to pay the stipulated amount of indemnity without
the necessity of proof of the existence and measure of damages
imposed by the obligation. Once again, what do you prove? Just the
fact of breach.
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE CORPORATION vs
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS & SERVICE CORPORATION, April
18, 2012
Paragraph 2.3 of the Building Contract clearly provides a
stipulation for the payment of liquidated damages in case of
delay in the construction of the project. Such is in the nature of
a penalty clause fixed by the contracting parties as a
compensation or substitute for damages in case of breach of
the obligation. The contractor is bound to pay the stipulated
amount without need for proof of the existence and the
measures of damages caused by the breach.
Article 2226 of the Civil Code allows the parties to a contract to
stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach.It is
attached to an obligation in order to insure performance and
has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages,
and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the
threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. As a
general rule, contracts constitute the law between the parties,
and they are bound by its stipulations. For as long as they are
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy, the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient.
REQUISITES FOR THE VALIDITY OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The amount of damages identified must roughly
approximate the damages likely to fall upon the
party seeking the benefit.
The damages must be sufficiently ascertained at the
time the contract was made that such clause will
save both parties the future difficulty of estimating
damages.
As a precondition to the award of the liquidated
damages, there must be proof of the fact of breach
in the performance of the obligation, not proof of
specific damages.
J PLUS ASIA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs UTILITY
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, G.R. No. 199650 June 26, 2013
Liability for liquidated damages is governed by Articles 2226 to
2228 of the Civil Code, which provide:
ART. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
ART. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.

ART. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the

defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine
the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
A stipulation for liquidated damages is attached to an obligation
in order to ensure performance and has a double function: (1) to
provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach. The amount agreed upon
answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the
completion of the project. As a precondition to such award,
however, there must be proof of the fact of delay in the
performance of the obligation.
GENERAL RULE: The court will not normally interfere in the

stipulation of the parties in a contract as part of the principle of
freedom of contract.
However, there are exceptions foremost of which is under Art 2227
of the New Civil Code.
Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
If it becomes apparent to the court that a liquidated damage(s)
would lead to iniquitous or unconscionable results, it has to
mitigate the award of damages. Compare that with Art 1229, NCC
because it is the correlative condition when it comes to penalty
clauses.
Article 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when
the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied
with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable. (1154a)
Lets look at Art 2227 and the last part of Art 1229. They have the
same reason for the reduction whether it is liquidated damages or
penal clauses/ penalty clauses. If they are iniquitous or
unconscionable, they will be reduced. It appears that in Art 1229,
there is a separate and specific ground for the reduction of
penalties under a penal clause to an obligation. So what is the
ground here? Partial and/or irregular compliance. But we will learn
as well in cases that we will be discussing that is also a ground for a
reduction of liquidated damages.
Atty E: There is practically no difference to penal clause and
liquidated damages.
URBAN CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTORS PHILIPPINES vs. THE
INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., INC., G.R. No. 180824 August 28,
2009
Whether petitioner Urban Consolidated Constructors
Philippines, Inc. (Urban) is liable to pay liquidated damages to
respondent Insular Life Assurance Co., Inc. (Insular).
In the present case, the factors considered by the Court of
Appeals were the absence of bad faith on the part of Urban and
the fact that the project was 97% complete at the time it was
turned over to Insular. In addition, we noted that Insular is

likewise not entirely blameless considering that it failed to pay
Urban P1,144,030.94 representing the balance of unpaid change
orders and to return the retention money in the amount of
P2,134,908.80, or a total of P3,578,939.74. Had Insular released
said amount upon demand, the same could have been used by
Urban to comply with its obligation to purchase the needed
construction materials and to expedite the completion of the
project. Under the circumstances, we find that this omission on
the part of Insular justifies a further reduction of the liquidated
damages decreed against Urban from P2,940,000.00 to
P1,940,000.00.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom
of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see
fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, and good
custom, public policy or public order. Nevertheless courts may
equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract where, as
in the instant case, the principal obligation has been partly
performed (97%) and where the penalty is iniquitous. 17 Article
1229 of the Civil Code, states:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with
by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
unconscionable.
ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC., vs.COURT OF APPEALS and HERBAL
COVE REALTY CORPORATION, G.R. No. 170732
October 11,
2012
Undoubtedly, petitioner may be held to answer for liquidated
damages in its maximum amount which is 10% of the contract
price. While we have reduced the amount of liquidated damages
in some cases because of partial fulfillment of the contract
and/or the amount is unconscionable, we do not find the same
to be applicable in this case. Per the CIAC findings, as of the last
certified billing, petitioners percentage accomplishment was
only 62.57%. Hence, we apply the general rule not to ignore the
freedom of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as
they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
Another exception would be Art 2228, NCC.
Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the
defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in
agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall determine
the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
If the breach is one outside of what was intended by the parties
when agreeing to have a liquidated damages clause, do not apply
that clause, you apply the law and therefore the award of damages
will not anymore be constrained by the liquidated damages clause.
It will now be set by the applicable law. There can be further
damages if the breach is not the one contemplated by the parties
when they executed the contract.
Another exception, when claimant also did not faithfully apply the
agreement. This means that the claimant himself has violated the
contract.

FILINVEST LAND, INC., vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, and
PACIFIC
EQUIPMENT
CORPORATION, G.R.
No.138980
September 20, 2005
There is no question that the penalty of P15,000.00 per day of
delay was mutually agreed upon by the parties and that the
same is sanctioned by law. A penal clause is an accessory
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of breach. 10 It is
attached to an obligation in order to insure performance 11 and
has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages,
and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the
threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. 12 Article
1226 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall
substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to
the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor
refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment
of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedom
of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as they see
fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. 13 Nevertheless, courts
may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contract in two
instances: (1) if the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied; and (2) even if there has been no
compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with
by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
unconscionable.
In herein case, the trial court ruled that the penalty charge for
delay pegged at P15,000.00 per day of delay in the aggregate
amount of P3,990,000.00 -- was excessive and accordingly
reduced it to P1,881,867.66 "considering the amount of work
already performed and the fact that [Filinvest] consented to
three (3) prior extensions." The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling but added as well that the penalty was unconscionable
"as the construction was already not far from completion." Said
the Court of Appeals:
Turning now to plaintiffs appeal, We likewise agree with the
trial court that a penalty interest of P15,000.00 per day of delay
as liquidated damages or P3,990,000.00 (representing 32%
penalty of the P12,470,000.00 contract price) is unconscionable
considering that the construction was already not far from
completion. Penalty interests are in the nature of liquidated
damages and may be equitably reduced by the courts if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 167
SCRA 815, Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588). The judge shall
equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if
there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable (Art.
1229, New Civil Code). Moreover, plaintiffs right to indemnity
due to defendants delay has been cancelled by its obligations

to the latter consisting of unpaid works.
This Court finds no fault in the cost estimates of the courtappointed commissioner as to the cost to repair deficiency or
defect in the works which was based on the average between
plaintiffs claim of P758,080.37 and defendants P306,567.67
considering the following factors: that "plaintiff did not follow
the standard practice of joint survey upon take over to establish
work already accomplished, balance of work per contract still to
be done, and estimate and inventory of repair" (Exhibit "H"). As
for the cost to finish the remaining works, plaintiffs estimates
were brushed aside by the commissioner on the reasoned
observation that "plaintiffs cost estimate for work (to be) done
by the plaintiff to complete the project is based on a contract
awarded to another contractor (JPT), the nature and magnitude
of which appears to be inconsistent with the basic contract
between defendant PECORP and plaintiff FILINVEST." 14
We are hamstrung to reverse the Court of Appeals as it is
rudimentary that the application of Article 1229 is essentially
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 15 As it is settled
that the project was already 94.53% complete and that Filinvest
did agree to extend the period for completion of the project,
which extensions Filinvest included in computing the amount of
the penalty, the reduction thereof is clearly warranted.
Filinvest, however, hammers on the case of Laureano v.
Kilayco,16 decided in 1915, which cautions courts to distinguish
between two kinds of penalty clauses in order to better apply
their authority in reducing the amount recoverable. We held
therein that:
. . . [I]n any case wherein there has been a partial or irregular
compliance with the provisions in a contract for special
indemnification in the event of failure to comply with its
terms, courts will rigidly apply the doctrine of strict
construction against the enforcement in its entirety of the
indemnification, where it is clear from the terms of the
contract that the amount or character of the indemnity is fixed
without regard to the probable damages which might be
anticipated as a result of a breach of the terms of the contract;
or, in other words, where the indemnity provided for is
essentially a mere penalty having for its principal object the
enforcement of compliance with the contract. But the courts
will be slow in exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon them
in article 115417 so as to modify the terms of an agreed upon
indemnification where it appears that in fixing such
indemnification the parties had in mind a fair and reasonable
compensation for actual damages anticipated as a result of a
breach of the contract, or, in other words, where the principal
purpose of the indemnification agreed upon appears to have
been to provide for the payment of actual anticipated and
liquidated damages rather than the penalization of a breach of
the contract. (Emphases supplied)
Filinvest contends that the subject penalty clause falls under the
second type, i.e., the principal purpose for its inclusion was to
provide for payment of actual anticipated and liquidated
damages rather than the penalization of a breach of the
contract. Thus, Filinvest argues that had Pecorp completed the
project on time, it (Filinvest) could have sold the lots sooner and
earned its projected income that would have been used for its
other projects.

Unfortunately for Filinvest, the above-quoted doctrine is

inapplicable to herein case. The Supreme Court
inLaureano instructed that a distinction between a penalty
clause imposed essentially as penalty in case of breach and a
penalty clause imposed as indemnity for damages should be
made in cases where there has been neither partial nor irregular
compliance with the terms of the contract. In cases where there
has been partial or irregular compliance, as in this case, there
will be no substantial difference between a penalty and
liquidated damages insofar as legal results are concerned. 18 The
distinction is thus more apparent than real especially in the light
of certain provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides in Articles 2226 and Article 2227 thereof:
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the
parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
Thus, we lamented in one case that "(t)here is no justification
for the Civil Code to make an apparent distinction between a
penalty and liquidated damages because the settled rule is that
there is no difference between penalty and liquidated damages
insofar as legal results are concerned and that either may be
recovered without the necessity of proving actual damages and
both may be reduced when proper."19
Finally, Filinvest advances the argument that while it may be
true that courts may mitigate the amount of liquidated damages
agreed upon by the parties on the basis of the extent of the
work done, this contemplates a situation where the full amount
of damages is payable in case of total breach of contract. In the
instant case, as the penalty clause was agreed upon to answer
for delay in the completion of the project considering that time
is of the essence, "the parties thus clearly contemplated the
payment of accumulated liquidated damages despite, and
precisely because of, partial performance." 20 In effect, it is
Filinvests position that the first part of Article 1229 on partial
performance should not apply precisely because, in all
likelihood, the penalty clause would kick in in situations where
Pecorp had already begun work but could not finish it on time,
thus, it is being penalized for delay in its completion.
The above argument, albeit sound,21 is insufficient to reverse the
ruling of the Court of Appeals. It must be remembered that the
Court of Appeals not only held that the penalty should be
reduced because there was partial compliance but categorically
stated as well that the penalty was unconscionable. Otherwise
stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the reduction of the
penalty not simply because there was partial compliance per
se on the part of Pecorp with what was incumbent upon it but,
more fundamentally, because it deemed the penalty
unconscionable in the light of Pecorps 94.53% completion rate.
In Ligutan v. Court of Appeals,22 we pointed out that the question
of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be partly
subjective and partly objective as its "resolution would depend
on such factors as, but not necessarily confined to, the type,
extent and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation,
the mode of breach and its consequences, the supervening
realities, the standing and relationship of the parties, and the
like, the application of which, by and large, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court."
JOE'S RADIO and ELECTRICAL SUPPLY, vs. ALTO ELECTRONICS

CORPORATION and ALTO SURETY and INSURANCE CO.,
INC., G.R. No. L-12376
August 22, 1958
While under the new Civil Code, penalties and liquidated
damages are dealt with separately, nevertheless, the
fundamental rules governing them still remain basically the
same, making them subject to reduction where equity so
requires.
In American law, it is only when the clause is a penalty
that the courts will reduce the stipulated damages
which are excessive. But article 2247 (now 2227) of the
proposed Code states:
ART. 2247. Liquidated damages, whether intended as
an indemnity or a penalty shall be equitably reduced if
they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
The reason is that in both cases, the stipulation
is contra bonos mores under article 1326. It is a mere
technicality to refuse to lessen the damages to their
just amount simply because the stipulation is not
meant to be a penalty. An immoral stipulation is none
the less immoral because it is called an indemnity.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 75)
What could be regarded as an equivalent provision of Article
1229 on penalties is Article 2228 with respect to liquidated
damages:
ART. 2228. When the breach of the contract
committed by the defendant is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the
liquidated damages, the law shall determine the
measure of damages, and not the stipulation."4
Where there is partial or irregular performance in a contract
providing for liquidated damages, it can be said, in view of the
foregoing cited provision of the Code, that the court may
mitigate the sum stipulated therein since it is to be presumed
that the parties only contemplated a total breach of the
contract. And this is usually so because of the difficulty or
sometimes inability of the parties to ascertain or gauge
beforehand, the amount of indemnity in case of a partial
breach, just as it is equally perplexing to foresee the extent of a
partial or irregular performance. And so it has been held in one
case that a stipulation for liquidated damages in case of a total
breach of the contract cannot be enforced if the party has
accepted a partial performance thereof (Tanenbaum Son & Co.
vs. Drumbor Bingell Co., C.C.A. Pa. 47 F [2d] 1009, certiorari
denied, 52 S. Ct. 7; 284 U.S. 619, 76 L. Ed. 588, cited 25 C.J.S.
695).
In this connection, we believe that the 20 per cent liquidated
damages clause in the dealership agreement must have had
reference to a failure to comply with the terms of the entire
agreement, that is to say, the delivery of 500 television sets (in
two shipments of 250 sets each) within the time provided
therein. To permit appellee to collect the same amount of
liquidated damages after more than half of the sets were
delivered and received, would amount to doubling the
stipulated damages in case none of the sets had been delivered,
and nothing in the contract warrants such a possibility.
The correct principle has been declared in the case of Sledge et

al., vs. Arcadia Orchards Co. (77 Wash. 477, 317 Pac. 1051, citing
Shute vs. Taylor, 5 Metc. [Mass.] 61, 67):
. . . The question what is liquidated damages, and
what is a penalty, if often a difficult one. It is not
always the calling of a sum, to be paid for breach of
contract, liquidated damages which makes it so. In
general, it is the tendency and preference of the law
to regard a sum, stated to be payable if a contract is
not fulfilled, as a penalty, and not as liquidated
damages, because then it may be apportioned to the
loss actually sustained. But, without going at large
into the subject, one consideration, we think, is
decisive against recovering the sum in question as
liquidated damages, namely: That here there has been
a part performance, and acceptance of such part
performance. If the parties intended the sum named to
be liquidated damages for the breach of the contract
therein expressed, it was for an entire breach. Whether
divisible in its nature or not, it was in fact divided by an
offer and acceptance of part performance. It is like the
case of an obligation to perform two more independent
acts, with a provision for single liquidated damages for
non-performance; if one is performed, and not the
other, it is not a case for the recovery of the liquidated
damages. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, it is immaterial whether the questioned clause in
the dealership agreement is a provision for liquidated damages,
or deemed a penalty clause under the above circumstances; it
has to be mitigated in either case, in the former case, because
of its being unconscionable if enforced in toto; and in the latter,
because of the acceptance of a partial performance.
LEON J. LAMBERT, vs. T. J. FOX, G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and
liquidated damages, so far as legal results are concerned.
Whatever differences exists between them as a matter of
language, they are treated the same legally. In either case the
party to whom payment is to be made is entitled to recover the
sum stipulated without the necessity of proving damages.
Indeed one of the primary purposes in fixing a penalty or in
liquidating damages, is to avoid such necessity.
Academically, you can differentiate Obligations with Penal Clauses
from Liquidated Damages in a contract. As a way of review, what
are the provisions relating to Obligations with Penal Clause?
Compare them with Liquidated Damages.
Article 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall
substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to
the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor
refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment
of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in
accordance with the provisions of this Code. (1152a)
Article 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the
performance of the obligation by paying the penalty, save in the
case where this right has been expressly reserved for him.
Neither can the creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation

and the satisfaction of the penalty at the same time, unless this
right has been clearly granted him. However, if after the creditor
has decided to require the fulfillment of the obligation, the
performance thereof should become impossible without his
fault, the penalty may be enforced. (1153a)
Article 1228. Proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is
not necessary in order that the penalty may be demanded. (n)
Article 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when
the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied
with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the
unconscionable. (1154a)
Article 1230. The nullity of the penal clause does not carry with it
that of the principal obligation.
The nullity of the principal obligation carries with it that of the
penal clause. (1155)
*From 2014-2015 class tsn
ART 1226
As what we have discussed, its the same as liquidated damages.
Its supposed to subsume all damages, indemnity for damages
or interest in the proper case unless theres a stipulation to the
contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor
refuses to pay the penalty or employed fraud in the fulfilment of
the obligation. Meaning, youre already assessed penalty, you
cannot pay. You can still be held liable for other types of
damages. It will no longer be subsumed because it is an entirely
different breach altogether. Non-payment and non-performance
are different, or if there is fault in the fulfilment of the
obligation. There can be double penalty. The penalty may be
enforced when it is demandable in accordance with the
provision of this code.
ART 1227
Payment of penalty, not a substitute to performance unless
there is a stipulation. Creditor cant ask for both performance
and payment of penalty at the same time unless theres a
stipulation. If after the creditors decided to require the
fulfilment, the performance thereof becomes impossible
without the fault of the creditor, the penalty may now be
enforced.
Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an

Meaning pareha gyud ang duha because liquidated damages can be
an indemnity or it can be in a form of a penal clause or a penalty
and it shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable. Same. Same treatment.
How do you distinguish between penalty and indemnity?
In the case of Lambert vs Fox, Penalty is in the nature of
punishment. It is punitive in character. Indemnity is in the nature of

security or protection of loss or injury, in the concept of an

insurance, surety or guaranty. Liquidated damages can serve both
purpose as indemnity or penalty. In American law, it is only when
the clause is a penalty that the courts will reduce the stipulated
damages which are excessive. While under the new Civil Code,
penalties and liquidated damages are dealt with separately,
nevertheless, the fundamental rules governing them still remain
basically the same, making them subject to reduction where equity
so requires. The reason is that in both cases, the stipulation is
contra bonos mores under article 1326. It is a mere technicality to
refuse to lessen the damages to their just amount simply because
the stipulation is not meant to be a penalty. An immoral stipulation
is none the less immoral because it is called an indemnity.
In the case of Joes Radio and Electrical Supply vs Alto Electronic
Corp, Consequently, it is immaterial whether the questioned clause
in the dealership agreement is a provision for liquidated damages,
or deemed a penalty clause under the above circumstances; it has
to be mitigated in either case, in the former case, because of its
being unconscionable if enforced in toto; and in the latter, because
of the acceptance of a partial performance.
PRYCE CORPORATION (formerly PRYCE PROPERTIES
CORPORATION), vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 157480 May 6, 2005
The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or
iniquitous is addressed to the sound discretion of the
courts. To be considered in fixing the amount of
penalty are factors such as -- but not limited to -- the
type, extent and purpose of the penalty;
the nature of the obligation;
the mode of the breach and its consequences;
the supervening realities;
the standing and relationship of the parties;
and the like.
TO SUMMARIZE - For liquidated damages, the proper basis for reduction is
unconscionability or inequitable.
- For penal clause, the proper basis for reduction is partial
performance if there is partial performance. The judge shall
equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. However,
even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
- When asked in the bar for the distinction of penal clause vs.
liquidated damages is that: In terms of effect, there are no practical
differences. Whether treated as a penalty or an indemnity, the
treatment is the same.
- In obligations with a penal clause, the GR is that the penalty serves
as a substitute for the indemnity for damages and the payment of
interests in case of noncompliance; that is, if there is no stipulation
to the contrary, in which case proof of actual damages is not
necessary for the penalty to be demanded.
There are exceptions to the aforementioned rule, however, as

enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 1226 of the Civil Code: 1) when
there is a stipulation to the contrary, 2) when the obligor is sued for
refusal to pay the agreed penalty, and 3) when the obligor is guilty
of fraud. In these cases, the purpose of the penalty is obviously to
punish the obligor for the breach. Hence, the obligee can recover
from the former not only the penalty, but also other damages
resulting from the nonfulfillment of the principal obligation.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by
way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
If you ask me, the most diverse damages would be exemplary and
liquidated damages.
Why? Because Art 2229 provides you can only impose exemplary
damages when it is only in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. So you need to be entitled to
other forms of damages first before you can be awarded with
exemplary damages.
What about liquidated damages? Liquidated damages also (ideally)
should be awarded by its clausal because the parties agreed as to
the damages that can be recovered. Exception to the rule is if the
breach is not what the parties contemplated to be, if that is the
case, it would be the law that would measure the damages and not
the stipulation of the parties.
*From 2014-2015 class tsn - It comes from the word exemplum
(Latin for "example", pl. exempla, exempli gratia = "for example",
abbr, e.g.) is a moral anecdote, brief or extended, real or fictitious,
used to illustrate a point. Its also the source of the Spanish word
ejemplo meaning example.
Under the Civil Code, exemplary damages are awarded in order to
set an example so that the public as a whole will refrain from
similar deplorable conduct. It is supposed to be a deterrent. In
America, it is called punitive damages so that others will not follow
you. It is awarded not to compensate the plaintiff but to reform or
deter defendant and similar from pursuing such court of action
such as that damage made.
DIOSDADO OCTOT, vs. JOSE R. YBAEZ, in his capacity as
Regional Director of Regional Health Office No. VII, CLEMENTE
S. GATMAITAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Health, and
Presidential Executive Assistant JACOBO C. CLAVE, G.R.No. L48643 January 18, 1982
Exemplary damages are not generally recoverable in a special
civil action for mandamus unless the defendant patently acted
with vindictiveness or wantonness and not in the exercise of
honest judgment. The claim for exemplary damages must
presuppose the existence of the circumstances enumerated in
Articles 2231 and 2232 of the Civil Code.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of

example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Such
damages are required by public policy, for wanton acts must be
suppressed. They are an antidote so that the poison of
wickedness may not run through the body politic.
Thus, our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when
exemplary damages may be awarded, as follows: (REQUISITES)
First: They may be imposed by way of example or correction
only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant.
Second: The claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Third: The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and
the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
VERY IMPORTANT!
Article 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of
the court, according to the circumstances of each case.
The question therefore is given Art 2216 we know that you do not
have to prove pecuniary loss, when is proof of pecuniary loss
required? It is only required for actual damages or compensatory
damages. So what do you do to claim for moral damages or
exemplary damages? How you plead it? How you prove it?
(Gregorio vs Angeles case)
SPOUSES BELEN GREGORIO, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE
ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Branch 58, SPOUSES SYLVIA AND RAMON
CARRION, and THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF OF MAKATI, G.R.
No. 85847 December 21, 1989
At any rate:
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated . 6
So also, "...the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved... 7
In other words, the amount payable by way of exemplary
damages may be determined in the course of the trial. The
plaintiff (the petitioners in this case) could not have therefore
predicted how much exemplary losses they had incurred.
We are not saying -so let us make one thing clear-that the
amount of exemplary damages need not be alleged in all cases.
Certainly, it would have been different had the case been one
purely for moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary, damages,
(as in libel) other than actual. Though these damages are, under
the Civil Code, damages that can not be shown with certainty,
unlike actual damages, the plaintiff must ascertain, in his
estimation, the sums he wants, and the sums required to

determine the amount of docket and other fees.
So what the SC is saying is when you are the lawyer of the plaintiff,
you have to prove it during trial that you are entitled to exemplary
damages. How?
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., and
FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., vs. THE
HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH
145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, G.R.
No. 88421 January 30, 1990
The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or
before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be
specified. While it is true that the determination of certain
damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the
sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties
claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The
exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims
although specified are left for determination of the court is
limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for
the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
It is the court that will determine even in the absence of the
testimony whether or not exemplary damages will be awarded. You
do not ask anymore the witness to testify for the award of
exemplary damages because it is the court that will determine.
CONRADO V. SINGSON, CAROLINA CRISOSTOMO, and
FLORENTINO DE LIMA, vs. CRISANTO ARAGON and MIGUEL L.
LORZA, G.R. No. L-5164 January 27, 1953
And the law having placed this matter within discretion of the
court, it must likewise be understood that the court should act
having due regards to its limited jurisdiction. In other words, if
the court should decide to award exemplary damages because
it is warranted by the evidence, it can only do so by awarding
the plaintiff such amount as, in addition to the actual or
compensatory damages, would not exceed the limit of its
jurisdiction.
Question: Can exemplary damages be merged with moral
damages? According to the SC, it is not the usual way of awarding
the said damages. However, there had been no question and the
entitlement of moral damages having been established; the
exemplary damages may be awarded even though not so expressly
stated.
*From 2014-2015 class tsn - The SC awarded P50k as moral and
exemplary damages. Merged. Remember that the basis for the
award of moral damages is different for the award of exemplary
damages. It may not be the usual way of awarding damages,
however, if both are found by the court to be proper to be
awarded then its okay. Its just a matter of form. The fact,
however, that the amount of exemplary damages prayed for in the
complaint has not been specified does not necessarily mean that

the case is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES YOU DONT HAVE TO PROVE IT BUT YOU
HAVE TO PLEAD IT.
How would the court determine whether or not exemplary
damages will be awarded in criminal offenses? It has to look at the
presence of aggravating circumstances. So if the crime is
committed with the aggravating circumstances lets say treachery
or evident premeditation then, the victim have entitlement to
damages.
Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part
of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such
damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid
to the offended party.
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
*From 2014-2015 class tsn - Aggravating circumstance in its generic
sense. It can be ordinary aggravating or qualifying aggravating. The
presence of either one or both should entitle the offended party to
an award of exemplary damages within the meaning of Art. 2230 of
the Civil Code.
Suppose there are 2 aggravating circumstances and 5 mitigating
circumstances. There is no effect on the award of exemplary
damages because the law does not provide for the reduction of
exemplary damages upon the presence of mitigating
circumstances.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
FRANCISCO
DACILLO alias DODOY AND JOSELITO PACOT y IBARRA (case
provisionally
dismissed),accused,
FRANCISCO DACILLO alias DODOY, G.R. No. 149368 April 14,
2004
In People vs. Catubig, we explained that:
The term "aggravating circumstances" used by the
Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is
to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The
commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect,
one on the public as it breaches the social order and
the other upon the private victim as it causes
personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by,
respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment
for the accused and by an award of additional
damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or
a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or
qualifying, in its commission. Unlike the criminal
liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby.
It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be
withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or

qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the
case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSE ISHIKAWA AMBA,
G.R. No. 140898 September 20, 2001
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil
Code provides that exemplary damages may be awarded if the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. We are therefore constrained not to award
exemplary damages in this case since no aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
VICTORY LINER, INC. vs. HEIRS OF ANDRES MALECDAN, G. R.
No. 154278 December 27, 2002
Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be recovered in
cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one
party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against
or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.
Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
PRUDENTIAL BANK, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LETICIA
TUPASI-VALENZULA joined by husband Francisco Valenzuela,
G.R. No. 125536 March 16, 2000
The law allows the grant of exemplary damages by way of
example for the public good. 10 The public relies on the banks'
sworn profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving
irreproachable service. The level of meticulousness must be
maintained at all times by the banking sector. Hence, the Court
of Appeals did not err in awarding exemplary damages. In our
view, however, the reduced amount of P20,000.00 is more
appropriate.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper when exemplary
damages are awarded and since private respondent was
compelled to engage the services of a lawyer and incurred
expenses to protect her interest. 11 The standards in fixing
attorney's fees are: (1) the amount and the character of the
services rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the
nature and importance of the litigation and business in which
the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5)
the amount of money and the value of the property affected by
the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and
the experience called for in the performance of the services; (7)
the professional character and the social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that
an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is

contingent than when it is not.

LABOR CASES If the dismissal of an employee was effected in
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner,
you give exemplary damages. If dismissal also is tainted with unfair
labor practice.
LIRAG TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and FELIX K. LIRAG, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CRISTAN ALCANTARA, G.R. No. L-30736 April 14,
1975
It is clear that petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc. violated the
contract of employment with private respondent Alcantara
when the former terminated his services without a valid cause.
The act was attended with bad faith and deceit because said
petitioner made false allegations of a supposed valid cause
knowing them to be false, thus making itself liable for payment
of actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees to
private respondent Alcantara. Petitioner Lirag Textile Mills, Inc.
cannot with impunity be allowed the absolute and unilateral
power to terminate without valid cause a contract of
employment with a definite period it voluntarily entered into
merely on the basis of its whim or caprice and under the false
pretense of financial distress.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the
court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered,
nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of
granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the
stipulation for liquidated damages.
Article 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all

obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)
(DONE WITH DAMAGES )
DETERMINING PROPER CO-EXISTENCE OF DAMAGES
ACTUAL DAMAGES WITH
Moral
YES, that is the usual case
Exemplary
YES, no effect of preclusion
Nominal
NO, Vda de Medina vs. Cresencia, 1956

Exception: Yes. The cake case, Francisco vs.
Ferrer; Rationale: Actual has monetary basis,
nominal has monetary basis also.
NO, basis is the same, pecuniary loss. (e.g. 25T or
actual damages)
Exception:
Yes.
Ramos
case,
medical
malpractice; Actually spent money, and future
costs. DIFFERENT PHASES is the basis. It can be
awarded even bigger than actual damages.
YES. (e.g. collection of sum of money only)
Temperate
Actual only
Liquidated
NO, because liquidated damages substitutes for

everything
Exception: YES. If the breach is not the one
contemplated by the parties in agreeing to the
stipulation, hence a different breach
MORAL DAMAGES WITH

Moral only
YES. (e.g. Defamation of character)
Exemplary
YES. (bestfriends)
Special Rule on Liquidated Damages

Take note of the special rule relating to liquidated damages.
Because in awarding liquidated damages, it substitutes the other
forms of damages. Normally, if you award liquidated damages, you
should not anymore award exemplary damages. But here, in case
liquidated damages have been agreed upon, despite no proof of
loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be
recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question
of granting exemplary damages in addition to liquidated damages,
the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation
for liquidated damages. Therefore, there would be no effect of
preclusion.
Nominal
NO, nominal damages has the effect of

precluding other forms of awards of damages.
They have the same basis, recognition or
vindication of a right. Awarding moral damages is
already the vindication of the right.
Exception: Yes. If the award is predicated on a
different violation or source of obligation such as
in Sumalpong vs. CA nominal damages and
moral damages for the scarification of his body
(and loss of earning capacity)
YES, Villanueva and Abrazaldo case (funeral cases
of 25T worth of damages)
YES, since cousins with Temperate.
Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are

renounced in advance shall be null and void.
Can you waive it? No, citing Art 2235.
Liquidated
Why? The prohibition here is the same with Art 1171, to wit:
Temperate
Actual
NO, It subsumes all other damages.

Exception: Yes, liquidated is based on Breach. If
the breach is not the one contemplated by the
parties by agreeing to the stipulation or there are
other violations justifying the moral damages.

NOMINAL DAMAGES WITH: (G.R. precludes the award of any

other kind of damage)
Moral
Exemplary
Nominal only
Temperate
Actual
Liquidated
NO.
Exception: Yes. If predicated on a different
violation or a different source of obligation
where moral damages can be awarded.
(Sumalpong case)
NO, (Article 2234 expressly excludes nominal
damages, the only kind of damage excluded)
inclusio union exclussio est alterius
YES. (Saludo case, no due process in labor
cases)
NO. (Cititrust case)
Exception: Yes, Francisco, actual and nominal
(What if the receipt of the cake was lost but
clearly they paid? As long as its pecuniary loss
is suffered, and you can prove with reasonable
certainty)
YES. (Francisco case, cost of the cake and the
nominal damages)
NO. Liquidated and Nominal both have the
effect of preclusion. Liquidated is already a
recognition or vindication of a right that is
breached.
TEMPERATE DAMAGES WITH:

Moral
Exemplary
Nominal
Temperate
Actual
Liquidated
YES. (Sumalpong case) Different bases and

awards.
YES. (always with other forms except nominal)
NO, incompatible with other damages according
to Cititrust case
Exception: Yes, Francisco cake case
YES.
NO, same basis
Exception: Yes, Ramos case. (present and future
expenses)
NO. (substitutes everything)
Exception: Yes, if the basis of the breach is
different from that stipulated or violation has a
different source.
LIQUIDATES DAMAGES WITH:

Moral, Temperate, NO. Liquidated substitutes everything
Actual
else.
Exception: Yes. Theoretically if the
breach is not the one stipulated by the
parties or the violation is surrounded by
circumstances justifying the award of
other damages.
Exemplary
YES. Article 2234. Also if the breach of
the contract is attended with wanton,
oppressive and abusive manner. But
prove first that you are entitled to moral,
temperate and actual.
Nominal
NO. Effect of preclusion is mutual.
Exception: Yes. If the SC decides to

vindicate a right other than the breach

of the contract stipulated or the
agreement.
YES. Ideal.
Liquidated only
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES WITH:

Moral
YES, constantly.
Exemplary alone
NEVER. No award of any damage, no
exemplary.
Nominal
NO. Effect of preclusion. Article 2234
expressly excludes.
Actual, Temperate YES
Liquidated
YES. (Article 2234 and special rule on
exemplary and liquidated damages, prove
entitled to actual, moral and temperate
damages)
GR: NO
EX:
YES
GR: NO
EX:
GR: NO
EX:
GR: NO
EX:
YES
April 1, 2016
DSOLANO
We begin tonight with the topic of Human Relations which is
something that is not unfamiliar to you as much as you discussed
that in first year in Person and Family Relations. But please take
note that we are going to discuss today although medyo review na
lang sya of the principles we discussed in first year for Articles 19 to
36 of the Civil Code ang focus nato is more on torts rather than
persons.
What is Human Relation?
YES
YES
GR: NO
EX:
BREACH
YES
YES
YES
YES
GR: NO
EX:
DIFFERE
NT
VIOLATI
ON
YES
NO
It is in
addition
NO
YES
GR: NO
EX:
DIFFERE
NT
VIOLATI
ON
DEFINIT
ELY NO
YES
GR: NO
EX:
FRANCI
SCO
CASE
YES
GR: NO
EX:
DIFFERE
NT
VIOLATI
ON
YES
GR: NO
EX:
FRANCI
SCO
CASE
YES
GR: NO
EX:
RAMOS
CASE
GR: NO
EX:
YES
YES
YES
GR: NO
EX:
CAKE
CASE
GR: NO
EX:
RAMO
S CASE
YES
GR: NO
EX:
It is the interaction or interrelation of one person to another

person, or persons and vice versa in accordance with mores, habits,
customs and public policy not contrary to laws. Its the attempt of
the framers of the civil code to define what it is to be a human
being in a civilized society. Its an attempt to try to regulate how I
should deal with my neighbor, how you should deal with your
fellow human beings, because in a modern society such as ours,
you have to remember that there are a lot of rights and there are
also a lot of obligations and most of the time, because we
represent diverse interest, there might also be a conflict between
the rights of the sovereign forceand the obligations that arise out
of these rights.
What is the rationale?
So the rationale according to the provision is that human beings in
their intercourse, not necessarily sexual with one another come in
certain relations from which some system of social control
becomes a necessity and therefore, what the law on human
relations actually represent is that form of control. Its again that
attempt of state to control our interpersonal relationships. With
human relations comes a consciousness of human wants and
desires which may be called interests. Society composed of men ,
each with interest of his own. In the course of life the interest of
one man conflict with those of many others, it is the primary
function of law to create legal protection for those interests.
Amidst the continuous clash of interests, the ruling social
philosophy should be that in the ultimate ideal social order, the
welfare of every man depends upon the welfare of every man
depends on the welfare of all.
Just read what you see in the board. What we are trying to drive at
here is once again is it is somewhat system of control. Its what the
code commission what do you call that, its designed by the code
commission to regulate certain aspects of human relationship or
relationship between individuals in the State in so fgar as their
rights might forfeit. Mao na syaang tumong sa Human Relation. If
you remember labor law, Father Nazareno would tell you the
cardinal principles of labor daghan syang gina-ingon na cardinals of

labor. I came up with my own, cardinal principles in human

relations. Why do I say cardinal principles in human relations?
Because if you know these principles, you already know how to
apply the provisions of the civil code on human relations.
Cardinal Principles in Human Relations
First that you need to remember is that, the law of human relations
applies equally well to the government as well as to private
individuals. And it is subject to legitimate exercises of the states
sovereign power. Now, if you look at article 3 of the1987
Constitution, otherwise known as the bill of rights, remember that
as a general rule, it is one that affords protection upon a private
citizen against a possible excess of government. Thats the reason
why the government cannot enter into your abode, to search or
incriminate one because you are protected, privacy on
communication and correspondence. But actually, you cannot
maintain the same action against the private individual by breach of
your own right of privacy not in the same way as you would
maintain actions against the government, under Article 3 of 1987
Constitution. Thats why even if we guard our right to privacy, lahi
ang remedies in a private individual compared to a government
instrumentality when it comes to invasion of the rights to privacy
for example. The bill of rights was only for government action.
Thats the cardinal rule when it comes to bill of rights. Now, kinsa
man ang gibugna, kay kinsa gibugna ang bill of rights for the
citizen, for the private individual against whom? Its not against a
private fellow citizen but it is against the government. Now, would
that therefore mean that the provision of the law in human
relations is one that is not like the government because we have
the bill of rights already that regulates the relationship between
the government and a private individual, the answer is of course is
no, the state and its agents are not immune to the provisions of the
law of human relations. It applies equally well to the both public
and private entities.
In case of the Republic of the Philippines vs. Lapac, March 2, 2007,
Supreme Court ruled in essence that the rules covered by the law
on human relations apply equally well with the government. So the
government cannot say that it has to be a good neighbor(?) claim,
the government cannot say na dili mag-apply ang rule na na sa
iyaha because it applies equally well to the government as well as
private individuals. However, the law on human relations is deemed
limited by the legitimate exercises of the states sovereign powers.
For instance, article 19 cannot be invoked against police measures
so long as encroachment upon private interest is justified by the
general welfare. Pero let us suppose that theres a police measure
that is enacted by the government that would entail curtailment of
your rights, to property, for examples, for your right to.. for
example, police measure in Davao City, smoking. Can you file a case
against the city government because it curtails your rights to
smoke and can you actually say that because you were not allowed
to smoke, you suffered damages. Can there be possible damage for
you not being around the smoke? (story about a pre-bar reviewer
who cannot lecture if he has not smoked) Can you therefore say
that he suffered damage by reason of that police measure for the
public welfare care here in Davao City? No, because that is a
legitimate exercise of police power under General Welfare Clause
that is as well provided in Republic Act 7160, the power of local
governments and force and act measures for common law. He
cannot complain. What about tax? Of course, you suffered damage
by reason of certain taxes. What is better, to pay or not to pay? Of

course, not to pay. Diba? But you cannot complain on the ground
that the government violated your right to property. You cannot
complain that the government abused its right in enacting tax
measures.
Next principle that you need to remember, the provisions of the
law on the human relations do not apply to exercises that so called
absolute rights. Remember that the law of human relations
primarily deals with the principle of abuse of rights under the
premise that a right disappears when a right is abused. Kung
masobra na ang pagexercise sa imohang right, kaduot, such that it
already injures your neighbor then, naa nay problema. Sic Utere
Principle under common law, Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas
so use your property so as not to endager others. So the exercise of
a right disappears when it is abused you cannot abuse rights such
as in a manner that would injure your neighbour already. Questions,
is there such thing as absolute right? There is, although authors
would tell you that while there is no such thing as absolute right
because all rights are subject to reasonable limitations. There are
certain rights which appear to be beyond the ambit of Human
Relation. So whats an example, example would be under Family
Code, parties between 18 and 21 years of age must secure parental
consent to be married. Can the parents refuse with the marital
consent? The answer is yes. That is a right that is absolute under the
law. Parents cannot be compelled to give their consent to the
marriage even if the reasons beyond that denial appeared to be
capricious. It doesnt matter, even if its very whimsical, in love gid
kaayo sa inyohang mga nubyo pero di gyud ka tugutan magpaasawa kay ingon sa imong inahan bahalag pag live-in na lang. They
cannot be sued for violating the law on human relations. Another
would be the testator. He has the absolute right to dispose of the
free portion of property however he sees fit for as long as the the
legitime of his heirs are not impaired. Thats absolute. Lets say for
example his is 10 million. So 5 million supposed to be legitime or at
least thats the way i understand succession because I am not that
good in succession my wife understands it very well. Let us assume
free portion is 5 million and then he gives it to one particular
individual such that, taas pa ang nakuha atong particular individual
kaysa sa nadaot sa iyahang mga anak diba you cannot complain,
even if he bequeaths all free portions of his property lets say in
favor of only one child to the exclusion of the others is the decision
that cannot be questioned by using the principles on Human
Relations.
The law on human relation is part and parcel of Philippine Tort Law
which also mind the fact that the defenses available in quasi-delicts
or under the general law of torts would apply equally well to
human relations. So remember what we learn in quasi-delicts lets
say for example, the doctrine of proximate cause, the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria or the doctrine of assumption of risk. Do not
forget that because that would still be applicable in the law on
human relations.
Fourth, the chapter in human relations consist in mandatory and
prohibitory provisions. These are commands, these are not merely
directory that you may choose to be a good mayor. You may
choose not to be governed by article 19 because its merely the
directory. No, its not. Its mandatory and prohibitory and then under
Article 5 of the Civil Code, acts executed against the provisions of

mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void except when the law

itself authorizes thereby. These are commands, positive commands
in fact under Articles 19,26 of the Civil Code.
These provisions are not self-redressing. The primary proper cause
of action must still be pursued in the courts of law. Verily, no person
is entitled to take the law into his own hands.Now the cause of
action may consist in cause of action for damages which is the case
in certain provisions. Or prevention or you file an action injunctive
relief and other relief such as criminal cause of action. Theyre not
self-progressive. We have to file appropriate case in court.
Violations on law of human relations can be set up in all forums civil,
criminal and even administrative. And therefore, the remedy to
redress the violation of provision law on human relations is not
limited to an action for damages, a civil case, an action for
damages. You can also make the proper prosecution before the
criminal courts and as we will learn later on as we go to Article 27,
also in administrative articles. Thus, an action for damages may be
pursued in the independently based on the provisions of the
chapter or claimed as an ancillary prayer in a case of breach of
contract. Also damages articles 19 to 21 of the civil law can be
pursued in the prosecution of the criminal case or the reopening of
the criminal case otherwise dismissed. See, for example you
committed a crime. When you commit a crime, remember that you
also abuse rights, you violate the right of another, you injure
another person so conceivably that can be subject to prosecution
not only under the Revised Penal Code but also by way of a
separate action under article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Does it
mean that you cannot file the case anymore because you already
instituted a civil action. The answer of course is no. It was said also
in the labor case that if the manner of termination of an employer
was attended by bad faith then damages can be assessed against
the employer for violation of the law on human relations.
Remember kana sya kay dili lang sya basta civil case, this is actually
a labor case, Globe MacKay vs. CA which we will ofcourse discuss in
Section 21. And finally, the law on human relations can also be
applied in disbarment cases.
For example, Spouses Olbes vs. Atty. Deciembre, April 27, 2005.
Even on contemptuous cases in the case of In Re: Emil Jurado.
Jurado there was a lawyer, who at the same time is a journalist.
According to him, he just happened to be a lawyer because
primarily he is a journalist in that 1995 case of In Re: Emil Jurado.
So even in contempt proceedings, you can cite the law on human
relations and as we said:
The law on human relation pervades the entire legal system and
appears to be catch-all legislation. What Im trying to say is when
you file a particular case, your course of action will not be limited to
that particular case only, you can always apply Articles 19, 20, 21 of
the civil code. There are even instances which we have discussed in
the beginning of the semester where, the remedies or the claims
you are presenting may not be grounded only in Article 2176, it
might be grounded as well under the law on human relations.
When you pry, for example,to the privacy of anothers residence
you have cause of action under the law on human relations but you
also have a cause of action elsewhere in the civil code so daghan
kaayo ang pwede iapply sa law on human relations and when i say it
appears to be catch-all legislation, it appears to be one percent
provision of something that statutes cannot and would not cover.

For example, in the case of Lozano vs. Martinez, can you recall this
case about BP 22 and the later case which we will be discussing a
little bit later which escapes me? Does the law BP 22 address that
claim of the offended party, ni issue og check nitalbog, of course
that creates damage upon the person to whom the check was
issued. Wala sya nabayran because nitalbog ang check. Can you sue
for damages based on BP 22? Can you? If you look at the provisions
on BP 22, all seven sections of it, wala gyud nabutang og to that the
private offended party of BP 22 case has redress. It appears that
under BP 22, the remedies are the participation of the private
offended parties witness the fact the check was issued without
sufficient funds. Naa bay nibutang didto na you can recover
damages? But clearly, you were prejudiced. Clearly, you were
damaged. So what will supply the deficiency? You will learn later on
that its actually the law on human relations.
Now, in the case of Velayo vs. Shell & Co., a very very old case, one
that is decided soon after the civil case of the Philippines was
enacted because, you remember the law on human relations, its an
entirely new title in the civil code. Wala pa sya sa Spanish civil code.
So the question that confronted the supreme court was the fact
that, kani bang law on human relations, can it be given retroactive
effect.? If you look at the provisions of the civil code, in article 4, for
example, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
proved. Later on in Civil Code which I know you dont bother to
read anymore because these are obscure provisions.
In 2252, changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by
this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive
effect. Duha na Article 4, Article 2252 says no retroactive effect. In
2253, however, states if a right shall be declared for the first time
in this Code it shall be effective at once even though the act of
event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have
occurred under prior legislation provided that the said new right
does not prejudiced or impair any vested acquired right of the
same origin. So what the law is actually saying is, even retroactive
effect to the provisions of the civil code of human relations, if there
is no vested right of the law, if the grant of remedies and rights
under the title on human relations would impair no vested right
then you can give it retroactive effect. So what was the ruling of
the supreme court in Velayo vs. Shell & Co, October 31, 1956,
supreme court said it cannot impair vested rights and therefore,
law on human relations can be given retroactive effect.
Can you make this out of what it says? JURIS PRAECEPTA SUNT
HAEC: HONESTE VIVERE, ALTERUM NON LAEDARE, SUUM CUIQUE
TRIBUERE. This is actually engraved outside the courthouse in
Milan, Italy which explains why it is in Latin. JURIS PRAECEPTA
SUNT HAEC: HONESTE VIVERE, ALTERUM NON LAEDARE, SUUM
CUIQUE TRIBUERE (these are precepts of the law; to live honestly,
to give everyone his due and observe honesty or something to that
effect. To live honestly, to hurt no one and to give engraved man
his due. Is it something that is familiar to you? Very very familiar
diba? the phraesology? These are the precepts of the law; to live
honestly, to hurt no one and to give every man his due which is
practically the language of the Article 19 Civil Code which is our own
principle of abuse of rights. Every person must, in the exercise his

rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Mao ni ang
principle of abuse of rights. It provides that a person should not use
his right unjustly or in bad faith, otherwise he may be liable to
another ____. The rationale for the concept is to present some
basic principles, to be followed for the rightful relationship in
human beings and the stability of the social order.
Let me ask you something, supposed i have property for sale and
then you express interest in buying the property, lets say you gave
me an offer, an offer that I have not yet accepted. Can I force you
to buy the property? Can you force me to sell the property to you
instead of me selling it to somebody else? What if you offer a better
price than the third person? Can you force me to sell the property
to you? Answer of course is a no. Why? Because the right not to
enter into contractual relations is absolute. Walay makapugos sa
imoha. But does it mean that when I, for example, unilaterally,
withdraw from entering into a contract with a person, does it mean
that there are no repercussions with or without ____? Remember
the exercise of rights ends when right disappears and it disappears
when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.
In the case of Sesbreno vs. CA, March 26, 2014, the Supreme Court
had the occasion to tell us about unsa ba ang standards that we
need to observe in order not to run counter with article 19 of the
civil code. Of course, its very very codal. To act with justice, to give
everyone his due, to observe honesty and good faith. The law
thereby recognizes the primordial limitations of all rights, that we
may exercise the rights, the standards under article 19 must be
observed. If I might hazard an opinion here, ang pinakaimportante
ay letter C, to observe honesty and good faith because it is very
important to prove an abuse of rights, that you have to prove as
well the presence of bad faith so to my mind anything that is done
by bad faith will be under article 19. Ngano? Why to my mind is it
the most important? Letter A: to act with justice. How do you
measure act with justice? Are we judges? Are we just pieces of the
Supreme court? So how can we gauge whether were acting with
justice or not? If I fail you, for example, in this class, does it mean i
m already not acting with justice? Does it mean that im not giving
you your due or is it the other way around? But if i do it, if i fail you
in bad faith, thats the only time that you can prosecute a cause of
action against me, because theres already bad faith but if
everything is done good faith, even if apparently ther is an abuse of
right, then we cannot seek refuge under the article because all was
done in good faith.
Now, Article 19 actually is a rejection of the classical theory
expressed in the Latin NEMINIM LAEDIT QUI SUO JURE UTITUR.
How weird is that? Knowing to memorize but he who stands in his
own right injures no one. Diba? Im just exercising my right. So
dapat wala kay mabuhat against me. I have a property, lets say for
example and then earlier, before I came here thats why im a little
bit late, theres a buang outside my gate and then the buang is
already throwing stuff on imaginary opponents. Again, it just
happened a few minutes ago outside my gate. Now what
happened if that buang was like, paglabas sa sakyanan sa driveway,
paglabas ko sa gate, what if iyahang gusto labayan akong sakyanan,
i paid a lot of money for that I used _____. What if gusto nya
gubaon akong sakyanan, labayan ng anything. If I try to defend my
property against him that buang, dont you think Im just exercising
my right? And therefore if Im only just standing on my right, Im

not injuring anybody, if I happened to repel him.
Now under this theory, an exercise of a legitimate right can never
be a source of liability even such exercise injures another person. In
this sense, neminem laedit, even when injury to another results,
the holder of the right does no legal harm and resulting damage is
considered damnum absque injuria. Thats under the classical
theory and you know what, under our present dispensation, there
are remnants of this classical theory that is quite opposed to the
principle of abuse of rights. For example, the doctrine of selfdefense in property, the doctrine of self-help in Article 429 of the
Civil Code, the owner or the lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or even just
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
I remember the doctrines in land titles and needs which I taught
before, which I do not do anymore except by way of review
because it is the most boring subject in the history of man. Anyway,
I remember in the case of _______(Sir forgot the title of the case),
or some of those cases where the Supreme court had this imagined
of a mental image of a person sitting at the mirador de su casa. Do
you know what a mirador de su casa is? The portals of your womb.
Mao nay meaning ana. You may be holding a shotgun or holding a
bangkal (?) because theres somebody here whos going through
the property and under article 429, you can prevent or repel that
actual or threatened physical invasion. So thats the mental
situation thats in my head. Can you do that? Can you use force
against force? Under the doctrine of self-help, article 49, you can.
This is a remnant again of the classical theory. However, Article 19,
Article 429 appears not to create an absolute right of defense
because it is guided by the principle of abuse of rights. Other
examples, Article 11,justifying circumstances, self-defense, thats
pursuant to the classical theory, if there is lawful aggression against
you, then you can defend yourself. Unsay requisites sa selfdefense? Unlawful aggression, lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself, and the reasonable means of
necessity employed to repel the unlawful aggression. For as long as
the requisites are present, You can kill. My dear students, you can
kill.
What else? Article 12 exempting circumstances. Article 247, which is
the most exciting provision of all. Why is it the most exciting
provision? Because of the mental picture that it makes. So theres
this guy coming home early from work, then suddenly he hears
some weird sounds emanating from his bedroom and it appears to
be the sound of two people in the process of carnal intercourse and
so he becomes furious, silip sya sa kwarto, he sees his wife with
another man, the law recognizes that your right to kill in that
situation. You can kill your spouse; you can kill the paramour of
your spouse. Although, it is considered a crime, remember, the
penalty which is only destierro, which is not even a penalty but a
means of protection. Protection for whom? Protection for the
person who made the killing pahawaun ka sa locality so that you
will be protected from the retaliation sa mga parente sa tao na
napatay nimo. Again, my dear students under Article 247, you can
kill. He who stands in his right injures no one. Thats the classical
theory. Now in Article 11, for example, in number 5, justifying

circumstances, that following no man incur any criminal liability,

any person who acts in a fulfilment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or lawful exercise of office. Thats actually
classical theory. You exercise your right, you kill somebody. You are
not criminally liable.
Now, how do we recognize(?) conflict or apparent conflict, naa kay
old will, the classical theory. You have exercise your right, you injure
somebody,damnum absque injuria thats the classical theory. But
now, with the principle of abuse of rights, under Article 19, unsa
ning nakabutang? Diba? The three standards stated in Article 19.
Now the law on human relations respects legitimate exercises of
established rights because had it been on the rise(?), it means diay
that if you kill somebody by reason of lawful self-defense. Pwede
gihapun ka file-an ug kaso civilly under Article 19 in relation to
probably article 20 or 21 of the civil code. And that would create a
disastrous, conflict situation within our system of laws. However,
malice or bad faith would never be permitted even if our rights
were being exercised. Thats what we need to remember. Again,
the important thing there, good faith,bad faith. The main role of
Article 19 is a mere declaration standard so this is not by itself
actionable. An abuse of right can only be repressed by invoking
Article 19 together with other provisions of the law such as Articles
20 and 21. You look at it this way, when you file a case for abuse of
rights or you file a case under the law of human relations, Article 19
is your foundation but the actual super structure that those _____
is actually not article 19 but you have to reckon with Articles 20 and
21 of the Civil Code. So dili pwede mufile ka ug Article 19 lang.
So lets look at article 19, Every person must, in the exercise his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. So thats
your contention, thats what youre suing for. So what will you
give? Wala. So you have to pair it with either Article 20 or Article 21.
In the case of Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, there is no hard and fast
rule which can be applied to determine whether or not principle of
abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision of law
depends on the circumstances of each case. When the right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another and legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. Although the requirements in each provision are
different, these three articles are all related to each other. As the
eminent Civilist Senator Arturo had said, with this article combined
with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law of civil code has been
very greatly broadened and has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law of torts. It is now difficult
to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not
be checked by the application of these articles.
Thats why I was talking to you about _____ when youre talking
about the cardinal principles. Its catch-all. Theres nothing you can
do right now with bad faith that cannot be addressed by the civil
code. The law will always give a remedy to the injured one. Ana ang
gwapo sa law on human relations. Why? Why is there a need for
these provisions? Its a right formation(?) that our legislators
cannot be bothered to do/make laws that could cover any
inconceivable wrong. Say, for example, if there is a requirement

that there should be a law, for every type of injury or for every type
of malevolent exercise of the law, kulang ang number sa balaod so
you need the provisions on the law of human relations.
So by way of summary what is the relation of Article 19 and Articles
20 and 21 of the civil code? So when a right is exercised in a manner
which is not conformed with the norms enshrined in the Article 19
and results in the damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible
but while article 19 lists down the rule of conduct for the
government on law of human relations and the maintenance of
social worker, it does not provide a remedy for its own violation.
Generally, an action for damages under article 20 and 21 would be
proper. So what you need to remember is you cannot apply article
19 by its own. You apply it together with 20 and 21 and sometimes,
the other provision of the law on human relations. But 99% of the
time, 19 and 20, or 19 and 21. Elements.
In the case of Andrade vs. CA, 371 S 555, 1) there is a legal right or
duty; 2) the right is exercised in bad faith and 3) the purpose or
intent is to prejudice or injure another. Again, that all important
elements of bad faith. So we discuss the doctrine of self-help. So
how do you harmonize that with article 19, abuse of right?
UCPB vs. Vasco, an old case, August 31, 2004. So what happened
her was that Basco was an employee of UCPB, he was also a
depositor and a stockholder. I think we have discussed this already.
He was dismissed from his employment with the bank. After his
dismissal, the bank invoking article 429 of the civil code banned him
from the premises. Would that be proper? What if pumunta syang
bangko para muwithdraw sa kayang kwarta? He cant do that
because he is far from the premises. On the pretext na makasulod
ka diri, you might be able to influence your fellow employees or you
might gather evidence against us. Tungod ana pwede ba na sya?
Invoking Article 429 of the Civil Code, the doctrine of self-help.
According to Supreme Court no, while we agree with the
respondent bank that it has the right to exclude certain individual
from its premises or to limit their access thereto as to time, to
protect, not only its premises and records but also the persons of
its personnel and its customer clients while in the premises, it bears
stressing that property rights must be considered for many
purposes not as absolute, unrestricted dominions but as an
aggregation of qualified privileges, the limits of which are
prescribed by the equality of rights and the correlation of rights
and obligations necessary for the highest enjoyment of the
property by the entire community of proprietors.
In Rellosa vs. Pellosis the Supreme Court held that it might be that
the owner of the land with the right to enjoy and exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof but the exercise
of his rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule
requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due
and to observe honesty and good faith. While right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be
held accountable. Rights of property, like all other social and
conventional rights are subject to such reasonable limitations in
their enjoyment and to such reasonable norms established. So like
here, whats the Supreme Court trying to say here. Yeah, you have

absolute right to this property. Yeah, under article 429, you can
prevent people from entering your property but is it capricious?
Does it amount to bad faith already? If that is the case, then that is
no longer allowed. You already violate Article 19 of the Civil Code.
respondents application, Cebu Country Club violated the rules

governing human relations.
Oh, this is one is very common: MWSS v Act Theater (June 17, 2004)
Utility companies who will unceremoniously cut-off your utilities.
Kanang kuryente or tubig, here it is tubig. In my case, the worst is
PLDT. I will give you a scenario. What if nakabayad na ka sa PLDT,
ok? Lets say for example my deadline for payment is every 29 th (of
the month) but I paid on the 28 th, which is, lets say, a Friday. I paid
thru my ATM. Pag-abot ug Sunday, I discovered that wala na koy
internet. Despite the fact na nakabayad ka on time and their policy
allows on-line payment. What if that happens to you? Naputlan ka
ug internet without notice, or tubig?
This happened in 1986, pending investigation for gross negligence

which caused losses to a depositor amounting to P50,600. Here,
Gomez, a PCIB employee, filed a petition to recover the amount of
P50,600. Gomez asked for an explanation as to legal basis for
PCIBs action. Why is PCIB making deductions? What is your basis? Is
there already a finding nga naa koy complicity sa pagkawala sa
P50,600? PCIB wouldnt answer. Belatedly, PCIB issued a
memorandum after Gomez asked for an explanation why there is a
salary deduction when the case is still pending. PCIB issued a
memorandum finding her guilty of gross negligence and ordered
salary deductions. PCIB also alleged that Gomez was afforded due
process.
Acording to the SC, you can cut-off your service but you have to
give notice. If you do not give notice to your customer, then you
can be considered abusing your right under Article 19.
Torrijos v CA (October 21, 1976)
In this case, just remember that while the death of the accused
extinguishes his criminal liability, including the fine, his civil liability
based on human relations remains. So it survives even the death of
the accused.
ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND CONTRACTS

Can a person be compelled to enter into contractual relations?
He cannot be compelled (to enter into contractual relations). The
right not to enter into contractual relations is absolute. However, in
option contracts, in rights to personal obligations and of other
preparatory juridical relations in the preparation stage of a
contract, a person can be compelled. The right to withdraw,
however, must not be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily,
otherwise it would give rise to damage claim under Article 19 which
ordains that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Ang Yu Asuncion v. CA,
Dec. 2, 1994)
Ok, lets say that in the preparatory stage of the contract there was
an option but I did not respect that option, you cannot you me for
specific performance. Why can you not sue me for specific
performance? You cannot sue me for specific performance because
there is not perfected contract yet. Nothing to enforce but because
I have exercised my right to withdraw whimsically, I am abusing my
right. Therefore, I can be held liable for damages. Remember, this
also applies to personal obligations.
Remember this case, Cebu Country Club v Elizagague.
Here is this guy who wanted to apply for proprietary membership
before Cebu Country Club, Inc. It uses the blackball system. In a
blackball system, even if there is only member who does not like
you, you are dead. If you are petitioning for membership and if
there is someone who does not like you, for whatever reason, you
can be denied membership. The SC held that in rejecting
Here is a new case, PCIB v Gomez (?). It is now BDO.
According to the SC, PCIB is liable under Article 19 in relation to

Article 21 of the Civil Code. Although PCIB has the right to penalize
its employees for acts of negligence, such right must not be
exercised unjustly and illegally. In this case PCIB made salary
deductions even if the investigation is still pending. Belatedly, PCIB
issued a memorandum finding her grossly negligent and requiring
her to pay the amount. When she asked for legal and factual basis
for the finding of negligence, PCIB refused to give any. Moreover,
PCIB continued to make deductions of her salary and allowances.
It was unfair but what is more unfair is this case was only decided
November 23, 2015 (?). Almost after thirty years!
What if walay contract? Walay quasi-contract? Walay delict or quasidelict pero nasakitan ka? You were injured by another person? Your
remedy would be Articles 13, 20 and 21 (?).
ABS-CBN v CA (January 21, 1999)
This is the case where the SC said that moral damages can be
awarded to a corporation. This is a doctrinal case.
UE v Jader (February 17, 2000). Jader here is a law student of the
University of the East who failed to take his examination for
Practice Court 1. Jader is asking for a special exam. Can you do that
in the bar? Diba there is a general rule that no special examinations
will be given to students on the reason of absence because there is
not special bar exams. We understand that here in Ateneo, right?
However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark when the
dean of his college approved his application to removal
examination. And so, in the second semester, his name appeared in
the tentative list of graduates. Come the end of the school year, he
was able to graduate, or, at least, was able to attend the
graduation ceremonies. So, he physically graduated.
If you are a law student, after graduation, of course, you would
prepare for the bar. Enrol in the review class, buy review materials.
That is what Jader did. To his dismay, he learned that he was given
a failing mark diay in his practice court 1 class despite the removal
examination. So, he was not able to take the bar. According to him,
this caused him besmirched reputation. He sued UE and prayed for
moral and exemplary damages arising from the negligence of UE.
What is the negligence here? He was not informed that he was

going to graduate and that he cannot take the bar exams because
he had a failing mark in practice court.
The trial court ruled in his favor and awarded him actual damages.
The CA affirmed the trial court with modification. The CA awarded
moral damages for the shock, anguish, serious anxiety and
wounded feelings to his person. What issue was brought to the SC?
May an educational institution be held liable for misleading the
student to believing that he has satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case? According to the SC, yes! The
school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem regarding the students grade or performance and most
importantly of the procedures for _____.
UE, in belatedly informing Jader of the result of the removal exam
particularly at that time when he had already commenced
preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good
faith. It is only the school that can compel its professors to act and
comply with the schools policies with respect to computation and
prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise control,
much less influence, over the way an educational institution should
run its affairs particularly in disciplining its professors or teachers
and ensuring their compliance with the schools rules and
regulations. The Dean is the senior officer responsible for the
operation of an academic program, foster the rules and
regulations, and supervisions of faculty services. He must see to it
that his own professors, regardless of their status or profession
outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the
latter. The negligent act of the professor who fails to observe the
rules of the school by not promptly submitting a students grade is
not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school,
being his employer.
Considering further that the institution of learning is involved
herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should
have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically
the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.
What damages should be awarded? He (Jader) already paid for the
review, he cannot take that back. UE must pay for that by way of
actual and compensatory damages. Whatever loss of income he
may have had because he took a leave of absence from work to
prepare for the bar exams must be compensated by UE.
Should there be an award of moral damages against UE? According
to the SC, NO! We do not agree with the CAs findings that Jader
suffered shock trauma and pain when he was informed that he did
not graduate and could not take the bar exams. At the very least, it
was the responsibility of the respondent to verify for himself is he
has completed all the necessary requirements to be eligible for the
bar exams. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
more responsible to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievements are in order. (Atty. E: That
I do not agree with. Diba the SC said earlier nga ang naa ray control
sa record is the school itself? What was the confirmation nga,
apparently, ok na sya? Gipa-attend sya ug graduation!)
Remember this case of Aytona v Castillo (4 SCRA 1) on midnight
appointments. What happened here?
Outgoing President (Bangs) Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim

governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath.
On the same that noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office and on the next day, he issued AO No. 2
withdrawing and cancelling all ad interim appointments by
President Garcia. All in all, there were 350 midnights or last minute
appointments. When did this happen? It happened at midnight
gyud! Dili bitaw, kanang mga last minute appointments, meaning,
mu-take-over na ang new president usa pa sya ning make ug
appointments.
Is that a proper exercise of the appointing power? According to the
SC, NO! It can be regarded as an abuse of presidential prerogatives.
The steps taken were mere partisan efforts to fill all vacant
positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions and thereby
depriving the new administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
If you recall your constitutional law, there is already a provision in
the 1987 Constitution regarding these appointments which we will
go on later on. What President Garcia was trying to do here is to
appoint everybody, more or less, so that ang iyahang mga tao kay
mao lang gihapon during the time that it was already President
Macapagal which is not fair.
Here is the Constitutional provision, Article VII, Section 15. You
know this, right? Karon hangtod mahuman ang term ni President
Aquino, he cannot make any appointments. So, from Aytona v
Castillo until the later cases, it was quite clear, within that period
the President cannot make any appointments. But that changed.
In the case of De Castro v Judicial and Bar Council, if you recall this
case, this was the case that paved the way for the appointment of
Renato Corona, Chief Justice of the SC. According to this case, the
prohibition on midnight appointments does not cover
appointments or vacancies in the judiciary. What prevails is Section
4 (1), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution which provides that any vacancy
should be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Nganong gusto gyud ni Arroyo to ensure that Corona would be
appointed Chief Justice? Because she already anticipated that a lot
of case would be filed against her after her term is over. What was
priority number one for the Aquino administration? You may not
know it. Remove Chief Justice Renato Corona and replace him with
a sympathetic Chief Justice Sereno. You know, at that time that
was a big deal. Maybe during that time you were still in college so
you didnt mind it.
Also, take note of this case, In Re: Emil Jurado (April 6, 1995). There
is this sensational case where this journalist, Jurado, wrote that naa
kunoy murag sindikato or mafia na mga Justices nga iyang gitawag
nga Magnificent 7. So it was a scandal, there was an imputation
of corruption in the judiciary involving justices of the SC. This is a
contempt case against Jurado.
According to Jurado, there were RTC judges in Makati and in Manila
who were being handled by Justices of the CA and of the SC. Guess
kung unsa nga company ang involved diri? PLDT! Jurado was saying
that there is corruption in the judiciary. Because of this, the SC
launched an investigation and found out that Jurado might have

misquoted, or has presented false/incomplete information, or

made absolute fabrication against the SC.
The SC said, in a nutshell, freedom of the press and of expression is
guaranteed by the Constitution but it is limited by Article 19. It has
to be exercised in good faith. The Court found him guilty of
contempt and ordered him to pay a fine of P1,000.
Lets go to Article 20.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
contract without hearing the side of Cruz about the strike,

petitioner opened itself for charge of bad faith. Although Petrophil
had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner should not have
act purposely to injure private respondent because that would
already constitute bad faith.
So, in the case of BPI v CA, there is abuse of right under Article 19
when the following elements are present:
There is a legal right or duty;
The right or duty was exercised in bad faith; and
The sole purpose or intent is to prejudice or injure
another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of

law which do not specially provide for their own sanction. Thus,
everyone who, whether wilfully or negligently, in the exercise of
their civil right or duty, causes damage to another shall indemnify
his victim for injuries suffered by the latter.
These elements are obviously present in this case. Moreover,

article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully
or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same. Petitioner might not deliberately intended to injure
the respondent-drivers but as a consequence of its act, Cruz and
the drivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss thereby.
Note that under article 20, there is no requirement that the act
must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person
suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in
order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer.
If the special law does not provide for civil indemnity in case it is
violated, what will automatically be the basis for the award for
damages? It is Article 20. That is what I want you to remember.
So, in a nutshell, what is it saying? Article 20 requires that there

should be a law violated. It is enough that the law violated is Article
19, in general, making it truly a catch all provision.
Also, there should be a law that is violated, irrespective of whether

the law provides for damages or not. It can be Article 19, when you
violate Article 19 in a manner that is contrary to law, then, Article 20
would be your sanction. Thats the provision that sanctions
damages. It can be a different law, as we will see later in our
discussion.
Also, the violation of law need not be directed against a specific

person. It suffices that a person suffered damage as a consequence
of the wrongful act. What happened here in Petrophil? Kinsa man
ang uban plaintiff? The drivers. Did Petrophil do anything directly
against the drivers? No, only against Dr. Cruz, the employer of the
drivers.
Take note that pwede with intent ug pwede pud negligent ang
pagcommit sa tort under Article 20. Wilfully signifies intent. Diba
remember, Article 2176, quasi-delicts, the cornerstone of liability is
negligence. If it is wilfully committed it becomes what? It becomes
a crime. This is in keeping with the Anglo-American law concept of
torts. Negligence, on the other hand, signifies culpa, fraud, or
failure to observe the appropriate degree of diligence. This is in
keeping with the Spanish-Roman law concept of torts. Therefore,
Article 20 is an amalgam of the Spanish and American tort law.
Now, for me lang, if you are suing under article 20, you have to pair
it with something else. In the same way that in article 19, you have
to pair it with either article 20 or 21, as a general rule.
Now, unsay important thing to remember here? The modes of

commission. What are the modes of commission here? Can it be
willful? Can it be negligent? It can be both.
An example would be the case of Petrophil v CA (December 10,

2001):
Petrophil here unilaterally terminated a trucking contract it had
with Cruz which resulted to the loss and income on the latters
drivers. The contract stated that it can be terminated with cause or
without cause, provided proper notice is given. So, Petrophil was
contractually allowed to sever its contractual relations with Cruz
maskin walay cause or reason but Cruz and the 26 drivers contend
that even granting arguendo that Petrophil have all the right to
terminate the contract, he would still be liable to answer for
damages under article 19 on abuse of right for terminating the
contract without reason but out of sheer will.
According to the SC, Cruz is correct. When it terminated that
Now, lets go to Article 20. Generally, you pair it with Article 19 and
that would be enough to support a cause of action. Ok? Lets now
examine certain cases where lahi nga law ang gigamit. It is not
always article 19, it can be applied even if article 19 is not being
involved. Please remember that. Article 19 cannot be invoked
without applying Article 20 or 21, but Article 20 and 21 can be
applied even if you do not invoke Article 19. Pwede special law like
BP 22 which do not provide for civil liability or indemnity. What
would be the remedy available for the private offended party? You
can always apply Article 20.
Banal v Tadeo (December 11, 1987)
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of
the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is
sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by
law for the commission of a crime. Every crime gives rise to a penal
or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage,
and indemnification for the losses.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil liability of the
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in
a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so, may
leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of
the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at
the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
So, even if BP 22 does not provide for indemnification for damages,
the private offended party can still be held liable for damages
under Article 20 in the same case. You do not have to file a separate
civil action, the court will adjudge damages under article 20 in the
same case.
Another bottle case, remember the first bottle case that we have?
Rufina?
Cagayan Valley Enterprises v CA (November 8, 1989)
So, La Tondea, Inc. (LTI) has a bottle. So, it has been using the 350
c.c. white flint bottles for its gin popularly known as "Ginebra San
Miguel". In 1981, LTI filed a case for injunction and damages against
Cagayan Valley Enterprises (CVE) for using the 350 c.c. bottles with
the marks "La Tondea" and "Ginebra San Miguel" stamped or
blown-in therein by filling the same with Cagayan's liquor product
bearing the label "Sonny Boy" for commercial sale and distribution,
without LTI's written consent and in violation of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 623, as amended by Republic Act No. 5700.
What is this Act No. 623? In a nutshell, what it says is that, if I am
the owner of the bottles, I am the one who paid registered patent
to use the bottle. I am the only one who will use it for commercial
use. Kung walay permiso sa akua unya gamiton nimo, you will be
held liable. However, if you examine RA No. 623, what does it say
about damages to be awarded to the offended party? Wala! It does
not say anything about liability for damages. Does it mean that LTI
cannot recover any damages from CVE? The answer is, there can be
recovery for damages.
While Republic Act No. 623, as amended, provides for a criminal
action in case of violation, a civil action for damages is proper under
Article 20 of the Civil Code which provides that every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same. This particular provision of
the Civil Case was clearly meant to complement all legal provisions
which may have inadvertently failed to provide for indemnification
or reparation of damages when proper or called for. In the
language of the Code Commission "the foregoing rule pervades the
entire legal system, and renders it impossible that a person who
suffers damage because another has violated some legal
provisions, should find himself without relief."
If there is a special law which does not provide for civil indemnity
for damages, in case there is injury to a private individual, Article 20
will be the measure of damages. As simple as that.
Picardal v Llagas (December 29, 1967)
The special law that is involved here is the Agricultural Tenancy Act.
According to the Agricultural Tenancy Act, if the landowner

unlawfully dispossesses a tenant, he can be held liable for damages.
The problem here is that the landowner is already dead. Naturally,
the land will form part of his estate. Kinsa karon ang gadumala (?)
sa iyang estate? Iyang mga heirs. Karon, iyahang heirs mao ang
nagpahawa sa tenant. Question, can you hold the heirs liable for
damages? The heirs contend that they cannot be held liable, it
should be the estate and not the heirs (personally), because under
RA 1199, it is only the landlord that can be held liable.
According to the SC, WRONG! Under Article 20, if you are the one
who caused the damage, you are the one who will pay the damage.
Who violated the law here by dispossessing the tenants? It is the
heirs, and so even if RA 1199 does not state that the heirs could be
held liable, Article 20 tells you that they can be (held liable).
Garcia v Salvador (March 20, 2007)
Salvador, here, started working as a trainee in the Accounting
Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (Limay). As a
prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical
examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia
who is a medical technologist, conducted the medical test and on
October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result indicating that Salvador
was positive for Hepa B. Thus, the Company terminated Salvadors
employment for failing the physical examination.
When Salvador told her father about it, the latter suffered a heart
attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During
Ramons confinement, Salvador underwent another medical test at
the said hospital and the result indicated that she had no hepatitis.
So there are now two conflicting test results. She informed the
company physician about it but she was told that the test result
from CDC was more reliable. So she had to go back to CDC for
confirmatory testing. This time, the result from CDC was negative.
Maja submitted the latest result to the executives of the company
who asked her to undergo another test before her employment
could be considered. Thus CDC conducted another test on
Salvador, which resulted to a negative. A certification was issued
correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining
medical technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as
positive or reactive. So nay mali on the part of Garcia, the MedTech
who first conducted the test. Thereafter, the company rehired
Salvador. However, it did not change the fact that Salvador
suffered damages, in fact, nadamay pa iyang papa!
Salvador filed a complaint against Garcia and a purportedly
unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the
erroneous interpretation of the results of the examination, she lost
her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless
nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business
opportunities.
Remember, we are talking here of Article 20. So, was there any
violation a law when you misinterpret the results? Wala man nay
law nga naviolate. It could be Article 2176, negligence lang gyud,
walay law nga na violate. But apparently, there is this obscure law,
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The
Clinical Laboratory Law. Such provides that it shall be unlawful for
any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical

laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in

laboratory medicine and authorized by the Secretary of Health,
such authorization to be renewed annually.
Who was in charge with laboratory here? Was Garcia a doctor? Was
Calderon a doctor? NO! But the CDC have an officer in-charge,
murag manager, who is a physician, by the name of Castro. Si
Castro ba ang nagsupervise sa laboratory? No! So there is a
violation of Section 2 of RA 4688. There is no licensed physician
duly qualified that supervised the tests. Mao ni sya karon ang
violation of the law.
According to the SC, CDC is not administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician as required by law. Failure to
comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that
care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Hence, there is liability under Article 20 even if there is no provision
providing damages for violation of the law.
Lets recap:
Again, Article 19 cannot be used to recover damages
solely on its own. It has to be paired with Article 20 or 21,
99% of the time because Ive read cases that Article 19 was
paired with Article 27 or other provisions.
Article 19 will be the general principle of law that will be
used, if there is a violation of law use it with Article 20.
However, if the violation is only such that is contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy, use Article 21.
April 8, 2016
GARAFOL
For tonight we begin with article 21
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage
This is a new provision. You can compare this to article 20 which we
already discussed and which provide that every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another
shall indemnify the latter for the damage done.
Take particular attention on how article 20 is worded compare to
article 21. In article 21 willfully causes loss or injury to another,
compensate the latter for the damage.
In article 20 willfully and negligently causes damage to another
shall indemnify the other for the damage done What is then the
basic difference in article 20 and article 21?
Article 20 can be violated either willfully or negligently whereas
article 21 can only be violated willfully or intentionally. In other
words, article 21 requires intent. A matter of intention causing
damage to another.
Take note that in the tort law, a tort can only be committed either
by intent or without intent as well. We discussed before that an act
which can be considered as a tort can also be considered as a crime.
Again lets go back to article 21 any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damage There was no mention there of intent. Willfulness or
voluntariness of a particular act.
So therefore, did you commit a crime when you violated article 21?
We know for the fact that when you violated article 21, there has
suppose to be intent, there suppose to be mens rea there. Dba, but
the question is, even if there is a physical act of causing damage to
another with intent would you thereby considered a violation of
article 21 a crime? The answer is NO. Why? Lets go back to the
principle that we know back in our criminal law , nullum crimen
nullum poena sine lege . Article 21 does not offend any statute and
when there is no statute violated by the act it could not be
considered as a crime. The act of violating article 21 here is only
violating good customs, public policy and morals. In the absence of
statute no matter how perverse the violation under article 21 in
cannot be considered as a criminal offense.
Thus if the act is covered by statute you apply article 20 but if the
act is not covered by statute but it is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy you apply article 21.
And if the act covers under article 20 remember the remedies that
we have would be enforcing the liability under the said statute if it
provides for a certain liability and damages under article 20. If the
act covers under article 21, you apply article 21 because there is no
other __ act. Article 21 is intended to be a catch all provision. Not all
possible acts that can cause damage can be covered by our statutes
so that is the wisdom of article 21. Therefore although that there is
no law that punishes the act it does not mean that there is no
possible remedies. In an old case under PNB vs. CA
PNB VS CA
Article 21 was intended to expand the concept of torts in our
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrong which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes.
So catch-all sya. No violation of law, the remedy is article 21. Similar
nature to article 19. While article 20 seeks to remedy or to provide a
__ with respect to certain acts that may violate the law but the law
that is violated does not provide for civil indemnity article 21 has a
greater scope. And that masking walay balaod, for as long that the
act that is committed causes damage to another that act would still
be actionable.
What is the effect of the absence of article 21? It would be damnum
absque injuria.
Example:
Gerald was an employee of ABC Company on which Mateo was a
manager. He was suspected na nagdispalko ug kwarta. Take note
under the labor law, a confidential employee who no longer enjoy

the trust and confidence of his employer can be terminated. You

cannot question that, it is the sole right of the employer. Assuming
further that Gerald was investigated by the company and giabswelto sya sa HR sa compania and sa police. Can you wronged
the manager Mateo if he does not hire the Gerald back? The
answer is no. The employer can still justify his action of terminating
Gerald by saying that as a confidential employee, he no longer has
trust and confidence to him. That is valid exercise of management_.
Assuming further that Mateo terminate Gerald and wrote a letter
to several companies that Gerald was suspected of theft. Tanan
iyang gisulatan, without being ask. Did Mateo commit crime? There
is nothing wrong with what he did. Why, because clearly he is
simply telling the truth. For as long that the letter was not libelous
or defamatory, there was no crime that is committed. But the
question is, is there damage or prejudice falls upon an employee
who cannot anymore find an employment? Naay damage.
Assuming that there is no article 21, would there be any other legal
injury that the law considered as actionable? The answer is no. So
the remedy here is in article 21. In a similar case (same facts) in the
case of Globe mackay cable vs Ca 1989
Globe Mackay Cable vs CA 1989
Article 21 adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes" that is a catch-all provision.
An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has
committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee
to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth
would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled
for. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in
which the right is exercised and the effects flowing there from. If
the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper,
invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that
"[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private
respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his
having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and
legal
act
of
the
defendants-appellants
(petitioners
herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or
loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount
to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application
in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal
wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover,
the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the
abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result
of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
That to my mind is a complete example of article 21. What are the
elements of Article 21? This was discussed in the case of Nikko Hotel
VS Reyes 2005
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes 2005
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following
elements:
There is an act which is legal;
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public

order, or public policy; and
it is done with intent to injure. ( Most important)
So what happen here in this case. There was this actor who was
quite famous during the era of FPJ. He was about to join the party
but then, he was approach my certain Miss Lim to leave the party
as the host intended it to be an intimate gathering only. Kung kinsa
lng tong nasa listahan. There are two version of the story here,
according to the actor, he was already lining in, nalinya na sya,
naggunit ug plato and then suddenly Miss lim approach intended to
humiliate and embarrassed him. According to Miss Lim, the she
merely whisper to him and was very polite in asking the actor to
leave the party. According to the latter, paghawa daw niya,
nasyaget2x causing scandal in the hotel. He was escorted by the
Makati police and was even more embarrassed for the Dr__ the
host does not even know him. And because that the actor was
humiliated he sue the hotel. Let go again to the requisites here.
There is an act which is legal. What act of the defendant here was
being question by the plaintiff? The act of asking him to leave. Is it
legal for Miss lim to ask him (partycrasher) to leave? Of course.
There is no law that tells you that basta nakasulod ka sa party
bawal nakapagawason. Because if that is the case, then wala na
maghold ug party.
The act is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
Would that be contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
to ask a party crasher to leave? It depends noh, well go to that
later.
The most important element, it is done with the intent to injure.
According to the Supreme Court, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.
Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not
know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994,
thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms.
Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her
work at the hotel with foreign businessmen." Unsa man ang buot
pasabot ana? Matadang dalaga na, ibig sabihin sulpada na kaau .
The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to
say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code

must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but

innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr.
Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the
appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
"predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her
part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
It is unlikely, to happen that miss lim expose to him to
ridicule because there was even an admission that by mr reyes that
miss lim was very close to him close enough to kiss. What does this
means? It means that he was politely asked by miss lim to leave the
party. It was done privately not publicly. Miss lim does not abuse
her right.
When this case out, I thought that this will be ask in the
bar immediately. It was eventually ask but now I cannot guarranty
you anymore that this will be asked in the bar anymore because it
was asked already. There are plenty of cases under rule 21 that can
be a source of bar examination. Lets go to another example.
Example:
Bangs and Amor decided to get married. There were already
invitations sent to their relatives and all the necessary wedding
preperations from the gowns to the cakes and etc.. But two days
before the wedding the defendants simple send a letter stating
that they have to postpone the wedding. Just imagine, if you are in
that situation. The bride sue the groom.
What is this reminds you? The concept of breach of contract to
marry. But is that actionable? Are there instances wherein the
breach of contract to marry is actionable or can be a source of
liability for damages? If so what type of damages are we talking
about? What would be the basis? In the case of De Jesus vs Syquia
1933, a breach of contract to marry is not actonable.
De Jesus vs Syquia 1993
It is a medicine to the heart of a rejected loverWith respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion
that the trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the
plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry.
Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced
by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
none of the features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be
based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita
Loanco.
Actaully the facts of the example above is the same facts of the
case of wassmer vs velez.
Wassmer vs Velez 1964
The Supreme Court ruled that surely this is not a case
of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
GENERAL RULE: Breach of promise to marry is not actionable. The
exception we will discuss later.
What is the basis of liability? The basis of course is that article 21.
That is the basis of the award of damages. Again, actionable
breaches. There are so many cases under this provision dili nato ni
isa-isahon kay they have same facts. We have the case of Gashem
Shookat Baksh vs CA 1993
Baksh vs CA 1993
Baksh is foreign. According to SC where a man's promise to marry is
in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
So therefore, if there is carnal knowledge under this case, breach of
contract of marriage is actionable and explain the reason of the
departure to the GR ths SC said it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree
(what kind of parent is this) to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage.
And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly
against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even
gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming
as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality
of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should
indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages. This was decided when Filipina
women were not that modern. Do you agree? .. talk about survey
about women.

But if the carnal knowledge was a product of mutual lust, no

damages are due such as in the case of Hermosisima vs CA
Hermosisima vs CA 1960
SC ruled we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately
ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirtysix (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be
when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit
of clergy."
Unsa man bout pasabot ana? Kasabot mo pikot. And therefore
according to this case if carnal knowledge is a product of mutual
there cannot be moral seduction. What is moral seduction in
context of article 21? You entice a woman to bed with you by
promossing to marry her. That is moral seduction.
Tanjangco vs CA December 17 1966
The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power
or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases
be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire,
there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon any

person who shall seduce his sister or descendant, whether or not
she be a virgin or over eighteen years of age.
Under the provisions of this Chapter, seduction is committed when
the offender has carnal knowledge of any of the persons and under
the circumstances described herein.
So what is the importance of the requisites here. There is seduction
if it is belowe 18 years of age. Carnal knowledge was had to a
women below 18 years of age. That is criminal seduction. So if
there is criminal seduction the basis for the award of damages
would be article 20 and 19 of NCC. It is not article 21.
Lets go to a different example:
Maja 19 years of age, had carnal knowledge with ramon because
ramon promised to marry her. But on the day again Ramon did not
show up. Can maja demand for damages? Yesyesyoh but this time
since there is no criminal seduction only moral seduction, the basis
for the award of damages is already article 21 rather than RPC and
article 19-20 of NCC. There is a difference ha. You only apply article
21 if there is moral seduction. If there is actual criminal seduction
you do not apply article 21. Why? Because the act is no longer an
act contrary to moral, good custom and public policy but rather
contrary to law. Remember this.
Another example:
Maja 24 years old, had carnal knowledge with Ramon and
surrenders herself because of that promise. On the day of marriage
Ramon did not show up. Can maja sue for damages? Of course, NO!
why? Because it is already a product of mutual lust rather than
moral seduction as in the case of Hermosisimo vs CA. If its recourse
is through mutual lust, according to suarez, there can be no
recovery base on the principle of in pari delicto non oritur action
meaning - When two persons are equally atfault, they shall have no
action against each other.
I promise to marry you so, give it to me murag ing-ana bah Let say
for example: Maja 17 years old had carnal knowledge with ramon
because Ramon promise to marry her. On the day of marriage
nawagting c ramon. Can maja recover damages? Was there a
seduction? Yes there is. Is article 21 applicable? No, because it is not
a moral seduction but rather a criminal seduction. What is criminal
seduction then? You have to go back to the RPC.
Take note of the cases
ARTICLE 338. Simple Seduction. The seduction of a woman who

is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under
eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall be
punished by arresto mayor.
Garcia vs Del Rosario

If a teacher resigns in his position because of a mans promise to
marry her, she can recover damages if his promise was not fulfilled.
ARTICLE 337. Qualified Seduction. The seduction of a virgin over

twelve years and under eighteen years of age, committed by any
person in public authority, priest, house-servant, domestic,
guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody of the woman seduced,
shall be punished by prisin correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
Domalagon vs Bolifer 33 PR 471

There was this guy who is rich nabighani sa usa aka babae.
Gihatagan ug 50k para magpakasal. Gidawat sa babae pero wala
gipakaslan. Nakagasto na ang lalaki. According to the SC that 50k
can be recovered.
One thing that I have to tell you when it comes to these cases that
in the recent years wla nay ing-ana na caso. Imagine gud wala ka
niya kipakaslan tapos when you sue you have to allege that you
have carnal knowledge with that man. Lahi na karon.
Another example
A seduces the 19 year old daughter of X. the girl becomes pregnant.
What is the criminal or civil liability here? Can there be liability for
seduction? Of course there is no seduction here. There was even no
promise to marry in this case. Neither there was criminal liability for

seduction here because again the girl was of age. In the absence of
the intent defraud and deceive the girl, there can be no liability
under article 21. Pero nabuntis ang girl? The proper action here is
that she can file action to compell recognition and an action of
support but not under article 21.
A a married man and B a single of woman of age entered into
written agreement to marry each other after A became and
widower. After A became a widower, A married C. can B sue A for
breach of promise of marriage? NO moral damage can only be
recovered if there is criminal or a special law. To enter into such
agreement over the lifetime of one spouse is clearly contrary to law
public morals, and therefore null and void.
Tenchavez vs Escano July 26 1966
The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escao is assailed on
the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial
of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the
enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie. The argument
is untenable. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce,
for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the
time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings
in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy"
(Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award
of moral damages.
Naa kay asawa when you deny marital consortium it does not mean
actually sexual consortium there is also intimacy. If you deny that
you might actually liable for damages. In fact the SC added, Thus, a
consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied
support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of
the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no
cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in
cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if
in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old
maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum". So you cannot be
forced
PE vs Pe 1962
Alfonso pe and Lolita pe. Lolita was missing and could not be
found. Alfonso pe a married man and nagbaligya ug sigarilyo in
marinduque and was treated as a Son by Cecelio Pe who is one of
the petitioners. Layo na ni sila na relatives. Alfonso here was
actually not a Filipino. Cecelio introduce alfonso to his children, one
of his daughter is lolita. Sige na syag bisita sa balay ni cecelio kay
tudloan niya ug rosary c lolita . And eventually they fell in love with
each other despite the fact that alfonso is married to another.
Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was living.
A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside
Lolitas aparador The present action was instituted under Article 21.
So the parents sued alfonso for damages kay tungod nadaut na
dungog sa pamilya tungod sa paglayas sa girl. Remember this case
happen a long time ago.. the SC ruled that There is no doubt that
the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that
defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita
Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how
to pray the rosary.
, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than
that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent
of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. Remember in this
case the girl is 24 years old. The girl has knowledge that Alfonzo is a
married man. The Sc still award damages on the pretext that he
was teaching the rosary. That deceit was the reason of the award.
Article 22
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.
We already know this. This is the principle of unjust enrichment.
Nemo ex alterius incommodo debet lecupletari (no man ought to be
made rich out of another's injury)
Hulst vs PR Builders
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit
at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property
of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and
good conscience.
Compare this provision in quasi contract
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall
be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (n)
We discussed this in passing in OBLICON. What s the basis of the
law under quasicontact in realtion to article 22. Again that is unjust
enrichment. The law abhords the situation of it.
Example :
A owed B a sum of money evidenced buy a promissory note. At
maturity A paid and a receipt was given to him. When later on he
was asked again to pay, he could not find the receipt, so to avoid
trouble, he paid again. Subsequently he found the missing receipt.
Can he get back what he had paid intentionally but unwillingly?
Can he? Based on article 22. But sir why not under Solutio indebiti
which is under the law on quasi-contracts? Why because when you
talk about Solutio indebiti, you are talking about payment by
mistakes. Here there was no payment by mistakes. There was no
mistakes here. He paid intentionally.
What will A file against B? that would fall under Accion in rem verso.
An action to recover and in the case of UP vs Philab Industries
September 2004 in order that accion in rem verso would prosper

the following elements must be present:
such thing as free lunch. This is quasi contracts.

Article 2150. Although the officious management may not
have been expressly ratified, the owner of the property or
business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be
liable for obligations incurred in his interest, and shall
reimburse the officious manager for the necessary and
useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may
have suffered in the performance of his duties.
UP vs Philab Industries 2004

(6) that the defendant has been enriched,
(7) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss,
(8) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or
legal ground, and
(9)
that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract,

quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.[43]
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action,

available only when there is no other remedy on contract, quasicontract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be
resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.[44]
In that sense, article 22 is also a catch-all provision. If it is a source
or a ground for recovery, and it is not covered by contract,
quasicontract, crime or quasi-delict then you can apply article 22.
Lets go back, Artcle 19 catch-all, article 20-21 catch-all, article 22
catch-all provision.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the

management had for its purpose the prevention of an
imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may have
been derived. (1893)
WHO WILL BE INDEMNIFIED? The owner of the property who was
benefited by the act of officious management.
WHO WILL BE INDEMNIFIED? Officious manager
Another example is under article 2168
Article 2168. When during a fire, flood, storm, or other
calamity, property is saved from destruction by another
person without the knowledge of the owner, the latter is
bound to pay the former just compensation.
Lets go to article 23
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to
another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited.
What is article 23? It is an act or event that cause the damage to
other property. Ikaw, wala kay paki-alam wla kay gibuhat pero the
damage to the property cause you to be vindicated.
It is another provision that discussed about unjust enrichment. This
provision is in place because unless there is a duty to indemnify,
unjust enrichment will occur. There is no such thing as a free beer.
WHO WILL INDEMNIFY? The owner

WHO WILL BE INDEMNIFIED? The person who saved the property
from destruction.
Another is situation of what we call state of necessity.
There was a fire, in order to stop the fire kinahanglan bumbahan
ang bakery. That is an act of state necessity. In perfoming the acts
under state of necessity you are criminally liable. However, the law
does not exempt you from civil liability. Why? Because under article
22
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
Example:
Without A knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the cultivated
highland of B. As cattle are saved but B crops are destroyed. True,
A was not at fault, but he was benefited. It is but right and
equitable that he should indemnify B.
WHO WILL INDEMNIFY? The person who benefited from the act or
event.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does

not act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
(1.)
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2.)
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done

to avoid it;
(3.)
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful

means of preventing it.
WHO WILL BE INDEMNIFIED? The person who suffered damage.

What I want you to think about are the similar situation under the
law where similar sa article 22. Example is negotiorum gestio.
Negotiorum gestio- an officious manager. This takes place when a
person voluntarily take charge of anothers abandoned business or
property without the owners authority. Reimbursement must be
made to the gestor for necessary and useful expenses. The is no
WHO WILL INDEMNIFY? Civil liability shall be borne by the person

benefited.
WHO WILL BE INDEMNIFIED? The person who suffered damage.
Jettison

During the storm the ship which was heavily loaded with goods was
in danger of sinking. The captain of the vessel ordered part of the
goods thrown overboard. In this case the captain is not criminally
liable. The question is who is to be made liable? Under the law on
averages , the ship owner and the cargo owners whose goods were
saved were liable.
Who will indemnify ?Ship owners and the cargo owners
Who will be indemnified? The owners of the jettison goods
Story about the Bar Question regarding Jason Clause- a waiver of
negligence. This is doubtful clause it is void and not existing in
Philippines Jurisdiction. I wonder why it was question in the bar.
Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of

indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.
Artilce III
Section 12 (1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.
Section 14 (2)
Lets go to article 24
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
This is to my mind this is misplaced. Why? Because law under
human relation is suppose to regulate the human interrelation of
one private individual to the other private individual. This article is
actually a command. A command or mandate. Apart from being
misplaced it is actually a very good provision.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
CRIMINAL LAW
This is so called UNDERDOG PROVISION of the civil code. It is

grounded upon the principle of PARENS PATRIA (father or parent
of the country), which refers to the duty of the state in
safeguarding the rights of a person who is at a disadvantage.
Article 24 means that in case of doubt, such doubt shall be
construed and resolved in favor of the underdog.
Take note that it is not only the provision under our law that is
considered as an underdog provision
LABOR:
In case of doubt the in the construction of the provision of Labor
code, the law always favored labor
Article 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall
be resolved in favor of labor.
CONSTITUTION
Article II
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Penal laws are construed in favor of the accused. And RA

9262 VAWC
These are just examples of underdog provisions under our laws.
Take note, article 24 you apply that under all contractual and
property relations. Example: you enter into a contract. The court
should be vigilant in your position(?) how does this article affects
contract of adhesion? Remember they are valid however, when
there is doubt it is to be construe liberally in favor of the party that
merely adhere to the said contract.
Article 24 is an underdog provision but it should be used as a mere
ARGUMENTUM AD MISERICORDIAM. What is that an appeal to
pity. It does not mean that you are an underdog kana, daug naka.
April 22, 2016

ALLORA
Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or

display during a period of acute public want or emergency may
be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any
government or private charitable institution.

If you look at Article 25, it seems like it is a restriction of what you

need to do with your money or what you might be able to do with
your property. Remember that Article 25 does not necessarily
define what thoughtless extravagance is. Remember that the
people in general would have relative abilities to spend. So it really
depends what is thoughtless extravagance. We really do not know.
There is no Jurisprudence that would tell you that extravagance is
thoughtless. Take note, the person generally has the right to use his
property and even consume it, provided he does not injure other
people. This article however imposes a limitation upon that right.
them the right to use, the right to dispose your property as you
see fit. And it allows exercise of police power of the state to
interfere in private property rights because otherwise you are free
to spend your money; you are free to exhaust your own resources.
The problem is when it offends Article 25, it may call upon the
exercise of the power of the State to prevent it or to stop such
thoughtless extravagance or ostentatious display of wealth.
According to Tolentino, the reason why this provision exists is,

When the rich indulge in thoughtless extravagance or display
during a period of acute public want or emergency, they may
unwittingly kindle the flame of unrest in the hearts of the poor who
thereby become more keenly conscious of their privation and
poverty and who may rise against the obvious inequality. Such
display of pomp and frivolity tends to demoralize the suffering
masses, and weaken the very structure of the social group.
According to Tolentino, again, quoting from the Code Commission,
what we are trying to prevent here would be to blew(?) up the
disparity between wealth and poverty and incite the feeling of the
masses. Dili pud maayo magsige ka ug gasto unya ang uban walay
makaon or ang uban tao is under a state of emergency.
Sumptuary Law - These are laws which attempt to regulate habits

of consumption.
For example:
In Kidapawan City, what happened here, farmers
ning-lugsong padulong sa syudad kay mangayo ug
bugas,
Panahon sa Yolanda.
Take note Article 25 is a sumptuary provision. Remember, I told you

to research what is meant by Sumptuary Law.
Laws made for the purpose of restraining luxury

or extravagance, particularly against inordinate
expenditures in the matter of apparel, food,
furniture, etc. (Blacks Law Dictionary)
Lets go to popular culture. I think it was former President E.
Quirino. He was criticized xxx the public were languishing in
poverty, in Malacanang he had a golden arinola. When word came
out about that golden arinola he was not reelected during that time
when we still allow re-election in the Philippine Law. Naay mga
ingon ana nga butang. What about the shoes of the son of Grace
Poe. Asta kunong mahala. When in fact a lot of people post Yolanda
time are still experiencing an acute public want or emergency.
These are things that come to mind when you talk about sumptuary
provisions.
Lets go to Examples of Sumptuary provision in Philippine Law
These are instances where there is acute public want or

emergency.
Take note that thoughtless extravagance or ostentatious display of
wealth is not per se illegal. Dili man siya illegal. However under
Article 25 of the CC, it gives a right of action to government or
private charitable institutions to ask the court to issue an order or
restrain the same. Article 25 is not necessarily self executing(?). In
fact it also limits the cause of action. Kung kinsa ang pwede mo-avail
sa cause action that would only be government or private
charitable institution.
What will happen if you are offended by an ostentatious display of
wealth during a period of acute public want or emergency? Can
you not file a case?
Based on Article 25 you cannot file a case for injunction or TPO,
precisely because individually you are not a government or private
charitable institution. So what you had to do would be probably to
incite a government or private charitable institution to file a case in
your behalf. Thats the only thing that you can do. Individually you
do not have a right of action.
Take note, Article 25 is an application of the sic utere principle in
common law. Sic utere principle means being a good neighbor. So
use your own property so as not to injure another. The injury here is
not physical; its not even economic to a certain extent. But rather
it is an injury upon the emotion or mental state of a person. It is a
limitation of the property owners jus disponendi. Remember the
attributes of ownership under Roman Law, jus disponendi is one of
Article 11, 1987 Constitution on accountability of public

officers
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
So bawal ang ostentatious display of wealth. But if you are a

government official you would rather not show your wealth.
Daghan magsolicit, ikaduha it might lead to the filing of cases
against you for graft and corruption.
General Order 15 October 5, 1972. General order, meaning

it was an order issued or a law issued by Pres Marcos
during Martial Law.
GENERAL ORDER NO. 15

WHEREAS, one of the objectives for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, placing the
entire country under martial law, is to effect social, economic
and political reforms, and thus bring about the
transformation of a new society in our country, one infused
with a profound sense of discipline, and social conscience;
WHEREAS, every citizen and resident of the Philippines

should participate in bringing about a new and reformed

society in our country;
WHEREAS, every effort to save and economize on the
nations already scarce resources should be exerted;
WHEREAS, among others, Article 25 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386) enjoins against thoughtless
extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a
period of emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Order No. 1 both dated September 22, 1972, do
hereby call upon every resident and citizen of the Philippines,
including all elective local officials from provincial governors
and city mayors down to barrio captains and councilmen, to
avoid and prevent, as the case may be, ostentatious display
of wealth and extravagance, including lavish town fiestas or
social gatherings. To this end, they are directed to limit town
fiestas and other local festivities to one day, which should be
as simple and economical as possible.
This coming from a person whose wife owns a collection of 2000

shoes
Remember:
Who can bring the action? ONLY government and private
charitable institutions
What action can be brought? TPO or an action/petition for
injunction.
Is there a need for a declaration of national emergency because
remember the phraseology of Article 25. In times of emergency or
calamity, kinahanglan ba nga adunay declaration of emergency
officially? Remember that local legislative councils can do that:
declare a state of emergency within a particular locality. The
President of the PH can do that, The Congress can do that.
Is there a need for an official declaration?
The Common opinion is there has to be an official state declaration
of emergency. However it is submitted that the existence of the
period of acute public want or emergency can be left to judicial
determination or taken under judicial notice. Otherwise Article 25
would be toothless.
What if walay mag-file ug kaso? Pasagdan lang nato ng thoughtless
extravagance or ostentatious display of wealth? Its kinda
problematic. When you file and you are a government or private
charitable institution are you exempt from the payment of docket
fees? We dont know that. There is no implementing rule with
respect to Article 25. The law that implements the rationale for
Article 25 is the General Order No.15 of President Marcos. Thats the
only one. It was issued during Martial Law, during the time of
alleged social disorder. Social disorder does not necessarily amount
to acute public want. But just the same, take note of General Order
No. 15 which of course no longer effective right now. Abrogated na
ni. So Article 25 is just that -Article 25 - a provision that is obscure
and rarely use by anybody.
If you are to master the law on Human Relations other than Articles
19, 20, 21 you have to master Article 26. Because the case law of
Article 26 is quite developed already with recent jurisprudence.
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
There is an emphasis on damages, prevention and other relief
which brings to mind the fact that under Article 26 your remedies
are purely civil in nature. You do not go to the extent of filing a
criminal action under Article 26. If it amounts to a criminal offense
then you file the necessary case but not under Article 26 of course.
What are these acts?
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
No 2, Which in American and recent PH jurisprudence is called
Alienation of Affection
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
Kanang pataka lang ka ug storya. Tsismis! Again this is part of what
we call Alienation of Affection but its no longer limited to Family
Relations under no. 2, it includes now to friendly relations.
beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
Again in recent jurisprudence this has been called Intentional
Infliction of Emotional or Mental distress which is a tort in
American Law but not necessarily a tort in PH law prior to No.4
which is vexing or humiliating another.
We look at the rationale of Concepcion vs. CA, January 31, 2000
The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that
the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of
human personality is a concomitant consideration of
every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of
every system of law, of the culture and civilization of
every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes
insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective. [11]Thus, under this
article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and
damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.
Brings to mind what happened a couple of months back about the
statement of Manny Pacquiao. You can very much sue him if you
want based on those statements under Article 26.
Lets go to Par. 1: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

Privacy is the expectation that confidential personal information

disclosed in a private place will not be disclosed to third parties,
when that disclosure would cause either embarrassment or
emotional
distress
to
a
person
of
reasonable
sensitivities. Information is interpreted broadly to include facts,
images (e.g., photographs, videotapes), and disparaging opinions.
Remember that the Right to Privacy is a constitutionally protected
right. Article 3, Section 2 (1987 Constitution)
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
If you look at Article 3, Section 3(1)
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
It presuppose into the so-called Fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine. If evidence is obtained in violation of the previous
provisions regarding searches and seizures and section 3 which is
right to privacy that would be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. That, we will be discussing more of in Evidence. Take
note of this case Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998 where there is this
so-called two-part test on the reasonableness of the persons
expectation of privacy.
(1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and
(2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.
Which brings to mind those celebrities who post everything about
themselves, whether on FB, instagram or twitter or what have you.
Then later on they will claim that their privacy is being invaded by
people. No. You dont exhibit any reasonable expectation of
privacy by your conduct.
Remember that the right to privacy is not a guarantee to hermetic
seclusion. No man is an island. You cannot keep everything about
your life, secret. Would that expectation of privacy be one that
Society finds reasonable? Because if its too much, then you fail in
that two-fold test in Ople vs. Torres - talking about the National ID
System.
Heres an interesting case, St. Louis Realty vs. CA (1984). St. Louis
Realty here caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio
an ad supposedly depicting, in Sunday Times Arcadios house under
title, "WHERE THE HEART IS". Its the way of St. Louis Realty of
selling their subdivision lot and townhouses. So its an
advertisement that would of course engage people to buy. The
problem here is, it was not Arcadios house. It was the house of
Doctor Conrado J. Aramil. So Dr. Aramil wrote to St. Louis Realty
about the mistake and seeing how it has affected his professional
and personal integrity as he has invited in several occasions
numerous medical colleagues, medical students and friends to his
house. Because of it he receives sly remarks, "it looks like your
house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", "like your
wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband,"
etc. He claims that the act of publishing on Sunday Times resulted
in mental anguish. So he sued for damages St. Louis Realty later on
for violation of Article 21 and 26 of the CC. What did St. Louis do?
Through a certain Ernesto Magtoto, he stopped the publication of
the advertisement and contacted Dr. Aramil and offered his
apologies but no rectification or official apology was published.
Ang gusto ni Dr. Aramil rectify it on paper and also make a public
apology but it was never done by St. Louis prompting again Dr.
Aramil to sue St Louis for damages. How did the SC rule? According
to SC there was gross negligence on the part of St Louis employees
in mixing up the Arcadio and Dr Aramil residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times and the SC lamented
also about the fact that was no official or written public apology.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were
confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he
was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio
had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was
mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
The SC awarded him a certain sum for damages. Thats a violation
of your right to privacy by means of gross negligence. This case is
perfectly okay. This is good precedent.
But what the SC failed to consider is the fact that Article 26 actually
makes out intentional torts or torts committed by intent not by
negligence. Diba diri gross negligence, there is no intent to do that.
But the SC applied Article 26 (1). Somehow medyo loose ang
interpretation sa SC.
Par 2: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another; or the so-called Alienation of Affection
Lets go to a hypothetical example:
Bangs, with her revealing clothing and flirtatious behavior
attempted to seduce Rrramon who did not submit to the
temptation. Rrramons wife, Leilania was furious causing
a marital rift between the spouses. If you look at the
facts, is there a cause of action? Is there a cause of action
there, especially so when it did not amount to anything?
Rrramon was not seduced. He did not do anything about
it; there is no criminal offense that is committed. There
can be no charge of concubinage. Why? They had no
relationship. Supposed that Rrramon had intercourse with
Bangs who succeeded in seducing him. Will the situation
be different? Naa bay criminal offense? Sexual intercourse
does not necessarily mean a criminal offense of
concubinage. When would there be concubinage in the
case of sexual intercourse? If it is under scandalous
circumstances or if there is cohabitation, or if there is

intercourse in the conjugal dwelling. Thats the only time.

What if they did it on the street? Nobody saw it. There is
no criminal offense, what is your remedy?
In the case of MVRS vs. Islamic Dawah Council January 20, 2003,
the SC had the occasion to tell us, lecture upon us what is meant by
the acts referred to in No. 2. According to the SC multifarious na
siya, daghan kaayo ang covered. And many of them are not within
the purview of the law. Alienation of the affection of anothers wife
or husband, unless it constituted adultery or concubinage, is not
condemned by the law, much as it may shock society. There are
numerous acts, short of criminal unfaithfulness, whereby the
husband or the wife breaks the marital vows, thus causing untold
moral suffering to the other spouse. Why should not these acts be
the subject matter of a civil action for damages? In American law,
they are:
Again, there is meddling of so-called friends who poison
the mind of one or more members of the family against
the other members. In this manner many a happy family is
broken up or estranged. Why should not the law try to
stop this by creating a civil action for damages?
Thats precisely what Article 26 provides. A Cause of action for
damages, prevention or other relief. Bihira kaayo ning damages. In
other words if there is an incursion in your privacy, if there is a
series of acts for example that would disturbed your family
relations, you can file an action for injunction, TPO or even in RA
9262 a protection order because that can come under the ambit of
No.2, family relations. The acts referred to in number 2, actually is
not limited to spousal relationship. Dili ni siya limited to acts that
can be committed against or by the Husband or Wife. Any type of
familial relationship is included.
For that purpose we go to RCPI vs. Verchez January 31, 2006. The
facts here happened in 1991, only decided by the SC in 2006.
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez was confined
at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. On
even date, her daughter Grace immediately hied to the
Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to
send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village, Quezon
City reading: "Send check money Mommy hospital." For
RCPIs services, Grace paid P10.50 for which she was
issued a receipt. As three days after RCPI was engaged to
send the telegram to Zenaida no response was received
from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS
Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any
financial aid. Immediately after she received Graces
letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato
Catibog, left on January 26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her
arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any
telegram. The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida,
25 days later or on February 15, 1991.
On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it,
the manager replied that the telegram was duly
processed in accordance with our standard operating
procedure. However, delivery was not immediately

effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which
were beyond the control and foresight of RCPI. Among
others, during the transmission process, the radio link
connecting the points of communication involved
encountered radio noise and interferences such that
subject telegram did not initially registered (sic) in the
receiving teleprinter machine.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died. Verchez sued RCPI for
damages contending that the delay in delivering the
telegram contributed to the early demise of the late
Editha to their damage and prejudice, for which they
prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.
So whats the family relationship that were talking about here?
Were talking about relationship between mother and child and
sisters. Filial relationship - mother and child. Nganong filial
relationship? Just imagine ikaw anak ka, you are supposed to
perform an obligation as a child pero wla nimo nabuhat ang imong
obligation. So she regretted kay tungod lang wala niabot ang
telegrama. How did the SC ruled here?
Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons.
The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief:
xxxx
relations of another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPIs negligence in not promptly performing its
obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not
only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by
the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity"
among them as they blamed each other "for failing to
respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts
and/or omissions complained of in this case are,
therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26
of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasidelict when courts may award moral damages under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
If you really look at it, was there an intentional act of RCPI that
would meddle or interfere in the family relations of the Verchezes?
WALA. Remember again, let me remind you that Article 26 makes
out an INTENTIONAL TORT. ITS NOT SUPPOSED TO BE
NEGLIGENCE TORT. Again, negligence gihapon according to the SC.
Par 3, which is another form of Alienation of Affection: (3)
Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

Friends are not relatives, so dili siya covered sa No.2. Let us assume
the facts that I told you about earlier on.
Naay BF, GF, unya nay babaye nga nag-interfere sa
relationship between BF-GF. Can you use no. 3, intriguing
to cause another to be alienated from his friends?
Technically speaking, YES. You can use this because this is
alienation of affection that is not included in the context
of family relations. Pwede, when you say man gud
intriguing to cause another, it can be anyone. Dili man
kinahanglan nga nagtsismis ka lang, there are also other
acts as we would explain later on.
Par 4, intentional infliction of emotional or mental distress
(4)Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.
Lets go back to this hypothetical example: remember we discussed
this when we were talking about the difference between a tort and
a crime. Remember the commission of crime requires two
elements: actus reus and mens rea: the criminal overt act and the
criminal intent. If you commit a wrongful act but without criminal
intent, that cannot be considered a crime. Whenever there is intent
it can make the status of a wrong from a civil wrong to a criminal
act depending on the elements of the offense itself.
In this example I remembered before naay away si Leila De Lima
and Duterte, nagkatambok lang ng agi nimo Leila de lima, bogo ka
bigaon pa dyud. Now what would be Dutertes liability for
intentionally calling De lima fat, dumb and a flirt. It depends. If the
statement was printed, the liability will be under Article 353 of the
RPC for libel or if it was merely uttered it could be slander or oral
defamation under Article 358. What you need to remember in
articles 353 and 358 of the RPC there is that element of publicity. So
without that publicity what would govern liability when the
statements were merely uttered privately? Nag away lang silang
duha walay lain nakadungog. Unsay liability? Can you file an action
for slander, for libel? You cannot. There is no criminal offense.
That is when you apply Article 26, and according to the Code
Commission: No less serious are the acts mentioned in no.4,
vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
etc. The penal laws against defamation and unjust vexation are
glaringly inadequate. That is true, right? Unjust vexation pila lang
man penalty niana? In my 12 years of practice as a lawyer the only
time that the fiscal found probable cause in an unjust vexation case
that are filed is once only. Its a very obscure provision of the law.
Not a lot of people would go for that. When you recall in your first
year, recall the unjust vexation provision of the RPC as a catch all
provision. In other words, kung wala nakay lain ma-file basi puwede
mu-file ug unjust vexation.
So for example, Religious freedom does not authorize
anyone to heap obloquy and disrepute upon another by
reason of the latters religion. Not a few of the rich people
treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly
station in life. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from
the nature of social makeup, but there ought to be a limit
somewhere, even when the penal laws against

defamation and unjust vexation are not transgressed. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established. The courts
will recognize it in each case. Social equality is not sought
by the legal provisions under consideration, but due
regard for decency and propriety. Place of birth, physical
defect or other personal conditions are too often the
pretexts of humiliation cast upon persons. Such
tampering with human personality, even though the
penal laws are not violated, should be the cause of civil
action.
Thats the explanation of the SC. Now you see the commonality
among the provisions, among the paragraphs in Articles 26. There
are certain acts that disturbed the peace of mind or the personality
of another but they may not constitute a criminal offense. So in
attempt to fill the gaps in the statute - because you cannot file a
criminal offense. Because the acts complained of would not
necessarily amount to criminal redress, the law would now supply a
civil action for damages, prevention and other relief. Maoy
nakagwapo sa Article 26. The problem with row of Lawyers
sometimes would be, there something happened between A and B.
His client is A. The first thing that we look for would be what would
be the provision in the RPC that we can apply. Unsa ba na crime ang
pwede nako i-file. A lawyer would think kung criminal case akong ifile mas sayon ipressure ang accused not thinking that it is actually
easier to file a commission in the law in Human Relations. That
would be the source of cause of action. Not to mention the fact
that its easier to prove a civil case compared to a criminal case.
Whats the quantum of proof required in criminal cases? Proof
beyond reasonable doubt, moral certainty that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Thats proof
beyond reasonable doubt. But what about preponderance of
evidence? Asay mas bug-at ang ebidensya sa plantiff ba o sa
defendant? Its easier to prove a civil case. A lot of lawyers tend to
miss out on that. A lot of lawyers tend to forget that you can
actually use effectively the provisions of the law on human
relations. Remember article 26, kini intentional tort.
Even the SC in the case of Islamic Dawah Council used this to
describe Article 26 as intentional tort. You cannot commit Article 26
by negligence contrary to previous jurisprudence. The offensive
statements may not be published or broadcasted but may be
hurled privately at the offended party. In the intentional infliction
of mental distress, the gravamen of tort is not the injury to
plaintiffs reputation but the harm to plaintiffs metal and
emotional state. If you are vexed, if you are humiliated, if your
feelings are hurt you use Article 26. In libel the gist of the action is
injury to plaintiffs reputation. Reputation is the communitys
opinion of what a person is. In intentional infliction of mental
distress the opinion of the community is immaterial to the
existence of the action although the court can consider it in
awarding damages. What is material is the disturbance on the
mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace
of mind. The offensive act or statement did not identify specifically
the plaintiff as the object of humiliation what is important is that
the plaintiff actually suffers mental or emotional distress because
he saw the act or read the statements and it alludes to an
identifiable group to which he clearly belongs.

Lets do A little bit of transpositions, recall the case of Nikko Hotel

vs. Reyes which is of course predicated upon Articles 19, 20, 21 of
the CC also on Human Relations. He was told to leave, He was a
gatecrasher and the SC found na wala man abuse of right nga
nahitabo and therefore there is no award for damages for Amay
Bisaya. But what if he used Article 26? Dont you think it would have
been an easier case to prove? Whats the testimony required under
Article 26? Your mental and emotional distress. You are not saying
that, yeah they abuse their rights. What youre actually filing a
case for would be unsay effect sa imoha sa pagpahawa sa imoha. Its
actually easier. Based on these words by Justice Carpio that would
have been a viable cause of action compared to Article, 19 and 21.
This merely illustrates that the requirements of libel have
no application in intentional torts under Article 26 where
the impression of the public is immaterial while the
impact on the mind or emotion of the offended party is
all-important. That is why in American jurisprudence the
tort of intentional infliction of mental or emotional
distress is completely separate and distinct 8 from the twin
torts of libel and slander.
This is a mere dissenting opinion of Justice Carpio but it was a very
well researched dissenting opinion that I am constrained to use it.
Unsay nahitabo diay aning MVRS vs. Islamic Dawah? What was the
publication all about? They say that the reason why Muslims do not
eat pork is because they worship pigs as God. Thats the publication
here, of course it offends the sensibility that it took the Islamic
Dawah Council of the PH to filing a case for libel. But there is no
criminal case that was found. Miingon si Justice CArpio ana na lang
walay remedy kay tungod walay probable cause for libel? There has
to be a remedy and that should be Article 26. With that were done
with Article 26
Lets go to Article 27.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
What you need to remember in Article 27 is this: it is a cause of
action that can be directed specifically against public servants and
employees. You cannot apply this to a private person. Niadto kag
mall, sa kataas sa pila dugay ka nagahulat nigkalit ug ingon ang
cashier nga last natong ganiha unya ikaw na ang sunod. Segue: [You
know what, it happened to me last Christmas. You have to
understand sometimes that these people are overworked and
underpaid ] You cannot apply Article 27 here, file an action for a
mandatory injunction to tell the cashier to go back to her station so
that you can pay for what you bought. You cannot do that. Only
public servants or employees. So if they failed to perform that
official duty you have the right to file an action for damages if the
refusal or neglect to perform the duty was without any justifiable
cause.
Remember the term other relief because the relief that is

accorded to the plaintiff would depend on the type of duty involve.
What if the duty is purely ministerial what is your relief? How do you
compel a ministerial officer to perform a duty? By filing for
mandamus to command him to perform the duty. What if it is
discretionary? Whats your remedy? Pwede ka mu-file ug action for
certiorari perhaps alleging grave abuse of discretion.
I was tempted to use Article 27 in a case that I handled few years
back. A fraternity brother of mine, ang iyang kaso has been
dragging on for the longest time. And when almost completed
kanang btaw dapat mu-rule, muhatag na lang ug verdict ang judge
and we were expecting an acquittal kalit lang mo-inhibit ang judge
upon pressure according to them by the DOJ itself. So pulihan and
judge, the [new] judge still has to study. There is no trial de novo
that is called for there. He has to study the records. Balik balik ingon
ana. Eventually he was acquitted after how many years. I was
tempted to use Article 27, force the judge to rule on the case.
Thats an example how to apply Article 27.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Have you heard of the term unfair competition? Maybe in 2 nd year,
Property. There is this provision if Im not mistaken Section 168
which deals with unfair competition, this is what RA 8293 talks
about.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any
other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass
off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals,
or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair
competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
Is this the unfair competition that Article 28 is talking about Passing off, unfair competition? Under the Intellectual Property,
deals with the act of passing off a product as the product of
another to take advantage of goodwill so you dont have to
advertise your own product. Is that the unfair competition under
Article 28? Brings to mind kanang mga imitation nga mga products
like example, LEVIS na pantalon unya naay mga magbaligya ug ELVIS
or LIVES kanang pangmalikmata just to avoid prosecution under
Section 168 because 168 punishes passing off. How could you pass
off two different products even if they have the same looks when
they are not named the same, ELVIS to LEVIS, lahi man na. Yes
actually, but it is not limited to acts of infringement or passing off
of products. It also covers Anti-trust matters, included acts in
restraint of trade and unfair labor practices.
(4.) Lets go first to Anti-trust Matters.
Anti-trust violation constituting Unfair Competition occurs
when one competitor attempts to force others out of the
market or prevent others from entering market through
Tactics such acts as predatory pricing, or obtaining

exclusive purchase rights to raw materials needed to

make a complete product.
a.
Let me try to explain, lets say for the longest

time you are the established brand, selling
shawarma. You already cornered the market for
shawarma and then there is this competing
shawarma outlet selling practically the same
product
and
you
believe
that
uy
ginakumpetensyahan man ko ang mga suki
nangadto na didto. What do you do? You employ
predatory pricing. What is predatory pricing?
Pamub-an nako pag-ayo ang akong presyo so that
my customers will have no choice but to come
back to me. Or anybody who is eating shawarma
for the first time will not go there because Im
selling it at a predatory price. What is the effect?
Its either that katong imong competitor will
follow suit, trying to match the price you are
offering which is unlikely because start-up
company lang mi. it cannot compete with the
long established business with a lot of research.
Or the second option would be to go out of
business kay wala na siyay customer.
Pagkasarado sa pikas balik ka na sa normal
pricing nimo. That is predatory pricing, that is
Anti Trust Unfair competition. You are not
competing already in a free market what you are
doing is trying to corner the market.
Another case here involves Sports. There is this case

about football players, television coverage. They say that
it is an anti-trust because other games do not get the
coverage.
Predatory pricing, driving out competitors form business
hangtod sa malugi finally thats the only product available
sa market, thats anti-trust for me.
b.
Local furniture shop in a particular locality. One

is more established, the other not so much
established. The furniture shop A, the older one,
is threatened by the new furniture shop. What
does it do? It corners all the wood available in
the City. They are not doing predatory pricing
but it is preventing Furniture shop B from ever
making any products. That is impossible for
Furniture Shop B to compete reasonably against
Furniture Shop A. In order to compete what
would Furniture Shop B has to do? It has to
import wood, the raw material for the furniture.
Thats also unfair competition.
Thats just an overview because I cannot explain to you

the entire field of Anti-Trust. Just remember that it is
covered by Article 28. Take note of this case, Tatad vs
Department Of Energy, November 5, 1997. Ang
interrelations sa Article 28 with constitutional provisions
and other provisions of law, the state shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
Name an enterprise right now that seems to be a monopoly?

Example here, Davao Light, sigeg brown out. When I saw my
Electric Bill its 7800 pesos. Were not even using electricity the
whole day were out, pag abot ug balay brownout. My wife
told me mag complain daw mi. What if when you complain,
being the lawyer that you are, and then you dont get what
you have asa ta magkuha ug kuryente if they decide to have our
service cut off because its being unfair? Thats a monopoly but
it is a monopoly under the guise of this highfalutin word
Franchise. Electricity franchise given by the government to
exclusively supply energy in Davao City area. You cant do
anything about it. DCWD maskin unsahon pa na ilang buhaton
wala may lain nagasupply ug tubig that is a monopoly under the
guise of franchise.
(5.)
What about: no combination in restraint of trade or

unfair competition shall be allowed. SMART, SUN,
owned by the same group of people. And a lot more. You
read this case, Tatad vs. Department of Energy,
combinations in restraint of trade. There is a difference
between monopoly and oligopoly. Monopoly rule of one,
Oligopoly rule of a few. When you talk about petroleum,
gasoline, diesel thats an oligopoly and in an oligopoly
the market behaves in such a way that one follows the
other. The major player, they more or less exhibit the
same pricing although that is not necessarily a collusion
or conspiracy or combination among these players under
that oligopoly. Just read the case of Tatad vs. DOE as to
when a monopoly may be considered a restraint of trade
is it the same or do they refer to different things?
Also Article 186 of the RPC and Article 28 of the NCC bring
life to this constitutional policy. Article 186 of the RPC
penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in
restraint of trade. While Article 28 of NCC makes any
person who shall engage in unfair competition liable for
damages. See also the case of Gokongwei vs. SEC April 11,
1972, those are the only two cases that deal with AntiTrust or Unfair Competition.
Why do we need to know these cases and principles when in fact

the SC does not even have an extensive ruling to anti-trust matters?
But you have RA 10667 or The Philippine Competition ACT, its been
pending before the legislature for 20 years. It took Senator Bam
Aquino to refilling the act and finally it was signed into law by Pres.
Aquino. Its not a very popular law. Its supposed to be covered by
RA 10667 kanang mga ing-ana nga acts. Like there is this law for
example, Truth in Advertising Act. It tells you that when you
advertise something it must be true but thats the minimum
requirement. When PLDT says up to 2 MBPS ang imong download
speed or internet speed, is it being untruthful if it gives you 1 MBPS
if you are lucky? NO. It advertises its services not as 2 Mbps
guaranteed but UP TO 2 Mbps. And so supposed to be ideally this
RA 10667 will deal with that. If youre only given 156kbps instead of
2mbps then they should state that. I dont know if this version of
the law includes that because that is to my mind Unfair
Competition. There may not be a monopoly because there are
other providers, but your choices are crappy. Read this RA 10667.

Heres an interesting case Calamba Medical Center vs. NLRC

November 25, 2008. When can unfair labor practice be violative of
Article 28? The act of CaLamba Medical Center of circulating,
containing the names of Union members to other companies
apparently in an attempt to discourage other companies from ever
hiring union members for union activities. As an effect wala
nakakuha ug trabaho ang mga workers. According to the SC that is
publishable by Article 28, there is a cause of action for damages
because that is an unfair Labor Practice and also amount to unfair
competition. We go back:
(1) Unfair competition;
(2) act of infringement or passing off;
(3) anti-trust matters;
(4) finally you have unfair labor practices in restraint of labor.
Remember that kung unsay covered by Article 28.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text
of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Article 29. Look at it. You know the General theme of the law on
Human Relations, right? Why is it here, why is it in the law in Human
Relations? It escapes me the reason why it's here. But it's there.
Just take note that Article 29 exists. If it is asked in the Civil Law, it
will be asked in Remedial law, kaning 29. Thats why also, when
we're taking up Persons and Family relations mubo ra ang
discussion ni Maam Galas aning Article 29. Its not supposed to be a
substantive provision, it is a procedural law. Is there an element of
abuse of right or a violation of right in this provision? Does it in any
way deal with the inter relations of one person to another? NO. Are
we going to discuss it? NO! Its a waste of time. Another is Article
30.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to
prove the act complained of.
It's not only a criminal procedure provision more importantly it
looks like an evidentiary provision, evidence ni gina-take up.
Although I dont necessarily take this up in evidence because this
can be subsumed under the General Principle that Civil cases would
requires preponderance of evidence. Does it deal with
interrelations of human beings in the society? Again NO. Do we
discuss it? NO.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such

civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Once again it is a remedial law provision. Does it deal in any way
with the common theme that transxxx the proper provision of the
law on Human Relations?
Heres one that is included, once again the defendant here is a
public officer or employee with the addition of private individuals
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties
of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against
one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate

and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
xxx
Here we're talking about Constitutional Rights, freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, right to the press etc., freedom from arbitrary
detention and so on and so forth. You are talking here about
Constitutional Right. Let's take No. 4 (Freedom from arbitrary or
illegal detention) for example.
Remember that if you are restrained of liberty or if your liberty is
restricted by an agent of the state, the case is arbitrary detention. If
it is done by a private individual, its a different case. You cannot call
it arbitrary detention, you call it illegal detention which is a different
way of saying kidnapping. Remember as well the General Principle
that the Bill of Rights is a proscription against public action. As a
General Rule it is a proscription against violation of your rights by
the state. Rights to privacy, for example. If somebody violates your
right to privacy and he is a public officer or employee then you
apply the Bill of Rights. But if it is committed by somebody else you
apply the Civil LAw. But what is your cause of action? Your cause of
action would be for damages. Again this is a stop-gap.
But if you look at it naa bay nakabutang diri sa provision that is
already covered by previous provisions? For example, freedom of
religion. What if somebody meddles with your freedom of religion,
vexes or humiliate you on account of your religion?That is under
Article 26. But you also have a cause of action under Article 32. So
doble actually. Daghan pa kaayo, giisa isa ang Constitutional Rights
by Article 32. What's the cause of action? For damages - Violation of
Constitutional Right. Everything gibalhin ra na sa law on Human
Relations.
So kini mao na pud criminal procedure or civil procedure provisions.
x x x The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
With respect to Moral Damages, remember that this provision Art
32 is also mentioned under Article 2219. Article 2219 is referring to
Article 32 and Article 32 is referring also to Article 2219 relating to
Moral Damages.
x x x The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from
a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.
You cannot file an action for damages against him, an action purely
for damages if you are talking about a violation of your rights by a
judge. Walay civil action but there can be criminal action.
Just read article 33.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 34
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
I have this question, of course you know the difference between
military and police. Militaries supposedly will defend against
external threats. The police supposed to defend against internal
threats. The police for example in Davao City. Davao City Police
Office tanan mga police station diri who controls them? PNP under
the DILG. Who supervises them? The Mayor. Different ang control
sa supervision and take note under Article 34 despite the fact that
the local government officials concerned are only supervisory and
they do not have control they are the ones who may be made
subsidiary responsible for damages. Mao lang na ang comment
under Article 34.
Article 35. read it.
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal
offense, charges another with the same, for which no
independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special
law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the
defendant in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should
be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall
be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Theres a lot of it. But again to my mind it's more of a procedural
provision. But it gives you a cause of action for damages. What are
you talking about here? If the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails
to institute criminal proceeding, the complainant may bring a civil
action for damages against the alleged lawyer. You file a case, by
the one paragraph decision of the prosecutor, he dismisses the
complaint. What are you gonna do? You can file a civil action thats
what Article 35 says. I filed a case under RA 9262, naay lalaki
nakabuntis sa akong kliyente unya doesnt want anything to do with
the girl. Then I filed a case for RA 9262 mainly to compel a
recognition and support. Its my way to pressure somebody to
compel recognition and support, but it was dismissed by the
prosecutor on the ground that at the time wala pay implementing
rules and regulation ang RA 9262. I was so mad, di ba remember, a
judge or tribunal should not refuse to decide a case on the ground
of the silence or insufficiency of the law. I did not even file a MR, I

just filed a comment nangasaba ko sa prosecutor. Thats because of

idealism, when you are a young lawyer, fresh from taking your oath
you want the law upheld. But eventually when you become lawyers
you found out that thats not what it is, there are a lot of gray
areas. More chika about law practice and legal education.
Article 36 prejudicial question.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any
criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the
provisions of this Code.
Once again you have a provision that is not really human relations,
procedural lang gihapon. so that ends the Human Relations for this
semester as i already told you that I won't be discussing nuisance
anymore..
END.

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TORTS AND DAMAGES | 1

Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

Lex Stalionis a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye

Penalty for punishment identical to the offense.

Again, it is the principle of exact reciprocity. For example, a person

offense? It should not be. A molested woman, for example, would

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

For criminal acts, there is prosecution, incarceration and

performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but

Also Article 1170, as you may recall.

Lets go to Persons and Family Relations. The most memorable,

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

damages. Whats the difference between the two?

That is the penalty, what is the curse?

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

(1) Personal obligation obligation to do or not to do.

NOVEMBER 27, 2015

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

According to Blacks Law Dictionary,

A tort is a private wrong, which involves private acts and

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

TORTS AND DAMAGES | 7

Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

ARTICLE 26: Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,

A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local

So it is not strictly within the definition of Blacks law.

quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt. And

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

(2.) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family

negligence) and acts that are deemed tortuous by law.

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

Mala Probihita is wrong only because it is made wrong by the

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

for libel. What if it is not printed? What if it is uttered publicly? The

belongs. The requirements of libel have no application in

A person must owe a duty or service to the plaintiff in

In short, 4 Elements of Torts are:

Lets discuss all the elements one by one.

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that

situations also change.

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

BATACLAN vs. MEDINA 102 PHIL 181

Finally, practice pa more. The next day, undeterred,

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Ateneo de Davao University College of Law

You can only approximate.

in a dangerous position, that it might foreseeably or potentially

- I lovingly refer this a Dolphy Doctrine. Why the Dolphy

AIMS or Theory Of Tort Law

According to Glanville Williams, there are four possible bases on

DEJECTUM EFFESUMVE ALIQUID-imposes liability against the