An Improved Authentication Scheme For Mobile Satellite Communication Systems

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING
Int. J. Satell. Commun. Network. (2014)

Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/sat.1079
An improved authentication scheme for mobile satellite

communication systems
Yuanyuan Zhang*,, Jianhua Chen and Baojun Huang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China
SUMMARY
Recently, Lee et al. proposed a simple and efcient authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication
systems. However, we nd that their scheme is vulnerable to the smart card loss attack, the denial of service attack
and the replay attack. To overcome the weaknesses of Lee et al.s scheme, we proposed an authentication scheme
for mobile satellite communication systems to improve security. The proposed scheme possesses the essential
properties and security requirements, which should be considered for the authentication scheme of mobile satellite
communication systems. Copyright 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 11 June 2013; Revised 25 October 2013; Accepted 11 March 2014
KEY WORDS:
satellite communication systems; attack; authentication; smart card
1. INTRODUCTION
Currently, satellite communication systems are one of the most important technologies used to provide
advanced personal communication services, which offer the benets of large coverage and enhanced
mobility for users. The geostationary satellite, located in geosynchronous equatorial orbit, is too far from
the earth. So it usually has a signal delay problem [1]. To solve this problem, the low-Earth-orbit (LEO)
satellite communication systems have been proposed [24]. It possesses the advantages such as small
attenuation of the signals and a shorter transmission delay [5]. In this satellite system, the LEO satellites
enable communication between mobile devices and network control center (NCC) via gateways (Figure 1)
[6]. The LEO satellites, the gateways, the NCC and the mobile devices are the main components.
In this assumption, the following essential properties and security requirements must be considered
to efciently establish a secure mobile satellite communication [715]:
Essential properties:
Mutual authentication: Mutual authentication between users and the NCC is an essential requirement, whereas many authentication schemes in the literature only provide unilateral authentication,
that is, Global System for Mobile Communication. Without proper authentication for the NCC, the
user might be fooled during the user authentication phase to send his sensitive information to an
unidentied target or be fooled into establishing a connection to retrieve services, which is not
recognized by the legitimate NCC.
User privacy: There are two major privacy issues of concern for mobile networks: users identity
and location. Since sometimes the users real identity is sensitive to adversaries or the linkable
identity of a user is useful in mining his/her behavior, the users identity and associated information
must be kept secret from outsiders and the mobile users current location [16].
Condentiality: Communication over wireless paths is susceptible to eavesdropping. Security
protocols guarantee the condentiality of communications between mobile users and the NCC
*Correspondence to: Yuanyuan Zhang, School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China.
E-mail: circle0519@hotmail.com
Copyright 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Y. ZHANG, J. CHEN AND B. HUANG
Figure 1. A simple mobile satellite communication network.
by concealing them using secret random numbers and hash functions. Only legal participants can
retrieve original messages through their shared information.
Low computation: A security protocol should result in low computation cost. Due to limited
resources, on one hand, complex computations will fail in the handheld device of a mobile user,
and, on the other hand, frequent computations might cause the NCC to become a bottleneck.
Minimum trust: It is well-accepted that the NCC is trustworthy, because legal mobile users
register their private information to obtain services at the NCC, but the trust level of the other
third parties involved should be as little as possible.
Perfect forward/backward secrecy: It is always possible that a session key can be compromised for
some reasons. An adversary may derive the secret key from the last session and the next session
(so-called known key attacks) if these keys have correlation with the compromised session key.
To avoid that the revealed key may inuence the security the session key must be derived from
a one-time-use parameter. This measure can prevent impersonation or replay attacks.
Security requirement:
Withstand replay attacks: An attacker may try to intercept the messages between two communicating parties and replay these messages in the further processes.
Withstand denial of server attacks: This attack would prevent legal users from accessing the
authentication server.
Withstand smart card loss attacks: If an attacker obtains the smart card by some way, then he or
she could use it to impersonate a legitimate user to communicate with the trust server.
Withstand impersonation attacks: An attacker may try to impersonate a legitimate user to communicate with the trust server or impersonate the trust server to communicate with the legitimate user.
Withstand stolen-verier attacks: An attacker could break into the trust server and steal the
password verier from the trust server. Then he or she could use it to create a valid login request
to communicate with the trust server.
In 1996, Cruickshank rst proposed a security system for satellite networks [17]. However,
Cruickshanks scheme has the following three disadvantages: (1) the complex computation overhead;
(2) the complexity of the public-key management in a Public Key Infrastructure; and (3) the reveal of
users privacy [15]. In 2003, Hwang et al. proposed another authentication scheme for mobile satellite
communication system based on secret-key cryptosystems [18]. However, Hwang et al.s scheme is
vulnerable to the known key attack and the stolen-verier attack. In their scheme, the session key needs

DOI: 10.1002/sat
A SCHEME FOR MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
to be updated on the server side whenever the mobile user is authenticated. In 2009, Chen proposed a
self-verication authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication systems [8]. They claimed
that their scheme had three advantages as follows: removing the complexity of Public Key Infrastructure,
avoiding complex computations for mobile users and requiring no sensitive verication table. In 2012,
Lee et al. proposed a simple and efcient authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication
systems [19]. They demonstrated that their scheme could achieve the security and functionality requirements, which should be considered for the authentication scheme of mobile satellite communication
systems. Nevertheless, we nd that their scheme has some security loopholes. Therefore, we proposed
an improved authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication systems with low computation
cost to avoid the security aw.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the concept of Lee et al.s scheme,
and Section 3 discusses its weakness analysis. Section 4 shows the details of our proposed scheme,
whereas Section 5 demonstrates the security analysis of our proposed scheme. Finally, Section 6
presents our conclusions.
2. LEE ET AL.S SCHEME

In this section, we review Lee et al.s scheme. In order to facilitate future references, frequently used
notations are listed in the following with their descriptions.
U a mobile user;
UID the identity of the mobile user;
TID the temporary identity of the mobile user;
LEOID the identity of the LEO satellite;
h() a one-way hash function;
the bitwise XOR operation; and
string concatenation operation.
Lee et al.s scheme includes three phases as follows: registration phase, login phase and authentication phase. They are described as follows.
2.1. Registration phase
Assume that the NCC owns its long-term private key x. During the registration phase, a user U requests
to be a legal user and the NCC conduct the following operations:
(1) U NCC: UID
The mobile user U chooses his/her identity UID freely and sends it to the NCC via a secure channel.
(2) NCC U: TID, R, k
After receiving the message from U, the NCC computes
P hU ID x
R PhU ID k
where k is a secret random number and x is a long-term private key generated by the NCC. Then,
NCC decides an initialized temporary identity TID and stores {UID, TID} in the verication table.
Afterward, the NCC issues a smart card containing {TID, R, k, h()} and sends it to U through a secure channel.
2.2. Login phase

When U wants to communicate with other mobile users, he/she should perform the following
operations:
(1) U LEO: Q, S, TID

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U inserts his/her smart card into a smart card reader and inputs his/her identity UID. Then the smart card
chooses a secret random number r to compute
P RhU ID k
Q P r
S hU ID r
Next U sends the login message {Q, S, TID} to the LEO.
(2) LEO NCC: Q, S, TID, LEOID
Upon receiving the message from U, the LEO forwards {Q, S, TID, LEOID} to the NCC.
2.3. Authentication phase
After receiving the authentication request from U, the NCC performs the following steps to authenticate U.
(1) Upon receiving the login request from U, the NCC achieves UID according to TID and computes
P hU ID x
r QP

S h U ID r
Then the NCC checks if S is equal to the received S. If this holds, the user U is authenticated. Otherwise, this authentication request is rejected.
(2) The NCC chooses a secret random t to compute
V 1 Pt
V 3 hrt
Then, the NCC generates a new temporary identity TIDnew, calculates
and updates the old TID with TIDnew
V 4 V 3 T IDnew
in the verication table for next time to authentication.
(3) NCC LEO: {V1, V2, V4, LEOID}

The NCC computes V2 = h(P r t V4) and session key SK = h(UID r t P). Then, the NCC
sends these messages {V1, V2, V4, LEOID} to the LEO.
(4) LEO U: V1, V2, V4
The LEO forwards the messages {V1, V2, V4} to U. After receiving these messages, U computes
t V 1 P

V 2 h P rt V 4
Checking if V2 is equal to the received V2. If this holds, the NCC is authenticated. Then U
computes
V 3 h rt
T IDnew V 3 V 4
U replaces TID with TIDnew in his/her smart card used for next authentication and computes the
session key SK = h(UID r t P).
In the end, they can use SK to encrypt/decrypt messages for secret communication. If the replying
message from NCC is lost, U will re-login and the NCC should know the old identity of U.
The login and authentication phases of Lee et al.s scheme are summarized in Figure 2.

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Figure 2. Login and authentication phase of Lee et al.s scheme.
3. CRYPTANALYSIS OF LEE ET AL.S SCHEME

Basing on analysis of Lee et al.s scheme, if the attacker Z obtains the smart card in some way, he/she
could use it to carry out various attacks to paralyze this system, such as a smart card loss attack and a
denial of service attack. Whats more their scheme is vulnerable to the replay attack.
3.1. Smart card loss attack
After obtaining the smart card from a user, the attacker can guess the identity of the user, which is
similar to the password-guessing attack. Detailed process is as follows.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Steal Us smart card and eavesdrop the login message {Qi, Si, TIDi} just once.
Extract the information {TIDnew, R, k, h()} stored in
card.
smart
Guess U ID and compute S h U ID Rh U ID k Qi .
Check whether S equals Si. If holds, we consider that U ID is equal to Us identity UID. If not, return S3.
The attacker can impersonate U to communicate with the NCC by using UID and TIDnew.
3.2. Denial of server attack

The denial of server attack can be mounted by injecting or suppressing messages between communicating parties, which would disrupt the service for legitimate users. Because if TID stored in users
smart card is not equal to the TID in NCCs verication table, the legal user will not be able to pass
the next authentication phase.
(1) Steal Us smart card and eavesdrop the login message {Qi, Si, TIDi} just once.
(2) Extract the information TIDnew from the smart card.
(3) Send a login message {Qi, Si, TIDnew} to the LEO. Obviously Z can be authenticated by the NCC
with the login message.

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After those steps, the NCC considers that the legal user U has been authenticated and U can communicate with other mobile users. Because Z has passed the authentication of the NCC, the TIDnew
in the verication table has been updated with a new temporary identity. So, the legal user U cannot
access the NCC in the next time.
3.3. Replay attack
In Lee et al.s scheme, they propose that if the replying message from the NCC is lost, U will re-login,
and the NCC should know the old identity of U. That means, after updating the old identity with a new
temporary identity in the verication table, the NCC still store the old identity until U has completed
the next authentication.
If the NCC does not store the login message Q and S, which correlate with the identity TIDold, the
attacker dose the following steps after the NCC sending the replying message to U.
(1) Eavesdrop the login message {Q, S, TIDold} from U.
(2) Sends the login message {Q, S, TIDold} to the LEO.
If the NCC stores the login message Q and S correlating with the identity TIDold, detailed process is
as follows.
(1) Obtain only once login message {Qi, Si, TIDi} from U.
(2) Eavesdrop the recent login message {Q, S, TIDold} from U.
(3) Sends the login message {Qi, Si, TIDold} to the LEO.
When receiving the login request from the attacker, the NCC may think that U has not
received the replying message and U re-logins with the old identity. Obviously, the attacker
can be authenticated by the NCC with the login message. The NCC updates the old identity with
another new identity in the verication table. Since then the identity in Us smart card is different
with the identity in the NCCs verication table. So the legal user U cannot access the NCC in
the next time.
4. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME

Based on Lee et al.s scheme, our protocol contains three phases as follows: the registration phase, the
login phase, and the authentication phase. The detail is described as follows.
4.1. Registration phase
To be a legal user, a mobile user U will register in the NCC through the following steps.
R1. U NCC: UID, PW
A mobile user U chooses his/her identity UID and password PW freely and sends them to the NCC via a
secure channel.
R2. NCC U: TID, R, k
After receiving the message from U, the NCC computes
P hU ID x
R PhU ID k
where k is a secret random number, and x is a long-term private key generated by the NCC. Then, NCC
chooses an initialized temporary identity TID and stores {UID, TID, PW} in the verication table. Then,
the NCC issues a smart card containing {TID, R, k, h()} and sends it to U through a secure channel.
4.2. Login phase
When U wants to communicate with another mobile user, he/she should do the following operations:

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(1) U LEO: Q, S, TID

U inserts his/her smart card into a smart card reader and inputs his/her identity UID and password PW.
Then the smart card chooses a secret random number r to compute
P RhU ID k
Q P rPW
S hU ID rT ID
And then, U sends the login message {Q, S, TID} to the LEO.
(2) LEO NCC: Q, S, TID, LEOID
Upon receiving the message from U, the LEO forwards {Q, S, TID, LEOID} to the NCC.
4.3. Authentication phase
After receiving the authentication request from U, the NCC will perform the following steps to authenticate U.
(1) The NCC obtains UID and PW according to the TID and computes
P hU ID x
r QPPW

S h U ID r T ID
Then the NCC checks if S is equal to the received S. If this holds, the user U will be authenticated.
Otherwise, this authentication request will be rejected.
(2) Next, the NCC chooses a secret random t to compute
V 1 Pt
The NCC generates a new temporary identity TIDnew, calculates

V 2 h Pr tT IDnew

V 3 h V 1 r T IDnew
and replaces the old TID with TIDnew in the verication table.
(3) NCC LEO: V1, V2, V3, LEOID
The NCC computes the session key SK = h(UID r t P), and sends these messages {V1, V2, V3,
LEOID} to the LEO.
(4) LEO U: V1, V2, V3
The LEO forwards the messages {V1, V2, V3} to U. After receiving messages from the LEO, U computes
t V 1 P
T IDnew V 3 hV 1 r

V 2 h P rt T IDnew
Then U checks if V2 is equal to the received V2. If this holds, the NCC will be authenticated, and TID
will be replaced by TIDnew in his/her smart card for the next authentication. Then U and computes the
session key SK = h(UID r t P).
At last, the two users can use SK to communicate through a secure channel. If the replying message
from the NCC is lost, U will be able to re-login, and the NCC should know the last login message of U.
The login and authentication phases of our proposed scheme are summarized in Figure 3.
4.4. Smart card lost phase
If U losts his/her smart card, he/she can send a request to the NCC via secure channel.

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Figure 3. Login and authentication phase of our proposed scheme.
(1) U NCC: UID, PW

U sends his/her identity UID and password PW to the NCC via a secure channel.
(2) NCC U: TIDnew, R, k
After receiving the message from U, the NCC obtains password PW according to the identity UID
and checks it with the message from U. If this holds, the NCC computes
P hU ID x

R P h U ID k
where k is a secret random number, and x is a long-term private key generated by the NCC. Then, NCC
chooses an initialized temporary identity TIDnew and stores {UID, TIDnew, PW} in the verication table. Then,
the NCC issues a smart card containing { TIDnew, R, k, h()} and sends it to U through a secure channel.
4.5. Password change phase
When the user wants to change his/her password PW to a new password PWnew, he/she should perform
the following steps:
(1) U LEO: Q, Qnew, S, TID
U inserts his/her smart card into a smart card reader and inputs his/her identity UID, password PW and
new password PWnew. Then the smart card chooses a secret random number r to compute
P RhU ID k
Q P rPW
Qnew PrPW new
S hU ID rT ID
And then, U sends the login message {Q, Qnew, S, TID} to the LEO.

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(2) LEO NCC: Q, Qnew, S, TID, LEOID

Upon receiving the message from U, the LEO forwards {Q, Qnew, S, TID, LEOID} to the NCC.
(3) After receiving the authentication request from U, the NCC will perform the following steps to
authenticate U. The NCC obtains UID and PW according to the TID and computes
P hU ID x
r QPPW

S h U ID r T ID
Then the NCC checks if S is equal to the received S. If this holds, the user U will be authenticated.
Otherwise, this authentication request will be rejected.
(4) In order to obtain the users new password, the NCC computes
PW new Pr Qnew
and replaces the old PW with PWnew in the verication table.
The last steps (5)(7) in this phase are the same to the steps (2)(4) in the authentication phase.
5. DISCUSSION AND SECURITY ANALYSIS

The scheme proposed by Lee et al. is vulnerable to the smart card loss attack, the denial of server attack
and the replay attack. To overcome the weaknesses of Lee et al.s scheme, we proposed an authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication systems to improve security. In this section, we will
discuss whether the essential properties in a mobile satellite communication network can all be satised
in our proposed authentication scheme. Subsequently, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme
against diverse attacks.
5.1. Discussion of the essential properties
(1)
Mutual authentication
Mutual authentication enables participants mutually to authenticate each other. In our proposed
scheme, the user sends a login message {Q, S, TID} to the server. The server veries the user by
checking the hash value S = h(UID r TID) and then sends the replying message {V1, V2, V3} to
the user. Upon receiving the message from the server, the user can achieve the secret random t to authenticate the server by checking V 2 h P rt T IDnew . After these authentication processes nished, the user and the server authenticate each other and compute the shared session key for secure
communication. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication and shared session key agreement.
(2) Users privacy
In the proposed protocol, the users identity UID is never transmitted over the public network for
authentication purposes. Here a different temporary identity TID is used in each session to keep the privacy of the user. Because the temporary identity TID is unlinkable, even the LEO and the gateway do
not have any idea who is communicating with the NCC. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides
users privacy.
(3) Condentiality
Communication between the user U and the NCC is kept condential by computing the messages
with secret random number r and t. The login message S = h(UID r TID) and Q = P r PW is
concealed by a secret random number r. Only the NCC can obtain r with the long-term private key
x. The response message from the NCC is also concealed by a secret random number t and hash
function h(). Therefore, the proposed scheme provides condentiality.

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(4) Low computation

Because there is no exponential computation and symmetric computation required on both sides
during the authentication phase in our proposed scheme, but only some concatenation operation, some
exclusive-OR operations and a few hashing operations, the proposed protocol is efcient and easy to
implement on mobile devices. Therefore, the proposed scheme holds low computation.
(5) Minimum trust
In the proposed scheme, except the NCC at which the users register, no other trust parties are required. It is reasonable to assume that the NCC is trustworthy because the user must register at the
server with their private information to obtain services. Therefore, the proposed scheme holds minimum trust.
(6) Perfect forward/backward secrecy
In our proposed scheme, the session key SK = h(UID r t P) is established with the secure random number r and t in every session(r is chosen by the mobile user, and t is chosen by the NCC). Obviously, the session keys are mutually independent. Even if the attacker obtains a subset of session
keys, he/she cannot acquire other session keys by these revealed session keys. Therefore, our proposed
scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy.
5.2. Security analysis

(1) Replay attacks
An attacker may try to intercept the login message {Qi, Si, TIDi} and the replying message {V1, V2,
V3}. In our proposed scheme, we point out that if the replying message from the NCC is lost, U will relogin, and the NCC should know the last login message of U. Because of Q = P r PW and S = h
(UID r TID), each login message {Q, S} is related to r and TID. So the attacker cannot use the previous login message {Qi, Si} to access the NCC. Therefore, our proposed scheme can withstand the
replay attack.
(2) Denial of service attack
The wireless mobile environment in such a satellite system is intrinsically a radio-based transmission medium for which a denial of service attack is a common threat. The denial of service attack
can be mounted by injecting or suppressing messages between communicating parties to disrupt the
service for legitimate users [20, 21]. In our proposed scheme, because of Q = P r PW and S = h
(UID r TID), each login message {Q, S} is related to r and TID. Although an attacker can obtain
TID from users smart card, he/she cannot forge a valid login message {Q, S} relating to r and TID.
Therefore, our proposed scheme can withstand the denial of service attack.
(3) Smart card loss attack
If an attacker steals a users smart card, then he/she could use it to impersonate a legal mobile user to
login to the NCC or guess the password of the user utilizing the password-guessing attack. However, in
our proposed scheme, the attacker has to input the mobile users identity and password. Even though
the attacker can eavesdrop {TID, R, k, h()} from the smart card and {Qi, Si, TIDi} from the insecure
channel, he/she must guess the users identity and password utilizing the password-guessing attack.
However, it is almost computationally impossible to guess the identity and password at the same time.
Therefore, our proposed scheme can withstand the smart card loss attack.
(4) Impersonation attack
An adversary may attempt to forge a valid login message to masquerade the legal user and login in
the NCC. However, it is impossible for the adversary to compute a valid login message S without the
knowledge of the users identity UID and temporary identity TID. Moreover, the adversary is unable to

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forge a valid login message Q = P r PW, because P = h(UID x) only known to the NCC and the
users smart card.
(5) Stolen-verier attack
In our scheme, if the attacker broke into the NCC in some way, then he/she can steal the identity
UID, the password PW and the temporary identity TID from the verication table. However, he/she
has no way of obtaining P = R h(UID k) to compute a valid login message Q without the long-term
private key x and the users smart card. Clearly, our proposed scheme has no sensitive information
stored in the verication table. Therefore, our proposed scheme can withstand stolen-verier attacks.
6. CONCLUSION
Based on Lee et al.s scheme, this paper proposed an improved authentication scheme for mobile satellite communication systems. Compared with their scheme, the proposed scheme can withstand the
smart card loss attack, the denial of service attack and the replay attack. Moreover, our proposed
scheme can possess all essential properties and security requirements, which should be considered
for the authentication scheme of mobile satellite communication systems. In additional, our scheme
is only based on hash functions, concatenation operation and exclusive-OR operations. As a result,
we believe that the proposed scheme is very suitable for LEO satellite communication system because
it provides security, reliability and efciency.
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AUTHORS BIOGRAPHIES
Yuanyuan Zhang received her MS degree in Applied Mathematics from Wuhan

University, China, in 2012. And now she is working as a PhD candidate in Applied
Mathematics in Wuhan University. Her research interests include cloud computing
security and cryptographic protocol.
Jianhua Chen received his BS degree in Applied Mathematics from Harbin Institute
of Technology, Harbin, China, in 1983 and received his MS and PhD degree in Applied Mathematics from Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, in 1989 and 1994, respectively. Currently, he is a professor of Wuhan University. His current research
interests include number theory, information security, and network security.
Baojun Huang received his BS and MS degree in Applied Mathematics from

Wuhan University, China, in 2010 and 2012. And now he is working as a PhD
candidate in Applied Mathematics in Wuhan University. His research interests
include network security and cryptography.

DOI: 10.1002/sat

An Improved Authentication Scheme For Mobile Satellite Communication Systems

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An Improved Authentication Scheme For Mobile Satellite Communication Systems

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKING

Int. J. Satell. Commun. Network. (2014)