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CA
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
Quiason, J.
Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the
respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the
petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his
answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is
prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of
said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day
period to file his answer.
Issue:
whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period
prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings
are governed by the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to
proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only
to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided
that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo
warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain
pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
FACTS: Rolando Salvador was proclaimed winner in a mayoralty race in May 14,
2001 elections. His opponent, Romeo Estrella, filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC)
an election protest which consequently annulled Salvadors proclamation and
declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor and eventually issued writ of execution.
While Salvador filed a petition for certiorari before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), raffled to the Second Division thereof, Estrella moved for inhibition of
Commissioner Ralph Lantion, but a Status Quo Ante Order was issued. However,
Commissioner Lantion voluntarily inhibited himself and designated another
Commissioner to substitute him. The Second Division, with the new judge, affirmed
with modifications the RTC decision and declared Estrella as the duly elected mayor.
Salvador filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was elevated to the COMELEC En
Banc, in which this time, Commissioner Lantion participated by virtue of Status Quo
Ante Order issued by the COMELEC En Banc. He said that as agreed upon, while he
may not participate in the Division deliberations, he will vote when the case is
elevated to COMELEC En Banc. Hence, Estrella filed a Petition for Certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
HELD: The Status Quo Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC
En Banc is nullified. Commissioner Lantions voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to
voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc
proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any
satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and
absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the
questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the
necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not
attained. The order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision or order.
MATEO v CA
August 14, 1995 | Puno, J. | Review on Certiorari | Jurisdiction
SUMMARY: Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager of MOWAD, was
placed under preventive suspension before being terminated by the BoD of MOWAD.
He filed a special civil action for quo warranto and mandamus. The Board moved
to dismiss the case, on the ground of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction
over disciplinary actions of government employees. RTC denied the motion. CA
dismissed the Boards petition. The SC granted the petition and set aside the CA
decision, saying that the CSC, not the RTC, had jurisdiction to entertain cases
involving the dismissal of officers and employees under the Civil Service Law.
DOCTRINE: The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the
provision of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. RTCs have no
jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered
by the Civil Service Law. Employees of GOCC with original charter fall under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
FACTS
1. Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees,
petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private
respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. He was then placed under
preventive suspension, later dismissed on January 7, 1993. Mazimo San Diego was
designated in his place.
2. Sta. Maria filed a Special Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with
Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Rizal challenging his dismissal
by petitioners. He averred that the petitioners unilaterally stopped and prohibited
him from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General
Manager and conspired to remove him from Office while he was out of office on
official travel.
3. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that (1) the court had no
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested
exclusively in the Civil Service Commission; and that (2) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy. This was denied. CA likewise dismissed their petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S: WON RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over cases involving dismissal of an
employee of a quasi-public corporation NO
RULING: Petition granted. CA decision annulled and set aside.
RATIO:
1. There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant
to PD No. 198, (Water Utilities Act of 1973) as amended. Jurisprudence already ruled
that employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission. The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees
of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
Regulations.
2. PD 807, EO 292, and Rule II Section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of
1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of
private respondent against illegal dismissal. The party aggrieved by a decision,
ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private
respondent could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if
he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.
3. It was held in Mancita v. Barcinas that the Civil Service Commission under the
Constitution is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the Civil service and as
such, and its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this
Court's certiorari judgment. However, this no longer governs for under the present
rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 195 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any event, whether
under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil
Service Law.
incorrect. Section 19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts in civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and
exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is
indisputable that said courts have power to try and decide claims for moral,
exemplary and other classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that
the rule in question is a mere procedure alone allowing joinder of an action of
mandamus and another for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for
damages arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus
suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the matter of damages not being
inextricably linked to the cause of action for mandamus
, which is certainly not the case.It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not
here charged with a crime, or civilly prosecuted for damagesarising from a crime,
there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.The petition was DENIED and the resolution was affimed.
RULING: The court held that respondent Estolas filed a petition for review beyond the
prescriptive period of 15 days where the decision of the MSPB can be made appealable
with the CSC. Beyond this reglementary period, the decision of the MSPB renders to be
final and executory. The petition was also filed at the wrong forum (to the office of the
Pres.) The court finds the CSC to have an excess of jurisdiction of entertaining the
petition and made a reversible error of setting aside the MSPB order which has long
become final and executory. The court granted the petition of the petitioner while
setting aside the decision of the CSC.
En Banc
and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision hence&
the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a valid act
that entitles him now to assume his seat in the house of Representatitves.
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance
of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the
Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food
and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By
virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private
respondents (San Joaquins).
RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.
CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b)
complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.
SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of
the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since
this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).
CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC
said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a
public use).
Issues:
1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the
expropriation is for a public use.
2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the
CAR Law?
3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of
inadequacy of the compensation offered?
Held/ratio:
1) The expropriation is for a public purpose, hence the resolution is authorized
and valid.
SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of public
purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general
public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience
or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the
whole community.
In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit
and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable info and tech on
agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and
fishermen, etc.
2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana
case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute
lands under the land reform program.
Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the
Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in
the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.
Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands
previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to
applications for reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be
broadened or constricted by implication.
3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the
valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.
It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the
value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just
compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to
justify what they consider is the just compensation.
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unionsdemands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the courtaction for
damages with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging
an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary restrainingorder pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the
subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security System
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Servicelaws,
rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC
or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides
guarantee among workers with the right to organize and conduct peacefulconcerted
activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the
Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the
government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoinsunder pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employeesfrom staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action
which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in
the absence of any legislation allowing government employees tostrike they are
prohibited from doing so.
- RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Salazar Vs Mathay
G.R. No. L-44061, September 20, 1976The Civil Service Commission: Appointments
Facts:
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor
General confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner
of Civil Service. On March 28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended
another appointment by way of promotion, as confidential agent in the same
office.On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that
her services as confidential agent have been terminated as of the close of office
hours on March 31, 1966. On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable
recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to
petitioner as Junior Examiner in his office which was approved by the Commission of
Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner assumed the position. On December 27,
1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that she be
reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was
taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court
to compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper
action to the Court of First Instance.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly
terminated on the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not
she could still be reinstated to said position after accepting theposition of Junior
Examiner in the same office.
Held:(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two
instances when a position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Civil
Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily confidential; or
(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the
office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case
before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265,
declaring ...confidential
agents in the several department and offices of the Government, unless otherwise
directed by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the
aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of
the Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.(2) Yes.
Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the
termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of
tenure, primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and
dismissal at pleasure of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It
should be noted, however, that when such pleasure turns into displeasure, the
incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office his term merely expires,
in much the the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of
the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and cannot be
deemed removed or dismissed therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The
main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the
latter is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not
pre-fixed, but indefinite, atthe time of his appointment or election, and becomes
fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an
end to the services of the incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not
removed or dismissed from office his term has merely expired.
But even granting for the sake of argument, that petitioner's position was not
primarily confidential and that therefore her removal from said position for loss of
confidence was in violation of her security of tenure as a civil service employee, yet
by her acceptance of the position of Junior Examiner in the Office of the Auditor,
GSIS on April 1, 1976, she was deemed to have abandoned former position of
confidential agent in the same office.
violation of the internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Mnetary
Board desoie the recommendation of the investigating committee that he be
reinstated and there was no basis for actions against Corpus. The Board
considered him resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for
reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of Manila which favored
him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He
was awardedP5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the
judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it
was lower than what he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed
that an officer holding highly technical position may be removed at any time for lack
of confidence by the appointing power who was Governor Cuaderno.
ISSUE: Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing
an employee or a public officer?
HELD: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly
technical employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for
removal is not applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the
petitioners claim for damages, the agreement between a client and his lawyer as to
attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee contract.
While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable counsel fees by way
of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court. Decision
appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.
officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to
the position, he commenced these proceedings.
Issue:
whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to
another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No
officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided
by law."
Held:
Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil
Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by
competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in
the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The
classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then
section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial
treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the
Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all
other officers of the government whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the
Philippines alone."
Three
specified
classes
of
positions
policy-determining,
primarily
confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure
of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions
obtain in the present case.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of
state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a
method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to
make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully
laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial
in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not
required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior
degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are
hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower
than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently
administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing
executive ability.
FLORES V DRILON
FACTS
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President
toappoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the
Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered
a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such
benefits.
Quimson v. Ozaeta
G.R. No. L-8321 March 26, 1956
Montemayor, J.
Facts:
The Rural Progress Administration is a public corporation created for the purpose of
acquiring landed estates through purchase, expropriation or lease, and later sub-letting or subleasing the same to tenants or occupants. The officials and employees of the Administration may be
considered as civil service employees embraced in the classified service. Sometime in 1947, one
Aurelio R. Pea, then comptroller of the Administration and performing duties of auditor in
representation of the Auditor General recommended to the Board of Directors of the Administration
that for purposes of economy municipal treasurers be appointed agent-collectors of the
Administration, and this recommendation was adopted by the Board of Director. Thereafter, Faustino
Aguilar, then manager of the Administration, prepared the appointment for the post of agentcollector on a part-time basis in favor of Plaintiff-Appellant Braulio Quimson, with compensation of
P720 per annum, the appointment to take effect upon assumption of duty. At the time, Quimson was
deputy provincial treasurer and municipal treasurer of Caloocan, Rizal. Defendant-Appellee Roman
Ozaeta who by reason of his office of Secretary of Justice was acting as Chairman of the Board of
Directors, signed the appointment and forwarded the papers to the President through the Secretary
of Finance for approval. Without waiting for the said approval Quimson assumed his position on May
6, 1948 and rendered service as agent-collector of the Administration until October 21, 1949,
inclusive, when he was informed that because of the disapproval of his appointment, his services
were considered terminated. There were several objections to his appointment, among them that of
the Auditor General on the ground that since Quimson was deputy provincial treasurer and municipal
treasurer of Caloocan, his additional compensation as agent-collector would contravene the
Constitutional prohibition against double compensation. The Commissioner of Civil Service said that
he would offer no objection to the additional compensation of Quimson as agent-collector provided it
was authorized in a special provision exempting the case from the inhibition against the payment of
extra compensation in accordance with section 259 of the Revised Administrative Code. In this
connection, it may be stated that this section of the Administrative Code provides that in the absence
of special provision, no officer or employee in any branch of the Government service shall receive
additional compensation on account of the discharge of duties pertaining to another or to the
performance of public service of whatever nature. Faustino Aguilar as manager of the Administration
asked for the reconsideration of the ruling of the Auditor General, alleging that the appointment of
the Plaintiff was for reasons of economy and efficiency, but the Auditor General denied the request
stating that reasons of economy and efficiency are not valid grounds for evading the constitutional
prohibition against additional compensation in the absence of a law specifically authorizing such
compensation. So, the services of Quimson as agent-collector of the Administration were terminated.
But R. Gonzales Lloret, then manager of the Administration on October 18, 1949, inquired from the
auditor of the Administration whether Quimson could be paid for the period of actual service
rendered by him from May 10, 1948, and the said auditor gave the opinion that it could not be done
for the reason that in his opinion the appointment extended to Quimson was clearly illegal and the
Administration may not be obliged to pay him for the services rendered since it was a violation of
section 3, Article XII, of the Constitution prohibiting double compensation. At the same time he
expressed the opinion that under section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code the appointing
official who made the illegal appointment should be made liable for the payment of salary of the
appointee, and consequently, Plaintiff should claim his salary for services rendered against said
appointing officer. It is highly possible that this opinion was what induced and prompted Quimson to
file the present case against Roman Ozaeta who, as Chairman of the Board, signed his
appointment, and the members of the said Board, namely: Faustino Aguilar, Vicente Fragante,
Roman Fernandez and Pedro Magsalin.
Issue:
whether or not Plaintiffs complaint for the recovery of accrued salaries as provincial
treasurer and municipal treasurer must be denied on the ground of the constitutional prohibition
against double compensation
Held:
No. Section 691 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
SEC. 691. Payment of person employed contrary to law. Liability of chief of office. No person
employed in the classified service contrary to law or in violation of the civil service rules shall be
entitled to receive pay from the Government; but the chief of the bureau or office responsible for
such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for the pay that would have accrued had the
employment been lawful, and the disbursing officer shall make payment to the employee of such
amount from the salary of the officers so liable.
Section 691 of the Administrative Code above reproduced refers and applies to unlawful
employment and not to unlawful compensation. The appointment or employment of PlaintiffAppellant Quimson as agent-collector was not in itself unlawful because there is no incompatibility
between said appointment and his employment as deputy provincial treasurer and municipal
treasurer. In fact, he was appointed agent-collector by reason of his office, being a municipal
treasurer. There is no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices and
performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. Clerks of court are sometimes
appointed or designated as provincial sheriffs. Municipal Treasurers like Plaintiffare often appointed
and designated as deputy provincial treasurer. The Department Secretaries are often designated to