Part 2:

Compilation of Strategic Policy and Crisis Scenarios

April 2012
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
On behalf of the
Federal Crisis Management Training (CMT)
of the Swiss Federal Chancellery

Table of Contents
1.

Introduction ..................................................................................................................3

2.

Compilation of individual scenarios ...........................................................................4

Geopolitical scenarios ................................................................................................................. 4

Nuclear Weapons Arsenals and Nonproliferation up to 2020 ............................................................ 4

The World in 2020 (focus on Canada) ................................................................................................ 8
Earthquake in the unstable country of Alphaland necessitating an air evacuation operation by the
EU while a chemical accident has occurred and terrorist, separatist and organized crime threats
are looming ....................................................................................................................................... 12
Instability in a former communist country ruled by dictatorship with active extremist groups
affecting three neighbouring democratic countries ........................................................................... 16

Malicious attack scenarios ........................................................................................................ 18

Nuclear material smuggling incident ................................................................................................ 18

Concerted cyber attack against the financial sector with significant disruption to payment
services against the backdrop of the 2012 Olympic Games ............................................................. 19
Series of targeted cyber attacks ........................................................................................................ 22
Cyber attack on critical information infrastructure ........................................................................... 24
Severe bioterrorist attack .................................................................................................................. 26
Terrorist attacks during severe storm................................................................................................ 29
Several conventional and CBRN terrorist attacks............................................................................. 32
Nuclear Detonation: 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device........................................................... 33
Chemical Attack: Nerve Agent ......................................................................................................... 37
Radiological Attack Radiological Dispersal Devices .................................................................... 39
Explosives Attack: Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device.................................................. 42
Several conventional and radiological terrorist attacks during two international events .................. 45

Natural hazard scenarios .......................................................................................................... 49

Severe flooding and dam collapse after heavy rains resulting in a number of incidents .................. 49
Earthquake followed by a tsunami and other cascading events ........................................................ 55
Severe earthquake ............................................................................................................................. 56
Worst credible flood ......................................................................................................................... 60
Influenza Pandemic (Germany) ........................................................................................................ 62
Influenza Pandemic (Canada) ........................................................................................................... 64
Forest fires requiring international assistance ................................................................................... 71
Thunderstorms, drought and big fires, causing accidents and chemical spills.................................. 72

Major accident scenarios .......................................................................................................... 75

Train accident with release of dangerous chemical substances ........................................................ 75

Accident at a nuclear power plant ..................................................................................................... 77
Long-term power failure ................................................................................................................... 81

Economic scenarios ................................................................................................................... 83

Global Economic Governance in 2020: The End of Globalization and the Beginning of the Era
of Regionalism .................................................................................................................................. 83
The World Economy and Economic Development on the African Continent in 2030 ..................... 87

1. Introduction
The Federal Crisis Management Training (CMT) of the Swiss Federal Chancellery
deals with issues such as crisis management structures, processes, tools, and infrastructure.
The CMT focuses on crisis management trainings for the staffs of the federal departments
and chancellery, crisis communication, and on the strategic leadership exercises, which
take place every four years.
With its activities, the CMT contributes to the preparedness of the Swiss government and
administration to effectively lead the country in times of crises.
For the organization of its strategic leadership and other exercises, the CMT, together with
partners, regularly develops exercise scenarios to practice the strategic response to major
crises. In order to facilitate this process, the CMT commissioned the Center for Security
Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich to develop an overview of publicly available scenarios and to
compile a set of relevant full text scenarios pertaining to strategic policy issues and crises.
These compilations are intended to provide an overview of what is available as well as to
serve as potential basis for the development of future exercises and source of inspiration.
The results are presented in two separate documents. In Part 1, various scenario collections
are listed in table form with a short description of each scenarios plot. The collections are
sorted alphabetically by source and subdivided into the following groups: International
Organizations, Governmental Institutions and Private Institutions. Stand-alone scenarios
were not included in Part1. Part 2 contains a number of scenarios in full text, which were
chosen because of their representativeness or uniqueness. Most but not all of them are also
summarized in Part 1 (only if they are part of a collection); the scenarios in Part 1 that are
available in full text in Part 2 are highlighted.
An online search was performed to find relevant scenarios. The search strategy employed
included looking for scenarios on a per country basis with an emphasis on the countries of
the OECD and BRICS, as well as by using various key words such as exercise scenario,
pandemic scenario, earthquake scenario, etc. Even though this overview of scenarios grew
larger than initially expected, it is by no means complete. Nevertheless, it provides a comprehensive synopsis of the kinds of scenarios that are available as well as of the issues that
are sought to be unraveled with the help of scenarios.
The kinds and forms of the scenarios available are diverse. There are future scenarios
depicting potential future developments with regard to certain topics; exercise scenarios
usually providing a detailed timeline of events in order to exercise particular aspects; risk
scenarios or descriptions characterizing the nature and potential variations of a certain
kind of hazard; etc.
All of these kinds of scenarios were included in this overview as long as they relate to
strategic policy issues or crises and contain some kind of narrative or timeline of events.
The rather large family of scenarios that are entirely based on mathematical modeling that
is not translated into some kind of narrative were not included in this compilation. Such
mathematical scenarios are typically applied to issues such as climate change, energy
supply and demand, demographics, etc. This report contains scenarios pertaining to these
issues, but not those based on calculations only.

2. Compilation of individual scenarios

The following is a compilation of a number of scenarios in full text, which were chosen
because of their representativeness or uniqueness. Most but not all of them are also summarized in Part 1 as indicated. They are sorted chronologically along the following categories: Geopolitical scenarios; Malicious attack scenarios; Natural hazard scenarios; Major
accident scenarios; and Economic scenarios.

Geopolitical scenarios
Nuclear Weapons Arsenals and Nonproliferation up to 2020
Beyond the Numbers: Strategies for Global Nuclear Governance
Global Public Policy Institute, Global Governance 2020 program, April 2011
http://www.gg2020.net/fileadmin/media/gg2020/GG2020_2011_nuclear-report_web.pdf
Scenario 1: A Brave New Nuclear World (2 scenarios in total)
After a 24h delay, President Obama condemns the nuclear test that Iran conducts on 1 February
2012 while simultaneously affirming his readiness to begin immediate disarmament talks. China
and Russia follow suit and vow to uphold the UN sanctions passed a few months earlier. Iran ignores Obamas olive branch, and Republicans seize the opportunity to portray Obama as a poor
strategist and a weak commander-in-chief. The Iranian fiasco and the jobless economic recovery
help the Republicans maintain their majority in the House and capture a small majority in the Senate during the November election. This setback unleashes a torrent of recriminations within the
administration, Obama having only been narrowly re-elected himself.
The administrations disarray does little to calm Washingtons allies in the Middle East. Despite
the Netanyahu governments efforts to reassure the Israeli public, the Iranian bomb touches a
nerve. The editors of Israels main English-language dailies, Haaretz and The Jerusalem Post, reflect widespread fears when they compare the Iranian regime to Nazi Germany. Public panic produces a modern Exodus as tens of thousands of Israelis with second pass- ports flee the country.
Israels technology entrepreneurs are the backbone of its economy, but these people also represent
the most mobile segment of the population, and their loss constitutes more of a brain hemorrhage
than a brain drain. Prime Minister Netanyahu orders a massive air assault on Irans weapons facilities, but before the attack begins, an American-born Israeli official with ties to a radical peace organization leaks the plan to the BBC. Netanyahu is forced to stand down, and the whistle- blower
is arrested at Ben Gurion airport as she attempts to leave the country.
Propagandists working for the Iranian Republican Guard (IRG) celebrate the impending end of the
Jewish State. Irans legitimacy increases throughout the Islamic world. While Irans rhetoric is
menacing, its slogans are carefully calibrated to prevent Western intelligence analysts from reaching a consensus about the regimes intentions. Even in Jerusalem, respected observers disagree
about whether Israel can live with an Iranian bomb. Meanwhile, Irans economy continues to stagnate despite soaring oil prices. Though the country does not enjoy a free press, some Iranian intellectuals publicly question the wisdom of deepening Irans isolation from the outside world.
Speaking at the Chancellery in Berlin, Angela Merkel declares that Germany has a historical responsibility to help protect the Jewish state. In late 2012, President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel
issue a statement of solidarity with Israel. Upon his return to Paris, Sarkozy affirms that his countrys independent nuclear deterrent is the backbone of French security strategy.
In December 2012, historian-cum-Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren meets with the Saudi Arabian
representative to the US, Adel Al-Jubeir, at a hotel in Washington, DC. The two men exchange
intelligence information and discuss the possibility of secretly cooperating against Iran. While
leaving the meeting, Oren is photographed by an Iranian operative. The image is widely distributed
4

through- out the Arab media and humiliates the Saudi royal family. Protesters take to the streets in
Riyadh as King Abdullah repeatedly disavows any knowledge that Israeli-Saudi talks took place.
Inspired by Irans nuclear achievements and rhetorical posturing, a group of disaffected engineering students at King Saud University create a popular website calling on Muslims around the world
to unite behind Tehran. Irans intelligence agency exploits the countrys newfound popularity in
the Arab world. Fluent Arabic speakers trained in the Iran-Iraq war are quietly dispatched to Saudi
Arabia where they declare that Sunnis and Shias ought to suspend their doctrinal differences in the
interest of protecting Islam against the Saudi royal familys apostasy. They organize and fund a
new terror group the Guardians of Al-Masjid al-Haram.
Cracks in the (tentative) international front against Tehran appear in early 2013 when Russia reneges on its earlier promise to cancel the sale of an advanced air defense system to Iran. The first
Russian engineers arrive within 48 hours to begin the installation. The announcement surprises
some Western diplomats (particularly in the US), though the most experienced Russia experts explain the about-face as a predictable attempt to exploit European and American inaction on Irans
weapon program. The move will complicate any future attempt to neutralize Irans capabilities.
The effects of the Russo-Iranian agreement are felt most acutely in the Middle East. The Saudi
Arabian government publicly offers to share its (recently acquired) nuclear weapons technology
with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait invite the Saudis to deploy nuclear tipped surface-to-surface missiles on their territory. Jordan, Egypt
and Turkey watch the regional proliferation of nuclear weapons with alarm. Like the Arab Gulf
states, they too are alarmed by Irans strengthening position, but since they are not members of the
GCC they do not fall under the new Saudi defense umbrella. Cairo, Am- man and Ankara request
new security guarantees from the US, while simultaneously initiating their own nuclear research
programs and asking Pakistan and North Korea for technical assistance. In March 2013, Vladimir
Putin succeeds Dmitry Medvedev as the president of Russia.
In early 2014, the Guardians of Al-Masjid al-Haram (operating at Irans behest) stage daytime assaults on three Saudi royal compounds. The terrorists kill four princes along with dozens of their
bodyguards and servants. King Abdullah declares martial law, while Osama bin Laden issues a
statement congratulating his fellow travelers. Bin Ladens public message proves to be his last. His
whereabouts are determined by a deep-cover Pakistani-born American spy, and in late July American Special Forces in Afghanistan conduct a cross-border raid into Pakistans Northwestern Frontier Province. They seize bin Laden and kill his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Obama calls a special press conference to announce bin Ladens capture. As the 2014 midterms
approach, Democrats in close re-election races enjoy a significant bounce in the polls by demonstrating that their party is tough on national security. Their popularity swiftly deteriorates, however, when Attorney General Eric Holder announces that Mr. bin Laden will be tried in a civilian
court (the United States District Court in Manhattan is selected as the appropriate venue). Americans prefer a military tribunal for bin Laden by a margin of three to one. Off the record, five senate
Democrats up for re-election complain that the Obama administration is snatching defeat from the
jaws of victory.
Although they are not officially affiliated with Al Qaeda, the Guardians of Al-Masjid al-Haram
vow to avenge bin Laden. The groups Iranian handlers recruit British-born Muslims for a spectacular suicide operation in the US. In late 2014, terrorists attack the commuter rail system in Long
Island, an airport security line in Omaha, and sink a crowded ferry in Seattle. It is the biggest coordinated terrorist attack anywhere in the world since 9/11. While American Muslim organizations
move swiftly to denounce the attacks, there are reports of spontaneous violence in Dearborn and
Los Angeles against people who look Muslim. The Federal Bureau of Investigation breaks up a
plot against the Islamic Community Center in Washington, DC. In the meantime, American and
British security agencies trace the origins of the recent terrorist attack back to Tehran, but since
their human intelligence capabilities in Iran are limited, they are unable to find the proverbial
smoking gun. The legacy of the Bush administrations failure to find weapons of mass destruction
in Iraq looms large and President Obama declines to confront the Iranians without slam-dunk evidence.
5

Irans fortunes take a dramatic turn for the worse I June of 2015 when all members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (except Venezuela and Libya) declare their commitment to preserving the geopolitical status quo in the Middle East. The cartel announces that its
members will not export to any country that consumes Iranian oil. Within a month, the Iranian
economy enters a tail- spin, and the regimes hold on power appears increasingly shaky. In order to
deflect attention away from the countrys economic woes, the IRG launches assaults on Dubai and
Abu Dhabi, seizing control of both cities after daring amphibious landings.
Iranian university students flood the domestic blogosphere with impassioned anti-war protests, but
foreign news correspondents stationed in Iran report that most citizens accept that to prevent the
impending deployment of Saudi nuclear weapons in the UAE, there was no other option. The Iranian government cites the precedent set by the Bush Doctrine and describes its invasion as an act
of preemptive self-defense. In March of 2016, Iran withdraws from the NPT and tests a second
nuclear de- vice that is significantly more powerful than the first. With a credible nuclear deterrent
and control over both sides of the Straits of Hormuz, military action against Iran seems increasingly unlikely. By early 2017, oil prices hit all-time highs and inflation in industrialized countries
reaches levels not seen since the oil crises of the 1970s.
The obsolescence of the existing nonproliferation architecture is now widely acknowledged. The
effects of its collapse are particularly acute in East Asia, a region where unresolved territorial disputes (the Diaoyu Islands, the Spratly Islands, the status of Taiwan, etc.) and longstanding rivalries
continue to generate international tension. In early 2018, the Japanese government openly reevaluates its policy against developing nuclear weapons. While the Japanese flirted with the idea of
establishing an in- dependent nuclear deterrent during the 1970s and the 1980s, the American security guarantee and the publics deep hostility to nuclear weapons (a product of being the only country in the world to have suffered a nuclear attack) sufficed to keep Japan in the non-nuclear weapons club. In early March 2011, a massive magnitude 9 earthquake struck off Japans northeast
coast triggered a devastating tsunami and seriously damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant causing the release of radioactive material in Japan. The events of this catastrophe further put
into question the safety and security of Japans nuclear establishment. But as the NPT falls apart
and memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade, a younger generation of Japanese leaders do not
exercise the same self-restraint. Japans announcement prompts Taiwan and South Korea to restart
their inactive weapons programs.
While the Chinese foreign ministry issues stern demarches to all three governments, its most
harshly worded comments are directed towards Taiwan, which it accuses of undermining over two
decades of cross-straits confidence building. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy dispatches its
new aircraft carrier task force to the Straits. A military confrontation between Taiwan and China is
narrowly averted when Obama persuades the Taiwanese government to abandon its weapons program in return for a strongly worded statement from the White House reaffirming Americas
commitment to Taiwans security. Policymakers in Beijing and Washington breathe a collective
sigh of relief and return to the safe and familiar business of managing their bilateral economic relations.
On the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Recession (August 2018), commentators
emphasize how little global economic patterns have changed over the past 10 years, particularly in
the worlds two biggest economies. American prosperity is still largely driven by domestic consumption, while the Chinese continue to follow an export-oriented strategy. Global imbalances are
as much a feature of economic relations in 2018 as they were in 2008. Though breathless talk of a
new global order managed by Chimerica proved to be misguided, slow global economic growth
during the previous 10 years has deepened Sino-US interdependence. Neither Beijing nor Washington has an appetite for making tough decisions on hot-button issues like nuclear nonproliferation and global warming for fear of disrupting their critical, but fragile bilateral relationship.
Sino-US retrenchment aggravates existing international tensions. Though the Taiwanese yield to
Chinese and American pressure and discontinue their nuclear program, South Korea and Japan
refuse to follow suit. By early 2019, both countries announce that they are nuclear capable and
declare a no-first-use policy. Washington is shocked when South Korea and Japan, two of its oldest
6

allies, bury a century of bitter history and sign an unprecedented bi- lateral mutual defense agreement. This new strategic alignment is but one of many: the Iraqi government declares its commitment to working with the GCC to contain Iranian ambitions in the Middle East, while diplomats
from India, Israel, Japan and South Korea talk about an informal coalition of nuclear armed democracies.
While Northeast Asia adds two new members to the nuclear club, leaders elsewhere explore alternative ways of reversing proliferation outside of the now-defunct NPT framework. Brazil and Russia convene a high-level multilateral strategic dialogue on the future of nuclear weapons. Recalling
Dwight Eisenhowers Atoms for Peace initiative, Brazil and Russia declare the establishment of
the Atoms for Growth Project and pledge to expand access to peaceful nuclear technology in developing countries in return for enhanced nonproliferation safeguards, including a new, multilateral
inspection agency.
While the Russo-Brazilian program resembles the original NPT, it has one critical difference: Russia and Brazil pledge to create an international fund to subsidize the cost of constructing nuclear
power plants in the developing world. As major oil producers (Brazil became a top 10 exporter
after tapping into its ultra-deep water reserves in 2015), the record price of crude seems to make
their commitment credible. Linking nonproliferation to economic development proves to be a winning combination as Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey quickly sign on to the Russo-Brazilian
program.

The World in 2020 (focus on Canada)

Canada in 2020: Identity Politics and Security, Future Scenarios
University of Ottawa, April 2009
http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cdmctrch/cnd-2020-eng.pdf
Scenario 2: The Lord of the Flies (4 scenarios in total)
Axes
A decrease in participation and confidence in international institutions. Slight disparity between
various affinity groups and various communities.
Context
This scenario, like the novel Lord of the Flies by W. Golding (1956), illustrates how reduced participation in international institutions and a decline in economic disparity and power incite States
to assert themselves and to defend their own interests more aggressively in the political, economic,
and social arenas.
Scenario
The number, usefulness, raison dtre, and effectiveness of international institutions have gradually
declined. We are experiencing a return to political realism. The States are promoting the national
interest in a world where international order and regulations are lacking. The failure of the United
Nations (UN), which has been unable to rise to enormous challenges, such as peacekeeping missions and the protection of the environment, has helped to erode the credibility of the international
system as a whole. International treaties, including the old Kyoto Protocol, have been replaced by
regional, bilateral agreements and other agreements of convenience.
Recent surveys show that even Canadians, who have always generally supported multilateralism,
now believe that their interests and values are better served and protected by national or regional
measures. Countries have decreased their involvement within the UN, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund. They are working more at concluding alliances and at negotiating
bilateral and regional agreements.
Since their first summit in 2009, the Heads of State of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, commonly
known as the BRIC countries, have strengthened their economic, political, and military ties and
have created a political circle that rivals the G8. Thanks to their impressive economic growth,
which is mostly sustained by the continued higher prices of raw materials, the BRIC countries,
where 40% of the worlds population now lives, have radically reduced the gap between the rich
and the poor, between the doers and the followers. They are no longer developing countries, but
real economic powers with average incomes. They are asserting themselves not only in the economic arena, but also in the geopolitical arena.
Populations on the move
The 2019 world census has shown negative emigration rates in BRIC countries. The economic rise
of these four countries has reversed the traditional trends of migration flow: people no longer migrate from the south to the north or from the east to the west. The trends have been reversed. For
emigrants and citizens, the prospects are now brighter in emerging rather than Western countries.
Canada has thus recorded a dramatic decline in immigration and even negative immigration rates
in the case of China and India.
The Canadian government is actively looking for new ways to attract immigrants and to ease admissibility criteria regarding language, skills, level of education, and criminal history. However,
the addition of this new category of immigrants is expensive from a social and financial point of
view.
To offset the shortage of qualified labour because the most promising citizens have left for greener
pastures, industries in major urban centres have lured workers from rural regions, which are today
seriously threatened. The result has been significant imbalances in the distribution of resources,
8

and the public authorities have closed hospitals and schools in these regions. The population,
which has suffered the effects of these policies, has mobilized by periodically staging strikes and
by setting up roadblocks which have tied up traffic and created serious tensions with the urban
population.
The regions rich in resources, in particular Alberta and the Arctic, have been powerful magnets for
workers. Canada has become a political economy and a society based for the most on the development of natural resources. All the public policies proposed by Ottawa have focused on natural resources, the main source of wealth, of growth, and of the countrys international prestige.
Nationalism and identity in a strong State
The growth of BRIC countries outside the multilateral system has incited citizens to turn away
from internationalism and move towards nationalism. The States have exploited this trend and become very active proponents of national identity based on religious, cultural, or linguistic group.
This rise in nationalism in a context where foreign interference is no longer tolerated has led to the
bloody repression of anyone who opposes the strengthening of national identity. For example, the
Roma and the Kurds, who refuse to assimilate into the host communities, have been exterminated.
The Government of Canada has also been involved in serious nationalist initiatives. In 2009, it has
launched the campaign Canadians first to foster a feeling of national pride and solidarity. The
campaign has been successful, except in Quebec, which considers its situation precarious. Consequently, there is a rise in nationalist ambitions and feelings. An increasing number of Quebeckers
now think that only sovereignty will enable them to adequately defend their interests. A referendum will be held shortly, and Ottawa is distributing funds and launching programs in Quebec in a
frantic effort to appease the population.
The effect of the diaspora has diminished, and people are seeking a sense of identity based on historical, religious, ethnic, and linguistic links. The rebirth of the sense of identity has opened the
door to the overt display of ethnic and religious differences in the form of Islamic banks, separate
religious laws in secular States, and renewed political extremism. The State is nevertheless very
active in all social areas, particularly in those areas where foreign interference is minimal. Protectionism and intrusive measures are rising, even in most countries which have the economy, immigration, and technology under control.
Canadas Arctic: Speed is of essence
The vulnerability of Canadas Arctic, which has been clearly shown since the collapse of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has forced Canada to strengthen its defence relations with the United States. Following Russias refusal to recognize Canadas territorial
claims under the Convention, which has led to latters demise, the Canadian Shield program of the
North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) has taken effect in 2013. This program
ensures the territorial integrity of Canadas Arctic by establishing an integrated land, sea, air, and
space defence system. The program obviously relies heavily on the United States in terms of
finance and equipment. The costs of this security system are high. Not only must Canada share the
Arctics resources with its US neighbour, but also it must bring into line most of its defence policies with those of the United States.
Russian ships make regular forays into Canadian territory, and Moscow is now offering Russian
citizenship to inhabitants of the contested territories, notably to members of the Aboriginal communities who live in the Arctic Islands. The problem is delicate, as the presence in this region of
Aboriginal peoples, whom Canada considers its citizens, is one of the cornerstones of the argument
concerning the recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands. Each side is fighting
for their loyalty, and Canada is waging a fierce struggle using recognition agreements, social programs, and, above all, settlements.
A New Cold War
The weakening of international institutions has led to the expansion of regional networks. The
Arab League, the BRIC, the EU, the ASEAN, the African Union, and the bloc consisting of the
three countries of North America have now become the designated spokespersons on the interna9

tional scene. Naturally, it has been difficult to reach a consensus on how to solve global problems in a system where each State defends only its own interests.
At the end of the BRIC 2020 summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, and China issued a
statement in which they called for a renewed commitment to the unconditional respect for territorial and national sovereignty. This stance is evidently aimed at the controversial reinforcement of the
US military presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The United States has negotiated military
agreements with several governments and has established military bases in Azerbaijan and Georgia
to protect the Baku-Tbilisi-Chechnya oil pipeline. The presence of US troops in their backyard
irritates in particular Russia and China and compromises their influence in these regions. Finally,
the launch of drones over Chinese and Russian territories from these bases has increased tensions.
In 2020, China is the largest donor country to Africa, overtaking even the World Bank. This fact
has considerably undermined the Wests influence over the continent. China buys resources and
raw materials and finances infrastructure, without regard for how the various regimes in power use
the money received. This is how al-Bashirs government succeeded in Darfur. Authoritarian regimes have been benefiting from Russias and Chinas struggle to acquire a market share of the
lucrative weapons industry. As the prices are low and natural resources are exchanged for weapons, the proliferation of weapons has increased on an unprecedented scale in unstable regions and
among terrorist and organized crime groups.
Not only are the weapons less and less expensive, but they are also increasingly sophisticated. The
US Department of Defence has invested heavily in the manufacture of military robots, and its
drones regularly patrol the air space around its military bases abroad and in Canadas Arctic. These
unmanned vehicles are used in the air, on land, and even under water. These technological advances are now an essential component of an effective system to monitor Canadas territory in the
Arctic.
The media is warning of a new Cold War between the West and the BRIC countries following
Irans recent nuclear tests in the Kavir Desert and in light of the massive proliferation of weapons
around the world. Thus, in 2020, clearly, the world, which was once comprehensible and lawful,
has been turned upside down.
Security risk evaluation (scenario assessment)
The scenario of the Lord of the Flies predicts a heightened threat to national defence and territorial
integrity because of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction against Canada, its interests, and its allies, as well as espionage and subversion against Canada, its capacity to protect and
defend its interests, its economic competitiveness, and the well-being of Canadians.
The threat to territorial integrity and national defence has primarily increased because of the vulnerability of the Canadian Arctic and the hostile gestures of neighbouring countries. During World
War II, the Arctic was a strategic crossing point for submarines. The opening of the Northwest
Passage and, particularly, the development of natural resources herald a new strategic interest in
the region.
None of the scenarios driving forces suggests any change concerning the risks of terrorist attacks
against Canada, its citizens, and its interests. With the tightening of borders and the strengthened
role of the State, the government should be able to implement counter terrorist measures and to
counter the plans of terrorist cells that are planning attacks in Canada. We have not included here
the terrorist acts committed in the course of armed conflicts, which would instead be the subject of
a military analysis.
The heightened terrorist threat and the increased use of weapons of mass destruction against Canada and its interests or its allies have important consequences and stem from several factors: i) the
proliferation of weapons has increased on an unprecedented scale, and a number of authoritarian
regimes and criminal groups are profiting from this situation; ii) the harmonization of Canadian
and US foreign policies makes Canada vulnerable to the threat posed by enemies of the United
States; and iii) a World War III scenario is taking shape following Irans nuclear tests and the
grouping of countries into geopolitical blocs.
10

Also, secrets, and hence sensitive and classified information, are even more important in periods of
heightened geopolitical tensions. Thus, in a scenario which foresees World War III, the threat of
espionage and subversion undoubtedly increase. According to certain scenarios, the acceptance of
immigrants whom the country cannot integrate or who do not want to integrate increases the
vulnerability of Canada and its institutions.
The BRIC countries are the dominant economies and are depriving Western economies of labour,
clients, market shares, and financing possibilities. These countries are now dictating economic and
financial relations. Furthermore, Canada, which has vast natural resources, sees its economy focusing on these sectors and abandoning innovation and future growth sectors. Education, industry,
immigration, and integration policies will have a strong impact on labour and its quality. The competitiveness of the country will largely depend on these policies.
In certain areas, given the development of driving forces in the Lord of the Flies scenario, the risk
diminishes. As countries isolate themselves and promote strong nationalist feelings, the State is
playing a larger role and is firmly running the country. In this context, the vulnerability of Canada
and its democratic institutions in the face of foreign-influenced activities is declining, as is the
threat to peace, public order, and good governance.

11

Earthquake in the unstable country of Alphaland necessitating an air evacuation operation by the EU while a chemical accident has occurred and terrorist, separatist and organized crime threats are looming
French Air Force Air Defence and Air Operations Command: Exercise BAPEX 2008
http://bapex08-gb.over-blog.com/pages/General_situation-847595.html
Alphaland (scenario background setting)
Identification
Defined land borders: Bravoland, Charlyland.
Conventional long name: Republic of Alphaland.
Nationality (noun): Alphalandian(s).
Nationality (adjective): Alphalandian.
Official language: Alphalandian is the main, official and widely used language.
Popuplation: 7 400 000.
Capital: Lille.
Flag:

National history
Alphaland was discovered in the early 16th century and became the colony of several European
countries before achieving its independence in 1889. After a short period of instability, the Republic of Alphaland was formed in 1901. The country took advantage of the two world wars providing
raw materials to the belligerents. During the second part of the 20th century, Alphaland was subject to the influence of the two political blocs and government authorities became more and more
corrupted. At the same time, relationships with neighbouring countries became strained with a
diminution of the regional trade and a direct impact on small producers. Alphaland entered the 21st
century isolated, with an ageing infrastructure and an economy undergoing crisis.
In 2006, demonstrations occurred in big cities and miners went on strikes. At the same time, the
Mafia, favoured by the lack of public administration and police forces action, took control over
large parts of the underground economy, including drug trafficking for Western countries, and the
insecurity started growing. Moreover, political and religious terrorist organizations emerged, contributing to a more destabilizing situation.
Geography
Terrain: Alphaland is a relatively flat country without mountain, only few hills are present and the
highest points, in the north-east region and close two Reims never exceed 400m. The country is
dominated by large plains and forests with a significant hydrograph. The countrys coastlines are
mainly made of sand beaches along coastal plains except in the north-east region which is dominated by rocky cliffs. Alphaland, situated between two major geological plateaux is susceptible to
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
Climate: Alphaland climate is hot and humid in the summer, hot and dry in the winter. Summer
time brings heavy rainfalls causing regular floods.
Natural Resources: Alpahaland underground is rich in raw materials (Nickel, coal, iron), especially
around Reims region and mine exploitation is generally performed under the direction of foreign
companies. Several thousands of European citizens work in these companies and live in the Reims
area.

12

Energy: Hydroelectricity, coal, and imported oil provide the basic sources of energy. The Refining
capacity is limited, with one ageing refinery on the north-east coast in the vicinity of Boulogne.
Crude and refined oil are imported and some foreign oil companies are prospecting for possible
future off-shore exploitation.
The government
President: Hector Punto (He was re-elected in 2003 for a second six year mandate)
Head of Government: Charles Phungus

Most of the political authorities have been elected democratically, though some irregularities have
been reported in several places.
Foreign Policy: The Alphalandian government mainly focuses on the homeland policy, but the
incapacity to reach custom agreements with Bravoland and Chralyland led to the closure of borders
in 2004 and the end of diplomatic relations with these two countries.
Land border disputes: Nothing significant.
Maritime border disputes: Nothing significant.
Representation Abroad: Alphaland is a member of the UN organization. The European embassies
are located in Lille and some consulates are in Reims.
Internal Political Situation: After years of prosperity and welfare, Alphalandian discovered their
elite was corrupted when recession started. A large part of the countrys income was not redistributed to invest in the equipment maintenance necessary, whilst public administration (including the
police and armed forces) was neglected.
Infrastructure
Roads: The road network links up most large towns and villages. Although the maintenance of
roads suffers from low budget investments, roads are still in reasonably good conditions. A highway network built in the 70s covers the country and allows fast exchanges. Yet a clash occurred in
2003, when Alphaland decided to increase taxes on goods transportation between the national ports
and bordering countries.
Railway facilities: Alphaland railway network was initially built in the early 20th century to favour
the transportation of raw materials from mines to the main ports and it was later extended to civil
transportation. After years of negligence, the network is today in a poor condition and passengers
often complain about important delays due to technical problems.
Power facilities: Three thermal (1xfuel and 2xcoal) and a dozen hydroelectric power facilities
should provide the country with sufficient energy. However, the inefficient management of power
distribution induces numerous power cuts and the pollution produced by the coal power factories
increase the general discontent.
Ports: Alphaland Lakuta has the following ports: Calais, Boulogne and Dunkerque on the Western
Sea and Valenciennes on the Eastern Sea. Calais is specialized in raw material transit from and to
Alphaland; the port can handle roll-on/off and container cargo boats, as well as tankers. Dunkerque
has a long commercial history, being the first harbour of the country; the port processed 400,000
containers in 2000, but the overall volume of cargo processed decreased by 35 per cent between
2003 and 2005 due to the breakdown of commercial relations with Bravoland and Charyland. Boulogne and Valenciennes are fishing ports and satisfy most of Alphalands needs.
Airports: Lille INTL is the only international airport in the country and many other airfields are
available throughout the country for domestic flights. Twelve international airliners provide regu13

lar flights to Lille and the number of international passengers transiting through Lille was about
168,000 in 2006. The Alphaland Airways fleet in 2008 includes nine aircraft, with 4 Boeing 737s
used for international flights, and 5 Fokker F-27s used for domestic flights.
Police and Armed Forces
Police
Placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, and headed by the Police Director: Julio
Foucay, the strength of the national police is about 15,000 personnel. Police stations are deployed
in every city including a population equal or superior to 5,000 inhabitants. In the countryside, each
police station has control over the surrounding area comprising less important towns.
Value: Due to the corruption problems, ageing equipments and the lack of political will to fight
against crime, the police forces are mostly assessed to be weak; only The Republican Security
Guard is efficient. With a strength of 1,500 well-paid and well-equipped guards, the mission of this
organization which is based in the capital is to protect state organizations in case of insurgency and
to provide individual protection to government authorities.
Armed Forces
Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, headed by General Raymond Georges, the armed forces
(18,000) comprise: the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Coast Guards. With the constant
budget cuts, the defence forces suffer from logistic and maintenance shortfalls. About 60 percent
of forces capabilities are unavailable for operational duty and the repeated delays in pays induce
low staff morale. Alphaland armed forces have no NRBC capability.

Risk assessment
Terrorist Activity Assessment
Two main terrorist organizations are present in Alphaland: The New Alphalandian Army (NAA)
movement which claims for the establishment of an autocratic military regime. Led by exiled general Maruento, its members are mainly former armed forces personnel, highly disappointed by the
military budget negligence. Well organized, assessed to be 400, they are equipped with light infantry weapons which have been stolen.
The Will of God Soldiers (WoGS) is a religious movement led by fundamentalists who reject
all forms of modernity and want to return to traditional life with religious predominance. Provided
with foreign logistic supplies, they are assessed to be 700.
Organised Crime
The Mafia is involved in criminal activities. Kidnapping and drug smuggling represent its largest
source of income. ALPHALAND is described as a cocaine producing country and even government officials seem to be involved in the traffic.
14

The insecurity is increasing in ALPHALAND and organized gangs specialized in robbery with
violence are emerging (banks, supermarkets, private houses, car-jacking). These groups are
armed with weapons ranging from assault rifles to anti-tank rockets and are reported to have attacked police stations and army depots in order to steal ammunition. They have close connections
with the mafia.
Risks against foreign people/organizations
Many Alphalandians are against what they see as a foreign interference. Mafia contributes to feeding this anti-foreign feeling. In 2007, the visit of DELTALAND prime minister was marked by
violent demonstrations. The employees of foreign companies based in ALPHALAND are regularly
threatened. Consulates advise tourists against visiting the country.
General situation (actual scenario events)
Alphaland is an unstable country, governed
by a weak and corrupted government. Its
main resources are derived from agriculture
and raw materials exploited by foreign companies. The population is essentially poor and
doesnt benefit from the mining income that
goes mostly into the hands of a few officials.
Moreover, several thousands of European
citizen live in the country.
An earthquake occurred a few days ago in the
Reims region and the Alphaland government
is unable to deal with all the consequences of
the disaster. Facing destroyed infrastructure,
disrupted communication lines, growing sanitary problems and insecurity, the Alphaland government claims for international assistance. Bravoland and Charlyland, are not able to provide any
assistance to Alphaland.
The EU decides to deploy a DOB at Vouziers Airfield in order to perform a non-combatant
evacuation operation from the disaster area to the capital city (Lille).
The theatre of operation remains under a ROTA (release other than by attack) CBRN threat and
possibly limited terrorist attacks.
In addition, the EU has been asked to provide limited assistance to NGOs in order to facilitate their
action to aid the Alphaland victims.
The threat
Terrorism consists of:

Islamist local cells connected to internationals leaders,

Alphaland separatist trying to set up a coup in order to take power.

Organized crime consists of local groups coming from non rule of law areas.
The ROTA CBRN threat consists of a damaged industrial chemical site threatening civilians.
Scenario materials include a number of maps, graphic charts and other resources.

15

Instability in a former communist country ruled by dictatorship with active extremist

groups affecting three neighbouring democratic countries
NATO Crisis Response Operation (CRO): Exercise BLUE GAME 2004 (BG04)
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/nigel.sadler1/page_article_Blue%20Game%202004.htm (unofficial
source / no official source could be found)
BLUE GAME 2004 is divided into phases starting with phase 1 (Harbour phase) 25-26 APR. At
the harbour phase the participating units will familiarize with each other and get communication
equipment installed.
Phase 2 will be conducted from the 27 APR - 09 MAY with a weekend stay in harbour. Phase 2
will focus on different warfares like Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW), Anti Air Warfare (AAW),
Mine Counter Measures (MCM) and Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW). The participating forces are
divided into different Task Units depending ship capabilities. On completion of Phase 2, BLUE
GAME will change to a Crisis Response Scenario (Phase 3) with asymmetric threats and the protection of international shipping as the main focus areas. This scenario will be driven by a
MEL/MIL-list which is different messages promulgated by the Exercise Staff to the participating
units during that phase.
The scenario requires the execution of a primarily maritime NATO-led Multinational operation
under a UN mandate to reduce the terrorist threat in the area. It is the first time that BLUE GAME
will be open for participation by partner nations. Sweden will take part and as a consequence Sweden has accepted to open its territorial water.
Phase 3 will be terminated on 13 MAY and Phase 4 (HWU) on the 14 MAY will take place in
Denmark where the exercise will analyse and discussed (lessons learned).
INTRODUCTION
The scenario for BLUE GAME 2004 (BG04) is totally fictitious and has no resemblance to any
real world situation. It has been designed solely to support the exercise aims and objectives. For
the benefit of the players five generic countries named STENSLAND, SCANDIA, SKAGIA, ANGOR and The FEDERAL BALTIC STATES (FBS) have been created as depicted on the map.
GENERAL
STENLAND (ST), SKAGIA (SK) and
SCANDIA (SC) are all democratic states,
with a modern infrastructure within most
areas of the societies. Through the industrial evolution the three states have evolved
from relatively poor fishery and farmer
states to modern industrial countries taking
active part in all the important international
forums.
The Republic of ANGOR is a former
communist country that has turned into a
sort of past-communism dictatorship. The
elected President has changed the constitution in order to remain in power. The Parliament has
been stripped of its powers and the marionette Government appointed by the President has neither
been willing nor able to implement market economy. Hence the economical situation in ANGOR
has deteriorated rapidly.
ANGORs former trading partners, in the vanished communist block, The FEDERAL BALTIC
STATES (FBS) included, but also STENSLAND, SKAGIA and SCANDIA have turned their back
to the country.

16

Political failures and grave financial hardship in ANGOR have led to a situation where several
fundamentalist groups have demanded extensive changes or a restoration to the old communist system. They argued that during this period people had work and veterans received their pensions.
The most extreme of these groups The People of ANGOR Political Party (PAPP) has on several
occasions raided legal commercial trade shipments between the democratic countries in the region
and the rest of the world. Bombings and assassinations of politicians and industrial leaders have
become a nearly daily event especially in East ANGOR. Other effects of the mismanagement of
the nation are: illegal immigration, organised crime and smuggling. Today this situation also affects all the neighbouring countries. Especially, the ethnic Angor enclave in the Arendal area of
STENSLAND, has become a PAPP stronghold on the northern side of the Skagerrak.
In addition, according to national intelligence sources the PAPP probably has several other sleeping operational groups known as the PAPPAs (The PAPP Assault Groups) in both SKAGIA and
SCANDIA.
SITUATION
On 10 July 2003 STENSLAND, SCANIA and SKAGIA implemented an economical embargo
against ANGOR. Although initially discounted by the UN as political posturing, international concern was raised when training and readiness stature of fundamentalist terrorist groups supporting
ANGOR became apparent. The International Society has also voiced concerns of the increasing
number of refugees from ANGOR to STENSLAND, SKAGIA and SCANDIA.
Some elected democratic politicians still active in ANGOR have continued to condemn the fundamentalist ideas within the ANGOR leadership. However, the Government has maintained strict
control of the opposition within the country. Some of the democratic elected politicians still active
in ANGOR still try to voice their opposition, and stop the refugee flow out of the country and use
every opportunity to condemn the President fundamentalist ideas.
After the small boat suicide attack on the Spanish oil tanker M/T BERBERANA enroute SCANDIA from Mongstad (STENSLAND), in Skagerrak 22 Jun 03. Where M/T BERBERANA caught
fire, three of the crewmembers were killed and the tanker eventually sank. The UN Security Council Resolution 6401 was implemented. UNSCR 6401 condemns actions by the PAPPAs and other
terrorist related groups in ANGOR, and advises the political leadership in ANGOR to take immediate action to bring the terrorist related group under control and gives NATO the lead of a MultiNational Maritime Force (MNMF) supporting STENSLAND, SKAGIA and SCANDIA to ensure
freedom of movement and protection for merchant shipping in the Skagerrak and Kattegat.
In East ANGOR some key commanding officers in the ANGOR military lately stated that they will
no longer abide to the orders and directives passed from the regular military leadership in the capital. Instead they intend to support the charismatic leader of PAPP Mrs Iva ISWOLF as their new
CINC. Many people also support her demand for an Independent East ANGOR. This is all according to press reports, however if these statements are proven to be correct PAPP and the PAPPAs
might be in control of huge weapon arsenals, ranging from sea mines to airplanes.

17

Malicious attack scenarios

Nuclear material smuggling incident
Avoiding Catastrophic Terrorism: Lessons Learned in a U.S. and Russia Tabletop exercise
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), November 2011
https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Tabletop_Report_FINAL.pdf?_=1323380823
The exercise used a plausible but fictitious scenario involving two seizures of kilograms of illicitly
transported nuclear material. Such quantities present the possibility that a sufficient quantity was
involved to create a nuclear bomb. The need for crisis management, in particular dealing with the
media, was central to the scenario as the seizures became known to the public. Given U.S. and
Russian expertise and their extensive nuclear material holdings, bilateral cooperation would be
critical in responding to a nuclear materials smuggling incident and is in both countries national
security interests. The scenario was designed to illuminate the issues and choices that U.S. and
Russian officials would confront, to identify the advantages of and constraints on coordination and
cooperation between the two governments, and to highlight actions that should be taken in advance
of such a contingency.
Procedurally, at specific points in the scenario (each phase), participants discussed the key issues
and responses. Participants were not playing specific roles, but rather served as advisors to their
respective governments, drawing on their background and experience in nuclear weapons policy
and technology as well as their experience with the news media. At the start of each phase, participants were provided information through a combination of intelligence briefings, information
feeds, and simulated broadcast news segments. U.S. and Russian participants first met separately to
discuss each groups initial perceptions and recommendations, and then met jointly to discuss these
perceptions and appropriate actions. All information was presented in English and Russian, with
simultaneous translation of the discussion.
Phase 1: First 24 Hours
Based on highly credible intelligence, Russian and Tajik personnel intercept a shipment of eight
kilograms of HEU metal on the Afghan-Tajik border and capture two suspects. On being interrogated, the suspects claim that the material was en route to the United States and that two additional
shipments had already occurred. Russian personnel pass the facts of the seizure to their U.S. liaison
counterparts. To help manage the situation, the scenario assumed that, at the end of the 24-hour
period, the Russian and U.S. presidents create a Joint Action Group to assess and respond to the
incident.
Phase 2: Days 24
Based on the initial Russian warning, one day after the seizure at the Afghan-Tajik border, U.S.
Navy forces intercept a ship in the Mediterranean Sea and seize an additional eight kilograms of
HEU. Two captured suspects assert that the ultimate destination of the material was New York
City and claim that prior shipments had occurred. Within hours, the ship intercept is leaked to the
U.S. media, and soon there are multiple media reports on television networks. The Joint Action
Group meets to determine the source of the material, assess claims of additional material, manage
public information, and consider responses.
Phase 3: After Two Weeks
After two weeks, both sides determine that the material did not come from the United States or
Russia and most likely came from another weapons program. Coordination and technical challenges, however, prevent a definitive assignment of responsibility, and nongovernment organizations call for greater transparency and involvement of international organizations. Continued interrogation of the suspects indicates that their claims of having additional materials were not plausible. In response to this narrowly averted crisis, the Russian and U.S. presidents ask the Joint Action Group to develop a set of specific recommendations to facilitate future cooperation should any
comparable situation arise in the future.
18

Concerted cyber attack against the financial sector with significant disruption to payment services against the backdrop of the 2012 Olympic Games
UK Financial Sector Continuity: Market-wide Exercise 2011
http://www.fsc.gov.uk/section_file.asp?objectid=949&object=file&docid=2759$
The core of the scenario was a concerted cyber attack on the financial sector that impacted telecommunications, the internet and both wholesale and retail payments systems. The loss of CHAPS
[Clearing House Automated Payment System] payments integrity within the member banks resulted in a suspension of wholesale payments across the sector and challenged organisations understanding of alternative payment mechanisms, their liquidity management strategies and their
ability to manage their business flows in response to the reduced capability of the payments infrastructure. On the retail side, organisations needed to be able to communicate quickly and effectively with customers to provide advice on alternative payment options. Ensuring the availability
of cash from ATMs became an issue early in the scenario.
Organisations also needed to consider the extent to which they were liable to protect customers
from, or compensate them for, costs arising from the payments disruption. The insurance companies taking part had to consider how they would react to claims against policies that were not fully
funded.
In order to further stretch participants, we chose 3 August 2012, likely to be the busiest day of the
2012 Olympics, as the backdrop to the exercise. The main impact of this dimension was on the
availability of staff, which posed a significant challenge to organisations managing their human
resources so as to maintain close to business as usual service levels. Remote working strategies
were tested, as was the ability of organisations to maintain effective communications while staff
were dispersed.
Objective: Olympic planning and preparedness
To provide the opportunity for participants to assess their Olympic planning preparedness, in particular the impact of a major disruption at the time of high staff absence.
The Olympics was chosen as the backdrop to the scenario and formed part of the crisis management element of the exercise. The scenario was developed to allow participants to test particular
components of their Olympic plan, including remote working capabilities at a time of high demand
as well as the suitability of alternate/ recovery site provisions. Participants were also given the opportunity to test their evacuation procedures, including staff accounting procedures to deal with a
displaced workforce (some of whom could not be contacted due to mobile network saturation).
Higher demands on internet usage leading to slower response times aimed to test participants remote working capabilities and organisations had to consider the criticality of those staff planning
to work remotely during the Olympics and whether existing contingencies were sufficiently robust.
Key aspects of the scenario

The build-up to exercise day covered the period from the Olympics Opening Ceremony on
27 July to 2 August 2012 in order to provide a detailed picture of how Londons transport
system and the rest of the UK was coping with the Olympics in the context of the exercise.
Terrorist threat level raised from Substantial to Severe.
Exercise day (3 August 2012), the busiest day of the Olympics, opened with an unidentified explosion close to Bank station during the early morning rush hour (at 07:45) resulting
in the declaration of a major incident and media speculation of there being a physical terrorist attack.
Significant knock-on effects to the transport network and Olympic Route Network (ORN)
caused longer than expected delays in public transport hotspots and resulted in staff being
unable to get to work on time (delays of more than one hour).
Companies with premises outside London received a suspect package alert and had to invoke their evacuation procedures for staff.

19

Between 60 to 80% (varying throughout the day) of home-working residential broadband

users experienced issues with connecting to the internet (response times were three to four
times slower) due to increased usage and media streaming of the Games and coverage of
the explosion at Bank. This in turn affected the ability of staff working remotely to connect
to their offices.
By 09:15, the cause of the explosion was confirmed as gas and the evacuation cordon was
extended to 200m, resulting in further buildings being evacuated.
At 13:00, the area was declared safe for re-occupation and the incident stood down.

Objective: Cyber and key suppliers

To explore and test dependence on key suppliers and in particular the internet and telecommunications.
The scenario was based on targeting UK financial sector organisations systems and websites that
resulted in higher than average call volumes from affected customers. Failures in Point-of Sale
(PoS) transactions were designed to test the retail sectors ability to process card payments and
deal with increased cash demands. In addition a complete suspension of CHAPS had not been previously addressed as part of a sector-wide exercise. As a result, integrity issues with CHAPS members own payments systems were presented to encourage members to consider the implications of
a temporary suspension of payments, and alternative contingencies, while problems were investigated.
A key element of this was to use vulnerabilities or strains of a cyber attack that were new and
could not be immediately resolved so as to test an organisations response rather than its internal
IT control frameworks.
Key aspects of the scenario

Abnormal levels of targeted phishing and sophisticated malware infections using new and
unknown vulnerabilities to compromise organisations internal networks.
A call for action by a credible hactivist group and activist chatter concerning a mass Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the financial sector in the week running up to
the busiest day of the Olympics.
Cyber threat level raised by CPNI warning of a potential attack on electronic systems.
DDoS attacks against UK financial services websites increase, affecting e-commerce, and
online payments are unable to complete transactions. This leads to customers seeking other
channels to interact with organisations and overloading call centres as well as additional
workload for IT support and operations staff.
Broad attacks against multiple web domains associated with the UK financial sector, building in tandem with the impacts of the explosion near Bank Station.
About half of the UKs PoS card transactions that require authorisation fail due to message
communication issues between acquirers and issuing banks, resulting in loss of confidence,
increased demand for cash and pressure on ATMs during a time of restricted delivery opportunities.
CHAPS members individually notice anomalous payments and subsequent investigations
uncover similar problems with other members.

Objective: Strategic decision-making

To focus on strategic decision-making and include elements of financial stress/crisis to better engage senior executives.
Key aspects of the scenario at 13:00

The incident close to Bank station had been stood down and the area was deemed safe by
the Emergency Services.
Normal transport services had resumed and underground stations and the Olympic Route
Network (ORN) had re-opened.

20

Cyber attacks were ongoing as the website DDoS attack pattern had changed to become
more sophisticated.
UK online banking and insurance websites were still only able to service 20% of normal
volumes with most transactions failing or timing out. 60% of home workers across the
country using residential broadband were still unable to maintain a satisfactory connection
to their offices.
Acquirer networks were investigating the source of the DoS and DDoS attacks against
them and Point-of-Sale issues were continuing.
Cash deliveries scheduled for after 15:00 on exercise day were not expected to be made.
A further CHAPS Board call was scheduled for 14:30 to assess the ongoing situation (note
that this information was only available to CHAPS members as they had not advised indirect participants in the scheme of their earlier problems).

Objective: The return to Business as Usual

To determine how participants and the markets prioritise and manage the return to Business as
Usual (BAU), following a major disruption.
Key aspects of the scenario
To provide a common basis for participants to consider the return to BAU, the end status and resolution time for payments and Point-of-Sale (PoS) and Cash-in-Transit (CIT) issues were provided
as follows:

The business day was initially extended to 17:40 and then to 18:40 following a further
CHAPS call with members.
CHAPS members continued in contingency mode for the rest of the day but expected to
resolve integrity issues over the weekend.
A CHAPS Board call was scheduled for the Sunday evening to confirm a controlled start
of payments on the Monday at 06:00.
The Point-of-Sale issues were expected to be resolved over the weekend and transaction
volumes would return to normal over the next few days.

CIT providers expected to clear backlogs caused by the disruption by Monday evening and return
to normal schedules from Tuesday morning.

21

Series of targeted cyber attacks

US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, National
Cyber Security Division: Cyber Storm III, Sept./Oct. 2010
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd-cyber-storm-iii-final-report.pdf
SCENARIO OVERVIEW
During CS III, players responded to a series of targeted attacks resulting from compromises to the
Domain Name System (DNS) and Internet chain of trust (i.e., validity of certificates and Certificate
Authorities [CAs]). Because of the reliance on DNS and the chain of trust for a wide range of
Internet transactions and communications, the adversary challenged players ability to operate in a
trusted environment and support critical functions and trusted transactions. In addition, the adversary used these compromises to execute variety of targeted attacks against private-sector companies, selected critical infrastructure sectors, public-sector enterprises, and international counterparts. All exercise players felt effects created by the core scenario, and numerous IT/Comms, other
sector, and Federal Government entities were heavily involved in resolving the situation. Overall
response required significant communication and coordination per the NCIRP among a distributed
and diverse player set.
The core scenario conditions allowed for the following targeted attacks to be played by a subset of
CS III participants:
Scenario Targets

Widespread Service Update Compromise. The adversary compromised IT and communications vendor service updates, leading to pervasive malware infections, phishing attacks, and an
impending logic bomb. All exercise players experienced these conditions, and the majority of
IT/Comms Community players in the public and private sectors spent live exercise play evaluating potential remediation activities and interfacing with customers and constituents. Communication of effective resolution guidance proved to be vital as typical response and recovery
procedures resulted in bricking of affected machines.
Energy Management System (EMS) Compromise. Adversary compromise of EMS coding led
to control systems compromises and the triggering of a logic bomb on D-Day (Monday). The
logic bomb severely limited system visibility and control, leading to grid reliability issues. As
the compromise persisted, major impacts on the grid, including service disruptions, occurred.
Compromises to the Energy Tagging and Trading System and customer-facing websites further complicated the response. The scenario resulted in robust play from private-sector providers, EMS vendors, independent system operators (ISOs), and regulatory bodies.
Chemical and Transportation Scenario Linkages. The adversary capitalized on core scenario
conditions to conduct attacks against chemical and transportation companies ordering systems
and customer-facing sites. Attacks affected production and transportation of goods. The scenario resulted in play for private sector chemical and rail companies, coordination bodies, and
the Government.
Federal Scenario Linkages. The adversary used core scenario conditions to compromise connect.dhs.gov and a DHS Chatter account, conduct a spearphishing campaign, disrupt legitimate traffic through distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, compromise personal information of Government employees, and compromise customer information and financial data.
Primary play occurred with DHS, Department of Transportation (DOT)/Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of State, and the United States Postal Service (USPS).
International Scenario Linkages. In Australia, the adversary used a series of compromises to
institute sophisticated cyber command and control infrastructure extending across financial,
energy, transport, water, government, and other critical sector systems. Attacks resulted in private-public coordination in Australia and some limited Usual 5 information sharing. In Canada, a massive web page defacement campaign followed by targeted malware distribution to
Government IT resources and Smart Phone Enterprise Servers and the threat of attacks
against control systems telecommunications assets prompted limited coordination, information
sharing, and communications among the Usual 5. Across the IWWN nations, propagation of
22

the Borders Worm led to massive exposure of sensitive data across political boundaries, damage to secure communications integrity, widespread outages, and bandwidth consumption.
DoD/LE/I Scenario Linkages. A Defense contractor brought home a laptop (against policy)
and plugged it back into the DoD information grid, leading to malware propagation. This action resulted in a compromise of the DoD military travel site, supply chain compromises of
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and severe network issues at a major international company
that supports the U.S. private sector and DoD (continental United States [CONUS]).
PA Scenario Linkages. As attacks affecting critical infrastructure sectors intensified, a journalist contacted several companies regarding reports of cyber attacks and published a story on the
National Cyber Exercise News Network (NCENN) citing specific companies and raising the
public profile of attacks. In addition, various companies experienced disruption of publicfacing websites, causing public imaging and communication concerns. NCENN publicized the
attacks and linked events to prior investigative reports of cyber attacks and vulnerabilities, fueling public panic and widespread concern.
States Scenario Linkages. The adversary targeted several states with attacks, focusing on disrupting constituent services and obtaining personally identifiable information (PII), in an attempt to create Government mistrust.

ADVERSARY OVERVIEW
To develop the CS III adversary, the Exercise Planning Team incorporated DHS Universal Adversary characteristics with real-world cyber threat elements. The simulated adversary operated as a
loosely organized umbrella organization known as FdIE and united a diverse set of cyber capability groups to carry out large-scale and sophisticated attacks against Government, private-sector,
and critical infrastructure targets. The combination of several distinct, advanced cyber attack capabilities created a uniquely qualified threat actor.
Per the exercise storyline, FdIE began as a small IT company in South America that went underground to provide illicit online services for malicious cyber activity. Individuals associated with
the mock organization had cyber attack capabilities that ranged from basic for-profit attacks to
advanced campaigns against critical infrastructure. FdIE gained experience by renting its services
to clandestine individuals and groups with malicious purposes. Players were told that in the past,
FdIE rented services to hacktivist groups, organized crime groups, individual actors, and even
known terrorist groups. As long as the group renting the service could prove that it was not associated with law enforcement or the intelligence community and could provide the capital, FdIE
would accept its business. FdIE commonly hired other groups, using their specific capabilities to
complete their contracts. In the past, they hired groups for malicious software development, exploit
development, and other services.
FdIEs founder was presented as a talented computer engineer with connections to the political
elite and strong anti-Western sentiments. While undergoing normal recruiting operations, the founder contacted a series of capability groups with specialties in cryptography, application- and service-layer exploitation, and malicious software development, among others. The expertise of these
groups, in addition to FdIEs expertise and connections to political elites, positioned FdIE to wage
a potentially devastating attack on the United States and its allies.

23

Cyber attack on critical information infrastructure

European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA): Cyber Europe 2010
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/exercise-and-contingency-plans/cybereurope/ce2010/ce2010report/at_download/fullReport
The exercise was structured around a scenario that included several incidents compromising the
resilience of the Internet. The incidents affected all participating countries. The scenario of CYBER EUROPE 2010 was developed to trigger communication between MS. The overarching idea
driving this scenario was an attack on critical assets that would impact all participating MS.
The main phases of the exercise were the following:
1. Discovery phase: i.e. to find points of contact in available directories, understand the exercise
set-up, etc.
2. Attack phase: i.e. several attacks against cross border Internet Interconnection Sites (IIS) to
trigger the need for communication between Member States.
3. Recovery phase: i.e. problem resolution triggers the need for communication between Member
States, in order to resume normal activity.
4. Wrap up phase: i.e. Member States are asked to issue a short report on cooperation activities.
The overall scenario concentrated on the contingency phase after the attack since, in reality, the
main actors involved during the initial stages of the attack would primarily be from the private sector. The exercise did not attempt to simulate the actions of the private sector, nor did it attempt to
engage participants in acting as the private sector. Accordingly, the scenario started at the point at
which public bodies were involved, focusing on the public sector component of incident response.
The general theme of the scenario
In CYBER EUROPE 2010, experts worked together to counter simulated attempts by hackers to
paralyse Internet Interconnection Sites (IIS) and critical online services in several European countries. The topology of the IIS network was deliberately fictitious. The simulation was based on a
scenario where Internet connectivity between European countries would be gradually lost or significantly reduced in all participating countries, so that citizens, businesses and public institutions
would find it difficult to access essential online services. In the exercise, Member States needed to
cooperate with each other to avoid a simulated total network crash. The loss of Internet connectivity during the exercise is visualised by the maps below.
Scenario walk through
The main idea of the first phase of the exercise was to give players the basic information of the
scenario, i.e. information that would be shared with the intelligence agencies of MS at a general
level during the early stages of an incident. When the players received their first injects, they were
asked to try to find relevant contacts in and outside their countries. After 60 minutes, the Exercise
Contact Book (ECB) was published. This led the CERTs to create a broadcast list in order to facilitate communication. The initiative to create a broadcast list is actually very close to ordinary behaviour and close to how CERTs usually operate, given their daily role in information sharing.
Despite this proximity to their standard operating practices, it was an unexpected development.
The first link went down around 11.15 CET (see Figure 2), which led to a scenario peak between
11.30-12.30. This period was the busiest in terms of scenario injects, since many communication
links were supposed to go down. However, by 11.30, players had already given a lot of feedback to
their MS-moderators. One could question whether the peak should perhaps have been scheduled
for later in the day in order to balance the players workload and to avoid lunchtime. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that the exercise was not a drill and hence players were not expected
to constantly have injects to react to. The baseline was that the goals of the exercise were to serve
as a measurement of success, but not depend on the level of activity being maintained at a constant
high. Furthermore, the fact that the pace of activity slowed down towards the end, because people
had completed their respective tasks, should be considered as positive.

24

A map of Europes Internet Interconnection Sites illustrated the chain of links that went down during the exercise. This map was only visible in the EXCON and each MS was only given a fragment
of the map (one map per country). The fact that no playing MS had the entire picture of Europes
IIS, created a difficult task for each MS and stimulated the need for communication. The players
acted very cleverly and understood that in order to solve the situation they had to create their own
map of Europe, since the problem clearly was not a local one.
Some of the players felt overloaded during this phase of the exercise, while others were familiar
with handling similar situations. The CERTs partly created additional pressure upon themselves
due to the fact that they often tried to solve the problem at a level of excessive detail.
At approximately 12.30, an inject announced the upcoming meeting between European Heads of
State. The aims of this inject were i) to direct the players within each MS towards the development
of a unified external message; and ii) to trigger them to write an official report. This proved to be a
very useful task and stimulated those responsible for crisis coordination to draft an easily understandable report, based on information gathered from their CERT community.
Some of the players thought that the afternoon was too calm due to the fact that the pace of injects
had decreased. This was, however, not a real problem from an exercise point of view. If the scenario had occurred in real life, the players would also have had to deal with their ordinary tasks.
Accordingly, it was important not to create so many different injects that they diminished the realism of the exercise and, additionally, to leave some free time for the players to consolidate their
experiences and observations, which were necessary for the exercise evaluation.
From a communications perspective, the exercise can be regarded a success, despite the fact that
many players focused more on finding a technical solution to the problem, rather than on the communication with - and flow of information to/from - other participants. Players often requested
very detailed technical information, although this could be explained by the fact that the CERTs
would generally request this type of information in order to resolve issues at a technical level. It is
important to note that the scenario and the injects were built around some challenging technical
issues. The fact that the players found ways of solving a problem of such a demanding nature is to
be commended.
Scenario materials also include fictional situation maps.

25

Severe bioterrorist attack

Project on National Security Reform: Vision Working Group Report and Scenarios
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2010
http://pnsr.org/data/files/project_on_national_security_reform_vwg.pdf, pp. 37ff., pp. 79ff.
Scenario: Red Death
Pre-National Security Reform
In this scenario, we meet a country struggling to get back on its feet after a major biological attack
and witness a debate about the future role of the U.S. Government both at home and abroad.
Dr. Meishan Prosper, MD, ScD, cycled through the various web feeds of the inaugural Strength
Through Unity Summit looking for anyone she knew. She assumed it would be unlikely, given the
death toll over the last 3 years. The first response and medical communities had been the hardest
hit, but no group of Americans had gone untouched. The word that was usually used was decimated, but she knew that decimated literally meant the death of 1 in 10 people. The Red Death,
attacking the victims central nervous systems, had taken one quarter of the worlds population
seemingly overnight and left an additional quarter paralyzed, with few people to care for them.
It had struck with no warning. It had not been picked up directly by any of the urban or airport biosensors put in place over a decade ago when the United States had feared an imminent biological
attack following September 11, 2001 (9/11). After bin Laden had been found dead in a tribal village in Pakistan, the desire to improve the biosensors capabilities had waned, and other priorities
had risen to the top. Of course, the sensors of those days would not have picked up the bio threats
of 2017. Biological research had made massive strides in the intervening decade and a half. Genetics, proteomics, and synthetic biology had all surged forward with the increasing automation and
miniaturization of biological research.
By 2017, biological research had become much more the domain of information hackers than of
beakers and glass vials. Following an exponential rate of change, the capability to manufacture and
modify biological agents had long since become cheap and easy to acquire despite international
prohibitions. The attack could have come from anywhere.
Even if most of the survivors had not been told to stay in their homes, there were not enough
people to maintain transportation, distribution, and public order. There were not enough skilled
workers to run farms, factories, or public water and sanitation systems. Trade ceased. Foreign oil
supplies ran out. Power plants and generators went silent. For all intents and purposes, the world
had stopped. People looked in- ward, and national governments gradually dissolved. The global,
national, and local economies collapsed, causing widespread starvation, disease, and violence. The
situation was desperate and hopeless.
The United States had fractured along state and then local lines. Some communities, closer to their
rural roots and managing their own security, began to show signs of recovery as soon as the virus
had burned itself out a year ago. Larger, more urban areas had been mostly deserted as food stocks
ran out and only now were showing signs of life.
Today, the U.S. Government was making its first tentative efforts to reestablish centralized national governance. Some parts of the country were eager to return to the way life had been before the
Red Death. Other parts were leery of their neighbors and thought that the Red Death was proof that
a centralized government was not the answer. Some pockets of Americans had declared their independence and were preparing to defend themselves against all comers.
This pattern was replicated around the world. New political boundaries were being established.
Many national borders, drawn 100 years earlier by departing colonialists, were now being redrawn
by local tribes and ethnic groups. In most places, the populations were too exhausted to fight over
this new political reality, but in other regions, warlords, demagogues, and nationalist leaders seized
the opportunity to engage in horrific acts of ethnic cleansing.

26

A vocal minority at the Summit argued vehemently for the need to reestablish a strong Federal
Government to face this new world. They feared that U.S. leadership of the world over the previous 80 years would be supplanted by whichever major power could recover first. Dr. Prosper
allowed herself a brief smile over this recovery gap.
Dr. Prosper, representing the Empire State of Georgia, could be counted among the remaining representatives to the Summit who were varying shades of isolationist. They wanted no part of the
wider world, except perhaps for trade on the strictest of terms. Dr. Prosper knew this attitude did
not come from the objective, scientific part of her brain, but rather from seeing her family, friends,
and colleagues die around her. She did not want to risk that ever happening again. Dr. Prosper had
been at her office at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, when the first
hints of a major pandemic had been picked up through syndromic surveillance systems, first in
Washington, DC, and then from all the capitals of the world.
She spent the next 2 months dividing her time between the CDCs Biosafety Level 4 lab and its
telepresence media center before the remnants of her team and the Army team at Fort Detrick,
Maryland, determined that the pathogen was artificial and had been released at what turned out to
be the last meeting of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.
Occurring just before a scheduled recess, dozens of infected diplomats had returned to their capitals to report on their activities to department executives. These executives, in turn, briefed their
heads of government, and within 2 weeks time, the worlds governments were largely decimated.
With the U.S. Government reeling, the state governments acted with varying degrees of effectiveness to the profound threat. Some states had inadequate or poorly resourced plans and succumbed
immediately. Others were able to maintain ring quarantines and sanctuaries for a time, but with
individuals evading checkpoints to find loved ones, the Red Death eventually came to every corner
of the country.
Dr. Prosper shifted in her seat to listen more closely to the representative of the Free State of the
Rockies. She could tell by his full mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) geargas mask
and full body suit that the Free State was not going to swallow a new national government easily. Its people were skeptical that a newly formed Federal Government would do what it needed to
keep them safe. Many Free Staters had died from untested vaccines the Federal Government had
rushed to many parts of the country. Now, they were unconvinced by any federal assurances.
Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that she had designed both the unsuccessful and eventually
successful vaccines, Dr. Prosper understood their concerns. After all, the world was full of people
with the means and motivation to attack again, and the original perpetrators of the Red Death had
never been found.
Post-National Security Reform
In the original scenario, we met a country struggling to get back on its feet after a major biological
attack and witnessed a debate about the future role of the U.S. Government both at home and
abroad. In the update to the scenario, measures have been put into place to prevent such an attack.
Dr. Meishan Prosper, MD, ScD, pulled into the driveway of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
in Atlanta, still puzzling over the last meeting of the Bioterror Interagency Team. An al Qaeda
splinter group was trying its hardest to infect world leaders with homemade biological agents using
locally infected diplomats as carriers. They kept trying despite the seeming futility of such efforts.
Three attempts had been made in the last 6 months resulting only in the deaths of some low-level
Iranian and Syrian diplomats who had not been treated in time. These officials had become the
unwitting pawns in a deadly global game of movecountermove. Apparently, the terrorists hadnt
gotten the word that U.S. and allied officials were now protected by several layers of sophisticated
sensing and detection devices developed by private industry and Argonne National Laboratory, so
small as to be hardly noticeable. The very fabric of the Presidents and his advisers clothes was
treated to both detect and destroy airborne and contact pathogens.

27

The air at the White House, State Department, United Nations (UN), and other diplomatic meeting
spots was constantly circulated through filters with sensors and tested for old and new viruses, bacteria, and prions. New agents were neutralized and gene sequenced, and their composition transmitted to labs around the world in real time, including here at the CDC.
Dr. Prosper and her team were three for three in identifying, neutralizing, and developing treatment
protocols for the attacks. Still, the terrorists might just get lucky someday.
She voice activated her cars view-screen and patched in the team. We need to do some more
gaming on possible infiltration scenarios. Im worried that we might be missing something, that
these attacks might be lulling us into a sense of complacency.
Colonel Andrews out of Fort Detrick, Maryland, responded, Lets do that. Ill set it up with the
National Assessment & Visioning Center. We should bring in the unexamined threats team to generate some unconventional inputs into the game.

28

Terrorist attacks during severe storm

European Civil Protection: EUDANEX 2006
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_preparedness/eu_danex_2006.pdf
The overall scenario of EU DANEX 2006 was mostly based on incidents, which actually have occurred and, if they ever should occur simultaneously, would call for the need to activate the European Community Mechanism.
According to the scenario a severe storm is raging over the territory of Denmark and southern parts
of Sweden. An extremist group, which is part of a global terrorist network, has taken advantage of
the chaos caused by the storm, and has detonated several explosive devices causing severe damage
on critical infrastructure. It is suspected that dirty bombs and toxic chemical agents have been
used.
Initially the capacity of Denmark and Sweden to conduct damage assessments is insufficient, and
requests for international assistance are sent to the international community through the MIC making use of CECIS. Immediately hereafter the need for coordination experts as well as intervention
teams arises as a result of the national resources being overstretched and a second request is communicated through the MIC.
Following the arrival of international intervention teams and experts, additional explosive devices
are detonated causing fire and leaks at a natural gas hub as well as a collapsed railroad tunnel. Almost simultaneously an aircraft is taken into quarantine at the international airport due to suspicion
of release of chemical hazardous material substances on board. Furthermore the capacity of the
rescue preparedness is stressed to the limits due to a large number of residential fires and harassment in the form of suspicious devices, e.g. handbags containing unknown chemicals and explosives, placed in the vicinity of various fire stations.
As a declared act of sympathy with fellow terrorists in Denmark, another faction of the terrorist
network is spreading fear in Sweden after causing a train, carrying liquefied ammonia, to collide
with a bus. Furthermore, a chemical warfare agent has been released in a regional coordination
centre and unconfirmed reports states that a dirty bomb (although small in size) has been detonated
in the southern part of Sweden. It is, therefore, decided to redeploy intervention teams from Denmark to Sweden.
Incident 1, Arrival of participants
In response to the request sent out by Denmark, international intervention teams arrived in Denmark. They were directed to a youth hostel in order to establish their base camp in cooperation
with a host nation support element.
Incident 2, Tunnel incident
A terrorist attack has caused a collision between a passenger train and a freight train in a railway
tunnel, resulting in a number of injured people in the passenger train. On the freight train an open
carriage with barrels containing corrosive materials has been derailed. A number of barrels have
fallen off the carriage and lie scattered on the ground leaking. A tanker containing toxic liquid is
damaged and is leaking as well. The liquid is slowly evaporating.
Incident 3, Natural gas incident
A terrorist attack has caused extensive damage on a natural gas processing plant. An explosion
forced a building to collapse and severely damaged the gas pipelines. There are a number of injured people - some of which are trapped in the collapsed building.
Incident 4, Airport incident
A hijacker has forced an airplane to land at Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup. The airplane has been
taxied to a remote staging area. The hijacker has an explosive device attached to a toxic substance.
During the negotiations the hijacker decides to surrender. As he is descending the staircase from

29

the airplane and is being taken into custody by the police, the explosive device detonates. Passengers in the vicinity of the device are hit by shrapnel and the toxic substance.
Incident 5, Suspicious handbag incident
A handbag containing several bottles with unknown contents, a battery, some wires and what appears to be explosives is found at the barracks of the regional rescue preparedness centre in the city
of Nstved, where OSOCC is located as well. There is a need for determining whether the handbag posses any danger or not.
Incident 6, Residential fire incident
A residential multistory building is on fire. Several persons are believed still to be in the building.
The municipal fire brigade has no vacant fire engines and is calling for assistance from the international intervention teams.
Incident 7, Redeployment
In response to a request sent out from Sweden the international intervention teams in Denmark are
redeployed to Sweden. The intervention teams are directed to Revinge via the resund Link. On
arrival in Revinge the intervention teams are directed to an area where they establish their base
camp in cooperation with a Swedish host nation support element.
Incident 8, Nuclear incident
At the premises of the Swedish Rescue Services College a dirty bomb has been detonated. A terrorist group is claiming responsibility for the detonation and the subsequent radioactive pollution.
This act of terrorism has been carried out to demonstrate their ability to manufacture dirty bombs,
and their willingness to use such a device. The task of the intervention teams is to detect, find and
mark the places where the radioactive deposits are situated.
Incident 9, Ammonia incident
A train carrying liquefied ammonia has collided with a small bus, causing a number of injured bus
passengers. Furthermore, a tank wagon with ammonia has derailed and is discharging ammonia
because of damage to the tank. The municipal rescue services handle the rescue operation, but need
assistance to control the discharge of ammonia.
Incident 10, Chemical warfare agent incident
The Swedish County Administration has established its coordination centre in order to handle the
consequences of the storm. Suddenly a number of explosions rock the coordination centre building
and it is assumed that it is a terrorist attack using a chemical warfare agent. Special police units
guard the building against further explosions, but assistance is needed to establish whether chemical agents have been used or not and to rescue the injured people.
Incident 11, Media
The severe weather conditions and the acts of terrorism have caused the national and international
media to focus their attention on the situation in Denmark and Sweden. The media are continuously approaching the national authorities as well as the international organisations and intervention
teams for information and comments on the situation.
Incident 12, Visits of observers and VIP-personnel
During their deployment to Denmark and Sweden the international intervention teams are visited
by a number of observers and VIP-personnel from the participating countries and their embassies,
which receive a short briefing on the incidents they attend during the exercise. Furthermore, the
OSOCC is tested and trained in giving briefings.
Incident 13, Situation reports
During the exercise daily situation reports are sent from the Regional Coordination Centre to the
OSOCC. These situation reports contain a description of the general preparedness situation in
Denmark and Sweden and a description of the security situation in Denmark and Sweden. The sit30

uation reports enable the OSOCC to draw up consolidated situation reports to the international intervention teams and the MIC. Likewise the OSOCC is obligated to send situation reports to the
Regional Coordination Centre and MIC.
Incident 14, Departure
Upon completion of their tasks the international intervention teams are released from further duties
in Sweden. The international intervention teams depart from their base camp in cooperation with
the Swedish host nation support element.

31

Several conventional and CBRN terrorist attacks

Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC): Joint Assistance 2005
http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2005/ukraine/index.html
Joint Assistance 2005, a major consequence management field exercise, planned and coordinated
jointly by the Government of Ukraine, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
(EADRCC) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), took place at
the Yavoriv Training Area near Lviv, Ukraine.
More than 1,000 relief personnel from Ukraine (the stricken nation) and eleven EAPC countries
arrived in Yavoriv to test and refine international cooperation procedures and to deliver emergency
assistance, following a simulated terrorist attack using a chemical agent.
The exercise began on 9 October 2005 with a simulated counter terrorist action by the CounterTerrorism Centre of the Security Service, of Ukraine, followed by rescue operations by personnel
from the Ukaine Ministry of Emergencies.
During yesterdays counter-terrorist operation, authorities were able to disarm the terrorists and
free the hostages. However, one of the terrorists hiding in the production area was able to detonate
several explosive devices. As a result of the explosions, the storage tank was seriously damaged
and substantial amounts of chlorine agent were released. A large number of factory personnel and
first responders are being exposed to the chemicals released during the incident.
Based on information obtained, it has been confirmed that the terrorists at SIRKA facility employed chemical warfare agent(s). Following the request of Ukraine the Director General of the
Technical Secretariat of OPCW initiates an Investigation of Alleged Use of CW to provide a basis
for further action.
Ukraine has asked again for international assistance in the areas of chemical reconnaissance, monitoring and detection, search and rescue, decontamination and medical expertise with specialisation
in toxicology.
Taking into consideration seasonal weather conditions, the terrain and other atmospheric factors,
the cloud of gaseous chemical substances creates a significant downwind hazard for the civilian
population. Several communities in the district of Lviv and Lviv itself are threatened by this
chemical cloud. Under worst conditions an estimated number of 150.000 inhabitants could be exposed to the chemical substances.
The contaminated zone currently (temperature +20C, wind in above earth area 3 meters per
second, wind direction northern-eastern, isotherm weather conditions) covers the territory of 4
towns of Yavoriv region (Shklo town, Starychi village, Novyi Yar village, Volia Starytska village)
with a total contaminated territory of 6714 square kilometres and a population of 8175 people, almost all of which have been affected.
During operations on October 10, the authorities and the involved teams were able to minimize the
consequences of the outbreak of chlorine at the SIRKA facility. The chemicals released during the
incident are no longer detectable.
Based on information obtained from the Ukrainian government, the national anti-terrorist forces
have launched a nation wide search for potential further terrorists or persons who have supported
the terrorists in the preparation of their activities.
At this stage the possibility of further terrorist attacks involving toxic chemicals cannot be excluded. The contaminated zone currently (temperature +15C, wind from 120 0 speed 10) covers
the territory of four towns of the Yavoriv region (Shklo town, Starychi village, Novyi Yar village
and Volia Starytska village) with a total contaminated territory of 6714 square kilometres and a
population of 8175 people, almost all of whom have been affected.
At the Shklo railway station train-cisterns have been damaged. Chlorine, a very hazardous chemical gas, was dispersed into the environment and an approaching passenger train was forced to stop.
Even though all passengers fled to safety, 22 persons were injured.
32

Nuclear Detonation: 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device

Homeland Security Council: Planning Scenarios, July 2004
http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/grant_docs/National_Planning_Scenarios_ExecSummaries_ver2.pdf
Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device

General Description
In this scenario, terrorist members of the Universal Adversary (UA) group assemble a gun-type
nuclear device using highly enriched uranium (HEU) used here to mean weapons-grade uranium
stolen from a nuclear facility located in the former Soviet Union. The nuclear device components
are smuggled into the United States. The 10-kiloton nuclear device is assembled near a major metropolitan center. Using a delivery van, terrorists transport the device to the central business district
of a large city and detonate it. Most buildings within 1,000 meters (~ 3,200 feet) of the detonation
are severely damaged. Injuries from flying debris (missiles) may occur out to 6 kilometers (~ 3.7
miles). An Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) damages many electronic devices within about 5 kilometers (~3 miles). A mushroom cloud rises above the city and begins to drift east-northeast.
Geographical Considerations/Description
This scenario postulates a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation in a large metropolitan area. The effects of
the damage from the blast, thermal radiation, prompt radiation, and the subsequent radioactive fallout have been calculated, based on a detonation in Washington, D.C. (details are not provided in
this executive summary but are presented in the full-text version in Appendix 1-A). However, the
calculation is general enough that most major cities in the United States can be substituted in a relatively straightforward manner. If the incident happened near the U.S. border, there would be a
need for cooperation between the two border governments. Additionally, the IND attack may warrant the closure of U.S. borders for some period of time. If the detonation occurs in a coastal city,
the fallout plume may be carried out over the water, causing a subsequent reduction in casualties.
On the other hand, the surrounding water will likely restrict the zones that are suitable for evacuation. Bridges and tunnels that generally accompany coastal cities will restrict the evacuation, causing delay and an increase in the radioactive dose that evacuees receive. This delay may be substantial and the resulting dose increase may drive a decision to shelter-in-place or evacuate-in-stages.
Timeline/Event Dynamics
The response timeline will begin the instant the detonation occurs. Initially, only survivors in the
immediate area will conduct rescue and lifesaving activities. Later (minutes to hours), rescue teams
will begin to arrive and provide assistance. With the current state of education, training, and
equipment, it is likely that many of these responders will subject themselves to very large (perhaps
incapacitating or fatal) doses of radiation. As various command posts are setup (which may take
hours to days), the response will become more coordinated.
For a nuclear detonation, the actual occurrence of injuries does not stop when the immediate blast
effects have subsided. The most critical components of the post-detonation response may not be
the lifesaving efforts that assist the victims directly injured by the detonation. Instead, it is likely
that the most effective lifesaving activities will be those that address the evacuation or shelteringin-place decisions for the potential victims in the immediate fallout path, the effective communica-

33

tion of instructions to the affected population, and the efficient decontamination of the evacuated
population.
Secondary Hazards/Events
The detonation will cause many secondary hazards. The intense heat of the nuclear explosion and
other subsequent causes will produce numerous fires located throughout the immediate blast zone.
Damaged buildings, downed power and phone lines, leaking gas lines, broken water mains, and
weakened bridges and tunnels are just some of the hazardous conditions that will need to be assessed. Depending on the type of industries present (such as chemical or petroleum production,
industrial storage facilities, and manufacturing operations), there could be significant releases of
hazardous materials.
Another secondary effect of a nuclear explosion is the EMP that will be produced by the ionization
and subsequent acceleration of electrons from the air and other materials by the intense radiation of
the detonation. This EMP is a sharp, high-voltage spike that radiates out from the detonation site. It
has the potential to disrupt the communication network, other electronic equipment, and associated
systems within approximately a 5-kilometer (~ 3-mile) range from the 10-kiloton ground blast.
There likely will be significant damage to the general public support infrastructure with potentially
cascading effects. These systems include transportation lines and nodes (e.g., air, water, rail, highway); power generation and distribution systems; communications systems; food distribution; and
fuel storage and distribution. There will be concerns about the safety and reliability of many structures (e.g., dams, levees, nuclear power plants, hazardous material storage facilities). Structures
may be damaged that are used to provide essential services (e.g., hospitals, schools).
Key Implications
A full description of the fatalities and injuries for a nuclear detonation is difficult and complicated.
There will be casualties directly associated with the blast, which will cause translation/tumbling
(the human body being thrown) and subsequent impacts of people and other objects. A nuclear detonation will also produce a great deal of thermal (heat) energy that will cause burns to exposed
skin (and eyes). There are two general categories of nuclear radiation produced in a detonation.
First is the so-called prompt nuclear radiation, arbitrarily defined as being emitted within the first
minute it is actually produced as the device detonates or shortly thereafter. For a 10-kiloton blast,
this radiation may expose unprotected people within a distance of a few kilometers (a couple of
miles) to extremely large gamma ray and/or neutron doses. In addition, a detonation of a nuclear
device near the surface of the ground will result in a great deal of fallout (in the form of dirt particles) that is radioactively contaminated. This fallout will settle out of the radioactive cloud over a
period of minutes to weeks. By far, the most dangerously radioactive fallout will be deposited near
the detonation site and will happen within the first couple of hours after detonation. Radioactive
fallout will exponentially decay with time, but may expose many people to large doses and will
certainly contaminate large areas of land for years. Many fatalities and injuries will result from a
combination of these various effects.
The largest radiation concerns following an IND incident will be the prompt radiation (gamma
ray and neutron) and the gamma dose received from the ground shine (radioactive particles deposited on the ground) as people are evacuated from the fallout areas. These effects are likely to
have significantly larger impacts on the population than internal doses. Internal doses tend to expose the body to relatively small radiation doses over a long period of time, which produces different effects than large radiation doses received during a short period of time.
As the distance from ground zero increases past 20 kilometers (~ 12 miles), the injuries due to
acute radiation exposure (from prompt radiation and the subsequent fallout) will decrease, and
lower level contamination, evacuation, and sheltering issues will become the major concern. In
general, at distances greater than 250 kilometers (~ 150 miles) from ground zero of a 10 kiloton
nuclear detonation, acute health concerns will not be a significant issue. However, contamination
of people and the environment will still be a concern.

34

Years later, there will still be health consequences in the form of increased probabilities of cancers
in the exposed population. The number of these cancers will likely run into the thousands and will
extract a large human, social, and financial cost.
It is likely that the blast and subsequent fires will destroy all buildings in the immediate area of the
detonation. Historically, decontamination of sites involves the removal of all affected material, so
most buildings in the immediate downwind fallout path will likely have to be destroyed in the decontamination effort. As the distance from the detonation site increases, the contamination level
will decrease. At some distance, the buildings will not have to be destroyed and removed but will
still require decontamination of all affected surfaces. This decontamination process will take years
and will be extremely expensive. The decontamination will produce a far greater challenge and
cost much more than the actual rebuilding of the destroyed structures. Approximately 8,000 square
kilometers (~3,000 square miles) of land will have to undergo varying degrees of decontamination.
This effort will last for many years and will cost many billions of dollars to complete.
Service disruption will be extensive in the area near ground zero and in the fallout path for several
miles downwind. Services in these areas will not be restored for years because the land affected
will not be returned to use until the decontamination is complete and the structures rebuilt. Service
disruption will be much less dramatic in areas that are less severely contaminated or not contaminated at all.
The electrical power grid is likely to be damaged by transients produced by the destruction of substations, as well as other power production and distribution installations, and perhaps by the EMP of
the detonation. It is likely that the grid damage may cause power outages over wide areas, perhaps
over several states, but these outages should be repaired within several days to a couple of weeks.
The communication systems in the area will suffer similar damage and will likely be repaired within similar timeframes.
City water mains will likely survive without major damage. The city water supply is unlikely to
become substantially contaminated with radiation via water main breaks, but it is possible that
some small amount of radioactive and non-radioactive contamination may enter the lines.
To varying degrees, all government services will be impacted over some geographical area. The
national economy will be significantly impacted. Decontamination, disposal, and replacement of
lost infrastructure will cost many billions of dollars. Replacement of lost private property and
goods could add billions more to the cost. Additionally, an overall national economic downturn, if
not recession, is probable in the wake of the attack.
Mission Areas Activated
Prevention/Deterrence/Protection
Law enforcement attempts will be made to prevent development and detonation of the device. Site
boundaries must be protected and surveyed after the detonation. Officers must respond to any additional threats or looting/theft issues.
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis
The detonation will be easily recognized as nuclear. Actions required include dispatching response
units; making incident scene reports; detecting and identifying the source; establishing a perimeter;
collecting information; making hazard assessments and predictions; coordinating hospital and urgent care facilities; coordinating county and state response requests; and coordinating monitoring,
surveying, and sampling operations.
Emergency Management/Response
Evacuation/shelter-in-place decisions must be made immediately. Required actions include alerting
the public, providing traffic and access control, protecting at-risk and special populations, supporting requests for assistance, directing and controlling critical infrastructure assets, and directing
pubic information activities. Location and removal of injured and disabled people will be a significant undertaking that will be greatly complicated by the need to keep the radiation dose of the in35

dividual workers as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Initial emergency workers will likely
receive high doses of radiation and must be trained on how to avoid as much as possible.
Incident/Hazard Mitigation
Self-evacuation should occur in the short-term, and the greatest factor impacting the reduction of
the effects of the detonation on the general population will remain the speed and appropriateness of
the decisions that are made and the effectiveness of the dissemination of this information (e.g.,
evacuation/shelter-in-place instructions). Evacuees must be promptly decontaminated.
Public Protection
Actions should include making and communicating protective action decisions, monitoring and
decontaminating evacuees, implementing decisions to administer prophylaxis to the affected populations, protecting special populations, protecting schools and day care facilities, and providing
shelter/reception facilities.
Victim Care
Tens of thousands will require decontamination and both short-term and long-term treatment. Due
to a high number of casualties, the level of care may be significantly lower than normally expected.
When overwhelmed with victims who need care, decisions must be made based on the fact that the
sooner the onset of the symptoms, the higher the dose received and the less likely the victim is to
survive (even with medical intervention).
Investigation/Apprehension
Attribution activities at the detonation site will rely largely on scientific forensic techniques and
will be provided by specialized national teams. Actions of incident-site personnel will include site
control and criminal investigation. Federal authorities or the military will probably conduct apprehension activities.
Recovery/Remediation
Expected radiation levels will limit the total time workers can spend in the affected area, quickly
leading to a shortage of willing, qualified, and trained workers. The volume of contaminated material that will be removed will overwhelm the national hazardous waste disposal facilities and will
severely challenge the nations ability to transport the material. This effort will be the most expensive and time-consuming part of recovery and will likely cost many billions of dollars and take
many years.
Note: For more information, there are two sections available [not publicly available] only in the
full-text version of this document that provide more detailed information regarding results. There
is an Estimated Realistic Results section that reflects a set of possible results from the 10-kiloton
detonation described in this scenario. The second section, Appendix 1-A, contains a consequence
report for a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation in Washington, DC, that describes a set of possible consequences calculated for a 10-kiloton nuclear blast including its prompt effects (occurring within
the first minute) and fallout. The results provided in Appendix 1-A are very conservative, and the
results provided in the section, Estimated Realistic Results are less conservative and are intended
to be more realistic.

36

Chemical Attack: Nerve Agent

Homeland Security Council: Planning Scenarios, July 2004
http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/grant_docs/National_Planning_Scenarios_ExecSummaries_ver2.pdf
Scenario 7: Chemical Attack Nerve Agent

General Description
Sarin is a human-made chemical warfare agent classified as a nerve agent. Nerve agents are the
most toxic and rapidly acting of the known chemical warfare agents. Sarin is a clear, colorless, and
tasteless liquid that has no odor in its pure form. However, Sarin can evaporate into a vapor and
spread into the environment. Sarin is also known as GB.
In this scenario, the Universal Adversary (UA) builds six spray dissemination devices and releases
Sarin vapor into the ventilation systems of three large commercial office buildings in a metropolitan area. The agent kills 95% of the people in the buildings, and kills or sickens many of the first
responders. In addition, some of the agent exits through rooftop ventilation stacks, creating a
downwind hazard.
For purposes of estimating federal response requirements, each building is assumed to have an occupancy of 2,000 personnel (i.e., twenty-story buildings with 100 occupants per floor), and the
outdoor/subway population density of the surrounding areas is 3,900 people per square mile (onetenth of the total population density in the vicinity of Times Square, New York).
Timeline/Event Dynamics
The attack will require 6 months to plan, including putting faux janitors in place, shipping the
agent, and fabricating the spray devices. The actual attack will take less than 10 minutes. First responders should arrive at the facility within 10 to 15 minutes of the attack. In order for the UA to
succeed in this attack, certain meteorological conditions wind speed, temperature, humidity, and
precipitation must be met.
Secondary Hazards/Events
Numerous injuries will occur as a result of panic on the street, including falling and crushing injuries. Further injuries are likely to occur due to motor vehicle accidents in the surrounding roadways.
Key Implications
Assuming 2,000 occupants per building, the initial fatality count will be 5,700 (95%) and 300 injured, including the initial Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and fire personnel at each building.
Patients who experience prolonged seizures may sustain permanent damage to the central nervous
system assume 350 patients in this category (300 inside plus 50 outside). Fatalities and major
injuries will occur due to falling and crushing during the panic on the street, and due to vehicle accidents.
Little direct damage due to the attack, except the building interiors and contents, will be highly
contaminated by agent condensing on surfaces. The three buildings and their contents will be a
total loss due to decontamination measures and/or psychological impacts of future usability. However, airing and washing should decontaminate adjacent structures adequately.
37

Overwhelming demand will disrupt communications (landline telephone and cellular) in the local
area. There will be large numbers of worried well swamping the medical system. Loss of three
fire crews and three EMS crews will impact readiness for other events in the short term.
Decontamination, destruction, disposal, and replacement of three large commercial office buildings
could cost up to $300 million. Business in the buildings may never reopen, and an overall national
economic downturn is possible in the wake of the attack due to loss of consumer confidence.
Those who survive usually recover within 4 to 6 weeks, with full cholinesterase level restoration
within 3 to 4 months. Patients who experience prolonged seizures may sustain permanent damage
to the central nervous system.
Mission Areas Activated
Prevention/Deterrence/Protection
The ability to prevent the attack is contingent on the prevention of CWM importation, weapons
assembly, and site reconnaissance.
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis
Rapid recognition of an attack will be key to avoiding first responder casualties. Actions required
include dispatch; agent detection; and hazard assessment, prediction, monitoring, and sampling.
Emergency Management/Response
Actions required include alerts, activation and notification, traffic and access control, protection of
special populations, resource support and requests for assistance, and pubic information activities.
Incident/Hazard Mitigation
Actions required include isolating and defining the hazard; establishing, planning, and operating
incident command; preserving the scene; conducting mitigation efforts; decontaminating responders, and conducting site remediation and monitoring.
Public Protection
Evacuation and/or sheltering of downwind populations will be required.
Victim Care
Tens of thousands of persons will require monitoring and decontamination as they are allowed to
leave their buildings. Hundreds will require hospital treatment.
Investigation/Apprehension
Tracking and apprehension of the suspects will be included. Actions required include suspect
tracking and apprehension, dispatch, site control, criminal investigation, and tactical deployment.
Recovery/Remediation
Anything exposed to a high-vapor agent concentration will require decontamination, including bodies. There will be little damage to the building as a direct result of the attack. However, decontamination of some materials may be difficult or impossible. Even if structures and property could be
technically decontaminated, the psychological impact on future usability would be significant.

38

Radiological Attack Radiological Dispersal Devices

Homeland Security Council: Planning Scenarios, July 2004
http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/grant_docs/National_Planning_Scenarios_ExecSummaries_ver2.pdf
Scenario 11: Radiological Attack Radiological Dispersal Devices

General Description
Cesium-137 (137Cs) has a half-life of 33 years. It decays by both beta and gamma radiation. It is
one of several known radioactive isotopes that stand out as being highly suitable for radiological
terror. This isotope causes skin damage similar to burns, but the injury may be as deep within the
body as on the skin. Cesium would be particularly dangerous if accidentally ingested or inhaled,
even in small quantities. Cesium mimics potassium in the body. It binds to concrete and other masonry, making decontamination of such buildings extremely difficult and possibly economically
infeasible. Use of 137Cs in an urban setting would seriously raise the cost of cleanup.
137

Cs is mostly used in the form of cesium chloride (CsCl), because it is easy to precipitate. CsCl is
a fairly fine, light powder with typical particle size median at about 300 microns. Fractions below
10 microns are typically less than 1%. In a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), most will fall
out within approximately 1 to 2,000 feet (although many variables exist), but a small amount may
be carried great distances, even hundreds of miles.
In this scenario, the Universal Adversary (UA) purchases stolen CsCl to make an RDD or dirty
bomb. The explosive and the shielded 137Cs sources are smuggled into the country. Detonator
cord is stolen from a mining operation, and all other materials are obtained legally in the United
States. Devices are detonated in three separate, but regionally close, moderate-to-large cities. The
cities are physically similar with geographic topography that is flat. The results in each city are
essentially the same. The contaminated region covers approximately thirty-six blocks in each city
and includes the business district (high-rise street canyons), residential row houses, crowded shopping areas, and a high school. Buildings in the affected areas are principally made of concrete and
brick; some are stone faced.
The entire scene is contaminated with 137Cs, though not at levels causing immediate concern to
first responders. Due to the size of the explosion, the radioactive contamination is blown widely
such that the ground zero area is not as radioactive as might have been expected. The detonation
aerosol contains 90% of the original 137Cs source with radioactive particles whose sizes range from
1 micron (or micro-meter, m) to 150 microns the size of most of the particles is approximately
100 microns. Larger particles either penetrate building materials in the blast zone, or drop quickly
to the ground as fall-out within about 500 feet.
Variable winds of 3 to 8 miles per hour carry the radioactively contaminated aerosol throughout an
area of approximately thirty-six blocks (the primary deposition zone). Complex urban wind patterns carry the contamination in unpredictable directions, leaving highly variable contamination
deposition with numerous hot spots created by wind eddies and vortices. Radioactivity concentrations in this zone are on the order of 5-50 microi/m2, with hot spots measuring 100-500
microi/m2; however, traces of the 137Cs plume carry more than 3.5 kilometers (~ 2.2 miles) on
prevailing winds. Air intakes contaminate interiors of larger buildings, and negative indoor build-

39

ing pressure draws contaminated aerosol into buildings via cracks around windows and doors. In
city one, the subway air intakes contaminate the subway system.
Timeline/Event Dynamics
The attacks have no advance notice or intelligence that indicates their possibility. The explosions
are instantaneous, but plume dispersion continues for 20 minutes while breezes navigate the complex environments before particles have fully settled. First responders do not recognize radioactive
contamination for 15 minutes in city one. The explosions in cities two and three are promptly identified as dirty bombs this provides some advantage to first responders and government officials
in managing contamination on-scene, and in communicating with the public concerning topical
contamination and spread of contamination.
Secondary Hazards/Events
Small fires from ruptured gas lines occur in the vicinity of the blasts. Unstable building facades,
rubble, and broken glass create physical hazards for rescue workers. Small amounts of lead, asbestos, and Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) are present in the air and on surfaces. Human remains
present a biohazard, and some of these are very radioactive.
Key Implications
At each site, the blast results in 180 fatalities and about 270 injured requiring medical care. In addition, up to 20,000 individuals in each primary deposition zone potentially have detectable superficial radioactive contamination.
In each blast, one building and twenty vehicles are destroyed, and eight other buildings suffer varying degrees of damage, such as minor structural damage and broken windows. Radioactive contamination is found inside and outside of buildings over an area of approximately thirty-six blocks in
each city. Minor contamination may be an issue further downwind as investigators perform more
thorough surveys. Most of the subway system in city one is contaminated.
Over the long term, decontamination efforts are expected to be effective, but some property owners
choose demolition and rebuilding. Many square blocks will be unavailable to businesses and residents for several years until remediation is completed.
Transportation is severely hampered in each city. Bus, rail, and air transport routes are altered, and
officials build highway checkpoints to monitor incoming traffic for contamination. The subway
system in city one is completely closed for an extended period. Hospitals in each region, already at
maximum capacity with injuries from the blasts, are inundated with up 50,000 worried well.
The sewage treatment plant is quickly contaminated. Seventy-five businesses are closed for an extended duration while radioactive contamination is remediated. Local tax revenues plummet, and
people discover that insurance claims are rejected. The schools in the contamination zones are
closed and students meet in alternate locations. Nearby towns and cities close their doors to residents of the impacted cities for fear of contamination spread.
Decontamination, destruction, disposal, and replacement of lost infrastructure will be costly (i.e.,
hundreds of millions of dollars per site). The entire contaminated area may be economically depressed for years. An overall national economic downturn may occur in the wake of the attack due
to a loss of consumer confidence.
In the long term, no one will suffer acute radiation syndrome, but approximately 20,000 individuals are likely to become externally contaminated at each site. Low-level contamination may enter
food and water supplies. The sum of the cumulative exposures results in an increased lifetime cancer risk proportionate to the dose. Mental health services will be required.
Mission Areas Activated
Prevention/Deterrence/Protection
Efforts should include prevention of trafficking and importation of CsCl and weapon components,
detection of the plot, reconnaissance of the site, protection, and deterrence measures.
40

Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis
First responders are likely to be contaminated. The downwind aerosol dispersion will be a significant component of the hazard. Assessment and coordination efforts required are numerous.
Emergency Management/Response
Actions required include mobilizing and operating incident command; overseeing victim triage;
stabilizing the site; cordoning the site and managing and controlling the perimeter; providing notification and activation of special teams; providing traffic and access control; providing protection
of at-risk and special populations; providing resource support and requests for assistance; providing public works coordination; providing direction and control of critical infrastructure mitigation;
and providing pubic information, outreach, and communication activities.
Incident/Hazard Mitigation
Actions required include isolating the incident scene and defining the hazard areas, building stabilization, providing fire suppression, conducting debris management and radioactive and hazardous
contamination mitigation, decontaminating responders and equipment as well as local citizens, and
conducting local site contamination control.
Public Protection
Sheltering and/or evacuation of downwind populations will be required and must occur quickly.
Protection actions required range from developing protective action recommendations and communicating them to the public to making radio-protective pharmaceutical decisions and efficiently
distributing drugs.
Victim Care
Injured people will require some decontamination in the course of medical treatment and, if possible, prior to hospital admission. Thousands more will likely need superficial decontamination, and
both short-term and long-term medical follow-ups.
Investigation/Apprehension
Actions required include dispatching personnel, conducting site cordoning and control, collecting
field data and witness interviews, and performing tactical deployment and apprehension of suspects. Reconstruction of the attack should occur.
Recovery/Remediation
The extent of contamination will be a major challenge because 137Cs is highly water-soluble and is
chemically reactive with a wide variety of materials, including common building materials such as
concrete and stone. Several buildings (those most damaged) will be torn down and eventually rebuilt. Decontamination activities are undertaken for building exteriors and interiors, streets, sidewalks, and other areas.

41

Explosives Attack: Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device

Homeland Security Council: Planning Scenarios, July 2004
http://www.scd.hawaii.gov/grant_docs/National_Planning_Scenarios_ExecSummaries_ver2.pdf
Scenario 12: Explosives Attack Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device

General Description
In this scenario, agents of the Universal Adversary (UA) use improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
to detonate bombs inside a sports arena and create a large vehicle bomb (LVB). They also use suicide bombers in an underground public transportation concourse and detonate another bomb in a
parking facility near the entertainment complex. An additional series of devices is detonated in the
lobby of the nearest hospital emergency room (ER).
The event is primarily designed for an urban environment, but could be adapted for more rural area
events such as county fairs and other large gatherings. Casualty estimates would be reduced as a
function of a reduced target population and less population density at target points.
Timeline/Event Dynamics
The fire is ignited approximately 1 hour after the start of the entertainment event. The detonation
of explosives is delayed approximately 10 to 15 minutes after the ignition of the fire in order to
allow for detection, evacuation, and response of emergency services providers. The detonation of
explosives at the hospital site will be the hardest to time for maximum effect and may need to be
coordinated by some communication among cell members. In any case, the hospital device should
be detonated before the arrival of casualties from the entertainment venue.
The timing of some of these events, with the exception of the evacuation stimulus, is not critical.
The more people who evacuate the venue, the more potential explosives-related casualties are produced. If evacuation of the venue is delayed, the fire and detonation of the LVB near the venue can
be expected to produce increased casualties inside the structure due to collapse, secondary and tertiary blast effects, increased exposure to products of combustion, thermal effects, and crowd surge.
Secondary Hazards/Events
Secondary hazards include the disruption of electric power, natural gas lines, and water mains the
disruption will cause undermining of streets and flooding of underground transit ways. There may
be toxic smoke resulting from fires and explosions. There will be loss of traffic controls in the area,
and fleeing citizens would likely cause traffic accidents. Media response to the area may affect
responders. Since one of the bombs was disguised as an emergency response vehicle, other legitimate vehicles may be impeded in their response to the scene and hospitals.
Key Implications
Casualties will result at all five incident sites and will include civilians, emergency personnel, and
the suicide bombers. The LVB detonation outside the venue can be expected to result in the largest
number of fatalities and injuries due to the population density expected. Fatalities and injuries
are summarized in Table 12-1.

42

Property damage would include severe fire and blast damage to the entertainment venue, blast
damage to buildings across from the entertainment venue, moderate damage to the transportation
center, severe damage to vehicles and nearby buildings at the parking facility, and severe damage
to the hospital ER.
Service disruption would be severe in the impacted city and would include traffic (especially the
subway), public transportation, emergency services, and hospitals. The local economic impact includes loss of use of the entertainment venue for a period of 1 year during the repair of fire and
blast damage. Major health issues include severe burn treatment and therapy for the victims; permanent hearing loss; long-term tinnitus; vertigo for some exposed to the blast; and post-traumatic
stress for victims, first responders, and nearby residents.
Mission Areas Activated
Prevention/Deterrence/Protection
The planning and execution of this event would require a significant level of relatively unsophisticated coordination. As such, the potential for detection in the pre-event planning stages exists.
Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis
The fire would be the first recognizable indication that the attack was under way. Actions required
include dispatch; agent detection; and hazard assessment, prediction, monitoring, and sampling.
Emergency Management/Response
Actions required include search and rescue, alerts, activation and notification, traffic and access
control, protection of special populations, resource support, requests for assistance, and public information. Establishment of a Joint Operations Center (JOC) is required.
Incident/Hazard Mitigation
Primary hazards include fire; toxic atmosphere/smoke; un-detonated explosives; unstable structures; electrical hazards; and low visibility. Hospital personnel must ensure that arriving vehicles
are not delivery systems for additional weapons.
Public Protection
Evacuation is required as well as additional threat assessment. The area must be cordoned.
Victim Care
Injuries range from walking wounded to multiple systems trauma, burns, and obvious fatalities.
Elimination of the ER facility at the target hospital will force other facilities to receive all patients
from the entertainment venue blasts.
Investigation/Apprehension
Investigation can begin during the rescue phase with photo documentation of the immediate scene,
victim locations, and injury patterns. Coordination of federal, state, and local investigative resources will begin early in the incident management.
Recovery/Remediation
Decontamination is necessary for blood-borne pathogens at all sites. Debris removal must occur
after evidence search and recovery. Restoration of the main venue could take more than 1 year
43

(depending on the extent of the fire damage). Repair and restoration of the transportation center
can be estimated at 4 months.
Note: The full-text version [not publicly available] of this document contains overpressure templates and calculations, as well as tables outlining human injury and property damage criteria for
various levels of blast overpressure.

44

Several conventional and radiological terrorist attacks during two international events
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC): Exercise Dacia 2003
http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/2003/dacia/index.htm
On 3 October 2003, a number of heavy explosions occurred in Bucharest, Ploiesti and Pitesti. All
these explosions are claimed by a terrorist group, which names itself EMANON. In the message
this group submitted to Radio and Television stations in Bucharest, they threaten with followingon actions. This caused widespread panic amongst the population. Immediately after this announcement, the National Security Council decided to put security forces at a higher state of alert,
also because from 5 to 10 October 2003, the "127 International Football Tournament" will be held
in Romania.
Additionally, an International demonstration exercise on "Consequence Management following a
Terrorist attack on Railway Infrastructure involving Hazardous Materials" will be conducted in
Romania from 4 to 10 October 2003. Several specialised teams from EAPC countries participate in
this demonstration exercise.
Specialised units of the "Romanian Terrorism Prevention and Negation Inspectorate" implement
close anti-terrorism protection measures for the teams participating in both international events, in
order to prevent any terrorist action against them.
On 4 and 5 October 2003 security forces took preventative actions to avoid explosions and fires in
the INOX steel factory in Targoviste, the 1 Mai Chemical Factory in Ploiesti, the East Railway
Station in Bucharest and the Chemical Factory Arpechim in Pitesti.
On 6 October at 20:00 (Local Time), during a football match, an explosion occurred near to the
Trivale football stadium. At that time of the day, the stadium is for approximately 80 percent filled
(some 18.000 people). Immediately after the explosion, local authorities receive an anonymous
phone call, claiming that EMANON is responsible for the explosion and that a "dirty bomb" has
been used. In addition, the group is informing them that similar attacks with "dirty bombs" are
planned against water and power supply stations, the gas network and places that attract many
people such as hotels and supermarkets. Measurements in the vicinity of the stadium confirm an
increase in radioactivity compared to the normal background radiation levels.
It is reported that as a consequence of the explosion, twenty people were immediately killed and
approximately 20.000 people affected The panic following the explosion, caused the high number
of spectators to stampede from the stadium.
The NBC counter-terrorist unit on-site immediately alerts to release of radiation considerably
higher than the natural back ground radiation level. The readiness teams of the unit are deployed
and establish a crime scene for further investigations, determining of the radiation and cordoning
off the area. Entrance and exit control points are established, contamination monitoring is continuing to be performed.
Information from the crime scene was passed to the national radiological institute, which predicted
possible contamination moving to the centre of Pitesti according to the actual meteorological situation. The explosion resulted into surface contamination of 50 MBq/m2 in an area of 1 km2. After
the crime scene investigation has been completed, control of the incident site is transferred to the
Civil Protection Command. The Civil Protection Command considers the need for assistance to
handle the probably affected 20000 people and submits a request to the Minister of Administration and Interior.
By the end of the day, also in other counties of Romania terrorists are committing attacks against
vital infrastructure, leading to heavy damage and major loss of lives. Consequently, national resources dealing with the consequences of the attacks are used to the maximum.
Despite a massive mobilisation of national resources international assistance will be needed.
Therefore, on Tuesday 7 October at 01:00 (Local Time), the Government of Romania decided to
appeal for international assistance through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Cen45

tre (EADRCC). In the initial request the following requirements for international assistance are
mentioned:

Specialised Radiological Search and Rescue teams and equipment;

Doctors and nurses, field hospitals, physicians, special medical supplies and equipment for the
treatment of contaminated persons;
Tents for accommodation of evacuees; and
Mobile chemical/nuclear laboratories.

Based on a Governmental decision a Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) responsible for the planning and coordination of national and international response to the emergency situation in the stricken area has been established in the city of Pitesti. The LEMA will consist of the
Disaster Intervention Coordination Centre (DICC), national liaison officers and liaison officers
from the countries offering assistance. In addition, the Government being concerned over the widespread panic in the country, decided to establish a Public Information Centre (PIC), to provide information to the public on the current situation and the risks to public health.
The same day, at 03:00 (Local Time), the EADRCC circulated an Urgent Request for International Disaster Assistance to the Initial Points of Contacts in EAPC countries, and started its coordination task in close cooperation with relevant International organizations.
Taking into account that their national units are already deployed to Romania, and in accordance
with existing bilateral agreements, all the EAPC countries participating in the demonstration exercise, confirm at 06:00 (Local Time), their national decision to assist Romanian authorities in response to the request for international assistance.
Team commanders involved in the demonstration exercise receive from their national authorities
the orders to deploy their intervention units to Pitesti. They are expected to arrive by 7 October
2003, not later than 07:00 (Local Time), in Bascov village, at 1,5 kilometres from Pitesti, where
Romanian authorities had established the Base of Operations, in order to be able to receive national
and international units. To inform the international team commanders on the current situation in
the affected area, a briefing will be organised at the same day at 08:00 (Local Time) in the Base of
Operations.
On 7 October 2003, at 09:30, the International Teams are ready to receive tasks from the LEMA/DICC.
Day 1 - 7 October 2003
At 8:03 on Tuesday morning, a new explosion takes place, again in the area of the stadium (Site 1),
this time damaging the water pump station (Site 2). Two persons are killed and eight injured. After
an initial assessment to ensure that teams can be deployed, the Local Emergency Management Authorities (LEMA) calls for:

A Hungarian team to investigate the nature of the radiological substance. The Hungarian team
identifies it as Cesium 137 and continues measuring radioactivity levels on site;
An Austrian team to search and rescue victims who may still be blocked in the debris of the
explosion;
A Portuguese medical team to support the Romanian medical team and the Red Cross.

To evacuate serious casualties, medical air evacuations (Romanian) also take place, however from
a different area (Strand). Landing and taking-off in the immediate vicinity of the stadium is forbidden as, due to the radiological situation, dust particles may prove hazardous.
While these operations are conducted throughout the morning, Belgian and Armenian teams look
for a location where to set up a camp to evacuate the civilian population (Glambocu village, North
of Pitesti). The evacuees come from areas potentially contaminated by the radioactive cloud - possibly moving north as now forecast by the national authorities. To monitor the levels of radioactivity in Pitesti, the LEMA also calls for Italian and Bulgarian teams.
In the meantime, suspicious packages are found by the Romanian security forces:
46

On Lanarie street, where Romanian and Austrian teams destroy them

In Parcul 1907 where three packages are destroyed by a Romanian team

At 2:00 pm, for the purpose of exercising, Romanian and Ukrainian teams are also practicing decontamination of the street Armand Calinescu.
While measurements of levels of radioactivity remain one of the main activities of the afternoon,
decontamination sites, including medical screening, are also established in three different locations: High School 14, School 7 and the Chemistry High School (Sites 3, 4 and 5). Norway, Italy
and Romania are taking care of the decontamination.
Day 2 - 8 October 2003
Early morning on Tuesday, it appeared that many civilians would need radiological screening and
possible medical assistance. So as of 8:30, the local authorities also called LEMA - decided to
ask the Romanian, Italian, Ukrainian and Turkish teams to deploy and start checking the population.
In the course of the same morning, there were a series of reports of suspicious packages spotted in
various locations in town, namely in the water filtering station of Trivale and in the southern railway station. An Austrian and a Romanian detection team as well as two Romanian demining teams
were sent to investigate.
Radioactivity also kept increasing in the area of the stadium where the first dirty bomb had exploded the day before. Teams from Armenia and Italy monitored the gamma dose rates. The authorities also decided to measure radioactivity in 4 other areas downtown, with the support of joint
teams (Bulgaria, Italy, Norway, Ukraine) and a wide array of equipment. Private firms producing
food became increasingly concerned about the quality of their products and also asked for radioactivity tests, which were performed by Romanian teams. All the tests proved negative.
Unfortunately, as often in such situations, misinformation started spreading. A restaurant and a
company were rumored to have contaminated their clients through the air conditioning system. The
Croatian detection and monitoring teams intervened to monitor the levels, reassured the population by rebuffing the rumor.
At 11 oclock in the morning, while Pitesti was still under shock from the previous blast, a new
explosion occurred near Polygone Jandarmerie and heavily damaged the ground floor of an apartment block. Ukrainians, Hungarians and Romanians were sent for radiological detection, which
proved positive. There were also 3 casualties rescued by the Austrian NGO Johanniter Umfallhilfe.
Norwegians conducted the decontamination of the victims and the personnel on-site while Portugal
ensured first medical aid.
In the meantime, the Belgians who had offered the previous day to build a temporary camp for the
evacuated civilian population had finally identified a location, Glambocu, in the North of Pitesti.
The initial camp was designed to accommodate 220 people. Following an immediate request from
the mayor, 70 persons (50 students and 20 adults) were evacuated and received by the Belgian and
Uzbek teams. The Romanians indicated that they could upgrade the capacity of the camp to 500
people.
Other events of the day included the medical evacuation of seriously contaminated individuals.
After medical screening performed by a Romanian team, one victim was urgently air-evacuated to
Bucarest to receive specific treatment. Another 10 victims were evacuated by road.
Day 3 - 9 October 2003
Very early in the morning, there were reports that more persons might still be trapped in the area of
Poligone Jandarmerie where the latest explosion had occurred the day before. The local authorities
sent units for special search and rescue, radiological detection and monitoring as well as first aid
medical assistance with teams from six different countries: Turkey, Austria, Moldova, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Portugal and Romania.

47

Air medical evacuation also continued with a helicopter, which evacuated two heavy casualties to
receive special treatment in Bucharest. Detection missions were again carried out in different
areas:

In the area of the stadium where the first bomb exploded: Austrians, Slovakians, Ukrainians
and Romanians;
in the vicinity of the water pump station: Bulgarians;
in schools where support was called in to check students: Romanian;
in food companies to check the products: Italians, Austrians, Ukrainians.

While these ongoing missions were carried out, the authorities received once again serious indications that suspicious packages were in the water pumping station. A mixed team of Romanians,
Ukrainians, Austrians, Portuguese and Bulgarians was sent to the spot and destroyed the objects.
Finally, because of the potential future contamination of certain areas, an additional 200 students
were evacuated to the Belgian camp. Two individuals critically sick (not out of contamination but
regular serious disease) were also air evacuated.
Scenario materials also include fictional situation reports and other documents.

48

Natural hazard scenarios

Severe flooding and dam collapse after heavy rains resulting in a number of incidents
Exercise Barents Rescue 2011, organized by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
https://www.msb.se/RibData/Filer/pdf/26117.pdf
Barents Rescue 2011 consisted of a range of main and sub-exercises that aimed to develop the capacity to provide and receive international assistance in the event of disasters in the Barents Region. The sub-exercises were held during a period from April to September 2011. The main exercises were held on 21-22 September 2011.
The fictitious scenario for the Barents Rescue 2011 exercise was based on a dam collapse in the
Lule River, which resulted in a number of incidents. The exercise was an opportunity to train and
test various emergency response skills. Participants from the northern parts of Norway, Sweden,
Finland and Russia were able to influence the type of incidents included in the exercise.
Lead in scenario
In a fictitious reality in the autumn of 2011 we found that a number of serious disasters have occurred around the world. In the wake of Haiti, Brazil, Chile, and Iceland, national and international
emergency services were stretched to the limit and enormous resources were needed for societal
infrastructure recovery. The international systems for risk assessment and emergency response, the
UN and other organisations, indicated that more disasters were expected. This because the negative
effect of global warming is leading to more natural disasters and an increased risk for environmental threats.
Since early April 2011, continuous rain had filled the water- ways in the middle and northern Sweden, a phenomena shared by almost whole Europe. The water levels were extremely high throughout the regions. The hydropower companies had increased the number of inspections of hydropower dams. In July 2011 the inspection of a hydropower dam in Vasterbotten County detected a
leak, where water was flowing into the Ume River. The leak was stopped and a major incident
avoided. However, one person was killed while repairing the dam site.
The Swedish media and the media from some neighbouring countries in the Barents Region described the action taken by the responsible companies and by the authorities as a failure (too little
too late, just good luck that nothing more serious happened...). The media pressure on the entities
involved was immense and they had continued to report on the rising water levels in Norrbotten
and Vasterbotten.
At the beginning of September 2011, a large earthquake hit a popular tourist area in Turkey (also
affecting tourists). Turkey requested international assistance and many countries, including Sweden, offered to help. Emergency response teams departed for Turkey on September 12th.
Field Training Exercise events
The following exercises were performed:

A train accident in Jokkmokk, mainly arranged with four train cars with dead and wounded
people, of which two train cars had fallen downhill, extraction of trapped people, transportation of wounded people and search for missing people in the surrounding terrain.
A medical rescue exercise linked to the train accident in Jokkmokk focused mainly on the
transportation of wounded people, triage/medical prioritising and treatment, identification and
registration.
Evacuation of patients from hospitals, moved to Kallax Airport for transportation with the
Swedish National Air Medevac (SNAM).
A tunnel accident in Letsi, mainly arranged with trapped people and a fire deep in a tunnel.
A hazmat accident in Boden with ammonia caused of a traffic accident between a cargo truck
and a bus.

49

A maritime accident in Lulea, mainly arranged as a boat collision with many people falling
into the fast-flowing water.
A fire in the engine room of the icebreaker Atle in Lulea harbour the lower decks were filled
with smoke. Since there were people on board, a search and rescue operation was needed.

General Scenario
2010 until May 2011
An increased number of severe environmental incidents have occurred around in the world during
recent years (e.g. in Japan, Haiti, Brazil, Chile and Iceland). National and international emergency
rescue units have been engaged and sometimes have been stretched to the limit. The recovery of
affected areas will take a long time and consume a tremendous amount of resource and requiring
international assistance. Assessments made by the UN and other agencies indicate an increase of
environmental incidents, even in areas previously assessed as being of low susceptibility.
Flooding in southern and central Europe has also increased and entails severe consequences, affecting the lives of people and having negative financial consequences. The pressure on the EU has
increased to take preventive measures in order to reduce negative consequences on the environment.
The Nordic countries have been affected in different ways and the situation in Sweden is worst.
Due to heavy rainfalls in the middle and northern parts of Sweden (Svealand and Norrland) large
areas are being flooded and the fire brigades have been heavily engaged since beginning of April.
Especially in Vsterbotten and Norrbotten counties (in Norrland) the previous winter was very severe. The spring and the ice melt resulted in severe flooding in April and May; the rivers most affected were Torne River, Kalix River, the lower parts of Lule River, Pite River, the lower parts of
Skellefte River, Ume River - notably the unregulated River Vindelalven, and Angerman River.
Buildings, bridges, parks and roads located in low-terrain areas particularly those near the rivers
sustained water damage and in some areas people were forced to move. Some roads are still
closed. Many municipal fire brigades managed to handle the situation well with limited support
from the Swedish Armed Forces (Home guard). On May 5th 2001 in Alvsbyn Municipality (Norrbotten County along the Pite River) temporary flood barriers close to a residential area collapsed
and two children drowned. This event led to major headlines and many questions were raised regarding the protection and reliability of temporary flood barriers. Many people also requested help
from the municipality to build temporary flood barriers in their areas but they only received recommendations.
Landslides occurred in areas close to rivers. Farmers were affected in many ways; both regarding
limited harvests, but also with flooded fields. Farmers asked the municipal authorities to provide
new fields for their cattle.
Road traffic accidents (RTAs) were a serious problem. Approximately 25 serious car accidents
with dead or severely injured persons, and many more were injured due to undermined condition
of roads. The amount of water on the roads caused many cases of aquaplaning. In May a Spanish
lorry coming from Finland and transporting hazardous materials was near to cause a major accident near Lulea. Bad tyres in combination with a drunk driver, high speeds and water on the road
surface make the vehicle out of control resulting in an overturned lorry of E4 motorway. Luckily
no explosion or leakage of poisonous materials occurred. It was only luck that stopped the catastrophe. The Swedish Transport Administration supported by the police issues regularly specific
information about the roads condition. However, it seems that the traffic accidents continue to be a
big problem. The police also obtained reports from the public about increased burglaries and looting in areas that were evacuated. It seems that the police have not enough personnel to match all
these emergency demands.
Many people have made complaints to insurance companies, which are unwilling to cover the cost
of damages. The many unsolved issues have led to some newspaper headlines. Insurance companies use the media for distributing information to the public: Take preventive action is their main
message!
50

During the whole timeframe, the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute (SMHI - a
government agency under the Ministry of the Environment) has issued general forecasts and
weather warnings as support to Swedish national, regional, local decision-makers and the public in
general. Since April 2011, SMHI has issued three warnings of level 2 and four warnings of level 1.
Level 2 indicates a 10 to 50 year flow and implies danger to the public and great material damage
and disturbance in the important community functions. Level 1 indicates a 1 to 10 year flow and
implies some risk to the public and disturbance in some community functions. The SMHIs long
term forecast for the summer predicts a continuation of high rainfall period and possibly an exceptional wet season. It is however a forecast and thus uncertain.
To support coordination of measures taken, MSB conducted a cooperation conference with the
county administrative boards and some governmental agencies. The purpose was to coordinate
public information and examine the preparedness and co-operational effectiveness of civil protection and joint emergency responses.
The MSB has also monitored the development of the spring flood by collecting data from the
County Administrative Boards (CAB) regarding water discharges. This information has been compiled and submitted on a weekly basis to the Ministry of Defence. The MSB has supported the municipalities with specific extra resources, e.g. sandbags, temporary flood barriers and water pumps.
The impact of the flooding was however limited:

drinking water was only slightly affected,

contamination of water was limited,
no hazardous substances (CBRN) incidents occurred,
the health of the population was quite good with a limited occurrence of stomach-related illnesses,
no sewage system collapsed,
electrical power supply and telecommunications were only slightly affected,
no major evacuations were necessary,
the municipalities including the fire brigades handled the situation well,
no major emergency situation occurred.

The severe spring flood situation was an issue on the annual meeting between the Nordic Directors
General (DGs) for civil protection. The DGs have encouraged their organisations to cooperate on
preventive measures when it comes to a flooding scenario. The duty officer at MSB has informed
the MIC on the situation in Sweden but Sweden has not made any request for additional international resources so far. The EU MIC continues to monitor the situation.
June until beginning of September 2011
The first part of June started dry, but the rest of the summer was wet and cold. The precipitation
amount has exceeded the maximum level in Norrbotten County since the start of weather observations more than 140 years ago and has been much higher than normal in Vasterbotten County. In
some areas precipitation has been more than the three times greater than the normal value. The
cooler than normal temperatures resulted in accumulation of precipitation in the form of snow in
winter and significantly lower than normal evaporation during Summer. This has led to extremely
high discharge and water levels in the rivers.
In early August the large regulation reservoirs were filled to their full supply level (FSL). In order
to maintain the safety margins of the dams the flood gates were opened to release the surplus water
downstream. As a consequence the resulting water flow in the lower parts of the rivers reached the
50-year values in many places. Decisions have been heavily questioned by those affected and some
people have raised financial com- plaints. The municipalities and county administrative boards
(CAB) have examined and updated their plans for handling the flooding situation. Extra temporary
flood barriers have been obtained. Public relations officers have been active in disseminating information. Routines for public warning systems have also been examined. Some of the municipalities have contacted the Swedish Government with financial complaints for extra costs for flood
measures. No decision has yet been made by the government.
51

The water level in the Lule River has increased very fast in the last few weeks and it is expected to
reach up to 3 metres higher levels than normal in the coming days for some areas. The long term
forecast from SMHI shows that the rainfall would intensify and increase in duration in Norrbotten
county in the first half of September. In the 90-day SMHI forecast however Norrbotten and
Vasterbotten counties can expect temperatures near-normal to a little cooler than normal for the
period, along with normal rainfall for Norrbotten and below-normal rainfall for Vasterbotten. The
second half of September looks to have near-normal temperatures with rainfall near normal in the
Norrbotten and near to below-normal in the Vasterbotten County. October temperatures and rainfall look near normal for both Norrbotten and Vasterbotten counties. For November temperatures
look below normal with rainfall also below normal.
It is worth mentioning that the 90-day weather forecast is just the start of the forecast process or
first approximation. It will have to be further refined in the months ahead based on other contributing meteorological factors.
The Norrbotten CAB extended attendance of their meetings to include representatives from the
municipalities and insurance companies, followed by increased public information work. The municipalities are also stepping up their efforts: Analysis of lessons learned from the spring floods,
mapping probable land- slide areas and assessing available resources for the handling of flooding
emergencies. Many municipalities have extended public relations service with specific public information centres (PIC). A growing task for the fire service is to rescue civilians trapped in motor
vehicles in deep water.
During the summer, the Swedish Transport Administration, conducted several examinations of
roads and railways and performed a safety supervision of companies involved. They have recommended the closure of some roads and railways. The railway used by Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara
AB (LKAB, an international high-tech mining corporation) for ore traffic from Kiruna to Lulea
Harbour is closed at Nattavaara. The traffic is routed to Narvik Harbour and is running with a reduced capacity.
Norrbotten County Council (local health authority) has also increased its readiness and public relations work. They are also supporting the municipalities and Norrbotten CABs with advice and recommendations.
The Swedish National Food Administration (NFA, a government authority) has issued instructions
to municipalities to increase inspections of abattoirs, butchers, dairies and poultry farms and also
food facilities in trains, aircraft and on certain maritime vessels. The NFA has also issued advice to
regional and local supervisory authorities and to the food processing industry. The NFA has also
the overall responsibility for export inspections. As a part of import control, the NFA offices at the
Border Inspection Posts carry out regularly test and sampling of food coming from the countries
outside the EU for different infectious diseases like salmonella.
The MSB supports other authorities with expertise and advice. It has been in close contact with
other national authorities and also with the private sector. The MSB has initiated discussions with
the Swedish Armed Forces regarding the possibility of support in the form of transport resources
(mainly helicopters and aeroplanes, but also tracked vehicles) and manpower from the Home
Guard for various tasks, so far no decision has been made.
The MSB general assessment, based on the facts from national authorities and the dam owner
companies, is that it will be a tough autumn ahead with increased flooding. MSBs estimation is
however that it will be manageable with the available resources.
The anxiety seen among people in the affected areas is increasing. The regional radio network of
Sveriges Radio (SR, PBS radio in Sweden) in Norrbotten County has started a daily programme on
the effects on daily life. Many questions have been raised by the listeners and SR used to invite
representatives from authorities, the private sector and insurance companies to answer the questions.
The extremely high water levels in the river system and the increased discharge of surplus water
from the reservoirs cause more and more problems for the public. Cellars and basements are
52

flooded and drinking water systems are contaminated by sewage water. Some municipal offices are
also concerned about the risk of water seepage into their basements where their computer servers
are located.
In some municipalities the decision has been taken to prepare evacuations of residents from affected areas. The municipal offices are receiving increasing numbers of telephone calls from residents and local businesses regarding support for the transport of properties and cattle out of the
affected areas. Elderly peoples home run by municipalities are requesting assistance to deal with
the flooding that is polluting drinking water, causing power cuts, and not least causing anxiety and
frustration among the elderly and their relatives. More and more calls are also received from people who are uninsured or have limited insurance; they are now turning to the municipalities for financial assistance.
At Sunderby Hospital (a county hospital on the border between Boden and Lulea) the flooding has
caused severe problems. The surgical operations are hampered due to temporary power cuts and
water flood. On 9th September an outbreak of salmonella was detected at a clinic in the Norrbotten
County. Incidents of diarrhoea are reported more frequently in the Norrbotten County and directives are issued by the local health authority regarding preventive hygiene.
Beside the hospitals, the electrical power is increasingly affecting the schools, farms, offices, shops
and factories. The Swedish National Grid (the government authority responsible for electricity preparedness) supports different actors and contributes with several kinds of resources to reinforce the
electricity supply system to ensure it is able to withstand this critical situation. Resources like
emergency power supply units and tracked vehicles with operators, line poles, communication
equipment, volunteers (operators, pilots) and so on are used.
The head teachers of some schools have allowed pupils to stay at home due to the risky transport to
and from school and due to reduce the risk of contagion. Some farmers are facing problems with
cattle drinking polluted water. Farmers are experiencing problems with power supply for their stables the reoccurring power shortages have affected the resilience of their back-up systems and the
transportation difficulties have caused gaps in fuel deliveries. There are also disturbances in milk
deliveries, which have forced the farmers to spill the milk in the sewage.
Some companies are facing problems with their computer server rooms, and from time to time
their homepages are down. More and more shops are having problems with their cash systems, but
also with equipment ceasing to work. They suffer also from shoplifting and burglary during the
power blackout. Transportation of food from regional distributors to local shops is being hampered
and even halted due to poor road conditions. Some factories report problems in receiving and distributing technical components.
The flooding has probably lead to contaminations in affected rivers as the chemicals used in
households (e.g. paint, methylated spirits and acetone) are dispersed into the rivers and further into
the Gulf of Bothnia. In some areas in Norrbotten County, large numbers of foreign lingo berry
pickers have showed up and used camping grounds with small cottages as temporary residences.
Problems with informing these groups have occurred as some groups only speak Thai.
At the same time, more and more people are calling both municipal and county offices to offer
their help, but with a limited response. In the media this is being reported as a failure by the authorities not accepting the assistance of those offering it. The Swedish Board of Agriculture has
released information on measures to prevent the spread of contagious animal diseases. Through the
organisation of district veterinarians animal health care is ensured. Directives for preventive animal
health care are issued. These are related to the environment, seeds and water, plant inspections and
cattle registration.
The Swedish National Veterinary Institute (SVA) (a government authority) has issued recommendations for managing animal diseases, particularly zoonotic diseases that can be transmitted between animals and humans. Airport authorities report that flooding has reduced road capacity to
and from the airport causing reduced operational capacity of Lule Airport by 25 %. The Swedish
Maritime Administration (SMA) has continued to keep the navigation routes open and safe. The
53

SMA together with the Swedish Sea Rescue Society (SSRS) and the Swedish Coast Guard has
conducted several maritime search and rescue operations in the Gulf of Bothnia.
More and more residents and tourists from neighbouring countries like Finland and Norway are
visiting the damaged areas which make the police work even more difficult. Further- more, some
policemen have reported incidents where criminals have used dangerous laser pointers against police. After medical examinations, minor injuries to the eyes of the policemen were noted. In early
September the police stopped a Finnish registered speedboat in Lulea Harbour, resulting in the arrest of a Swedish man and a Finnish woman. So far the investigation shows that those arrested
were involved in illegal import of laser pointers from China to Sweden via Finland. They used
Lulea Harbour and the Torne River as the gateway to Sweden. The Chief Constable in Norrbotten
County has requested assistance from other counties with additional police personnel to maintain
law and order in the area. The use of helicopters, both civil and military, has been limited because
of the bad weather. The increased need for tracked vehicles with drivers is forwarded to Norrbotten
County Administrative Board from the police and the municipalities. The road conditions are
worsening and more and more roads (both gravel and metalled) are being closed for the traffic.
Telecommunications are also affected by the flood situation and disruption to telecommunications
has been reported in many rural areas. From time to time the switchboards at municipal and county
council offices also have been blocked by too many calls. Low-pressure system coming from the
west has brought record rainfalls causing the water levels in the river systems and reservoirs reaching extremely high levels. The flood maps over the most affected river, Lule River, are attached to
this report. As mentioned earlier, the hydro power companies continue with high discharge levels
for the surplus water from the reservoirs. There are reports about overworking and stress related
problems among municipal employees in Norrbotten CAB employees, particularly from
switchboard operators. Some employees have also faced threats from angry residents. These employees have been working with flood related tasks without holiday since early May. The medical
advice is that they need rest.
During the summer, churches within the Swedish Church experienced the increased turmoil in the
community. The needs for pastoral care and individual calls have increased significantly, talks
about people s anxiety, fear and anger. Many who live along the rivers have expressed their decreased confidence in insurance companies. People have tried to get help to protect their property
from the water. More and more people express a sense of being abandoned. Everyone does not believe in authorities assurance that it has the situation under control. Peoples concerns and anxiety
for the future have also brought many existential questions, which deals with security in life and
society. The parishes have been concentrated in worship, pastoral care, diaconal work, home visits
and visits to nursing homes. Parish employees meet a lot of anxiety and anger mixed with sorrow.
On-duty priest has also noticed an increasing number of calls, dealing with concerns about what
will happen. The CAB of AC and BD have conducted cooperation conferences with regional actors
addressing coordination of information and to examine the preparedness of civil protection capacities.
Scenario materials include several maps and graphic charts.

54

Earthquake followed by a tsunami and other cascading events

European Civil Protection: EU Command Post Exercise 2010
http://sertit.u-strasbg.fr
The EU Command Post 2010 exercise is set in the Aude Department, southern France: an earthquake (magnitude 8.4) hits the area on the 31st of May 2010 at 10h32 (8h32 GMT) in the morning.
The earthquakes epicentre is located in Mouthoumet, Aude Department. Much damage to buildings and infrastructure is caused. Furthermore, the Aude Departments coastline is hit by a tsunami: a wave of 5 meters high that has swept up to 10 km inland. The 2 main affected areas are: the
Upper Aude Valley and the coastline (Narbonne: this lowland area is exposed to flood risk). Apart
from infrastructure and building damage, the earthquake and tsunami have wrought havoc to
communication links (road and rail), triggered landslides, and has led to factory and forest fires,
pollution, floods, etc. Faced with this catastrophic situation, the French government has requested,
within the EU Civil Protection mechanism, reinforcements towards the Member States of the European Union though the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) in Brussels.
The scenario source above includes a number of geographical damage assessment maps regarding
earthquake damage, floods, landslides, fires as well as industrial and transport accidents in the
area surrounding the epicentre of the earthquake.

55

Severe earthquake
European Civil Protection - Tuscany Earthquake Relief EXercise TEREX 2010
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/cms/attach/editor/TEREX_2010_exercise_workplan_document
%5B1%5D.pdf
The exercise foresees the simulation of a seismic event of 6.4 Magnitude, with its epicenter in the
Municipality of Piazza al Serchio (LU), similar to the one that occurred on September 7th, 1920.
The estimate of the damage was carried out through the FaCES (Fault-Controlled Earthquake Scenario) calculation code, considering a linear seismic source with azimuth N125 centered on the
epicenter, with a 6.4 Magnitude.

Epicentral Coordinates: Lat. 44.180, Long. 10.280

Approximate length considered for the calculation: 15km
Epicentral Municipality: Piazza al Serchio (LU)
Intensity degree: I = IX MCS
Magnitude: M = 6.4
Population involved: approx. 8.270.000 (approx. 1.217.000 in the 4 Provinces)

The most severely struck provincial territory is Lucca, which besides being the epicenter is also
where the highest number of buildings prone to damage are concentrated. The most affected Municipalities, according to the planned scenario presenting a macro-seismic intensity of 9 are the following: [list of municipalities, see p. 6]
The chart below relates the figures of the effects on buildings, population, hospitals and the road
system as well as on the mobile phone line and the fixed telephone line in the historical centers.
Effects on the homes and on the population

Effects on the hospitals

The main hospital complexes located in the most severely damaged area are 4: 2 in Garfagnana
and 2 in Lunigiana.

The hospitals in the municipalities of Massa, Carrara, Viareggio and Lucca, although outside the
most severely hit area, may be interested by slight structural damage and temporary failure/loss of
operability of a number of structures and services.
Effects on the artificial basins
[Table with national dams, see p. 7]
In particular the Vagli Dam, in the Careggine Municipality, Province of Lucca is carefully monitored. A critical hydraulic situation occurs in the Basin of Serchio causing the Vagli reservoir over56

flow to reach its highest level. The seismic event, beside the activation of specific assessments carried out by ENELs Monitoring Plan regarding the evolving situation and state of integrity of the
dam including the banks of the basin, implies also a simulated rapid discharge of water. This necessary procedure to ensure the safety of rising reservoir levels is carried out by the activation of
the hydraulic safety plan, after which the situation is further aggravated by the Torrite power station interruption.
Effects on the fixed telephone line and mobile phone system
Problems and interruption of the fixed telephone lines and mobile phone system are foreseen
throughout the province of Lucca and part of the Massa Carrara Province.
Effects on the historical and cultural heritage centers
The affected area, namely the exercise premises, is filled with many historical centers distributed
according to the local morphology, dating as far back as the areas medieval settlement period. The
hill towns were built according to typical medieval urban planning for strategic defence and commercial trade purposes. The towns are mostly located along the Apuan Alps and the Apennine
slopes.
In case of an analogous event taking place in actual reality, these centers would be subject to a significant loss of cultural heritage in terms of historical buildings, architectural heritage and civil
housing.
Effects of the event on the road and railway systems
The main road network of the area [cf. Fig. 2, p. 8] includes the S.R. 445 of Garfagnana, on the
right river bank of the Serchio river, intersecting Southward with the S.S. 12 Abetone and Brennero directions, at the Bagni di Lucca exit, and Northward with the S.S. 63 Aulla Reggio Emilia, at
the Aulla exit, and the S.P. 324 that through the Cerreto passage leads to Emilia. The provincial
route S.P.20, in the valley end connects the inhabited centers located on the left bank of the river
Serchio, with those on the right one. These roads are intersected by the secondary municipal road
leading to the single towns.
The road network of the area hit by the emergency presents the typical characteristic of mountainous areas: winding curves, small and tight roads, reduced lane space and traffic obstructions in the
town centers.
The road and rail systems are strongly characterized by bridges, overpasses, containment walls and
other water regulation infrastructural works.
The access roads to the Lunigiana and Garfagnana areas may be interested by interruptions for
landslides, not only due to the earthquake, but also as a consequence of heavy rainfalls and then
floods, snow and ice caused by the seasonal winter conditions.
Listed below are the main roads and the problems that could alter the traffic conditions of the area
affected by the seismic event: see source document.
The railway system
The railway and road systems are characterized by the presence of many bridges, overpasses, containment and support infrastructures including water regulation works. The main rail stretches are
ensured by the Tyrrhenian line Genova/Rome and by the Tyrrhenian line connecting the Padana
plain (Pontremolese).
Inside the area there is also a non powered single track line connecting Lucca to Aulla. This 85 km
long stretch connects the main municipalities of Garfagnana to the city of Lucca and after passing
Piazza al Serchio, enters the Lunigiana area through the Lupacino tunnel, merging with the Pontremolese (Parma- la Spezia) rail line at Aulla .
This line classified as a secondary railway, is a single track line without electrical power. Along
the stretch there are many infrastructural works due to the local geo- morphological characteristics:
31 tunnels for a total of 18 Km including the 7 km long Lupacino gallery, about 20 bridges and
57

overpasses above 70 m., among which particularly noteworthy is the 408 m long River Serchio
bridge at Villetta San Romano as it is one of the longest bridges of the Italian railway system.
Air operations
Considering the severely critical conditions of the road network following the simulated event, operations carried out by the air fleet represent the best strategy to ensure timely rescue in the epicentral zone of the Lunigiana and Garfagnana areas, characterized by a large number of small towns
and hamlets (approx.600) and spread buildings.
This organization will guarantee access to the most impervious areas and sensibly reduce the time
factor needed to rescue and assist the population involved and ensure an immediate technicallogistic support to the local authorities.
The helicopters should take off from equipped areas, Northward in the direction of Lunigiana and
high Garfagnana, and Southward in the direction of Media Valle del Serchio.
Besides the Tassignano airport, designated as the main heliport by the DPC, other ones will also be
available as, for example, the Pisa Airport and the Viareggio heliport which in the winter period
may have some inconvenient restrictions due to their location surrounded by the Apuan Alps.
General plan of activities
At 11:00 am of November 25th, 2010 a strong earthquake strikes a wide area of the Northern
Apennine including Garfagnana and Lunigiana.
The INGV- Geophysics and Volcanology Institute- network begins to register a seismic alert identifying an earthquake of significant magnitude, whose epicenter is located in the high Garfagnana
area in Northern Tuscany.
Relief operators release the first information collected in the Sala Situazione Italia e Monitoraggio
del Territorio (National Situation and Monitoring Room - SISTEMA) of the DPC, which
represents the National Coordination Center. The above stated center, operational on a 24 hours
basis, carries out the task of monitoring and supervising the territory at all times in order to identify
any emergency situation and proceed to alert and activate the different components and operational
structures of the National Service of Civil Protection working together in emergency response operations.
In the meantime SISTEMA is answering private phone calls coming from the population involved
and from the various operational centers.
At the local level the overall relief machinery is immediately activated; the single structures ordinarily operating on the territory that are not affected by the event begin to intervene spontaneously by providing first assistance and relief to the population, communicating exclusively with
their own operational centers.
The first information released reports a very wide area interested by severe damages.
The first elaboration of the damage scenario at the DPC, with the Information System for the
Emergency Management (S.I.G.E.) based on the parameters provided by I.N.G.V. (Magnitude and
Epicenter coordinates), provides a first draft of the earthquakes effects.
In the mean time, the first local municipal operational centers are fully operational followed by the
activation of the provincial operational centers.
SOUP sends its representatives on the territory to ensure the necessary support to the activities
coordination and emergency management.
The Prefectures Government Territorial Offices (UTG) guarantee the activation of State resources
available in their own territory.
The Prime Minister, given the exceptional nature of the emergency in progress, calls for the deployment of the National operational structures needed to face the state of emergency under the
coordination of the Head of the Civil Protection Department (art.3, L. 286/02) who in turn summons the Civil Protection National Operational Committee.
58

Italy, through the Department of Civil Protection, then proceeds to inform the MIC on the event in
course.
At 12:00 am the Operational Committee is convened in a permanent meeting at the DPC, and
based on the events evolving scenario and constant flow of updated data coming from the Sala
Situazione Italia- SSI- defines the intervention strategy and ensures the coordination of the requested National resources.
At this stage the following list of priority decisions is implemented:

activation on site at the Citt del Carnevale di Viareggio, of Di.Coma.C., namely the National
emergency coordination center, in charge of implementing the Operational Committees decisions;
activation of emergency plans for the massive influx of injured people in a number of Italian
hospitals ;
immediate request to the Regions of available resources, in terms of manpower, means and
equipment to send to the areas hit by the emergency;
activation of the national volunteer organizations;
closing of the railway system in the area hit by the emergency until an assessment of the infrastructures state is provided;
activation of all available communication channels including SMS messages by the mobile
phone operators to inform the population;
access restrictions to ordinary traffic.

At the same time the National Major Risk Commission for the seismic risk sector is convened (only command post activation).
As the emergency evolves, according to decisions taken by the Operational Committee, each civil
protection component and operational structure following specific procedures and working in close
collaboration proceeds to implement the necessary emergency response operations required within
each field of competence.
Response operations by the National Civil Protection Service are carried out both by the command
posts in charge and by those operating on the field, in the full scale exercise.

59

Worst credible flood

European Civil Protection - FloodEx 2009
http://www.hkv.nl/documenten/EU_FloodEx_2009_An_analysis_of_testing_international_assistan
ce_during_BK_WEBSITE.pdf
The international exercise EU FloodEx 2009 aimed to test the recently developed procedures
concerning incoming foreign assistance in the Netherlands during a worst credible flood. For the
exercise a scenario was developed that described the development of the threat starting 6 days (D6) before the flood (D-0) up to a few days after the flood. The scenario was based on:

Worst credible flood scenario for the West coast of the Netherlands; The size and impact of the
flood in North Holland is adapted to fit to the exercise goals. Worst Credible Floods give an
upper limit of flooding scenarios that is still considered realistic and credible by experts, and
that can be used for emergency planning in addition to other less extreme scenarios. For the
exercise scenario it was decided that the worst-case flood scenario should be chosen and that it
will focus on a situation with shortage of almost all available means.
Evacuation using advanced traffic management (using the national concept of evacuation)
National emergency planning, using the National Crisis Plan for Flooding [30], National Operation Plan for Evacuation and the Guideline for Extreme Water Level and Storm Surge.

The development of the scenario used for FloodEx was based on the experiences of the flood in
1953, the Dutch exercise Waterproef and scenarios as Worst Credible Flood and Evacuation in
The Netherlands, H19 in United Kingdom and expert opinions. The scenario describes a storm
surge in the North Sea, in which the area is hit by a severe depression with extreme wind velocities, coinciding with spring tides. This combination of natural events leads to extreme high water in
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands and high tide in Germany that causes high water levels
in estuaries.
The scenario starts when meteorological and flood-forecasting experts detect the possibility for
extreme weather (and flooding). The actual weather at that time, and the forecast for the following
few days are weather as usual. Only experts are able to clarify why some conditions above the
Atlantic Ocean that might cause extreme weather in the nearby future. At this moment it is foreseen that a flooding could occur over 5 to 6 days because of the storm surge and high tide. The
probability for flooding is low, about 5%. The development and direction of the depression and the
combination with the local tide on sea is very uncertain. Flooding can only occur in very specific
conditions as extreme wind above the North Sea region with direction northwest.
In the following days the probability slowly increases to 15% at D-4. At D-1, at the start of the
storm, the probability further increased up to 40% in the Morning and 55% in the afternoon. These
are akin to a genuine scenario.

The exercise scenario postulates that the threatened area after detection (D-6) is the entire North
Sea area, which is flood prone due to a storm surge (United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, The
60

Netherlands and Belgium). The exercise also suggest that the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
may experience an impact that exceeds the flood of 1953. For the Northern part of Germany there
was a high risk of overtopping of dikes and river flooding caused by extreme seawater levels. The
development of the flood in The Netherlands after the dike breach for the first day is shown in Figure 2.
After detecting the possibility of extreme wind (by meteorological offices) and a possible flood
situation (by Flood Forecasting Centres) on D-6, the crisis centres will be alarmed. The crisis structure of local, regional and national authorities is started up. As a result, the national government
gives instructions and guidance to the regions in order to prepare evacuation planning. In addition
they a set out guidelines for decision-making and business continuity in the threatened area.
National organisations give instruction and guidance to the regional and local organisations to
make a decision about a preventive or vertical evacuation based on the consequences in the whole
affected area. At D-6 national organisations prepare themselves for possible decisions for evacuation on D-4. All partners develop an overall strategy combining national and regional planning and
assistance (within a country).
At D-4 the first decisions are made for evacuation of the most vulnerable, measures for infrastructure protection and business continuity. Decisions to evacuate those who are self-supporting are
postponed a day to wait for the development of the threat.
At D-3 the probability has not declined so the evacuation of the self-supporting is initiated. Some
people self-evacuate and leave the threatened area, whilst others prepare themselves inside their
homes or in relief centres for the public (such as community centres). National and regional traffic
management plans are implemented to facilitate the evacuation. After D-3 regional authorities start
emergency planning for possible rescue operations after a flood.
The time available for proactive or precautionary evacuation is approximately 33 hours after the
decision is made, which includes the implementation of traffic management measures for evacuation. It will not be possible for all people to evacuate ahead of the predicted floods due to the limited capacity of infrastructure. Those not evacuated (which may include local businesses) are
assumed that they will support themselves for 72 hours starting from D-1. At midnight of D-1,
overloading on the highway networks hinders the evacuation. Additionally, during D-1, extreme
wind speed makes outdoor areas too unsafe to travel through. According to the scenario, 1.4 million people succeed in evacuating the affected areas, however, there are an equal number still is in
the flood zone. These people are either in a relief centre, in their homes, or elsewhere.
The scenario continues at D+2 and takes place at the Field Exercise locations in Noord Holland.
Several parts of the west side of the Netherlands are flooded. As stated in the exercise description,
it is assumed that the Netherlands will retain control over the response and therefore the local
emergency services and the national disaster organisation are still (if partially) functioning. There
is however a shortage of operational capacities and adequate information for defining needs assessments. Because of the scale of the flood, a comprehensive assessment of the need for help has
not been carried out everywhere in the flooded zone and it is difficult to define the precise capabilities needed. However the local emergency management authority (LEMA) and International EU
Coordination Team are coordinating the deployment of incoming foreign units on D+2 together
with Dutch units at various locations in the northern part of Noord Holland (the Amstelmeer,
Groote & Kleine Vliet and the Alkmaardermeer) as shown in figure 3. During their deployment
they are required to conduct various search and rescue activities and pumping operations. Their
mission lasted for about two days according the scenario.

61

Influenza Pandemic (Germany)

Germany, Interstate Crisis Management Exercises: Lkex 2007
http://www.katpharm.de/pdf.php?id=1248&lang=de&name=Kapitel%2013:%20L%C3%9CKEX
%202007%20Influenza-Pandemie and
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/BevoelkerungKrisen/luek
ex_2007.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Grundlegende bungsannahme war eine Influenza-Pandemie, in der ein mittelschweres Pandemieszenario gewhlt wurde, um die weit reichenden gesamtgesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen (im Wesentlichen: Gesundheitswesen, Versorgung und Transport, ffentliche Sicherheit, Banken) darzustellen und ein bereichs- und lnderbergreifendes Krisenmanagement zu beben.
Fr die bung wurde ein knstliches Influenza-Virus H7N2 dargestellt, das real nicht existieren
wird. Eine Influenza-Pandemie wird wie in der Vergangenheit mehrfach den Erdkreis umrunden,
bis sie erlischt. In einem fiktiven Land in Sdost-Asien werden Anfang September 2007 vermehrt
Hufungen von Influenza-hnlichen Erkrankungen gemeldet. Die WHO Task Force Influenza tritt
aktuell zusammen, um die Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich einer mglichen Hherstufung der Pandemiephase zu bewerten. Am 4. September 2007 wird bekannt gegeben, dass nach Einschtzung der
WHO Task Force Influenza die Entwicklung der Ereignisse einen Eintritt in die PandemieWarnphase 5 belegen.
Die bungsstruktur weist eine dreiteilige Gliederung auf: Der 1. bungstag wurde in Form von
Planbesprechungen (Coaching) der bungsleitung mit den benden Stben (Bund/Lnder) in den
Wochen vor dem 2. bungstag realisiert. Der 2. und 3. bungstag stellten die eigentliche Stabsrahmenbung dar, die an zwei aufeinander folgenden Tagen durchgefhrt wurde.
1. bungstag: Szenario am 7. September 2007
WHO Pandemie-Phase 5
Die Ausbreitung des Virus ist noch regional begrenzt, aber die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Pandemie
ist sehr hoch. Maximierte Bemhungen sollen eine Pandemie mglichst verhindern bzw. weitere
vorbereitende Manahmen ermglichen. Bund und Lnder stimmen in Konsultation mit der EU die
Manahmen fr die Seuchenbekmpfung ab.
Bei dem gewhlten mittelschweren Pandemieszenario standen somit am ersten bungstag die akute Krisenbewltigung und die Verfgbarkeit der hierfr erforderlichen personellen und materiellen
Ressourcen im Mittelpunkt.
2. bungstag: Szenario am 7. November 2007
WHO Pandemie-Phase 6
Die 1. Pandemiewelle hat Europa und Deutschland erreicht; das bungsszenario spielt 1 Woche
vor dem Hhepunkt der 1. Influenza-Welle. Es kommt zu einer krisenhaften Entwicklung der Gesundheitslage mit totaler Aus- und berlastung des ffentlichen und privaten Gesundheitswesens
sowie mit gravierenden Auswirkungen in Schlsselbereichen des gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Lebens (z.B. Versorgung/Verkehr etc.). Das Krisenmanagement ist jetzt auch auf strategischer Ebene gefordert, und eine lnderbergreifende Koordination wird erforderlich.
Am zweiten bungstag (am Ende der ersten Pandemiewelle) lag der Fokus auf der Bewltigung
der Folgen der ersten und den Vorbereitungen auf die zu erwartende zweite Influenzapandemiewelle.
3. bungstag: Szenario am 7. Februar 2008
Intervallphase in der WHO Phase 6
Die 1. Pandemiewelle ist abgeklungen; es gibt ca. 2 Monate nach der 1. Welle allgemein keine
oder nur noch sporadische Neuerkrankungen. Erste Manahmen dienen der Wiederherstellung des
normalen gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Die Erfahrungen aus der 1. Pandemiewelle werden ausgewer62

tet, Vorbereitungen fr die 2. epidemische Welle laufen an, und ein erstes Kontingent an InfluenzaPandemieimpfstoff ist produziert.
Eine 2. Pandemiewelle hat Asien erfasst und breitet sich nach Westen aus. Deshalb sind zustzliche Prventionsmanahmen zu koordinieren, eine enge internationale Zusammenarbeit ist weiterhin anzustreben.
Dominierend waren hier die Diskussionen ber die Verteilung der verfgbar werdenden Impfstoffdosen mit der sich hierbei stellende Fragen der Priorisierung und die erste Analyse der Auswirkungen der ersten Welle.
Entsprechend den Modellrechnungen im nationalen Pandemieplan fr ein mittelschweres Pandemieszenario wurde von einer Gesamterkrankungshufigkeit von 30% der Bevlkerung whrend
der ersten Pandemiewelle in einem Zeitraum von 8 Wochen ausgegangen, d.h. von insgesamt ca.
27.000.000 Erkrankten in Deutschland. In der bung wurde mit zustzlich 13 Millionen Arztbesuchen, 307.000 stationren Patienten und 102.000 Todesfllen in diesem Zeitraum gerechnet.

63

Influenza Pandemic (Canada)

Emergency Management Ontario and Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care
Exercise Influenza Pandemic 2006, February 2006
http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/providers/program/pubhealth/oph_standards/ophs/progstds/ph
ep/req8/req84.pdf
Part A: Pandemic Begins Outside of Canada (October to December 2005)
In October of 2005, an outbreak of unusually severe respiratory illness is identified in a small village in Java, Indonesia. At least 25 cases have occurred, affecting all age groups; 20 patients required hospitalization, 5 of whom have died to date. Surveillance in the surrounding areas is increased and new cases begin to be identified throughout the area. In a matter of days, a number of
cases with the same symptoms seem to appear out of nowhere in other villages in the neighbouring
island of Sumatra. All of these cases have been admitted to the designated infectious diseases hospital in the capital city of Jakarta. Nearly a full week later, health officials in Indonesia are scrambling to deal with nearly 50 suspect cases in total. Approximately 20 of these cases have died so far
and a further 40 cases have been kept under close observation. Viral cultures collected from several of the initial patients are positive for type A influenza. The isolates are sent to the World
Health Organization (WHO) Reference Laboratory in Hong Kong for further characterization. The
WHO determines that the isolates are type A H7N1, a subtype never before isolated from humans.
This information is immediately transmitted back to the Ministry of Health in Indonesia and
throughout the WHO network. The WHO, in collaboration with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, dispatches a team of epidemiologists and laboratory personnel to further
evaluate the outbreak. However, it is currently unclear as to whether the suspect cases have had
any contact with infected poultry in their respective areas. Previous outbreaks of avian influenza in
the country were declared over months ago and no new outbreaks were thought to exist in the region since.
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) advises all provincial health ministries to be on the
alert for patients with severe respiratory illness and a history of travel to Indonesia. The outbreak
caused by the novel influenza virus begins to make headlines in every major newspaper and becomes the lead story on major news networks. Key government officials are briefed on a daily basis as surveillance is intensified throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim. The WHO announces that the evidence accumulated from their initial investigation leads them to conclude that
they may be facing a virus that is capable of efficient human-to-human transmission that is localized within Indonesia at this time. The WHO declares that the world is now at Pandemic Level 4.
By mid-December, human cases of H7N1 have been reported in Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea, and Japan. Although cases are reported in all age groups, young adults appear to be the
most severely affected, and fatality rates approach 50% of infected cases. The WHO elevates the
worlds pandemic preparedness level to 5. Numerous countries around the world place themselves
on high alert. PHAC obtains isolates of the H7N1 virus so that work can begin to produce a reference strain for vaccine production. Influenza vaccine manufacturers are placed on alert. Public unease grows because vaccine is not yet available and antiviral supplies are severely limited.
Part B: Pandemic in Ontario - First Wave (March to June 2006)
By mid-January 2006, human cases are identified in Canada and the United States. The H7N1 virus is isolated from ill airline passengers arriving from Hong Kong in Toronto, Ottawa, Vancouver,
Los Angeles, Honolulu, Chicago, and New York. Provincial and local agencies are asked to intensify influenza surveillance. At a press conference at the WHO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, the WHO Director-General declares that the world is indeed facing another pandemic strain
and elevates the worlds Pandemic Level to 6.
At the beginning of March, local outbreaks are being reported in major cities throughout Canada.
In Ontario, the impact has begun to be felt in earnest as evidenced by a noticeable increase in the
number of persons presenting to family doctors and hospital emergency departments with symp64

toms consistent with influenza and in the number of people calling in sick to work. Several communities have declared emergencies in response to these events. Rates of absenteeism in schools,
hospitals, government offices and businesses are beginning to rise. Similarly, personnel in key positions in health care, law enforcement and other emergency management personnel are absent presumably due to illness or caring for ill family members or fear. The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre and most Ministry Emergency Operations Centres, including the MOHLTC Emergency Operations Centre are fully activated. A provincial emergency has also been declared by the
Premier based on the recommendation of the Chief Medical Officer of Health and the Commissioner of Emergency Management.
Phones at physician offices and the MOHLTC Telehealth hotline have been ringing constantly.
More people are seeking medical care than actually need it. The pressure is increased as a number
of physicians have simply closed their offices and have directed their patients to go to the nearest
emergency department if there is an emergency. Given the coverage of avian influenza by the media over the last year, the public is not sure whether this new influenza pandemic is the same as
avian influenza. Efforts to clarify that the two are NOT the same have not been terribly successful.
Because of this, numerous questions are arising. The media is speculating as to whether outbreaks
of bird flu would soon materialize within domestic poultry farms in the province and whether protective actions would be adopted by other countries leading to negative impacts on the provinces
economy. They are also showing footage of concerned citizens who are unsure whether they
should continue to consume poultry. Media have also questioned whether migratory birds within
Ontario could carry the H7N1 virus and whether this may extend the duration of this pandemic.
Local authorities are worried that the government may order the closure of provincial parks and
other tourist attractions such as zoos if such cases were discovered and its resulting effects on tourism. Owners of golf courses throughout the province have voiced their fears that the government
will come and shut them down as they enter the summer months on the basis that large numbers of
migratory birds tend to flock to their landscaped properties. A number of sport hunters have suggested during interviews that increased hunting activity might assist in managing an outbreak in
the migratory bird population and therefore help to curtail the human pandemic.
Citizens are calling physicians and pharmacists looking for a vaccine, but they are being told that it
will still be another two to four months until the new vaccine is available. The news media are reporting that even when the new vaccine does become available, the vaccine will be distributed according to priority groups that have been identified within the influenza pandemic plans of
PHAC and the MOHLTC as there wont be enough available at the start for all Ontarians. In the
meantime (until the vaccine does become available), antiviral medications such as Tamiflu would
have to be distributed from government stockpiles also according to priority groups. Angry and
upset citizens are making numerous phone calls to elected provincial and municipal officials voicing their frustration and lack of understanding about why life-saving medication is being targeted
only for certain personnel and will not be distributed to the general public. They tell authorities that
they are watching loved ones die because they cannot get access to any medication, yet they believe government officials will be getting their medication first. Numerous class action lawsuits
have been started.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have notified government officials that unless their workers are
placed on the priority list, their production lines will grind to a halt as the workers book off sick.
This could mean that important medications for heart problems, hypertension, diabetes, organ
transplants, cancer treatments and many more types of medication will cease to be manufactured
causing more people to become ill, hospitalized and perhaps die. The pharmaceutical companies
advise they are not issuing a threat, but insist that they are only highlighting a concern that was
raised previously with the government. Other drugs that are imported from off-shore are being delayed at border crossings.
There is growing anxiety among healthcare workers in the province. The government has recommended that they utilize surgical masks when responding to patients who present with an influenza-like illness (ILI). However, many of the same individuals recall their experience with SARS
just a few years prior in which N95 respirators were recommended. Physicians and nurses, with the
65

support of some members of the microbiology and infection control community, are demanding
that their various employers provide them with N95 respirators that will provide them with additional protection against the pandemic strain. These requests are being relayed straight to the province. Correctional officers warn that they will walk off the job of N95 respirators are not provided
to them.
Anecdotal information suggests that people are flooding physician offices looking for prescriptions
for antivirals to protect themselves and their families. A number of media organizations are running stories on the issue of access to antivirals. They report on several large corporations that have
been stockpiling antivirals for months in an effort to keep their business fully operational during
the influenza pandemic. Yet, they also highlight communities in remote areas of the province, such
as First Nations communities, for which access to antivirals and other medical supplies presents
more of a challenge. One Chief in particular states during an interview that his people are extremely concerned that they may be forgotten by the government, which, he adds, has an obligation
to protect citizens in these remote communities. He does not know how First Nations will be included in the governments response to the pandemic. However, he states that either the government should consider flying in stockpiles of antivirals and medical supplies to these communities
along with trained health professionals to help administer them or fly the people out to places in
which they can receive the care they need and deserve. In his final comment, he states that he does
not care whether this help comes from the federal or provincial government, but that he will support whoever comes forward first.
In other news stories, it was reported that individuals are now able to purchase Tamiflu over the
internet via online pharmaceutical companies that have been set up both in Canada and overseas.
The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Cares INFOLine has also received a number of calls over
this same issue. A small number of concerned citizens have turned their purchased product over to
local authorities and initial tests have shown the drug to be a fake containing mainly Vitamin C.
The public is calling for a crackdown on these online operations.
During this initial pandemic period, the province has been focused on maintaining the continuity of
critical operations. But in doing so, it has diverted its attention away from a few less-critical areas,
which have also attempted to maintain business-as-usual. However, these services have come to
light during recent attempts at good news announcements by some ministries. While these small
pockets of new spending were designed to lift spirits during the crisis, these efforts seem to have
backfired with the public and the media. They accuse the government of being unresponsive to the
pandemic by announcing initiatives that are unrelated to the emergency. They also question
whether the government truly needs to sustain some of these lower-priority services during the
pandemic and whether simply directing resources towards the emergency response for the interim
period could save costs, and ultimately the lives of many Ontarians who will eventually become
sick from the virus.
By June 2006, the number of influenza cases begins to overwhelm the province. Surveillance estimates indicate that overall 20% of the population is ill with H7N1 influenza with higher percentages in urban areas and pockets of rural Ontario. Workplace absenteeism data from employers indicates that the current workforce is understaffed by approximately 30% to 40% on average, depending on the job type and geographic location. The main reasons cited are illness, caring for
family members, and fear (not only for their own health and safety, but also for the health and
safety of close family members). Specific work areas are reporting significantly higher absentee
rates than the average:

Healthcare (physicians, nurses, dentists)

First Responders (police, EMS, fire)
Teachers
Front line government workers (OHIP offices, driver licensing offices, food and water inspection, workplace inspection, conservation officers, Fire Rangers, etc.)
Staff in critical infrastructure areas such as hydro, gas, water, phone, cable, etc.

66

This is resulting in significant cutbacks to services, which, in turn, is causing more problems in
other areas. Several provincial ministries are also experiencing considerable challenges with respect to service delivery:

Construction companies have advised the Ministry of Transportation that several scheduled
road projects will not be completed this year because they have had to consolidate their crews
to account for fewer personnel.
The Ministry of Energy has been contacted by Ontario Power Generation. They report that the
Pickering Nuclear Generating Station is at a critical staffing stage and has requested advice
from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
The Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities have been contacted by numerous parents
wanting to know what can be done about their children in university residences. Some universities have closed down and have sent residence students home. However, others are waiting,
claiming that they are awaiting direction from either the ministry or from public health officials.
The courts are being inundated with lawsuits related to the pandemic, while numbers of
healthy judges, clerks, attorneys, etc. who are able to work decline to do so.
Front-line employees that collect taxes for the Ministry of Finance are unable or are refusing to
work causing concern that if tax collection is allowed to slow for too long, there will be severe
financial implications for the province.
The public is calling on the government to provide emergency compensation to individuals
that are unable to work and to business that are unable to remain afloat during this period.
Gaming sites within the province are reporting that people are disregarding advice to stay
home if they are sick and are arriving in large numbers at the doors of casinos and racetrack
facilities. The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO) and the Ontario Lottery
and Gaming Corporation (OLGC) are concerned that if people are allowed into these sites,
they could infect staff and other people, thereby prolonging the pandemic. Yet, if they refuse
these people entry, they will effectively reduce their profits and a significant source of income
for the provincial budget.
After years of sustained pressure by the LCBO to remove illegally imported liquor/medicinal
products from the shelves of ethnic grocery stores, these stores are now seeing a sharp increase
in sales of these products as people attempt to stock up in the hope that these products will help
them to combat the influenza virus. Health Canada has issued warnings in the past about the
contents of these products for individuals with pre- existing medical conditions.
The Chief Coroners Office is being requested to help investigate eight suspicious deaths in the
GTA over the past week that may be related to the use of the above products. Questions have
been raised as to whether sufficient morgue capacity exists at a period of high demand and
fewer trained staff.
There is unrest in the correctional system, not only from the inmates, but from correctional
officers as well. The inmates are protesting the lack of medication available to them and that
once an inmate displays flu-like symptoms, the facility is locked-down. Inmates are then confined to their cells until the facility has been clear of influenza for at least 5 days. Inmates are
also upset that visits have been suspended and that they may not see their loved ones for
months. On the other side, correctional officers are protesting the lack of PPE (personal protective equipment) that is available to them. The correctional officers and OPSEU are demanding
more than just the surgical masks that are currently recommended. They are requesting N95
respirators, disposable gowns and better disinfectant.
Another group that is requesting PPE from the province is teachers. Several elementary and
secondary teachers unions are inquiring as to whether the government has a stockpile of PPE
that they can access or whether there are plans to procure PPE for their members. Otherwise,
they would like to know what the process is for them to procure the appropriate PPE for themselves. They are also unsure as to what PPE would be appropriate for their members. They fear
that the masks would be uncomfortable to wear and would impede their interaction with students. Yet, they fear that, if they dont wear masks, they may become infected.

67

School boards across the province are reporting that a large number of parents are still sending
their children to school sick with colds and flu-like symptoms. Parents say that they are caught
in the middle, as they are unable to find suitable daycare spots. Many daycares have closed
down for the duration of the pandemic while others are operating at full capacity but with reduced staff. There are reports that some daycare centres are caring for up to 75 children with
only two or three staff members. Parents say they cant take time off of work as their employers are refusing their requests to stay at home and look after their family members.
The Ombudsman has received several complaints that have been filed by French- speaking
individuals in various communities across the province. They are angry that a number of organizations, including the government, public health units and healthcare providers are issuing
emergency information messages solely in English.
Funeral homes are overwhelmed by the numbers of dead and are unable to keep up with the
need for services. This is causing further stress for grieving families as they are being told that
their funeral service will be delayed indefinitely due to increased demand and a lack of supplies. This is causing problems for various communities, which have strict religious practices
that need to occur within certain timeframes. Funeral homes report long delays in issuing death
certificates. In some cases, this delay is hindering families in repatriating remains to their
homeland.
Many individuals (particularly those with chronic medical conditions) are afraid to venture out
for fear of becoming seriously ill. The majority of them are staying home while essential supplies such as food are being depleted. Grocery stores warn that the public will suffer food
shortages due to the impact of fewer truckers needed to deliver those supplies and the drop in
food production. Numerous other industries that rely on the transportation sector and other delivery services such as couriers are asking the province to step in and coordinate this sector so
that trucks can get back on the road. Public transit services, including TTC and GO Transit are
grinding to a halt due to fewer staff and low ridership. These developments are contributing to
an overall slowdown of the economy.

Part C: Pandemic in Ontario - Inter-wave Period (July 2006)

It is now the beginning of July 2006, and health officials are starting to see the first noticeable drop
in the number of influenza cases in Ontario according to the most recent surveillance. This could
signify that the province has reached the tail end of the first wave. If this is indeed the case, there
will be a brief opportunity for the province to recuperate and reorganize in anticipation of a second
wave of influenza cases.
News of this development has traveled fast, but has seemingly had no effect on the general public.
The workforce absentee estimates remain relatively unchanged as the public remains unsure as to
whether it is safe to report back to work. However, the need for families to maintain a stable income is expected to drive some individuals back to their jobs. Anecdotal evidence indicates that
some employers are contemplating a move to proactively cancel the temporary leave given to some
employees and recall them to work in an effort to make up for lost productivity and revenues during the first wave. The Ministry of Labour, in particular, is receiving numerous calls on this very
topic given that many of these individuals have opted to take Ontarios Family Medical Leave program. These callers fear that the government will eventually cancel this program if a second wave
occurs. It is clear that the government must take a position on the employers course of action
soon. Further complicating this move to return to work is the slowdown in public transit. If individuals choose to comply with their employers but continue to avoid public transit, it is likely that
traffic management will become a major issue during the inter-wave period.
As the case count begins to subside, thoughts turn to the upcoming school year, which is now less
than a month away. A number of school boards as well as several colleges and universities are requesting the governments advice with respect to the resumption of classes amid competing requests from teachers unions for the contrary. The unions recognize that a second wave may be inevitable and they do not want to increase the risk of infection to teachers regardless of whether the
virus is in decline at this point in time.

68

Ontarians are also expecting to learn of the governments strategy with respect to service restoration. Specifically, they are hoping the government will provide them with a sense of how services
will be brought online again and a timeline in which this restoration will occur. The public is interested in particular services such as drivers licences, marriage licenses and birth certificates so that
they might take advantage of these services during the inter-wave period no matter how brief it is
expected to be. However, there is pressure on the province to reinstate other services as well. Calls
have been made to the Ministry of Environment requesting the inspection of dozens of companies
that have allegedly relaxed or ignored the pollution controls on their factories or plants during the
pandemic because of the decreased workforce. It is unclear whether the ministry can commit to
this level of inspection given the significantly fewer inspectors that have reported to work.
Public and private organizations and individual families alike are attempting to re-supply in anticipation of the second wave. However, suppliers everywhere are experiencing difficulties in meeting
the demand. Grocery stores, as mentioned previously, have been hit particularly hard by the first
wave and products are leaving the shelves faster than they can be restocked. In other cases, suppliers are too busy trying to meet the demand for governments and businesses outside of Ontario that
are still overwhelmed by the H7N1 virus. This is particularly the case for Personal Protective
Equipment and other medical supplies. Suppliers have informed the province that any new demands for PPE cannot be met as their current production is being directed towards jurisdictions in
more urgent need, whereas the situation in Ontario in improving. Meanwhile, a number of sectors
such as energy and agriculture are approaching the government to discuss a coordinated re-supply
effort within the province to ensure that their needs will be met for the second wave. Some sectors
have even reported that suppliers and other local businesses have begun to engage in price-gouging
tactics, which is hampering the efforts of many organizations to mobilize new supplies.
Several communities are also attempting to reorganize themselves and have begun to apply pressure on the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing for additional financial support through the
Ontario Disaster Relief Assistance Program (ODRAP). They see this support as critical to their resupply effort and their ability to save lives during a second wave. Unlike a flood or a tornado, the
damage assessment from an influenza pandemic is not easily calculated. Several northern communities have also contacted the Ministry of Northern Development and Mines to request any assistance it can provide.
The reports of price-gouging and requests for disaster relief have stimulated discussion over the
economic and financial impact of the pandemic thus far and whether the government has the ability
to weather a second wave much less support the fallout from the first wave. Banking institutions
also report that they are being overwhelmed by the droves of individuals and businesses that are
demanding to know the status of their accounts and whether their investments are safe. Their customers are also seeking to withdraw and/or borrow vast amounts of money to keep them afloat and
to have some additional purchasing power on hand in case of a second wave.
Though the number of cases continues to drop, the virus is still very active in parts of Ontario. A
number of key senior political and OPS officials have become ill:

Premier (ill at home)

Citizenship and Immigration (Minister hospitalized with influenza)
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (3 Community Officers hospitalized
within respective assigned communities)
Economic Development and Trade (2 Assistant Deputy Ministers ill at home)
Ministry of Finance (Minister/Chair of Management Board ill at home)
Ministry of Government Services (Minister ill at home)
Intergovernmental Affairs (Deputy Minister ill at home)
Ministry of Natural Resources (Ministry Emergency Management Coordinator hospitalized
with influenza)
Northern Development and Mines (Minister and Deputy Minister ill at home)
Public Infrastructure Renewal (Deputy Minister ill at home)
Training, Colleges and Universities (2 Assistant Deputy Ministers ill at home)
69

The public has become aware of some of these illnesses, particularly that of the Premier and several cabinet ministers. On behalf of their constituents, many opposition MPPs are beginning to ask
how decisions will continue to be made and how the government will continue to function for the
duration of this emergency.
However, the province has finally received some good news. The Ministry of Health and LongTerm Care has been advised that the first shipments of the H7N1 vaccine are scheduled to arrive
within the next couple of weeks. Once it arrives, the vaccine will be distributed (similarly to the
antivirals) to health-care workers and first responders of the most affected communities according
to the aforementioned priority groups. However, local authorities fear that there may be a general
breakdown of public order at dispensing sites throughout the mass vaccination process. Initial requests are sent to the PEOC as to whether additional security could be obtained through the province to help protect vaccine supplies in transit, at their destinations as well as to keep healthcare
workers safe at the dispensing sites. Shortly thereafter, these requests are rescinded as these communities opt instead to seek additional support directly from the military through their local reserve
Community Contingency Planning and Liaison Officers (CCPLOs). The rationale for this move is
the quick response that the army is able to offer as well as the visual aspect of military personnel
on the ground, which is expected to avoid issues of public order before they begin.
The media has been following the story on vaccine development very closely. More importantly,
they have started running special reports that are meant to highlight a new movement that has been
slowly building momentum during the first wave. On the same day that the vaccine was publicly
declared ready, a number of faith-based groups stated during press interviews that they will not be
seeking vaccination for religious reasons and that they would be encouraging followers of their
faith to do the same.
Meanwhile, the Province of Manitoba, still in the throes of its first wave, has become increasingly
overwhelmed by the influenza cases among its citizens and the resultant difficulties in business
continuity and public order. The provincial government has reached out to Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness Canada as well as emergency management organizations in the
neighbouring provinces of Saskatchewan and Ontario to request support. In particular, they require
any assistance in terms of additional healthcare capacity and human resources. They are also aware
that the delivery of vaccine within the country is imminent and are therefore requesting whether
Ontario is able to spare any remaining stocks of Tamiflu in order to help save additional lives in
Manitoba while they still struggle to weather their first wave.

70

Forest fires requiring international assistance

European Civil Protection Forest Fire Exercise 2004
http://www.fire.uni-freiburg.de/emergency/EU-Fire-Exercise-2004.pdf
Several forest fires started in the forest solid clumps in the south of France. After a change of wind
orientation and very unfavourable reinforced weather conditions, fires progress very quickly and
threaten the urban zones. Taking into account the nature of these fires and major risks of evolution,
the Brussels Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) is immediately aware of the situation. The
MIC inform the European Union member states, with a first request for setting in pre alert the Italian and Spanish air means.
The security teams and the air means are engaged on these fires which have already covered about
10 000 hectares of pine forests, while occurs simultaneously several significant fire departures in
the Bouche-du-Rhne department. It becomes imperative to backup the fight device by calling the
member states air and terrestrial means. The French government, through the ministry of Interior,
interior security and local liberties (Direction of Defense and Civil Security, COGIC) requests the
implementation of the civil protection European mechanism.
Monday April 19, - 08:30 a.m., fire departures are noticed on the territory of Gmenos commune.
Very quickly the situation becomes alarming and requires significant additional means.
Monday April 19 11:00 a.m., Gmenos fires are getting worst. In spite of the engaged means, fire
could only be contained, but not be stopped. Protection of sensible points is carried out. The security operations commander (COS) decided to stop its progression at the level of La Petite Sainte
Baume. At the same time fire departures take place in the Sainte Victoire Mountain and in Trets
commune. The general situation is alarming and mobilizes many terrestrial and air fight means, in
particular on the Sainte Victoire, at Gmenos and Trets. It is decided to engage the available European backup set up by the Brussels Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC).
Monday April 19, 02:00 p.m., the attempt to stop the fire failed and its progression increases, many
sensible points and urban zone need protection. A new action will be tried around 05:00 p.m. with
the support of the whole air means.
Tuesday April 20, 08:30 a.m., In spite of the efforts provided the situation became worst during the
night and the fire still progressed. The situation requires important terrestrial, air and helicopter
fighting means. A new support line will be set up in the south of the fire, to try to definitively stop
it. The European terrestrial teams will be simultaneously engaged with the French teams and the
air means will participate in the norias.

71

Thunderstorms, drought and big fires, causing accidents and chemical spills
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC): Exercise "Taming the Dragon Dalmatia 2002"
http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/tdragon/exercice2002.htm
Lead-in scenario and Startex situation
In the early hours of 19 May 2002, sudden thunderstorms without rain but with strong southeast
winds set the vegetation ablaze in various locations between the cities of Makarska and Baka Voda, north of the Adriatic highway.
Due to long periods of drought, the fires - carried by the strong wind and facilitated by the vegetation and terrain characteristics - spread very rapidly towards Baka Voda with the risk of merging
into one big fire. Most of the fires move towards Baka Voda and the villages located at the foot of
the Biokovo Mountain, producing a minor fire front towards Makarska. After six hours, the wind
direction changes and a strong northwestern wind starts to blow, carrying the fires towards Makarska, the villages on the steep slopes of Biokovo, the Adriatic highway and the sea.
The villages that are immediately endangered by the fire are Andrijaevici (on the northern side of
the Adriatic highway), Promajna (on the coast), "Djecje selo" (a holiday and health resort), Bako
Polje (a campsite and holiday resort), as well as a few villages on the Biokovo slopes. After the
change of the wind direction, the villages of Turnici, Gojaci, Puharici, Batinici, Sv. Ivan, Makar,
Mlinice, north of Makarska, are endangered.
The high-voltage power transmission lines have to be disconnected leaving the whole area without
power supply. In addition, the water supply for a large part of the region is interrupted. The population in the affected area, including the Baka Voda municipality and the city of Makarska, is
15,900 people. The Baka Voda holiday resort accommodates 250 guests, while twenty-nine families (112 persons) are also staying in the campsite.
The fires cross the Adriatic Highway and pose an immediate threat to the inhabitants of
Andrijaevici and Promajna, as well as to the guests of the hotels in Krvavice holiday resort, the
Bako Polje campsite and the patients of the "Djecje selo" health resort. They have to be evacuated
by sea with the assistance of the Croatian Navy. The Civil Protection Service of the Police Administration of Split-Dalmatia, in cooperation with the Social Care Centre and the Red Cross, have
temporarily provided accomodation for these people in hotels in Baka Voda.
The traffic on the Adriatic highway is interrupted at the village of Andrijaevici; from the south, it
is redirected from Brela via estanovci, to Imotski; and from the north, it is also redirected to Imotski from Makarska. Local traffic from the northern entrance into Makarska to Baka Voda is also
interrupted. In addition to the forest, the dense underbrush and agricultural areas near the villages
are now on fire. There are many vineyards, olive-groves, fig-orchards and horticultural plants in
the gardens near the villages that catch fire making fire fighting more difficult.
Immediately after the outbreak of the fires, the voluntary fire-fighting brigades from the Makarska
Riviera start operating. However, as the fire continues to spread the Public Fire Brigade of Split
and other voluntary fire brigades from Split-Dalmatia County join in to help. The Fire-fighting Air
Force and the Fire-fighting Intervention Force of the Ministry of Interior accompany them.
As a consequence of the long drought, a large number of wild fires are ablaze in the coastal area of
Istra, ibnik-Knin, Split-Dalmatia and Dubrovnik-Neretva. This necessitates deploying all existing
national fire-fighting capabilities, consequently the Republic of Croatia requests international assistance. A request is sent to neighbouring states, especially to those that have signed bilateral
agreements on cooperation in protection and rescue; member states of the SEECMEP and to
NATO/PfP countries through the EADRCC. The requirements for assistance are land and air firefighting forces, mountain rescue, search and rescue, water rescue, equipment for the provision of
drinkable water, and first aid equipment.
The Ministry of Health uses the capabilities of the Split Clinical Hospital (Firule) to organize two
mobile medical teams and to establish a field hospital near Bako Polje. The mobile teams are used
72

for triage and first aid to possible casualties from the area between Brela and Ploce. Other medical
institutions are in a state of preparedness, for a large number of casualties that might occur among
fire fighters and inhabitants of the coastal area.
On 19 May 2002, the fire in the area of Bako Polje is partially under control and the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) requests that specialised units of the Croatian Army participate in the fire fighting. In some areas the fire has crossed the fire-fighting line and it is necessary
to introduce additional forces and to replace those that had already been deployed. Fire-fighters
from other parts of the country and members of the intervention fire-fighting units of the Civil Defence are engaged for that purpose.
At the morning of 20 May 2002, the fire in the area of Bako Polje is not under control and is approaching the outskirts of populated villages. During 21 May 2002, international teams arrive and
the LEMA takes stock of national and international resources available for intervention.
EXERCISE SCENARIO
During 21 May 2002, the major task of the national forces is to get the fire near Brela under control. At the same time, the action plan for the use of international teams in being prepared by the
LEMA. In addition, with the assistance of the Liaison Officers from the teams participating in the
EADRU, the capabilities for intervention and the equipment of individual national teams are assessed. Also communication matters and the deployment of teams are organised. In the early morning of 22 May 2002, the international fire-fighting and rescue teams are ready to be activated.
During the night of 21 to 22 May 2002, the situation near Cista Velika becomes worse and the local fire-fighting forces assisted by the fire-fighting units of the Police Administration SplitDalmatia can no longer cope with the situation. The assistance of the EADRU is requested. On 22
May 2002 at 09.00, international teams are sent from their campsite in Bako Polje to the fire site
north of Cista Velika, to carry out the requested tasks. Around 14.30, the fires are under control,
and as of 15.30, the control over the burnt area is taken over by the Croatian forces, the international forces return to their base.
At the same time, the international teams are engaged in three other activities:

A mountain rescue team is in the area of Promajna searching for tourists.

A Search and Rescue Team is searching for a group of people, allegedly trapped under a
landslide near Podpec (along the road from Makarska to Vrgorac).
A water rescue team is searching for a group of tourists from a yacht, which turned over near
Bako Polje.

In the morning of 23 May 2002, the situation is getting worse along the road from Makarska to
Vrgorac and at 08.00, national elements of the EADRU are deployed to fire-sites in Podpec and
oici. The fires are completely extinguished at 13.00. Also on 23 May 2002, North of Bako Polje
a house, which was on fire a week earlier, collapses. According to the reports the owner and two
construction workers were present and are trapped under the debris. Search and rescue teams of the
EADRU are sent to the site.
The mountain rescue team continues the rescue of the three mountaineers trapped on a rock in the
Biokovo Mountain. Near Baka Voda, a sailing boat and a jet boat collide, and two persons are
reported missing. EADRU water rescue teams are sent to the site to start a search operation.
During the night of 23 to 24 May 2002, fires start again on the fringes of the fire sites; all firefighting lines are crossed and around 10.30 the fire suddenly comes closer to Bako Polje campsite,
where the national elements of the EADRU are staying. All available fire-fighting forces are deployed to the campsite.
At around 11.30, in a long queue of vehicles, on the Adriatic Highway between Baka Voda and
Bratu, a collision between a bus and a truck occurs. The truck is loaded with twenty containers
each carrying 50 kg of liquefied chlorine. The truck turns over and a number fall out. The valve of
one of the containers is broken and chlorine is leaking out. In addition, gasoline leaks from the

73

truck's fuel tank, but so far no fire has started. During the collision one driver and twenty-five bus
passengers are slightly injured, and ten passengers seriously injured.
Persons injured by the collision as well as those assisting them (drivers and other persons on the
scene of the accident) are seriously contaminated by the chlorine spill. It is impossible to get closer
than 50 meters to the place of the accident without protective clothing. The voluntary fire fighters
from Makarska, who were engaged in fire-fighting some 150 meters from the accident, intervene,
but have to withdraw because of the chlorine vapours. The Commander of the voluntary fire fighters requests assistance from the LEMA.
The LEMA urgently sends the Fire-fighting Intervention Unit of the Ministry of Interior and the
Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) team of the Croatian Army, who are based in the Bako Polje
campsite. These forces are able to bring the injured persons out of the danger zone, to decontaminate them and provide first aid to the victims. They also decontaminate the terrain and remove the
remaining containers in order to prevent further accidents.
One of the fires is spreading towards the Biokovo slopes, a group of trackers from the Krst area
(756 m) above the village of Baovici cannot get down. This is their fourth day there and without
food and water supplies. It is necessary to organise their rescue by air. EADRU teams arrive using
the nearest available roads circumventing the chemical vapour and join in the fire-fighting on
Baka Voda-Promajna line. The fire front now is approximately 2,5 km wide and keeps on getting
closer to houses and the camp.
Scenario materials also include fictional situation reports and other documents.

74

Major accident scenarios

Train accident with release of dangerous chemical substances
European Civil Protection: Euratech 2005
http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/sections/a_la_une/toute_l_actualite/archives-actualites/archivessecurite-civile/euratech2005/downloadFile/attachedFile/maquette_do_press_17_03_05.pdf?nocache=1140081174.87
EURATECH 2005 est un exercice grandeur nature mettant en scne un accident technologique
majeur avec des composantes incendie et chimique, dveloppement et propagation dun nuage de
gaz toxique et mise labri des populations appliqu aux consquences dun accident majeur comparable celui dans un complexe industriel ptrochimique.
Cet exercice chimique se droule la gare de triage de Portes-ls-Valence, dans le dpartement de
la Drme. Le caractre technologique de lvnement est gnr par un accident ferroviaire impliquant un train de matires dangereuses ainsi quun train de voyageurs.
Le 12 avril 2005, vers 08H30, un convoi en provenance de Lavera (Bouches du Rhne) draille
lapproche de laiguillage de la gare de triage de Portes-ls-Valence. Il est compos de wagons citernes contenant des carburants liquides et liqufis, des gaz liqufis toxiques et de wagons plateau transportant des fts et colis de matires dangereuses.
Laccident a lieu proximit dhabitations et de la ligne de chemin de fer Paris-Lyon- Marseille.
Le draillement provoque le dversement de carburant liquide senflammant instantanment. La
chaleur mise entrane linflammation de gaz liqufis sous forme de chalumeau au niveau des
soupapes des wagons citernes. Un de ces wagons explose par BLEVE ( Boiling Liquid Expanding
Vapour Explosion ) proximit du train de voyageurs en provenance de Lyon immobilis suite
laccident en aval de lexplosion. La chaleur est telle que de nombreux voyageurs et personnes situs dans le primtre sont gravement brls.
Ds lors, des incendies secondaires apparaissent sur les wagons contenant des produits chimiques
et gnrent des fumes toxiques. Ces manations se propagent sous un vent de secteur WSW de
20km/h. Rapidement les premiers intervenants, des travailleurs de la SNCF prsents sur les lieux et
des riverains circulant proximit, sont victimes de malaises. La raction en chane amorce, provient dune fuite de gaz liqufis toxiques contenus dans des wagons: des vapeurs toxiques se dispersent dans latmosphre. Les produits dverss au sol, dans lenchevtrement de wagons et de
ferraille se mlangent en produisant des ractions exothermiques et en mettant des vapeurs
toxiques et corrosives.
1re phase
Lors de la premire matine, suite lvolution rapide dun accident ferroviaire de transport de
matires dangereuses provoquant un feu important et impliquant de nombreuses victimes, la situation devient rapidement incontrlable pour les premiers intervenants. Les premires actions de
sauvetage et de lutte contre lincendie sont engages. Cet accident majeur occasionnant de trs
nombreuses victimes impose lalerte des populations, la mise en place rapide dun zonage, la monte en puissance des moyens dintervention par lappel de renforts zonaux, nationaux et europens
et lexploitation des conventions avec les industriels et experts pour aider la gestion de crise.
2me phase
Alors que le premier feu est matris et que la monte en puissance des moyens dintervention
sorganise (renforts zonaux, nationaux et europens), des feux secondaires dgradant des wagons
produisent des fumes toxiques. Lensemble des intervenants doivent agir protgs. La population
doit tre rapidement mise labri.
3me phase
Les incendies sont teints et la population est mise labri. Commence un travail didentification
et de rcupration de lensemble des produits contenus dans les diffrents wagons et fts dt75

riores. Lensemble des intervenants europens participe lobturation de fuites sur des wagons de
gaz liqufis. La dcouverte du pouvoir contaminant de certains agents en cause ncessite la mise
en place dune dcontamination de masse pour lensemble des intervenants de la zone.
4me phase
Les oprations de dcontamination des matriels et de restauration des lieux sont entreprises.

76

Accident at a nuclear power plant

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency: INEX 2000, May 2001
http://www.oecd-nea.org/rp/docs/2005/crpph-inex2005-10.pdf
The INEX 2000 exercise took place on 22 - 23 May 2001 based on a French national nuclear
emergency exercise at the French Gravelines nuclear power plant. The power plant is located in the
north of France not far from the Belgian border. This exercise was similar in scope to the INEX 2
command-post exercises and lasted approximately 24 hours.
Location
The Gravelines NPP site contains six units. Units 1 to 4 entered into commercial operation during
1980 1981 and units 5 and 6 in 1985. Each unit is a pressurised water reactor (PWR) of 920
MWe. The core is cooled by 3 loops. Around the site, there are 67500 people living in the 10 km
radius emergency planning zone, including all or part of 14 communities. The site is located on the
sea shore, North of the town of Gravelines. Figures 1 and 2 show the location on two different
scales.
Exercise Scenario
The scenario for the exercise was prepared by Electricit de France (EDF) in collaboration with the
French Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN). The simulated accident occurred at a
fictitious Unit 11 of the Gravelines Site, using Unit 1 for technical references. The initial status
was as follows:

The plant was running at 100% of nominal power;

The containment spray system (EAS) B train was unavailable;
Primary activity (I-131 equivalent) was equal 0.7 GBq/Ton (metric).

The accident process was designed to be a slow one. It included releases beginning about 10 hours
after the initial event. The first event (at 05:00 UTC) would be a small primary leak (1.8 cm in diameter). This event would induce a scram and safety injection.
A series of additional events including loss of feed water in steam generators (+ 1h15min) and a
second major event, loss of high pressure safety injection (+4h) would induce the high probability
of core melting event. Figure 3 summarises graphically, in a schematic way, the events leading to
the accident (see below).
The core would start to become uncovered at 14:50 UTC (+9h50min after the initial event). Ten
minutes later (15:00 UTC) core degradation would begin inducing the initiation of releases. Core
melting was planned to start at 15:20 UTC. The proportion of core melted would be 3% to 5%. The
steady status would be reached by an increase of the initial leak (the size of the leak will grow from
1.8 cm to 10 cm). The release pathway would be the authorised leakage from the reactor containment. The accumulated release activity was expected to be as follows:

Under the prevailing, forecasted weather conditions (5 m/s wind speed, normal diffusion, no rain),
the projected emergency doses (external dose due to plume, deposition and inhalation) to the populations were estimated as presented in Table 1.

77

The European Commission limit for milk contamination of 500 Bq/l was expected to be reached at
about 20 km from the plant under the same weather conditions.
The French Emergency Planning Criteria
The French Emergency Planning defines three emergency planning zones (EPZ). The first zone is
inside a circle of 3 km radius. Within this zone, the population may be requested, by the local authority, to shelter and to listen to the radio in the case of a quickly evolving accident or very early
releases. In such situations, the local authority (the Prefect), is responsible for decisions regarding
the implementation of protective actions. The Prefect did not wait for national support, and activated the off-site emergency response plan on an instructive basis.
The second EPZ is inside a circle of 5 km radius. In this zone evacuation of the population is foreseen if the intervention level of 50 mSv averted dose can be reached.
The remaining EPZ is inside a circle of 10 km radius. This is determined for the purpose of sheltering of the population on the basis of an intervention level of 10 mSv. This EPZ is also used for predistribution of stable iodine to the population. Regarding this protective action, the associated intervention level is 100 mSv to the thyroid.
Events and release during the exercise
During the course of the actual exercise, the core started to be uncovered at 15:45 UTC (+ 11 h
after the initial event). Fifteen minutes later (16:00 UTC) core degradation began inducing the initiation of releases. Core melting started at 16:20 UTC and stopped at 16:30 UTC.
The proportion of core melted was 3%. Safety status was reached by recovering first low pressure
safety injection possibilities then all emergency safety injections systems. A detailed schedule of
events is given in the Annex.
The release pathway was from the reactor containment. The accumulated released activity was as
follows:

Real weather, 22 May 2001

According to information provided by METEO France, the real weather conditions on 22 May
2002 were rather steady and can be summarised as presented in Table 2.

Doses to the public (retrospective calculation)

Based on the actual accumulated released activity and the real weather conditions on 22 May 2001,
the following emergency doses to the populations were retrospectively calculated.

78

Countermeasures taken during the exercise

As the simulated accident at Gravelines developed, the threat from a potential release of radioactive substances led to the decision, at the level of the local authority (the Prefect) to evacuate a
population of 8000 inhabitants downwind of the release in the municipality of Dunkerque:
On 22 May 2001, at 14:15, the Prefecture decided to implement evacuation in a zone located in the
direction of the wind and its 5 km radius. A total of 8000 people were affected including 4500
people of school age in 22 schools and 500 disabled people. At 16:34 the evacuation was nearly
completed and 8000 people evacuated. In addition, 700 people from the neighbouring department
Pas-de-Calais were also evacuated. No other countermeasure had been decided to be implemented.
The stable wind coming from north-east during the entire exercise did not require decisions on
short-term countermeasures in neighbouring countries.
ANNEX: DETAILED TIME LINE OF THE EXERCISE SCENARIO
Plant initial status: 100% of nominal power, end of life core. Containment Spray System (EAS) B
train unavailable and primary activity (I-131 equivalent) = 0.7 GBq/Ton. Failures not detected on
the electrical command at two (out of three) of the pressure release valves and on the valve RRA
021 VP, what implies the impossibility to operate the Residual Heat Removal System.

79

Scenario materials also include detailed maps, tables and schemata.

80

Long-term power failure

Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA): Risk and vulnerability analysis model (RVA
Model) example scenario
http://brs.dk/eng/inspection/contingency_planning/rva_model/Documents/Scenario_example.doc,
see also http://brs.dk/eng/inspection/contingency_planning/rva_model/Pages/rva_model.aspx
Threat scenario no. 1

Title: Long-term power failure

Threat category/
Type of event

Disruption/failure of critical functions Your organisation/area is

hit by the consequences of a very extensive electricity grid
and power station fall out.

Summary of events

There is a power outage in your entire geographic region. As

time passes, more and more emergency power generators fail
because of lack of fuel. Battery-driven back-up systems and
the like fail within hours.

Geographic extent

Regional The power failure affects the entire region, as well

as power supplies between the region and other
regions/countries.

Duration

2 - 7 days The power failure lasts 3 days.

Placement in time

Winter Weekday within normal working hours The power

failure begins on a winter day during normal working hours.

Warning

No warning

Persons/assets at risk

The power failure affects the entire region and immediately

impacts all activities and functions that are dependent on electricity, including heating systems, communication systems, IT
systems, public and private transport modes, petrol stations,
traffic lights, businesses, burglary alarms and much more .

Background
scenario

for

the Incident observed abroad In 2003, USA and Canada were hit
by a long-term power failure that affected 50 million people. In
2003, Italy was hit by a short-term power failure that affected
the entire country. In 2003, Denmark and southern Sweden
were hit by a power failure that lasted approximately 6 hours
because of a technical breakdown in southern Sweden.

Direct causes leading

to the realisation of the
scenario

Natural factors
Intentional human actions
Unintentional human actions
Technical malfunction
Organisational errors
The power outage is a result of a number of almost coinciding
net and power station fall outs. These are caused by a series
of simultaneous faults, which, taken together, eventually lead
to the failure of the electricity grid.
Re-starting the grid is dependent on the re-starting of certain
special power stations that can start up from a dead grid, or
on voltage supply from abroad. Major power station blocks,
windmills, etc. cannot be used before there is electricity in the
grid again.
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Other important infor- The temperature during the 3 affected days is below -5C and
mation about the sce- windy, which significantly increases demand for electricity and
nario
makes repair work difficult. Lack of heating will therefore be
among the potentially most serious consequence of the power
failure. Oil and natural gas fired furnaces will not work. District
heating supply will presumably not function either, because
the pumps in the individual households are driven by
electricity. Measures are thus needed to aid the elderly and
people in poor health. Several schools and day-care centres
will probably choose to close, and many people will be
unwilling to attend work full-time in cold buildings.
Depending on the extent to which emergency power supplies
have been secured, the power failure will also cause
significant problems for food supplies and financial
transactions. This includes production and distribution
facilities, shops and storage houses that require refrigeration
and freezing facilities, and payment facilities such as
supermarket scanners and bank card terminals.
Similarly, extensive transportation problems are to be
expected. Petrol stations and private oil and petrol depots will
generally not work, since pumps require electricity. Traffic
signals will not work, and there may be problems maintaining
certain control room functions.
IT and telecommunications will also be affected to varying
degrees. Many mobile phones will not work after a short time,
and there could be consequences for landline telephony,
master IT systems, broadband, servers, Internet providers,
etc.
The above list of possible consequences is far from
exhaustive.

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Economic scenarios
Global Economic Governance in 2020: The End of Globalization and the Beginning of
the Era of Regionalism
Facing the Challenges: Three Scenarios for Global Economic Governance in 2020
Global Public Policy Institute, Global Governance 2020 program, May 2011
http://www.gg2020.net/fileadmin/media/gg2020/GG2020_2011_econ_facing_the_challenges.pdf
Scenario 2: The End of Globalization and the Beginning of the Era of Regionalism (3 scenarios in total)
The Situation in 2020
In scenario 2, The End of Globalization and the Beginning of the Era of Regionalism, the world
now multipolar is less promising and encompassing than had been hoped for at the beginning of
the decade.
Instead, the second great era of globalization has come to an end. Increasing economic tensions
between the US, China and the EU led to political conflict and the emergence of three distinct regional blocs.
The establishment of three distinct monetary funds epitomizes the new power structures, with the
IMF representing US interests, the Asian Monetary Fund representing Chinese interests and the
European Monetary Fund representing the interests of the EU.
Scenario 2 Timeline

Stages and Triggers

Stage 1: Domestic Pressures Lead to Rise of Protectionism and Negative Economic Spiral
Trigger 1: Bailout of Portugal, Spain and Italy by the EU and Failed Austerity Program in Greece
Efforts by Eurozone countries to impose prudent fiscal policies proved too socially and politically
costly. Implementation of austerity programs slowed dramatically in these countries and led to a
further deterioration of public finances. Portugal, Spain and Italy, following the lead of Greece and
Ireland, moved to request external financial support from both the EU and the IMF. Bond markets
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began to turn on all Eurozone countries because of uncertainty surrounding the survival of the euro
itself. Investor confidence in the European market and its ability to solve internal problems continued to drop sharply. The euro continued to depreciate to almost 1:1 with the US dollar. Antimarket sentiments led to a wave of protectionist measures and an increasingly inward-looking economic policy throughout the union.
Trigger 2: Subsequent Rounds of Quantitative Easing Instigate Currency War
An acerbic political climate in the US prevented a coherent response to the stagnant economic performance of the US. Domestic pressures pushed for autarkic policies aimed at protecting jobs. The
populist pressures pushed the US to enter a vicious circle of economic policies that failed to stimulate growth. With the US turning inwards, other economies began to follow suit. Especially troubling was the active slandering of Chinese economic policy by the US Congress, which led to the
official accusation that China was a currency manipulator. The US and other actors tried to use the
World Trade Organization as a mechanism to galvanize momentum and put pressure on China.
Trade between the two states was severely disrupted. Without low cost Chinese goods to fulfill
American demand and to hold down prices, inflation began to creep into the US domestic market.
Inflation in the US facilitated the weakening of the dollar and further triggered appreciation pressures in other floating currencies. For example, markets like Brazil, Chile and South Africa began
to overheat as new global capital flows moved away from traditional western markets.
Trigger 3: Property Bubble Bursts in China
Hot money from asset investment poured into emerging markets, which in turn fuelled an asset
bubble that exacerbated the already high inflation. Even in countries with a relatively closed capital
account, the pressure was present. For example, faced with fewer investment options, property and
stock markets in the Chinese economy continued to inflate, leading to a bubble. Global market volatility ensued. As a result, the Chinese economy faced a dilemma: keep the undervalued exchange
rate through a peg but have increasing inflationary pressures through imported inflation, or float
the renminbi, with the possibility of economic contraction as the Chinese economy restructures
around domestic demand.
With the traditional fear of economic contraction and vested interests in exporting (despite opposition from the Chinese Central Bank), the government decided to stick to the de facto peg. When
questions about the sustainability of an ex- port model arose due to sluggish demand in the anemic
economies of the West, speculators quickly withdrew their investments, creating a panic much like
that of the late 90s in Southeast and East Asia.
The resulting domestic economic turmoil posed not only an economic challenge to the Chinese
government. It also created an environment of political instability. Many Chinese began to strongly
question the states ability to deliver economic growth through state-run capitalism.
Stage 2: Economic Contraction and Anti-market Sentiment is Not Addressed Through Global Governance Mechanisms
Trigger 4: Fallout of G20 Summit in Mexico Over Currency and Trade War with Doha Round Declared Dead in 2013
Differences in underlying interests meant that the G20 could not reach consensus on how to handle
the new round of crises. Underlying interests included, for example, price stability in Europe, fiscal
expansion and exports in the US, and continued trade surplus in China. The IMF ran out of financial (and political) resources to handle the extensive fallout from Europe. Furthermore, no real
progress was made in reforming the voting rights of the IMF in 2011. The recession continued to
drag along and high unemployment rates introduced populist pressures for higher levels of trade
protectionism. China became an easy target for trade sanctions and non- tariff barriers. Green protectionism became prominent as states began to use green technology investments as a front for
protectionist policies. For example, the US passed a domestic energy bill in 2012 that imposed tariffs on imports that do not meet domestic environmental and safety standards. The measure was
widely perceived as a tool to impose further protectionist measurement on Chinese exports. China
retaliated in the same manner. Trade wars became visible among other major economies as well.
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The WTO was unable to handle the sudden rise in claims and as a result proved to be ineffective as
a means for international mediation.
Furthermore, the Doha Round was declared dead by the leaders of major world economies in 2013.
Global markets became increasingly nervous about longstanding trade conflicts. Cross-continent
foreign direct investment flows and trade levels started to slump even before most protectionist
measures went into effect. Global markets braced for the worst. As it became increasingly clear
that no dispute in the international financial and trade system would be solved at the global level,
the US, China and Europe shifted their focus towards regional solutions to limit the damage to the
real economy.
Stage 3: Disentanglement of the Global Economy, Creation of Regional Trading and Financial
Blocs with Limited International Coordination
Trigger 5: Establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund and European Monetary Fund; Nomination
of an American Managing Director of the IMF
Global markets became increasingly volatile and foreign direct investment flows across continents
plunged due to a lack of global economic coordination and the combative nature of dialogue at the
international level. Anticipating further economic tensions, businesses reduced the complexity of
supply chains and vertically reintegrated their businesses. Stock markets stagnated as profit margins were expected to narrow in the increasingly segmented global marketplace.
Politically, the US and China began to signal further isolation from international processes. The
Chinese political succession originally planned for 2012 became a year-long process because of
slowing economic growth and international engagement. The US, focusing on domestic policy and
rhetoric regarding protectionism and jobs, sent mixed signals to international actors. Suspicion and
distrust between the two countries led to their confrontation on the international stage. Most importantly, China phased out its purchase of US securities and began a concerted effort to tilt its reserves away from the dollar, thus undermining US creditworthiness and exacerbating the already
strained relations.
Trade and currency disputes between the US and China had global repercussions. In order to contain the damage to a broken global economic governance system, and to stabilize regional economic growth, Asian countries deepened their regionalization process by establishing the Asian Monetary Fund. Efforts led by China and the ASEAN states, which had little choice but to align, sought
to provide regional stability amid global turmoil and to limit the influence of US and European
monetary policy on Asian markets. Faced with global insecurity and financial volatility, regional
states increasingly demanded leadership from China. Major Asian economies agreed on a basket of
Asian currencies as the starting point for the Asian Monetary Fund reserves. As Asia became Japans prime export market, Japan felt compelled to participate. The fund provided an outlet to protect the value of the Japanese yen, which had been driven by a global shift away from the US dollar.
In the midst of the global trade regimes deterioration, a 2014 free trade negotiation known as the
Con Dao Round (named after an island in South China Sea) marked the beginning of a renewed
effort to reach a regional free trade zone in Asia. Unsurprisingly, China and Japan had to bear the
greatest cost in establishing Asias monetary fund, but both accepted their respective roles given
the rapidly changing global economic landscape.
With enormous structural and economic challenges, Europe retreated from the global stage to focus on regional issues specific to the EU. As Germany could no longer bear the majority of bailout
costs, once the threat had somewhat stabilized, the European Monetary Fund was finally established in 2015. The funds mandate included regulation of European financial markets, Eurozone
bond issuances and financing packages for European economies under stress.
The establishment of the Asian Monetary Fund and the European Monetary Fund diluted the resources, priorities and commitments of European and Asian member countries to the IMF. The
once prominent international financial institution became an American-led regional financial organization with dollar-denominated assets that primarily served North and South American mar85

kets. To underscore this shift, the managing directorship of the IMF is held by an American and
deputy chiefs are chosen from within the Americas.
Scenario Summary
With the restructuring of the global economic system into three major economic blocks, increased
intra-regional openness took the place of globalization and emerged as the key driver of growth.
As strong regional leaders, the US, the EU and China offer stability and economic prosperity under
their respective umbrella. The WTO no longer serves as an international arbiter of trade as all negotiations are conducted between the three regional blocks. In 2020, intra-regional trade accounts
for over 70% of global trade, with the balance primarily driven by raw material acquisitions. In the
last few years, global markets have become increasingly worried about the lack of global economic
governance and the combative tone at the international level. Foreign direct investment levels between regions have plunged. Multinational enterprises have begun to untangle their web of international involvements and refocus on their home regions. With the expectation of further economic
tensions, businesses have reduced the complexity of production lines and vertically reintegrated
themselves. Stock markets around the world have begun to lose value as margins become tighter in
the face of less efficient production models. The new multi-polar global economy is characterized
by suspicion and mistrust, key ingredients of volatile markets.

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The World Economy and Economic Development on the African Continent in 2030
Building Long-Term Scenarios for Development: The Methodological State of the Art with an Application to Foreign Direct Investment in Africa
German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn 2008
http://www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3.nsf/%28ynDK_contentByKey%29/ANES7MFE2L/$FILE/Studies%2040.2008.pdf
Scenario: Weathering the storm
Thirty years ago, globalization was the buzzword that launched a thousand publications. The
term described the changing quality of the world economy, which was characterized by the expansion of trade and investment flows, the acceleration of technological change, the ready diffusion of
information, and an unprecedented level of interdependence among national economies. Globalization was not always considered in positive terms. For some, it was thought to be propelled forward
by private corporations that benefited disproportionately from these economic integration
processes in relation to workers and other disadvantaged populations. Others pointed to negative
aspects of the increased facility of cross-border movements and technological diffusion such as the
rise in human trafficking and the growth of terror networks and transnational crime syndicates.
Whatever the assessment of globalization, there were few academic authors or journalists who
doubted that the acceleration of economic integration that had been taking place would continue in
the coming decades. Developments in the world economy in the last two decades have not vindicated that assumption. While the global economy today still bears the marks of that period of accelerated market integration, globalization has now lost its momentum. The economic downturn in
much of the world has reinforced the national dimensions of economic organization and highlighted the differential capacities of states to respond to major economic challenges.
Though the waters of the global economy have been choppy over the last twenty years, African
economies that one might have expected to be the most vulnerable to the global economic downturn have navigated these waters remarkably well. While declining external finance from private
and public sources depressed their opportunities for growth, the domestic reform processes that
produced a favourable climate for productive investment and promised more widely distributed
economic opportunities provided a basis for political stability that laid a foundation for growth in
the absence of ideal international economic conditions.
20102015
Africa was receiving a healthy amount of good press around 2010. Major international organizations bestowed praise on leaders across the continent for their continuing efforts to maintain solid
macroeconomic fundamentals. The agenda of the New Partnership for Africas Development (NEPAD), which promoted strengthened intra-regional trade ties, improved governance, and enhanced
cooperation on security issues among other goals, enjoyed widespread support from African leaders, who viewed cooperation on a regional level as the main vehicle for graduating from their marginalized position in the world economy.
The emphasis that African leaders placed on improving their physical and governmental infrastructures produced clear short-term gains. Sensing potential in a growing market, multinational firms
in the natural resources sec- tor increasingly diversified their activities on the continent and invested growing sums in processing activities in particular. A shortage of skilled labour meant that
investment in manufacturing was still growing only slowly, however Asian firms were expanding
their presence in the manufacturing sector as well as in the primary sector. These manufacturing
investments had a perceptible influence on climbing employment figures in a number of Southern
and Western African countries in particular.
20152020
In September 2015, an impressive gathering of world leaders convened in New York to commemorate the Millennium Summit that had been held fifteen years earlier. The tone of the 2015 summit
was more subdued than the tone of the meeting in 2000: the failure of the international community
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to reach the lofty goals set out then seemed to have scaled back expectations among many participants. Yet the gathering did provide an opportunity to highlight some emerging development success stories. The diversification of sources of development finance was regarded as one of the
more important changes in the global development landscape, and India and China were praised
for the contributions that they had made to development in Southern and Eastern Africa in particular through their increased aid funding and investment promotion policies.
The world economy had seen its share of ups and downs in the lead up to 2015, but increased regulation of financial institutions in the United States and in other OECD countries along with other
government measures to strengthen domestic markets seemed to have contributed to lowered economic vulnerability in many of the worlds leading economies.
If domestic economic policy choices had placed the US and other industrialized countries on a
sound footing, however, few countries were prepared for the coming global shock that resulted
from the stumbling Chinese economy. Growth in China had been a major engine of global growth.
Its factories produced cheap imports for consumers across the world and its large open internal
market was an enticing destination for many exporters. Its steady demand for the natural resources
that fed its factories had also ensured persistently high commodities prices. Perhaps because of
these economic virtues, underlying political problems in China were overlooked by many economic analysts. Chinas mounting internal challenges were nevertheless significant. Key sources of
tension included the countrys growing surplus of men, mounting environmental problems, and
widening inequalities between coastal regions and the interior. In 2017, a spate of revelations about
the contamination of major water supplies spawned protests across the country. The governments
efforts to suppress these protests only angered the demonstrators further, however. Demonstrations
continued to multiply and spread beyond environmental issues to take up questions of economic
justice and political expression. The Chinese state faced a major threat to continued internal cohesion.
The Chinese motor of world growth did not grind to a complete halt, but its internal difficulties did
lead to a significant drop in output and declining consumption. This had a ripple effect on other
economies, including the United States, which stood to lose thousands of export-related jobs as a
result. It also had ripple effects on African economies. The drop in commodities prices that resulted from depressed demand in China was regarded as a major setback to key commodity exporters on the continent. Many observers of the business environment in African countries also began
to question how the growing crisis would affect the activities of the state- owned firms that had
established operations in the region.
20202030
By the beginning of the 20s, the braking effect that the Chinese slowdown had had on the rest of
the world economy became increasingly evident. While vulnerable commodity-dependent countries in Africa had been adversely affected by the economic downturn, the early response of OECD
countries to the downturn seemed to close off other opportunities for generating trade and investment that would offset declining trade with China.
OECD governments faced populist pressures to impose new protectionist measures, while firms
headquartered there responded to the reversal of fortune in China by trying to limit their exposure
to risk internationally. In many corporate boardrooms, refocusing operations in OECD countries
became a high priority. Yet for many manufacturing firms, shifting production back to putatively
safer OECD countries did not seem like a viable option: not only were the labour costs too great
but the firms also recognized that they would be competing for a share of a shrinking labour pool.
The silver lining of the Chinese downturn for African economies thus seemed to be the increasing
attention paid by European manufacturing multinationals in the region.
These multinationals were attracted not only by low labour costs but by the stable political footing
that African economies were built on. The continental initiatives such as NEPAD had not only
proven their worth in establishing better framework conditions for foreign investors; they also
served as important forums for exchanging ideas about how to stave off rising internal tensions in a
continent marked by its ethnic diversity and growing rural-urban cleavages. In that context, some
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observers pointed to the mixed blessing that the new inflows of investment in manufacturing might
bring due to the increased concentration of wealth in key coastal areas, but emerging initiatives
such as an effort to stimulate regional agricultural trade suggested that African leaders were actively anticipating these potential negative outcomes and working to prevent them from materializing.
While global investment flows had dropped in the aftermath of the Chinese crisis, the effect of
these developments within Africa was to allow the continent to attract an increasing share of global
investment. In the face of global economic turbulence, Africa seemed to be weathering the storm
better than expected.

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